PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27 and 49

(79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING THERETO

PART 16

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 88 THROUGH 110

Printed for the use of the
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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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2	401– 982	1059– 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
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4	1585–2063	4195– 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065–2492	5461– 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493–2920	6647– 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921–3378	7889– 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379–3927	9108–10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929–4599	10518–12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601–5151	12278–13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153–5560	13709–14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31. 1946.

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2	24 11–15–45	254	Selection of intercepted messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between Dec. 2, 1940, and Dec. 8, 1941, concerning military installations, ships movements, espionage reports, etc.
3	87 11–16–45	317	Navy Department dispatch No. 252203 dated Nov. 25, 1941, directing the routing of trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits.
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7	172 11–17–45	391	Photostatic copy of Opana Radar Detector Station plot, submitted by Senator Ferguson, identified by Admiral Inglis, previously marked "Exhibit 3–B in evidence" in proceedings before Army Pearl Harbor Board.
8	233 11–19–45	391	Material obtained by Army and Navy primarily from Japanese sources, relating to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
8–A	1792 12–18–45	413	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8–B	1792 12–18–45	415	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8–C	1792 12–18–45	424	Report dated Dec. 4, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
8–D	2480 1–5–46	425	Report dated Dec. 13, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
9	256 11–19–45	923	Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
10	279 11–20–45	1000	Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.
11	319 11–21–45	1006	Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.
12	363 11–21–45	1013	Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.
13	387 11–21–45	1019	Study of the air situation in Hawaii dated Aug. 20, 1941, by Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
14	397 11–21–45	1040	Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, entitled "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor" in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject (see exhibit No. 10), enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security).
15	401 11–23–45	1042	Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941, Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941, which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United States.

16	401 11-23-45	1061	(a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (b) Minutes of The Joint Board for Nov. 3, 1941; (c) Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Gerow.
16-A	3839 2-6-46	1077	Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
16-B	4341 2-13-46	1081	Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through the Department of State.
17	402 11-23-45	1083	Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.
18	402 11-23-45	1084	Documents relating to proposed "*Modus Vivendi*," including Secretary Hull's recommendation dated Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit).
19	402 11-23-45	1201	Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan.
20	402 11-23-45	1226	Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents, including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941.
21	402 11-23-45	1246	Two dispatches dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memorandum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21, 1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941. All documents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the Far East.
22	458 11-23-45	1252	(a) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government; (b) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 160115; (c) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President and British Prime Minister.
22-A	1694 12-15-45 2065 12-31-45	1262	Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 ((c) above), of proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Sumner Welles. (See p. 556, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of statement made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
22-B	1783 12-18-45	1269	Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells of his conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning proposed parallel action with reference to Japan.
22-C	1783 12-18-45	1275	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Welles, of conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, attended by Welles, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry Hopkins concerning "British-American Cooperation".
22-D	1783 12-18-45	1292	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of conversation between Sumner Welles and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning "British-American Cooperation" at the Atlantic Conference, and Welles' subsequent conversation with the President.
23	476 11-24-45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
24	476 11-24-45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
25	574 11-26-45	1301	Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, reporting reaction in Japan to the Secretary's proposal of Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note). See pp. 766 to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, for proposal dated Nov. 26, 1941, to the Japanese Government.
26	634 11-27-45	1303	Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State concerning general policy toward Japan (so-called "green light" dispatch).
27	670 11-27-45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction (pamphlet edition, 1942), Department of State Publication 1853.
28	670 11-27-45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction and Documents (cloth edition, 1943), Department of State Publication 1983.
29	670 11-27-45	1315	"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941", vols. I and II (1943). Department of State Publication 2008.
30	670 11-27-45	1315	"Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew, Simon and Schuster (1944).

31	737 11-28-45	1316	Six dispatches bearing various dates from April 4 to Dec. 2, 1941, from United States diplomatic officials in foreign countries reporting to the Department of State inquiries and comments of Japanese representatives in those countries concerning possible break in United States-Japanese relations.
32	778 11-29-45	1326	Selection of messages between War Department and Hawaiian Department from July 8 to Dec. 7, 1941. Included are certain messages sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur in the Philippines, and to Commanding General, Panama, as well as their replies. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33	778 11-29-45	1334	Selection of Military Intelligence Estimates prepared by G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., covering period July 7 to Dec. 6, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33-A	2092 12-31-45	1385	Secretary of War's copy of memorandum, dated Oct. 2, 1941, from Col. Hayes A. Kroner to the Chief of Staff, concerning "Japanese-American Relations", bearing note in handwriting of Secretary Stimson.
34	825 11-30-45	1389	Memorandum, dated Oct. 18, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for Chief of Staff, concerning "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet" and proposed message to Army outpost commanders.
35	828 11-30-45	1390	Memorandum, dated Jan. 31, 1942, prepared by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, concerning "Warnings Sent to Hawaii Prior to Dec. 7, 1941", with enclosures.
36	830 11-30-45	1393	Photostatic copy of draft of General Marshall's message of Nov. 27, 1941, to General Short, containing phrase "hostile action possible at any moment", which draft contains a sentence that did not appear in the message as transmitted to General Short. (See Exhibit No. 32 for message sent.)
37	839 11-30-45	1395	Selection of dispatches sent and received by the Navy Department entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
38	841 11-30-45	1409	Paraphrase of message, dated Dec. 3, 1941, from General Miles to Military Attaché, Tokyo, concerning the handling of his codes and secret documents.
39	928 12-4-45	1409	Memoranda for the record on events of Dec. 7, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff; Col. W. B. Smith, Secretary, General Staff; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Col. J. R. Deane, Secretary, General Staff.
40	954 12-4-45	1412	Dispatch, dated Dec. 7, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV (Ø7Ø645) concerning report of promised armed support to British under certain conditions.
41	988 12-5-45	1413	Information from documentary evidence on interception, decoding, and translating of Japanese messages Nos. 901, 902, 907, 910 (so-called pilot message, 14 part message, 1 o'clock delivery message, and code destruction message).

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
42	990 12–5–45	1416	Copy of Army Regulation No. 10–15, dated Aug. 18, 1936, with amendments up to Dec. 7, 1941, entitled "General Staff—Organization and Duties".
43	997 12–5–45	1422	Instructions dated Jan. 27, 1941, of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff concerning staff conversations to be held with representatives of British Commonwealth.
44	1001 12–5–45	1423	Compilation entitled "Copies of Defense Plans", which contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans, to illustrate defensive measures contemplated against air attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
45	1019 12–5–45	1471	Memorandum, dated Nov. 27, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Far Eastern Situation" and warning messages to outpost commanders.
46	1027 12–5–45	1472	Photostatic copies of replies by General MacArthur and General Short to warning messages of Nov. 27, 1941, with routing slip.
47	1041 12–5–45	1476	Supplementary documents concerning the Nov. 5, 1941 Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President (see Exhibit No. 16), including dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from Ambassador Gauss to State Department; message dated Nov. 2, 1941, from Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt; memorandum for Director of Naval Intelligence concerning "Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 3Ø085Ø"; dispatch 3Ø085Ø from Alusna, Chungking, to OPNAV dated Oct. 30, 1941, and another same date, same correspondents; message dated Oct. 28, 1941, from General Magruder, Chungking, to War Department.
48	1044 12–5–45	1481	Two memoranda dated Nov. 17, 1941, by Brig. General Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers", and letter dated Dec. 20, 1941, to Gen. Delos C. Emmons, from General Marshall, concerning unity of command in Hawaii.
48–A	2093 12–31–45	1484	Memorandum, dated Dec. 5, 1941, from General Marshall for General Gerow, concerning coordination of command.
49	1053 12–6–45	1485	Report dated Mar. 27, 1941, of United States-British Staff conversations (ABC–1).
50	1053 12–6–45	1551	Report of American-Dutch-British Staff conversations at Singapore, dated Apr. 27, 1941 (A. D. B.).

51	1053 12-6-45	1585	Report entitled "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2" (ABC-22).
52	1053 12-6-45	1593	Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, concerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
53	1063 12-6-45	1600	Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
54	1067 12-6-45	1627	"Notes on General Council Meeting", Feb. 19, 1941, concerning "Defense Objectives" (revised Feb. 13, 1941).
55	1067 12-6-45	1628	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff", on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of Pearl Harbor was discussed.
56	1076 12-6-45	1630	Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department" by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff.
57	1077 12-6-45	1631	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941", concerning use of planes in proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B-17 bombers that were not dispatched to Hawaii.
58	1088 12-6-45	1632	List of President's appointments with military representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6, 1941; list of President's appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
59	1092 12-6-45	1635	General Marshall's aide memoire to the President concerning "Defense of Hawaii".
60	1094 12-6-45	1636	General Marshall's memorandum for the President concerning "Ground Forces".
61	1112 12-7-45	1640	Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders.
62	1284 12-10-45	1641	Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed.
63	1345 12-11-45	1644	Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General in connection therewith.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
64	1544 12–13–45	1645	Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941.
65	1541 12–13–45	1677	Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated.
66	1642 12–15–45	1680	Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (Ø61255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, by R. E. Schuirmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters.
67	1642 12–15–45	1682	Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President's return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called "parallel action message").
68	1675 12–15–45	1689	Log of U. S. S. *Boise* for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship on certain dates.
69	1677 12–15–45	1715	Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941.
70	1695 12–15–45	1716	Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the President's statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941.
71	1696 12–15–45	1719	Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract from radio address of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese policies.
72	1696 12–15–45	1721	Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassador's reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand; digest of Secretary of State's news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand.
73	1700 12–15–45	1727	Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of State Department on the matter. No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the Konoye cabinet in Japan).

74	1703 12–15–45	1735	Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern offices, advising American citizens to leave the Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 19, 1941.
74–A	2768 1–19–46	1741	Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hostilities.
75	1705 12–15–45	1744	Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining the delivery of the so-called "Ten Point Note" on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note.
76	1709 11–15–45	1754	Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State Minister Meissner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945.
77	1712 12–15–45	1757	Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy, Peiping, China, to State Department presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12, 1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called "green light" dispatch.
78	1724 12–17–45	1768	Navy dispatches concerning "Kra Peninsula Alert (1941)". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
79	1724 12–17–45	1770	Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
80	1724 12–17–45	1774	Office of Naval Intelligence "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations" dated Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, 1941.
81	1724 12–17–45	1837	Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6, 1941.
82	1728 12–17–45	1864	Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP–16).
83	1754 12–17–45	1866	Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (ø31850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPAC, COM 14, and COM 16, advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts to destroy most of their codes and secret documents.
84	1775 12–17–45	1867	Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo (so-called "Mori telephone call").

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
85	1799 12-18-45	1870	Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through Dec. 3, 1941.
86	1825 12-18-45	1901	Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas.
87	1889 12-19-45	1907	Memorandum, dated Dec. 15, 1945, prepared by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, concerning "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940", with attached documents referred to therein.
88	1912 12-19-45	1937	Sections of document "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, Oct. 23, 1940", concerning duties of "War Plans Division (OP-12)".
89	1938 12-20-45	1937	Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy "For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii".
90	2066 12-31-45	1941	Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories, and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies.
91	2067 12-31-45	1950	Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers and records after outbreak of hostilities.
92	2068 12-31-45	1960	Photostatic copy of pp. 591 to 618, vol. 377, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, containing statement by Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on Jan. 27, 1942.
93	2075 12-31-45	1974	Photostatic copy of p. 2, G-2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941.
94	2078 12-31-45	1975	3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, transmitting the so-called "Ten Point Note" which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull on that date.
95	2091 12-31-45	1987	Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark.

96	2091 12-31-45	1989	Memorandum dated July 16, 1940, and study "Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and certain problems of United States Far Eastern Policy, July 4, 1940", attributed to Stanley K. Hornbeck.
97	2091 12-31-45	2007	Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, concerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda.
98	2093 12-31-45	2014	Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stimson for the President concerning "Japanese Convoy Movement Toward Indo-China".
99	2094 12-31-45	2015	Memorandum dated Sept. 26, 1944, prepared by J. W. Ballantine and M. M. Hamilton, relating their recollection of the delivery of intercepted Japanese messages to Secretary Hull's office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941.
100	2095 12-31-45	2016	Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning "Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay".
101	2095 12-31-45	2023	Log of U. S. S. *Enterprise* from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive.
102	2095 12-31-45	2107	Log of U. S. S. *Lexington* from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
103	2095 12-31-45	2118	"Report of Action With Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941", by Commander, *Enterprise* Air Group to his Commanding Officer, dated Dec. 15, 1941.
104	2095 12-31-45	2122	"U. S. S. *Lexington* War Diary" for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive.
105	2096 12-31-45	2140	Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941.
106	2096 12-31-45	2144	Compilation of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral H. E. Kimmel from Jan. 13 to Dec. 12, 1941.
107	2349 1-4-46	2258	"Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Pearl Harbor Investigations", prepared by Navy Department. It contains endorsements by Secretary James Forrestal, Judge Advocate General, Admiral T. L. Gatch, and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, to the Hewitt Report, and endorsements by the same officials to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry's Findings of Fact.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
107–A	2479 1–5–46	2393	"The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy", including the Fourth Endorsement by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel.
108	2364 1–4–46	2432	Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28, 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", described by him as "a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation".
109	2476 1–5–46	2444	Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941.
110	2477 1–5–46	2444	Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8, 1941.
111	2495 1–15–46	2457	Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence and memoranda.
112	2496 1–15–46	2458	Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
113	2558 1–16–46	2502	Letter, dated Aug. 13, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders, concerning Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, and attached Employment Schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3.
113–A	2807 1–19–46	2532	Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning "Battle Organization and Condition Watches".
113–B	2807 1–19–46	2534	Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL–41, dated Oct. 31, 1941, concerning "Task Forces—Organization and Missions".
113–C	3449 1–31–46	2538	(*a*) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL–41, together with documents which approve same; (*b*) Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing 2 (December 1941).

114	2558 1-16-46	2568	WPPac-46, and letters from Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 25, 1941, promulgating WPPac-46, which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow 5).
115	2558 1-16-46	2601	Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (*a*) Fourteenth Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941; (*b*) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (*c*) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
115-A	3449 1-31-46	2672	Fourteenth Naval District "Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force".
115-B	3450 1-31-46	2677	Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, dated Nov. 27, 1941.
116	2558 1-16-46	2700	Selection of correspondence of Admiral H. R. Stark, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, and others from Feb. 11, 1941, to Oct. 3, 1941, concerning anti-torpedo baffles for protection of ships in harbor against torpedo plane attacks.
117	2559 1-16-46	2707	Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.
117-A	5015 2-20-46	2713	Letter dated Feb. 17, 1941, concerning "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," from Gen. W. C. Short to his Commanders.
118	2559 1-16-46	2714	Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled "Steps to be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours".
119	2559 1-16-46	2716	Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
120	2559 1-16-46	2721	(*a*) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning "Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941"; (*b*) Compilation of dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (*c*) Report of Army-Navy Board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas, Hawaiian area.
121	2561 1-16-46	2727	Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters.
122	2588 1-16-46	2735	Selected correspondence in June and August 1941 of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and Gen. W. C. Short concerning aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.

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Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
123	2588 1-16-46	2736	Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942.
123-A	5015 2-20-46	2743	Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.)
124	2674 1-17-46	2749	Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29, 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1.
125	2678 1-17-46	2801	Log of the *U. S. S. Wright* from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941.
126	2767 1-19-46	2832	(*a*) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (*b*) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (*c*) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.
127	2768 1-19-46	2867	Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7, 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same subject.)
128	2768 1-19-46	2870	Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii, recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941.
129	2842 1-19-46	2875	Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R. Stark promulgating the plan.
130	2879 1-21-46	2941	Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese and United States air reconnaissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government protesting reported flight of United States planes over Tiawan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's reply to Ambassador Grew.
131	2892 1-21-46	2943	Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army Pearl Harbor Board.

132	2917 1-21-46	2943	Selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 7874–7877, Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Memorandum "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (b) Memorandum "Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941."
132–A	5137 2-20-46	2946	Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 13662–13665 Joint Committee Trarscript): (*a*) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881, 941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (*b*) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug. 19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and Vice-Minister Aman; (*c*) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a peace settlement between Japan and China; (*d*) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the progress of Japanese-American negotiations.
133	2965 1-23-46	2953	Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request. Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Commission and Army Pearl Harbor Board.
134	2965 1-23-46	3124	Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population characteristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee.
135	2965 1-23-46	3171	Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning messages of Nov. 27–28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages.
136	2966 1-23-46	3187	Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War.
137	2966 1-23-46	3187	Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material.
138	2976 1-23-46	3195	Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen. F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii". (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 13.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
139	3006 1-23-46	3196	Two reports dated Oct. 17 and 25, 1941, entitled "G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation" by Lt. Col. G. W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department.
140	3188 1-26-46	3203	Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate General, and related material.
141	3311 1-28-46	3254	File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It".
142	3324 1-29-46	3302	Compilation of Material Relating to so-called "Winds" code. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
142-A	3324 1-29-46	3318	(*a*) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese Weather Broadcast; (*b*) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
142-B	3674 2-4-46	3321	Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.
142-C	3741 2-5-46	3322	Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three messages, two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called "winds" messages, indicating no interception by the British or Dutch Governments of a "winds execute" message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.
142-D	3780 2-5-46	3323	Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called "winds" code.
143	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22 through 25.)
144	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. 26.)
145	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339. 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 27 through 31.)

146	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.)
147	3929 2-7-47	3332	Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U. S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.)
148	3929 2-7-46	3332	Report of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, A. U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.)
149	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)
150	4083 2-8-46	3333	Letter dated Mar. 18, 1944, from Admiral H. E. Kimmel, retired, to Admiral W. E. Halsey, suggesting questions for Comdr. A. D. Kramer concerning the so-called "winds" message.
151	4421 2-13-46	3335	Six memoranda prepared by Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in connection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese messages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
152	4794 2-18-46	3351	Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, "General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941", prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.
153	5009 2-19-46	3353	Prepared statement dated Dec. 1, 1945 entitled "The War Record of Civilian and Industrial Hawaii", with attached Exhibits, submitted to the Joint Committee by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.
154	5013 2-20-46	3430	Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. L. Martin from Aug. 15 to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
155	5068 2-20-46	3435	Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941.
156	5122 2-20-46	3436	Memorandum dated June 21, 1941 prepared by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning "Final Recommendations Far Eastern Intelligence Organization".
157	5201 4-11-46	3441	Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
158	5201 4–11–46	3441	Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
159	5201 4–11–46	3488	Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
160	5240 4–11–46	3502	Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.
161	5241 4–11–46	3508	Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)
161–A	5464 5–23–46	3520	Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.
162	5269 4–11–46	3534	Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.
162–A	5464 5–23–46	3543	Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.
163	5292 4–11–46	3557	Log of the U. S. S. *Helena* from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.
164	5292 4–11–46	3593	Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
165	5292 4–11–46	3643	Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.
166	5468 5–23–46	3648	State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)

167	5468 5-23-46	3652	(*a*) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (*b*) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 26, 1941, relating to the delivery of (*a*); (*c*) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery and text of (*a*); and (*d*) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (*a*) and general Far East matters.
168	5468 5-23-46	3666	Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed *modus vivendi*, which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
169	5469 5-23-46	3696	Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
170	5469 5-23-46	3789	Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.
171	5469 5-23-46	3942	Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
172	5469 5-23-46	3978	Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and antiaircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.
173	5469 5-23-46	3985	Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.
174	5469 5-23-46	4030	Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
175	5470 5-23-46	4115	Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President.
176	5470 5-23-46	4121	Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
177	5470 5-23-46	4132	Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
178	5470 5–23–46	4209	Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
179	5470 5–23–46	4241	Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.
180	5471 5–23–46	4551	Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
181	5520 5–23–46	4565	The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.
182	5537 5–23–46	4702	Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G–2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.
183	5468 5–23–46	4766	Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the *Utah* by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940–45 production of B–17 4-engine bombers.

EXHIBIT NO. 88

WAR PLANS DIVISION (OP 12)

12-1. *Duties:*
(a) *Policy and Projects Section:*
(1) Development of policies and projects in support of war plans.
(2) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of current plans for joint action of the Army and Navy, and in the solution of current problems.
(3) Collaboration with other Government departments on policies and projects affecting national defense.
(4) Study of subjects referred to the War Plans Division by the Chief of Naval Operations.
(5) Action in advisory capacity in current administrative matters referred to the War Plans Division.
(b) *Plans Section:*
(1) Direction of war planning.
(2) Preparation of designated war plans.
(3) Review of Operating Plans and Principal Contributory Plans.
(4) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of Joint Basic War Plans.
(5) Collaboration with other Government departments on plans affecting national defense.

12-2. The Director of the War Plans Division is a member of the Joint Board (General Order No. 7).

12-3. The War Plans Division has membership on the following committees:

Joint Board.
Joint Planning Committee.
Joint Aeronautical Board.
Joint Air Advisory Committee.
Shore Station Development Board.

12-4. The War Plans Division is nonadministrative.

EXHIBIT NO. 89

RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK IN HAWAII

[1] 1. The broad responsibilities of the Army and Navy in Hawaii were contained in Army and Navy war plans prepared and issued to the Army and Navy Commanders in Hawaii. These responsibilities were expressed in the various plans in terms of joint missions and separate Army and Navy missions. With the exception as indicated below, these missions are stated identically in all war plans current in 1941 as follows:

JOINT MISSION

To hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval Base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

NAVY MISSION

To patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

ARMY MISSION

To hold Oahu against attack by land, sea and air forces and against hostile sympathizers; to support the Naval forces.

2. In the most recent plan the phrase in the Army Mission "to support the Naval Forces" was deleted and the following was substituted; "Support Naval Forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases."

[2] 3. It should be noted that in all cases the missions called for mutual support.

4. Based on these broad missions the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Navy Commander in Hawaii agreed to accept certain responsibilities for defense against air attack. These agreements are to be found in the various local joint plans and the separate plans of the Army and Navy in Hawaii. The basic current plans in Hawaii on Dec. 7, 1941 were: The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 1941, and the Army and Navy Operations Orders and agreements based thereon. These plans and agreements contain the following major provisions pertaining to defense against air attack:

(a) *Antiaircraft Defense*

Responsibility	Provisions	Source
ARMY	(1) "Shall provide for: *a.* The * * * antiaircraft defense of OAHU"	Par 17, Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 1941
	(2) Army Antiaircraft, "supported by Naval Units placed under the tactical control of the Army, will operate to defend Oahu from attacks by hostile aircraft."	Par 2, FO No. 1 NS (Naval Security) Hq. Hawaiian Dept.
	[3]	
	(3) The Army, "Arrange for such coordination of the antiaircraft artillery fire of naval ships in PEARL HARBOR and the Army antiaircraft defense as may be practicable."	Par. 3*b* (3), FO No. 1 NS (Naval Security)
NAVY	"The Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District * * * are taking certain security measures, which include:	Par. 1*b* FO No 1 NS (Navy Security) Hq. Hawaiian Dept.
	* * *	
	(d) The organization of four air defense groups for the control and distribution of the antiaircraft fire of all ships anchored in Pearl Harbor."	
	* * *	
	"In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense."	Par. 3*g*. (2) (6) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2 CL-41.
	* * *	
	[4]	
	"The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District * * * shall; (a) exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack. (b) Arrange with the Army to have their antiaircraft guns emplaced."	
	* * *	
	(d) Coordinate Fleet antiaircraft fire with the base defense."	

Conclusion: The orders and agreements on the part of the local Army and Navy Commanders lead to the conclusion that primary responsibility for antiaircraft defense rested with the Army but that the Navy had a secondary responsibility in conection therewith.

(b) *Aircraft Warning Service*

Responsibility	Provisions	Source
Army	(1) The Army "shall provide for: * * * *b*. "An antiaircraft * * * intelligence and warning service."	Par 17, Joint Coastal Frontier Def. Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 1941.
Navy	"During the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of RADAR, and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable."	Par. 11, Annex VII Joint Coastal Frontier Def. Plan Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

Conclusion: The Army had primary responsibility for the establishment of an aircraft warning service. The Navy, however, agreed to furnish such means as it had, pending the installation of the Army facilities then under construction.

(c) *Aircraft*

(RECONNAISSANCE PHASE)

Responsibility	Provisions	Source
Army	(1) "Shall provide for: * * *	
	Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the Oahu DCA in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol."	Par. 17, Joint Coastal Frontier Def. Plan HCF.
Navy	(1) Navy "shall provide for: *a*. An inshore patrol. *b*. An offshore patrol * * * *i*. Distant reconnaissance."	Par. 18, Joint Coastal Frontier Def. HCF.
	(2) "When naval forces are insufficient for long distant patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations."	Par. 2*c*, Annex VII, Joint Coastal Frontier Def. HCF.
[6]	(DEFENSIVE AIR)	
Army	"b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army."	Par. 2*b*. Annex VII Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan
Navy	(1) "Each commander will * * * make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant."	Par 2 Annex VII
	(2) "With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable."	Par 2*b*. Annex VII
	(OFFENSIVE AIR)	
Army	"*g*. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea within range of Army bombers."	Par 17*g*. Joint Coastal Frontier Def. Plan
Navy	(1) "Shall provide for * * * *j*. Attacking enemy Naval Forces."	Par 18, Joint Coastal Frontier Def. Plan. Par 2*a* Annex VII
	(2) "Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy."	

[7] *Conclusion:* The Navy was primarily responsible for close and distant aerial reconnaissance and offensive air operations against hostile surface craft. The army was primarily responsible for defensive air operations. Regardless of the service primarily responsible, the opposite service was charged with supporting the operation within the means available to it.

To summarize, it will be seen from the above analysis that:

(a) Definite plans and agreements existed in Hawaii for defense against aircraft;

(b) Although the Army had the primary responsibility for antiaircraft defense, aircraft warning service and defensive air operations and the Navy had the primary responsibility for close and distant reconnaissance, and offensive air operations, each service was charged with augmenting the forces of the other with the means available to them in order to provide the maximum effective defense.

EXHIBIT NO. 90

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

PLAIN

Washington,

124.94
124.93/94
124.90/93

December 18, 1941

Department

AMERICAN LEGATION

BERN

329

AMERICAN INTERESTS.

Please express to Swiss Government this Government's appreciation of its message expressing willingness to undertake the representation of American interests in Japanese-occupied territories and, when necessary, in other regions of the Far East.

Department would be grateful if Swiss Government would by telegraph circularize to its representatives in the Far East, for the information of such American diplomatic or consular offices as may by reason of the present situation find it impossible to carry on their functions or to communicate with the Department, the following message (in substance already communicated to Embassy Chungking, which endeavored without [repeat without] success to repeat it to the offices concerned):

QUOTE One. In the event of a sudden emergency, when communications with the Department are broken

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

TELEGRAM SENT

PARTAIR

PLAIN

Department of State

Washington.

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Full rate
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Charge Department:
Full rate
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TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Department of State

-3-

Washington,

is charged), the expenditure herein [illegible] authorized shall be [illegible] no. 11-1942 and officers [illegible] draw [illegible] drafts and render [illegible] accounts. [illegible] in this paragraph shall be [illegible] the Japanese Government [illegible], recognizes in intern[illegible], [illegible] for such official [illegible] transportation from their posts to [illegible] point beyond [illegible] frontiers, and the provisions of this [illegible] are not (repeat not) [illegible] tion [illegible] occupied or controlled by [illegible] Japanese Government fail[illegible] obligation.

Three. At the expiration [illegible] leave, less any leave [illegible] calendar year, the services [illegible] should be terminated [illegible] provided in numbered [illegible].

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

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TELEGRAM SENT

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TELEGRAM SENT

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TELEGRAM SENT

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Department of State

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[redacted] the Far East [redacted]

[redacted]

EXHIBIT NO. 91

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, December 15, 1941.

SUBJECT: DESTRUCTION OF CODES, CIPHERS AND CIPHER DEVICES.

124.946/147

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith for the 1/ Division of Communications and Records a list of the codes, ciphers and cipher devices which were burned or destroyed under standing instructions on December 8, 1941 on the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan. This list comprises all the

codes

codes, ciphers, cipher devices and other material pertaining to codes in possession of the Embassy. As provided by regulation, this statement is signed by the two officers in whose presence they were burned. The true readings of all telegrams in confidential codes were likewise burned on December 8, 1941 in the presence of the same two officers.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew.

Enclosures:

1/ List of codes, ciphers and cipher devices.

110.2

CEB:gch

Original and two copies to Department.

The following [illegible] list of all [illegible] in the [illegible] of the American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, which were [illegible] under security instructions, in [illegible] undersigned officers on December , 19[illegible].

We, the undersigned officers of the American Embassy at Tokyo, Japan, hereby certify that the codes, ciphers, and other secret material were burned or destroyed as indicated [illegible] on December , 19[illegible].

Charles E. Bohlen
Charles E. Bohlen
Second Secretary

[illegible]
Third Secretary

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, December 15, 1941.

SUBJECT: DESTRUCTION OF A-1 CIPHER MACHINE AND CODES AT CONSULATE AT KOBE, JAPAN, AND CONSULATE GENERAL AT SEOUL, CHOSEN.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Noted 11/6/42 file J.V.

Noted 12/20/42 DAJ

Filed 11/20/42

119.255

119.255/3438

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that just prior to the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan the Embassy received, by pouch from the Department, two registered sealed envelopes addressed to the American Consulate



[illegible]

[illegible], December , 1941.

[illegible] officers, certify that the

[illegible] were under standin[illegible]

[illegible].

[illegible]

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 6013 Tokyo, February 16, 1949

SUBJECT: DESTRUCTION OF REPORTING SECTION'S FILES

124.946/145

The Honorable

Secretary of State

Washington

Sir:-

I have the honor to submit herewith a 1/ statement by the Commercial Attache relative to the destruction of the files of the Reporting Section of this Embassy.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew.

File No. 124.2
PSW/mp
Enclosure: as stated

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 910
Dated February 18, 1942 from the
Embassy at Tokyo

[illegible] SECTION'S
FILES

[illegible]

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, March 25, 1942.

~~DAS~~
~~FA~~
~~DCR~~

SUBJECT: DESTRUCTION OF STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FILES.

noted on inventory WRK 5/29/42

124.946/144

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose a list of the strictly confidential material in the files of the Embassy which was burned in accordance with Section 7 of the Department's undated "Instructions to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers in Japanese Occupied Territories and other Regions of the Far East" received in January 1942 through the Swiss Legation in Tokyo.

In addition to the strictly confidential material listed on the enclosure to this despatch, all true readings of telegrams in confidential code were burned on December 8, 1941, as reported in my unnumbered despatch dated December 15, 1941.

In

In conformity with the Department's instruction, non-confidential bound and current correspondence was not in general destroyed, but was stored in the Embassy vault for safe keeping in custody of the Swiss representative, and only such material contained therein which might have proved compromising to any individuals in areas under Japanese control was removed and burned.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew.

Enclosure:

1/ as indicated.

CEB:gh

EXHIBIT NO. 92

satisfactorily. Ten meetings have so far been held. I am satisfied that conditions prevailing in British prisoner of war camps under German or Italian control are being kept under close watch as a result of regular inspections by the Protecting Power and the International Red Cross Committee, and that where any breach of the Convention is observed a prompt protest is made to the enemy government concerned.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Attlee): I beg to move,

> "That the Proceedings on any Motion for the Adjournment of the House that may be moved by a Minister of the Crown at this day's Sitting be exempted from the provisions of the Standing Order (Sittings of the House)."

I think that it would meet the convenience of the House if we extended the Sitting to-day.

Mr. Tinker: Can that also apply to other days of the Debate?

Question put, and agreed to.

WAR SITUATION.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[*Mr. James Stuart.*]

Mr. Stephen (Camlachie): May I ask whether the Vote of Confidence is to be put on the Paper, so that it will be in the hands of Members to-morrow?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): It will be on the Paper for the next Sitting Day.

From time to time in the life of any Government there come occasions which must be clarified. No one who has read the newspapers of the last few weeks about our affairs at home and abroad can doubt that such an occasion is at hand.

Since I returned to this country, I have come to the conclusion that I must ask to be sustained by a Vote of Confidence from the House of Commons. This is a thoroughly normal, constitutional, democratic procedure. A Debate on the war has been asked for. I have arranged it in the fullest possible form for three whole days. Any Member will be free to say anything he thinks fit about or against the Administration or against the composition or personalities of the Government, to his heart's content, subject only to the reservation which the House is always so careful to observe about military secrets. Could you have anything freer than that? Could you have any higher expression of democracy than that? Very few other countries have institutions strong enough to sustain such a thing while they are fighting for their lives.

I owe it to the House to explain to them what has led me to ask for their exceptional support at this time. It has been suggested that we should have a three days' Debate of this kind in which the Government would no doubt be harshly belaboured by some of those who have lighter burdens to carry, and that at the end we should separate without a Division. In this case sections of the Press which are hostile—and there are some whose hostility is pronounced—could declare that the Government's credit was broken, and, it might even be hinted, after all that has passed and all the discussion there has been, that it had been privately intimated to me that I should be very reckless if I asked for a Vote of Confidence from Parliament.

And the matter does not stop there. It must be remembered that these reports can then be flashed all over the world, and that they are repeated in enemy broadcasts night after night in order to show that the Prime Minister has no right to speak for the nation and that the Government in Britain is about to collapse. Anyone who listens to the fulminations which come from across the water know that that is no exaggeration. Of course, these statements from foreign sources would not be true, but neither would it be helpful to anyone that there should be any doubt about our position.

There is another aspect. We in this Island for a long time were alone, holding aloft the torch. We are no longer alone now. We are now at the centre and among those at the summit of 26 United Nations, comprising more than three-quarters of the population of the globe. Whoever speaks for Britain at this moment must be known to speak, not only in the name of the people—and of that I feel pretty sure I may—but in the name of Parliament and, above all, of the House of Commons. It is genuine public interest that requires that these facts should be made manifest afresh in a formal way.

We have had a great deal of bad news lately from the Far East, and I think it highly probable, for reasons which I shall presently explain, that we shall have a great deal more. Wrapped up in this bad news will be many tales of blunders and shortcomings both in foresight and action. No one will pretend for a moment that disasters like these occur without there having been faults and shortcomings. I see all this rolling towards us like the waves in a storm, and that is another reason why I require a formal, solemn Vote of Confidence from the House of Commons, which hitherto in this struggle has never flinched. The House would fail in its duty if it did not insist upon two things, first, freedom of debate, and, secondly, a clear, honest, blunt Vote thereafter. Then we shall all know where we are, and all those with whom we have to deal at home and abroad, friend or foe, will know where we are and where they stand. It is because we are to have a free debate, in which perhaps 20 to 30 Members can take part, that I demand an expression of opinion from the 300 or 400 Members who will have sat silent.

It is because things have gone badly and worse is to come that I demand a Vote of Confidence. This will be placed on the Paper today, to be moved at a later stage. I do not see why this should hamper anyone. If a Member has helpful criticisms to make, or even severe corrections to register, that may be perfectly consistent with thinking that in respect of the Administration, such as it is, he might do better and fare worse. But if an honourable Gentleman dislikes the Government so much and feels it in the public interest that it should be broken up, he should have the manhood to testify his convictions in the Lobby. There is no need to be mealy-mouthed in debate. There is no objection to anything being said plain, or even plainer, and the Government will do their utmost to conform to any standard which may be set in the course of the Debate. But no one need be mealy-mouthed in debate, but no one should be chicken-hearted in the Lobby. I have voted against Governments I have been elected to support, and looking back, I have sometimes felt glad that I did so. Everyone in these tough times must do what he thinks is his duty.

Mr. Shinwell (Seaham): A free vote?

The Prime Minister: A vote under all the conditions which hitherto have made the conduct of Parliamentary government possible. Surely the hon. Gentleman is not the man to be frightened of a Whip? The House of Commons, which is at present the most powerful representative Assembly in the world, must also—I am sure, will also—bear in mind the effect produced abroad by all its proceedings. We have also to remember how oddly foreigners view our country and its way of doing things. When Rudolf Hess flew over here some months ago he firmly believed that he had only to gain access to certain circles in this country for what he described as "the Churchill clique"——

Mr. Thorne (Plaistow): Where is he now?

The Prime Minister: Where he ought to be—to be thrown out of power and for a Government to be set up with which Hitler could negotiate a magnanimous peace. The only importance attaching to the opinions of Hess is the fact that he was fresh from the atmosphere of Hitler's intimate table. But, Sir, I can assure you that since I have been back in this country I have had anxious inquiries from a dozen countries, and reports of enemy propaganda in a score of countries, all turning upon the point whether His Majesty's present Government is to be dismissed from power or not. This may seem silly to us, but in those mouths abroad it is hurtful and mischievous to the common effort. I am not asking for any special, personal favours in these circumstances, but I am sure the House would wish to make its position clear; therefore I stand by the ancient, constitutional, Parliamentary doctrine of free debate and faithful voting.

Now I turn to the account of the war, which constitutes the claim I make for the support and confidence of the House. Three or four months ago we had to cope with the following situation. The German invaders were advancing, blasting their way through Russia. The Russians were resisting with the utmost heroism. But no one could tell what would happen, whether Leningrad, Moscow or Rostov would fall, or where the German winter line would be established. No one can tell now where it will be established, but now the boot is on the other leg. We all agree that we must aid the valiant Russian

[The Prime Minister.]

Armies to the utmost limit of our power. His Majesty's Government thought, and Parliament upon reflection agreed with them, that the best aid we could give to Russia was in supplies of many kinds of raw materials and of munitions, particularly tanks and aircraft. Our Forces at home and abroad had for long been waiting thirstily for these weapons. At last they were coming to hand in large numbers. At home we have always the danger of invasion to consider and to prepare against. I will speak about the situation in the Middle East presently. Nevertheless we sent Premier Stalin—for that I gather is how he wishes to be addressed; at least, that is the form in which he telegraphs to me—exactly what he asked for. The whole quantity was promised and sent. There has been, I am sorry to say, a small lag due to bad weather, but it will be made up by the early days of February. This was a decision of major strategy and policy, and anyone can see that it was right to put it first when they watch the wonderful achievements, unhoped for, undreamed of by us because we little knew the Russian strength, but all the more glorious as they seem—the wonderful achievements of the Russian Armies. Our munitions were of course only a contribution to the Russian victory, but they were an encouragement in Russia's darkest hour. Moreover, if we had not shown a loyal effort to help our Ally, albeit at a heavy sacrifice to ourselves, I do not think our relations with Premier Stalin and his great country would be as good as they are now. There would have been a lack of comradeship, and the lack of comradeship might have spread reproaches on all sides. Far from regretting what we did for Russia, I only wish it had been in our power—but it was not—to have done more.

Three or four months ago, at a time when the German advance was rolling onwards, we were particularly concerned with the possibility of the Germans forcing the Don River, the capture of Rostov and the invasion of the Caucasus, and the reaching of the Baku oil wells before the winter by the Panzer spearheads of the German Army. Everyone who has been giving careful study and independent thought to this war, knows how deep an anxiety that was in all our breasts three or four months ago. Such an advance would not only have given the Germans the oil which they are beginning seriously to need, but it would have involved the destruction of the Russian Fleet and the loss of the command of the Black Sea. It would have affected the safety of Turkey, and it would, in due course, have exposed to the gravest dangers Persia, Iraq, Cyria and Palestine, and beyond those countries, all of which are now under our control, it would have threatened the Suez Canal, Egypt and the Nile Valley. At the same time as this menace defined itself with hideous and increasing reality as it seemed, General von Rommel, with his army of 10 German and Italian divisions entrenched in his fortified positions at and behind the Halfaya Pass, was preparing to make a decisive attack on Tobruk as a preliminary to a renewed advance upon Egypt from the West. The Nile Valley was therefore menaced simultaneously by a direct attack from the West and by a more remote but in some ways more deadly attack from the North. In such circumstances it is the classical rule of war, reinforced by endless examples—and some exceptions—that you prepare to fight a delaying action against one of the two attacks and concentrate, if possible, overwhelming strength against the other and nearer attack. We therefore approved General Auchinleck's plans for building up a delaying force in the vast region from Cyprus to the Caspian Sea, along what I may call the Levant-Caspian front, and preparing installations, airfields and communications upon which larger forces could be based, as time and transport allowed. On the other flank, the Western flank, we prepared to set upon Rommel and try to make a good job of him. For the sake of this battle in the Libyan Desert we concentrated everything we could lay our hands on, and we submitted to a very long delay, very painful to bear over here, so that all preparations could be perfected. We hoped to recapture Cyrenaica and the important airfields round Benghazi. But General Auchinleck's main objective was more simple. He set himself to destroy Rommel's army. Such was the mood in which we stood three or four months ago. Such was the broad strategical decision we took.

Now, when we see how events, which so often mock and falsify human effort and design, have shaped themselves, I am sure this was a right decision.

General Auchinleck had demanded five months' preparation for his campaign, but on 18th November he fell upon the enemy. For more than two months in the desert the most fierce, continuous battle has raged between scattered bands of men, armed with the latest weapons, seeking each other dawn after dawn, fighting to the death throughout the day and then often long into the night. Here was a battle which turned out very differently from what was foreseen. All was dispersed and confused. Much depended on the individual soldier and the junior officer. Much, but not all; because this battle would have been lost on 24th November if General Auchinleck had not intervened himself, changed the command and ordered the ruthless pressure of the attack to be maintained without regard to risks or consequences. But for this robust decision we should now be back on the old line from which we had started, or perhaps further back. Tobruk would possibly have fallen, and Rommel might be marching towards the Nile. Since then the battle has declared itself. Cyrenaica has been regained. It has still to be held. We have not succeeded in destroying Rommel's army, but nearly two-thirds of it are wounded, prisoners or dead.

Perhaps I may give the figures to the House. In this strange, sombre battle of the desert, where our men have met the enemy for the first time—I do not say in every respect, because there are some things which are not all that we had hoped for—but, upon the whole, have met him with equal weapons, we have lost in killed, wounded and captured about 18,000 officers and men, of whom the greater part are British. We have in our possession 36,500 prisoners, including many wounded, of whom 10,500 are Germans. We have killed and wounded at least 11,500 Germans and 13,000 Italians—in all a total, accounted for exactly, of 61,000 men. There is also a mass of enemy wounded, some of whom have been evacuated to the rear or to the Westward—I cannot tell how many. Of the forces of which General Rommel disposed on 18th November, little more than one-third now remain, while 852 German and Italian aircraft have been destroyed and 336 German and Italian tanks. During this battle we have never had in action more than 45,000 men, against enemy forces—if they could be brought to bear—much more than double as strong. Therefore, it seems to me that this heroic, epic struggle in the desert, though there have been many local reverses and many ebbs and flows, has tested our manhood in a searching fashion and has proved not only that our men can die for King and country—everyone knew that—but that they can kill.

I cannot tell what the position at the present moment is on the Western front in Cyrenaica. We have a very daring and skilful opponent against us and, may I say across the havoc of war, a great General. He has certainly received reinforcements. Another battle is even now in progress, and I make it a rule never to try and prophesy beforehand how battles will turn out. I always rejoice that I have made that rule. [AN HON. MEMBER: "What about the Skaggerak?"] That was hardly a battle. Naturally, one does not say in a case like that that we have not a chance, because that is apt to be encouraging to the enemy and depressing to our own friends. In the general upshot, the fact remains that, whereas a year ago the Germans were telling all the neutrals that they would be in Suez by May, when some people talked of the possibility of a German descent upon Assiut, and many people were afraid that Tobruk would be stormed and others feared for the Nile Valley, Cairo, Alexandria and the Canal, we have conducted an effective offensive against the enemy and hurled him backward, inflicting upon him incomparably more—well, I should not say incomparably, because I have just given the comparison, but far heavier losses and damage—than we have suffered ourselves. Not only has he lost three times our losses on the battlefield, approximately, but the blue waters of the Mediterranean have, thanks to the enterprise of the Royal Navy, our submarines and Air Force drowned a large number of the reinforcements which have been continually sent. This process has had further important successes during the last few days. Whether you call it a victory or not, it must be dubbed up to the present, although I will not make any promises, a highly profitable transaction, and certainly is an episode of war most glorious to the British, South African, New Zealand, Indian, Free French and Polish soldiers, sailors and airmen who have played their part in it. The prolonged, stubborn, steadfast and successful defence

[The Prime Minister.]

of Tobruk by Australian and British troops was an essential preliminary, over seven hard months, to any success which may have been achieved.

Let us see what has happened on the other flank, the Northern flank, of the Nile Valley. What has happened to Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Persia? There we must thank Russia. There the valour of the Russian Armies has warded off dangers which we saw and which we undoubtedly ran. The Caucasus and the precious oilfields of Baku, the great Anglo-Persian oilfields, are denied to the enemy. Winter has come. Evidently we have the time to strengthen still further our Forces and organisations in those regions. Therefore, sir, I present to you, in laying the whole field open and bare and surveying it in all its parts, for all are related, a situation in the Nile Valley, both West and East, incomparably easier than anything we have ever seen, since we were deserted by the French Bordeaux-Vichy Government and were set upon by Italy. The House will not fail to discern the agate points upon which this vast improvement has turned. It is only by the smallest margin that we have succeeded so far in beating Rommel in Cyrenaica and destroying two-thirds of his forces. Every tank, every aircraft squadron was needed. It is only by the victories on the Russian flank on the Black Sea coast that we have been spared the overrunning of all those vast lands from the Levant to the Caspian, which in turn give access to India, Persia, the Persian Gulf, the Nile Valley and the Suez Canal.

I have told the House the story of these few months, and hon. Members will see from it how narrowly our resources have been strained and by what a small margin and by what strokes of fortune—for which we claim no credit—we have survived so far. Where should we have been, I wonder, if we had yielded to the clamour which was so loud three or four months ago that we should invade France or the Low Countries? We can still see on the walls the inscription, "Second Front Now." Who did not feel the appeal of that? But imagine what our position would have been if we had yielded to this vehement temptation. Every ton of our shipping, every flotilla, every aeroplane, the whole strength of our Army would be committed and would be fighting for life on the French shore on the shores of the Low Countries. these troubles of the Far East and Middle East might have sunk to significance compared with the questio another and far worse Dunkirk.

Here, let me say, I should like to my tribute to one who has gone from since I left this country, Mr. Lees-Smi who, I remember, spoke with so profound wisdom on this point at moment when many opinions were in about it. His faithful, selfless and conduct of the important work which discharged in this House was undoubted of great assistance to us all, not only to the Government but to us all, in the various stages of the war. His memory as a distinguished Parliamentarian will long find an honoured place in the recollection of those who had the fortune to be his colleagues.

Sometimes things can be done by saying "Yes," and sometimes things can be done by saying "No." Yet I suppose there are some of those who were vocal and voluble, and even clamant, for a second front to be opened in France, who are now going to come up bland and smiling and ask why it is that we have not ample forces in Malaya, Burma, Borneo and the Celebes. There are times when so many things happen, and happen so quickly, and time seems to pass in such a way that you can neither say it is long or short, that it is easy to forget what you have said three months before. You may fail to connect it with what you are advocating at the particular moment. Throughout a long and variegated Parliamentary life this consideration has led me to try and keep a watchful eye on that danger myself. You never can tell. There are also people who talk and bear themselves as if they had prepared for this war with great armaments and long, careful preparation. But that is not true. In two and a half years of fighting we have only just managed to keep our heads above water. When I was called upon to be Prime Minister, now nearly two years ago, there were not many applicants for the job. Since then, perhaps, the market has improved. In spite of the shameful negligence, gross muddles, blatant incompetence, complacency, and lack of organising power which are daily attributed to us—and from which chidings we endeavour to profit—we are beginning to see

our way through. It looks as if we were in for a very bad time, but provided we all stand together, and provided we throw in the last spasm of our strength, it also looks, more than it ever did before, as if we were going to win.

While facing Germany and Italy here and in the Nile Valley we have never had any power to provide effectively for the defence of the Far East. My whole argument so far has led up to that point. It may be that this or that might have been done which was not done, but we have never been able to provide effectively for the defence of the Far East against an attack by Japan. It has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all costs to avoid embroilment with Japan until we were sure that the United States would also be engaged. We even had to stoop, as the House will remember, when we were at our very weakest point, to close the Burma Road for some months. I remember that some of our present critics were very angry about it, but we had to do it. There never has been a moment, there never could have been a moment, when Great Britain or the British Empire, single-handed, could fight Germany and Italy, could wage the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle of the Middle East—and at the same time stand thoroughly prepared in Burma, the Malay Peninsula, and generally in the Far East against the impact of a vast military Empire like Japan, with more than 70 mobile divisions, the third navy in the world, a great air force and the thrust of 80 or 90 millions of hardy, warlike Asiatics. If we had started to scatter our forces over these immense areas in the Far East, we should have been ruined. If we had moved large armies of troops urgently needed on the war fronts to regions which were not at war and might never be at war we should have been altogether wrong. We should have cast away the chance, which has now become something more than a chance, of all of us emerging safely from the terrible plight in which we have been plunged.

We therefore have lain—I am putting it as bluntly as I can—for nearly two years under the threat of an attack by Japan with which we had no means of coping. But as time has passed the mighty United States, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, from reasons of its own interest and safety but also out of chivalrous regard for the cause of freedom and democracy, has drawn ever nearer to the confines of the struggle. And now that the blow has fallen it does not fall on us alone. On the contrary, it falls upon united forces and united nations, which are unquestionably capable of enduring the struggle, of retrieving the losses and of preventing another such stroke ever being delivered again.

There is an argument with which I will deal as I pass along to pursue my theme. It is said by some, "If only you had organised the munitions production of this country properly and had had a Minister of Production (and that is not a question which should be dogmatised upon either way) it would have made everything all right. There would have been enough for all needs. We should have had enough supplies for Russia, enough well-equipped squadrons and divisions to defend the British Islands, to sustain the Middle East and to arm the Far East effectively." But that is really not true. As a matter of fact, our munitions output is gigantic, has for some time been very large indeed, and it is bounding up in a most remarkable manner. In the last year, 1941, although we were at war in so many theatres and on so many fronts, we have produced more than double the munitions equipment of the United States, which was arming heavily, though of course a lap behind on the road. This condition will naturally be rapidly removed as the full power of American industry come into full swing. But, Sir, in the last six months, thanks to the energies of Lord Beaverbrook and the solid spadework done by his predecessors and the passage of time—he particularly asks me to say that—[An HON. MEMBER: "Who did?"]—Lord Beaverbrook; I should have said it anyway—our munitions output has risen in the following respects: We are producing more than twice as many far more complicated guns every month than we did in the peak of 1917-18 war period, and the curve is rising. The guns are infintely more complicated. Tank production has doubled in the last six months. Small arms production is more than twice what it was six months ago. Filled rounds of ammunition have doubled in the last six months. I could go on with the catalogue, but these are not doublings from early very small totals, they are doublings from the totals we boasted about, as far as we

[The Prime Minister.]

dared, six months ago. There has been an immense leap forward. In aircraft production there is a steady increase not only in the numbers but also in the size and quality of the aircraft, though I must say there has not been all the increase which I had hoped for.

But all this has nothing to do with the preparations it was open to us to make in Malaya and Burma and generally in the Far East. The limiting factor has not been troops or even equipment. The limiting factor has been transport, even assuming we had wished to take this measure and had had this great surplus. From the time that this present Government was formed, from the moment it was formed I may say, every scrap of shipping we could draw away from our vital supply routes, every U-boat escort we could divert from the Battle of the Atlantic, has been busy to the utmost capacity to carry troops, tanks and munitions from this Island to the East. There has been a ceaseless flow, and as for aircraft they have not only been moved by sea but by every route, some very dangerous and costly routes, to the Eastern battlefields. The decision was taken, as I have explained, to make our contribution to Russia, to try to beat Rommel and to form a stronger front from the Levant to the Caspian. It followed from that decision that it was in our power only to make a moderate and partial provision in the Far East against the hypothetical danger of a Japanese onslaught. Sixty thousand men, indeed, were concentrated at Singapore, but priority in modern aircraft, in tanks, and in anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery was accorded to the Nile Valley.

For this decision in its broad strategic aspects, and also in its diplomatic policy in regard to Russia, I take the fullest personal responsibility. If we have handled our resources wrongly, no one is so much to blame as me. If we have not got large modern air forces and tanks in Burma and Malaya to-night no one is more accountable than I am. Why then should I be called upon to pick out scapegoats, to throw the blame on generals or airmen or sailors? Why, then, should I be called upon to drive away loyal and trusted colleagues and friends to appease the clamour of certain sections of the British and Australian Press, or in order to take the edge off our reverses in Malaya and the Far East, and the punishment which we have yet to take there? I would be ashamed to do such a thing at such a time, and if I were capable of doing it, believe me, I should be incapable of rendering this country or this House any further service.

I say that without in the slightest degree seeking to relieve myself from my duties and responsibility to endeavour to make continual improvements in Ministerial positions. It is the duty of every Prime Minister to the House, but we have to be quite sure that they are improvements in every case, and not only in every case but in the setting. I could not possibly descend to, as the German radio repeatedly credits me with, an attempt to get out of difficulties in which I really bear the main load by offering up scapegoats to public displeasure. Many people, many very well-meaning people, begin their criticisms and articles by saying, "Of course, we are all in favour of the Prime Minister because he has the people behind him. But what about the muddles made by this or that Department; what about that general or this Minister?" But I am the man that Parliament and the nation have got to blame for the general way in which they are served, and I cannot serve them effectively unless, in spite of all that has gone wrong, and that is going to go wrong, I have their trust and faithful aid.

I must linger for a moment on our political affairs, because we are conducting the war on the basis of a full democracy and a free Press, and that is an attempt which has not been made before in such circumstances. A variety of attacks are made upon the composition of the Government. It is said that it is formed upon a party and political basis. But so is the House of Commons. It is silly to extol the Parliamentary system and then, in the next breath, to say, "Away with party and away with politics." From one quarter I am told that the leaders of the Labour party ought to be dismissed from the Cabinet. This would be a return to party Government pure and simple. From opposite quarters it is said that no one who approved of Munich should be allowed to hold office. To do that would be to cast a reflection upon the great majority of the nation at that time, and also to deny the strongest party in the House any proportionate share in the National Government, which

again, in turn, might cause inconvenience. Even my right hon. Friend the leader of the Liberal party—[An Hon. Member: "Who is he?"]—the Secretary of State for Air, whose help to-day I value so much and with whom, as a lifelong friend, it is a pleasure to work, even he has not escaped unscathed. If I were to show the slightest weakness in dealing with these opposite forms of criticism, not only should I deprive myself of loyal and experienced colleagues, but I should destroy the National Government and rupture the war-time unity of Parliament itself.

Other attacks are directed against individual Ministers. I have been urged to make an example of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who is now returning from his mission in the Far East. Thus, he would be made to bear the blame for our misfortunes. The position of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster at the head of the Council which he had been instructed to form at Singapore was rendered obsolete by the decision which I reached with the President of the United States to set up a Supreme Commander for the main fighting zone in the Far East. The whole conception of a Supreme Commander is that, under the direction of the Governments he serves, he is absolute master of all authorities in the region assigned to him. This would be destroyed if political functionaries representing the various nations—for it is not only this country which would be represented; others would have to be represented as well as ours—were clustered round him. The function of the Chancellor of the Duchy was therefore exhausted by the appointment of General Wavell to the Supreme Command. I may say that regret was expressed at his departure by the New Zealand and Australian Governments, and still more by the Council he formed at Singapore, which, in a localised and subordinate form, it has been found necessary to carry on. When I am invited, under threats of unpopularity to myself or the Government, to victimise the Chancellor of the Duchy, and throw him to the wolves, I say to those who make this amiable suggestion, I can only say to them, "I much regret that I am unable to gratify your wishes."—or words to that effect.

The outstanding question upon which the House should form its judgment for the purposes of the impending Division is whether His Majesty's Government were right in giving a marked priority in the distribution of the forces and equipment we could send overseas, to Russia, to Libya, and, to a lesser extent, to the Levant-Caspian danger front, and whether we were right in accepting, for the time being, a far lower standard of forces and equipment for the Far East than for these other theatres. The first obvious fact is that the Far Eastern theatre was at peace and that the other theatres were in violent or imminent war. It would evidently have been a very improvident use of our limited resources—as I pointed out earlier—if we had kept large masses of troops and equipment spread about the immense areas of the Pacific or in India, Burma and the Malay Peninsula, standing idle, month by month and perhaps year by year, without any war occurring. Thus, we should have failed in our engagements to Russia, which has meanwhile struck such staggering blows at the German Army, and we should have lost the battle in Cyrenaica, which we have not yet won, and we might now be fighting defensively well inside the Egyptian frontier. There is the question on which the House should make up its mind. We had not the resources to meet all the perils and pressures that came upon us.

But this question, serious and large as it is by itself, cannot be wholly decided without some attempt to answer the further question—what was the likelihood of the Far Eastern theatre being thrown into war by a Japanese attack? I have explained how very delicately we walked, and how painful it was at times, how very careful I was every time that we should not be exposed single-handed to this onslaught which we were utterly incapable of meeting. But it seemed irrational to suppose that in the last six months—which is what I am principally dealing with—the Japanese, having thrown away their opportunity of attacking us in the autumn of 1940, when we were so much weaker, so much less well-armed, and all alone, should at this period have plunged into a desperate struggle against the combined Forces of the British Empire and the United States. Nevertheless, nations, like individuals, commit irrational acts, and there were forces at work in Japan, violent, murderous, fanatical and explosive forces, which no one could measure.

[The Prime Minister.]

On the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference, at which I discussed these matters with Mr. Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into a war in the Far East, and thus make final victory sure, seemed to allay some of these anxieties. That expectation has not been falsified by the events. It fortified our British decision to use our limited resources on the actual fighting fronts. As time went on, one had greater assurance that if Japan ran amok in the Pacific, we should not fight alone. It must also be remembered that over the whole of the Pacific scene brooded the great power of the United States Fleet, concentrated at Hawaii. It seemed very unlikely that Japan would attempt the distant invasion of the Malay Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, and the attack upon the Dutch East Indies, while leaving behind them in their rear this great American Fleet. However to strengthen the position as the situation seemed to intensify we sent the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" to form the spear-point of the considerable battle forces which we felt ourselves at length able to form in the Indian Ocean. We reinforced Singapore to a considerable extent and Hong Kong to the extent which we were advised would be sufficient to hold the island for a long time. Besides this in minor ways we took what precautions were open to us. On 7th December the Japanese, by a sudden attack, delivered while their envoys were still negotiating at Washington, crippled for the time being the American Pacific Fleet, and a few days later inflicted very heavy naval losses on us by sinking the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse."

For the time being, therefore, naval superiority in the Pacific and in the Malaysian Archipelago has passed from the hands of the two leading naval Powers into the hands of Japan. How long it will remain in Japanese hands is a matter on which I do not intend to speculate. But at any rate it will be long enough for Japan to inflict very heavy and painful losses on all of the United Nations who have establishments and possessions in the Far East. The Japanese no doubt will try to peg out claims and lodgments over all this enormous area, and to organise, in the interval before they lose command of the seas, a local command of the air which will render their expulsion and destruction a matter of considerable time and exertion.

Here I must point out a very simple strategic truth. If there are 1,000 islands and 100 valuable military key points and you put 1,000 men on every one of them or whatever it may be, the Power that has the command of the sea and carries with it the local command of the air, can go around to every one of these places in turn, destroy or capture their garrisons, ravage and pillage them, ensconce themselves wherever they think fit, and then pass on with their circus to the next place. It would be vain to suppose that such an attack could be met by local defence. You might disperse 1,000,000 men over these immense areas and yet only provide more prey to the dominant Power. On the other hand, these conditions will be reversed when the balance of sea power and air power changes, as it will surely change.

Such is the phase of the Pacific war into which we have now entered. I cannot tell how long it will last. All I can tell the House it that it will be attended by very heavy punishment which we shall have to endure, and that presently, if we persevere, as I said just now about the Russian front, the boot will be on the other leg. That is why we should not allow ourselves to get rattled because this or that place has been captured, because, once the ultimate power of the United Nations has been brought to bear, the opposite process will be brought into play, and will move forward remorselessly to the final conclusion, provided that we persevere, provided that we fight with the utmost vigour and tenacity, and provided, above all, that we remain united.

Here I should like to express, in the name of the House, my admiration of the splendid courage and quality with which the small American Army, under General MacArthur, has resisted brilliantly for so long, at desperate odds, the hordes of Japanese who have been hurled against it by superior air power and superior sea power. Amid our own troubles, we sent out to General MacArthur and his soldiers, and also to the Filipinos, who are defending their native soil with vigour and courage, our salute across those wide spaces which we and the United States will presently rule again together. Nor must I fail to pay a tribute, in the name of

the House, to the Dutch, who, in the air and with their submarines, their surface craft, and their solid fighting troops, are playing one of the main parts in the struggle now going on in the Malaysian Archipelago.

We have to turn our eyes for a moment to the hard-fought battle which is raging upon the approaches to Singapore and in the Malay Peninsula. I am not going to make any forecast about that now, except that it will be fought to the last inch by the British, Australian and Indian troops, which are in the line together, and which have been very considerably reinforced. The hon. Member for the Eye Division of Suffolk (Mr. Granville) had a very sound military idea the other day, when he pointed out the importance of sending reinforcements of aircraft to assist our ground forces at Singapore and in Burma. I entirely agree with him. In fact, we anticipated his suggestion. Before I left for the United States, on 12th December, the moment, that is to say, when the situation in Singapore and Pearl Harbour had disclosed itself, it was possible to make a swift redistribution of our Forces. The moment was favourable. General Auchinleck was making headway in Cyrenaica; the Russian front not only stood unbroken but had begun the advance in a magnificent counter-attack, and we were able to order a large number of measures, which there is no need to elaborate, but which will be capable of being judged by their results as the next few weeks and the next few months unfold in the Far East.

When I reached the United States, accompanied by our principal officers and large technical staffs, further important steps were taken by the President, with my cordial assent, and with the best technical advise we could obtain, to move from many directions everything that ships could carry and all air power that could be flown transported and serviced to suitable points. The House would be very ill-advised to suppose that the seven weeks which have passed since 7th December have been weeks of apathy and indecision for the English-speaking world. Odd as it may seem quite a lot has been going on. But we must not nourish or indulge light and extravagant hopes or suppose that the advantages which the enemy have gained can soon or easily be taken from him. However, to sum up the bad and the good together, in spite of the many tragedies past and future, and with all pity for those who have suffered and will suffer, I must profess my profound thankfulness for what has happened throughout the whole world in the last two months.

I now turn for a short space—I hope I am not unduly wearying the House, but I feel that the war has become so wide that there are many aspects that must be regarded—to the question of the organisation, the international, inter-Allied or inter-United Nations organisation, which must be developed to meet the fact that we are a vast confederacy. To hear some people talk, however, one would think that the way to win the war is to make sure that every Power contributing armed forces and every branch of these armed forces is represented on all the councils and organisations which have to be set up, and that everybody is fully consulted before anything is done. That is in fact the most sure way to lose a war. You have to be aware of the well-known danger of having " more harness than horse," to quote a homely expression. Action to be successful must rest in the fewest number of hands possible. Nevertheless, now that we are working in the closest partnership with the United States and have also to consider our Alliance with Russia and with China, as well as the bonds which unite us with the rest of the 26 United Nations and with our Dominions, it is evident that our system must become far more complex than heretofore.

I had many discussions with the President upon the Anglo-American war direction, especially as it affects this war against Japan, to which Russia is not yet a party. The physical and geographical difficulties of finding a common working centre for the leaders of nations and the great staffs of nations which cover the whole globe are insuperable. Whatever plan is made will be open to criticism and many valid objections. There is no solution that can be found where the war can be discussed from day to day fully by all the leading military and political authorities concerned. I have, however, arranged with President Roosevelt that there should be a body in Washington called the Combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee, consisting of the three United States Chiefs of the Staff, men of the highest distinction, and three high officers representing and acting under the general instructions

[The Prime Minister.]

of the British Chiefs of the Staff Committee in London. This body will advise the President, and in the event of divergence of view between the British and American Chiefs of the Staff or their representatives, the difference must be adjusted by personal agreement between him and me as representing our respective countries. We must also concert together the closest association with Premier Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek as well as with the rest of the Allied and Associated Powers. We shall, of course, also remain in the closest touch with one another on all important questions of policy.

In order to wage the war effectively against Japan, it was agreed that I should propose to those concerned the setting-up of a Pacific Council in London, on the Ministerial plane, comprising Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the Dutch Government. Assisted by the British Chiefs of the Staff and the great staffs organisations beneath them, I was to try to form and focus a united view. This would enable the British Commonwealth to act as a whole and form part of plans—plans which are at present far advanced—for collaboration at the appropriate levels in the spheres of defence, foreign affairs and supply. Thus the united view of the British Commonwealth and the Dutch would be transmitted, at first, on the Chiefs of the Staff level, to the combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee sitting in Washington. In the event of differences between the members of the Pacific Council in London, dissentient opinions would also be transmitted. In the event of differences between the London and Washington bodies, it would be necessary for the President and me to reach an agreement. I must point out that it is necessary for everybody to reach an agreement, for nobody can compel anybody else.

The Dutch Government, which is seated in London, might be willing to agree to this arrangement, but the Australian Government desired and the New Zealand Government preferred that this Council of the Pacific should be in Washington, where it would work alongside the Combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee. I have therefore transmitted the views of these two Dominions to the President, but I have not yet received, nor do I expect for a few days to receive, his reply. I am not, therefore, in a position to-day to announce, as I had hoped, the definite and final arrangements for the Pacific Council.

I should like to say, however, that underlying these structural arrangements are some very practical and simple facts upon which there is full agreement. The Supreme Commander has assumed control of the fighting areas in the South-West Pacific called the "A.B.D.A." area—A. B. D. A—called after the countries which are involved, not the countries which are in the area but the countries which are involved in that area, namely, America, Britain, Dutch and Australasia. We do not propose to burden the Supreme Commander with frequent instructions. He has his general orders, and he has addressed himself with extraordinary buoyancy to his most difficult task, and President Roosevelt and I, representing, for my part, the British Government, are determined that he shall have a chance and a free hand to carry it out. The action in the Straits of Macassar undertaken by forces assigned to this area apparently has had very considerable success, of the full extent of which I am not yet advised. The manner in which General Wavell took up his task, the speed with which he has flown from place to place, the telegrams which he has sent describing the methods by which he was grappling with the situation and the forming of the central organism which was needed to deal with it—all this has made a most favourable impression upon the high officers, military and political, whom I met in the United States. This is all going on. Our duty, upon which we have been constantly engaged for some time, is to pass reinforcements of every kind, especially air, into the new war zone, from every quarter and by every means, with the utmost speed.

In order to extend the system of unified command which has been set up in the "A.B.D.A." area—that is to say, the South-West Pacific—where the actual fighting is going on, in order to extend that system to all areas in which the forces of more than one of the United Nations—because that is the term we have adopted—will be operating, the Eastward approaches to Australia and New Zealand have been styled the Anzac area, and are under United States command, the communications between the Anzac area and

America are a United States responsibility, while the communications across the Indian Ocean and from India remain a British responsibility. All this is now working, while the larger constitutional, or semi-constitutional, discussions and structural arrangements are being elaborated by telegrams passing to and fro between so many Governments. All this is now working fully and actively from hour to hour, and it must not, therefore, be supposed that any necessary military action has been held up pending the larger structural arrangements which I have mentioned.

Now I come to the question of our own Empire or Commonwealth of Nations. The fact that Australia and New Zealand are in the immediate danger zone reinforces the demand that they should be represented in the War Cabinet of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. We have always been ready to form an Imperial War Cabinet containing the Prime Ministers of the four Dominions. Whenever any of them have come here they have taken their seats at our table as a matter of course. Unhappily, it has not been possible to get them all here together at once. General Smuts may not be able to come over from South Africa, and Mr. Mackenzie King could unfortunately stay only for a short time. But Mr. Fraser was with us, and it was a great pleasure to have him, and we had a three months' visit from Mr. Menzies, which was also a great success, and we were all very sorry when his most valuable knowledge of our affairs and the war position, and his exceptional abilities, were lost. For the last three months we have had Sir Earle Page representing the Commonwealth Government at Cabinets when war matters and Australian matters were under discussion and also, in similar circumstances upon the Defence Committee. As a matter of fact this has always been interpreted in the most broad and elastic fashion. The Australian Government have now asked specifically "that an accredited representative of the Commonwealth Government should have the right to be heard in the War Cabinet in the formulation and the direction of policy." We have of course agreed to this. New Zealand feels bound to ask for similar representation, and the same facilities will of course be available to Canada and South Africa. The presence at the Cabinet table of Dominion representatives who have no power to take decisions and can only report to their Governments evidently raises some serious problems but none, I trust, which cannot be got over with good will. It must not, however, be supposed that in any circumstances the presence of Dominion representatives for certain purposes could in any way affect the collective responsibility of His Majesty's Servants in Great Britain to Crown and Parliament.

I am sure we all sympathise with our kith and kin in Australia now that the shield of British and American sea power has, for the time being, been withdrawn from them so unexpectedly and so tragically and now that hostile bombers may soon be within range of Australian shores. We shall not put any obstacle to the return of the splendid Australian troops who volunteered for Imperial service to defend their own homeland or whatever part of the Pacific theatre may be thought most expedient. We are taking many measures in conjunction with the United States to increase the security of Australia and New Zealand and to send them reinforcements, arms and equipment by the shortest and best routes. I always hesitate to express opinions about the future, because things turn out so very oddly, but I will go so far as to say that it may be that the Japanese, whose game is what I may call "to make hell while the sun shines," are more likely to occupy themselves in securing their rich prizes in the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and the Malayan Archipelago and in seizing island bases for defensive purposes for the attack which is obviously coming towards them at no great distance of time—a tremendous onslaught which will characterise the future in 1942 and 1943. [An HON. MEMBER: "1944 and 1945?"] No, I do not think we can stretch our views beyond those dates, but, again, we must see how we go. I think they are much more likely to be arranging themselves in those districts which they have taken or are likely to take than to undertake a serious mass invasion of Australia. That would seem to be a very ambitious overseas operation for Japan to undertake in the precarious and limited interval before the British and American navies regain—as they must certainly regain, through the new building that is advancing, and for other reasons—the unquestionable command of the Pacific Ocean. However, everything in human power that we can do to help Australia, or persuade America

[The Prime Minister.]

to do, we will do; and meanwhile I trust that reproaches and recriminations of all kinds will be avoided, and that if any are made, we in Britain will not take part in them.

Let me, in conclusion, return to the terrific changes which have occurred in our affairs during the last few months and particularly in the last few weeks. We have to consider the prospects of the war in 1942 and also in 1943, and, as I said just now, it is not useful to look further ahead than that. The moment that the United States was set upon and attacked by Japan, Germany and Italy—that is to say, within a few days of December 7, 1941—I was sure it was my duty to cross the Atlantic and establish the closest possible relationship with the President and Government of the United States, and also to develop the closest contacts, personal and professional, between the British Chiefs of Staff and their trans-Atlantic deputies, and with the American Chiefs of Staff who were there to meet them.

Having crossed the Atlantic, it was plainly my duty to visit the great Dominion of Canada. The House will have read with admiration and deep interest the speech made by the Prime Minister of Canada yesterday on Canada's great and growing contribution to the common cause in men, in money, and in materials. A notable part of that contribution is the financial offer which the Canadian Government have made to this country. The sum involved in one billion Canadian dollars, about £225,000,000. I know the House will wish me to convey to the Government of Canada our lively appreciation of their timely and most generous offer. It is unequalled in its scale in the whole history of the British Empire, and it is a convincing proof of the determination of Canada to make her maximum contribution towards the successful prosecution of the war.

During those three weeks which I spent in Mr. Roosevelt's home and family, I established with him relations not only of comradeship, but, I think I may say, of friendship. We can say anything to each other, however painful. When we parted he wrung my hand, saying, "We will fight this through to the bitter end, whatever the cost may be." Behind him rises the gigantic and hitherto unmobilised gigantic power of the people of the United States, carrying with them in their life and death struggle the entire, or almost the entire, Western hemisphere.

At Washington, we and our combined staffs surveyed the entire scene of the war, and we reached a number of important practical decisions. Some of them affect future operations and cannot, of course, be mentioned, but others have been made public by declaration or by events. The vanguard of an American Army has already arrived in the United Kingdom. Very considerable forces are following as opportunity may serve. These forces will take their station in the British Isles and face with us whatever is coming our way. They impart a freedom of movement to all forces in the British Isles greater than we could otherwise have possessed. Numerous United States fighter and bomber squadrons will also take part in the defence of Britain and in the ever-increasing bombing offensive against Germany. The United States Navy is linked in the most intimate union with the Admiralty, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific. We shall plan our Naval moves together as if we were literally one people.

In the next place, we formed this league of 26 United Nations in which the principal partners at the present time are Great Britain and the British Empire, the United States, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of Russia, and the Republic of China, together with the stout-hearted Dutch, and the representatives of the rest of the 26 Powers. This Union is based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter. It aims at the destruction of Hitlerism in all its forms and manifestations in every corner of the globe. We will march forward together until every vestige of this villainy has been extirpated from the life of the world.

Thirdly, as I have explained at some length, we addressed ourselves to the war against Japan and to the measures to be taken to defend Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Burma, and India against Japanese attack or invasion.

Fourthly, we have established a vast common pool of weapons and munitions, of raw materials and of shipping, the outline of which has been set forth in a series of memoranda which I have initialled with the President. I had a talk with him last night on the telephone, as a result

of which an announcement has been made in the early hours of this morning in the United States, and I have a White Paper for the House which will be available, I think, in a very short time. Many people have been staggered by the figures of prospective American output of war weapons which the President announced to Congress, and the Germans have affected to regard them with incredulity. I can only say that Lord Beaverbrook and I were made acquainted beforehand with all the bases upon which these colossal programmes were founded, and that I myself heard President Roosevelt confide their specific tasks to the chiefs of American industry and I heard these men accept their prodigious tasks and declare that they would and could fulfil them. Most important of all is the multiplication of our joint tonnage at sea. The American programmes were already vast. They have been increased in the proportion of 100 to nearly 160. If they are completed, as completed I believe they will be, we shall be able to move across the ocean spaces in 1943 two, three or even four times as large armies as the considerable forces we are able to handle at sea at the present time.

I expect—and I have made no secret of it—that we shall both of us receive severe ill-usage at the hands of the Japanese in 1942, but I believe we shall presently regain the naval command of the Pacific and begin to establish an effective superiority in the air, and then later on, with the great basic areas in Australasia, in India and in the Dutch East Indies, we shall be able to set about our task in good style in 1943. It is no doubt true that the defeat of Japan will not necessarily entail the defeat of Hitler, whereas the defeat of Hitler would enable the whole forces of the united nations to be concentrated upon the defeat of Japan. But there is no question of regarding the war in the Pacific as a secondary operation. The only limitation applied to its vigorous prosecution will be the shipping available at any given time.

It is most important that we should not overlook the enormous contribution of China to this struggle for world freedom and democracy. If there is any lesson I have brought back from the United States that I could express in one word, it would be "China." That is in all their minds When we feel the sharp military qualities of the Japanese soldiery in contact with our own troops, although of course very few have as yet been engaged, we must remember that China, ill-armed or half-armed, has, for four and a half years, single handed, under its glorious leader Chiang Kai-shek, withstood the main fury of Japan. We shall pursue the struggle hand in hand with China, and do everything in our power to give them arms and supplies, which is all they need to vanquish the invaders of their native soil and play a magnificent part in the general forward movement of the United Nations.

Although I feel the broadening swell of victory and liberation bearing us and all the tortured peoples onwards safely to the final goal, I must confess to feeling the weight of the war upon me even more than in the tremendous summer days of 1940. There are so many fronts which are open, so many vulnerable points to defend, so many inevitable misfortunes, so many shrill voices raised to take advantage, now that we can breathe more freely, of all the turns and twists of war. Therefore, I feel entitled to come to the House of Commons, whose servant I am, and ask them not to press me to act against my conscience and better judgment and make scapegoats in order to improve my own position, not to press me to do the things which may be clamoured for at the moment but which will not help in our war effort, but, on the contrary, to give me their encouragement and to give me their aid. I have never ventured to predict the future. I stand by my original programme, blood, toil, tears and sweat, which is all I have ever offered, to which I added, five months later, "many shortcomings, mistakes and disappointments." But it is because I see the light gleaming behind the clouds and broadening on our path, that I make so bold now as to demand a declaration of confidence of the House of Commons as an additional weapon in the armoury of the united nations.

Mr. Pethick-Lawrence (Edinburgh, East): The Prime Minister has drawn, in his own inimitable manner, a comprehensive picture of what has been happening all over the world during the last six weeks while he has been away from us, and of all the dispositions that have been made for the major control of the war. I have no intention of attempting to embellish, still less to repaint, that picture. What I propose to do is to attempt to

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

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10	✓✓ 1277	London	r	"	DEC 8 1941	M/A		
11	✓✓ 1272	London	r	"	DEC [illegible]	M/A		
12	✓✓ 285	Cairo	r	"	DEC 8 1941	M/A		
13	✓✓ 84	Lisbon	r	"		M/A		
14	✓✓ 1278	London	r	"	DEC 8 1941	M/A		
15	✓ 597	Panama	c	"	1941	CIB		
16	✓✓ CR0222	Batavia	s	"				
17	✓✓ 85	Rio	s	"	DEC 9 1941	M/A		
18	✓✓ 604	Panama	c	"	DEC 5 1941	IB		
19	✓✓ 19	Baghdad	s	"		M/A		
20	✓ 298	Cairo				Chief Clk		
	[illegible]					CIB	8 50	
21	✓✓ 25	Teheran	c	10:38	DEC 5 1941	IB	10:55	
22	✓ 32	Santiago	r	"	DEC [illegible]	M/A	10:55	

Form #C-4

*R/S - Record Section
*M/C - Message Center

Date: DEC 5 1941

See Page 2

EXHIBIT NO. 94

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Room 4D757
The Pentagon

18 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MITCHELL:

Pursuant to your request there are inclosed herewith the Magic messages from the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, transmitting the documents handed to him by the Secretary of State on 26 November 1941.

/s/ Harmon Duncombe
HARMON DUNCOMBE
Lt. Col., GSC

Incls.

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (English text)

#1192. (Part 1 of 4)

Oral.

Strictly confidential.

November 26, 1941.

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

ARMY SECRET [illegible] 11-20-41 (1)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 28, 1941
Purple (English Text)
(Extremely Urgent)

#1198. Part 2 of 4.

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary "modus vivendi" could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purpose above indicated.

Trans. 11/29/41 (1)

ARMY SECRET

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple (English Text)
Extremely Urgent

#1192. Part 3 of 4.

To be handled in government code.

The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contains some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggest that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

25487

ARMY SECRET Trans. 11/28/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (English text)

#1192. (Extremely urgent) (Part 4 of 4)

With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

The plan herein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1942 and the Japanese draft of September 25th by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited.

25488

SECRET

Trans. 11-29-41 (S)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (English text)

#1193. (Extremely urgent) (Part 1 of 2)

Separate wire.

To be handled in Government Code.

Strictly confidential, tentative and without commitment.

November 26, 1941.

Outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan.

Section 1.

Draft mutual declaration of policy.

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial design in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

ARMY SECRET

Trans. 11-29-41 (1)

5

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (English text)

#1193. (Part 2 of 2)

(4.) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes; the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

(2) The principle of internal economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the economic enterprise and the continuous development of all countries and may permit

Page 1.

SECRET

SECRET

payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

25490

ARMY SECRET

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (English text)

#1194. (Extremely urgent) (Part 1 of 4)

Secret Wire.

To be handled in Government Code.

Section 2.

Steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan:

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question.

SECRET

Trans. 11-29-41 (1)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (English text)

#1194. (Extremely urgent) (Part 2 of 4)

Secret outside the Department.

To be handled in Government Code.

Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo-China.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support -- militarily, politically, economically -- any Government or regime in China other than the national government of the republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

25492

ARMY SECRET Trans. 11-29-41 (1)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (English text)

#1194. (Part 3 of 4)

5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other Governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

25493

ARMY SECRET Trans. 11-29-41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (English text)

#1194. (Extremely urgent) (Part 4 of 4)

Secret outside the department.

To be handled in Government Code.

8. Both Governments will agree upon applying the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other Governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

25494

ARMY SECRET Hamm. 11-20-41 (2)

EXHIBIT NO. 95

(Handwritten note:)

MEMO

Hornbeck is anxious to have you read this. The high ranking officer mentioned is Adm. Richardson.

I think the paper is slightly Academic.

/s/ R. E. S.

I have read.

/s/ *HRS.*

I feel that in the evolving of the thought of which record is made in this memorandum, I have brought into clearer light than any in which I had seen it before a point which is, I feel, of fundamental importance in connection with any and all of our deliberations regarding courses to be taken in the field of major policy in regard to the Far East: a point which has to do with something that is definitely and inescapably fundamental. I am sure that you will not begrudge the time which it will take for you to read the memorandum.

(Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL

(Hand printed note:) Return to Op–13.

JULY 12, 1940.

In the course of a conversation yesterday with a high ranking officer of the Navy, there was put to me this question: *Is there an irresolvable conflict of interests and policies between the United States and Japan?*

I replied to this effect: There is today a fundamental conflict between the United States and Japan as regards major objectives and the policies which prevail, respectively, in consequence thereof and in regard thereto. This conflict can be resolved only by an abandonment on the part of one country or the other of those objectives and policies which it envisages and by which it proceeds at the present time. The United States has as its objectives: prevalence within and between and among nations of peace; prevalence of rules and provisions of law; prevalence of practices of justice; prevalence of practices of order; procedure by commitments and respect therefor; prevalence of equality of opportunity in terms of fair treatment; respect for rights of nations and of individuals; and due regard for interests of nations and [2] of individuals. Japan (the Japanese military leadership) has as its objectives today; spread and extension of Japanese political authority and economic control into and over areas outside of and beyond the boundaries of the present Japanese Empire (some of which areas are inhabited by independent nations and some of which are dependencies of other indepndent countries—but in none of which there is a Japanese population at present of more than a comparatively insignificant minority); a setting up by whatever means, positive or negative, may seem likely to contribute thereto, of a Japanese hegemony in eastern Asia and the western and southern Pacific; the working out of a "divine Destiny" which in the minds of not a few Japanese envisages first a vast Japanese empire in the Orient and ultimately a world supremacy for Japan's "Divine Emperor" These objectives are in fundamental conflict, globally and in detail.

In the case of the United States, the objectives stated are the objectives of the whole American people. In the case of Japan, the objectives stated are those of an essentially feudal leadership, the "military element", which comprises probably less than ten percent of the nation, which includes probably a majority of those Japanese who are descendants of the fighting men (the Daimyo and the Samurai) of the pre-restoration (1867) era, the spearhead among which is a considerable number of chauvinists among [3] the Army officer personnel and to a less extent among the Navy officer personnel, which leadership makes the nation's decisions and carries the nation with it.

The policies which are those of the United States are representative of the fundamental thoughts and beliefs and attitude of the people of the United States during the whole century and half of our national existence. Their roots run far back into the past. They run back to the days of Magna Charta, the days of John Hampden, the days of Oliver Cromwell, the days of the Pilgrims and the Cavaliers, the days of the Boston Tea Party and the Declaration of Independence, the days of Washington and Jefferson and John Paul Jones and James Monroe and Andrew Jackson; the days of the French Revolution; the days of emigration from Europe of the German liberals; the days of the Civil War; the days of our

liberation of Cuba; the days of our participation in the World War with popular enthusiasm for the ideas of fighting to end wars and to make the world safe for democracy: they are policies which in a general way express the thought and the aspirations, inherited by and developed under conditions of freedom in the minds of practically all of the 130 million persons who constitute the people of the United States. The policies which are those of Japan have no such universal and no such [4] deep-rooted acceptance in and among the 90 million persons who constitute the people of the Japanese Empire.

There is warrant for a belief that the conflict between American and Japanese objectives and policies is not irresolvable. There is warrant for belief that one or the other of the countries might in course of time give up its present objectives and policies.

Where does the greater possibility, as regards relinquishment, lie? In giving consideration to that question, thought should be given to the comparative qualities of the two sets of objectives and policies. Which of the two is the more sound? Which of the two is more fundamental from points of view of human nature, of morality, et cetera? Then, consideration should be given to historical facts. It is a fact that the attitude, the objectives and the policies of the American people are a product of a long course of forward-looking evolution. It is a fact that the Japanese nation made in 1867 a substantial break with its own past, and that during the last eight decades the outlook upon life of the Japanese people and many of the practices of the Japanese State have undergone substantial change. To make a long matter short, is there not warrant for believing that a change in objectives and in policies by and on the part of Japan would be much easier and is much more readily conceivable than would be and is a change of the objectives and policies of the United States?

[5] How would (could) a change on Japan's part be brought about? If Japanese armed forces succeed in conquering China, taking Indochina, taking the Netherland East Indies, taking the Malay States, taking Thailand (Siam) and Burma, ultimately taking the Philippines, et cetera, et cetera, no change is likely. The conflict between Japanese interests and objectives and policies and those of the United States would continue and become intensified. But if Japan's efforts in China were to fail, if Japan's efforts to establish a great empire in the Far East were to be thwarted, if Japan's military leadership were to be in course of time discredited in the eyes of the middle classes and the common people of Japan, it is conceivable that the Japanese nation might work out a modification or even a reversal of Japan's objectives and policies.

It should be remembered that three centuries ago a great Japanese leader started out to conquer China and that ultimately the Japanese nation gave up that idea. It should be remembered that not long after the Japanese Army and Navy had withdrawn from Korea, another great Japanese leader decided to make Japan an isolated and secluded hermit nation: he forbade, to all intents and purposes, political, economic or cultural intercourse between Japan and the outside world.

[6] The present conflict between Japanese and American objectives and policies is not irresolvable. There is little possibility, however, that the objectives and policies of the American people will be given up. Moreover, an abandonment of them would not resolve the conflict—for, an adoption, by the United States, in substitution for them, of objectives and policies similar to or identical with those of Japan would be impossible, and, if not impossible and if made, would merely create greater conflict. But an abandonment of Japan's present objectives and policies is a thing by no means impossible; is a thing which, if made, would admit of an adoption by Japan of policies similar to those of the United States, which adoption, if made and if lived up to, would resolve the whole conflict.

Surrender of the American objectives and policies in favor of Japan would serve no useful purpose. Maintenance of the American objectives and policies, patient but unremitting resistance by the United States and by other countries to Japan's efforts at conquest, has within it the possibility of an ultimate resolving of the conflicts between the objectives and policies of Japan and the objectives and policies of the United States (and those of several other countries).

EXHIBIT NO. 96

JULY 16, 1940.

It is my thought that you might find interesting the papers here attached. If so, and if you should feel so disposed, perhaps you would care to send the memorandum on to the Chief of Naval Operations.

You will note that there are on these papers no identifying marks. I think that it would be well to give no indication of source. The material stands or falls on its own merits without reference to authorship or location of the authors.

(Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL

(Hand printed:) Return to Op–13 Room 2058.

REFLECTIONS ON CERTAIN FEATURES OF THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION AND CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF U. S. FAR EASTERN POLICY. JULY 4, 1940.

I. *General Observations.*

The situation in the Pacific is one in which, on the one hand Japan and China are engaged in armed hostilities in the course of which Japanese armed forces have been and are doing violence to American lives and property and the Japanese Government by official acts is impairing American rights and interests, while on the other hand there is constant, though not now acute, tension in relations between Japan and the United States; it has been and is the policy of the United States to discourage and to oppose the course which Japan is following; it is generally agreed that diplomatic representations by the American Government, together with the termination of the treaty of 1911 upon this Government's initiative, and the moves which this Government has made in disposal of its naval forces, have exercised some restraining influence upon Japan; it is now notorious that a strong element in Japan's leadership advocates a move by the Japanese armed forces toward seizure of French Indo-China and/or the Dutch East Indies, and that the said element has strong support among the Japanese populace; it is the estimate of various observers that the presence of the U. S. Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor weighs heavily in Japan's deliberations with regard to the question of the Dutch East Indies and other new moves of [2] aggression; the most effective opposition at the present moment to Japan's program of imperialistic expansion is the resistance which is being made by the Chinese; the Government and the people of the United States desire that the Chinese resistance be not overcome and the Japanese effort to gain control of China be not successful; and the policy and the acts of the United States during recent years have given encouragement and support to the Chinese policy of resistance, have strengthened Chinese morale, and have contributed to the facts that the Chinese have refused to negotiate a compromise settlement and the Japanese have not been able to gain an undisputed control of China or any part of China.

For seventy-five years the Germans, acting politically and as a nation, have given evidence that those elements which exercise decisive leadership of the German people believe in and rely upon force as the most effective and the conclusive instrumentality in international relations. For forty-five years the Japanese, acting politically and as a state, have given evidence that those elements which exercise decisive leadership of the Japanese people believe in and rely upon force as the most effective and the conclusive instrumentality in international relations.

[3] Modern Germany was brought into existence in 1870 through Bismarck's success in pursuing his policy of "Eisen und Blut". The present Japanese Empire has been developed since 1867 by a process of accumulation under threat of force and/or application of force: first, seizure of nearby islands; next, war upon China and acquisition of Formosa and the Pescadores; next, war upon Russia and occupation of South Manchuria; next, gradual occupation followed by sudden annexation of Korea; next, seizure of Shantung and the now Japanese Mandated Islands in the Pacific; next, the occupation of all of Manchuria and Jehol; and now the effort to conquer China.

During the last ten years Japanese leadership has given ample evidence, for all who are willing to divest themselves of preconceived theories and natural prejudices, of their high regard for force and low regard for moral principles.

legal precepts, and/or constractual obligations, in international relations. Since 1933 Nazi leadership has done the same—but with greater intensity.

In 1931 the Japanese resorted to the use of force against China. Neither the League of Nations nor any of its members were willing to take any forceful effective steps toward stopping the Japanese. Nor was the United States willing to take any such steps. The Japanese went ahead, and, [4] by use of force, attained not only their objective but more than what they had had in contemplation at that stage. In 1934 the Italians resorted to use of force and found that neither the League of Nations nor any of the world powers, including the United States, were willing to use force to stop them. The Italians achieved all that they had set out to achieve. In 1937 the Japanese decided to take the next step in a program to which their leadership has long been committed in principle, another step in a program which envisages many more steps extending far into the future. They attacked China. They occupied considerable portions of China. Neither the League of Nations nor any great power has seen fit forcefully to oppose them. The only resistance by force that has been made to Japan's program of use of force is that which has been and is being made by the Chinese.

In 1932 the British Government asked the Japanese Government for a pledge that the Japanese Government would respect the principle of the "open door" in Manchuria, and, having been given by the Japanese Government that pledge, the British Government declared itself satisfied. In 1935 certain British and French statesmen collaborated in secret and were prepared to make to Italy a proposal for a compromise in regard to Ethiopia. World opinion ruled that [5] proposal out. Had that proposal been made to Mussolini, there is little reason for anyone believing that it would have been accepted. Had it been made and been accepted, there is little warrant, in the light of subsequent events, for any supposition that Mussolini would later have been restrained by his acceptance of it. In 1938 Mr. Chamberlain made an agreement with Herr Hitler. Almost immediately Hitler completely disregarded his part of the agreement and went forward with steps in a program which is conceived in terms of force and is being carried out in terms of force.

The Government and the people of the United States are committed by a long tradition to the principle of opposing conquest. They are likewise committed to the principle of supporting international law. They are committed by a considerable number of treaties to the principle of respecting the sovereignty and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. They are committed both by treaty and by unilateral declarations (of several Administrations) to the principle of respecting the rights and interests of all concerned in and with regard to China. They are committed by declarations of the last preceding and the present Administration to the principle of refusing [6] to recognize (i. e. to give technical recognition to) certain types of change brought about by certain specified methods in the situation in the Far East.

The situation in the Far East, as between Japan and China, has for some months past been developing along the lines which tend to confirm the estimates upon which United States policy in this period has in large part been based. Chinese resistance has been maintained; the Japanese have been unable to bring matters to a conclusion at any point; processes of attrition have been affecting the Japanese more adversely than the Chinese; the Japanese people have developed doubts; Japanese resources have become constantly more slender; the possibility of a gradual dissolution of the Japanese effort to conquer China has constantly increased. If the United States and the British Government will but permit "Nature" to take its course, with a little help by giving some assistance to China and withholding some assistance from Japan, there is more than an even chance that the present Japanese effort to conquer China will be brought to an end, adversely to Japan, by processes of attrition and concomitants thereof.

[7] II. *Retention of U. S. Fleet in the Pacific.*

The Battle Fleet is at present in the Pacific. It is based in major part on Pearl Harbor. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet is in the Far Eastern Waters.

An order by the American Government for the U. S. Battle Fleet to leave the Pacific would be equivalent to a notification to the Japanese and the Chinese that the United States substantially abandons, for the time being at least, its effort to influence the course of events as between Japan and China. It would tremendously strengthen Japanese morale and (probably disastrously) weaken Chinese morale. It would give assurance to the Japanese Army in China that opportunity exists for it to go as far as it may be able with not only the Chinese

but also American and other foreign nationals, foreign properties, foreign rights and foreign interests in China. It would give assurance to the Japanese Navy that opportunity exists for it to go as far as it may be able with foreign territorial possessions in the Pacific. It would encourage the Japanese toward thinking seriously even of closing in upon Singapore and of stirring up trouble in India. It might resolve such doubts as many Japanese entertain of the advisability of a closer association with Germany. It would make Japan the one and only great power exercising effective influence in the area of the [8] Pacific and the Indian Oceans, in the whole area westward from the Panama Canal and eastward from Suez and the Cape of Good Hope. It would leave the United States exposed on the West Coast; it would leave Mexico and Central America exposed; it would leave the whole west coast of South America exposed. It would make it difficult if not impossible for any countries other than the United States to venture upon exerting of economic pressures against or in resistance to Japan; and it would increase such dangers to the United States as are or might be involved in the exerting by the United States of such pressures or resistance.

But, assume the order to have been given, assume the Fleet to have left the Pacific (with the flow of consequences which its departure would have), assume that the transit of the Canal to have been made successfully,—What disposal would be made in the Atlantic of this Fleet, and what necessary and useful purposes would that disposal be expected to serve? Would the expectation be that the Fleet be sent to European waters? Would the etxpectation be that, if sent there, itwould be used for combat purposes? Would the expectation be that, the Fleet being kept in American waters, the mere presence of the Fleet in the Atlantic would in any way deter the Germans and Italians from the courses which they are pursuing in Europe or would in any way be of assistance to the British in their resistance? Would the [9] expectation be that the presence of the Fleet in the Atlantic would deter the Germans and Italians from launching attacks in the near future upon some part or parts of the Western Hemisphere? Would the expectation be that the Fleet would soon be needed for the purpose of defending this Hemisphere against such attacks definitely launched?

It would unquestionably be detrimental to the interests in the Pacific of the Allied Powers and their benevolent associate (the United States) for the United States to withdraw its Battle Fleet, at this early moment, from the Pacific. But mere transfer by the United States of its Battle Fleet to the Atlanic would in no way benefit the cause, at this moment, of the Allied Powers and the United States in connection with and in regard to the present phase of the armed conflict between the British and Germany. The German menace to the United States, while very real, is not yet direct, and it cannot short of several weeks or months become a physical reality. The United States Fleet has been and is needed in the Pacific; it is not yet needed in the Atlantic; and, if moved from the Pacific to the Atlantic at this moment, it could not in the Atlantic serve purposes equivalent to or more important than those which it has been and is serving in the Pacific.

[9a] Hitler still has some fighting to do in Europe. It is possible that within a short time England may, following the fate and the example of France, have to sue for peace. It is possible that the British Navy will be sunk. At the worst, Hitler may possibly gain complete control of Great Britain and acquire what remains of both the French and the British fleets. That, however, will not have happened by tomorrow morning and is not likely to have happened by the morning of a week from tomorrow.

The logical course for Hitler and Mussolini to follow is: Pursue to the end their armed conflict with Great Britain; make sure, either by diplomacy or by armed force, of the security of their rear, that is, make solid their relationships, for better or for worse, with the Soviet Union; consider and deal with whatever problems may remain as regards Sweden, Switzerland, the Balkans, Turkey and the Mediterranean; meanwhile, reorganize and improve their battered though victorious armed forces; consolidate administratively their position in and over the areas which they have conquered; recondition whatever implements and munitions of war they [9b] may capture; take care of various economic and social problems which are already acute and bound to be more so, such as the feeding and the clothing of the people of Germany and the peoples of the conquered territories; *make adequate preparations for* an *ultimate attack* upon points in the Western Hemisphere, which attack, if prematurely made, would be almost sure to be challenged by the United States and would absolutely ensure

embarkation by the United States upon an enormous program of armament; meanwhile, wage a diplomatic and propagandist campaign, based upon and centered in assurances that Germany and Italy are sated and are satisfied, have no further territorial objectives, are prepared to maintain peace in Europe and to be at peace with the rest of the world, and are in no way whatever a menace to the security or the prosperity or the general welfare of the Western Hemisphere and least of all to those of the United States.

Neither Hitler nor Mussolini nor both are going to [*10*] attack Latin America or the United States in the near future—certainly not within the next few weeks. If by any chance they should send over some sort of an expedition, their having done so would be "all to the good" so far as effect upon public opinion in this Hemisphere, and especially in the United States, is concerned. It would help to wake up a lot of people who are still only half awake and some more who are still sound asleep. From the point of view of general and particular political effects, we should welcome the making by Hitler or Mussolini of such a mistake. They will not make it.

Unless we are prepared to take the offensive, in support of Great Britain, in Europe, against Hitler, or unless we would expect to be so prepared before or by the time that our Fleet could arrive in the Atlantic, there does not exist today any good reason, in terms of use to be made of our Battle Fleet, for moving that Fleet today or tomorrow from Pearl Harbor.—Should an unforeseen and unforeseeable emergency develop, the Fleet could be moved from Pearl Harbor to Panama, at a practicable speed, in 13 days. And transit of the Canal requires two days.

If and when Hitler and Mussolini finish off England, and if and when the British fleet is sunk or is surrendered, the moment will then have arrived for reconsidering, urgently, the question of a better (than now) disposal of [11] our Fleet. Meanwhile, our Fleet stands on guard, as it has for some time past stood, in the Pacific—at Pearl Harbor, a highly strategic point. The presence of that Fleet there has exercised and is exercising a restraining influence upon Japan, discouraging new adventurings by Japan which would be adverse to American and British and French and some other countries' interests and encouraging continuance by the Chinese of their resistance to Japan. Whenever that Fleet leaves the Pacific, its departure will not only remove an obstacle to further adventuring by Japan but will actually encourage embarkation by Japan upon such adventuring; it will give Japan free rein in the Western Pacific, in the Southern Pacific and in the Indian Ocean; it will give Japan opportunity to place herself in full possession of vastly important natural resources and highways; it will enable the Japanese to complete their blockade of China; it will vastly strengthen Japanese and vastly weaken Chinese morale; it will probably mark the beginning of the end as regards China's resistance to Japan; it will enable the Japanese to send vast amounts of material to Germany and Italy; it will prepare the way for full cooperation by Japan with her Axis associates.

We may have to move our Fleet from the Pacific, and take those consequences—in due course. We do not have [12] to do it today. To do it now when there has not yet come real need for doing it would be to indicate that we are in a state of panic, not to say hysteria, that we are driven into that state by the mere thought of a possible risk of a possible attack upon some point in "our" Hemisphere; that we, not having gone to the aid of democracy in Europe, are ready to abandon the one country (China) which is "opposing force" in Asia; that, although we may be able at sometime in the future to fight, we are not able now to hold even a diplomatic position. If we were ready, now, to fight, and if we would, now, fight—to prevent the destruction of the British Fleet—we should at once move our Fleet, move it at full steam toward Europe. Not being either ready or willing, now, to do that, we should still leave our Fleet where it is until there comes a time when we can do more with it elsewhere than we are doing with it now where it now is.

If and when we do move the Fleet out of the Pacific, we should simultaneously do something substantial in the line of giving further assistance to the Chinese. We might well do some more of that momentarily and frequently. The Chinese Government has for several months past been urgently asking us for assistance. The President, in his Charlottesville address, said: "* * * we will extend to the opponents [13] of force the material resources of this nation . . .". We can no longer give assistance to France. We should be all the more in position, so far as our resources are concerned, to give assistance to China. Only Great Britain is opposing force in Europe today. Only China is opposing force in eastern Asia today. In assisting Great Britain—in whatever way—we

work for our own security. In assisting China—in whatever way—we work toward the same end.

There is little that we can do about Europe now. But we can still, if we but will, do a good deal about the Far East. Unless we are prepared to fight Hitler in Europe, now, we practically abandon our position in Europe, now, because of our not being prepared to act toward safeguarding it. Our abandonment of Europe is automatic. Question then comes: Not, shall be abandon our position in Asia in order to defend our position in Europe, but, our position in Europe already having been abandoned automatically, shall our position in Asia be abandoned by our own deliberate action—for the sake of safeguarding and strengthening our position in the Western Hemisphere.

Defense of and strengthening of our position in the Western Hemisphere does not require abandonment of our position in Asia, and the objective of defending and strengthening [14] of our position in the Western Hemisphere would not be best served by such an abandonment.

The unanswered question which this country must consider today is not the question what will Hitler do in regard to the Western Hemisphere after he has made himself supreme in Europe. It is what will *Germany and Japan* do, if and after Germany has become supreme in Europe *and* Japan has become supreme in the western Pacific and eastern Asia.

It is an axiom of military strategy that "the best defense is offense".

The soundness of this axiom is being demonstrated on an unprecedented scale in what has gone on in Europe recently and what is going on in Europe today; in their *war plans*, the Germans have built for offense; the British and—even more—the French built for defense; the Germans have taken the offensive and the British and the French fought a losing defensive battle—on French soil and with terrific defensive losses.

The vital problem which the people and the Government of the United States should be considering today is that of ways and means whereby Germany and Italy and Japan can be [14a] *stopped* rather than that of ways and means whereby the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere may become prepared to defend this Hemisphere in a world in which, Germany and Italy and Japan not having been stopped, those three powers and their satellites will begin (in due course) directly to make assaults upon the economy, the political setup, et cetera, et cetera, of this Hemisphere—with each of those three countries feeling that it cannot be secure as long as the United States remains a great power and feeling that the common objective of the three should be to render impotent or to destroy the United States.

We should keep in mind the fact that for practical purposes the world's great powers are today divided into two camps: on the one side are three aggressor nations—in combination: Japan, Germany, and Italy; on the other side are China, Great Britain—and the United States. (Russia is in a sense a not disinterested and not unbiased bystander, temporarily associated with but not very actively assisting the three active aggressors, and capable of becoming a liability or even a belligerent enemy to them.) The United States has not become a belligerent, but it also is not an impartial neutral; its interests lie on the side of Great Britain—and China; it will more and more give assistance to Great Britain—and should do the same for China; it is opposed to the three aggressors; it will be regarded more [14b] and more by each and all those aggressors as definitely and distinctly an enemy state; if the aggressors win, the United States—whether actively a belligerent or not—will thereafter be considered by the winners as having been for practical purposes an ally of the defeated powers and as a power remaining to be dealt with and disposed of (adversely) as such.

The United States has not been able by diplomacy nor by measures—including gestures—short of war to restrain Germany or Italy; but it has thus far exercised some restraining influence upon Japan and it is *capable of continuing* to exercise such influence.

The United States is not today in position to take the offensive (with use of force)—in the Atlantic. The United States is today in position to discourage, and to render difficult if not impossible, a move by *one* of the aggressors which, if attempted and if unchallenged, would place that aggressor (which is closely associated with its fellow aggressors) in undisputed control of a huge area in which there are very substantial British and French and Netherland and American political and economic interests and very substantial resources—in the Pacific.

If the United States wishes to contribute with maximum effectiveness, within the limitations under which we now work, toward *stopping* Germany and her aggressor associates, [14c] and thereby toward assisting the British and improving our own position as regards long swing security, the one area in which we *might* operate at present by disposal or use of force is the Pacific.

A course based on the principle of merely conserving and adding to our stock of weapons—while and notwithstanding the fact that the Nazis and the Italians win in Europe and the Japanese take possession of the western Pacific and the Indian Oceans—in order that we may now guard and later defend the Western Hemisphere, will not make the world safe for the United States. It will merely mean, if the British are defeated, that we, not having gone to their aid in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, and not having safeguarded their position and ours in the Pacific, we, having let the rest of the world go under to Germany and Italy *and* Japan, will in the not distant thereafter have to take up arms by ourselves (with possibly *some* aid from *some* Latin American states) *on the defensive*, against assaults by one or two or three—but all working together—of the successful aggressor nations, those nations having then at their disposal unlimited resources, vast matériel, and a combined population of their own of 200,000,000 men and reservoirs of supplementary man power in the countries which they would have subjugated.

The best defense is offense. The next best defense is preparedness to use such weapons as one may possess toward preventing one's enemies from being strengthened and prevent- [14d] ing one's friends from being weakened. The poorest strategy of defense is that of simply building fortifications while permitting one's position to be completely encircled by a hostile combination the various units in which are daily becoming stronger and the combined forces of which will ultimately be overwhelming as regards resources and man power.

The United States could today either throw its forces in on the side of the British toward defeating the enemy combination in Europe *or* stand guard in the Pacific and prevent Japan from gaining control of the western Pacific, eastern Asia, and the Indian Ocean. If it does neither of these things, and if Germany, Italy and Japan win, the victorious aggressors will have before them and will give their attention to three tasks: they will have Russia to dispose of; they will have Latin America to dispose of; and they will have the United States to dispose of. If they attack Russia first, the United States will do nothing about that. If they begin assaults upon Latin America first, the United States will not be soon enough and full enough prepared to ensure against aggressor successes there. If they attack the United States first, we will be poorly equipped to stop them without initial and substantial losses to ourselves—and we would have practically no help from Latin America; we would be *fighting alone* against a combination which can attack both from the east and from the west; and we have only a one-ocean Navy.

[14e] This country could today make a substantial contribution toward making the world safe for the United States—and for other democracies. The United States can do little today toward preventing Hitler from becoming supreme in Europe. The United States could do much today toward preventing Japan from becoming supreme in eastern Asia. The United States can (may), of course, fall back upon and fortify its position within the Western Hemisphere. If it chooses to do this, and only this, the probability will be that, before long, weakened economically and cut off from valuable markets, especially those from which various essential raw materials are derived (in the Far East), the United States and its American associates will be confronted by material pressures, including those of armed force, not from the east alone but from the east and from the west—not by Germany alone but by Germany and Japan.

Not being ready and willing now to fight toward stopping [15] Hitler in Europe, we surely should refrain from giving him the aid and comfort of making to him a free gift of assured access, through Japan, to the natural resources of the Far East.

III. *"Making Friends" with Japan.*

On May 30 the *Chicago Daily Tribune* published an editorial entitled "How to Double the Fleet in a Week" in which the idea was advanced that the United States and Japan can and should "come to a friendly understanding". In this editorial the *Tribune* said: "The best defense policy of the United States could be written within a few weeks in a renewed trade treaty with Japan. . . . In effect the strength of the fleet would be doubled by cutting half its problem away."

On June 3 the *New York Daily News* published an editorial under the same title as that of the *Chicago Tribune*'s editorial of May 30. In this editorial the *News* stated that, while it by no means always agrees with the *Chicago Tribune*, the latter's editorial under reference "interests us greatly". It expressed the opinion that "by making friends with Japan" the United States can avert finding itself "menaced with urgent trouble in the Atlantic and Pacific at the same time" and "would in effect double the strength of our (its) fleet".

[16] On June 6, Mr. Lippmann in an article of that date advanced the view that the United States and Japan should "enter immediately into friendly and conciliatory and candid negotations . . . for the avowed purpose of preserving peace in the Pacific."

On July 1, Rear Admiral Yates Stirling (Retired) expressed in an article of that date the view that the interests of the United States "lie in reaching a friendly understanding with Japan, if one can be attained." Admiral Stirling said that "history would indicate that they (the Japanese) can be stopped only by superior military force". He advocated the beginning by the United States of "negotiations for a new basic treaty with Japan" and an attempt by the United States "generally to normalize Japanese-American relations". He concluded the article with the statement that "it would seem but the part of wisdom to assure the safety of our Pacific flank if we can do so with honor."

The fallacy in the line of reasoning which leads to the conclusions thus advanced in terms of suggestion or proposal by such analysts of international relations as propose that the United States should pursue a policy of appeasement toward Japan lies in the assumed—but not stated—major premise. What such analysts assume is that a country which is bent upon and is engaged in a major [17] program of predatory acquisitive activity (Japan) and a country which is opposed to and is menaced by that kind of activity (the United States) can merely by the conclusion by their governments of an agreement become "friends"; and, further, that if the United States and Japan would thus "become friends" the United States could expect Japan to respect and to safeguard American interests (and principles) in the Far East and the Pacific.—The authors of this suggestion—and assumption—apparently believe that two strokes of a pen on one piece of paper by two diplomats will transform a predatory nation overnight into a contented, peace-loving and peace-supporting power; also, that a treaty can take the place of and do the work of a Battle Fleet.—In the case of Mr. Lippmann, we find a writer who on June 4 had expressed regarding "the conquerors" (Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy) the view that ". . . we cannot buy their good will by trying to appease them" expressing two days later with regard to Japan the view that we can not only gain Japan's good will but can make of Japan a friendly and to-be-relied-upon associate by a process of appeasement. Query: Do any of these protagonists *really believe* that Japan's objectives and methods are today so unlike those of Germany that the United States and Japan could be "good friends" whereas and while the United States and Germany [18] cannot possibly be friends; that the United States must in the interests of its own security oppose Germany but at the same time not only should not oppose but should aid and support Japan?

Mr. Lippmann affirms that "Japan and the United States have nothing to gain and a very great deal to lose by going to war—or even by standing opposed as if they might be going to war" and that "it follows that there is no conflict between Japan and the United States which is not reconcilable by diplomacy", whence—that the United States has nothing to gain by opposing Japan. By the same tokens, there were not long ago those who, notwithstanding all of the evidence which was available to the whole world regarding the objectives and the methods of the Nazi leaders of Germany, contended that Great Britain and France had nothing to gain by standing opposed to Germany. By the same tokens, all conflict between Nazi Germany and Great Britain could be reconciled by diplomacy. (An effort based on that principle was made at Munich.) By the same tokens, all conflict between any "have" nation or nations and any "have not" nation or nations could be reconciled by diplomacy. By the same tokens, all conflict between capital and labor, and all conflict between political parties, and all conflict between the law-abiding members and the predatory members [19] of any community could be settled by diplomacy; the conflict between Japan and China could be settled by diplomacy; Japan's desire to possess the Netherlands East Indies could be disposed of by diplomacy; and "fifth column" activities anywhere and everywhere could be disposed of by diplomacy.

The essence of Mr. Lippman's proposal is that the United States should enter upon a "negotiation which might lead *through a new commercial treaty* to a political understanding", which would leave the American and the Japanese navies "free to maintain order and stability in their respective spheres of influence".

From 1911 to January 26, 1940 the United States and Japan *had* a commercial treaty and they had a number of other treaties—including the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact—which collectively were intended to regulate contacts, to ensure fair and equal treatment, and to maintain peace. Nothwithstanding the existence of these treaties, Japan embarked upon a procedure of conquest and did all sorts of violence to American nationals, American property, and American rights and interests in general. The American Government protested and pled. Japan went right on. Finally the American Government denounced the commercial treaty in order that it might have its hands free to take, [*20*] if and when it saw fit, retaliatory action by measures short of war. For the first time, the Japanese became alarmed and began to show *some* respect for American rights in the Far East. Treaties had proved ineffective. Entreaties had proved ineffectual. Fear of possible material pressures finally had, and has been having, *some* influence. What the Japanese leadership today wants now above all things is to be relieved of all possibility of pressure from the United States—in order that Japan may "go the limit" toward completing her conquest of China and taking possession of various great storehouses of natural resources in eastern Asia and the western Pacific. The conclusion of a new commercial treaty *at this time* would be of tremendous advantage to Japan and would give the United States nothing comparable in diplomatic or economic value.

A division of the Pacific into a United States "sphere of influence" on the east and a Japanese "sphere of influence" on the west would, it is true, leave the Japanese Navy "*free*" in the thus-created Japanese "sphere", but it would not in any way ensure that the said navy would "maintain order and stability" in the said "sphere" or that Japan would respect in that area American, or British, or French, or Netherland, or Soviet, or Chinese rights and interests.

In passing, attention may be called to the fact that [*21*] the Japanese Navy was "free to maintain order and stability" in the Far East in 1931; the Japanese Navy has been "free" to do that thing ever since; it is "free" to do it today; and it has *not* done that; it has done just the opposite.

The Japanese have today no higher regard for a diplomatic arrangement, an international commitment, or a treaty provision than have the Germans. Some of the Japanese leaders may talk of or may make commitments, their Foreign Office may negotiate treaties, but the objective of their real leaders, the Army and the Navy within the "military element", is expansion of Japanese political authority and economic power—and Japanese armed force will move on and will take where it can, when it can, and as it can, being checked only by opposition to it of material obstacles which are or which it fears to be too great for it to overcome.

It is *not* "the truth" that "there is no conflict between Japan and the United States which is not reconcilable by diplomacy". The United States stands for peace on a basis of law, of order, of security, of justice, et cetera. Japan is bent today upon driving occidental interests out of eastern Asia and the western Pacific, and is bent upon establishing in eastern Asia and the western Pacific by whatever processes may contribute thereto a Japanese hegemony or a great and constantly greater Japanese political empire.

[*22*] There is no need or occasion for the European war to come to the Pacific—unless Japan chooses to bring (put) it there and the United States permits Japan to do so. There is no need or occasion for war to come between the United States and Japan—unless *Japan* goes further than she has already gone (which is too far) in moves of aggression and of general disregard and destruction of the rights and interests of the United States (and of the world at large). While the United States is in position to use economic pressures against Japan and to use a Fleet against Japan, there exist material obstacles which tend to restrain Japan's leaders. If the United States were to conclude with Japan, now, a new treaty ensuring Japan against economic pressures, and/or if the United States removes its Battle Fleet from the Pacific, one or both of those obstacles will thereby have been removed, and the temptation to Japan's effective leadership ("the military") to make the most of the opportunity thus presented will have been increased. Mere concluding of agreements at this moment will not suffice to convince the Japanese leadership that "friendly

relations" [23] with the United States henceforth are preferable to the gathering in of spoils rendered, by the concluding of agreements, the more readily available now and immediately available.

We should, of course and by all means, try to prevent consummation of a closer association by Japan of herself with the axis powers. But, we should do more than that, we should try to prevent advance by Japan toward further acts of aggression and acquisition by herself on her own account and for her own advantage—all of which acts, when and as engaged in, will contribute toward the working out of the plans of Nazi Germany. We have already done much toward restraining Japan. Simultaneously, ourselves exercising a great measure of self-restraint, we have been endeavoring to lead the Japanese to see that a course of aggression will in the long run be not profitable where as a course of procedure by peaceful means could be highly profitable. We have talked consistently and constantly of the importance of principles. Should we now make a wholesale abandonment of the said principles—thereby conceding that, not force, but mere *fear of force* is mightier than principles and mightier than professed devotion to principles?

Reduced to simplest terms, what the advocates of an appeasement propose is that we abandon our Far Eastern policy [24] of a hundred years' standing, that we abandon the idea of the integrity of sovereignties in the Far East, that we abandon such responsibilities as were and are ours under those which remain in effect of the Washington Conference treaties, that we give up the idea of befriending China toward resistance to Japan and thus toward defense of various of our principles and interests, and that we accord Japan, deliberately and by process of agreement, what would amount to a free hand in the western Pacific and eastern Asia. Now, if we wish to make these various abandonments, and if we wish to give Japan a free hand, we can do both very easily and without going to the trouble of or incurring the disadvantages which would accrue from doing so by concluding an agreement; all that we would need to do would be to announce on our own part that we abandon the field, to withdraw by our own orders the few ships that we have in Far Eastern waters and the few marines that we maintain at three points in China, and to move our Fleet from the Pacific into the Atlantic.

Assume, for the sake of thorough exploration, that it were granted in principle that we should negotiate some kind of an agreement with Japan. What might the provisions of that agreement be? What should they be? By answers to these two questions the appeasement thesis might be and [25] should be tested. These two questions should stand at the beginning of Mr. Lippmann's statement of that thesis. They should be answered before he proceeds with the contention that the problem of Japanese-American relations can be solved by diplomacy alone and that the action for which he contends would produce the solution.

The whole of the appeasement contention rests—for whatever else it may be worth—upon an assumption that, promises having been given by the United States and promises having been given by Japan, the United States could thereafter assume and expect that Japan would live up to or perform within the limits of her promises. In the light of the history of the past forty-five years, no such assmuption could with warrant be made, and reliance upon any such assumption would be folly.

Japan has it within her power to ensure the peace of the Pacific. The United States does not have that within its power. Japan needs only to desist from certain courses in which she is engaged and to refrain from certain courses toward which she is inclined—and there will be peace in the Pacific. This means that the problem is a problem not of giving pledges, it is a problem of action, a problem [26] of behavior, a problem of performance. Action gives evidence and proof of intention. Assurances of intention constitute neither evidence nor proof.

The conflict which is raging today is between two great groups of major powers, is between two ideologies, is between those nations which have and which wish to hold and those nations which are out to "take"—and this conflict is world-wide. On one side are China, Great Britain, and the United States: on the other side are Japan, Germany and Italy. The conflict is raging not alone in Europe but also in the Far East. The three powers of the to-have-and-to hold group are menaced not alone in Europe and on the Atlantic but in eastern Asia and on the Pacific. Whatever *any* one of the to-have-and-to-hold group loses is a loss *for all* members of the group: and whatever any one of the "take" group gains is a gain for all members of that group.

The United States, as a party to this conflict, *must function* not on one front only but *on two fronts*. In the event of our "abandoning" any angle of our western front (that is, the western Pacific and the Far East)—and of Japan's gaining thereby, and of China, Great Birtain, et cetera, losing thereby—by just so much will the position [27] of the "have" group of which the United States is a member be weakened and the "take" group (Japan, Germany and Italy) be strengthened.

"We cannot buy . . . (the) good will" of the Nazis or the good will of the Fascists. Nor can we buy the good will of the Japanese military leadership. "We can (could), however, earn their (the Nazis' and the Fascists') contempt" and we can (could), by like efforts of attempt to "appease" them, "earn the contempt" of Japan's military leadership. And more, we could also earn the contempt of the British, the contempt of various of our own "neutral" associates, the contempt and resentment and bitterness of 400 million plus Chinese, the contempt of the whole world of today and of tomorrow.

[28] IV. Encouraging China to Make a Compromise or Adverse Settlement with Japan.

The Chinese do not wish today to make peace with Japan on the basis of any compromise which would leave Japanese armed forces in China. The Chinese are war weary, but no more so than are the Japanese. The Chinese are not confronted with any imminent necessity of making an early peace with Japan. Given a free field, the Chinese have at least even chances of outlasting the Japanese in a struggle which is highly burdensome to each of the two countries. It has been demonstrated during the past three years that the Japanese belief and representation that Japan is capable of creating in China conditions of peace, law, order, and stability are not well founded: the Japanese have shown themselves psychologically unqualified for the performance of that task. A "peace" settlement concluded between China and Japan now and under existing circumstances would have no solid foundations or anchorage. It would be inconsistent with American relationships and with U. S. objectives in relationships with the Far East, and it would not on balance profit the United States.

[29] Excerpt from letter by a Chinese business man to Mr. Walter Lippmann, dated June 6, 1940

"Carried to its logical conclusion, your thesis undoubtedly means that China should surrender and, like Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Norway cooperate with the aggressor. It would also signify that China's three years of desperate resistance in the name of democracy, with its unprecedented sacrifice of human lives and property, should be halted because of a European conflict which may affect America. In case any Chinese leader follows your logic and leads his people into the arms of Japan, what assurance would America have that the Japanese war machine, with the cooperation of 450,000,000 Chinese who have proved themselves sterling fighters, would not wage war on all Pacific countries? Does such an eventuality relieve America?

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"As I view the desperate world situation, there is no easy short-cut to a peaceful settlement. Short-cuts no matter how sincere and well-intended, as amply demonstrated by the Munich agreements, only prolong the agony. The United States cannot fight aggression in one ocean and condone it in the other. To do so, simply destroys America's traditional foreign policy to no practical purpose.

"The Chinese during the past few years have successfully [30] resisted the aggressions of a mechanized army considered second only to Hitler's in striking power. They have done this with little else but their human flesh, indomitable spirit and courage. Thus far, they have demonstrated that vitality and spirit can count for just as much as mechanized material in modern warfare. They have kept the Japanese so occupied and exhausted that Japan today dares not move as rapidly as she would like in the direction of the Allied and American possessions in the Pacific. Japan, I assure you, cannot be placated by momentary measures of appeasement, and she fears nothing more than the Chinese will to continue their undying resistance. America's greatest assurance in the Pacific is the maintenance of this Chinese will to resist."

[31] Excerpts from *Chicago Daily News* editorial, June 10, 1940.

"A DEAL WITH JAPAN?

"In order to make a deal with Japan today, we would have to condone, openly or covertly, its treaty-breaking invasions of China. We would have to betray not only our Chinese friends, but also more than a hundred years of American

policy in the Far East. We would be imitating, in effect, the worst and most dangerous aspects of Britain's 'appeasement' efforts.

"And once we had made the deal, of what use would it be? Japan has deliberately broken one solemn treaty with us. Why should it keep another, any longer than its own interest required? What guarantee would we have that, at the first opportunity, Japan would not gang up against us with the rest of our enemies?

"No, there is only one way for us to be secure. We must make ourselves able, by combined sea and air power, supported by a sufficient army, to wage war, if need be, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific. No diplomacy, no scheming, no wishful thinking, no device, nothing whatever can save us now from this painful necessity, short of a miracle—the miracle of an Allied victory over Hitler."

[*32*] Excerpts from article by Raymond Clapper, published June 13, 1940.

NO DEAL WITH JAPAN

"Because we are afraid, we should try to appease Japan. How? By selling out now. By turning adrift to the tender mercies of the yellow race Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and all way stations.

"In order to buy Japan's friendship and support, we would put the seal of our approval upon such a betrayal. We would scuttle on every international ideal. For our treachery we would gain nothing but a Munich, to last until the day when Japan wanted something else that had not been included in the bargain. Then Japan would take whatever it was that she wanted and pay no more heed to her deal with us than she paid to her treaty pledges when she went into Manchukuo, into China proper, or when she fortified the mandate islands in the Pacific.

"If Japan is determined to extend her domination in the Far East, at least let it not be done with our approval, as part of a deal with us. Let us not be a party to it in a craven act that would instantly be a tip-off to the totalitarian powers that we had lost our nerve as completely as the British lost theirs in the early 1930s, when [*33*] Japan went into Manchukuo, or as the French lost theirs when they permitted Hitler to reoccupy the Rhineland.

"Don't think that a deal with Japan would not be recognized as a tip-off to all Latin America, a tip-off that the third great democracy also was on the run. Are we to invite every Latin American country to begin saying of us, as the little nations of Europe did of Britain, that they cannot depend upon us? Are we to give them that encouragement to rush into deals with Hitler as the new rising force that is to replace the United States as the protector of the Western Hemisphere?

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"When France and England have been crushed, only the United States and our system on the Western Hemisphere, plus what we may take over from the British Empire, will be left standing in the way.

"In this situation we can trust nobody but ourselves. We can trust only our own force. We want none of the false sense of security that a deal with Japan would give us, a deal that might prove as treacherous as Munich. Japan is playing the same game as the other crowd and we should be foolish to deceive ourselves. We must make busy being the strong neighbor in the Western Hemisphere. No neighbor now is a good neighbor unless he is strong. We need guns, not treaties."

[*34*] Full text of *Chicago Daily News* editorial, June 17, 1940.

"THE APPEASERS

"The agitation for appeasement of Japan's ambitions in Asia by American concessions is growing among those who seem determined to force the United States into the fatal course taken by Britain under Neville Chamberlain.

"The proponents of this idea seem to think that Japan would be reasonable in its demands, and that, having signed an agreement with the United States, Japan would abide by it. Chamberlain had the same delusions about Germany and Italy. We have had agreements and treaties with Japan before. But they have been honored in the breach rather than in the observance.

"The philosophy behind this agitation is exemplified by a thoughtful editorial that appeared in the Chicago Tribune of May 30. Excerpts from it are cited here-

with. Accompanying them in italics are excerpts from the speeches of Neville Chamberlain:

" 'The United States and Japan can come to a friendly understanding. There is no obstacle in the way except the determination of some Americans to dominate Japan's policy in China.

" '*And yet whatever differences there may be between* [35] *us and other nations on that subject, do not forget that we are all members of the human race. . . . There must be something in common between us.*

" 'Japan needs peace with the United States.

" '*There is not a country or government that wants to see a European war.*

" 'Japan would be disposed to be more reasonable if Chinese ports and forts were not in European hands.

" '*If we can bring these four nations into friendly discussion, into a settlement of their differences, we shall have saved the peace of Europe for a generation.*

" 'The Japanese are more willing now than ever to come to settlement in China. * * *

" '*Before saying farewell to Herr Hitler* * * * *he repeated to me with great earnestness what he had already said at Berchtesgaden, namely, that this was the last of his territorial ambitions in Europe and that he had no wish to include in the Reich people of other races than Germans* * * * *that he wanted to be friends with England.*

" 'America may be able to aid China a great deal more effectively if it isn't quarreling with Japan than it can by keeping up a futile bombardment of threats and hard words. * * *

" '*What we did was to save her (Czechoslovakia) from annihilation and give her a chance of new life as a new state.* * * * *Therefore I think the government deserves the approval of this House for their conduct of affairs in this crisis which has saved Czechoslovakia from destruction and Europe from Armageddon.*'

"The italicized paragraphs exemplify the Chamberlain philosophy of appeasement and delusion. The alternate paragraphs exemplify the philosophy of those who would follow the Chamberlain program here. We know how fallacious the Chamberlain philosophy was in the case of Britain. We should know how fallacious it would be if applied to our own affairs."

[37] Excerpts from letter by Carl Crow, dated June 14, 1940, published in Lynchburg, Virginia, *News*, June 17, 1940.

"No sensible person can disagree with the argument of Mr. Walter Lippmann that peace between the United States and Japan is highly desirable. But in his contention that we should hasten to conclude an amicable arrangement because of the dangers which threaten us Mr. Lippmann ignores consideration of facts which must be better known to him than to most Americans.

"The most important of these is that, as has so often been emphasized by Japan, the only basis of friendship she will recognize is based on approval of her policy in East Asia, involving the conquest of China. Unless we are prepared to do that anything else we might do would be as futile as Mr. Chamberlain's appeasement policy at Munich. Any move we might make toward the conclusion of a new trade treaty would be interpreted by the war lords who rule Japan as an evidence of weakness and instead of making relations better would only make them worse. It would only encourage them to further aggressions and would be a disservice to the Japanese people whose progress is halted by their own war lords.

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[38] "Mr. Lippmann appears momentarily to have forgotten that Hitler's attack on Europe, Japan's invasion of China and Mussolini's sword rattling were all preceded by the so-called "anti-Comintern pact" whereby the three became partners in a program which was not officially disclosed but has been made clear by actions. It was as a result of that pact and supplemental agreements that Mussolini is helping Hitler. The only reason Japan is not playing the same part is that she is bogged down in China and the American fleet is in the Pacific. Give Japan a free hand and she would at once abandon her policy of non-involvement—a policy that has been forced on her by her inability to carry out any other. With the open or secret aid of Japan to Hitler the chances of

an Allied victory would be greatly lessened. Indeed we might face much graver dangers than those which inspire Mr. Lippmann's fears—a victorious Germany on the Atlantic, a victorious Italy in the Mediterranean and a victorious Japan on the Pacific, all bound together by a secret agreement and each inspired by the same conviction that democratic government should be crushed.

"Faced by a menace of that seriousness, what further measures of appeasement could Mr. Lippmann suggest?"

[39] Excerpts from article by Major George Fielding Eliot, published June 27, 1940.

"MAJOR ELIOT TAKES SHARP ISSUE WITH MOVES TO APPEASE JAPAN

"There are some voices in this country now raised in favor of an American 'understanding' with Japan, as a means for freeing our hands in the Atlantic. Why there should be any more virtue in a Japanese signature on a treaty today than there was on certain previous occassions of historic note it is difficult to understand.

"If we are compelled temporarily, or permanently, to abandon certain of our Pacific or Far Eastern interests by the necessity of concentrating our strength in the Atlantic, then we must do so. But let us be perfectly clear in our minds about what we are doing. Le us be sure that what we are abandoning is not worth more than what we can save by making any drastic changes in our dispositions.

"We must do the best we can, with a critical situation and inadequate military force, but let us not commit the crowning folly of again putting our faith in scraps of paper bearing totalitarian seals and promises."

[40] Excerpts from Oakland, California, *Tribune* editorial, June 19, 1940

"FIRMNESS IN THE FAR EAST

"What the United States' policy will be in the event of new Japanese aggression we do not know. But this much is patent on the basis of past experience: Any appeasement of Japan on the part of this country will defeat its ends by encouraging the Tokyo chauvinists, by giving the impression that we are weak, and by undermining our prestige with South American States who look to us for protection. It also is clear that we cannot stop Japan unless we are prepared for a protracted naval warfare in the Pacific and unless we use the great British naval base at Singapore. Whatever happens, we must be uncompromising in our opposition to the pilfering of Franco-British territory in the Far East."

[41] Excerpts from article by Barnet Nover, published June 28, 1940.

"CHINA FIGHTS ON"

"The spirit of appeasement is not dead; it has merely shifted its habitation. It is being urged that the United States come to terms with Japan in order that our fleet might be free for any eventualities that might occur on this side of the hemisphere. It may be that, faced by threats from both Asia and Europe, we shall have to abandon Asia and concentrate our force to resist incursions from the other side of the Atlantic.

"But let us be under no illusions as to what that would mean; it would be a capitulation to Japan and a capitulation which, in no sense, would add to our security.

"At the moment when she is still very vulnerable we would be permitting Japan to become invulnerable; at the moment when Japan is still at our mercy we would, by a policy of appeasement toward her, be placing ourselves at Japan's mercy. And at no time can we for a moment forget that the German threat from the East is paralleled by the Japanese threat from the West.

"As long as Great Britain fights on, the Nazi danger to us is limited; as long as China fights on, we have relatively little to fear from Japan. But China, like Great [42] Britain, is fighting our battles which is why out of selfishness no less than out of sentimental considerations, we must give whatever aid we can to both and desert neither.

"It is always the counsel of wisdom when facing grave emergencies to limit one's risks; but nothing is gained and much is lost when, in an attempt to limit risks, we stand a real chance of multiplying them."

[43] Excerpts from La Crosse, Wisconsin, *Tribune* editorial, June 22, 1940.

"NO APPEASEMENT HERE"

"Loss of prestige is one of Great Britain's chief liabilities at the present moment. With each concession, with each step backward, with each attempt to stave off danger, England lost face. In the case of the island empire, ill prepared as events proved, there was little else to do.

"But the United States is not now in a situation where it need proclaim to the whole world it is afraid. The nation is unprepared admittedly to fight in two oceans. But there is no doubt that if this country gears itself for defense—and it is gearing itself for defense—it can meet any challenge.

"It will not do to announce to the world that the last great democracy has lost its nerve. South America must have faith in the integrity of the United States and in this nation's ability to back up the Monroe doctrine. Japan will be less a menace if she fears America that if America fears her. Any agreement with Japan which revealed this nation's desire for protection would be tantamount to an invitation to attack.

"The Fascist nations put practical considerations before [44] ideals or principles. A treaty based on the fright oof the United States would remain in effect only so long as Japan found it profitable.

"The world bas been shown with terrible clarity the effects of such a peace as the Munich peace. Let not this nation make Great Britain's mistake."

[45] Excerpts from an article by Robert North in *Amerasia*, July 1940.

"AN AMERICAN-JAPANESE AXIS IS PROPOSED

"Appeasement of Japan and withdrawal of the United States naval forces from the Pacific is urged by the Chicago *Tribune*, the New York *Daily News* and Walter Lippmann's column in the New York *Herald Tribune*. They propose negotiation of a new commercial agreement and diplomatic alignment with Japan.

" 'Be nice to Japan now, and we may well be able to double our fleet's effective strength by making friends with the Japanese Navy,' says the *News*. 'It seems to us the time has come for us to try to shut our back door, so to speak, before sending our best fighting men, guns, planes and ships out our front door to try to win another war for the Allies,' it says editorially. So it recommends that we 'insure ourselves against a two-front war if we can, by renewing our trade treaty with Japan and soft-pedaling the moral indignation over Japan's aggressions in China for a while.'

"These proposals, if carried into effect, would leave the defense of our Pacific coast to the Japanese Navy, instead of our own. San Francisco, Seattle, Los Angeles, Portland would be protected by Japanese promises. So would Hawaii, the Philippines, and our trade and investment position in [46] the Far East, not to speak of Alaska and the Pacific approaches to Canada, Mexico and all points south in this hemisphere.

"These newspaper strategists give us for defense against Japanese aggression the Japanese Navy. On its decks will stand Japanese admirals, beaming friendship because civilians at home have signed another treaty.

"Why not go the whole way, gentlemen, and shut the front door on the Atlantic, also, by making a similar agreement with Hitler? Let bygones be bygones with him, as with Japan, and while we are at it treble our navy by adding the German and Italian fleets to ours along with the Japanese. Then with Hitler protecting us against Hitler onthe East, and Japan protecting us against Japan on the West, we could get away from all this bother about national defense. We could use our new trade agreements to strengthen our new allies for our own protection. We could build them up economically, just as the Allies built up Hitler, and hope for the best."

* * * * * * *

"If Japan should emerge from this war with her industrial machine intact, she would no longer be a competitor merely in knick-knacks, toys, light bulbs and other small consumers' goods. She has shifted the center of gravity of her pro-

duction from light to heavy industry. The capacity of her heavy industrial plant has more than doubled since 1931".

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[47] "Chinese resistance has not only prevented the proposed development of Chinese cotton, but has compelled importation of foreign growths for Chinese mills. But if, with the help of a new American trade agreement, Japan should succeed in subjugating China, or even in establishing a firm foothold in North China alone, the first condition for complete independence of American cotton will have been met. China is the third largest cotton producer.

"Success of the New Order means not only that Japan would be lost as our third largest customer by obtaining new sources of supply of the things she buys here; it means that she would be equipped for cut-throat competition in those very price markets, Latin America and Asia, which offer us the only opportunity for substantial expansion. At a time when the European market appears about to be closed to our goods, this would lead toward American export strangulation. The effects on our entire economic structure are incalculable."

[48] Full text of article by Walter Lippmann in New York Herald Tribune of June 6, 1940.

TOWARD A PEACE WITH JAPAN

Although the attention of the Americas is fixed upon Europe, they must never forget that the American continents are a great island set amidst the oceans of the world. On the west the ocean washes the coasts of Asia and of the island empires of the east.

The only Navy which the American hemisphere possesses is now in the western ocean. In that same ocean there is the Japanese navy. As between the United States and Japan, two nations which have never been at war, there has developed in recent years a growing opposition of policies, interests and diplomatic principle. Their relationship today is obviously unstable. The naval treaty has lapsed. The commercial treaty has been abrogated. In respect to China the two countries have taken positions which are in theory irreconcilable. In respect to the Netherlands Indies their public declarations promising respect for the status quo are ambiguous, and in the light of conceivable developments, exceedingly precarious.

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To put the matter more plainly, the two countries confront each other across the vast expanse of the Pacific, each having taken a position where untoward circumstances or an uncalculated overt act might plunge both of them into a prolonged and exhausting struggle. In such a struggle [48a] neither Japan nor the United States would be serving its vital interests. Both nations would be sacrificing them. The Japanese, already suffering from the Chinese war, would by engaging and exhausting themselves still further make themselves vulnerable to the only great power, namely Russia, which can strike by land and by sea and by air at the very heart of the Japanese empire. The United States, by drifting into such a war, would be engaging the Navy for years to come in a confused and indecisive campaign on the other side of our world; yet at that very moment the security of the American continents may require the use of the whole Navy to guard those strategic points in the Atlantic Ocean which must be held if this hemisphere is to be defended.

It is now a kind of suicidal madness for the two nations to contemplate even the possibility of letting the existing tension and the existing conflicts of interest and principle develop into a war. For in such a war both would be sacrificing much greater principles than they were upholding and both would be jeopardizing fatally interests which are infinitely more important than those they were defending.

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Some, perhaps, will feel that to express this candid view of Japanese-American relations is to display a deplorable weakness at a time when only strength and firmness are good currency in international affairs. I do not think it is weakness to make the plain truth the basis of national [48b] policy. The Japanese know their own strength and their own weaknesses and they know our strength and our weaknesses; and we know the same of them and of ourselves. Neither they nor we can afford to bluff. Neither we nor they can afford to provoke the other. This is the truth. And on the truth we shall both do well to found our policies.

Lest this opinion be ascribed to a sudden fear engendered by the critical state of Europe, I hope I may be pardoned for saying that many of us have held and expressed this view for a long time, ever since the outbreak of the European war was manifestly inevitable. For it has been clear to us that whatever our sympathies and interests in the Far East, a great European war for the domination of the Western World would affect directly and vitally the security and the independence of this hemisphere. We have held that, by comparison, our interests in the Far East would prove to be secondary, however important they might under more normal circumstances appear to be. We have, therefore, held that it was perilous and in the highest degree unstatesmanlike to let develop an irreconcilable conflict with Japan, to conceal from ourselves the immense gravity of such a conflict, to exacerbate the tension by threats and by declarations that are too absolute to be negotiable.

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We have held that this provocative attitude was downright folly especially at a time when the country was doped and duped by a notion of "neutrality" in Europe which might compel it to stand by and risk the collapse of Allied sea power. We have argued that the policy of the majority of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate during the month of July a year ago was a classic example of how misguided men can imperil the security of a nation.

For in that fatal month the committee challenged Japan in the Pacific by supporting, and even by inciting to, the abrogation of the commercial treaty, and by brandishing the threat of an embargo; in the very same weeks when it was proposing to risk a war with Japan, the same committee was refusing to lift the embargo on the sale of arms to the Allies on the ground that what happened to them was no concern of ours. It was a most awful case of not letting your right hand know what your left hand is doing, an almost incredible case of being blindly provocative in one ocean and blindly supine in the other ocean. And unhappily the Administration, which knew better, acquiesced in this utterly unstatesmanlike policy of challenging Japan in Asia while we were forbidden to support the Allies in Europe.

* * * * * * *

The situation today is, of course, worse than it was then. But still the fundamental interests involved are the same. It is still true that Japan and the United [*48d*] States have nothing to gain and a very great deal to lose by going to war—or even by standing opposed as if they might be going to war. It is still true that our interests in the Far East are secondary to our interests in this hemisphere; because this is true, it follows that there is no conflict between Japan and the United States which is not reconcilable by diplomacy. We should, therefore, recognize this truth and should, I submit, enter immediately into friendly and conciliatory and candid negotiations with the Japanese for the avowed purpose of preserving the peace in the Pacific.

* * * * * * *

This is not a time for bluffing and this is not a time for indulging that false pride which causes men to cling to an untenable position. We know that we must defend our security and our very independence in this hemisphere and in the Atlantic Ocean. We know that Japan has a greater interest in Asia than we have. Let us recognize the fact. On the other hand, the Japanese position in the Far East is at least as difficult as is our position in the Western Hemisphere. Japan is at war with China. Japan has Soviet Russia for her nearest neighbor. Her commerce with this hemisphere is of critical importance to the standard of life of the Japanese people.

In these considerations there are the essential elements of a negotiation which might lead through a new commercial treaty to a political understanding based on the principle [*48e*] that the European war, which is also a European revolution, is not to be extended to the Pacific. We should aim high and aim far—at a new order of things in the Pacific in which, having adjusted our secondary conflicts, the two navies will cease to confront each other as potential antagonists and will be free to maintain order and stability in their respective spheres of influence.

* * * * * * *

I have no way of knowing whether the Japanese nation will respond to such a change of American policy. My belief is that they might, that they do not regard themselves as our enemies, that they respect the power we are capable of developing and that the best of the Japanese leaders and the mass of the

Japanese people desire peace with the United States. Even if this is not the fact, we shall never, I believe, regret having tried wholeheartedly to preserve the peace in half the world.

[49] Full text of New York Herald Tribune editorial, July 7, 1940.

"JAPAN'S APPEASEMENT"

It is rather amazing at this juncture, when the character of the totalitarian response to Mr. Chamberlain's appeasement policy is so familiar to every American, and seems so inevitable in retrospect, to note that there is some agitation in Washington and elsewhere for the appeasement of Japan. It is suggested that we make concessions to the Japanese point of view and negotiate a new commercial treaty with Japan, so that we can turn our backs on the Pacific and give all our attention to the menace from Europe. These suggestions, which have had Senator Vandenberg's support, must be borne of ignorance of the Japanese point of view, of the workings of the Japanese military mind and of Japan's record of bad faith.

It can be stated, without condition or reservation, that no price in terms of appeasement which this country could pay would buy Japanese good will or good behavior in the Pacific.

To get even an empty promise of security from a Japan whose policies are completely controlled by the uniformed expansionists, this country would have to recognize the justice of Japan's alienation of Manchuria and the martyrdom of China: recognize the legality of whatever position Japan can acquire in China through a campaign of indiscriminate slaughter and bestial savagery; recognize her police rights and special interests throughout eastern Asia, the adjacent waters [49a] and the East Indies; and agree to withdraw all armed forces from that part of the world and leave to Japan's discretion what access we should have to markets and sources of supply between Hawaii, Singapore and the Aleutian Islands. And what would the pledges bought with such concessions be worth in a crisis, if the fleet were withdrawn from the Pacific and if Nippon's militarists discovered that it was Japan's heaven-appointed destiny to expand in this direction? All pledges would then become as "in applicable" to Japan's mission in Hawaii, California, Alaska, or withersoever weak defenses invited her, as the nine-power treaty of 1922 is to continental expansion. Remember that among Asiatic totalitarians, as among Europe's Asiatic-minded despots, a leaning toward appeasement is irrefutable evidence of weakness and fear; and remember that, when the gods have delivered the weak into the hands of the strong, it is a breach of faith with divinity to keep faith with weakness.

Those who contend that we should buy security from Japan contend that the President, Mr. Hull and the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee have made a bungle of our relations with Japan. This is untrue. The powers of the United States government to check Japanese aggression and to resent flagrant breaches of faith have been limited, because of the nation's aversion to overseas entanglements and its fear that strong measures would bring reprisals, and reprisals, war. [49b] With such powers as it has had, however, it has put the only effective check on Japan's intense craving to profit by British, French and American preoccupation with the European situation.

The denunciation of the commercial treaty a year ago brought to an end the campaign of persecution against Occidentals in China, just when it was being extended to American citizens. Japanese presistence in that campaign would have meant war. The Administration's refusal to renew the treaty, since its expiration in January, and its retention of the right to impose disabilities upon Japanese trade which would have hamstrung the Japanese Army have kept the militarists in as placatory a mood as any influence could have short of the presence of an overwhelmingly superior army. The presence of the fleet in the Pacific has been the only sedative in the world that has restrained Japan's naval expansionists from adventures that would have brought the war into the Pacific.

[*50*] Full text of Chicago Daily Tribune editorial May 30, 1940.

"HOW TO DOUBLE THE FLEET IN A WEEK"

We are talking excitedly of armaments and congress is voting the money in billion dollar bills. War material is coming out of the mills on Capitol hill, but it is not coming out of the factories, and for a long, long time it will not be coming out of them. In the meantime we are neglecting to improve a situation affecting our Pacific frontier. The opportunity is there, and if this nation would make use of it it could double the power of its fleet and do more in a short time to increase the strength of its defenses than it can do in a year of production, even on a 24 hour day and a 7 day week.

The United States and Japan can come to a friendly understanding. There is no obstacle in the way except the determination of some Americans to dominate Japan's policy in China. Japan needs peace with the United States. Japanese statesmen may be looking at the future with as much uncertainty as prudent Americans. In a world rapidly changing from its old historical trends and whirling off its old historical foundations, Japan may feel quite as dubious as the United States. Many overtures have been made by Japan for an understanding which would deal with what is real in the relations of the two countries and avoid what is superficially conflicting.

[*50a*] The United States at this time cannot afford to conduct its foreign relations wholly on moral preconceptions. America may be able to aid China a great deal more effectively if it isn't quarreling with Japan than it can by keeping up a futile bombardment of threats and hard words which have done the Chinese no good and can do America a great deal of harm.

This country cannot afford to have an enemy in the Pacific. It is not necessary to have one there. Peaceable trade can be resumed and a peaceable understanding can be had. That understanding would rest upon material advantages which Japan would obtain from friendship with the United States and therefore would have the promise of an enduring understanding.

Japan need not be driven into the German-Italian camp. If events progress as they have been doing in Europe the British and French interests in China will be canceled out. Japan then will have won a major campaign. Its policy has been, in a way, a duplicate of our Monroe doctrine. Japan has objected to the entrenchment of powerful European nations off its coast, just as we would object to the same thing in relation to our national life.

Japan would be disposed to be more reasonable if Chinese ports and forts were not in European hands. China itself will be better satisfied to know that the foreigner [*50b*] is out. The Japanese are more willing now than ever to come to a settlement in China which will relieve them of a protracted and expensive war. That may not be possible at once, but an understanding between the United States and Japan might do more to conciliate the Chinese question than can be expected from the present bellicose attitude of the American government.

If we intend to keep our Pacific front bristling with threats the Japanese will look for their associations in other quarters and we know exactly where that will be. If the people in Washington who are rushing to arms in fear of a danger to the eastern front are sincere, if they mean to take precautions and provide against the future, they'll protect the western flank by making a friendly arrangement with the power which controls the far east. They won't so manage American affairs that trouble in the Atlantic will be accompanied by trouble in the Pacific. While they are passing a billion dollar appropriation for the American navy they won't continue to make it necessary to keep the battle fleet on its Honolulu base.

By accepting the Japanese overtures they can double the strength of the fleet immediately. The best defense policy of the United States could be written within a few weeks in a renewed trade treaty with the Japanese. That peaceable treaty would immediately enable the United States to use its [*50c*] fleet in the Atlantic if that's where it is needed. It would not be tied as now to the Pacific. In effect the strength of the fleet would be doubled by cutting half its problem away.

EXHIBIT NO. 97

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS,
September 21, 1940.

U.

Mr. WELLES: You state that both you and the Secretary feel that at this moment it would be undesirable for the Department to oppose the plans of the Navy to which the underlying memorandum relates.

You ask for my reaction.

The proposal is susceptible of discussion from two points of view: (a) policy in foreign relations or (b) policy in relations between this Department and the Navy Department.

There arises in my mind at once the question of which is more important, service of our objectives in the field of foreign relations, or service of some objectives particularly regarding which are not known to me in relations between this Department and the Navy Department.

On the face of Mr. Chapin s memorandum it appears that the Navy Department is advancing merely a tentative proposal and that it is seeking in good faith our opinion of the proposal on its merits. If there exists some particular and good reason why we should regard this as a definitive "plan" of the Navy and why we should advance no expression of view unfavorable to it, I am not aware of such fact. Again reverting to Mr. Chapin's statement [2] of the problem, I am compelled to assume that Admiral Stark will wish to discuss the matter with you on its merits.

The proposal calls for a withdrawal of the Fleet from Hawaiian waters and its engagement in maneuvers southward from San Diego for a period of approximately 60 days. The objective is stated to be Fleet training. The problem involved would be apparently a problem of defending the Panama Canal against a naval attack.

As you know, I have contended constantly and consistently during recent months that, the situation in the Far East having been and being what it is, the most advantageous point at which to hold our Fleet is Pearl Harbor. I believe that the presence of the Fleet at that point has rendered the Fleet more useful that would have been its presence at any other point, so long as disposal of the Fleet is simply for guard duty and general defense. I do not today share the view which I heard expressed a few days ago that the presence of the Fleet at Honolulu no longer exercises any restraining influence as regards the situation in the Far East. I believe that withdrawal of the Fleet eastward would diminish our diplomatic influence as regards that situation—even though it be announced that the withdrawal is only temporary, et cetera, et cetera.

[3] That the Fleet must have training exercises is axiomatic. Announcement that the Fleet is engaged in a problem relating to defense of the Panama Canal against a naval attack would tend to emphasize the fact that our policy is essentially a policy of defense in our own waters (only). The suggestion is made that the problem be kept very secret. I do not believe it would be so kept. Whether there be or not be an announcement, and whether there be or not be secrecy, the Japanese would learn enough about the Fleet's whereabouts to enable Japanese naval experts to draw inferences, and their inferences would be that, as always suspected by them, we have no intention of having our Fleet operate in the western Pacific.

I doubt the need at this time for training on a problem of defense of the Panama Canal against a naval attack. In my opinion the Japanese have no thought whatever of any possibility of a launching by them in any near future of a naval attack against the United States or the Panama Canal or any part of South America.

In Mr. Chapin's memorandum it is stated, presumably as an observation advanced by the Navy Department, that there might be an alternative: "a minor Fleet problem could be conducted if necessary in waters adjacent to Hawaii".—In my opinion it would be preferable at this time that training of the Fleet be achieved through such [4] an exercise than through the Pacific Coast exercise under reference.

The Navy is at present engaged in an operation involving the sending of the vessels of the Fleet, one-third at a time, from Pearl Harbor to San Diego and return. There arises in my mind the question why, in the light of that fact,

contemplate at this time a bringing of the whole Fleet again back to the West Coast at about the moment when that operation will have been completed.

In principle, I would always doubt the advisability of sending the whole pack of one's watchdogs to a hospital or to a training school at a time when there are an unusual number of ugly prowlers in one's neighborhood or in the neighborhood of one's outlying estates. My mind reacts adversely to suggestions which seem to me to involve such a procedure, just as it does to suggestions for the making of gestures without the accompaniment of definite and decided-upon objectives and at least tentatively decided-upon intentions.

In these days, we have almost ceased to give consideration to questions of expense. I would point out, however, that Fleet movements cost money. I for one would rather see such money as may be spent upon the Navy and its operations spent in greater proportion upon construction of new planes [5] and of new ships than upon maximum possible expansion of training operations.

/s/ SKH.

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

September 20, 1940

PA/H - Dr. Hornbeck:

The Secretary and I both feel that at this moment it would be undesirable for the Department of State to oppose the plans of the Navy which are obviously based on what in the judgment of the Navy is required by national defense.

Please let me have your reaction.

U:SW:IJ


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Mr. Hamilton
The Secty will
shortly call you and
Dr. Hornbeck to discuss
the attached.
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For your strictly confidential information, the original part of the problem is understood to involve a simulated attack at an unspecified time on the Panama Canal and its defenses from the East and West Coasts simultaneously. The problem has already been discussed with the President and has received his endorsement. The War Department is to be kept in complete ignorance for the time being of even the broad concept of the problem which is to be essentially a surprise affair.

The Navy Department is desirous of ascertaining the reactions of the Department of State to the proposed absence for two months of the main body of the United States Fleet from Hawaiian waters. It is of course realized that the world situation may develop so that at the last moment it would be inconsistent with policy to withdraw the Fleet completely from Hawaiian waters, and it was inferred that a minor fleet problem could be conducted if necessary in waters adjacent to Hawaii. The Navy Department also desires to know what the reactions of this Department would be to a request to use the territorial waters of the American republics listed above in this fleet problem.

It is my understanding that Admiral Stark will wish to speak personally with the Under Secretary at an early date.



EXHIBIT NO. 98

NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:
Subject: Japanese Convoy Movement towards Indo-China.

About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move approximately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000 already there by previous agreement.

Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from ten to thirty ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been assembled near the mouth of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could mean a force as great as 50,000, but more probably a smaller number. Included in this ship concentration was at least one landing-boat carrier. The deck-load of one vessel contained heavy bridge equipment. Later reports indicate that this movement is already under way and ships have been seen south of Formosa.

The officers concerned, in the Military Intelligence Division, feel that unless we receive other information, this is more or less a normal movement, that is, a logical follow-up of their previous notification to the Vichy Government.

I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular field.

(Signed) HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

EXHIBIT NO. 99

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
OFFICE OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
September 26, 1944.

Top Secret

There is attached a page from the *Congressional Record* of September 21, 1944, in which there is a statement by Congressman Church in respect to the delivery of a message to the State Department on December 7, 1941, by Lieutenant Commander Kramer of the Navy Department.

Our recollection of the matter is as follows: At about 10:00 a. m. on December 7 Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine came to the outer office of the Secretary of State to discuss the general situation of relations with Japan. They were shown by Mr. John Stone, a Foreign Service officer then serving as an assistant in the office of the Secretary, a document the contents of which were pertinent to the subject of what they were going to discuss with the Secretary and which had then been delivered to the outer office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, then on duty in the Navy Department. Lieutenant Commander Kramer was present in the room. The document contained no reference to any Japanese military movement. Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine are positive that no statement was made in their presence by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, as alleged, to the effect that "this looks like a surprise attack upon Pearl Harbor and a midnight attack upon the Philippines."

The conversation in the Secretary's outer office was intermittent and scattered among those present in the room. In other words, each person was not a party to all of the conversation. Mr. Hornbeck has a distinct impression that there was brought up Japanese naval disposition with specific mention of most recent advices of Japanese naval movements in the Gulf of Siam.

Mr. Hamilton recollects also that Lieutenant Commander Kramer remarked on that occasion, in reference to the matter of an appointment for the Japanese Ambassador to see the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m. on December 7, that the naming of the hour might mean that it was the hour for some Japanese movement. No mention was made of Pearl Harbor or of Hawaii or of the Philippines.

With regard to the statement that Lieutenant Commander Kramer then went to the White House and delivered the message, they have no knowledge whether this was a fact.

/s/ JWB
FE: Ballantine: HST

/s/ M. M. H.

EXHIBIT NO. 100

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

December 8, 1941.

REPORT OF PRISONER NUMBER ONE

Detailed information concerning this report will be submitted today. Preliminary report indicates the prisoner a Japanese Sub-Lieutenant, aged twenty-four years. Was pulled out of the water off Bellows Field this morning. Was taken prisoner by the Army and is held at Fort Shafter by Colonel Fielder. The officer refused to talk concerning the enemy's composition or disposition and at the present time the only information present is as follows:

1. He came ashore from a reef one mile off Bellows Field.

2. He and another officer were the only members of a two-man submarine. The reason for his capture was that he was sneaking up on what he thought to be a capital ship and in order to navigate he had to open the hatch of the submarine - whereupon water came into the hatch and swamped the motor. He thereupon drifted upon the reef. This officer was Captain and Navigator. The other officer has not been recovered. Information indicates that there are more of these small submarines in the vicinity and that they were brought here from some type of a mother ship. The prisoner did state that he had to navigate a distance of a hundred miles before running aground upon the reef. At the time of his capture the officer wore a step watch around his neck which stopped running at 0710. It is not known whether this is GCT or LCT. Although he did not give the enemy's forces or disposition he stated that so far as he knew the attack was a disappointment in that they expected a paralyzing blow to our fleet.

3. In accordance with the samuri code this prisoner has requested that he only be allowed to commit suicide.

It is evident that the officer appreciated the treatment afforded him by the naval questioners to that of the Army, and it is felt that with proper handling, further information might by derived from this officer.

Respectfully,

C. Tuttle

E. T. LAYTON.

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
District Intelligence Office
Sixth Floor, Young Hotel
Honolulu, Hawaii

O16/MB

December 8, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fleet Intelligence Officer

1. [illegible] young, adult Japanese male--muscular build, crop-ped black hair--[illegible]ently in excellent health. Gave his age as 24, sub-lieutenant in the Japanese Navy and a graduate of the Imperial Naval Academy.

2. He was without clothing of any kind, and seated in a chair was covered in an army blanket. Before questioning was started it was learned that this prisoner was taken on the beach at Bellows Field. That he had swum ashore and had around his neck, on a lanyard, a wrist watch which had salt water inside of it. The watch was stopped at 0720. The watch was inscribed on the reverse in Japanese characters--translated as follows: "Watch 2ND class, Type 1, Navy Model. Love-[illegible]." It was stated that he was an officer of the Japanese Navy, and gave his name as KAZUO SAKAMAKI of Okayama Prefecture. He had been one of a crew of two in a submarine which had run ashore on a reef approximately one mile off Bellows Field. He stated that he was the commanding officer of the submarine and the navigator and that his associate was the engineer--entire crew consisted of himself and one shipmate. He admitted that the submarine was of a small type which operated from a mother ship but refused to give the name or tonnage of the mother ship or the distance at sea of his disembarkation from the mother ship. When questioned as to whether the submarine was diesel or electric propelled he refused to answer. He stated that he had navigated "more than one hundred miles" when asked if the distance were as much as one hundred miles. Too much credence should not be placed in this answer as he obviously realized he was being trapped. He stated that he wished to commit suicide and had not done so at the time of landing on shore because of the possibility which presented of making his escape and rejoining the Japanese Navy. He stated that he had now been disgraced and did not want his name or his picture sent back to Japan. When complimented on the success of the Naval comrades had made their attack, he stated that it had been much less successful than they had anticipated. He expressed surprise at this and he was asked what they originally expected to accomplish, he replied, in effect, a knock-out blow to your Navy.

3. He stated that off Bellows Field this morning he had been approaching a capital ship but that the darkness was so complete that he was forced to open his conning tower and stand on

C. Ingalls.

December 8, 1941

in the open hatch while running half submerged towards his target. As a result of the manuever in the choppy sea, he shipped a great deal of water down the hatch which crippled his motor and this motor failure resulted, of course, in the loss of control of the submarine and his being dashed into a reef over one mile from Bellows Field. He and his fellow officer stripped, dived into the ocean and attempted to swim ashore. He stated that he last saw his shipmate in the heavy surf. He admitted the possibility that the Navy might examine the submarine, which had run on the reef (because he was not aware that Naval planes had subsequently bombed and sunk his submarine). He stated that there were no papers in the submarine and admitted that this type of submarine represented essentially a sort of enlarged variation of a one man torpedo. He stated "My greatest mistake was being captured. This is the first time I have failed. Please do not advise Japan about this. Please kill me." During the course of this questioning, which was begun by the aid of two competent interpreters, it developed that this young officer had some knowledge of English, which he at first did not disclose. Later on he explained his inexpertness in this language by saying that, while in the middle school, he had studied English, but in the Academy, in expectation of duty in the China Seas, he had selected Chinese.

4. A drawing of a petty officer's Navy Pilot's insignia was made by him and he explained the significance of the various details of this device.

5. There remains the possibility, if the Naval authorities so desire, that this submarine may yet be located and raised for examination of mechanical details, etc.

C. H. C.

C. Intel

In Reply Refer To:

SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR
U. S. S. ARGONAUT, Flagship
Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

December 8, 1941

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

MEMORANDUM: Fleet Intelligence Officer.

Subject: Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay.

1. The submarine when first sighted was about six hundred yards from the beach, off the end of the run-way at Bellows Field. At the time of my arriv l at the Field, three Navy Utility planes were engaged in dropping what appear d to be either twenty-five or fifty pound bombs, the bombs being dropped in pairs. No direct hits were made but out of about twelve bombs dropped six appeared to l nd within fifty feet of the submarine. After the bombing the submarine did not appear to have been damaged or to have altered its position.

2. The pilot who first sighted the submarine was interviewed and stated that when he sighted it up there was a large oil slick around its stern, also its position had not changed any since the first sighting of it.

3. The operations officer at Bellows Field sent me up in a plane to get a closer view of the submarine and I was able to come within one hundred feet of it. The color was dull black with no distinguishing marks, between thirty and forty feet in length, and about four feet in breadth. There was a small periscope projecting about three feet from what appeared to be periscope shears. The contour followed the general line of all submarines and there was a basket like projection on the bow. At the time, the submarine was down by the stern with the bow and periscope shears coming out of water from time to time due to the action of the waves. Judging from the location of the bomb hits on the coral bottom, which could be seen from the plane, the submarine appeared to be drifting in towards the beach.

4. It is believed that with the minimum amount of effort, the submarine can be towed in and beached.

R. L. HUTTER,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy.

C. Intel.

C O P Y

To a Commanding Officer:

From Japanese Naval Officer
KAZUO SAÑAMAKI

I thank you for the kindly visit of yesterday. Now I will write down your requests of yesterday in Japanese. Please pardon my poor writing and composition.

1. BRIEF PERSONAL HISTORY

In August 1940 I was graduated from the Naval Academy and became a midshipman. In April of this year I was commissioned a sub-lieutenant in the navy, my present rank.

2. RECORD OF BATTLE

Your honorable "have" country instituted an economic blockade of Japan, a "have not" country, refusing to sell us oil, cotton and the like, until we had no choice but natural collapse. Because of this we began diplomatic negotiations with your country, but these ended in failure. Therefore, with a friend, I set out for Pearl Harbor with the purpose of sinking a battleship, but due to _____ accident, although we were able to reach the mouth of the harbor by creeping underneath your bombs falling like rain, since the _____ accident was fatal to the submarine, we determined to proceed without hesitation on the surface of the water, and dashing into the harbor, and climbing the gang-way ladder, hoped to leap onto the deck and die simultaneously with blowing up the enemy warship just as in olden times, during the Mongol invasion, our Tsuyu Kawano lowered the mast and boarded the enemy ship with it. However, because of the _____ accident suffered at the harbor mouth, we struck a reef which given ten seconds we would have safely cleared. My first stratagem had failed. With this difference of ten seconds the fate was decided and one of the warships of your country was saved.

Seeing the success of our sister submarines and the splendid achievements of our air force, I left the mouth of the harbor, compelled to do so due to my submarine being disabled. Later, finally being unable to do anything with the submarine, I swam through the ocean and reached an enemy airport. Due to my exhaustion, I was captured without having time to even fight. And thus my sad fate began.

Due entirely to my inexpert navigation and strategy, my honor as a soldier has fallen to the ground. Thus I betrayed the expectations of our 100,000,000 (people) and became a sad prisoner of war disloyal to my country.

C. Inkel.

3. The talk I had with an understanding naval officer in the home of an army man in "Honolulu" was very pleasant. Because I thought about the trouble I would cause your country later on, and because I was unable to endure my shame, committing suicide or being shot to death became impossible, and thus began my [illegible] life as a prisoner of war. Now that things have come to such a pass, I have started the life a peaceful Japanese naval officer abiding by the rules of international law.

In olden times, Hakui and Shukusei of China, refusing to eat millet of a foreign land, went into the mountains and ate grass (?) until they starved, but I, since I began eating your country'sbread, have thought what a cause for shame and sorrow it is.

Although I have caused you much annoyance, I have done things right along according to righteousness. However, such incidents as that which happened yesterday which is from the standpoint of your country a sad thing has been continued. My righteousnesshas made scores of men of your country with draw all day long with their guns pointed at me and made them afraid, but as a result of this, I must face a death which to me is not too pleasing.

My willingness to die need not be mentioned; to be killed by one of your bullets of your country shall make me very happy. I pray for your country's lasting military success.

An uprighteous pistol has been aimed at me. This is my end. Good-bye.

4. To the Japanese people, especially to officers like ourselves, becoming a prisoner of war is inexcusable. Of course, whether or not there is a record of the incident or not, I will commit suicide upon my return to my native land. Even though we are unarmed, to bite with teeth and fight to the last is the Japanese spirit.

I pray that my death will forgive me for all my failures and I pray that my spirit will be enshrined at the Yasukuni (Shrine).

Please forward the following to the Japanese Navy Department.

[illegible]

[illegible] th of the harbor, [illegible] I struck [illegible] people of [illegible] I arrived at [illegible] could do nothing. [illegible] I have no excuse [illegible] also [illegible] reap this opportunity of being a prisoner of war. I am about to die after fighting [illegible] the very [illegible] as an officer of the [illegible]

[illegible] Imperial Majesty!

Showa [illegible] (1941), 14th day (Month omitted)

Kazuo Sakamaki
Naval Sub-lieutenant

POEM COMPOSED AMONG THE ENEMY (ON THE UNFORTUNATE DAY THAT I BECAME A PRISONER OF WAR)

When cherry blossoms fall,
Let them fall!
Drenched are the its branches and leaves
With the sorrow of today!

3. I like best "DOWN THE TORPEDO" and "AMONG THE SHOTS THROUGH THE BARRAGE". I experienced all these things in this current battle which is the goal of all naval men's ambition, and I manifested the Yamato Damashii (Japanese spirit). Last night, again scores of bayonets and muzzles were pointed at me from the front door and from the window and from above my head. However, righteousness won. And although as a result of this a regrettable situation came about, I hope that all would be forgiven with my death. On the eve of my "fairly death" lamenting the many sacrifices of your country due to my "call of righteousness", I earnestly hope that this will be clearly understood, that supreme desire and joy in dying as a soldier by your country's bullets.

I appreciate your many kindness shown me up to now, and I pray for your success in the war.

Respectfully,

Kazuo Sakamaki

C O P Y

C. Intel

EXHIBIT NO. 101



Page 1161

UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Monday 24 November, 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION PLUS 10½

REMARKS

0 - 4

Moored starboard side to berth B-3, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with 12 manila lines, 5 wire breasts and 2 wire cables. Receiving fresh water and telephone services from the dock. No. 4 boiler steaming for auxiliary purposes. SOP is CincPac in Submarine Base; SOPA is Comairbatfor in this vessel. Ships present are various units of U.S. Pacific Fleet. 0115 the following men reported aboard after having completed temporary duty as shore patrol in the Honolulu area: BALL, F.R., B.M.1c, U.S.N.; FERREIRA, R., E.M.1c, U.S.N.; CANNON, C.B., A.M.M.2c, U.S.N., and BARNARD, A.L., B.M.2c, U.S.N. 0250 SANFORD, F.L., Pfc, U.S.M.C. reported on board A.O.L. since 0100 this date, a period of 1 hour, 50 minutes. Made a P.A.L. by order of Commanding Officer.

E. E. DeGarmo
E. E. DEGARMO, Ensign, U.S.N.

4 - 8

Moored as before. WOOLSTENHULME, R., Pfc, U.S.M.C. was arrested by civil police at 0230 for creating a disturbance and returned to the ship at 0440. Made a P.A.L. by order of Commanding Officer. Patrol officer's report to follow. 0545 received on board for use in the general mess the following provisions: from Dairymen's Association, Ltd., 70 gallons fresh milk. Inspected as to quantity by Ens. B.C. Byrnside, U.S.N. and as to quality by Lieut(jg) D.P. Hightower, (MC), U.S.N. 0630 ALTMAN, F.W., A.M.M.3c, VB-6, returned on board A.O.L. since 0100 this date, a period of about 5 hours and 30 minutes. Made a P.A.L. by order of the Commanding Officer.

F. Shine
F. SHINE, 1st. Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.

8 - 12

Moored as before. 0800 Mustered crew on stations. Absentees: CAROL, E.R., Sea.2c, U.S.N. AOL from 0100, 7 November 1941; and STACEY, T.L., Sea.2c, U.S.N., AOL from 0100, 8 November 1941. 0800 received YO-44 alongside to port. 0830 commenced fueling (gasoline) from YO-44. Draft forward 24' 10", aft 28' 5". 0831 Commenced fueling from Yard lines. SEAGULL underway. 1025 UTAH underway and standing out. 1025 Discontinued fueling gasoline, having received 30,500 gallons, 100 octane aviation gasoline. 1043 YO-44 cast off. 1100 pursuant to orders of Commanding Officer, ARIZONA, CHAPMAN, G.W., 293 42 54, A.O.M.3c, U.S.N. reported aboard for duty. 1125 held quarters for physical drill. 1140 pursuant to orders of the Commanding Officer, Ensign R.C. Glassman, U.S.N.R. returned aboard with Camp Andrews recreation party. Held daily visual examination of all magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal.

W. J. KRIM, Ensign, U.S.N.

12 - 16

Moored as before. 1250 pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, the following men left the ship with orders to report to the senior patrol officer at Old Navy Yard, Honolulu, T.H. for temporary duty as shore patrol: LYNCH, H.E., 337 02 86, B.M.2c, U.S.N.; LUCAS, F.H., 207 00 92, A.M.M.1c, U.S.N.; JACKSON, J.A., 259 30 13, W.T.1c, U.S.N.; MELNICK, A., 385 79 52, S.M.1c, U.S.N. 1300 HURLEY, M.D., S.C.3c, U.S.N. was transferred to the U.S. Naval Hospital, Pearl Harbor, T.H. Diagnosis: Hernia, recurrent, after operation, hernia bilateral #2009. 1300 NEVADA hoisted Union Jack at starboard main yard arm. 1310 PROCYON underway. 1325 CURTIS underway. 1350 HOVEY standing in. 1435 completed fueling. Received 6,911.61 bbls. fuel. Ship's draft fwd. 26' 9.5", aft 28' 11".

A. N. Kelly
A. N. KELLY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

Approved:
G. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
R. W. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N., Navigator

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)



N. Nav. 63
(Mar., 1939)

Page 1162

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) CV6 (Identification Number)

AT Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H. TO Tuesday (Day) 25 (Date) November (Month) 19 41
PASSAGE

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10½ G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hour	"All Right" Average Engine Revs	By Revs. Nautical Miles	By Revs. Tenths	By Log Nautical Miles	By Log Tenths	Course (P.C.) Gyro Mag. (Indicate which)	Wind Direction	Wind Force	Barometer Height in Inches	Barometer Reading at. Ther.	Temperature Air, Dry Bulb	Temperature Air, Wet Bulb	Temperature Water at Surface	Weather by Symbols	Clouds Form	Clouds Moving From—	Clouds Amount	Visibility	Sea Character	Swells Direction
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M.																				
1		MOORED					ESE	4	2991	-	73	67	-	BC	cu	E	2	25	-	-
2							ESE	4	2991	-	74	68	-	BC	cu	E	2	25	-	-
3							ESE	5	2990	-	74	66	-	BC	cu	E	2	25	-	-
4							ESE	3	2990	-	73	67	-	BC	cu	E	2	25	-	-
5							SW	2	2990	-	72	67	-	BC	st cu	SW	2	25	-	-
6							SW	2	2990	-	72	67	-	BC	st cu	SW	2	30	-	-
7							SW	2	2990	-	73	62	-	BC	st cu	SW	2	30	-	-
8							E	1	2990	-	73	62	-	BC	st cu	E	2	30	-	-
9							NE	5	2992	-	74	64	-	BC	st cu	NE	3	30	-	-
10							NE	7	2993	-	75	65	-	BC	st cu	NE	2	30	-	-
11							NE	7	2994	-	75	65	-	BC	cu	NE	3	30	-	-
12							NE	6	2995	-	75	65	-	BC	cu	NE	4	30	-	-

Noon { Latitude
Longitude

8 p.m. { Latitude
Longitude

8 a.m. { Latitude
Longitude

Current { Set
Drift

Gyrocompass in Use
Error

Standard Mag. Compass
Compass No.
S. H.
Error
Variation
Deviation

Fuel { Received 6,912
Expended 98
On hand 36,263

Water { Distilled 0
Received 38,500
Expended 44,012
On hand 152,264

Before Leaving Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft.

After Entering Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft.

Magazine Temperatures:
Maximum 67°
Minimum 67°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

Hour	"All Right" Average Engine Revs	By Revs. Nautical Miles	By Revs. Tenths	By Log Nautical Miles	By Log Tenths	Course (P.C.)	Wind Direction	Wind Force	Barometer Height in Inches	Barometer Reading at. Ther.	Temperature Air, Dry Bulb	Temperature Air, Wet Bulb	Temperature Water at Surface	Weather by Symbols	Clouds Form	Clouds Moving From—	Clouds Amount	Visibility	Sea Character	Swells Direction
P.M.																				
13		MOORED					NE	12	2992	-	75	67	-	BC	cu	NE	3	30	-	-
14							NE	12	2989	-	75	68	-	BC	cu	NE	3	30	-	-
15							NE	12	2989	-	75	68	-	BC	cu	NE	2	30	-	-
16							NE	12	2988	-	75	68	-	BC	cu	NE	2	30	-	-
17							NE	12	2988	-	75	68	-	BC	cu	NE	1	30	-	-
18							NE	15	2988	-	74	67	-	BC	cu	NE	1	25	-	-
19							NE	4	2987	-	74	63	-	BC	cu	NE	1	25	-	-
20							NE	5	2987	-	74	63	-	BC	cu	NE	1	25	-	-
21							NE	5	2990	-	74	66	-	BC	cu	NE	1	25	-	-
22							NE	5	2992	-	74	68	-	BC	cu	NE	1	25	-	-
23							NE	2	2992	-	74	68	-	BC	cu	NE	1	25	-	-
24							NE	2	2992	-	74	68	-	BC	cu	NE	1	25	-	-

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

2

ADDITIONAL SHEET

S.S.A. NITTANYLION Date 25 November 1941

12 - 16
Moored as before. 1500 BARNARD, A.L., S.M.2c, U.S.N. and FERREIRA, R., S.M.1c, U.S.N. left the ship on temporary shore patrol duty in Honolulu, T.H. 1316 the following men left the ship to report to the LEXINGTON for duty: DAY, R.L., A.M.M.2c, U.S.N.; HERLAN, S.F., A.M.M.3c; BROOK, J., Ph.M.2c,U.S.N.; BOOKER, E., R.M.3c, U.S.N.; STAGG, M.M., F.2c,U.S.N.; ERICKSON, J.W., F.1c,U.S.N.; CROWE, J.W., F.2c, U.S.N.; LOCKARD, L.M., Sea.2c,U.S.N.; MOODY, A., Sea2c, U.S.N.; CHESTER, J.T., Sea.2c,U.S.N.; GAINES, R.F., Sea.2c,U.S.N. 1400 Ensign R. W. Campbell, V-7(S), U.S.N.R. reported on board for duty. The following men reported on board for duty: MEAD, E.F., Sea.1c,U.S.N. QUIG, L.I., AS, U.S.N., HOOVER, W.M., Dsg.1c, U.S.N.; PARKINSON, O.L., Sea.2c,U.S.N.; RAMSEY, O., Sea.2c,U.S.N.; HIDDEN, T.F., Sea.2c, U.S.N.; ROBINSON, H.S., Sea.2c,U.S.N.; THATCHER, W.E., F.2c,U.S.N.; SOUTHERLAND, L.F., F.3c,U.S.N.; SHIELDS, L.R., F.2c,U.S.N.; FLASH, L.G., AS,U.S.N.; DELBACH, G.W., A.C.M.3c,U.S.N.

J. C. Roper
J. C. ROPER, Ensign, U.S.N.

16 - 20
Moored as before. At 1623 the following men reported on board for duty in accordance with Comairbatfor Serial 3101 of November 15, 1941: DeLONG, L.B., 000 00 00, Sea.2c,U.S.N.; FORD, T.W., 356 49 19, Sea.2c,U.S.N.; FLOYD, P.A., 000 00 00, Sea.2c,U.S.N.; GALLION, M., 340 92 64,Sea.2c,U.S.N.; GISH, E.W., 000 00 00, Sea.2c,U.S.N.; MARTINEZ, L.C., 372 28 40, Sea.2c,U.S.N.; McCUTCHEN, J.L., 000 00 00, Sea.2c,U.S.N.; MILLER, F.F., 337 58 00, Sea.2c,U.S.N.; PITTERLAN, C., 000 00 00, Sea.2c,U.S.N.; SCHULTZ, V.L. 393 32 20, Sea.2c,U.S.N.(for duty in Comairbatfor Flag Allowance); TRIPLETT, L.M., 393 62 21, Sea.2c,U.S.N.; WHITMIS,O.R., 000 00 00, Sea.2c,U.S.N.; WOLF, F.G., 369 63 52, Sea.2c,U.S.N. Records and accounts received on board. 1830 received on board for use in the general mess the following stores, inspected as to quality by Lieut(jg) B.F. Hightower,(SC),U.S.N. and as to quantity by Acting Pay Clerk J. R. Whitener, U.S.N. From Dairymen's Association, Ltd., Honolulu, T.H., 60 gallons buttermilk, 70 gallons grade "A" milk; from Chun Hoon, Ltd., Honolulu, T.H. 600 lbs. grapefruit, 1650 lbs. lemons, 5956 lbs. oranges, 3652 lbs. cabbages, 810 lbs. cucumbers, 3079 lbs. tomatoes; from Standard Brands, Honolulu, T.H., 300 lbs. yeast; from K. Otani Co., Honolulu, T.H., 150 lbs. frozen shrimp, 200 lbs. halibut, 400 lbs. red snapper; from Tai Hing Co., Honolulu, T.H. 1452 lbs. lettuce, 1000 lbs. pineapples, 493 lbs. carrots, 727 lbs. papaias; from Chun Chong Co., Honolulu, T.H., 445 lbs. green peppers, 2265 lbs. potatoes, yam, 3650 lbs. celery, 746 lbs. cauliflower, 32 lbs. parsley, and 4550 lbs. apples.

W. C. STRONG
W. C. STRONG, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

20 - 24
Moored as before.

E B Mott
E. B. MOTT, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

Approved: O. H. Hudson
O. H. HUDSON,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Executed: R. W. Ruble
R. W. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N. Navigator

(This page is to be sent to Bureau of Navigation promptly with Log sheets)


Page 1384
Approved:
Assistant
U. S. S. Navigator
(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

Page 165

UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Tuesday 25 November 1941
(Day) (Date) (Month)

ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 10½

REMARKS

0 - 4

Moored starboard side to berth B-3, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H. with 12 manila lines, 2 wire cables, and 5 breast wires. Boiler No. 4 in use for auxiliary purposes. Receiving fresh water and telephone service from the dock. 30P is Sinclair as Submarine Base. 302A is Comsubpatfor in this vessel. Ships present various units of U.S. Fleet. 0110 LYNCH, J.E., M.M.2c; U.S.N.R.; MELNICK, A., S.K.3c, U.S.N. and JACKSON, J.A., W.T.1c, U.S.N. returned on board from temporary shore patrol duty in Honolulu, T.H. 0150 LOGAS, J.E., A.M.M.1c, U.S.N. returned on board from temporary shore patrol duty in Honolulu, T.H.

J. C. Roper
J. C. ROPER, Ensign, U.S.N.

0 - 8

Moored as before. 0231 SOLACE underway and shifting berth. 0605 SS LURLINE standing in. 0619 executed sunrise. 0623 ALDEBARAN standing in. 0650 received the following fresh provisions inspected as to quality by Lieut(jg) D.F. Lightower [SC], U.S.N., and as to quantity by Acting Pay Clerk J. F. Whitmer, U.S.N.: from Dairymen's Association, Honolulu, T.H.: 60 gallons fresh buttermilk. 0725 CUMMINGS standing in.

A. N. Kell
A. N. KELL, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

8 - 12

Moored as before. 0800 mustered crew on stations. Absentees: CAROL, F.R., Sea.2c, U.S.N.R., A.O.L. from 0100, 7 November 1941; STACEY, T.L., Sea.2c, U.S.N.R., A.O.L. from 0100, 6 November 1941; HARDLOW, R.K., Sea.1c, U.S.N., A.O.L. from 0100 25 November 1941. 0805 PELICAN, ARGONNE, BEAVER, CASTLE, MONTGOMERY, VESTAL and CURTISS standing in. 0820 HARRIS, HARDING, INDIANAPOLIS, TREVOR, CHICAGO, HONOLULU, CHEMUNGA and ELLIOT standing in. 1000 LONG, LEXINGTON, SACRAMENTO, CHANDLER and PORTER standing in. 1015 pursuant to orders of the Commanding Officer, Sail, F.R., 305 09 71, B.M.1c, U.S.N. left the ship for temporary duty as shore patrol in Honolulu, T.H. 1020 pursuant to orders of the Commandant 11th. Naval District, San Diego, California Lieutenant(jg) John Saunsister, U.S.N.R. reported aboard for duty. 1021 pursuant to orders of the Commanding General, First Marine Division, F.M.F., Marine Barracks, New River, N.C., Lieutenant A.R. Miller, U.S.M.C. reported aboard for duty. 1042 LAFFERTY, BOMBARD, ALLEN and FLUSSER standing in. 1100 ALLEN standing out to sea. 1126 DRAYTON, STERETT, HENLEY and DOWNEY standing in. Captain's Mast was held at 1100 this date on the below named men, and punishments were awarded as follows: TALICHEF, T., Sea.2c, U.S.N., A.O.L. from 0100 to 1100, 25 November 1941, a period of 10 hours. Punishment 2 weeks restriction. SINCLAIR, A.J., F.C.Sc, Affray. Punishment, Deck Court. KELLEY, A.D., Sea.1c, U.S.N., Affray. Punishment, Deck Court. STEVENS, J.C., Sea.1c, Affray. Punishment, Deck Court. FLINT, H.R., Sea.1c, U.S.N. Affray; Disorderly conduct; Drunkenness. Punishment, Summary Court Martial. LEAHY, T.D., Sea.1c, Affray; Disorderly conduct; Drunkenness. Punishment, Summary Court Martial. WILDE, W.F., Sea.2c, U.S.N., Affray; Disorderly conduct. Punishment, Summary Court Martial. Made daily visual inspection of all magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

W. K. ARNI, Ensign, U.S.N.

(CONTINUED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET.)

Approved:
S. D. Sherman
S. D. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S.Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
E. W. Noble
E. W. NOBLE,
Lieut-Comdr.,
U.S.N.Reserve

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

Page 166

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) CV6 (Identification Number)

AT Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H. TO Wednesday (Day) 26 (Date) November (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10½ G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

		BY REVS.		BY LOG		COURSE (P. C.)	WIND		BAROMETER		TEMPERATURE				CLOUDS				SEA	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M. 1		MOORED					NE	7	2991	-	71	67	-	BC	cu	NE	5	20	-	-
2							NE	5	2991	-	71	67	-	BC	cu	NE	5	20	-	-
3							NE	5	2990	-	70	67	-	BC	cu	NE	5	20	-	-
4							NE	5	2989	-	70	66	-	BC	cu	NE	5	20	-	-
5							NE	8	2990	-	71	67	-	C	ci cu	NE	9	25	-	-
6							NE	3	2990	-	70	66	-	C	ci cu	NE	9	25	-	-
7							NE	2	2990	-	70	67	-	C	ci cu	NE	7	30	-	-
8							NE	4	2991	-	73	70	-	BC	ci cu	NE	2	30	-	-
9							Calm	-	2993	-	75	70	-	BC	ci cu	NE	1	30	-	-
10							ENE	2	2993	-	78	71	-	BC	cu	NE	1	30	-	-
11							E	5	2991	-	81	72	-	BC	cu	NE	1	30	-	-
12							E	8	2989	-	83	73	-	BC	cu	N	3	30	-	-
P.M. 13		MOORED					S	6	2987	-	82	72	-	BC	cu	SW	4	30	-	-
14							S	6	2986	-	82	72	-	BC	cu	SW	4	30	-	-
15							S	5	2986	-	82	73	-	BC	a cu	W	5	30	-	-
16							S	6	2986	-	82	73	-	BC	ci cu	W	5	30	-	-
17							SSW	4	2987	-	82	73	-	BC	ci cu	W	4	30	-	-
18							SSW	5	2988	-	81	73	-	C	st cu	W	7	25	-	-
19							SSW	5	2990	-	80	73	-	C	st cu	W	7	30	-	-
20							SSW	6	2991	-	79	72	-	C	st cu	W	7	25	-	-
21							SSW	3	2991	-	79	73	-	C	st cu	W	8	35	-	-
22							SW	2	2992	-	79	72	-	C	st cu	W	8	25	-	-
23							SW	3	2992	-	78	72	-	C	st cu	W	7	25	-	-
24							SW	6	2992	-	78	71	-	C	st cu	W	6	25	-	-

Latitude
Longitude

Latitude
Longitude

Latitude
Longitude

Current Set
Drift

Gyrocompass in Use
Error 0° 10' E

Standard Mag. Compass
Compass No. 54994
S. H. 228-30
Error 11° 40' E
Variation 11° 15' E
Deviation 0° 25' E

Received 0
Expended 104
On hand 56,179

Distilled 0
Received 42,500
Expended 47,829
On hand 146,575

Before Leaving Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft

After Entering Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft

Magazine Temperatures
Maximum 87°
Minimum 67°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

	Morning	Afternoon
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUMMARIES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

Page 1147

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE Date 26 November, 1941

18 - 24 (Continued)

of Commanding Officer, LEXINGTON, the following named men reported aboard for duty. Transportation and temporary duty on LEXINGTON in connection with general court martial is completed. OAKLEY, J.H., 201 90 74, Sea.2c,U.S.N., and COGGER, W.F., 375 89 04, Sea.2c,U.S.N.

M. T. Leonard
M. T. LEONARD, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

24 - 30

Received as before. 1855 GASKILL underway. 1700 received on board for use in general mess the following fresh provisions: from Harden Co., Ltd., Honolulu, T.H., 275 lbs. fruit mix. Inspected as to quantity by Acting Pay Clerk J. H. Kaltenmer, U.S.N. and as to quality by Lieut(jg) D.F. Hightower, (MC), U.S.N. 1840 FLUCKEY and MAHAN standing in. 1825 DRAYTON standing in.

J. C. Roper
J. C. ROPER, Ensign, U.S.N.

27 - 31

Received as before. 2205 HOLDEMBY, R.L., B.M.2c,U.S.N. was returned to the ship by the beach guard under charges of creating a disturbance, fighting at the Fleet Landing. Charges to follow. Made prisoner at large by order of the Commanding Officer. 2230 KING, R.B., Pfm2c,U.S.N. reported aboard upon completion of seven days leave, on time.

A. H. Benditson
A. H. BENDITSON, Ensign, U.S.N.

Approved
C. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined
R. W. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N.



Page 1169

UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Wednesday 26 November 1941
(Day) (Month)

TIME DESCRIPTION plus 10½

REMARKS

0 - 4
Moored starboard side to berth B-3, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with 12 manila lines, 5 wire breasts, and 2 wire cables. Receiving fresh water and telephone service from the dock. No. 4 boiler in use for auxiliary purposes. Ships present, various units of the U.S. Fleet, district and yard craft. SOPA is Commairbatfor in this vessel. SOP is CinCPac at the Submarine Base. 0215 the following named men reported aboard upon completion of temporary duty with the shore patrol in Honolulu, T.H.: CANNON, C.B., A.M.M.2c,U.S.N.; BARNARD, A.L., jr., S.M.2c,U.S.N.; BALL, F.R., S.M.1c,U.S.N. and FERREIRA, W., S.M.1c,U.S.N.

A. H. BERNTSON, Ensign, U.S.N.

4 - 8
Moored as before. 0520 received on board for use in general mess the following provisions from Dairymen's Association, Ltd., Honolulu, T.H., inspected as to quantity by Acting Pay Clerk J. H. Whitener, U.S.N. and as to quality by Lieut(jg) E.P. Sightower, (MC), U.S.N., 70 gallons grade "A" milk, 65 gallons ice cream. 0720 Lieutenant Commander A. I. Ealstrom returned from three days leave. Lieut(jg) W. S. Stewart returned from nine days leave. 0740 SCHLEY underway.

T. C. ROPER, Ensign, U.S.N.

8 - 12
Moored as before. 0800 mustered crew on stations. Absentees: CAROL, S.R., Sea.2c,U.S.N., AOL from 0100, November 7, 1941, and STACEY, T.L., Sea.2c,U.S.N., AOL from 0100 November 8, 1941. 0905 First Lieutenant F. Shine, U.S.M.C. was detached in accordance with Major Gen. Comdt. U.S.M.C. ltr. 05421-1, AN-114 LWK of October 1, 1941, to report to Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Calif. 1054 Ensign J. W. Acree, U.S.N., left the ship to report to Combasefor with the following men for duty as harbor patrol: SHAW, J.L., Cox., U.S.N., BEATTIE, M.G., S.M.2c,U.S.N., NELSON, L.L., Sea.1c, U.S.N., PEACOCK, L.R., O.M.3c,U.S.N., MOODY, A.L., Sea.1c, U.S.N., NIMMAN, J.W., Sea.1c, U.S.N., and NOLDEMEN, E.F.,F.2c,U.S.N. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples, condition normal. 1042 the following men left the ship for temporary duty as shore patrol in Honolulu, T.H.: JACKSON, J.A., M.T.1c,U.S.N.;LYNCH,M.E.,M.M.2c,U.S.N.;LUCAS,J.H.,A.M.M.1c,U.S.N. 1100 Ensign H.B.Roggenburg, U.S.N.R., Ensign J.H.Faulhaber,U.S.N.R. were detached in accordance with BuNav despatch 241316 of November 1941 to report to Commandant 11th. Naval District for temporary duty under instruction. 1135 Ensign J.G. Tess, U.S.N.R., A-V(N), was detached in accordance with Commanding Officer's ltr. CV6/ P16-4(10-11t), Serial 1191 of November 19, 1941 to report to Commanding Officer CINCPACFLT, FPT West Coast of U.S.

W. C. STRONG, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

12 - 16
Moored as before. 1300 pursuant to orders of Commanding Officer of Nov. 26, 1941, CV6/P16-4/(10-jah), BuNav despatch 241316 of Nov. 1941, Ensign R. W. Carrington, U.S.N.R. was this date detached, with orders to report to Commandant 11th. Naval District, San Diego, California for temporary duty and further transfer to Commandant 12th. Naval District, San Francisco, California for duty, at Armed Guard Center, Treasure Island, California. Authorized delay Dec. 15, 1941 to report Comdt. 11. Delay counts as leave. 1315 Cut in degaussing cable. 1322 pursuant orders of Commanding Officer CV6/QL of Nov. 17, 1941, the following men left the ship for temporary duty as shore patrol in Honolulu area: MENICK, A., 366 72 62, S.2.2c,U.S.N.; GADONSKI, P., 283 22 15, A.M.3c,U.S.N. 1330 PORTLAND stood in. Pursuant to orders of Commanding Officer, U.S.N.T.S., Norfolk, Va. of October 20, 1941, ref. BuNav ltr. Nav-632-PHD-1961 of September 24, 1941, GOBBLE, E.W., 225 52 56, Sea.1c, U.S.N. reported on board with orders to report to Commanding Officer, VS Squadron 6 for duty. Transportation via SUMNER completed, 1345 secured degaussing cable. 1513 LAMSON underway and standing out. 1545 pursuant orders of Commanding Officer,LEXINGTON,CV2/P16-4/12,Ref.(a) verbal orders,

(CONTINUED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET)

Approved:
C. D. BURNETT,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
R. W. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N., Navigator

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

Page 1170

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) CV6 (Classification Number)

AT Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H. to / PASSAGE — Thursday 27 November 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10½ — G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding

Hour		BY REVS.		BY LOG		Course	WIND		BAROMETER		TEMPERATURE				CLOUDS				SEA	
								Kts							Form	Moving from				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M. 1		MOORED					NE	8	2991	-	75	70	-	BC	a cu	NW	4	25	-	-
2							N	2	2990	-	75	70	-	BC	a cu	NW	4	25	-	-
3							Calm	0	2990	-	75	70	-	C	st cu	ENE	6	25	-	-
4							Calm	0	2986	-	75	70	-	BC	a cu	ENE	2	25	-	-
5							Calm	0	2988	-	74	69	-	BC	a cu	ENE	4	25	-	-
6							Calm	0	2988	-	74	69	-	C	a cu	ENE	6	25	-	-
7							NE	3	2991	-	74	69	-	C	st cu	ENE	9	25	-	-
8							NE	3	2992	-	75	70	-	C	st cu	ENE	7	30	-	-
9							ENE	2	2993	-	77	72	-	BC	cu	NE	4	30	-	-
10							NE	2	2992	-	80	72	-	BC	cu	NE	3	30	-	-
11							NE	4	2992	-	82	73	-	BC	cu	NE	2	30	-	-
12							NE	8	2990	-	82	72	-	BC	cu	NE	2	30	-	-

Latitude
Longitude

Latitude
Longitude

Latitude
Longitude

Current { Set / Drift

GYROCOMPASS IN USE
Error

STANDARD MAG. COMPASS
Compass No.
S. H.
Error
Variation
Deviation

Received	0
Expended	100
On hand	36,079

Distilled	0
Received	43,400
Expended	43,400
On hand	60,000

BEFORE LEAVING PORT
Draft for'd
Draft aft

AFTER ENTERING PORT
Draft for'd
Draft aft

MAGAZINE TEMPERATURES:
Maximum 90°
Minimum 70°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Drills	Morning	Afternoon
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

Hour		BY REVS.		BY LOG		Course	WIND		BAROMETER		TEMPERATURE				CLOUDS				SEA	
P.M. 13		MOORED					NE	6	2990	-	83	72	-	BC	cu	NE	2	30	-	-
14							NE	6	2990	-	82	72	-	BC	cu	NE	3	30	-	-
15							NE	7	2990	-	82	72	-	BC	a cu	NE	4	30	-	-
16							NE	7	2990	-	82	72	-	BC	a cu	NE	4	30	-	-
17							ENE	10	2990	-	82	73	-	BC	cu	NE	1	30	-	-
18							ENE	6	2991	-	81	73	-	C	a cu	ENE	6	25	-	-
19							ENE	4	2993	-	78	72	-	C	st cu	ENE	9	25	-	-
20							ENE	4	2991	-	78	72	-	C	st cu	ENE	9	25	-	-
21							NE	2	2990	-	77	72	-	BC	cu	NE	4	20	-	-
22							NE	1	2991	-	77	72	-	BC	cu	NE	1	20	-	-
23							NE	1	2991	-	77	72	-	BC	cu	NE	1	20	-	-
24							NE	1	2991	-	76	71	-	BC	cu	NE	2	20	-	-

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)



U. S. S. ENTERPRISE

ADDITIONAL SHEET

Page 1171

Date 27 November, 1941

16 - 20

Moored as before. 1605 CRAVEN underway, shifting berths. 1613 FANNING underway and standing out to sea. 1625 GRIDLEY underway and standing out. 1650 [illegible] underway. 1735 CUMMINGS underway. 1745 pursuant to orders of the Commanding Officer dated 27 November 1941 MARTIN, J., Jr., 265 98 09, M.Att.1c, U.S.N. was released from confinement and placed under armed guard for transfer to LEXINGTON, FFT to Naval Prison, Navy Yard, Mare Island, California for confinement. 1800 the following men left the ship with orders to report to the commanding officer, LEXINGTON, FFT to West Coast for re-enlistment leave:

ADAIR, J.N., 337 17 69, C.Ph.M.,(PA), U.S.N.
MC ELWAIN, G.H., 316 31 91, Mus. 1c, U.S.N.
LEE, H., Jr., 288 29 36, M.Att.1c, U.S.N.
GREITENS, A.R., 337 02 16, G.M.2c, U.S.N.
SPENCER, B.L., 262 24 87, F.1c, U.S.N.
MESSER, R.E., 272 16 82, A.M.M.2c, U.S.N.
MADLEY, J.(n)., 295 38 50, M.Att.1c, U.S.N.
JOHNSON, J.P., 295 39 68, B.M.2c, U.S.N.
EVANS, T.H., 332 01 82, S.F.2c, U.S.N.
GARD, C.D., 268 77 66, F.1c, U.S.N.
CHRESTLER, F.C., 207 81 20, G.M.2c U.S.N.
SULLIVAN, W.P., 258 27 81, C.M.M.(AA), U.S.N.
KINNARD, S.C., 337 01 80, A.M.M.2c, U.S.N.
PHILLPOTT, J.A., 274 53 06, T.M.2c, U.S.N.
ETHERIDGE, G.E., 274 31 84, S.K.3c, U.S.N.
KNIGHT, L.N., 267 12 35, C.W.T.(PA), U.S.N.
WHITE, W.H., 251 78 52, C.W.T. (PA), U.S.N.
MC RAE, R.D., 341 80 18, C.M.M. (AA), U.S.N.
MILLER, R.V., 380 62 83, C.M.M. (PA), U.S.N.
JENKINS, W.H., 265 88 64, M.Att.1c,U.S.N.
EDKIN, E.F., 409 39 74, Mldr.1c, U.S.N.
BURNS, M.S., 268 30 72, S.F.2c, U.S.N.
FORD, E., 346 38 45, M.M.1c, U.S.N.
WASHBURN, J.M., 262 24 51, W.T.2c, U.S.N.

The following men left the ship with orders to report to the Commanding Officer, LEXINGTON, FFT as indicated:

MARTIN, J.(n)., Jr., 265 98 09, M.Att.1c,U.S.N. to Navy Prison, Nyd,Mare Island for confinement.
[illegible], W.K., 271 95 36, G.M.1c,U.S.N. to Rec.Sta.,San Diego, Calif. FFT to new construction.
[illegible], S.J., 307 21 40, Bkr.1c, U.S.N. to LEXINGTON for duty.
[illegible], V.S., 274 31 24, B.M.2c,U.S.N., to Rec.Sta.New York, N.Y. FFT to ATLANTA detail.
[illegible], M.H., 268 25 08, A.M.M.2c, U.S.N., to N.A.S., San Diego, Calif. for course of instruction.
[illegible], 345 75 26, F.C.3c,(M), U.S.N., to MACOMB detail, Boston Mass.
[illegible], 410 47 93, F.1c, U.S.N.R., to MACOMB detail, Boston, Mass.
[illegible], 254 21 51, F.1c, U.S.N., to MACOMB detail, Boston, Mass.
[illegible], 300 01 25, U.S.N. to MACOMB detail, Boston, Mass.
[illegible], 413 06 96, A.M.1c, U.S.N. to Advanced Carrier Group, N.A.S., San Diego, California.
HANCOCK, J.B., 277 89 64, A.M.1c, U.S.N., to Advanced Carrier Group, N.A.S., San Diego, California.

1800 pursuant to the Commanding Officer's orders CV6/P16-4/MM(11-hd) of 27 Nov. [illegible] PHILLIPS, E.G., Pvt., U.S.M.C. left the ship on temporary guard duty to deliver prisoner to LEXINGTON and returned aboard having completed duty at 1855.

H. K. BRAGG, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

20 - 24

Moored as before.

G. R. OVER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

Approved:
G. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
R. W. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N., Navigator.

(This sheet to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)



UNITED STATES SHIP ... Page 1173

ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 10½ ... Thursday 27 November 1941

REMARKS

0 - 4

Moored starboard side to berth B-3, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with 12 manila lines, 5 wire breasts and 2 wire cables. Receiving fresh water and telephone service from the dock. Nos. 4 boiler in use for auxiliary purposes. Military and Medical guard in this ship. Ships present are various units of U.S. Fleet. SOPA is Comairbatfor in this vessel. 0100 SOP is CincPac in Submarine Base. SOPA is Comairbatfor in this vessel. 0100 the following named men reported aboard having completed temporary duty as shore patrol in Honolulu area, T.H.: LUCAS, J.H., 207 00 92, A.M.M.1c, U.S.N.; HOWLICK, A., 385 79 42, S.1.2c, U.S.N.; LYNCH, M.E., 357 02 23, M.M.2c, U.S.N.; JACKSON, J.J. 292 30 13, W.T.1c, U.S.N.

M. T. Leonard
M. T. LEONARD, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

4 - 8

Moored as before. 0630 received on board for use in general mess the following fresh provisions from Dairymen's Association, Ltd., Honolulu, T.H. 60 gallons buttermilk and 150 lbs. cottage cheese. Inspected as to quantity by acting pay clerk, J. E. Whitmer, U.S.N. and as to quality by Lieut(jg) D.F. Hightower, (MC), U.S.N. 0630 lighted fires under No. 1 boiler.

J. C. Roper
J. C. ROPER, Ensign, U.S.N.

8 - 12

Moored as before. 0800 mustered crew on stations. Absentees: STACEY, E.L., Sea.2c, U.S.N., AOL since 0100, Nov. 7, 1941 and CAROL, E.A., Sea.2c, U.S.N., AOL since 0100, Nov. 6, 1941. 0900 hauled down military and medical guard flags. NEVADA assumed guard duties. The summary court martial of which Lieutenant Commander O.L. Livdahl, U.S.N. is senior member met in the case of ALLEN, R.J., MM2c, U.S.N. 0945 fasted steering gear. Conditions normal. 0956 secured fires under No. 1 boiler. 1100 Captain's mast was held on the below named men and punishments were awarded as follows: WOOLSTENHULME, R.G., Pvt., U.S.M.C., Disorderly conduct, Punishment 2 weeks restriction. HYMAN, S.L., Cox., U.S.N., Disorderly conduct, Punishment Deck Court. 1115 HALL, F.E., S.1c, U.S.N. left the ship on temporary duty with the shore patrol in Honolulu, T.H. 1145 Commander O.L. Goss, (SC), U.S.N. returned aboard upon completion of 8 days leave of absence. Daily inspection of smokeless powder samples and magazines made. Conditions normal.

K. H. Berntson
K. H. BERNTSON, Ensign, U.S.N.

12 - 16

Moored as before. 1205 commenced receiving 5" ammunition on board. 1219 HALEY, J.H., A.C.O.M., U.S.N. reported on board for duty. 1300 CANNON, C.B., M.M.2c, U.S.N. HAMMARD, A.L., R.M.2c, U.S.N. and FERRIERA, R., R.M.1c, U.S.N. left the ship on temporary shore patrol duty in Honolulu, T.H. 1320 the summary court martial of which Lieutenant Commander O.L. Livdahl, U.S.N. is senior member, adjourned to await further orders of convening authority. 1400 S.N. LUKINS BURNS underway and standing out. 1500 GRAY, W.C., A.M.M.2c U.S.N. and HINKLE, S.L., S.1c, U.S.N. left the ship to report to Commanding Officer, R.A.S., Pearl Harbor, T.H., for temporary duty. BRADBURY, R.E., M.M.1c, U.S.N. and ROGERS, D.G., Sea.1c, U.S.N. left the ship to report to Commanding Officer, R.A.S., Pearl Harbor, T.H., for temporary duty. 1515 the following men left the ship to report to Commanding Officer, R.A.S., Pearl Harbor, T.H., for temporary duty: BRADBURY, R.E., M.M.1c, U.S.N., CALLOWAY, F.A., F.1c, U.S.N., for temporary duty. STANTON, R.S., Cox., U.S.N., reported on board for duty. 1520 DI MICHAEL, V.J., MM.1c, U.S.N., Sea.2c, U.S.N. 1620 completed loading ammunition, having received on board 345 5"- 38 cal. cartridges, 55 5" 38 cal. star shell projectiles, 166 salad loaded and traced 5" 38 cal. projectiles and 104 3" 50 cal. anti-aircraft gunnes projectiles. 1635 ARGONAUT underway and standing out.

J. C. Roper
J. C. ROPER, Ensign, U.S.N.

Approved:
W. R. Purnell
W. R. PURNELL,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
R. W. RUBLE,
Lieut.-Comdr., U.S.N.R.

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

Page 1174

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE CV6

AT Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H. TO Friday 28 November 1941
PASSAGE

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10½ G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding

		BY REVS		BY LOG		COURSE	WIND		BAROMETER		TEMPERATURE				CLOUDS				SEA	
								Kts							Form	Moving from				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M. 1	MOORED						N	6	2991	-	75	71	-	BC	cu	N	4	25	-	-
2							N	6	2991	-	74	69	-	BC	cu	N	4	25	-	-
3							N	6	2991	-	74	69	-	BC	cu	N	4	25	-	-
4							N	6	2991	-	74	68	-	BC	cu	N	4	25	-	-
5							N	3	2990	-	73	70	-	BC	cu	N	1	25	-	-
6							N	4	2994	-	73	69	-	BC	cu	N	1	25	-	-
7							N	8	2994	-	73	69	-	BC	cu	N	1	30	-	-
8	34.9	3	7				NNE	5	2996	-	77	69	78	BC	cu	N	1	30	-	-
9	92.9	10	3	6	8		NNE	9	2996	-	76	66	78	BC	a cu	N	1	30	1	N
10	156.1	17	6	19	1		NE	13	2996	-	77	68	76	BC	a cu	NE	2	30	1	NE
11	212.5	23	4	21	6		N	13	2994	-	75	66	78	BC	a cu	NE	2	30	1	NE
12	128.6	14	5	13	2		N	12	2990	-	24	66	78	BC	a cu	NE	2	30	1	NE

Latitude	21° 28' 30" N
Longitude	158° 18' 35" W
Latitude	21° 28' 30" N
Longitude	158° 18' 30" W
Latitude	21° 23' 15" N
Longitude	160° 43' 30" W
Current: Set	
Current: Drift	

GYROCOMPASS IN USE
Error 0° 10' E

STANDARD MAG. COMPASS

Compass No.	54994
S. H.	258°
Error	12° 10' E
Variation	11° 00' E
Deviation	1° 10' E

Received	0
Expended	104
On hand	35,075
Distilled	0
Received	78,100
Expended	47,915
On hand	173,469

BEFORE LEAVING PORT
Draft for'd 26' 8"
Draft aft 29' 1"

AFTER ENTERING PORT
Draft for'd
Draft aft

MAGAZINE TEMPERATURES:
Maximum 94°
Minimum 69°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Morning	Afternoon
1 Torpedo Defense	
2 Flight Quarters	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	

P.M. 13	125.9	14	2	13	1	270	NE	17	2988	-	72	66	78	BC	cu	NE	2	30	1	NE
14	160.0	18	0	16	5	270	NE	13	2989	-	73	66	78	BC	cu	NE	5	30	1	NE
15	160.0	18	0	17	0	270	NE	19	2987	-	73	65	76	BC	cu	NE	5	30	1	NE
16	151.5	17	0	16	2	270	NE	20	2985	-	72	65	79	BC	cu	NE	5	30	1	NE
17	160.0	18	0	17	5	270	ENE	17	2989	-	72	67	79	C	a cu	NE	7	30	1	NE
18	146.5	17	4	15	6	270	ENE	15	2992	-	72	67	79	C	a cu	NE	9	30	1	NE
+112.T) 19	160.0	18	0	17	1	270	NE	9	2994	-	73	67	78	C	a cu	NE	7	25	1	NE
20	160.0	18	0	16	2	270	NE	12	2994	-	73	67	78	C	a cu	NE	8	25	1	NE
21	160.0	18	0	16	0	270	NE	11	2990	-	73	65	78	C	a cu	NE	7	25	1	NE
22	160.0	18	0	17	2	270	NE	15	2991	-	73	65	78	C	a cu	NE	8	25	1	NE
23	160.0	18	0	16	9	270	NE	13	2991	-	72	66	78	C	a cu	NE	8	25	1	NE
24	160.0	18	0	17	1	270	NE	12	2991	-	72	66	78	C	a cu	NE	7	25	1	NE
19(	+10½	2.T)		9	5	270	NE	9	2994	-	73	67	78	C	a cu	NE	7	25	1	NE

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

14

Page 1175

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE

Date 28 November 19 41

12 - 16

Steaming as before. 1704 changed course into the wind preparatory to launching aircraft. 1709 launched first plane. 1718 landed last plane. Changed course to 270°T. and spd. 237°.5 pse, and 256°.5 pstb. Changed speed to 16 knots. 1727 darkened ship. Average steam 410. Average rpm 154.1.

G. R. OVER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

16 - 20

Steaming as before. 1641 secured boilers No. 1 and No. 2. 1654 cut No. 3 boiler in on main steam line. 1655 sighted Kauia light, bearing 315°, distance about 16 miles. 1900 set clocks back 1/2 hour. 1922 Radar reported plane bearing 004°, distance 15 miles. 1930 Radar reported plane bearing 004°, distance 13 miles. 1940 Radar reported plane bearing 185°, distance 15 miles. 1941 Radar reported plane bearing 004°, distance 15 miles. Average steam 410. Average rpm 160.

C. O. F. DORSETT, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

20 - 24

Steaming as before. Average steam 410. Average rpm 160.

W. G. HOLCOMB, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

O. B. HARDISON,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

R. W. BURNS,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N., Navigator.

(Over page to be used for Narrative of Navigation normally with log sheets)





Page 1177

UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Friday 28 November, 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10½

REMARKS

0 - 4

Moored starboard side to berth B-3, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with 12 manila lines, 5 wire breasts and 2 wire cables. Boiler No. 4 in use for auxiliary purposes. Receiving fresh water and telephone service from the dock. SOP is Cincpac at Submarine Base. SOPA is Comairbatfor in this vessel. Ships present, various units of the U.S. Fleet. 0100 Lieutenant J.C.F. Dorsett, U.S.N., returned from temporary duty with Patrol Wing Two. 0110 BALL, F.E., [illegible], USN; [illegible], [illegible], U.S.N.; BARNARD, A.L., [illegible], and [illegible], G.D., [illegible], U.S.N., returned on board from temporary shore patrol duty in Honolulu, T.H. 0140 Ensign [illegible], D-V(G), U.S.N.R., reported on board for temporary duty.

J. C. Roper
J. C. ROPER, Ensign, U.S.N.

4 - 8

Moored as before. 0445 lighted fires under boilers No. 2 and No. 5. 0505 lighted fires under boiler No. 9. 0525 lighted fires under boiler No. 8 and cut in No. 9 boiler on main steam line. 0600 cut in No. 5 boiler on main steam line. 0610 pursuant to Commanding Officers orders dated Nov. 27, 1941, the following men left the ship for temporary duty at N.A.S., Pearl Harbor, T.H.: OLEAR, F.L., [illegible], U.S.N., and BLANKENSHIP, G.S., [illegible], U.S.N. 0630 lighted fires under No. 3 boiler. 0635 lighted fires under No. 6 boiler and cut in No. 2 and No. 8 boiler on main steam line. 0735 underway on various courses and speeds, standard speed 15 knots, [illegible] r.p.m., Captain conning, Navigator on the bridge. 0748 cast off all tugs. Average steam (0700 to 0800) 410; average r.p.m. (0700 to 0800) 54.9.)

W S Stewart
W. S. STEWART, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

8 - 12

Steaming as before. 0804 Set Material Condition Baker. 0808 Torpedo Defense. 0829 secured mooring details. 0840 passed channel Buoy No. 1 abeam to starboard. Changed course to 154°T. 0842 streamed paravanes. 0847 changed speed to standard speed. 0850 changed course to 180°T. 0852 ELLET and FANNING reported for duty as plane guards. Took position in inner anti-submarine screen. 0903 changed course to 225°T. 0905 changed speed to 18 knots. 0915 changed course to 240°T., 228°, 30' psc, 229° stgc. 0927 changed speed to 10 knots. 0930 flight quarters. 0934 took in paravanes. 0936 changed speed to 20 knots. 0951 changed speed to 25 knots. 0953 secured from Torpedo Defense. Set condition of readiness III, in ship control and fire control. 1010 changed speed to 20 knots. 1013 changed course to 010°T. 1017 commenced steaming on various courses and speeds to launch and land aircraft. 1034 ceased landing aircraft. Changed course to 325°T. 1044 changed course to 250°T., 1050 commenced steaming on various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 1147 last plane landed. Changed speed to 10 knots. 1150 Task Force Eight formed cruising disposition 7-V on ENTERPRISE as guide. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 147.5.

W. C. [illegible], Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

12 - 16

Steaming as before. 1236 changed speed (fleet speed), and ships speed to 16 knots, 160 rpm. 1345 sounded flight quarters. 1507 maneuvering preparatory to launching aircraft. 1513 first plane launched. 1517 launched last plane; average steam 410. Average rpm 143.3.

J. A. Holmes
J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

(CONTINUED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET)

Approved:
G. D. Murray
G. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
R. W. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N. Navigator

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

Page 1178

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) CV6 (Classification Number)

AT / PASSAGE Hawaiian Operating Area TO

Saturday [illegible] December 1941 (Day) (Date) (Month)

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 11

G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding

Hour		BY REVS.		BY LOG		Course (P. C.) Gyro 1	WIND		BAROMETER		TEMPERATURE				CLOUDS				SEA	
								Kts							Form	Moving from				
A.M.																				
1	160.0	18	0	17	0	270	NE	11	2991	-	73	67	79	0	s cu	NE	8	25	3	[illegible]
2	160.0	18	0	17	1	270	NNE	9	2991	-	73	66	79	0	st cu	NE	9	25	2	[illegible]
3	160.0	18	0	17	0	270	NE	10	2991	-	73	66	79	0	st cu	NE	7	25	2	NE
4	160.0	18	0	17	3	270	ENE	13	2991	-	72	66	79	BC	s cu	NE	1	25	2	NE
5	160.0	18	0	17	6	270	ENE	14	2993	-	72	66	76	0	st cu	NE	6	25	2	NE
6	161.1	18	1	16	6	270	NE	12	2997	-	72	66	76	0	st cu	NE	6	25	2	NE
7	160.0	18	0	16	6	270	NE	11	2996	-	73	67	76	0	s cu	NE	6	25	2	NE
8	160.0	18	0	16	9	270	ENE	14	2998	-	73	66	76	C	s cu	NE	5	30	2	[illegible]
9	160.0	18	0	17	3	270	NNE	17	2999	-	73	68	76	BC	cu	NE	3	30	2	[illegible]
10	155.9	17	5	16	6	270	NE	18	3000	-	75	65	76	BC	cu	NE	4	30	2	[illegible]
11	160.0	18	0	16	9	270	NNE	18	3000	-	75	66	76	BC	st cu	NE	4	30	2	[illegible]
12	160.0	18	0	16	7	270	NNE	21	2998	-	72	67	76	BC	st cu	NE	5	30	1	[illegible]

Latitude 21° 25' 00" N
Longitude 164° 17' 15" W

Latitude 21° 31' 30" N
Longitude 165° 21' 45" W

Latitude 21° 37' 45" N
Longitude 167° 28' 45" W

Current Set
Drift

GYROCOMPASS IN USE
Error

STANDARD MAG. COMPASS
Compass No.
S. H.
Error
Variation
Deviation

Fuel	Received	0
	Expended	1,004
	On hand	34,973
Water	Distilled	47,359
	Received	900
	Expended	45,359
	On hand	174,299

BEFORE LEAVING PORT
Draft for'd
Draft aft

AFTER ENTERING PORT
Draft for'd
Draft aft

MAGAZINE TEMPERATURES:
Maximum 89°
Minimum 68°

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Digits	Morning	Afternoon
1	Flight Quarters	Flight Quarters
2		
3		General Quarters
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

Hour		BY REVS.		BY LOG		Course (P. C.) Gyro 1	WIND		BAROMETER		TEMPERATURE				CLOUDS				SEA	
P.M.																				
13	160.0	18	0	16	9	270	NNE	17	2997	-	72	66	76	BC	cu	NE	5	30	2	NNE
14	152.6	17	2	16	0	044	NE	16	2995	-	73	66	78	0	st cu	NE	8	30	2	[illegible]
15	157.8	17	7	16	5	270	NNE	24	2996	-	73	67	79	0	st cu	NE	6	30	2	[illegible]
16	160.0	18	0	16	5	271	NNE	21	2995	-	73	68	79	BC	a cu	NE	3	30	2	[illegible]
17	154.3	17	4	16	5	270	ENE	22	2995	-	73	65	79	BC	a cu	NE	4	30	3	[illegible]
18	143.1	16	1	14	6	270	NNE	26	2999	-	73	68	76	C	st cu	NE	7	25	2	[illegible]
19	160.0	18	0	16	7	270	NE	27	3001	-	72	66	76	BC	st cu	NE	4	20	2	[illegible]
20	160.0	18	0	16	7	270	NE	27	3003	-	71	67	78	C	st cu	NE	7	20	2	[illegible]
21	160.0	18	0	16	6	270	NE	33	3004	-	72	66	79	C	st cu	NE	9	20	2	[illegible]
22	160.0	18	0	16	6	270	NE	31	3002	-	73	65	79	C	cu	NE	7	20	3	[illegible]
23	160.0	18	0	16	5	270	NE	30	3002	-	72	65	79	0	cu	NE	7	20	2	[illegible]
24	160.0	18	0	18	5	270	NE	31	3002	-	73	65	79	C	cu	NE	7	20	2	[illegible]

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)



U.S.S. ENTERPRISE

ADDITIONAL SHEET

Page 1179

Date 29 November, 19 41

16 - 18

Steaming as before. 1610 the Summary Court Martial of which Lieutenant H. A. Dutton, U.S.N. is senior member adjourned in the case of FLINT, H.R., Seaman, U.S.N., to await the action of the convening authority. 1610 Plane made unsuccessful attempt to drop message. 1620 sounded flight quarters. 1652 maneuvering preparatory to landing aircraft. 1657 first plane landed. 1711 last plane landed; resumed base course and speed. 1720 sounded general quarters. Average steam 410. Average rpm. 148.7.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

18 - 20

Steaming as before. 1825 secured from general quarters. Set condition of readiness Three, watch three. Average steam 410. Average rpm 160.0.

G. E. OWEN, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

20 - 24. Steaming as before. Average steam 410. Average rpm 160.0.

J. C. F. DORSETT, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

Approved:

G. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:

R. W. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N., Navigator.


Page 1380
20

UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Page 1181

SERIAL NO. DESCRIPTION plus 11 Saturday 29 November 1941

REMARKS

0 - 4

Steaming in company with Task Force Eight on course 270°T. and pgc, 258° psc, 258° pstc, in cruising disposition S-Y. Standard speed 15 knots. Steaming at 18 knots, 160 rpm, under boilers No. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9. Fleet course and axis 270°T, fleet speed 15 knots. Plane Guards FANNING and KILEY in inner anti-submarine screen 1-A. All vessels steaming darkened. Fleet guide and SOPA in this vessel. Average steam 410. Average rpm 160.0.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

4 - 8

Steaming as before. 0445 lighted fires under No. 8 boiler. 0534 cut in No. 8 boiler on main steam line. 0535 steaming at various courses and speeds preparatory to launching aircraft. 0548 launched first plane. 0557 launched last plane. Changed course to 270°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 18 knots. Average steam 410. Average rpm 180.2.

G. R. OYER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

8 - 12

Steaming as before. 0840 sounded flight quarters. 0915 changed course into the wind preparatory to launching aircraft, using various courses and speeds. Approximate course 030°T, approximate speed 17 knots, 151 rpm. 0919 first plane launched. 0920 last plane launched. Came left to course 270°T., 18 knots, 180 rpm. 0934 steadied on course 270°T. Changed course right into the wind preparatory to landing aircraft. Approximate course 028°T. Approximate speed 18 knots, 143 rpm. 0939 first plane landed on board. 0941 changed course left momentarily, waiting for plane to return. 0943 changed course back into course 270°T. 0945 last plane landed on board. Changed course left to join fleet on 1000 mustered crew on stations. Absentees: CAROL, E.R., Sea.2c,U.S.N., AOL from 0100, November 0100, November 7, 1941, and STACEY, T.L., Sea.2c,U.S.N., AOL from 0100, November 6, 1941, made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. 1151 lighted fires under No. 7 boiler. Average steam 410. Average rpm 158.9.

J. C. F. DORSETT, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

12 - 16

Steaming as before. 1203 lighted fires under boiler No. 1. 1250 right quarters. 1340 boiler No. 9 secured. 1343 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch and land aircraft. 1402 landed last plane. Changed course to 290°T. and pgc, 258° psc, 258° pstc. 1408 changed course to 270°T. and pgc, 258° psc, 258° pstc. Changed course relieved KILEY on station in inner anti-submarine screen as plane guard. 1453 MC CALL the summary court martial of which Lieutenant H. A. Hatton, U.S.N. is senior member, sat in the cases of MILLS, W.F., Sea.2c,U.S.N.; LEAHY, T.E., Sea.1c,U.S.N. and FLINT, H.R., Sea.1c,U.S.N. Average steam 410. Average rpm 157.5.

W. G. SHEABURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

(CONTINUED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET)

Approved:

Examined:

Captain, U.S. Navy.
Commanding.

R. W. RUBLE
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N.
Navigator

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation promptly)



Page 1182

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) CV6 (Hull number)

AT PASSAGE Pearl Harbor, T.H. TO Wake Island Sunday (Day) 30 (Date) November (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 11. G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding

		By Revs.		By Log		Course (P.C.) Gyro Mag.	Wind		Barometer		Temperature				Clouds				Sea	
A.M. 1	160.0	18	0	16	2	270	NE	23	3009	-	74	65	79	0	ci cu	NE	7	15	1	NE
2	160.0	18	0	16	8	270	NE	24	3009	-	74	65	80	0	ci cu	NE	6	15	1	NE
3	160.0	18	0	16	5	270	NE	25	3009	-	73	64	80	BC	cu	NE	5	15	1	NE
4	160.0	18	0	16	4	270	NE	18	3009	-	73	64	80	BC	cu	NE	5	15	1	NE
5	160.0	18	0	16	7	270	NE	25	3009	-	73	65	78	BC	st cu	NE	5	20	1	NE
6	160.0	18	0	16	6	270	NE	20	3007	-	73	65	78	C	st cu	NE	V	25	4	NE
7	141.8	16	0	14	4	270	ENE	23	3010	-	73	63	79	BC	st cu	NE	5	25	4	NE
8	160.0	18	0	17	4	270	ENE	25	3012	-	73	64	79	BC	st cu	NE	5	30	4	NE
9	160.0	18	0	16	6	270	ENE	23	3014	-	73	64	79	BC	ci st	NE	4	30	4	NE
10	143.4	16	2	16	3	074	ENE	25	3013	-	73	65	79	0	a st	NE	10	20	4	NE
11	146.7	16	5	15	5	270	ENE	22	3015	-	75	65	78	0	st cu	NE	10	20	4	NE
12	160.0	18	0	17	1	270	ENE	21	3014	-	75	65	79	0	a st	NE	10	20	4	NE

Latitude 21° 31' 00" N
Longitude 171° 06' 00" W

Latitude 21° 35' 00" N
Longitude 172° 12' 15" W

Latitude 21° 36' 00" N
Longitude 174° 59' 15" W

Current Set
Drift

Gyrocompass in Deg.
Error 0° 9' W

Standard Mag. Compass
Compass No. 54994
S. H. 258°
Error 11° 51' E
Variation 10° 30' E
Deviation 1° 21' E

Received 0
Expended 1,410
On hand 33,515

Distilled 54,636
Received 0
Expended 45,008
On hand 182,929

Before Leaving Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft

After Entering Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft

Magazine Temperatures:
Maximum 89°
Minimum 68°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

	Morning	Afternoon
1	Flight Quarters	Flight Quarters
2		General Quarters
3	General Quarters	
4	Flight Quarters	
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

		By Revs.		By Log		Course (P.C.) Gyro Mag.	Wind		Barometer		Temperature				Clouds				Sea	
P.M. 13	160.0	18	0	17	2	270	ENE	22	3013	-	75	65	78	0	st cu	NE	5	25	4	NE
14	144.9	16	3	15	2	082	ENE	19	3007	-	75	65	78	0	a cu	NE	10	25	4	NE
15	158.0	17	8	16	7	270	ENE	16	3008	-	75	66	78	0	st cu	NE	9	25	4	NE
16	160.0	18	0	17	4	270	ENE	18	3008	-	75	66	78	0	st cu	NE	8	25	4	NE
17	160.0	18	0	17	4	270	E	21	3009	-	75	65	78	0	a cu	ENE	7	25	4	E
18	167.6	18	7	17	2	270	ENE	22	3009	-	75	65	78	0	a cu	NE	6	25	4	NE
(+11)---19	224.0	24	6	24	2	270	ENE	25	3011	-	74	66	78	BC	a cu	ENE	1	25	4	ENE
(+12)19---20	224.0	24	6	23	8	270	ENE	23	3010	-	74	67	78	BC	a cu	ENE	4	25	4	ENE
20---21	224.0	24	6	23	6	270	ENE	21	3012	-	75	67	78	BC	st cu	ENE	2	25	4	ENE
21---22	224.0	24	6	23	6	270	ENE	19	3013	-	75	67	78	BC	st cu	ENE	2	25	4	ENE
22---23	224.0	24	6	24	0	270	ENE	22	3013	-	75	67	78	BC	cu	ENE	1	25	4	ENE
23---24	224.0	24	6	24	1	270	ENE	17	3012	-	75	67	78	BC	cu	ENE	2	25	4	ENE
24	224.0	24	6	24	1	270	ENE	18	3011	-	76	67	77	BC	cu	ENE	1	25	4	ENE

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

Page 4183

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE Date 30 November 19 41

20 - 24
Steaming as before on course 270°T. and pgo, Speed 24 knots, 224 rpm. Average steam 410. Average rpm 224.

G. R. Over
G. R. OVER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

Approved:
O. B. HARDY,
Captain, U.S.Navy,
Commanding.

Received:
R. W. EUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr. U.S.N. Navigator.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with log sheets)



UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Page 1185

NAVY DEPARTMENT DESCRIPTION plus 11 Sunday (Day) 30 (Date) November (Month) 19 41

REMARKS

0 - 4

Steaming on course 270°T. and pgo, 256° pstgo, 256° psg, at 16 knots, in company with Task Force Eight in cruising disposition 8-F (Eight), axis 270°T., ENTERPRISE guide. Ships darkened. Boilers Nos. 1, 3, 5, 6, and 8 lighted off and in stand-by status. Standard speed 16 knots. Fire control, ship control and air control in Condition of Readiness III. Material Condition "B" set below second deck. Average steam 410. Average rpm 160.

W. C. HEBURN, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

4 - 8

Steaming as before. 0518 sounded flight quarters. 0534 maneuvering preparatory to launching aircraft. 0539 launched first plane. 0545 launched last plane, resumed base course and speed. 0547 secured from general quarters, set Condition of Readiness Three, watch II, in shipand fire control. Average steam 410. Average rpm 155.2.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

8 - 12

Steaming as before. 0938 changed course into the wind preparatory to launching aircraft. Steaming at various speeds. 0944 launched first plane. 0948 launched last plane. 0957 landed first plane. 1006 last plane landed. Changed course to 270°T. and pgo, 257°.5 psg, 256° psto. Changed speed to 16 knots. 160 rpm. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions found to be normal. Average steam 410. Average rpm 162.5.

L. M. OYER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

12 - 16

Steaming as before. 1245 sounded flight quarters. 1250 published the findings and sentence in the cases of STINSON, A.D., Sea.1c, U.S.N. Finding, Guilty. Sentence; Confinement for five days and to lose $9 a month for a period of one month; RYMAN, S.L., Cox, U.S.N. Finding; guilty. Sentence; to be confined for five days and to lose $20 of his pay a month for a period of one month; STEVENS, J.C., Sea.1c, U.S.N. Finding; guilty. Sentence; to lose $20 of his pay a month for a period of one month; SINCLAIR, A.W., S.1.c, U.S.N. Finding; guilty. Sentence; to lose $9 a month of his pay for a period of one month; STEVENS, J.C., Sea.1c, U.S.N. Finding; guilty. Sentence; to be confined for five days and to lose $9 a month of his pay for a period of one month; 1300 by order of Commanding Officer, STEVENS, J.C., Sea.1c, U.S.N. and STINSON, A.D., Sea.1c, U.S.N. were confined for a period of five days in execution of sentence of Deck Court. 1336 changed course right into wind preparing to launch aircraft. Approximate course 062°T. 1342 landed first plane. 1346 landed last plane. Changed speed to 16 knots. 160 rpm. resumed base course 270°T. 1352 changed course to right into wind preparing to land aircraft. 1358 first plane landed. 1400 last plane landed. Changed speed to 16 knots, 160 rpm. resumed base course 270°T. Average steam 410. Average rpm 155.7

J. C. F. DORSEY, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

16 - 18

Steaming as before. 1653 Boiler No. 3 cut in on main steam line. 1706 commenced steaming on various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 1726 last plane landed. Changed course to left to 270°T. and pgo, 256° psg, 256° psto. Changed speed to 18 knots. 1735 changed speed to 24 knots. 1743 general quarters. 1750 darkened ship. Average steam 410. Average rpm 163.8.

W. C. HEBURN, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

18 - 20

Steaming as before. 1853 secured from general quarters. Set condition of readiness III, watch II, ship control and fire control. 1900 set clocks back one hour to zone plus 12 time. Average steam 410. Average rpm 154.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

(CONTINUED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET)

Approved:

A. B. [illegible]
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:

R. W. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr.,

Original officers copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation weekly


LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP
DRILLS AND EXERCISES



UNITED STATES SHIP

Page 1187

REMARKS

Approved:

Examined:



Page 1188

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) CV6

AT Hawaiian Operating Area TO Monday 1 December 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 12 G. D. MURRAY Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

A.M. 1	224.0	24	6	23	7	270	ESE	17	3011	-	76	68	78	BC	cu	E	1	25	2	E
2	224.0	24	6	23	6	270	ESE	17	3008	-	76	68	78	BC	cu	E	1	25	2	E
3	224.0	24	6	23	6	270	ESE	19	3007	-	76	69	78	BC	cu	E	1	25	3	E
4	224.0	24	6	23	7	270	E	17	3006	-	77	69	78	BC	cu	E	1	25	2	E
5	224.0	24	6	24	0	270	ESE	21	3005	-	77	69	78	BC	a cu	E	2	25	3	E
6	202.1	22	8	21	8	270	ESE	17	3004	-	77	68	78	BC	a cu	E	1	25	2	E
7	225.3	24	5	23	6	270	ESE	16	3006	-	78	69	78	BC	a cu	E	3	25	2	E
8	224.0	24	6	22	5	270	E	16	3008	-	78	69	80	BC	a cu	E	2	25	2	E
9	210.7	22	5	22	5	120	E	17	3009	-	79	70	80	BC	a cu	E	1	25	2	E
10	80.1	9	0	8	5	110	ENE	18	3008	-	80	71	78	BC	a cu	E	1	30	2	E
11	65.0	7	0	6	3	110	ESE	17	3009	-	80	71	80	BC	a cu	E	2	30	2	E
12	65.0	7	0	6	0	110	ESE	16	3008	-	80	72	80	BC	a cu	E	4	30	2	E

8 A.M. Latitude	21° 37' 45" N
Longitude	179° 53' 30" W
Noon Latitude	21° 33' 30" N
Longitude	179° 55' 30" W
8 P.M. Latitude	21° 25' 30" N
Longitude	179° 17' 30" W
Current Set	[illegible]
Drift	
Gyrocompass in Use Error	0° 30' [illegible]

Standard Mag. Compass

Compass No.	[illegible]
C. N.	266°
Error	11° 26' E
Variation	10° 00' E
Deviation	1° 30' E

Received	0
Expended	2,045
On hand	31,672
Distilled	38,173
Received	0
Expended	[illegible],578
On hand	[illegible],584

Before Leaving Port

Draft for'd

Draft aft

After Entering Port

Draft for'd

Draft aft

Magazine Temperatures:

Maximum 89°

Minimum 66°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

	Morning	Afternoon
1	Flight Quarters	General Quarters
2		
3	General Quarters	
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

P.M. 13	65.0	7	0	6	3	095	ESE	9	3008	-	81	72	80	C	cu	E	6	30	2	E
14	65.0	7	0	6	7	095	ESE	15	3005	-	80	71	80	BC	cu	E	4	30	2	E
15	[illegible]	7	[illegible]	6	[illegible]	095	ESE	14	3005	-	80	71	80	C	st cu	E	7	30	2	E
16	[illegible]	17	0	16	[illegible]	264	ESE	16	3002	-	79	70	80	C	cu	E	5	30	2	E
17	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	15	3004	-	78	70	78	BC	cu	E	4	25	2	E
18	[illegible]	[illegible]	5	16	4	264	[illegible]	16	3005	-	78	72	78	BC	cu	E	4	25	2	E
19	[illegible]	[illegible]	7	16	2	264	[illegible]	15	3006	-	78	71	79	C	cu	E	6	25	2	E
20	[illegible]	[illegible]	7	[illegible]	[illegible]	264	[illegible]	16	3007	-	77	71	79	C	cu	E	5	25	2	E
21	[illegible]	[illegible]	7	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	17	3009	-	77	71	79	C	st cu	E	8	25	2	E
22	[illegible]	[illegible]	9	17	5	264	[illegible]	18	3009	-	77	73	79	C	st cu	E	7	25	2	E
23	[illegible]	[illegible]	7	17	[illegible]	264	[illegible]	19	3009	-	77	73	79	C	st cu	E	8	25	2	E
24	[illegible]	[illegible]	7	17	5	264	E	19	3009	-	77	73	79	C	st cu	E	7	25	2	E

(Original (Ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

28



U.S.S. ENTERPRISE

ADDITIONAL SHEET

Page 1189

Date 1 December, 1941

16 - 18

Steaming as before. 1628 changed fleet course to 264°T. and PGC, 258° psc, 250° pstc. 1640 sounded flight quarters. 1654 changed course left into wind preparatory to landing aircraft. Approximate course 098°(T), approximate speed 15 knots. 1702 first plane landed. 1706 last plane landed. Changed course right to 264°T. Changed speed to 18 knots, 160 r.p.m. 1709 sounded General Quarters. 1716 darkened ship. Cut in degaussing gear for half hour test. 1746 secured the degaussing girdle. Test completed. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 160.3.

J. O. F. Dorsett
J. O. F. DORSETT, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

18 - 20

Steaming as before. 1817 secured from General Quarters. Set Condition of Readiness III, ship control and fire control. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 160.0.

[illegible], Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

20 - 24

Steaming as before. 2400 date changed to Wednesday, December third, zone description (-) 12. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 160.0.

J. A. Holmes
J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

Approved:
G. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy, Navigator


No. 1130
Approved
Examined

Page 1181

UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Monday 1 December 1941
(Day) (Date) (Month)

Zone Description Plus 12

REMARKS

0 - 4

Steaming darkened in company with Task Force Eight, in special cruising disposition S-V, on course 270°T. and pgc, 258° psc, 258° pstc. Standard speed 15 knots, 133 r.p.m., steaming at 24 knots, 224 r.p.m., on boilers Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8. Fleet course and axis 270°T, fleet speed 24 knots, 224 r.p.m. Plane guard DD's MO CALL and FANNING in inner anti-submarine screen 1-A. Fleet guide O.T.C. and S.O.P.A. in this vessel. Task force in condition of readiness three. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 224.

J. O. F. DORSETT, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

4 - 8

Steaming as before. 0450 flight quarters. 0510 general quarters. 0542 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 0554 landed last plane. Changed course to 270°T. and pgc, 258° psc, 258° pstc. Changed speed to 24 knots. 0617 secured from general quarters. Set condition III in ship control and fire control. Lighted ship. Average steam 410. Average rpm 224.

W. C. KEMBERY, Lieut(jg),U.S.N.

8 - 12

Steaming as before. 0817 sounded flight quarters. 0816 changed speed to 15 knots, 150 r.p.m. 0831 maneuvering preparatory to launching aircraft. 0856 launched first plane. 0886 launched last plane; changed speed to 24 knots, 224 r.p.m.. changed course to 090°. 0902 changed speed to 15 knots, 133 r.p.m., course 120°T. and pgc. 0903 landed first plane. 0913 landed last plane; changed speed to 7 knots, changed course left to 110°T. and pgc. 0915 preparing to receive MO CALL for fueling. 0932 passed first line to MO CALL. 0945 sent provisions to MOCALL. 0944 commenced fueling MO CALL. 1100 MO CALL cast off. 1105 preparing to receive FANNING for fueling. 1111 passed first line to FANNING. 1120 sent stores to FANNING. 1125 commenced fueling FANNING. 1152 FANNING cast off. Made routine daily inspection of all magazines and smokeless powder samples, conditions normal. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 104.2

J. A. REGNER, Ensign, U.S.N.

12 - 16

Steaming as before, refueling the FANNING on starboard side. 1236 changed course to 095°T. and pgc, 066° psc, and 066° pstc. 1239 disconnected forward fuel hose. 1240 towline parted. 1241 FANNING cast off. Total amount of fuel received by FANNING 49,060 gallons. 1303 changed course to 085°T. and pgc. 1315 secured towline to BALCH. 1325 passed forward hose to BALCH. 1328 passed after hose to BALCH. 1331 MO CALL hoisted "Breakdown" flag. 1351 sounded flight quarters. 1407 MO CALL regained position circling ship. 1447 disconnected after hose. 1450 BALCH cast off, having received 65,371 gallons fuel oil. 1500 changed course into the wind to launch aircraft. 1502 launched first plane. 1505 launched last plane. 1515 first plane landed. 1545 last plane landed. Changed course to 224°T. Changed speed to 15 knots, 150 rpm. 1554 changed course to right to 244°T. and pgc, 274° psc, 273° pstc. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 85.0.

W. R. OTER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

Approved:

H. D. BUSBEE,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:

R. W. BUSBEE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N. Navigator.

(Original ribbon copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)



Page 1182

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE CV6

Hawaiian Operating Area TO Wednesday 3 December 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION Minus 12 G. D. MURRAY, Captain,

1	166.0	16	6	18	2	264	E	15	3006	-	78	73	79	C	st cu	E	9	25	2	E
2	166.0	16	7	17	6	264	E	16	3004	-	78	73	79	C	st cu	E	6	25	2	E
3	166.0	16	7	17	7	264	E	16	3003	-	78	73	79	C	st cu	E	8	25	2	E
4	166.0	16	7	17	7	264	E	17	3003	-	78	73	79	C	s cu	E	7	25	1	E
5	166.0	16	7	17	6	264	E	16	3005	-	78	73	79	BC	s cu	E	4	25	1	E
6	160.5	16	0	17	6	264	E	12	3008	-	78	73	79	BC	s cu	E	1	25	1	E
7	162.0	16	3	17	1	264	E	13	3008	-	80	73	79	BC	s cu	E	1	30	1	E
8	166.0	16	6	17	6	264	E	15	3005	-	78	73	79	BC	s cu	E	1	30	1	E
9	162.0	16	6	16	2	264	ENE	11	3010	-	77	73	78	BC	cu	NE	2	30	1	E
10	250.4	17	9	16	9	Var.	ENE	14	3010	-	80	75	79	BC	cu	NE	2	30	1	E
11	240.5	16	8	15	1	Var.	NE	14	3008	-	80	74	79	BC	cu	NE	2	30	1	E
12	140.0	15	6	15	2	Var.	NE	16	3008	-	80	75	80	BC	cu	NE	2	30	1	E

Latitude 21° 00' 45" N
Longitude 175° 27' 50" W

Latitude 20° 50' 45" N
Longitude 175° 39' 45" W

Latitude [illegible]
Longitude 176° [illegible] 45" W

Current Set 25° 35' 30" N
Drift 156° 57' 46" E

Deviation of Std 6° 16' E

Compass No. 56094
S. H. 256°
Error 0° 00' E
Variation 0° 00' E
Deviation 0° .00

Transferred 4,092
Expended 1,900
On hand 35,400

Received 56,075
Received 0
Expended 55,157
On hand 167,440

Draft fw'd
Draft aft

Draft fw'd
Draft aft

Maximum 84°
Minimum 70°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

	Morning	Afternoon
1	Flight Quarters	Flight Quarters
2	General Quarters	
3		Flight Quarters
4		General Quarters

13	240.0	16	8	11	7	260	E	13	3005	-	82	76	79	BC	cu	NE	1	30	1	E
14	140.0	[illegible]	[illegible]	14	3	112	E	13	3004	-	82	76	79	BC	cu	NE	2	30	1	E
15	182.5	[illegible]	[illegible]	15	0	260	E	14	3002	-	82	75	80	BC	cu	NE	2	30	1	E
16	140.5	16	6	14	8	264	E	13	3005	-	80	74	79	BC	cu	NE	2	30	1	E
17	140.0	[illegible]	[illegible]	15	0	238	ENE	16	3006	-	80	75	79	BC	s cu	NE	4	30	1	E
18	153.2	[illegible]	[illegible]	15	8	264	E	20	3004	-	79	73	79	BC	s cu	NE	5	30	1	E
19	164.1	20	[illegible]	20	4	264	ENE	20	3005	-	78	74	78	BC	cu	NE	1	25	1	E
[illegible]	168.0	20	7	19	4	264	ENE	18	3005	-	78	74	79	BC	cu	NE	1	30	1	E
[illegible]	164.0	20	7	19	9	264	ENE	18	3005	-	79	76	79	BC	cu	NE	1	30	1	E
[illegible]	124.8	20	7	19	9	264	ENE	13	3008	-	79	75	78	BC	cu	NE	2	25	2	E
[illegible]	160.0	20	7	19	3	264	ENE	17	3006	-	78	75	76	BC	cu	NE	2	25	2	E
[illegible]	164.0	20	7	20	1	264	ENE	16	3008	-	78	73	72	BC	cu	NE	3	25	2	E
24	156.0	20	7	20	1	264	ENE	14	3009	-	79	75	80	BC	cu	NE	3	25	2	E

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ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE Date 8 December, 19 41

16 - 20
Steaming as before. 1847 secured from General Quarters. Set condition of readiness three, watch four. 1900 set clocks back one hour to 1800 Zone (-)11 time. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 165.4.

J. O. F. DORSETT, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

20 - 24
Steaming as before. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 166.0.

T. C. MEBURN, Lieut.(jg), U.S.N.

Approved:
S. B. [illegible]
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
H. L. [illegible]
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N.R.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation enclosed with log sheets)



Page 1195

UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Wednesday 3 December 1941
(Day) (Month) (Month)

Ship's Description: Class 1B

REMARKS

0 - 4
Steaming darkened in company with Task Force Eight, except NORTHAMPTON and SEMINOLE, in special cruising disposition S-V, on course 264°T. and pgc, 254° psc, 253°.5 pstc. Standard speed 15 knots, 133 r.p.m. Steaming at 16 knots, 156 r.p.m. Killery Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 on the line. Fleet course and axis 264°T. Fleet speed 16 knots, 156 r.p.m. Plane guards CRAVEN and FANNING. Ship in Condition of readiness three. Fleet guide and C.T.C. in this vessel. 0155 sighted NORTHAMPTON and SEMINOLE bearing 091°T, approximate distance 10 miles. 0345 NORTHAMPTON and SEMINOLE rejoined formation. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 156.0.

G. R. OVER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

4 - 8
Steaming as before. 0500 manned all flight quarter stations. 0525 Went to General Quarters. 0530 changed speed to 15 knots, 133 r.p.m. 0559 changed course into the wind to launch aircraft. Approx. course 111°T. and pgc. Approx. speed 18 knots. 0606 launched first plane. 0611 launched last plane. Changed course to right to 264°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 16 knots, 166 r.p.m. 0632 lighted ship. 0656 secured from general quarters, set condition of readiness three, watch four. 0747 shifted steering unit to port unit. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 163.3.

J. H. DUNSFF, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

8 - 12
Steaming as before. 0855 Flight Quarters. 0933 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch and land aircraft. 1000 last plane landed. Changed course to right to 264°T. and pgc., 254° pstc, 253° 50' psc. Changed speed to 16 knots. 1015 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 11. 1021 Changed fleet speed to 15 knots. Changed speed to 15½ knots. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 155.3.

W. C. TEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

12 - 16
Steaming as before. 1210 sighted PBY patrol plane bearing 140°T. 1300 sounded flight quarters. 1330 ceased zigzagging. Changed course right into wind, preparing to launch aircraft, approx. course 118°T, average speed 19 knots. 1358 launched first plane. 1404 launched last plane. 1411 first plane landed. 1414 last plane landed. Changed course to 314°T. and commenced zigzagging in accordance with Plan No. XI, speed 15 knots, 140 r.p.m. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples, conditions normal. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 161.6.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

16 - 18
Steaming as before. 1715 changed courses and speeds preparatory to landing aircraft. 1717 first plane landed. 1727 last plane landed. Changed course to 264°T. and pgc, 253°.5 psc, 254° pstc. Changed speed to 12 knots. 1740 sounded General Quarters. 1746 commenced zigzagging according to Plan No. 2. 1800 changed speed to 20 knots. 164 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 136.8.

G. R. OVER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

(CONTINUED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET)

Approved:
U. PRATT
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
P. N. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr.,

Original without entry of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly



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LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) CV6 (Classification-Number)

At/Passage Hawaiian Operating Area to Thursday (Day) 4 (Date) December (Month) 1941

Zone description Minus 11 G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding

1	188.0	20	7	19	6	264	E	24	3006	-	79	74	80	BC	a cu	E	3	25	3	E
2	188.0	20	7	19	5	264	E	13	3005	-	79	75	80	BC	st cu	ENE	4	25	3	E
3	188.0	20	7	20	0	264	E	13	3004	-	79	75	80	BC	a cu	E	4	25	3	E
4	186.0	20	7	20	0	266	E	14	3002	-	80	75	80	BC	a cu	NE	4	25	3	E
5	184.0	20	7	19	3	264	ENE	18	3004	-	80	75	79	BC	a cu	NE	3	25	3	E
6	181.4	17	0	18	9	064	E	27	3003	-	80	73	79	BC	a cu	NE	1	30	3	E
7	188.6	17	9	16	8	064	E	26	3005	-	79	73	79	BC	cu	E	2	30	3	E
8	187.3	17	6	16	6	064	ESE	27	3007	-	80	73	79	BC	cu	E	1	30	3	E
9	183.5	16	4	15	2	064	ESE	27	3009	-	80	74	80	BC	cu	E	2	20	3	E
10	182.5	16	0	16	5	064	E	26	3010	-	80	73	80	C	a cu	E	7	30	3	E
11	188.0	20	7	19	5	064	ESE	25	3007	-	80	73	80	BC	cu	E	1	30	3	E
12	129.5	14	8	15	5	064	E	24	3004	-	80	73	80	BC	cu	E	1	30	3	E

8 A.M. Latitude 20° 52' 00" N
Longitude 170° 09' 45" W

Noon Latitude 20° 37' 20" N
Longitude 171° 16' 55" W

8 P.M. Latitude 20° 58' 18" N
Longitude 173° 45' 45" W

Current Set / Drift

Chronometer on G.C.T.
Error 0° 00' 6

Standard Mag. Compass
Compass No. 58234
C.H. 070° 30
Error 1° 30' E
Variation 8° 12' E
Deviation 6° 42' W

Fuel Oil (gals.)
Received 0
Expended 1,431
On hand 24,049

Fresh water (gals.)
Distilled 50,900
Received 0
Expended 52,395
On hand 101,544

Before leaving port
Draft for'd
Draft aft

After entering port
Draft for'd
Draft aft

Magazine temperatures
Maximum 94°
Minimum 77°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Morning	Afternoon
General Quarters	Flight Quarters
Flight Quarters	
	General Quarters.

13	188.0	20	7	20	5	064	E	21	3002	-	79	73	80	BC	cu	E	1	30	3	E
14	185.3	18	8	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	E	21	3001	-	80	73	80	BC	cu	E	3	30	3	E
15	188.0	20	7	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	E	21	3000	-	79	73	80	BC	cu	E	2	30	3	E
16	186.0	20	7	19	9	[illegible]	E	21	[illegible]	-	79	73	79	BC	cu	E	3	30	3	E
17	186.3	[illegible]	6	[illegible]	0	064	E	23	3000	-	79	73	79	C	st cu	E	4	25	3	E
18	186.1	18	6	17	1	064	E	24	3001	-	79	73	79	C	st cu	E	6	25	3	E
19	[illegible]	20	7	19	0	064	ESE	26	3003	-	79	73	79	BC	cu	E	1	25	3	E
20	182.0	20	7	19	0	064	ESE	27	3003	-	79	73	80	BC	cu	E	4	20	3	E
21	—— Set clocks ahead one hour to [illegible] zone time.																			
22	[illegible]	20	8	19	7	064	ESE	27	3004	-	79	73	80	BC	cu	E	2	20	3	E
23	[illegible]	20	7	20	1	064	ESE	26	3006	-	79	73	79	BC	cu	E	3	20	3	E
24	[illegible]	20	9	20	5	064	ESE	24	3007	-	79	73	79	C	st cu	E	7	20	3	E

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ADDITIONAL SHEET

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE Date 4 December 19 41

12 - 16
Steaming as before. 1200 COLVIN, C.D., Sea.1c, U.S.N. was treated for fracture, comminuted right and left radius, sustained in fall from ladder at No. 1 crane. Admitted to sick list. 1217 Flight Quarters. 1308 ceased zigzagging. Resumed base course. 064°T. Changed speed to fleet speed 7 knots. 1320 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch and land aircraft. 1345 last plane landed. Commenced zigzagging in accordance with plan No. 2. Changed speed to 20 knots, 136 r.p.m. Changed fleet speed to 18 knots. 1540 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 1550 last plane landed. Commenced zigzagging in accordance with plan No. 2. Base course 064°T. and ppc. Changed speed to 20 knots, 136 r.p.m., fleet speed 18 knots. 1630 flight quarters. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 175.0.

W. G. MEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

16 - 18
Steaming as before. 1600 changed course left to 049°T. 1608 ceased zigzagging. Resumed base course of 064°T. 1604 commenced landing operations. Various courses and speeds while landing planes. Average course 064°T. Average speed 11 knots. 1609 first plane landed. 1615 last plane landed. 1616 commenced zigzagging in accordance with zigzag plan No. 2. Changed speed to 18 knots, 136 r.p.m. 1640 sounded general quarters. 1647 darkened ship. 1740 secured from general quarters. Set condition of readiness three, watch three, ship control and fire control. 1800 ceased zigzagging. Changed speed to 20 knots, 136 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 131.2.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

18 - 20
Steaming as before. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 136.0.

R. E. OVAS, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

20 - 24
Steaming as before. 2000 set clocks ahead one hour to zone (+)minus 12 time. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 136.6.

J. O. F. DORSETT, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

Approved
Captain, U.S. Navy.
Commanding.

Entered
E. M. COMBS,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N. Navigator

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

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UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Thursday 4 December 1941
(Ship) (Date)

DESCRIPTION 0000 11. REMARKS

0 - 4

Steaming in company with Task Force Eight in cruising disposition SV (night formation). Fleet course and axis is 264°T, fleet speed 15 knots. Task force is zigzagging in accordance with plan No. 2. Ship is steaming at 20 knots, 185 r.p.m., under six boilers, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8. ENTERPRISE plane guards are the CRAVEN and BALCH. All ships in task force are steaming darkened and maintaining condition of readiness III, in ship control and fire control. S.O.P.A. and G.T.C. is Comairbatfor in this vessel. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 186.0.

J. A. ROLLER, Ensign, U.S.N.

04 - 08

Steaming as before. 0450 sounded General Quarters. 0500 ceased zigzagging, changed speed to 18 knots, 164 r.p.m. 0515 changed course right to 264°T. and pgc. 0527 steaming on various courses and speed preparatory to launching aircraft. 0537 launched first plane. 0537 launched last plane. Changed speed to 20 knots, 180 r.p.m. Changed course to 264° T. and pgc. 0542 changed speed to 18 knots, 164 r.p.m. 0600 secured from General Quarters. Set condition of readiness three, watch three. 0610 changed course to 250°T. and pgc. 041°.5 psto, 040° psc. 0650 commenced zigzagging at various courses and speeds preparatory to launching aircraft. 0654 first Marine plane launched. 0707 last plane launched. Changed course to 264°T. and psc. 077° psto. Changed speed to 18 knots, 160 r.p.m. 0716 Task Force Eight resumed cruising in disposition 9-V. Fleet course and axis 024°T, fleet speed 16 knots. C.T.G. is Comairbatfor in this vessel. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 158.8.

G. R. OVEM, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

8 - 12

Steaming as before. 0800 mustered crew on stations. Absentees: CAROL, E.R., Sea.2c,U.S.N.R. AOL from 0100, November 7, 1941, and STACEY, T.L., Sea.2c,U.S.N.R. AOL from 0100,November 6, 1941. 0811 Radar reported a group of planes bearing 310°T., distant 25,000 yards. 0815 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Changed speed to 20 knots, 186 r.p.m. Went to flight quarters. 0835 changed speed to 8 knots, 45 r.p.m. 0839 changed speed to 8 knots, 72 r.p.m. 0840 ceased zigzagging and returned to base course, 084°T. 0841 changed course into wind to launch aircraft. Steaming at various courses and speeds as necessary. Approximate course 084°T. 0848 launched first plane. 0844 launched last plane. Landed first plane. 0845 FLAGG, R.E., A.M.M.3c,U.S.N. suffered laceration of right hand when remote light in wing of plane he was holding broke. Disposition: to duty. 0850 landed last plane. Changed speed to 7 knots, 85 r.p.m. Steadied on base course, 084°T. and pgc. 0855 changed speed to 15 knots, 160 r.p.m. 0916 changed course into wind to recover aircraft. On various courses and speeds as necessary. Approximate course 000°T. 0918 landed first plane. 0924 landed last plane. Resumed to base course, 084°T. and pgc. 0927 changed speed to 20 knots, 186 r.p.m. 0928 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1107 ceased zigzagging. Changed course into wind to recover aircraft. On various courses and speeds as necessary. Approximate course 093°T. 1119 first plane landed. 1144 last plane landed. Changed speed to 20 knots, 186 r.p.m. Commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Completed monthly inspection of smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 185.8.

J. C. F. DOHERTY, Lieutenant,U.S.N.

(CONTINUED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET)

Approved: Examined:

C. H. MURRAY, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

R. W. BOOTH, Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N.R., Navigator.

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

1200

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE CV6

AT Hawaiian Operating Area TO Friday 5 December 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION Minus 12 G. D. MURRAY Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

1	[illegible]	20	7	19	7	084	E	25	3007	-	77	73	78	BC	st cu	E	5	25	2	E
2	[illegible]	20	7	19	6	084	E	27	3006	-	77	73	79	C	cu	E	6	25	2	E
3	[illegible]	[illegible]	7	19	5	084	E	30	3005	-	77	73	78	0	cu	E	5	25	2	E
4	[illegible]	[illegible]	7	19	5	084	E	21	3005	-	77	73	79	0	cu	E	6	25	2	E
5	[illegible]	[illegible]	7	19	7	084	ENE	19	3003	-	78	72	79	C	st cu	E	9	25	2	E
6	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	19	4	084	E	21	3004	-	78	73	78	BC	cu	E	1	25	2	E
7	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	18	1	084	ENE	25	3006	-	76	71	79	BC	cu	E	3	30	2	E
8	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	19	[illegible]	084	E	19	3010	-	78	71	79	BC	cu	E	2	30	2	E
9	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	E	19	3010	-	79	71	77	BC	cu	E	2	30	2	E
10	[illegible]	19	[illegible]	19	4	[illegible]	E	19	3012	-	80	73	77	BC	cu	E	4	30	2	E
11	[illegible]	21	[illegible]	18	6	090	E	20	3010	-	80	72	77	BC	cu	E	5	30	2	E
12	[illegible]	[illegible]	6	[illegible]	5	090	E	20	3010	-	80	73	77	C	cu	E	6	30	2	E

Latitude 21° 24' 00" N
Longitude 177° 30' 45" W

Latitude 21° 27' 00" N
Longitude 178° 54' 00" W

Latitude 21° 29' 15" N
Longitude 178° 27' 15" W

Compass in Use

Error 0° 07' E

Standard Mag. Compass

Compass No. 54224

074° 30'

9° 27' E

9° 00' E

0° 27' E

Fuel

Received 0

Expended 1,794

On hand 22,255

Water

Distilled 39,100

Received 0

Expended 45,100

On hand 82,000

Before Leaving Port

Draft for'd

Draft aft

After Entering Port

Draft for'd

Draft aft

Magazine Temperatures

Maximum 85°

Minimum 74°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1	Flight Quarters	Flight Quarters
2	General Quarters	
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

13	159.0	21	0	19	4	090	E	25	3005	-	79	72	78	C	st cu	E	6	25	2	E
14	[illegible]	17	9	18	5	090	E	23	3004	-	79	72	78	BC	cu	E	2	30	2	E
15	[illegible]	21	0	19	5	090	E	20	3004	-	79	72	78	BC	s cu	E	2	30	2	E
16	[illegible]	21	0	18	6	090	ENE	20	3003	-	78	72	79	BC	s cu	E	3	30	2	E
17	[illegible]	18	5	16	5	090	ENE	20	3003	-	76	72	79	BC	s cu	E	3	30	2	E
18	[illegible]	21	0	19	5	090	ENE	21	3005	-	77	71	79	CP	cu nb	E	7	20	2	E
19	[illegible]	21	0	19	0	090	ENE	[illegible]	[illegible]	-	77	71	79	BC	st cu	E	3	25	2	E
20	[illegible]	21	0	19	5	090	ENE	21	3006	-	77	71	79	BC	s cu	E	4	25	2	E
21	[illegible]	21	0	19	3	090	ENE	20	3007	-	77	70	79	BC	s cu	E	5	25	2	E
22	[illegible]	21	0	19	5	090	ENE	23	3007	-	77	70	79	C	st cu	E	6	25	2	E
23	159.0	21	0	19	5	090	ENE	21	3005	-	77	70	79	0	st cu	E	10	20	2	E
24	159.0	21	0	18	5	090	ENE	23	3005	-	77	71	79	0	st cu	E	10	18	2	E

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

Page [illegible]

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE Date December 5, 1941.

16 - 18
Steaming as before. 1608 changed course into wind to recover aircraft. Steaming at various speeds as necessary. Approximate course 075°T. 1613 first plane landed. 1625 last plane landed. Changed speed to 20 knots, 180 r.p.m. Changed course right to 260°T, and pgc. 1650 went to general quarters. 1649 darkened ship. 1745 secured from general quarters. Set condition three, watch [illegible]. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. [illegible]

[illegible], Lieutenant, U.S.N.

18 - 20
Steaming as before. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. [illegible]

[illegible], Lieutenant (jg), U.S.N.

20 - 24
Steaming as before. 2000 set the clocks ahead one hour to zone plus 11 time. 2300 changed fleet speed to 15 knots. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. [illegible]

J. A. [illegible], Ensign, U.S.N.

Approved: G. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: [illegible]
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N., Navigator

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with log sheets)


1202

N. Navy. 43 (Mar. 1929)

Page 1203

UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE, Friday (Day) 5 (Date) December (Month), 19 41

ZONE DESCRIPTION Minus 12

REMARKS

0 - 4

Steaming on course 084°T. and pgc, 076°.30' psc, 079° pstgc, at 20 knots, 186 r.p.m. in company with Task Force Eight in special cruising disposition 9-V (night), course and axis 084°T. Plane guards FANNING and CRAVEN in inner anti-submarine screen. Boilers Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 in use. Ship darkened. Ship control, fire control and air control in condition of readiness III. Condition "B" set below second deck. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 186.0

W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

4 - 8

Steaming as before. 0500 sounded flight quarters. 0530 sounded general quarters. 0600 changed course into wind to launch aircraft, steaming at various courses and speeds. Approx. course 095°. 0605 first plane launched. 0616 last plane launched. Changed course to 084°T, speed 20 knots, 186 r.p.m. 0635 secured from general quarters. Set condition of readiness III, watch II, ship control and fire control. Lighted ship. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 182.7.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

8 - 12

Steaming as before. 0922 steaming on various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 0923 launched first plane. 0924 launched last plane. Changed speed to 15 knots, 133 r.p.m. 0932 landed first plane. 0940 landed last plane. Changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. Changed course to 090°T. and pgc, 080° psc, 084° pstc. Made daily visual examination of all magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Made weekly test of magazine and shell room flooding and sprinkling system. Conditions normal. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m.184.2.

G. R. OVER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

12 - 16

Steaming as before. 1215 secured degaussing coils. MC BURNEY, J.C., Sea.2c, U.S.N., 3rd. Division was injured while standing in mess line for dinner, when he fell down unguarded hatch. Diagnosis: Hematomea left shoulder; was admitted to sick bay. 1300 went to flight quarters. 1338 changed speed to 10 knots, 89 r.p.m. Changed course into wind preparatory to launching aircraft. Approximate course 080°T. Approximate speed 10 knots, 89 r.p.m. 1341 launched first plane. 1346 launched last plane. Changed course right to 090°T. and pgc. 1350 changed course left into wind to land air group. Approximate course 080°T. Approximate speed 10 knots, 89 r.p.m. 1353 first plane landed. 1354 last plane landed. Changed course right to 090°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 1413 CRAVEN and DUNLAP exchanged stations in disposition. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 181.5.

J.C.P. DORSETT, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

16 - 18

Steaming as before. 1632 commenced steaming on various courses and at various speeds preparatory to landing aircraft. 1634 first plane landed. 1640 plane 6-B-4 crashed into barrier, no injuries to personnel. 1654 last plane landed. Changed speed to full speed, 20 knots, 189,r.p.m. Changed course to 090°T. and pgc, 080° psc, 084° pstc. 1710 sounded general quarters. 1715 darkened ship. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 175.7.

W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

18 - 20

Steaming as before. 1817 secured from general quarters, set condition of readiness three, watch two. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 189.0.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

20 - 24

Steaming as before. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 189.0

G. R. OVER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

Approved:

G. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:

R. W. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N., Navigator.

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N. Nav. 48 (Mar., 1920)

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LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) CV6 (Identification Number)

AT PASSAGE Hawaiian Operating Area TO Friday (Day) 5 (Date) December (Month) 19 41

ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 12 C. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hours	"All Hands" Arrive Here	By Revs. Nautical Miles	By Revs. Tenths	By Log Nautical Miles	By Log Tenths	Courses (P. C.) Gyro. X Mag. (Indicate which)	Wind Direction	Wind Force Lbs.	Barometer Height of Liquid	Barometer Reading at Temperature	Temperature Air Dry Bulb	Temperature Air Wet Bulb	Temperature Water at Intake	Weather by Symbols	Clouds Form	Clouds Moving From	Clouds Amount	Visibility	Sea Condition	Sea Swell From
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M. 1	189.0	21	0	19	3	090	ENE	23	3005	-	76	70	79	BC	cu	NE	4	20	1	NE
2	189.0	21	0	18	9	090	ENE	23	3005	-	76	71	79	BC	cu	NE	3	20	1	NE
3	189.0	21	0	19	0	090	ENE	20	3005	-	76	71	79	BC	ci cu	NE	3	20	1	NE
4	189.0	21	0	19	1	090	ENE	20	3005	-	76	71	79	BC	a cu	NE	4	20	2	NE
5	189.0	21	0	19	2	090	ENE	23	3002	-	76	71	79	BC	cu	NE	3	20	2	NE
6	185.8	20	6	19	1	090	ENE	23	3004	-	76	72	79	BC	cu	NE	3	25	2	NE
7	189.0	21	0	18	5	090	ENE	22	3005	-	77	72	79	BC	cu	NE	3	30	2	NE
8	189.0	21	0	19	5	090	NE	25	3005	-	78	72	79	C	a cu	E	6	25	2	NE
9	170.8	19	0	17	3	090	ENE	27	3 06	-	79	72	79	C	st cu	E	9	16	2	NE
10	116.3	13	0	11	6	090	ENE	21	3008	-	77	71	79	C	st cu	E	8	20	2	NE
11	116.7	13	1	11	6	Var.	ENE	22	3005	-	77	71	79	C	a cu	E	6	20	2	NE
12	150.4	16	9	14	9	090	ENE	27	3002	-	78	70	79	BC		E	4	25	2	ENE
P.M. 13	189.0	21	0	18	9	090	E	27	3000	-	78	72	79	BC	a cu	E	4	30	2	ENE
14	140.7	15	8	14	1	090	E	25	2998	-	78	73	79	BC	a cu	E	3	30	2	ENE
15	189.0	21	0	19	0	090	ENE	28	2998	-	78	70	79	BC	a cu	E	2	30	2	ENE
16	189.0	21	0	19	0	090	ENE	27	2998	-	78	70	79	BC	a cu	E	2	30	2	ENE
17	151.0	17	0	15	2	090	ENE	25	2998	-	76	70	79	BC	a cu	E	4	25	4	ENE
18	189.0	21	0	18	9	090	ENE	30	3000	-	76	68	79	BC	cu	ENE	1	25	4	ENE
19	189.0	21	0	19	2	090	ENE	26	2999	-	76	68	77	BC	cu	ENE	3	25	4	ENE
20	Set clocks ahead one hour to Plus 11 Zone Time																			
21	189.0	21	0	19	1	090	E	30	3003	-	76	68	77	C	cu	ENE	7	25	4	ENE
22	189.0	21	0	18	7	090	E	31	3003	-	76	68	78	C	cu	E	7	25	4	ENE
23	189.0	21	0	19	3	090	E	27	3001	-	75	67	79	BC	cu	E	4	25	4	ENE
24	140.8	15	8	14	1	090	E	28	3004	-	76	67	78	BC	cu	E	2	25	4	ENE

Noon Latitude 21° 26' 30" N
Longitude 174° 09' 45" W

Noon Latitude 21° 30' 30" N
Longitude 173° 08' 00" W

Latitude 21° 29' 50" N
Longitude 170° 23' 45" W

Current: Set
Drift

Gyrocompass in Use
Error 0° 07' W

Standard Mag. Compass
Compass No. 54294
S. H. 079° 30'
Error 14° 37' E
Variation 10° 00' E
Deviation 4° 37' E

Fuel: Received 0
Expended 2,102
On hand 20,153

Water: Distilled 48,942
Received 0
Expended 48,899
On hand 183,287

Before Leaving Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft.

After Entering Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft.

Magazine Temperatures:
Maximum 89°
Minimum 66°
Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1	Flight Quarters	Flight Quarters
2	General Quarters	General Quarters
3	0745 flight ctrs.	
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUMMARIES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

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UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Friday (Day) 5 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 12

REMARKS

0 - 4

Steaming on course 090°T. and pgc, 080° psc, 083°.5 patc. Standard speed 15 knots, 133 r.p.m. Steaming at full speed, 20 knots, 189 r.p.m., under boilers Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8; Boilers Nos. 1, 6 and 9 available on one hour notice. Enroute to Pearl Harbor, T.H., in company with Task Force Eight. Disposition 9-V. Commander Aircraft in this vessel, S.O.P.A. and C.T.C.; guide is ENTERPRISE; steaming darkened. Condition III set in fire control, air control and ship control. 0000 changed time to Zone plus 12. (Changed date to 6 December 1941). Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 189.0.

J.C.F. DORSETT, Lieutenant, U.S...

4 - 8

Steaming as before. 0430 flight quarters. 0450 general quarters. 0503 Sighted light of unidentified vessel bearing 156°T., distant 15 miles. 0536 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 0546 last plane launched. Changed course to 090°T. and pgc, 079°.30' psc, 083°30' patgc; changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 0603 lighted ship. 0604 secured from general quarters. Set condition of readiness III in ship control and fire control. 0745 flight quarters. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 186.8

A. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

8 - 12

Steaming as before. 0800 sighted PBY CALL bearing 252°T, distance 13 miles. 0846 maneuvering preparatory to launching aircraft. 0850 launched first plane. 0855 entering rain squall; ceased launching planes. 0857 changed course to 090°T. and pgc; changed speed to 20 knots, 151 r.p.m. 0901 maneuvering to resume launching of aircraft. 0904 resumed launching aircraft. 0912 launched last plane; preparing to land air patrol. 0914 first plane landed. 0926 last plane landed. 1015 published findings of Summary Court Martial of which Lieutenant L. A. Hatton, U.S.N., is senior member, in case of CHMELEWSKI, S.J., A.C.M.3c, U.S.N. Tried for I Neglect of duty; II A.W.O.L. from 0700, 27 October 1941 to 0700 3 November 1941. Sentenced to reduction to next inferior rating and loss of pay amounting to ninety dollars. Payment of sentence of 390 struck out by Commanding Officer, and approved by Commander Aircraft, Battle Force. 1020 Sounded flight quarters. 1030 Maneuvering to launch aircraft. 1039 launched first plane. 1055 launched last plane; preparing to land aircraft. 1058 recovered first plane; ceased landing to prepare for emergency landing. 1102 made emergency landing. 1120 landed last plane; changed course to 090°T. and pgc; changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. Made daily visual examination of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 130.5

L. A. HOLTEN, Ensign, U.S.N.

12 - 16

Steaming as before. 1230 PBY sighted bearing 255°T, approximate distance twelve miles. 1305 maneuvering at various courses and speeds preparatory to holding flight operations. 1312 launched first plane. 1315 STINSON, A.D., Sea.1c, U.S.N. and STEVENS, J.C., Sea.1c, U.S.N. were released from confinement by order of the Commanding Officer. 1319 launched last plane. 1327 landed first plane. 1330 landed last plane. Changed course to 090°T. and pgc, 078° psc, 080° patc. Changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 1530 sounded flight quarters. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 176.6.

G. R. OVER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

(CONTINUED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET)

Approved:
G. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
R. W. RUHLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N., Navigator.

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Navy Dept. Bur. Nav. Page 1206

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) CV6 (Identification Number)

AT Hawaiian Operating Area PASSAGE TO Saturday (Day) 6 (Date) December (Month) 19 41

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 11 G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hour	Patent Log Reading	By Revs. Nautical Miles	By Revs. Statute Miles	By Log Nautical Miles	By Log Statute Miles	Course (C. T.) Gyro / Mag. (Standard Steer)	Wind Direction	Wind Kts	Barometer Reading at Noon Inches	Barometer Reading at Noon m.b.	Temperature Air Dry Bulb	Temperature Air Wet Bulb	Temperature Water at Surface	Weather & Visibility	Clouds Form	Clouds Motion From—	Clouds Amount	Visibility	Sea Condition	Sea Swell Direction
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M. 1	139.0	15	7	13	7	090	ENE	28	3001	-	76	66	79	BC	a cu	ENE	3	25	4	ENE
2	139.0	15	7	14	1	090	ENE	29	3000	-	75	67	79	C	st cu	ENE	9	25	4	ENE
3	139.0	15	7	14	1	090	E	24	3000	-	75	67	79	BC	a cu	ENE	5	25	4	ENE
4	139.0	15	7	14	0	090	ENE	26	3001	-	75	68	79	BC	a cu	ENE	3	25	4	ENE
5	139.0	15	7	14	1	090	ENE	31	2998	-	75	68	79	C	a cu	ENE	7	25	4	ENE
6	139.0	15	7	13	6	090	ENE	33	3000	-	75	69	78	BC	cu	ENE	6	25	4	ENE
7	139.0	15	7	13	9	090	ENE	29	3001	-	75	69	78	BC	st cu	ENE	4	25	4	ENE
8	139.0	15	7	13	9	090	E	29	3003	-	75	69	75	BC	cu	E	2	30	4	ENE
9	139.0	15	7	14	0	090	E	31	3004	-	76	69	75	BC	cu	ENE	4	30	4	ENE
10	139.0	15	7	14	0	090	E	28	3005	-	77	68	75	C	cu	ENE	7	25	4	ENE
11	139.0	15	7	13	9	090	ENE	28	3006	-	77	70	75	C	cu	ENE	6	25	4	ENE
12	139.0	15	7	14	0	090	E	26	3005	-	77	69	75	BC	cu	ENE	7	25	4	ENE
			7																	

Noon Position: Latitude 21° 26' 30" N, Longitude 107° 28' 00" W

Latitude 21° 27' 30" N, Longitude 166° 23' 00" W

Latitude 21° 22' 45" N, Longitude 164° 44' 45" W

Current: Set, Drift

Gyrocompass in Use: Error 0° 10' W

Standard Mag. Compass: Compass No. 54924, S. H. 077½ 30', Error - 12° 20' E, Variation 10° 30' E, Deviation 1° 50' E

Fuel: Received 0; Expended 1,846; On hand 18,307

Water: Distilled 46,400; Received 0; Expended 51,074; On hand 178,613

Before Leaving Port: Draft for'd, Draft aft.

After Entering Port: Draft for'd, Draft aft.

Magazine Temperatures: Maximum 90°, Minimum 67°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1	General Quarters	Flight Quarters
2	Flight Quarters	General Quarters
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

P.M. 13	135.5	15	2	13	7	090	ENE	26	3002	-	76	68	79	BC	cu	ENE	4	30	4	ENE
14	70.4	7	6	6	3	090	ENE	26	3001	-	76	68	79	BC	cu	ENE	4	30	4	ENE
15	86.0	7	4	4	7	076	ENE	36	2998	-	80	71	79	BC	ci cu	ENE	4	30	4	ENE
16	126.2	14	3	12	4	093	ENE	27	2998	-	76	68	79	BC	ci cu	ENE	4	30	4	ENE
17	104.5	12	8	10	2	090	E	28	2999	-	75	66	79	BC	ci cu	ENE	5	25	4	ENE
18	149.6	15	9	15	0	093	ENE	31	3002	-	75	65	79	BC	ci	ENE	4	25	6	ENE
19	138.0	16	6	17	0	093	E	32	3001	-	77	66	76	BC	cu	ENE	1	30	6	ENE
20	168.0	18	8	17	6	093	E	30	3000	-	75	65	76	BC	cu	ENE	1	20	6	ENE
* 21	170.6	19	1	7	5	093	ENE	32	3000	-	74	65	77	BC	cu	ENE	4	15	4	ENE
22	108.0	12	1	16	0	093	ENE	27	3001	-	74	66	76	BC	cu	ENE	4	15	4	ENE
23	149.1	16	8	15	0	093	ENE	27	3001	-	73	68	77	BC	cu	ENE	4	15	4	ENE
24	149.0	16	8	15	0	093	ENE	20	3002	-	72	69	76	BC	cu	ENE	4	15	4	ENE

* Set clocks ahead at 2100.

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

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Page 1207

UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Ship) Saturday (Day) 6 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 11

REMARKS

0 - 4
Steaming darkened in company with task force eight in special cruising disposition 9-V on course 090°T. and pgc,077°.5 psc, and 080° psto. Speed 15 knots, 139 r.p.m., using boilers Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8. Fleet course and axis 090°T, fleet speed 15 knots. Fleet guide, S.C.P.A., and C.T.C. in this vessel. Task force in condition of readiness three. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 139.0.

G. R. OVER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

4 - 8
Steaming as before. 0525 went to general quarters. 0633 lighted ship; secured from general quarters; set condition three watch four. 0740 shifted steering units. Port unit now in use. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 139.0.

J. C. F. DORSETT, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

8 - 12
Steaming as before. 0800 mustered crew on stations. Absentees:CAROL, E.R., Sea.2c,U.S.N., AOL from 0100, November 7, 1941, and STACEY, T.L., Sea.2c,U.S.N., AOL from 0100, November 6, 1941. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples, conditions normal. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 139.0.

W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

12 - 16
Steaming as before. 1200 sounded flight quarters. 1250 maneuvering preparatory to launching aircraft. 1256 launched first plane. 1304 launched last plane. 1340 NC CALL coming alongside starboard side for fueling. 1343 passed first line to NC CALL. 1349 commenced pumping fuel oil to NC CALL. 1448 stopped pumping fuel oil to NC CALL. 1452 NC CALL cast off; all engines ahead standard 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 1505 maneuvering to regain position in center of formation. 1516 changed course to 093°T. and pgc; all engines ahead 2/3,(10 knots, 83 r.p.m.). 1530 sounded flight quarters. 1532 all engines ahead standard, 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 99.5.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

16 - 18
Steaming as before. 1627 steaming at various courses and speeds preparatory to landing aircraft. 1635 landed first plane. 1755 changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. Changed course to 090°T. 1710 sounded general quarters. Changed course to land aircraft, reduced speed to 7 knots, 66 r.p.m. 1716 first plane landed. 1716 last plane landed. Changed course to 093°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 15 knots. 1719 Fleet and ship speed changed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 127.1.

G. R. OVER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

18 - 20
Steaming as before. 1818 secured from general quarters; set condition III, watch four. 1835 Stationed fire watch for blowing tubes. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 168.0

J. C. F. DORSETT, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

20 - 24
Steaming as before. 2000 changed to Zone plus ten and one-half time. 2200 changed speed to 16 knots, 149 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 144.2

W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

Approved:
G. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
R. W. RUSLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N., Navigator.

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

N. Nav. 43

Page [illegible]

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) CV6 (Classification Number)

AT / PASSAGE Hawaiian Operating Area TO ________ Sunday (Day) 7 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 10½ ________ G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hour	1	By Revs. 2	By Revs. 3	By Log 4	By Log 5	Course 6	Wind 7	Wind 8 (Kts)	Barometer 9	Barometer 10	Temperature 11	Temperature 12	Temperature 13	14	Clouds: Form 15	Clouds: Moving From 16	Clouds 17	18	Sea 19	Sea 20
A. M.																				
1	149.0	16	8	15	2	090	ENE	25	3001	-	73	69	76	oc	cu nb	ENE	9	6	5	[illegible]
2	149.0	16	8	13	4	093	ENE	20	3003	-	70	68	76	oc	cu nb	ENE	10	6	5	[illegible]
3	[illegible].0	16	8	15	2	[illegible]	ENE	21	3003	-	74	68	76	bc	cu	ENE	1	20	5	[illegible]
4	165.2	[illegible]	4	16	8	[illegible]	NE	[illegible]	3000	-	72	68	76	bc	ci cu	ENE	4	20	5	[illegible]
5	163.9	20	5	16	6	[illegible]	NE	23	2999	-	73	68	77	c	cu	ENE	7	20	5	[illegible]
6	160.0	[illegible]	0	19	2	093	ENE	[illegible]	3000	-	79	68	76	c	cu	ENE	9	30	5	[illegible]
7	169.4	[illegible]	9	17	4	093	ENE	25	3003	-	74	68	77	bc	cu	ENE	5	25	5	[illegible]
8	191.8	[illegible]	3	19	3	090	ENE	23	3003	-	75	67	77	c	cu	ENE	5	25	5	[illegible]
9	192.0	[illegible]	0	19	1	090	ENE	27	3005	-	75	67	76	c	a cu	E	7	30	5	[illegible]
10	[illegible].3	20	[illegible]	18	6	090	E	28	3005	-	75	67	76	bc	a cu	E	4	30	5	[illegible]
11	180.0	[illegible]	0	19	4	300	NE	18	3005	-	75	69	76	bc	a cu	E	3	30	4	[illegible]
12	[illegible].5	20	3	19	2	090	E	28	3005	-	76	67	76	bc	a cu	E	3	30	4	[illegible]

8 A.M. Latitude 21° 11' 15" N
Longitude 161° 09' 15" W

12 M. Latitude 21° 29' 00" N
Longitude 160° 37' 00" W

8 P.M. Latitude 21° 11' 00" N
Longitude 159° 27' 00" W

Current Set ________
Drift ________

GYROCOMPASS IN USE

Error ________

STANDARD MAG. COMPASS

Compass No. ________
S. H. ________
Error ________
Variation ________
Deviation ________

Fuel Received (-)1,187
Expended 1,163
On hand 15,957

Water Distilled 47,154
Received 0
Expended 47,385
On hand 178,362

After refueling & BEFORE LEAVING PORT
Draft for'd 25' 3"
Draft aft 25' 3"

AFTER ENTERING PORT
Draft for'd ________
Draft aft ________

MAGAZINE TEMPERATURES:
Maximum 90°
Minimum 84°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1	Flight Quarters	General Quarters
2	General Quarters	
3	0830 flight quarters	
4	0853 General Quarters	
5	0905 Condition "B".	
6	0932 Condition "A".	
7		
8		
9		

Hour	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
P. M.																				
13	139.0	15	7	14	1	120	E	27	3000	-	76	68	77	bc	cu	E	2	30	4	[illegible]
14	147.3	16	[illegible]	15	5	100	E	24	2995	-	76	68	77	bc	a cu	E	1	30	4	[illegible]
15	139.0	15	7	14	5	107	E	25	2996	-	76	70	77	bc	a cu	E	2	30	4	[illegible]
16	141.9	16	0	15	0	107	E	21	2997	-	79	69	77	bc	a cu	E	5	30	4	[illegible]
17	144.5	16	0	14	8	065	ENE	29	2996	-	75	69	76	bc	a cu	E	3	30	4	[illegible]
18	149.4	16	8	15	2	270	ENE	16	2998	-	75	70	77	bc	a cu	E	2	25	4	[illegible]
19	175.2	19	5	18	8	270	E	23	2999	-	79	73	77	bc	a cu	E	2	25	4	[illegible]
20	[illegible].7	21	0	19	4	270	NE	30	3000	-	76	70	77	b	--	-	-	25	4	[illegible]
21	95.0	10	7	9	7	068	ENE	26	3002	-	75	69	77	bc	cu	ENE	1	25	4	[illegible]
22	122.9	13	[illegible]	12	5	280	ENE	23	3004	-	75	70	77	bc	cu	ENE	1	25	4	[illegible]
23	134.4	15	2	14	4	280	E	25	3005	-	75	70	77	c	a cu	ENE	6	25	4	[illegible]
24	[illegible].2	15	6	14	9	280	E	23	3003	-	75	70	76	bc	cu	ENE	1	25	4	[illegible]

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

Page 1209

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE Date 7 December, 19 41

16 - 18
Steaming as before. 1610 sighted unknown vessel bearing 071°T, distance 18 miles. 1618 sighted ComTask Force 3, 3-CA, 1 CL and 12 DD's, broad on port bow. 1631 sounded flight quarters. 1640 observed anti-aircraft fire on port beam. 1641 changed course left into wind preparing to launch aircraft, approx. course 061°T., average speed 16 knots. 1642 first plane launched. 1659 last plane launched. 1702 first plane landed. Submarine reported bearing 305°, distance appro.. 6,000 yards. Changed course right to 120°T. All engines ahead flank. 1704 changed course left to 090°T. 1706 all engines ahead standard, 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 1720 sounded general quarters. 1721 set material condition Affirm. Task Force Eight less ENTERPRISE and plane guard DD's joined Task Force Three. 1723 first plane landed. 1726 last plane landed. 1736 resumed landing aircraft. GAMBLE joined this vessel for screening. 1743 all engines ahead 1/3, 5 knots, 47 r.p.m. 1744 changed course left to avoid tanker. 1747 all engines ahead full, 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. Changed course left to 270°T. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 146.9.

J. A. Holmes
J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

18 - 20
Steaming as before. 1803 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 1809 landed one plane. 1810 changed course to 270°T. Changed speed to 12 knots, 1813 changed speed to 15 knots. 1827 secured from General Quarters. Set condition of readiness II. Set material condition Baker. 1904 changed course to 180°T. and pgc, 1921 changed course to 090°T., and pgc, 079°30' psigo. 1948 planes sighted bearing 200°T, distant 5000 yards. 1951 flight quarters. Average steam 410, Average r.p.m. 181.9.

W. C. HEMBURY
W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

20 - 24
Steaming as before. 2004 turned on lights required for flight operations. 2009 changed course left into the wind to recover aircraft. Steaming at various speeds as necessary. Approx. course 075°T. 2010 turned on breakdown lights. 2017 first plane landed. 2038 6-T-13 crashed into No. 1 barrier, no damage to plane or personnel. 2044 sighted HULL bearing 142.5°T. 2045 HULL joined formation. 2113 last plane landed. Changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 2115 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 6. 2116 changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 2117 changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 2114 stopped all engines. 2119 changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 2125 turned off running lights. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 122.7.

J. A. Holmes
J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

Approved: D. D. Murray
D. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: R. W. Rubble
R. W. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N., Navigator.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)

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
Page 1210
Approved:
Executed:
U. S. N., Navigator.
(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly.)

Page 1211

UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Ship) Sunday (Day) 7 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10½

REMARKS

0 - 4
Steaming in company with Task Force 9-V on course 093°T. and pgc, 080°.5 psc, 062° pstc, under boilers number 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8, at 16 knots, 149 r.p.m. Fleet course 093°, fleet axis 090, fleet speed 16 knots. Plane guards MC CALL and DUNLAP in inner-anti submarine screen 1-A. Fleet guide, C.T.C., and S.O.P.A. in this vessel. Task force in condition of readiness three. All vessels of this force steaming darkened. 0315 changed speed and fleet speed to 18 knots, 169 rpm. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 152.5.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

04 - 08
Steaming as before. 0415 changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 0525 sounded general quarters. 0612 changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 0615 changed course into the wind preparatory to launching aircraft. 0618 first plane launched. 0632 changed speed to 12 knots. Steaming at various courses and speeds while launching aircraft. 0629 last plane launched. Changed course to 093°T. Changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 0642 secured from general quarters, set condition of readiness three, watch three. 0706 changed speed to 22 knots, 208 r.p.m. 0716 changed speed to 20 knots 189 r.p.m. 0730 changed course to 090°T. and psc, 078° psc, 079°.5 pstc. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 183.5

C. R. OVER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

08 - 12
Steaming into the wind on approx. course 078°. Approximate speed 14 knots, preparatory to launching aircraft. 0800 launched first plane, 0803 launched last plane. 0818 landed first plane. 0819 652 reported ship bearing 320, distant 76 miles. 0822 ship reported bearing 050, distant 25 miles. 0834 last plane landed. 0835 changed course to 000°. Changed speed to 12 knots. 0847 Changed course to approx. course 075 to land aircraft. 0850 first plane landed. 0851 last plane landed. 0855 changed course to 360°T. 0900 On radio orders from SecNavy, executed War Plan against Japan in view of unprovoked air raid on Pearl Harbor at 0800 this date. 0904 commenced zigzagging. 0906 changed speed to 15 knots. 0932 sighted smoke bearing 015°T. 0938 BLUE and JARVIS joined formation. 1022 ceased zigzagging. Steadied on course 060°T, approx. to launch aircraft. 1028 launched plane. 1032 changed to course 280°T. 1049 commenced zigzagging. 1055 ceased zigzagging. Changed course to 060°T. to launch aircraft. 1101 launched first plane. 1103 launched last plane. 1126 landed first plane. 1128 landed last plane. 1151 changed course to 090°T, 078° psc, 079°.5 pstc. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 185.9.

J. O. F. DORSETT, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

12 - 16
Steaming as before. 1229 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch and land aircraft. 1254 last plane landed. 1257 changed course to 120°T and pgc. 1311 changed course to 170°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 20 knots. 1321 changed course to 120°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 15 knots. 1343 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 1347 changed course to 090°T. 1350 changed course to fleet course 120°T. 1358 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 1406 last plane landed. Changed course to 090°T. 1414 Changed course to 107°T, 093° 30' psc, 097° 30' pstgc. 1424 secured from General Quarters. Set condition of readiness II, 1506 changed course to 070°T. 1507 commenced steaming on various courses and speeds to launch and land aircraft. 1509 launched last plane. 1526 set material condition Baker. 1532 last plane landed. Changed course to 120°T. and pgc. 1540 changed course to 107°T. and pgc, 095° psc, 098° pstgc. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 141.8.

W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

Approved:
C. H. McMORRIS,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
R. W. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N., Navigator.

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N. Nav. 49 (Mar., 1929)

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LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) CVS (Classification Number)

AT PASSAGE civilian operating area TO Monday 8 December 1941 (Day) (Date) (Month)

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10 C. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hour	"Taff Rail" Average Speed for Hour	By Revs. Number of Revolutions	By Revs. Time	By Log Knots Run	By Log Time	Course (P. C.) Gyro	Course (P. C.) Mag. (Deflection +Add)	Wind Direction	Wind Force	Barometer Reading at 32°	Barometer Reading at Sea Level	Temperature Air (Dry Bulb)	Temperature Air (Wet Bulb)	Temperature Water at Surface	Weather, by Symbols	Clouds Form	Clouds Moving From—	Clouds Amount	Visibility	Sea Course	Sea Force
	1	2	3	4	5	6		7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M. 1	132.0	15	7	14	5	190		E	31	3000	-	75	70	76	BC	a cu	E	2	25	2	E
2	139.0	15	7	15	0	210		E	30	3000	-	75	71	76	BC	a cu	E	2	25	2	E
3	139.0	15	7	15	6	100		E	25	2998	-	75	70	76	BC	a cu	E	2	25	2	E
4	139.0	15	7	14	4	080		E	35	2999	-	75	70	76	BC	a cu	E	3	25	2	E
5	137.3	15	6	14	2	110		ENE	16	2997	-	75	68	77	BCP	cu nb	E	4	25	4	E
6	139.4	15	7	14	5	088		E	28	3000	-	76	69	76	BC	cu	E	4	25	4	E
7	136.3	17	7	16	0	090		ENE	30	3001	-	75	70	77	C	cu nb	E	9	25	4	E
8	137.9	16	6	13	7	078		ENE	21	3002	-	76	71	76	C	cu nb	E	9	25	4	E
9	108.9	11	5	10	8	260		ENE	24	3004	-	76	71	77	C	a cu	E	8	25	4	E
10	136.1	15	4	14	2	280		E	17	3006	-	75	70	77	C	a cu	E	8	25	4	E
11	137.9	15	6	13	6	060		E	20	3007	-	75	70	77	C	a cu	E	7	25	4	E
12	140.8	15	9	14	7	060		E	22	3004	-	76	70	77	BC	a cu	E	5	25	4	E

Noon Position
- Latitude 20° 44' 30" N
- Longitude 158° 55' 00" W

Last Position
- Latitude 21° 07' 15" N
- Longitude 158° 57' 45" W

Present Position
- Latitude
- Longitude

Current
- Set
- Drift

Gyrocompass in Use
Error 0° 04' E

Standard Mag. Compass
Compass No. 5a994
S. B. 076°
Error 12° 00' E
Variation 11° 15' E
Deviation 0° 45' E

Fuel (Gals.)
- Received 0
- Expended 1,615
- On hand 11,546

Water (Gals.)
- Distilled 42,149
- Received 0
- Expended 28,460
- On hand 192,571

Before Leaving Port
Draft for'd 23' 7"
Draft aft. 26' 5"

After Entering Port
Draft for'd 23' 7"
Draft aft. 26' 5"

Magazine Temperatures:
Maximum 87°
Minimum 79°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1	Flight quarters	
2	General quarters	
3	Flight Quarters	
4	Flight Quarters	
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

P.M. 13	153.9	17	4	16	0	077		ENE	20	2999	-	76	70	76	C	a cu	ENE	8	30	4	ENE
14	78.7	8	2	7	7	006		ENE	26	2998	-	77	69	77	C	st cu	ENE	9	30	2	ENE
15	115.1	12	5	11	3	090		ENE	25	2999	-	78	68	77	C	st cu	ENE	8	30	2	ENE
16	169.0	21	0	18	6	055		ENE	27	2998	-	75	68	77	C	st cu	ENE	9	30	2	ENE
17	153.9	17	4	16	5	000		NE	13	3000	-	75	68	78	C	st cu	NE	8	30	-	-
18	34.5	5	8					NE	14	3003	-	75	67	78	C	a cu	NE	7	25	-	-
19								NE	10	3006	-	75	67		BC	a cu	NE	4	25	-	-
20								NE	12	3009	-	75	67		C	a cu	NE	7	25	-	-
21								NE	8	3008	-	75	67		C	a cu	NE	7	25	-	-
22								NE	8	3008	-	75	67		C	a cu	NE	7	20	-	-
23								NE	8	3008	-	75	67		C	a cu	NE	8	20	-	-
24								NE	6	3008	-	75	67		C	a cu	NE	8	20	-	-

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)



Page [illegible]

17

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE Date 8 December 1941

12 - 16 (Continued)
1452 last plane landed. All engines ahead to 090°T. and pgc. All engines ahead full, 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 1453 sounded general quarters. 1500 changed fleet speed to 18 knots. Commenced zigzagging according to Plan No. 2. 1557 ceased zigzagging, returned to base course 090°T. 1558 changed course left to 055°T. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 134.2.

J A Holmes
J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

16 - 18
Steaming as before. At 1630 changed course to 090°T; began making various courses and speeds standing into Pearl Harbor channel, conforming to channel, the Captain conning. At 1647 passed between entrance buoys Nos. 1 and 2. At 1656 secured fires under No. [illegible] boiler. At 1703 set Material Condition Baker. At 1711 secured fires under No. 1 boiler. At 1730 secured fires under No. 6 boiler. At 17[illegible] secured from General Quarters. At 1736 secured fires under No. 7 boiler. At 1737 received tugs alongside for assistance in bringing ship to mooring berth. At 1743 moored to quay walls at berth F-9, Pearl Harbor, T.H., starboard side to, with following lines: wire bow and stern lines, 4 wire breasts and 6 manila springs. Boiler No. 4 in use for auxiliary purposes. Ships present: Various units of the U.S. Fleet. S.O.P.A. Combatfor in CALIFORNIA. At 1750 darkened ship.

WPMcGirr
W. P. MC GIRR, Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N.

18 - 20
Moored as before. 1813 secured No. [illegible] boiler. 1814 secured No. 4 boiler. 1827 sounded torpedo defense. 1840 secured No. 5 boiler. Boiler No. [illegible] in use for auxiliary purposes. 1915 Captain [illegible], U.S.M.C. returned on board from temporary duty from Fort Weaver Rifle Range detail.

T. B. [illegible], Lieutenant, U.S.N.

20 - 24
Moored as before. 2050 received camels alongside port side. 2145 Lieut(jg) R. Rutherford, U.S.N., reported on board. Duty uncertain, having been recalled from transfer to Asiatic Station. Pursuant to orders of Commanding Officer, CVe/P16-4/[illegible], the following men reported aboard, having completed temporary duty at Fleet Machine Gun School at Pualoa Point: [illegible], U.S.M.C.; [illegible], F.E., Sgt., U.S.M.C.; [illegible], Pfc, U.S.M.C.; [illegible], Pfc, U.S.M.C.; [illegible], Pfc, U.S.M.C. 2352 [illegible] came alongside to port.

M. T. Leonard
M. T. LEONARD, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

Approved: G. D. Murray
G. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: R W Ruble
R. W. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N., Navigator

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)

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
Page 1214
Approved:
Examined:
U. S. N., Navigator.
(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly.)
54

N. Nav. 48
(Mar 1939)

Page 1115

UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Monday (Day) 8 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10

REMARKS

0 - 4

Steaming darkened in company with MULL, CRAVEN, MC CALL, and GAMBLE. Zigzagging according to plan No. 6 along base course, 280°T. and pgc, 268° 30' psc, and 268° pstc, at 15 knots. Boilers Nos. 1 to 9 inclusive in use. Ship in condition of readiness II, in Material Condition Baker. 0015 ceased zigzagging, resumed base course, 280°T. 0030 changed base course to 190°T. and pgc. 0045 resumed zigzagging according to plan No. 6. 0215 ceased zigzagging and resumed base course 190°T. 0230 changed base course to 100°T. and pgc. 0245 resumed zigzagging according to plan No. 6. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 139.0.

W. C. HEILBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

4 - 8

Steaming as before. 0405 changed course to 350°T. and pgc, 337° psc, and 338° pstc. 0403 changed course right to 110°T. and pgc. 0434 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 6. 0455 sounded flight quarters. 0515 sounded general quarters. 0516 set Material Condition Affirm. 0545 Task Force 8.4 sighted bearing approx. 170°T., distant 10 miles. 0555 changed course left into wind to launch aircraft. Approx. course 086°T. 0557 first plane launched. 0559 last plane launched. Resumed zigzag course. 0605 changed course to right to 120°T, speed 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. and ceased zigzagging. 0610 sighted destroyers bearing 220°T. 0618 sighted destroyer bearing 240°T. 0620 changed course left to 090°T and pgc, 098° psc, and 079.5° pstc. All engines ahead standard, 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 0628 sighted ship. 0630 secured from General Quarters, set Condition of Readiness Two, watch two. Set Material Condition Baker. 0635 joined Task Force 8.4 , formed cruising disposition 8-V, fleet course 090°T. and pgc, fleet speed 15 knots, ENTERPRISE guide. 0748 changed course and fleet course to 000°T. and pgc. 0750 cut in the DeGaussing gear. 0755 changed course into wind to launch aircraft, approx. course 076°T., approx. speed 14 knots. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 142.7.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

8 - 12

Steaming as before. 0803 last plane launched. 0834 last plane landed. 0835 changed speed to 12 knots. Changed course to 000°T, 345° psc, 345° pstgc. 0847 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 0851 last plane landed. 0855 changed course to 280°T. and pgc, 268° psc, 269° pstgc. 0904 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Changed speed to 15 knots. 0938 BLUE and JARVIS joined formation. 1022 ceased zigzagging. Changed course to 060°T, 049° 30' psc, 049° pstgc. 1023 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 1032 last plane launched. Changed course to 280°T. and pgc, 268° psc, 269° pstgc. 1049 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1055 changed course to 060°T. 1057 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 1103 launched last plane. 1105 changed course to 060°T. and pgc. 1121 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 1128 last plane landed. Changed speed to 15 knots. Changed course to 060°T. and pgc. 1151 changed course to 090°T, 078° psc, 079°30' pstgc. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 129.2.

W. C. HEILBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

12 - 16

Steaming as before. 1219 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1225 all engines ahead full, 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 1239 ceased zigzagging. Changed course left to 090°T. and pgc, 1241 changed speed to 18 knots, 189 r.p.m. 1247 changed course into wind to launch aircraft. Approx. course 083°T, using various speeds. 1249 first plane launched. 1317 last plane landed. Preparing to stream paravanes, using various speeds. 1413 streamed paravanes, starboard paravane streamed unsatisfactorily. 1422 changed course right into wind to launch and recover aircraft. Approx. course 076°T., using various speeds. 1425 first plane landed. 1444 set Material condition Affirm. 1447 cut in DeGaussing coils.

(CONTINUED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET)

Approved:

D. C. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:

R. W. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N.R., Navigator.

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

55



N. Nav. 45

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LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) CV6 (Identification Number)

AT N.A.S., Pearl Harbor, T.H. TO ~~PASSAGE~~ Tuesday (Day) 9 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10½ G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hour	"All Chart" Average Revolutions	By Revs. Nautical Miles	By Revs. Tenths	By Log Nautical Miles	By Log Tenths	Course (P.C.) Gyro X Mag.	Wind Direction	Wind Kts	Barometer Height in Inches	Barometer Reading Att. Ther.	Temperature Air Dry Bulb	Temperature Air Wet Bulb	Temperature Water at Surface	Weather by Symbols	Clouds Form	Clouds Moving From	Clouds Amount	Visibility	Sea Condition	Sea Swells From
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M. 1		MOORED					NE	10	3010	-	75	67		O	cu	NE	10	20	-	-
2							NE	8	3008	-	74	67		OR	cu	NE	10	20	-	-
3							NE	10	3008	-	73	67		O	st cu	NE	10	20	-	-
4							ENE	15	3006	-	73	63		C	st cu	NE	9	25	-	-
5	40.3	4	5			230	ENE	14	3003	-	74	65	76	C	st cu	NE	9	25	-	-
6	66.4	7	4			154	ENE	27	3003	-	70	66	76	O	st cu	NE	10	25	1	E
7	189.0	21	0	19	8	070	NE	30	3002	-	74	69	76	BC	st cu	ENE	9	25	2	ENE
8	189.0	21	0	18	8	020	ENE	31	3004	-	74	68	74	C	a cu	ENE	9	25	4	ENE
9	133.1	15	0	12	6	080	E	31	3003	-	75	69	76	C	a cu	E	9	25	4	ENE
10	146.2	16	5	14	4	340	E	29	3007	-	75	69	76	C	a cu	E	9	25	4	ENE
11	144.0	16	2	14	3	020	ENE	22	3004	-	76	69	76	BC	a cu	ENE	3	25	4	ENE
12	135.7	15	4	13	6	020	E	29	3004	-	76		76	BC	a cu	ENE	3	25	4	ENE

Latitude 20° 20' 30" N
Longitude 157° 27' 45" W

Latitude 21° 54' 45" N
Longitude 157° 02' 00" W

Latitude 23° 34' 15" N
Longitude 156° 33' 00" W

Current { Set
Drift

GYROCOMPASS IN USE
Error 1° 56'.5" W

STANDARD MAG. COMPASS
Compass No. 54994
S. H. 078°
Error 10° 04' E
Variation 11° 15' E
Deviation 1° 11' W

Fuel { Received 0
Expended 980
On hand 10,566

Water { Distilled 38,767
Received 0
Expended 40,716
On hand 192,622

BEFORE LEAVING PORT
Draft for'd 25' 3"
Draft aft 28' 3"

AFTER ENTERING PORT
Draft for'd
Draft aft

MAGAZINE TEMPERATURES:
Maximum 87°
Minimum 82°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES.

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1	Torpedo Defense	Flight Quarters
2	General Quarters	
3	Flight Quarters	
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

Hour	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
P.M. 13	136.6	15	4	13	1	020	ENE	16	3001	-	75	67	75	BC	a cu	ENE	3	25	4	NE
14	142.4	16	0	13	8	020	ENE	28	3000	-	74	68	75	BC	a cu	ENE	4	25	4	NE
15	140.1	15	8	13	9	020	E	28	3000	-	74	70	75	BC	a cu	ENE	3	25	4	NE
16	140.5	15	8	13	9	020	E	26	3001	-	75	70	76	BC	a cu	ENE	3	25	4	NE
17	138.0	15	6	13	8	020	E	26	3004	-	74	69	76	BC	cu	ENE	1	25	4	E
18	125.3	14	2	12	3	020	E	28	3004	-	73	65	76	BC	cu	ENE	2	25	5	ENE
19	126.0	14	3	12	3	020	ENE	30	3009	-	73	67	75	BC	cu	ENE	2	25	5	ENE
20	126.0	14	3	12	3	020	ENE	30	3008	-	73	67	75	BC	cu	ENE	2	25	5	ENE
21	126.0	14	3	12	2	020	ENE	33	3011	-	72	67	76	BC	a cu	ENE	3	25	5	ENE
22	126.0	14	3	12	5	020	E	27	3012	-	72	65	76	BC	a cu	ENE	1	25	5	ENE
23	126.0	14	3	12	4	020	E	25	3012	-	73	65	76	BC	a cu	ENE	2	25	5	ENE
24	129.7	14	7	12	8	020	E	23	3013	-	72	64	76	BC	a cu	ENE	1	25	4	ENE

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

Page 1217

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE Date 9 December, 19 41

12 - 16
Steaming as before. 1206 ceased zigzagging. Resumed base course 020°T. and pgc. 1224 formed cruising disposition 10V, fleet course 020°T. and pgc, fleet speed 13.5 knots, 126 r.p.m. ENTERPRISE guide. 1226 submarine reported sighted bearing 030°T. 1227 HALSEY attacked with two depth charges. 1229 all engines ahead full, 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 1230 all engines ahead full power. 1233 all engines ahead 13.5 knots, 126 r.p.m. 1303 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2., speed 15.1 knots, 140 r.p.m. 1315 submarine reported dead ahead. 1316 changed course emergency left to 355°T. All engines ahead full, 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 1318 all engines ahead emergency. Ceased zigzagging. 1320 changed course left to 020°T. and pgc. All engines ahead standard, 15.1 knots, 140 r.p.m. 1330 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1343 MC CALL dropped a depth charge bearing from the ENTERPRISE 159° relative. 1537 sounded flight quarters. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 139.9.

W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

16 - 18
Steaming as before. 1602 Changed speed to 10 knots, 93 r.p.m. 1605 changed course right into wind to recover aircraft. Approx. course 060°T. 1610 first plane landed. 1612 last plane landed. Changed course left to 340°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 1617 changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 1621 changed course to 335° T. and pgc. 1630 FANNING reported submarine contact. 1631 changed course left emergency to 300°T. Changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 1635 changed course right to 345° T. Changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 1645 returned to base course, 020°T. and pgc. 1655 ceased zigzagging. Steadied on base course 020°T. 1700 Task Force One left formation. Task Force Eight formed special cruising disposition 9-V. 1710 sounded General Quarters. 1711 darkened ship. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 131.6.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

18 - 20
Steaming as before. 1812 secured from general quarters, set condition of readiness II. 1823 secured boilers Nos. 2 and 4. 1825 secured boiler No. 9. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 126.

W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

20 - 24
Steaming as before. 2030 Observed long oil slick close aboard port side. 2052 warning report surface craft bearing 290°T. distance 2.5 miles. 2303 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 126.9.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

Approved:
C. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
R. W. HUBBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U. S. N., Navigator.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)

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
Approved:
Examined:
(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly.)

Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Tuesday 9 December 1941
(Day) (Month) (Year)

ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 10

REMARKS

0 - 4
Moored starboard side to Berth F-9, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with 6 manila lines, 2 wire cables and 4 breast wires. Boiler No. 2 in use for auxiliary purposes, with boilers on two hours notice. Ships present: various units of the U.S. Fleet. 30PA is Cincpac at Submarine Base. 0015 commenced fueling ship. Draft forward 23' 7", aft 28' 5". 0055 commenced receiving gasoline. 0300 started preparations for getting underway. 0315 stopped fueling, amount received 463,000 gallons fuel oil and 61,000 gallons of gasoline. 0353 NEOSHO underway from alongside.

G. R. OVER, Lieutenant, U.S.N.

4 - 8
Moored as before. 0402 boiler No. 1 cut in on main steam line. 0410 boiler No. 6 cut in on main steam line. 0413 target raft removed from along port side. 0420 Underway from berth F-9, Pearl Harbor, T.H., for operations as directed. Boilers No. 1 to No. 9 inclusive in use. Standard speed 15 knots. Captain, Executive Officer, Navigator and pilot on bridge. Captain conning. Material Condition Baker set. 0425 tugs cast off. Commenced steaming on various courses and speeds, conforming to channel to clear harbor. 0520 Torpedo defense. 0551 pilot left ship. 0556 passed entrance channel buoy No. 1 abeam to port. Changed course to 154°T. Changed speed to 20 knots. 0600 changed course to 140°T. 0602 General Quarters. 0626 changed course to 090°T. 0629 lighted ship. 0632 secured from General Quarters. Set condition of readiness II. 0633 changed course to 070°T. 0640 changed course to 160°T. 0646 changed course to 070°T. 0649 changed course to 130°T. 0658 changed course to 070°T. 0727 changed course to 020°T. 0745 Flight quarters. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 121.2

W. C. LEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

8 - 12
Steaming as before. 0802 Destroyer on starboard quarter reported a submarine sighted bearing 190° from them. 0815 changed course right into wind to recover aircraft. Approx. course 080°T., steaming at various speeds. 0818 first plane landed. 0820 last plane landed. 0821 formed special cruising disposition 9-T. 0827 changed course, fleet course and fleet axis to 020°T. and pgc. 0837 changed speed to 10 knots, 93 r.p.m. 0836 changed course right into wind to launch aircraft. At various speeds as necessary. Approx. course 072°T. 0840 first plane launched. 0841 last plane launched. 0842 first plane landed. 0917 ceased landing aircraft. Changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. Changed course to right to 170°T. and pgc. Submarine contact reported by FANNING. 0919 changed course to left into the wind to resume recovery of planes. 0925 FANNING contact reported false. 0928 last plane landed. Changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. Changed course left to 020°T. 0950 GRIDLEY reported submarine contact. Changed course left to 290°T. 0959 changed course left to 015°T. and pgc. 1003 changed course left to 338°T. 1004 BENHAM reported sighted torpedo. 1010 changed course right into the wind to launch aircraft. Steaming at various speeds as necessary. Approx. course 021°T. 1016 BAGLEY reported a submarine on her starboard bow. 1017 BAGLEY annulled report. 1018 launched first plane. 1019 last plane launched. Changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. Returned to base course 020°T. and pgc. 1022 changed course to right into wind to recover aircraft, at various speeds as necessary. Approx. course 083°T. 1027 first plane landed. 1034 observed plane zooming on port beam low to water. Changed speed to 25 knots, 1238 r.p.m.). Changed course to right to 175°T. 1041 changed speed to 20 knots. Changed course to right to 210°T. 1042 changed course into the wind to resume recovery of aircraft. 1045 6-3-1 dropped message on deck. 1046 Sky Control reported sighting a white plane (army bomber) bearing 345°T., distance approx. 20 miles. 1049 first plane landed. 1052 last plane landed. Changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m., 020°T. and pgc. 1053 changed speed to 15 knots, 130 r.p.m. 1104 changed speed to fleet speed, to 13.5 knots, 126 r.p.m. Commenced zigzagging according to Plan 2. 1107 changed speed to 15 knots, 140 r.p.m. 1150 sighted Task Force One bearing 010°T., distance 14 miles. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 139.7.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

Approved:
C. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
R. W. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N.R., Navigator

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

N. Nav. 48
(Mar. 1939)

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LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) CV6 (Classification Number)

AT / PASSAGE Operations, Hawaiian Area TO Wednesday (Day) 10 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10½ G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hour	Average Revolutions	By Revs. Nautical Miles	By Revs. Tenths	By Log Nautical Miles	By Log Tenths	Course (P. C.) Gyro X Mag. (Indicate which)	Wind Direction	Wind Kts	Barometer Height in Inches	Barometer Height at Ther.	Temperature Air Dry Bulb	Temperature Air Wet Bulb	Temperature Water at Surface	Weather by Symbols	Clouds Form	Clouds Moving From—	Clouds Amount	Visibility	Sea Condition	Sea Swell From—
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A. M. 1	136.0	14	3	13	0	110	NE	20	3014	-	70	64	74	C	st cu	ENE	10	20	2	ENE
2	130.0	14	7	13	5	200	ENE	18	3014	-	72	65	74	BC	ci cu	ENE	4	20	2	ENE
3	140.0	15	3	14	8	200	ENE	23	3012	-	72	64	73	BC	a cu	ENE	2	20	2	ENE
4	140.0	15	8	14	9	200	ENE	27	3012	-	72	63	74	BC	a cu	ENE	1	20	2	ENE
5	140.0	15	8	13	9	200	E	24	3011	-	73	64	75	BC	a cu	ENE	1	25	4	ENE
6	143.0	16	1	14	9	005	E	26	3011	-	73	62	75	BC	a cu	ENE	3	25	4	ENE
7	147.9	16	8	14	9	290	ENE	24	3012	-	73	65	75	C	st cu	ENE	9	30	2	ENE
8	141.8	16	0	14	7	020	ENE	23	3012	-	74	66	76	BC	st cu	ENE	4	30	4	ENE
9	137.2	15	5	13	4	020	E	19	3013	-	72	65	75	BC	st cu	ENE	4	25	4	NE
10	146.1	16	6	15	2	060	E	29	3014	-	73	65	75	BC	cu	ENE	3	25	4	NE
11	138.7	15	7	14	8	020	E	25	3014	-	73	66	75	BC	a cu	ENE	3	25	4	NE
12	136.8	15	4	12	5	064	E	18	3014	-	72	66	75	BC	a cu	ENE	4	25	4	NE

8 A.M. Latitude 23° 56' 00" N
Longitude 156° 07' 00" W

Noon Latitude 23° 58' 00" N
Longitude 156° 06' 45" W

8 P.M. Latitude 25° 05' 00" N
Longitude 157° 24' 00" W

Current Set
Drift

GYROCOMPASS IN USE
Error 0° 12' E

STANDARD MAG. COMPASS
Compass No. 54994
S. H. 008°
Error 12° 00' E
Variation 12° 00' E
Deviation 0° 00' E

Fuel Received 11,024
Expended 1,138
On hand 20,452

Water Distilled 35,100
Received 0
Expended 32,100
On hand 75,000

BEFORE LEAVING PORT
Draft for'd
Draft aft

AFTER ENTERING PORT
Draft for'd
Draft aft

MAGAZINE TEMPERATURES:
Maximum 87
Minimum 79

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Morning	Afternoon
Division	
1 Flight Quarters	
2 General Quarters	
3 Condition Afirm	
4 Condition Baker	
5 Flight Quarters	
6 General Quarters	
7 General Quarters	
8	
9	

Hour	Average Revolutions	By Revs. Nautical Miles	By Revs. Tenths	By Log Nautical Miles	By Log Tenths	Course	Wind Direction	Wind Kts	Barometer Height in Inches	Barometer Height at Ther.	Temperature Air Dry Bulb	Temperature Air Wet Bulb	Temperature Water at Surface	Weather by Symbols	Clouds Form	Clouds Moving From—	Clouds Amount	Visibility	Sea Condition	Sea Swell From—
P. M. 13	137.9	15	6	14	0	020	NE	24	3011	-	72	66	73	BC	a cu	ENE	3	30	4	NE
14	154.3	17	3	19	5	020	NE	27	3013	-	69	65	73	CQ	cu nb	ENE	9	25	4	NE
15	189.7	21	1	15	5	300	E	27	3010	-	62	67	73	CQ	cu nb	ENE	10	12	4	NE
16	175.8	19	6	16	2	300	ENE	24	3011	-	69	66	73	CQ	a cu	ENE	7	20	4	NE
17	180.0	20	0	17	4	300	E	23	3010	-	69	67	76	CQ	a cu	ENE	8	20	4	NE
18	166.5	18	7	17	4	300	E	26	3014	-	67	67	75	CQ	cu nb	ENE	10	15	4	NE
19	189.0	21	0	21	0	300	ENE	27	3016	-	70	66	75	BC	a cu	ENE	1	25	4	NE
20	189.0	21	0	20	0	300	ENE	22	3017	-	70	65	75	BC	a cu	ENE	1	25	4	NE
21	189.0	21	0	20	0	300	ENE	18	3018	-	70	65	76	C	a cu	ENE	6	20	4	NE
22	189.0	21	0	20	3	300	ENE	18	3021	-	70	64	78	C	a cu	ENE	6	20	4	NE
23	189.0	21	0	20	1	300	ENE	25	3021	-	70	64	74	C	a cu	ENE	6	20	4	NE
24	189.0	21	0	20	1	300	ENE	27	3020	-	70	64	74	BC	a cu	ENE	1	25	4	NE

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

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ADDITIONAL SHEET

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE Date 10 December, 19 41

16 - 16 (Continued)
1558 ceased zigzagging and returned to base course of 300°T. 1400 RADIST reported hydrophone contact of submarine. 1401 changed course left to 320°T. All engines ahead flank, 25 knots. 1404 changed course to 310°T. 1405 came right with hard left rudder to course 300°T. Changed speed to 18 knots. 1414 Changed course and fleet course to 300°T. and fleet speed to 18 knots. 1416 secured from General Quarters. Set condition of readiness Two, watch two. Set Material Condition Baker. 1421 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. All engines ahead full, 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 1508 surface lookouts aft reported periscope bearing 187°T. All engines ahead flank speed. Changed course right to 270°T. and pgc. 1512 changed course left to 260°T. and pgc. 1520 changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. 1522 ceased zigzagging. 1527 changed course right to 320°T. and pgc. 1554 changed course right into wind to recover aircraft. Average course 090°T., using various speeds. 1537 first plane landed. 1543 SALT LAKE CITY, on starboard quarter of ENTERPRISE, sighted submarine bearing 080°T. All engines ahead flank, 25 knots. Changed course left to 045°T. and pgc, SALT LAKE CITY opened fire on submarine. 1551 changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. 1552 changed course into wind to recover 6-F-15. Steaming at various courses and speeds. 1556 6-F-15 landed. All engines ahead 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. 1558 changed course left to 360°T. Average steam 413.7. Average r.p.m. 164.4.

J. A. Holmes
J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

16 - 18
Steaming as before. 1600 submarine sighted dead ahead. All engines ahead emergency full. Changed course left to 255°T. and pgc. 1605 all engines ahead full, 20 knots, 168 r.p.m. 1608 changed course left to 300°T. and pgc. 1623 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1640 ceased zigzagging, resumed base course, 300°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. 1648 changed fleet axis to 300°T. and pgc. 1700 sounded General Quarters. All engines ahead 2/3, 10 knots, 93 r.p.m. 1703 changed course right into the wind and commenced steaming at various courses and speeds preparatory to recover aircraft. 1705 darkened ship. 1707 sky control reported torpedo 1,000 yards on port beam. All engines ahead emergency flank. Changed course left to 072°T. 1709 set Material Condition Affirm. 1710 changed course into the wind to recover aircraft. 1715 first plane landed. 1716 last plane landed. All engines ahead full, 20 knots. Returned to base course 300°T. 1721 changed fleet speed to 20 knots. 1725 HALSEY reported a submarine bearing 150°T. 1726 all engines ahead emergency flank, full right rudder. Came to course 030°T. HC CALL fired depth charges, oil came to surface. 1727 commenced zigzagging to avoid submarine. 1729 all engines ahead full, 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. Came left slowly to 300°T. Average steam 417.5. Average r.p.m. 175.2

W. C. HEMBURY
W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

18 - 20
Steaming as before. 1811 secured from General Quarters. Set condition of readiness Two, watch two. Set Material Condition Baker. 1850 cut No. 4 boiler off the main steam line. 1854 cut No. 2 and No. 9 boilers off the main steam line. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 189.

J. A. Holmes
J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

20 - 24
Steaming as before. 2400 changed course and fleet course right to 000°T. and pgc. Changed speed and fleet speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 189.

W. C. Hembury
W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

Approved: [illegible]
[illegible]
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: R. W. Noble
R. W. NOBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U. S. N., Navigator.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)

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
Page 1222

Approved: Examined:

U. S. N., Navigator.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly.)

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Page 1283

UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Wednesday 10 December 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10

REMARKS

0 - 4

Steaming in company with Task Force Eight in cruising disposition 9-7. Fleet course and axis 020°T. Fleet guide and O.T.C. in ENTERPRISE. Standard speed 15 knots. Steaming at 135 knots with boilers Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 in use. Ship in Condition of Readiness II and Material Condition Baker. All ships darkened. 0000 changed course to 110°T. and pgo, 098°30' psc, 102°30' pstgc. 0100 changed course to 200°T. and pgo, 184° pstgc, 186° psc. 0109 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Changed speed to 15.1 knots. Fleet course 200°T, fleet speed 18.8 knots. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 134.

W. C. HAMBURG, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

4 - 8

Steaming as before. 0454 sounded flight quarters. 0530 cut in No. 1 and No. 2 boilers on main steam line. 0535 set Material Condition Affirm. 0550 ceased zigzagging. Changed course into wind to launch aircraft. Approx. course 065°T. speed 15 knots. 0552 launched first plane. 0602 last plane launched. 0603 changed course to right to 135°T. 0610 changed course into wind to launch aircraft. Approx. course 060°T., 18 knots, 139 r.p.m. 0615 first plane launched. 0619 6-B-17 reported submarine at lat. 22° 30' N, longitude 158° 30' W., course 060°T. 0621 last plane launched. 0624 changed course to 200°T. 0626 secured from General Quarters. Set Condition of Readiness Two, watch two. Set Condition Baker. 0627 lighted ship. 0627 6-B-2 reported submarine bearing 020°T. from point option, course 080°. 0630 changed speed to 13.5 knots, 126 r.p.m.. Changed course left to 220°T. and pgo, 277° psc, and 278° pstc. 0630 6-B-17 reported bombing a submarine bearing 090°T. 0637 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Changed speed to 15 knots. 0730 sounded flight quarters. 0748 submarine contact made by sound by destroyer of screen, port side. 0749 changed course emergency right to 110°T. All engines ahead flank, 25 knots. 0752 all engines ahead full, 30 knots. 0757 changed course left to 020°T. and pgo. Changed speed to 13.5 knots, 126 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 143.2.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

8 - 12

Steaming as before. 0811 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 0915 changed course to 045°T. and pgo, 035° pstgc, 081° psc. Changed speed to 20 knots. 0920 changed speed to 13.5 knots. 0933 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 1000 last plane landed. Changed speed to 13.5 knots. 1004 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to land plane. 1015 plane landed. Changed speed to 13.5 knots. Changed course to 045° T. and pgo, 1025 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 4. Changed speed to 15.2 knots. 1147 ceased zigzagging, resumed course 020°T. and pgo. 1156 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 144.2

W. C. HAMBURG, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

12 - 16

Steaming as before. 1201 last plane landed. Changed speed to 13.5 knots, 126 r.p.m. Changed course left to 020°T and pgo. 1206 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 4. Changed speed to 15 knots, 142 r.p.m. 1325 PAGANO reported submarine contact by hydrophones. Changed speed to 25 knots. Changed course right emergency 100°T. 1327 PAGANO reported torpedo wake approaching ENTERPRISE and attacked with depth charges. 1329 changed speed emergency flank, 30 knots, 338 r.p.m.. 1330 changed course left into wind to launch aircraft. Steaming on various courses and speeds as necessary, approx. course 077°T. 1331 sounded general quarters. 1336 set material condition Affirm. 1354 launched first plane. 1356 discontinued launching. Changed speed to 10 knots, 95 r.p.m.. Changed course left to 020°T. and pgo. 1359 changed speed to 20 knots, 198 r.p.m.. 1340 emergency full speed. 1345 changed speed to 10 knots, 99 r.p.m.. 1347 commenced zigzagging. 1352 changed speed to 15 knots, 141 r.p.m.

(CONTINUED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET)

Approved:

C. G. [illegible]
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:

R. H. [illegible]
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N. Navigator.

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

N. Nav. 49 (Mar., 1920)

Page 1 of 4

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) 3TC (Symbol and Number)

AT PASSAGE Hawaiian Operating Area TO (Day) Thursday (Date) 11 (Month) December 19 41

ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 10 C. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hours	Distance Average Speed Hours	By Revs. Knots	By Revs. Tenths	By Log Knots	By Log Tenths	Course (P. C.) Gyro X Mag. (Indicate which)	Wind Direction	Wind Force	Barometer Reading at Noon	Barometer Reading at 4 A.M.	Temperature Air Dry Bulb	Temperature Air Wet Bulb	Temperature Water at Noon	Weather & Remarks	Clocks Port	Clocks Morning Factor	Clocks Afternoon	Variation	Sea Condition	Sea Swell Direction
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M. 1	168.3	18	8	17	2	000	ENE	23	3020	-	70	62	74	BC	a cu	ENE	1	25	4	ENE
2	166.0	18	6	16	7	000	ENE	20	3020	-	69	62	74	BC	a cu	ENE	1	25	4	ENE
3	166.0	18	6	17	5	000	ENE	19	3021	-	69	62	73	BC	a cu	ENE	1	25	4	ENE
4	166.0	18	8	17	3	000	ENE	20	3021	-	69	62	73	BC	a cu	ENE	1	25	4	ENE
5	166.0	18	8	17	2	000	ENE	18	3022	-	69	61	73	BC	a cu	ENE	2	25	4	ENE
6	166.0	18	8	17	3	000	ENE	14	3024	-	69	60	74	BC	a cu	ENE	1	25	4	ENE
7	171.5	19	2	16	0	300	E	20	3030	-	69	61	72	BC	a cu	ENE	2	28	4	ENE
8	166.1	18	6	16	2	100	E	18	3032	-	70	62	73	BC	a cu	ENE	2	28	4	ENE
9	172.7	19	3	16	7	090	E	17	3032	-	71	61	73	BC	cu	ENE	1	30	2	ENE
10	171.0	19	1	16	5	090	E	17	3033	-	71	62	74	BC	a cu	ENE	1	30	2	ENE
11	166.0	18	8	17	8	090	ENE	17	3028	-	71	63	73	BC	a cu	ENE	3	30	2	ENE
12	172.8	19	3	16	0	090	E	16	30[illegible]	-	71	63	73	C	at cu	ENE	9	30	2	ENE
P.M. 13	164.8	20	5	19	4	090	ESE	19	3024	-	70	62	73	BC	at cu	ESE	2	30	1	ESE
14	178.8	19	7	19	6	090	ESE	14	3024	-	72	61	72	BC	cl at	ESE	2	30	1	ESE
15	178.8	19	7	19	8	090	ESE	15	3024	-	71	61	72	BC	c cu	ESE	3	30	1	ESE
16	161.0	20	1	18	2	090	ESE	15	3024	-	71	62	72	B	a cu	ESE	3	30	1	ESE
17	175.3	19	6	18	2	101	ESE	15	3025	-	70	62	72	C	a cu	ESE	7	30	1	ESE
18	177.7	19	8	18	6	090	ESE	15	3028	-	69	62	73	BC	a cu	ESE	1	30	1	ESE
19	168.0	18	8	16	8	090	ESE	15	3024	-	69	62	72	BC	a cu	ESE	1	30	1	ESE
20	166.0	18	6	18	8	090	ESE	15	3024	-	68	62	72	BC	a cu	ESE	1	30	1	ESE
21	160.0	18	8	17	3	090	ESE	12	3031	-	68	61	70	B	-	-	-	28	1	ESE
22	166.0	18	6	17	9	130	ESE	11	3029	-	68	61	70	BC	at cu	ESE	1	28	1	ESE
23	168.0	18	8	17	3	100	ESE	11	3029	-	69	61	70	BC	a cu	ESE	1	25	1	ESE
24	169.0	18	6	17	4	050	ESE	8	3029	-	69	63	70	B	-	-	-	25	1	ESE

a/ Latitude 37° 27' 15" N
a/ Longitude 165° 58' 45" W

z/ Latitude 27° 32' 45" N
z/ Longitude 157° 45' 30" W

a/ Latitude 27° 29' 00" N
a/ Longitude 135° 15' 15" W

Current { Set / Drift

Gyrocompass in Use
Error 0° 51' E

Standard Mag. Compass
Compass No. 54294
S. H. 077°
Error 12° 51' E
Variation 12° 30' E
Deviation 1° 21' E

Fuel { Received 0 / Expended 1,077 / On hand 18,775

Water { Distilled 35,605 / Received 0 / Expended 40,441 / On hand 164,602

Before Leaving Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft.

After Entering Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft.

Magazine Temperatures:
Maximum 87°
Minimum 77°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Number	Morning	Afternoon
1	Flight quarters	Flight quarters
2	General quarters	General quarters
3	Condition "A"	Condition "A"
4	Condition "3"	
5	Flight Quarters	
6		
7		
8		
9		

RECOMMENDED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

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ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE Date 11 December, 19 41

12 - 16

Steaming as before. 1223 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 1329 changed course to 090°T. and pgc. 1331 changed speed to 18 knots. 1336 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 1242 changed course to 090°T. and pgc, 077° psc, 061° pstgc. Changed speed to 16.5 knots. 1253 changed speed to 18 knots. 1256 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1342 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 1348 changed course to 090°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 18 knots. 1352 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1439 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 1443 changed course to 090°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 16 knots. 1448 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1451 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid destroyer submarine contact. 1500 changed course to 090°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 18 knots. 1507 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1524 unloaded 1.1 in./75 cal. mounts by firing. 1558 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 179.7.

W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

16 - 18

Steaming as before. 1602 changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. 1605 6-8-10 reported contact with aircraft, later reported friendly. 1605 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1630 sounded flight quarters. 1646 ceased zigzagging. Steadied on course 125°T. and pgc. 1652 changed fleet speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. 1655 Sounded general quarters. Set material condition Afirm. Changed speed to 23 knots, 216 r.p.m. Changed course into wind to recover aircraft, approx. course 101°T. 1656 first plane landed. 1701 darkened ship. 1705 last plane landed. Changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Changed course to 125°T. 1707 changed course to 090°T. 1735 BAUER and MC CALL reported submarine to starboard of MC CALL. MC CALL attacked with depth charges. Changed speed emergency flank. Commenced zigzagging to avoid possible torpedoes. 1739 returned to base course, 090°T. Changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. 1800 secured from General Quarters. Set condition of readiness Two, watch one. Set material condition Baker. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 176.5.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

18 - 20

Steaming as before. 1600 secured from General Quarters. Set Condition of readiness Two and material condition Baker. 1907 secured boilers Nos. 4 and 9. 1918 secured boiler No. 1. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 168.

W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

20 - 24

Steaming as before. 2100 changed front of disposition right to 180°T. and pgc, 165° psc and 165° pstc. 2300 changed front of disposition right to 250°T. and pgc, 237° psc, and 235° pstc. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 168.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

Approved: G. B. CONRAD, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

Examined: R. W. RUBLE, Lieut-Comdr., U. S. N., Navigator

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)

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
Page 1226
Approved:
Examined:
U. S. N., Navigator.
(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly.)

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UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Thursday (Day) 11 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10

REMARKS

0 - 4

Steaming darkened in company with Task Force Eight in special cruising disposition 9-V(Night) on course 000°T. and pgc, 345° psc, and 340° pstc, on six boilers, Nos. 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Boilers Nos. 2, 4, and 9 lighted off in stand-by status. Steaming at 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Plane guard DD's MC CALL and CRAVEN in inner-anti-submarine screen 1-A. Fleet course 000°T. and pgc, fleet axis 300°T, fleet speed 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Fleet guide, C.T.G. and S.O.P.A. in this vessel. Task force in condition of readiness two. 0045 changed fleet axis right to 000°T. 0110 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 168.1

J. A. Holmes

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

4 - 8

Steaming as before. 0510 flight quarters. 0525 boilers Nos. 2 and 9 cut in on main steam line. 0534 boiler No. 4 cut in on main steam line. 0535 General Quarters. 0549 set Material Condition Afirm. 0610 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 0618 last plane launched. Changed course to 000°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 18 knots. 0632 changed speed to 16.5 knots. 0635 changed course to 300°T. and pgc. 0642 lighted ship. 0643 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Base course 300°T. Changed speed to 18 knots. 0645 secured from General Quarters. Set Condition of Readiness II. Set Material Condition Baker. 0655 changed course to 216°T. and pgc. Changed to flank speed. 0656 changed course to 300°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 18 knots. Resumed zigzagging. 0758 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 168.4.

W. C. Hemsbury

W. C. HEMSBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

8 - 12

Steaming as before. 0804 first plane landed. 0811 last plane landed. Changed speed to 16.5 knots, 154 r.p.m. Changed course to base course, 300°T. and pgc. 0819 Changed course right into the wind to recover aircraft. Steaming at various speeds as necessary. Approx. course 090°T. 0824 first plane landed. 0828 last plane landed. 0832 changed speed to 16.5 knots, 154 r.p.m. Changed course left to 300°T. and pgc. 0834 SALT LAKE CITY reported sighting submarine in ~~section~~ one. 0835 changed speed emergency flank. SALT LAKE CITY opened fire on submarine. Changed course left to 282°T. FANNING attacked with depth charges. 0836 SALT LAKE CITY reported submarine bearing 175°T. from SALT LAKE CITY. Changed course right to 010°T. 0841 changed speed flank speed, 25 knots, 238 r.p.m. 0843 changed course left to 300°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 16.5 knots, 154 r.p.m. 0850 changed course, fleet course and axis right to 090°T. and pgc. 0901 Torpedo reported from starboard to port twenty yards astern of ship. Changed speed emergency flank. 0903 changed speed flank speed, 25 knots, 238 r.p.m. 0904 changed speed to 16.5 knots, 154 r.p.m. 0911 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. 1034 Sounded General Quarters. 1110 ceased zigzagging. Changed course left into wind. Steaming on various courses. Approx. course 113°T. 1115 first plane launched. 1123 last plane launched. Changed speed to 16.5 knots, 154 r.p.m. Changed course left to base course, 090°T. 1134 changed course into wind to recover aircraft. Approx. course 113°T. 1139 first plane landed. 1144 discontinued landing aircraft, waiting for 6-B-13 to arrive. Changed speed to 16.5 knots, 154 r.p.m. Changed course left to 090°T. 1147 sighted 6-B-13 and came into wind to recover. Plane recovered on approx. course 103°T. 1154 Changed speed to 16.5 knots, 154 r.p.m. Changed course left to 090°T. 1157 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 171.1.

J. A. Holmes

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

(CONTINUED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET)

Approved:

H. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:

R. W. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N. Navigator

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

N. Nav. 15

Page 1

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE CV6

AT PASSAGE Hawaiian Operating Area TO Friday 12 December 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10½ G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy Commanding

Hour	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M. 1	168.0	18	6	17	4	250	SSE	5	3030	-	69	65	72	bc	a cu	ESE	1	30	1	ESE
2	168.0	18	6	17	0	250	ESE	11	3028	-	69	65	72	bc	a cu	ESE	1	30	1	ESE
3	168.0	18	6	17	9	250	E	9	3026	-	69	65	72	bc	a cu	E	1	30	1	E
4	168.0	18	6	18	1	250	E	9	3026	-	69	64	72	c	a cu	E	6	30	1	E
5	168.0	18	6	17	9	250	ESE	7	3022	-	69	64	72	bc	cu	ESE	1	35	1	ESE
6	16[illegible].0	19	0	18	6	300	E	10	3023	-	70	64	72	bc	a cu	E	4	35	1	ESE
7	169.4	[illegible]	[illegible]	20	0	250	ENE	11	3026	-	70	64	72	bc	a cu	E	3	30	1	ESE
8	165.1	18	2	17	[illegible]	030	ENE	12	3025	-	70	64	72	bc	a cu	E	4	30	1	ESE
9	171.4	19	2	16	0	030	ENE	12	3033	-	71	64	72	bc	a cu	E	4	30	1	E
10	169.8	18	9	17	5	030	NE	18	3029	-	70	65	72	bc	a cu	E	3	30	1	E
11	179.1	19	9	16	6	080	NE	16	3029	-	71	63	72	bc	ci st	E	4	30	1	E
12	182.0	20	9	20	1	030	NE	19	3024	-	71	63	72	bc	ci st	E	4	30	1	E

Latitude	20° 52' 45" N
Longitude	157° 10' 00" W
Latitude	21° 32' 50" N
Longitude	158° 13' 15" W
Latitude	21° 24' 15" N
Longitude	157° 09' 45" W
Current Set	
Current Drift	

Gyrocompass in Use

Error 0° 27' E

Standard Mag. Compass

Compass No.	[illegible]
S. H.	207° 30'
Error	15° 57' E
Variation	12° 00' E
Deviation	3° 57' E

Received	0
Expended	1,389
On hand	18,906

Distilled	35,500
Received	0
Expended	27,500
On hand	74,000

Before Leaving Port

Draft for'd

Draft aft

After Entering Port

Draft for'd

Draft aft

Magazine Temperatures:

Maximum 87°

Minimum 78°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Morning	Afternoon
Flight Quarters	Flight Quarters
General "	General "
Condition Afirm	Condition Afirm
Condition Baker	Darkened ship.
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	

Hour	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
P.M. 13	167.0	18	[illegible]	18	4	050	[illegible]	8	3022	-	70	62	72	bc	ci st	E	1	30	1	E
14	1[illegible].0	1[illegible]	[illegible]	17	6	030	ENE	7	3020	-	70	63	72	bc	ci st	E	1	30	1	E
15	182.0	20	2	19	3	020	NE	6	3016	-	70	63	72	bc	ci st	E	1	30	1	E
16	172.0	19	2	18	4	030	NW	7	3016	-	70	62	72	c	ci st	E	6	30	1	E
17	160.1	16	7	17	6	300	NW	7	3020	-	69	60	72	c	ci st	E	7	30	1	E
18	168.0	18	0	18	4	240	SW	10	3019	-	69	62	72	c	a cu	E	6	25	1	E
19	168.0	18	[illegible]	17	[illegible]	240	SSW	10	3020	-	69	62	70	c	st cu	E	8	25	1	E
20	168.0	18	[illegible]	16	6	240	S	11	3020	-	69	61	72	c	st cu	E	8	25	1	E
21	168.0	18	[illegible]	18	[illegible]	240	S	11	3027	-	69	61	72	c	a cu	E	9	25	1	E
22	168.0	18	0	18	[illegible]	240	S	12	3027	-	69	60	72	c	a cu	E	.9	25	1	E
23	16[illegible].0	18	[illegible]	18	[illegible]	240	S	8	3027	-	69	60	71	c	a cu	E	9	25	1	E
24	168.0	18	2	17	7	240	S	5	3020	-	69	58	72	c	a cu	E	6	25	1	E

Submerged Run Data—Submarines

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

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ADDITIONAL SHEET

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE Date 12 December 19 41

12 - 16
Steaming as before. 1550 sounded flight quarters. 1408 ceased zigzagging resumed base course 030°T. 1410 changed speed to 22 knots, 269 r.p.m. 1415 changed course into wind, approx. course 040°T. 1417 launched first plane. 1420 launched last plane as inner and intermediate air patrol. Changed speed to 18 knots, 166 r.p.m. Returned to base course, 030°T. 1423 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1430 C-B-2 reported attacking submerged submarine in Lat. 27° 10' N, Long. 152° 13' W. Sent another plane to aid. 1433 cruiser recovering inner and intermediate air patrol. 1435 C-B-2 reported another submarine in the vicinity of one being bombed. 1440 BENHAM left formation to aid planes in attacking submarines. 1442 changed course right 60° to 055°T. and pgc. 1447 changed course right 30° to 085°. C-B-2 reported having dropped two bombs and that bubbles were visible. 1450 changed course left to 280°T. and pgc. 1452 C-B-2 reported he believed that the periscope thought sighted was a school of small fish, occasionally breaking the surface. 1456 changed course right to 300°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 12.5 knots, 154 r.p.m. 1507 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 4. Changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Changed fleet speed to 12.5 knots, 118 r.p.m. 1516 GRIDLEY reported sighting a submarine bearing 197° T. and dropped depth charge. Changed speed to flank speed, 25 knots, 238 r.p.m. Changed course right to 015°T. 1521 returned to base course 030°T. Changed speed to 18 knots, 166 r.p.m. 1523 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 4. 1526 FANNING left formation to order BENHAM to rejoin. 1535 Plane reported a submarine 5,000 yards astern of SALT LAKE CITY. Changed speed emergency flank speed. Changed course left to 035°T. 1537 sky control reported two 300's swooping low over the water astern. 1538 changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Returned to base course, 030°T. 1545 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 4. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 172.4.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

16 - 18
Steaming as before. 1600 ceased zigzagging. 1603 changed fleet course and axis to 300°T. and pgc. Changed speed and fleet speed to 18 knots, 117 r.p.m. 1615 sounded flight quarters. 1630 All engines ahead full, 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. 1644 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds into the wind preparatory to landing aircraft. 1651 landed first plane. 1655 sounded General Quarters. Set Material Condition Afirm. 1657 last plane landed. Changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Changed course left to 300°T. and pgc. 1701 darkened ship. Changed fleet course and axis to 240°T. and pgc. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 167.4.

W. G. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

18 - 20
Steaming as before. 1802 secured from General Quarters, set condition of readiness Two, watch two. Set Material Condition Baker. 1840 cut No. 1 boiler off the main steam line. 1841 cut No. 4 and No. 9 boiler off the main steam line. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 168.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

20 - 24
Steaming as before. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 168.

W. G. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

Approved: G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

Examined: R. H. RUMLEY, Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N., Navigator.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with log sheets)

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
Page 1230

Approved: Examined:

U. S. N., Navigator.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly.)

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Page 1231

UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Ship) Friday (Day) 12 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10

REMARKS

0 - 4

Steaming on course 250°T. and pgc, 237° psc, 235° pstgc, in cruising disposition 9-V in company with Task Force Eight. Guide and C.T.G. in ENTERPRISE. Fleet course and axis 250°T. Steaming at 18 knots, standard speed 15 knots. Boilers Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 in use. Ship in Condition of Readiness II and Material Condition Baker. Steaming darkened. 0054 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 168.

W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg),U.S.N.

4 - 8

Steaming as before. 0520 sounded General Quarters. Set Material Condition afirm. 0529 cut in No. 1 boiler on the main steam line. 0558 changed course right into the wind to launch aircraft. Steaming at various speeds as necessary. Approx. course 000°T. 0604 first plane launched. 0613 last plane launched. 0614 changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Changed course right to 250°T. and pgc. 0626 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 0634 BENHAM reported a submarine to her starboard. Changed speed to 25 knots, 238 r.p.m. Maneuvering to avoid submarine. Changed course right to 290°T. 0635 changed course to 250°T. 0636 lighted ship. 0637 changed course to 140°T. 0641 returned to base course 250°T. Changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Secured from general quarters. Set Condition of Readiness Two, watch two. Set Material Condition Baker. 0646 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 0723 ceased zigzagging, resumed base course. 0724 changed front of disposition right to 340°T. and pgc, 327° psc, and 327°.5 pstc. 0737 changed front of disposition right to 030°T. and pgc., 016°.5 psc, 015° pstc. 0745 BENHAM reported torpedo wake to her starboard. Emergency flank speed, 238 r.p.m. Changed course to left to 270°T. 0746 changed speed to 16.5 knots,154 r.p.m. Changed course left to 030°T. and pgc. 0750 made routine shift of steering units. Port unit now in use. Commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 171.9.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

8 - 12

Steaming as before. 0834 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 0838 changed course to 030°T. and pgc., 016°.20' psc, 015° pstgc. Changed speed to 16 knots. 0846 changed course to 060°T. 0850 changed course to 030°T. 0854 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 0902 changed course to 120°T. and pgc. Commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 0919 changed course to 245°T. Changed speed to 25 knots. 0930 changed course to 120°T. and pgc, 107° psc, 105° pstc. 0936 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 0955 ceased zigzagging Changed course to 030°T. and pgc, 016° 30' psc, 017° pstgc. 0957 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1001 flight quarters. 1033 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 1035 changed course to 030°T. and pgc, 016° 30' psc, 017° pstgc. Changed speed to 18 knots. 1039 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1045 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 1052 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid submarine contact. 1058 resumed landing aircraft. Steaming at various courses and speeds. 1114 last plane landed. Changed course to 030°T. Changed speed to 18 knots. 1132 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1141 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 1145 changed speed to 16.5 knots, Changed course to 030°T. and pgc. 1151 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Changed speed to 18 knots. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 177.1.

W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

(CONTINUED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET)

Approved: C. D. MURRAY, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

Examined: R. W. RUBLE, Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N. Navigator.

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

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N. Nav. 42 (Mar., 1926)

Page

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) 376 (Identification Number)

AT Hawaiian Operating Area TO Saturday 13 December 1941 (Day) (Date) (Month)

PASSAGE

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10 W. D. MURRAY Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hour	Patent Taffrail Speed Indicator	By Revs. Nautical Miles	By Revs. Tenths	By Log Nautical Miles	By Log Tenths	Course (P. C.) Gyro / Mag. (Deduct which)	Wind Direction	Wind Force	Barometer Inches	Barometer Reading at Noon	Temperature Air, Dry Bulb	Temperature Air, Wet Bulb	Temperature Water at Distiller	Weather, by Symbols	Clouds Form	Clouds Movement From—	Clouds Amount	Clouds Visibility	Sea Condition	Sea Force
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M. 1	166.0	16	6	16	0	240	ENE	4	3023	-	69	61	74	C	st cu	E	2	20	1	E
2	166.0	16	6	16	0	240	ENE	3	3022	-	68	60	74	SC	st cu	E	2	25	1	E
3	166.0	16	8	16	1	240	E	2	3020	-	70	61	72	C	st cu	E	10	25	1	E
4	166.0	16	8	16	8	240	ENE	2	3020	-	70	60	74	C	st cu	E	10	25	1	E
5	16 .0	16	8	16	8	240	ENE	6	3019	-	70	61	74	C	st cu	E	10	25	1	E
6	166.0	16	8	16	0	240	ENE	7	3016	-	70	62	74	C	st cu	E	10	25	1	E
7	198.3	21	9	21	7	090	ENE	9	3020	-	70	61	74	C	st cu	E	8	25	1	E
8	155.5	17	5	15	5	090	ENE	10	3022	-	71	62	74	C	st cu	E	6	25	1	E
9	166.0	16	6	17	7	090	E	6	3023	-	70	61	74	C	st cu	E	10	25	1	E
10	166.0	16	9	17	6	090	ENE	7	3022	-	71	62	74	C	st cu	E	10	25	1	E
11	200.5	22	2	21	1	090	ENE	5	3021	-	71	61	74	C	st cu	E	10	25	1	E
12	174.6	19	4	16	6	090	E	5	3019	-	70	62	74	C	st cu	E	9	25	1	E
P.M. 13	166.0	19	0	16	8	090	E	9	3016	-	71	61	78	C	s cu	ENE	10	25	1	NE
14	168.0	16	8	16	5	090	ENE	8	3014	-	71	63	70	C	s cu	ENE	9	25	1	NE
15	176.3	19	3	16	4	018	NW	10	3014	-	69	60	70	C	s cu	ENE	9	25	1	NE
16	168.5	20	9	20	0	090	E	10	3013	-	70	61	71	C	s cu	ENE	9	25	1	NE
17	158.8	17	6	16	1	000	NW	15	3013	-	69	63	71	C	st cu	NW	9	25	1	W
18	148.0	16	1	15	2	000	NW	15	3013	-	70	61	71	C	st cu	NW	10	25	1	NW
19	130.0	15	7	14	0	000	NW	19	3014	-	69	61	71	C	st cu	NW	10	25	1	NW
20	139.0	15	7	14	4	000	NW	19	3015	-	70	63	71	C	st cu	NW	10	25	1	NW
21	139.0	15	7	14	3	000	NW	12	3013	-	69	62	72	C	st cu	NW	9	25	1	W
22	139.0	15	7	14	2	000	NW	16	3012	-	69	61	71	20	st cu	NW	8	25	1	NW
23	139.0	15	7	14	4	000	NW	19	3010	-	69	64	71	C	st cu	NW	9	25	2	NW
24	139.0	15	7	14	2	000	NW	15	3010	-	67	63	71	30	cu nb	NW	8	25	2	NW

At Latitude 25° 45' 30" N
Longitude 159° 45' 30" W

Last Latitude 25° 55' 45" N
Longitude 158° 25' 00" W

At Latitude 27° 09' 00" N
Longitude 157° 24' 00" W

Current: Set
Drift

Gyrocompass in Use
Error

Standard Mag. Compass
Compass No.
S. H.
Error
Variation
Deviation

Water: Received 0
Expended 1,981
On hand 15,085

Fuel: Distilled 32,904
Received 0
Expended 32,089
On hand 169,558

Before Leaving Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft.

After Entering Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft.

Magazine Temperatures:
Maximum 86°
Minimum 76°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Periods	Morning	Afternoon
1	General Quarters	
2	Condition Afirm	
3	Condition Aker	
4	Flight Quarters	
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

Page 131

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U.S.S. KIDDER Date 13 December, 19 41.

16 - 18
Steaming as before. 1615 sounded flight quarters. 1624 ceased zigzagging, resumed base course. Changed speed to 16.5 knots, 154 r.p.m. 1633 changed front of disposition left to 000°T. and psc., 340° psc, and 340° psc. Changed speed and fleet speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 1655 changed course left into wind to recover aircraft. Approx. course 336°T. Approx. speed 25 knots, 236 r.p.m. 1695 sounded General Quarters. Set Material Condition AFRI. 1656 first plane landed. 1659 last plane landed. Changed course to right to base course 000°T. Changed speed to standard, 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 1707 darkened ship. 1735 darkened ship and set Condition sounded stations. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 140.

L. Holmes
U.S.N. Chief, Engr., U.S.N.

18 - 20
Steaming as before. 1803 secured from General Quarters. Set Condition of Readiness Two and Material Condition Baker. 1912 secured No. 3 Boiler. 1913 secured No. 4 Boiler. 1916 secured No. 1 and No. 2 Boilers. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 139.

W. C. Hembury
U. S. NAVY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

20 - 24
Steaming as before. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 139.

J. C. Holmes
U.S.N. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

Approved: [signature]
U.S.N. Commander,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: [signature]
U.S.N. Navigator,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N. Navigator.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)

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
Page 1234
Approved:
Examined:
U. S. N., Navigator.
(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly.)

Page 5235

UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Saturday 13 December 19 41
(Ship) (Day) (Date) (Month)

ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 10

REMARKS

0 - 4

Steaming darkened in company with Task Force Eight in special cruising disposition 9-V (Night), on course 240°T. and pgc, 227° psc, and 424° pstg, at 18 knots, 168 r.p.m., on six boilers Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8. (Boilers Nos. 2, 4 and 5 in standby condition to be on line in one hours notice). Fleet course and axis 240°T, fleet speed 18 knots. Fleet guide, C.T.C. and S.O.P.A. in this vessel. Plane guards DD's GRAYSON and MC CALL in inner anti-submarine screen 1-A. Task force in condition of readiness two. 0200 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 168.0.

J. A. Holmes
J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

4 - 8

Steaming as before. 0508 lighted fires under boiler No. 9. 0514 lighted fires under boiler No. 4. 0520 lighted fires under boiler No. 1. 0535 General quarters. Set Material Condition Afirm. 0554 boilers 1 to 9 inclusive on main steam line. 0604 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 0623 launched last plane. Changed course to 080°T. and pgc. Changed speed to 18 knots. 0627 changed course to 240°T. and pgc. 0641 front of disposition changed to 150°T. 0648 lighted ship. 0649 secured from General quarters. Set Condition of Readiness II, and Material Condition Baker. 0657 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 0755 changed speed to 18 knots. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 172.4.

W. C. Hemsbury
W. C. HEMSBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

8 - 12

Steaming as before. 0923 FANNING and GRIDLEY left formation to investigate probable submarine. 0927 sighted JR3 bearing 140°T, crossing from starboard to port. 0934 FANNING and GRIDLEY rejoined. 0939 BILLET reported hydrophone indicated submarine in zone one. Changed speed flank, 25 knots, 238 r.p.m. Returned to base course 090°T. and pgc. 0948 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1002 rounded flight quarters. 1032 changed speed to 22 knots, 208 r.p.m. 1033 changed speed to flank speed, 238 r.p.m. 1035 changed course left into wind to recover aircraft. Approx. course 049°T. and pgc, speed 30 knots, 291 r.p.m. 1040 first plane landed. 1047 last plane landed. Changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Changed course slowly to right to base course 090°T. and pgc. 1050 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1117 MC CALL reported sighting a submarine in zone two. Changed speed to flank speed, 25 knots, 238 r.p.m. Changed course left to 015°T. and pgc. 1122 changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Changed course right slowly to base course, 090°T. 1126 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1149 cruiser plane dropped depth charge bearing 353.3°T., distance approx. 2 miles. Changed course to right to 180°T, speed 25 knots, 238 r.p.m. FANNING proceeding to investigate. 1152 changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Returned to base course 090°T. 1155 Plane dropped smoke bomb bearing 352°T. 1156 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 177.9.

J. A. Holmes
J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

12 - 16

Steaming as before. 1241 commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds to avoid reported submarine contact. 1245 changed speed to 18.5 knots. 1248 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Changed speed to 18 knots. 1251 shifted steering control to conning tower. 1323 shifted steering control to bridge. 1350 Flight quarters. 1403 ceased zigzagging. Changed course to 090°T. and pgc. 1406 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 1418 last plane launched. Changed speed to 18 knots. Changed course to 090°T. and pgc, 078° pstgc, 075° psc. 1429 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. 1432 ceased zigzagging. 1437 commenced steering at various courses to conform to movements of cruisers recovering aircraft. 1455 Flight quarters. Commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to land plane. 1514 Plane landed. Changed speed to 18 knots. Changed course to 090°T. 1524 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 175.7.

W. C. Hemsbury
W. C. HEMSBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

(CONTINUED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET)

Approved:
G. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
R. W. HUSEL,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N. Navigator

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

N. Nav. 43
(Mar., 1939)

Page 1236

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) CV6 (Identification Number)

At Passage Hawaiian Operating Area TO Sunday (Day) 14 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10½

G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hour	"All Shaft" Average Revolutions	By Revs. Nautical Miles	By Revs. Tenths	By Log Nautical Miles	By Log Tenths	Course (P. C.) Gyro X Mag. (Indicate which)	Wind Direction	Wind Force Kts	Barometer Height in Inches	Barometer Reading at Ther.	Temperature Air, Dry Bulb	Temperature Air, Wet Bulb	Temperature Water at Surface	Weather, by Symbols	Clouds Form	Clouds Moving From—	Clouds Amount	Visibility	Sea Condition	Sea Swell From
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A. M.																				
1	139.0	15	7	14	3	000	NNW	19	3010	-	66	61	71	C	a cu	NW	10	15	1	NW
2	139.0	15	7	14	4	000	NNW	17	3010	-	68	61	71	O	a cu	NW	10	15	2	NW
3	139.0	15	7	14	6	000	NNW	20	3006	-	67	61	71	O	a cu	NW	10	15	2	NW
4	139.0	15	7	14	7	000	NNW	20	3007	-	67	61	71	O	a cu	NW	10	15	2	NW
5	139.0	15	7	14	5	000	W	15	3001	-	68	64	70	BC	cu nb	NW	3	20	2	NW
6	139.0	15	7	14	5	000	W	20	3003	-	68	64	70	C	cu nb	NW	7	20	2	NW
7	139.0	15	7	14	4	280	WNW	22	3006	-	71	64	70	BCP	cu nb	W	3	25	4	W
8	139.0	15	7	14	0	285	WNW	23	3007	-	67	64	70	BCP	cu nb	W	3	25	6	W
9	139.0	15	7	13	2	280	NW	22	3007	-	66	64	70	BCP	cu nb	W	9	20	6	W
10	132.2	14	9	13	1	000	NNW	30	3009	-	66	61	68	BCP	a cu	W	9	15	6	NNW
11	112.0	12	5	11	4	180	NNW	29	3009	-	65	58	67	BC	a cu	W	5	20	6	NNW
12	112.0	12	5	10	7	000	NNW	25	3009	-	66	58	67	BC	a cu	W	7	20	6	NNW

Latitude 29° 48' 00" N
Longitude 159° 36' 00" W

Latitude 30° 08' 30" N
Longitude 157° 10' 15" W

Latitude 28° 39' 30" N
Longitude 157° 44' 00" W

Current Set
Drift

GYROCOMPASS IN USE
Error 0° 00' 36" E

STANDARD MAG. COMPASS
Compass No. 54994
S. H. 346°
Error 14° E
Variation 13° 15' E
Deviation 0° 45' E

Fuel Received 0
Expended 1,674
On hand 13,411

Water Distilled 37,100
Received 0
Expended 36,100
On hand 73,000

BEFORE LEAVING PORT
Draft for'd
Draft aft

AFTER ENTERING PORT
Draft for'd
Draft aft

MAGAZINE TEMPERATURES:
Maximum 84°
Minimum 76°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1	General Qtrs.	General Qtrs.
2	Condition Afirm	Condition Afirm
3	Condition Baker	Condition Baker
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

Hour	"All Shaft" Average Revolutions	By Revs. Nautical Miles	By Revs. Tenths	By Log Nautical Miles	By Log Tenths	Course	Wind Direction	Wind Force	Barometer Height in Inches	Barometer Reading at Ther.	Air, Dry Bulb	Air, Wet Bulb	Water at Surface	Weather, by Symbols	Clouds Form	Clouds Moving From—	Clouds Amount	Visibility	Sea Condition	Sea Swell From
P. M.																				
13	112.0	12	5	10	9	340	NNW	25	3006	-	65	56	67	C	st cu	NW	9	25	5	NNW
14	109.5	12	2	10	6	150	NW	24	3005	-	65	57	67	O	st cu	NW	9	25	5	NW
15	135.7	15	3	14	4	180	NNW	26	3009	-	65	57	67	BC	a cu	NW	4	25	5	NW
16	146.1	16	5	14	7	180	N	29	3011	-	64	56	67	C	st cu	NW	9	25	5	NW
17	139.0	15	7	14	8	180	N	29	3012	-	64	58	69	C	st cu	NW	9	25	5	NW
18	165.0	16	5	17	5	160	N	24	3013	-	65	58	71	C	st cu	NW	9	25	4	NW
19	168.0	18	8	18	3	180	N	28	3020	-	65	58	72	O	st cu	NW	10	25	4	NNW
20	168.0	18	8	18	6	180	N	27	3022	-	65	58	72	O	st cu	NW	10	25	4	NW
21	168.0	18	8	19	4	204	NNE	20	3024	-	65	58	72	BC	st cu	NW	7	25	4	NW
22	168.0	18	8	17	2	204	NNE	9	3025	-	64	58	71	BC	a cu	NE	4	25	3	NE
23	168.0	18	8	18	3	204	NNE	19	3025	-	65	59	72	BC	a cu	NE	4	25	3	NE
24	168.0	18	8	18	6	204	NNE	17	3025	-	69	59	73	BC	a cu	NE	4	25	3	NE
										-										

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

Page 1237

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE Date 14 December 19 41

20 - 24 (Continued)

168° psc, 191°30' pstgc. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 168.

W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg),U.S.N.

Approved:
G. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
H. W. KUHLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N., Navigator.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)

77


Page 1238
Approved:
Examined:
C. C. V. Sanford
(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly.)

N. Navy 48 (Mar. 1937)

Page 1239

UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Sunday (Day) 14 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10

REMARKS

0 - 4
Steaming on course 000°T. and pgc, 346° psc, 347° pstc, in company with Task Force Eight in special cruising disposition 9-V. O.T.C. and formation guide, and S.C.P.A. in ENTERPRISE. Standard speed 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. Steaming at standard speed under boilers Nos. 2, 3, 5, 7, 8. Ship darkened. In condition of readiness Two and Material Condition Baker. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 139.

W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

4 - 8
Steaming as before. 0515 sounded flight quarters. 0540 sounded general quarters. Set Material Condition Afirm. 0632 changed course left to 290°T. and pgc. 0644 executed signal "fuel designated". 0646 lighted ship. 0650 secured from general quarters, set condition of readiness Two, watch two. Set material condition Baker. 0653 commenced zigzagging to hold position on cruisers during fueling preparations. No definite plan used. 0749 changed course into wind to launch aircraft. Approx. course 305°T. Speed 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 139.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

8 - 12
Steaming as before. 0944 changed speed to 12 knots, 112 r.p.m. 1037 changed course left to 210° T. and pgc, to close SALT LAKE CITY for visual signaling. 1115 steaming at various courses to rejoin position ahead of cruisers. Speed 12 knots. 1120 commenced zigzagging to Hold position on cruisers during fueling operations. Steaming on various courses at 12 knots. 1200 sounded flight quarters. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples, condition normal. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 123.8.

W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

12 - 16
Steaming as before. 1244 secured No. 9 boiler. 1249 secured No. 1 boiler. 1250 secured No. 9 boiler. 1251 changed course left into the wind to recover aircraft. Approx. course 340°T. and pgc., approx. speed 12 knots, 112 r.p.m. 1252 landed first plane. 1257 DUNLAP, seven miles astern, reported contact with submarine. Ceased landing aircraft. 1258 changed speed to 10 knots, 93 r.p.m. 1302 sent the two remaining airplanes in the air to aid the DUNLAP in attacking reported submarine. 1303 commenced zigzagging. 1305 changed speed to 12 knots, 112 r.p.m. 1331 ceased zigzagging. Changed course left into wind to resume landing aircraft. Approx. course 325°T. Approx. speed 12 knots. 1336 resumed landing aircraft. 1339 last plane landed. Changed course right to 065°T. 1347 changed course left to 160°T. 1358 executed signal "cease present exercises". Changed course left to 150°T. and pgc. 1405 formed special cruising disposition 9-V. 1407 changed front of disposition right to 180°T. and pgc, 168° psc, and 187° pstc. Changed speed and fleet speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. 1453 secured No. 6 boiler. 1529 changed speed and fleet speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. 1544 changed speed and fleet speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 125.8.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

16 - 18
Steaming as before. 1700 general quarters, set condition Afirm. 1704 darkened ship. 1706 changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 152.

W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

18 - 20
Steaming as before. 1806 secured from general quarters, set condition of readiness Two, watch two. Set material condition Baker. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 168.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

20 - 24
Steaming as before. 2000 changed course to fleet course, 204°T. and pgc,

(CONTINUED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET)

Approved:
C. B. McVAY, 3rd,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
H. W. RUBLE,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N. Navigator

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

N. Nav. 43
Page 1240

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) CV6 (Identification Number)

AT / PASSAGE Hawaiian Operating Area TO ________, Monday (Day) 15 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10½ G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hour	[illegible]	By Revs. Nautical Miles	By Revs. Tenths	By Log Nautical Miles	By Log Tenths	Course (P. C.) Gyro X Mag. (Indicate which)	Wind Direction	Wind Force	Barometer Height in Inches	Barometer Reading at Ther.	Temperature Air Dry Bulb	Temperature Air Wet Bulb	Temperature Water at Surface	Weather by Symbols	Clouds Form	Clouds Moving From—	Clouds Amount	Visibility	Sea Condition	Sea Swell From—
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A. M. 1	168.0	18	8	18	6	204	NNE	21	3020	-	66	60	72	0	st cu	NNE	10	25	4	NNE
2	168.0	18	8	18	5	204	NE	15	3019	-	66	60	72	0	st cu	NNE	10	25	4	NNE
3	168.0	18	8	18	4	204	NE	17	3020	-	66	59	72	0	st cu	NNE	9	25	4	NNE
4	168.0	18	8	18	2	204	NE	17	3021	-	67	61	72	0	st cu	NNE	10	25	4	NNE
5	168.0	18	8	18	7	204	NE	20	3022	-	66	61	73	0	st cu	NNE	10	25	4	NNE
6	168.0	18	8	18	4	204	NE	20	3021	-	68	61	73	0	st cu	NNE	10	25	4	NNE
7	170.8	19	1	18	2	204	ENE	18	3022	-	68	61	72	0	st cu	NNE	10	25	4	NNE
8	189.9	21	1	20	4	204	E	20	3022	-	68	62	72	0	st cu	NNE	10	25	4	NNE
9	191.8	21	3	20	5	204	NE	21	3023	-	70	61	74	0	st cu	NE	10	25	4	NE
10	189.0	21	0	20	2	204	NE	24	3023	-	71	63	74	0	st cu	NE	10	25	4	NE
11	153.2	17	3	16	3	204	ENE	22	3021	-	70	62	74	0	st cu	NE	10	25	4	NE
12	189.0	21	0	20	2	204	ENE	20	3021	-	71	62	74	0	st cu	NE	10	25	4	NE
										-										

8 a.m. Latitude	25° 25' 00" N
Longitude	159° 14' 00" W
Noon Latitude	24° 21' 00" N
Longitude	159° 44' 30" W
8 p.m. Latitude	22° 21' 30" N
Longitude	160° 51' 00" W
Current Set	
Drift	

GYROCOMPASS IN USE
Error 0° 03' W

STANDARD MAG. COMPASS
Compass No. 54994
S. H. 292°
Error 11° 57' E
Variation 11° 40' E
Deviation 0° 17' E

Fuel Received	0
Expended	1,061
On hand	12,350
Water Distilled	41,404
Received	0
Expended	33,094
On hand	199,491

BEFORE LEAVING PORT
Draft for'd ________
Draft aft ________

AFTER ENTERING PORT
Draft for'd ________
Draft aft ________

MAGAZINE TEMPERATURES:
Maximum 85°
Minimum 75°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1	General Qutrs	General Qtrs.
2	Condition Afirm	Condition Afirm
3	Condition Baker	Condition Baker
4	Flight Qtrs.	
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

Hour	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
P. M. 13	189.0	21	0	18	1	189	E	26	3014	-	72	63	74	BC	cu	NE	5	25	4	NE
14	186.5	18	7	19	7	079	ENE	30	3014	-	72	63	74	BC	a cu	NE	5	25	4	NE
15	156.9	17	6	16	1	204	NE	23	3011	-	73	64	74	BC	ci	NE	4	25	4	NE
16	184.1	20	5	19	6	215	ENE	27	3010	-	74	66	75	BC	st cu	NE	4	25	4	NE
17	189.0	21	0	20	3	215	ENE	25	3011	-	73	66	75	C	st cu	NE	9	25	4	NE
18	168;4	18	8	17	8	215	ENE	25	3012	-	73	67	75	C	st cu	NE	6	25	4	NE
19	189.0	21	0	20	4	215	NE	23	3016	-	73	67	75	C	st cu	NE	8	25	4	NE
20	189.0	21	0	20	6	215	NE	23	3014	-	72	67	75	C	st cu	NE	6	25	4	NE
21	181.0	20	1	19	5	215	ENE	29	3012	-	74	68	76	BC	a cu	NE	1	25	4	NE
22	189.0	21	0	20	5	215	ENE	26	3013	-	74	69	76	C	st cu	NE	6	25	4	NE
23	189.0	21	0	19	9	180	ENE	23	3012	-	74	68	76	CD	cu nb	NE	9	20	4	NE
24	189.0	21	0	20	5	138	ENE	25	3007	-	75	69	76	BC	a cu	NE	3	20	4	NE

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

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ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE Date 15 December, 1941

16 - 16
Steaming as before. 1715 changed course left into wind to recover aircraft. Approx. course 070°T. and approx. speed 12 knots, 113 r.p.m. 1720 sounded General Quarters. Set Material Condition Afirm. 1722 first plane landed. 1727 darkened ship. 1731 last plane landed. Changed speed to 18 knots, 158 r.p.m. Changed course right to 215°T. and pgc. 1734 changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 1736 changed fleet speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 178.7.

J. A. Holmes
J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

16 - 20
Steaming as before. 1838 secured from General Quarters, set Condition of Readiness Two, watch one. Set Material Condition Baker. 1906 secured No. 1 boiler. 1929 secured No. 9 boiler. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 189.

W. C. Hembury
W. C. HEMBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

20 - 24
Steaming as before. 2030 FANNING cut sharply across our bow from port to starboard. Stopped engines. Changed course hard right to 240°T. Maneuvering on various courses and various speeds to avoid FANNING. 2034 returned to base course 215°T. Changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 2200 changed front of disposition to 180°T. and pgc, 168° psc, and 165° pstc. 2300 changed front of disposition left to 138°T. and pgc, 126° psc, and 128° pstc. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 187.

J. A. Holmes
J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

Approved: G. D. Murray
G. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: R. W. Rubel
R. W. RUBEL,
Lieut-Comdr., U. S. N., Navigator.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)

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
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Approved:
Examined:
(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly.)

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UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE Monday 15 December 1941
(Name) (Date) (Month)

SHIP'S DESCRIPTION plan 10-y

REMARKS

0 - 4

Steaming darkened in company with Task Force Eight in special cruising disposition 2-Y (71.5%) on course 204°T. and pgo, on boilers No. 2, 3, 5, 7 and 9. Boilers No. 1, 4, 8, and 6 in stand-by status to be on the main steam line in one hour's notice). Steaming at 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. Fleet course and axis 204°T, fleet speed 18 knots, fleet guide, O.T.C. and S.O.P.A. in this vessel. Plane guard DD's HENLEY and FANNING in inner anti-submarine screen 1-A. Task Force in condition of readiness Two. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 168.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

4 - 8

Steaming as before. 0505 lighted fires under boiler No. 6. 0535 lighted fires under boilers Nos. 1, 4, and 8. 0540 General Quarters. Set Material Condition Afire. 0623 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch aircraft. 0639 launched last plane. Changed course to 204°T. and pgo. Changed speed to 24 knots. 0644 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 1. Changed speed to 20 knots. 0645 lighted ship. 0647 secured from General Quarters. Set Condition of Readiness Two. Set Material Condition Baker. 0742 bridge lost steering control due to tripping out of transformer relay in control circuit. 0747 steering control returned to bridge. Casualty remedied without affecting ship's position or maneuverability. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 174.2.

W. W. HAWBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

8 - 12

Steaming as before. 0849 plane reported submarine astern. Changed speed plane, 25 knots, 236 r.p.m. 0850 submarine report intercepted. Did not concern ENTERPRISE. Changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 0932 sounded flight quarters. 1017 changed course left into wind to launch aircraft. Approx. course 060°T. Approx. speed 18 knots, 112 r.p.m. 1022 launched first plane. 1050 launched last plane. 1035 landed first plane. 1044 landed last plane. Changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. Changed course right to 204°T. and pgo. 1046 changed speed to 18 knots, 168 r.p.m. 1046 changed speed to 20 knots, 189 r.p.m. 1054 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 1. 1057 unloaded No. 5, 5" 38 cal. gun through its scuttle. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 180.7.

J. A. HOLMES, Ensign, U.S.N.

12 - 16

Steaming as before. 1210 flight quarters. 1242 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to launch and land aircraft. 1404 ceased landing aircraft. 1405 changed course to 204°T. 1411 commenced steaming at various courses and speeds to land planes. 1419 plane landed. Changed course to 204°T. and pgo. Changed speed to 18 knots. 1445 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 1. 1513 ceased zigzagging. Changed course to 204°T. Changed speed to 18 knots. 1520 changed course to fleet course 215°T. and pgo, 208° pgo, axis 215°T. 1535 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 1. Changed speed to 20 knots. Average steam 410. Average r.p.m. 174.1.

W. W. HAWBURY, Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

Approved:

P. N. [illegible],
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:

E. P. [illegible],
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N.R., Navigator.

Original and [illegible] copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly.



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LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ENTERPRISE (Name) CV6 (Identification Number)

AT/PASSAGE Hawaiian Operating Area TO Tuesday (Day) 10 (Date) December (Month) 19 41

ZONE DESCRIPTION plus 10½ G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

1	[illegible]	20	3	19	0	098	ENE	31	3004	-	74	67	76	0	st cu	NE	9	15	4	NE
2	155.0	18	5	17	2	098	ENE	28	3002	-	74	68	76	0	st cu	NE	9	15	4	NE
3	158.0	18	6	13	3	098	ENE	30	001	-	74	69	76	0	st cu	NE	5	15	4	NE
4	165.0	19	5	16	4	098	E	27	3002	-	74	68	76	0	st cu	NE	9	15	4	NE
5	165.0	16	5	18	2	098	ENE	27	3003	-	72	68	76	0	st cu	NE	9	20	4	NE
6	162.0	15	6	17	1	098	ENE	27	3001	-	75	66	76	0	st cu	NE	9	25	4	ENE
7	166.3	18	5	17	0	135	ENE	26	3003	-	75	68	76	0	st cu	ENE	10	25	5	ENE
8	159.0	21	0	19	2	135	ENE	29	3004	-	76	69	77	0	st cu	ENE	10	25	5	ENE
9	157.7	20	9	18	2	135	ENE	22	3004	-	76	70	77	0	st cu	ENE	9	25	5	ENE
10	177.0	19	5	18	2	074	ENE	30	3010	-	75	67	77	0	st cu	ENE	8	25	5	ENE
11	[illegible]	17	5	15	4	039	ENE	26	3010	-	76	67	75	0	a cu	ENE	5	25	5	ENE
12	177.7	19	8	18	2	032	NE	30	3008	-	76	67	75	0	a cu	ENE	5	25	5	ENE

8 a.m. Latitude 20° 34' 00" N
Longitude 156° 44' 00" W

Noon Latitude 20° 52' 30" N
Longitude 158° 11' 00" W

Latitude
Longitude

Fuel Received 0
Expended 1,002
On hand 10,848

Water Distilled 21,100
Received 0
Expended 32,100
On hand 74,000

Before fueling
After Entering Port
Draft for'd 24' 3"
Draft aft 27' 0"

Magazine Temperatures
Maximum 85
Minimum 74

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Morning	Afternoon
1 Flight Quarters	General Quarters
2 General Quarters	Condition Afirm
3 Condition Afirm	Condition Baker
4 Condition Baker	Torpedo Defense

13	[illegible]	18	[illegible]	18	0	049	ENE	31	3003	-	76	68	76	0	a cu	ENE	9	25	5	ENE
14	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	18	3	[illegible]	ENE	40	2997	-	76	66	76	0	a cu	ENE	9	25	5	ENE
15	[illegible]	23	[illegible]	11	[illegible]	050	NE	32	3002	-	74	64	75	0	a cu	ENE	9	25	5	ENE
16	[illegible]	13	5			020	NE	33	3004	-	74	64	76	0	a cu	ENE	6	25	-	-
17	[illegible]	4	[illegible]				NE	17	3009	-	74	67	76	0	a cu	ENE	7	25	-	-
18		ANCHORED					NE	12	3009	-	76	66	-	0	a cu	ENE	7	25	-	-
19							NE	10	3011	-	75	68	-	0	a st	ENE	8	25	-	-
20							NE	9	3010	-	75	66	-	0	a st	ENE	5	30	-	-
21							NE	7	3010	-	75	68	-	BC	cu	ENE	2	30	-	-
22							NE	4	3012	-	75	68	-	BC	cu	ENE	2	30	-	-
23							NE	3	3014	-	75	66	-	BC	cu	ENE	2	30	-	-
24							NE	2	3013	-	75	68	-	BC	cu	ENE	1	30	-	-

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EXHIBIT NO. 102



Page 1280 RESTRICTED

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP LEXINGTON (Name) CV-2 (Classification Number)

AT/PASSAGE Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, T.H., Friday (Day) 5 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION +10½ FREDERICK C. SHERMAN Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

Hour	"All Shaft" Average Revs.	By Revs. Nautical Miles	Tenths	By Log Nautical Miles	Tenths	Course (P.C.)	Wind Direction	Wind Force	Barometer Height in Inches	Reading Att. Therm.	Air Dry Bulb	Air Wet Bulb	Water at Surface	Weather by Symbols	Clouds Form	Moving From—	Amount	Visibility	Sea Condition	Sea Direction
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M. 1						232	074	10	30.04		73	68		cp	cu-nb	NE	10	25	0	
2						232	075	12	30.02		73	67		cp	cu-nb	NE	9	25	0	
3						232	082	15	30.02		72	67		cp	st-cu	NE	8	25	0	
4						232	090	12	30.00		74	66		cp	st-cu	NE	8	25	0	
5						232	074	10	30.00		73	68		cp	st-cu	NE	7	25	0	
6						232	042	17	30.00		73	67		c	st-cu	NE	7	25	0	
7						232	122	10	30.02		74	67		c	st-cu	NE	7	30	0	
8	54.0					180	030		30.03		74	69	80	c	st-cu	NE	7	30	0	
9	129.1	15	0			215	065	33	30.04		75	71	80	c	st-cu	NE	6	30	4	NE
10	89.0	10	1	10	1	073	080	23	30.03		77	71	80	c	st-cu	NE	8	30	4	NE
11	139.0	16	0	14	8	270	080	26	30.03		74	70	80	c	st-cu	NE	8	30	4	NE
12	67.5	11	2	7	2	074	069	25	30.02		78	71	80	c	st-cu	NE	4	30	4	NE
P.M. 13	125.3	14	4	14	4	270	072	18	29.92		75	70	80	bc	cu	NE	1	35	2	NE
14	149.4	17	0	16	9	290	087	19	29.98		76	70	80	bc	cu	NE	2	15	2	NE
15	153.5	17	7	16	9	270	084	20	29.97		75	70	80	bc	cu-nb	NE	7	35	2	NE
16	153.5	17	7	16	7	250	047	21	29.97		75	70	80	bc	cu	NE	2	35	2	NE
17	151.7	17	4	17	5	C/C	059	27	29.98		75	71	80	bc	s-cu	NE	3	35	4	NE
18	153.9	17	6	17	2	290	056	26	29.98		74	71	80	bc	st-cu	NE	3	30	4	NE
19	[illegible]	16	4	16	4	270	095	27	30.02		74	70	80	bc	st-cu	NE	3	30	4	NE
20	147.5	16	8	16	8	C/C	050	23	30.04		74	70	80	bc	st-cu	NE	3	30	4	NE
21	153.0	17	5	17	7	C/C	040	25	30.04		74	71	80	bc	st-cu	NE	3	30	4	NE
22	152.7	17	4	16	8	C/C	075	17	30.04		76	71	78	bc	st-cu	NE	3	30	4	NE
23	153.1	17	6	17	0	C/C	065	24	30.04		75	71	78	bc	st-cu	NE	3	30	4	NE
24	153.7	17	5	17	3	285	064	22	30.04		75	70	80	bc	st-cu	NE	3	30	2	NE

Latitude

Longitude

Latitude 21°-03.1 N.

Longitude 158°-14.1 W.

Latitude 21°-05.7 N.

Longitude 160-25.4 W.

Current: Set

Drift

GYROCOMPASS IN USE

Error 0°-12.0 W.

STANDARD MAG. COMPASS

Compass No. 270

S. H. 253

Error 17 E.

Variation 11°-15' E.

Deviation 5°-45' E.

Received

Expended 5,796

On hand 1,749,352

Distilled

Received 36,675

Expended 43,265

On hand 230,665

BEFORE LEAVING PORT

Draft for'd 31'-6"

Draft aft 33'-6"

AFTER ENTERING PORT

Draft for'd

Draft aft

MAGAZINE TEMPERATURES:

Maximum 84/86

Minimum 74/75

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1	Torpedo Defense	Flight quarters
2	Condition III,	A.A. quarters.
3	Streamed paravanes.	
4		
5	Flight quarters.	
6		
7		
8		
9		

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

Corrected G

[illegible] 23 Nov.

RESTRICTED

Page 1283

UNITED STATES SHIP U.S.S. LEXINGTON Friday (Day) 5 (Date) December (Month) 19 41

ZONE DESCRIPTION +10½

REMARKS

00 to 04

Moored port side to mooring platforms F-9-N, and F-9-S, Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, T.H., in 7½ fathoms of water with the following lines in use: six 10" manila hawsers, one 8" manila hawser, four 1-5/8" wire hawsers, and three 1-5/8" wire breasts. Boiler No. 3 and forward machinery spaces in use for auxiliary purposes. Ships present: CALIFORNIA (SOPA-ComBatFor) and various units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and yard and district craft. Fresh water and telephone services being received from the shore. 0020 Disconnected fresh water line from shore. 0030 The following men returned aboard having completed temporary duty with shore patrol detail at Honolulu area: REILLY, J.A., TClc; OHLER, W.G., MMlc; CUSHING, D.R., SO2c, and GILL, S.R., AM2c. 0130 RENO, J.C., Seaman 2c, having returned from liberty in a drunken and disorderly condition, was placed in confinement for safekeeping. 0035 KELLY, W.B., Cox, was returned to ship under arrest by shore patrol and was made a prisoner at large by order of the Commanding Officer. Charge: Disobedience of safety orders of beach guard patrol.

R.L. HOUSER, Captain, USMC.

04 to 08

0405 BRUNO, F.J., Sea2c, returned absent over leave since 0000, this date, made a prisoner at large by order of the Commanding Officer. 0410 Pursuant to Bureau orders of 7 November, 1941, modified, Lieutenant C.H.B. MORRISON, USN, was detached and ordered to duty at Naval Air Station, Quonsett Point, Rhode Island. 0445 Lighted fires under boilers Nos. 1,6,10,12, and 15, commenced warming up "A" and "C" units; commenced preparations for getting underway. 0645 Tested main engines, all departments ready for getting underway. 0650 Pilot OTTERSON came aboard. 0705 Energized degaussing coils. 0728 Got underway in accordance with approved operating schedule. Captain conning, Executive Officer, and Navigator, and Pilot on the bridge. 0735 Commenced steering various courses at various speeds, standing out of Pearl Harbor channel. 0750 Went to torpedo defense quarters. The following ship movements occured during the watch: stood out: PORTER, LAMSON, HOPKINS, SOUTHARD, DRAYTON, CHICAGO, MINNEAPOLIS, ASTORIA, PORTLAND, and INDIANAPOLIS. Average steam: 285. Average r.p.m. 54.0.

J.A. MOORE, Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

08 to 12

0806 Passed channel entrance buoys abeam to port and starboard. 0810 Changed speed to 6 knots, 53 r.p.m. 0812 Streamed paravanes. Steaming on various courses at various speeds to clear defensive sea area at channel entrance. 0827 Secured from torpedo defense, set condition III in the anti-aircraft battery. 0857 Retrieved paravanes and secured for sea. 0900 Went to flight quarters. 0901 All engines stopped, shifted to low speed 44 pole combination. All engines ahead 1/3, 6 knots, 53 r.p.m. Steaming on various courses at various speeds for flight operations. 0937 All engines stopped, cut out the two inboard shafts, all engines ahead 1/3, 6 knots, 53 r.p.m. 0940 Landed eighteen VSB planes of Marine Scouting Squadron 231. 1011 All engines stopped. Cut in all shafts, all engines ahead 1/3, 6 knots, 61 r.p.m. 1030 LEXINGTON joined Task Force 12 in disposition 12S as formation guide with the following units of the Pacific Fleet: CHICAGO (ComBatFor), PORTLAND, ASTORIA, and Destroyer Division Nine plus PORTER on fleet course 270° T., speed 17 knots, 149 r.p.m. 1103 Left formation to land air group. Commenced maneuvering on various courses at various speeds for flight operations. 1121 S-F-15 crashed into the barrier: ALLARD, C., AMMlc, pilot of the plane received slight facial lacerations.

E.W. BERGMAN, Ensign, U.S. Navy

12 to 16

1202 Changed speed to 6 knots, 58 r.p.m. 1210 Having completed landing LEXINGTON Air Group changed course left to 270° T., 254° psg., 253° pso. Changed speed to 17 knots, 149 r.p.m. 1220 All engines stop, cut out "C" unit. 1221 All engines ahead 16½ knots, 145 r.p.m. 1222 Commenced zigzag in accordance with standard zigzag plan. 1328 Changed speed to 17.6 knots, 154 r.p.m. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 145.4.

E.H. ELDRIDGE, Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Approved: FREDERICK C. SHERMAN, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

Examined: J.A. MOORE, Lieutenant, U.S. Navy, Executive Officer.

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation)



1201

Page

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. LEXINGTON Date December 5, 19 41

16 to 18
1624 Ceased zigzagging and resumed base course 270° T., 255° patgc, 253° psc. Changed speed to 16.5 knots, 144 r.p.m. 1628 Changed fleet axis to 285° T.1637 Commenced zigzagging in accordance with standard plan, base course 270° T. Changed speed to 17.5 knots, 154 r.p.m. 1732 Darkened ship. Average steam: 285. Average r.p.m. 152.8.

H.W. HOWARD, Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

18 to 20
1800 Ceased zigzagging and resumed base course. Changed speed to 16½ knots, 144 r.p.m. 1930 Changed course to 285° T., and pgc, 274° patgc, 274° psc. 1935 Moonrise, commenced zigzagging; changed speed to 17½ knots, 153 r.p.m. At 1400 this date FRISTERSH, L.E., 250-46-31, Flc, suffered a compound fracture, third finger, when the roll of the ship caused a door to close on the finger. Treated: with Scott's solution, vasaline gauze dressing and splint. Patient was not admitted to the sick list. Average steam: 285. Average r.p.m. 146.0.

J.R. MOORE, Lieutenant, U.S. Navy.

20 to 24
Passed through intermittent light rain squalls. Average steam: 285. Average r.p.m. 153.1.

E. MUELLENHARD, Ensign, U.S. Navy.

Examined:

J.H. DUDLEY,
Commander, U.S. Navy.

(One page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)



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(RESTRICTED)

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP [illegible] (Name) CV-2 (Classification Number)

AT / PASSAGE as [illegible] Operating Area TO Saturday 6 December 19 41

ZONE DESCRIPTION +10½ [illegible] Captain U.S. Navy Commanding

A.M.																			
1	153.[illegible]	17	6	17	5	335	075	29	30.03		73	70	79	or	cu-sb	NE	2	25	2	NE
2	[illegible]	17	5	17	5	325	07[illegible]	22	30.02		74	[illegible]	[illegible]	or	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
3	[illegible]	17	5	17	[illegible]	305	[illegible]	31	30.01		75	70	78	[illegible]	st-cu	NE	[illegible]	30	2	NE
4	153.3	17	5	[illegible]	[illegible]	265	075	3[illegible]	30.01		74	69	80	[illegible]	st-cu	NE	[illegible]	3[illegible]	2	NE
5	[illegible]	17	[illegible]	16	8	3[illegible]	[illegible]	3[illegible]	30.0[illegible]		74	69	80	[illegible]	st-cu	NE	2	[illegible]	[illegible]	NE
6	[illegible]	17	5	17	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	27	30.05		74	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	st-cu	NE	2	30	3	NE
7	152.3	17	4	17	[illegible]	305	078	32	30.05		74	69	80	bc	st-cu	NE	3	30	3	NE
8	152.3	17	5	17	9	285	065	2[illegible]	30.05		74	69	78	bc	st-cu	NE	3	30	3	NE
9	150.5	17	2	16	8	285	078	[illegible]	30.09		74	69	78	bc	st-cu	NE	2	30	3	NE
10	151.[illegible]	17	2	16	2	285	275	26	30.11		74	68	78	bc	st-cu	NE	3	30	3	NE
11	155.4	17	[illegible]	16	3	2[illegible]5	[illegible]	2[illegible]	30.09		74	68	78	bc	st-cu	NE	3	30	3	NE
12	155.4	17	7	17	3	[illegible]	272	22	30.10		74	67	78	[illegible]	st-cu	NE	3	30	3	NE

8 Latitude 21°-[illegible] N.
Longitude [illegible]°-[illegible] W.

12 Latitude 2[illegible]°-[illegible]' N.
Longitude [illegible]

20 Latitude 2[illegible]°-[illegible]' N.
Longitude 1[illegible]7°-14' N.

Current Set 2[illegible]°
Drift .27 knots.

Gyrocompass on the
Error

Standard Mag. Compass
Compass No. 220
S.H. 225° E. 270° [illegible]
Error 15° [illegible]
Variation 11° 15' E.
Deviation 3°-15' E.

Fuel
Received ——
Expended [illegible]
On hand [illegible]

Water
Distilled [illegible]
Received [illegible]
Expended 59290
On hand 198715

Before Leaving Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft

After Entering Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft

Magazine Temperatures
Maximum [illegible]
Minimum [illegible]

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Morning	Afternoon
1 General quarters.	Aircraft rearming drill.
3 [illegible] call.	Flight quarters.

P.M.																			
13	150.4	17	1	17	0	285	072	24	30.08		76	66	78	bc	st-cu	NE	4	25	2	NE
14	14[illegible].0	16	5	16	1	285	060	25	30.[illegible]		75	66	78	bc	st-cu	NE	4	25	2	NE
15	143.8	15	3	15	9	235	074	27	30.06		75	68	[illegible]	bc	st-cu	NE	4	25	2	NE
16	149.1	17	0	17	1	285	050	26	30.03		74	68	78	bc	st-cu	NE	5	30	2	NE
17	152.8	17	5	17	2	285	082	28	30.04		74	67	78	bc	st-cu	NE	4	30	2	NE
18	152.8	17	5	17	0	285	082	26	30.04		74	67	78	bc	st-cu	NE	4	30	2	NE
19	152.6	17	5	17	3	285	086	24	30.04		74	67	78	bc	st-cu	NE	4	3[illegible]	1	NE
20	152.5	17	5	17	4	285	086	26	30.08		74	67	78	bc	st-cu	NE	3	30	1	NE
21	152.9	17	4	16	3	285	083	24	30.01		74	68	78	bc	st-cu	NE	3	[illegible]	1	NE
22	153.3	17	5	17	9	228	087	27	30.11		73	68	78	bc	st-cu	NE	2	30	1	NE
23	152.9	17	4	17	2	285	090	18	30.08		73	71	78	bc	st-cu	NE	3	30	1	NE
24	153.2	17	5	17	3	285	087	25	30.10		73	72	78	bc	st-cu	NE	3	35	1	NE

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

4

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UNITED STATES SHIP LEXINGTON Saturday, December 19 41

ZONE DESCRIPTION +10½

REMARKS

0 to 04
Steaming under boilers Nos. 1,3,5,10,12, and 16, with "A" unit in a low speed combination, on base course 285° T., 274° psc, 274° pgc, at standard speed, 15.5 knots, 153 r.p.m., enroute Pearl Harbor, T.H., to exercise area; in company with Task Force XII, Pacific Fleet, CHICAGO (Commander Task Force, in formation 12-8, Fleet guide in LEXINGTON; all ships darkened and zigzagging in accordance with prescribed plan. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 153.6.

[signature illegible], Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy

04 to 08
0400 Went to general quarters. 0445 Secured from general quarters, set condition of readiness III. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 153.1.

[signature illegible], Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

08 to 12
0800 Mustered crew on stations, no absentees. 0815 Ceased zigzagging, resumed base course 285° T., 274° psc, 274° pgc, and speed 10.5 knots, 144 r.p.m. 0816 Commenced zigzagging. Changed speed to 15.2 knots, 153 r.p.m. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder handling conditions normal. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 153.

[signature illegible], U.S. Navy

12 to 16
1230 Ceased zigzagging, resumed fleet course 285° T., and pgc, 270° psc, and psc, and fleet speed 10.5 knots, 144 r.p.m. 1404 Changed course to 335° T., and pgc, 324° psc, 325° psc. 1420 Sounded flight quarters. 1428 Sighted two unidentified aircraft which disappeared from sight on the port quarter. 1437 Changed course to 235° T., and psc, 220° psc, 221° psc. 1500 Changed course to 285° T., and pgc, 271° psc, 270° psc. 1507 Secured from flight quarters. 1525 Changed fleet speed to 15.5 knots, 153 r.p.m. steaming at fleet speed. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 153.6.

[signature illegible], Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

16 to 18
1752 Darkened ships. 1800 Assumed night search sector 100° T., to 280° T., average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 152.7.

[signature illegible], Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

18 to 20
No remarks. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 152.7.

H.W. HOWARD, Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy

20 to 24
No remarks. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 153.0.

J.H. [illegible], Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Approved: Frederick C. Sherman
FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: J.R. Dudley
J.R. DUDLEY,
Commander, U.S. Navy,

U.S.S. [illegible]

(Original (White) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)



1289

UNITED STATES SHIP U.S.S. LEXINGTON Sunday 7 December 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION +10½

REMARKS

00 to 04

Steaming in company with Task Force XII in special cruising disposition 12S, under boilers Nos. 1,5,6,10,12, and 15, "A" unit, at standard speed 17.5 knots, 153 r.p.m., on course 285° T., 271° pstgc, 272° psc. LEXINGTON is formation guide at center of formation, OTC and ComTaskForce XII is in CHICAGO (SOPA-ComCruScoFor). Ships darkened, condition of readiness III set in the anti-aircraft batteries and damage control. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 153.

E. MUHLENFELD, Ensign, U.S. Navy

04 to 08

0619 Went to general quarters. 0645 O'BRYAN, P.M., 287-26-76, SC2c received contusion right fourth finger while working on powder hoist in No. II turret, when finger was caught between two powder cans. X-ray showed no fracture. Tincture of merthiolate antiseptic and dry dressing applied. Was not admitted to sick list. 0710 Set condition of readiness III in the anti aircraft batteries and damage contro Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 153.1.

T.J. NIXON, Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy

08 to 12

0815 Mustered crew on stations, no absentees. 0821 Went to general quarters in order to set condition II, on signal from OTC. 0830 Received signal from CinCpac, "Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl". Commenced zigzagging in accordance with standard zigzag plan on signal from OTC. 0835 Went to flight quarters. 0830 Secured from general quarters, set condition II, starboard watch. 0915 Lighted fires under boilers Nos. 2,4,9,16,5,7,11,13, and 14. 0921 Maneuvering on various courses at various speeds into wind launching scouting group and combat air patrol. 0925 Cut in "B" unit and boilers Nos. 2,4,9,16, on the main steam line. 0936 Completed flight operations, resumed zigzagging. 0951 Went to general quarter on signal from OTC. 0953 Cut in "C" and "D" units, boilers Nos. 5,7,11,13, and 14 on the main steam line. 1012 Changed speed to flank, 24 knots, 210 r.p.m. on signal from OTC. 1013 Maneuvering on various courses at various speeds launching air group 1020 Completed flight operations, resumed zigzagging. 1043 Maneuvering on various courses at various speeds launching air group. 1059 Completed flight operations, changed fleet course and axis to 102° T., 094° psc, 093° stg, on signal from OTC. 1115 Secured from general quarters, set condition III, section III. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 174.7.

J. WELDEN, Ensign, U.S. Navy

12 to 16

1216 Increased speed to 20 knots, 175 r.p.m., full speed. 1245 Commenced maneuvering at various speeds on various courses to launch aircraft. [illegible] landed on flight deck and right landing gear gave away. Pilot [illegible]. Completed flight operations and went ahead full speed, 20 knots, 175 r.p.m. on course 102° T., 094° stg, 093° psc. 1320 FLUSSER left formation to investigate oil spots, results negative. 1353 All engines stopped. Commenced maneuvering at various speeds on various courses astern for stern aircraft operations. 1357 Completed launching six relief and combat patrol over the stern and went ahead on course 102° T., 094° stg, 093° psc, at 20 knots, 175 r.p.m. 1400 Secured boilers Nos. 3,6,8,10,12,15, placed on 30 minutes standby. 1427 Slowed to 15 knots, 130 r.p.m. and launched aircraft. 1514 Completed aircraft operation, having launched second day search group and went ahead full speed 20 knots, 175 r.p.m. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 162.9.

L.S. LOCKETT, Ensign, U.S. Navy

16 to 18

1620 Changed course to 210° T., 197° pstgc, 195° psc. 1633 Commenced steaming at various speeds on various courses in connection with recovering aircraft. 1644 Ceased flight operations, came to course 210° T., 197° pstgc, 195° psc, speed 22 knots, 193 r.p.m. 1720 ESTEP, E.L., 381-27-68, 2c3c, received fracture, distal end fourth metacarpal. Injury sustained when patient fell from box while taking [illegible] readings and caught finger in locker door. Treatment: immobilization by splint dressing. X-ray shows fracture. ESTEP was not admitted to sick list. 1752 Set condition Yoke on and below the second deck, ventilation systems to be left open. Commenced steaming on various courses and speeds for recovery of aircraft [illegible] steam 285. Average r.p.m. 181.9.

E. MUHLENFELD, Ensign, U.S. Navy

Approved: FREDERICK C. SHERMAN, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

Examined: O.R. DUDLEY, Commander, U.S. Navy

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ADDITIONAL SHEET

Date December 7

[illegible]

[illegible], U.S. Navy

[illegible]

[illegible], U.S. Navy.

FRED[illegible] [illegible],
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

J.R. DUDLEY,
Commander, U.S. Navy



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RESTRICTED

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP LEXINGTON (Name) CV-2 (Identification Number)

AT PASSAGE Assigned Areas, North Pacific. Monday (Day) 8 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION +10½ FREDERICK C. SHERMAN Captain U. S. Navy, Commanding.

		BY REVS.		BY LOG		Course (P. C.) Gyro Mag.	WIND		BAROMETER		TEMPERATURE				CLOUDS				SEA	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M.																				
1	193.6	22	0	21	3	170	074	24	30.00		77	71	78	c	st-cu	NW	6	30	4	NW
2	193.7	22	1	21	7	170	079	22	30.00		77	70	80	bc	st-cu	NW	2	30	4	[illegible]
3	193.6	22	0	21	8	170	070	26	30.00		77	70	80	bc	st-cu	NW	3	30	4	NW
4	193.6	22	0	21	8	170	070	25	29.97		77	71	80	bc	st-cu	NW	5	30	4	NW
5	193.8	22	0	20	9	170	072	26	29.98		78	71	80	bc	st-cu	NW	4	30	4	NW
6	193.6	22	0	21	8	170	065	23	29.97		77	71	80	bc	st-cu	NW	4	30	4	NW
7	190.1	21	7	21	1	170	090	21	30.00		78	72	78	bc	st-cu	NW	4	30	4	NW
8	182.6	20	8	20	1	170	068	22	30.00		78	72	78	bc	st-cu	NW	3	30	4	NW
9	208.1	23	8	23	5	174	075	25	30.00		78	71	78	bc	st-cu	NW	3	30	4	NW
10	208.4	23	8	23	5	174	072	23	30.00		79	72	78	bc	st-cu	NW	3	30	4	NW
11	203.6	23	2	33	6	174	070	29	29.96		80	73	78	bc	cu	NW	3	30	4	NW
12	166.3	19	0	18	5	074	067	23	29.97		80	72	80	bc	cu	NW	3	35	4	NW

Latitude	18°-3416 N.
Longitude	168°-45
Latitude	17°-10°0
Longitude	168°-2715
Latitude	17°-3910 N.
Longitude	167°-2210 W.
Current Set	
Current Drift	

Gyrocompass in Use

Error

Standard Mag. Compass

Compass No. 270

S. H. 174° T. 169° psc.

Error 5° E.

Variation 11°-15'E

Deviation 6°-15' W.

Received	None
Expended	147966
On hand	1451814

Distilled	29310
Received	None
Expended	44360
On hand	215190

Before Leaving Port

Draft for'd

Draft aft

After Entering Port

Draft for'd

Draft aft

Magazine Temperatures:

Maximum 87/86

Minimum 74/79

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1	General quarters.	Flight quarters.
2		General quarters.
3		
4	Flight Operat-	War Watches.
5	ions. War Watches.	
6	Set clocks to	
7	zone +11 time.	
8		
9		

P.M.																				
13	131.1	15	1	14	4	068	061	19	29.95		80	72	78	bc	st-cu	N	3	35	4	N
14	143.8	16	5	15	6	300	066	21	29.94		78	72	78	bc	st-cu	N	4	35	4	[illegible]
15	149.5	17	0	16	5	068	065	20	29.93		79	72	79	bc	st-cu	N	5	30	4	[illegible]
16	135.0	15	6	15	3	068	060	19	29.93		80	72	78	bc	st-cu	N	5	30	4	NE
17	142.9	16	5	15	7	068	065	19	29.93		80	72	78	bc	st-cu	N	5	30	4	[illegible]
18	130.9	15	0	14	4	068	060	21	29.95		80	77	78	o	st-cu	N	7	30	4	[illegible]
19	130.0	15	0	14	2	068	060	21	29.98		76	71	78	o	st-cu	N	10	30	4	[illegible]
20	131.0	15	1	15	5	245	065	22	29.98		76	71	78	o	st-cu	N	8	30	4	NE
21	154.2	17	5	16	8	070	070	25	29.97		78	74	78	bc	st-cu	N	3	30	4	NE
22	130.0	15	0	14	6	070	075	23	29.98		78	72	78	b c	st-cu	N	5	30	4	[illegible]
23	129.6	15	0	13	9	070	077	24	29.99		77	72	79	bc	st-cu	N	2	30	4	NE
24	173.2	19	7	18	5	070	070	26	29.96		78	71	78	bc	st-cu	N	[illegible]	30	4	NE

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

RESTRICTED

Page 1293

UNITED STATES SHIP LEXINGTON (Ship) Monday (Day) 8 (Date) December (Month) 19 41

ZONE DESCRIPTION +10½

REMARKS

00 to 04
Steaming as part of Task Force XII, OTC (ComCruScoFor-SOPA) in CHICAGO. LEXINGTON guide on course 170° T., 163° psts, 162° psc, speed 22 knots, 193 r.p.m. Boilers Nos. 1,2,4,5,7,9,11,13,14, and 16 and units "A","B","C", and "D" on the line. Ship in condition of readiness II. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 193.

E.A. ROGERS, Ensign, U.S. Navy

04 to 08
0515 Lighted fires under boilers Nos. 3,6,8,10,12,15, and cut them in on the main steam line at 0530. 0530 Went to flight quarters. 0611 Went to general quarters. 0642 Commenced steaming on various courses and speeds in connection with launching morning air patrol. 0700 Ceased flight operations and set course 170° T., 164° patgc, 163° psc. 0715 Secured from general quarters; set condition of readiness III, section I. 0728 Commenced maneuvering on various courses and speeds to recover aircraft. 0735 Ceased flight operations and set course 170° T., 164° patgc, 163° psc, full speed 22 knots, 193 r.p.m. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 190.0.

E. MURLANFELD, Ensign, U.S. Navy

08 to 12
0800 Mustered crew on stations, no absentees. 0804 Changed speed to 24 knots, 210 r.p.m. and course to 174° T., 167° stg, 168° psc. 0840 Plane 2-S-7, SBD-3, Lieutenant (jg) J.C. HUNTER, USN, pilot and LANG, E.W., 328-61-68, AM2c, crashed into the sea. Latitude 15° 30' North, Longitude 166° 50' West. Pilot and passenger took to rubber collapsible boat. DRAYTON left formation to their assistance. 0935 Sighted INDIANAPOLIS, distant 15 miles, 194° T. 1010 INDIANAPOLIS joined formation and took command of Task Force XII. 1050 Set all clocks back 1 hour to zone +11 time. 1027 Slowed speed to 22 knots, 193 r.p.m. and commenced zigzagging according to standard plan on base course 170° T., 164° stg, 163° psc. 1130 Ceased zigzagging and slowed speed to 15 knots, 130 r.p.m. 1135 Commenced maneuvering on various courses for launching aircraft. 1142 Completed launching aircraft and prepared to land aircraft. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 196.6.

R.S. LOCKETT, Ensign, U.S. Navy

12 to 16
1227 Completed flight operations, all planes returned except 2-S-7. This plane was reported down 200 miles from the ship, pilot and radioman were reported embarked safely in rubber boat by accompanying planes. Came to course 068° T., 055° stg, 056° psc. 1250 PORTER and PORTLAND left the formation and took course to westward. 1330 On signal from O.T.C. commenced zigzagging in accordance with standard zigzag plan. 1352 MAHAN reported submarine. MAHAN left formation to search for submarine. Went to flight quarters, manned all rearming stations. Executed emergency turn on signal from O.T.C. 1403 Secured boiler No. 5. 1405 On signal from O.T.C. resumed fleet course 068° fleet speed 15 knots. 1411 On signal from O.T.C. resumed zigzagging in accordance with standard plan. 1426 Maneuvering on various courses at various speeds launching anti-submarine patrol and planes of VB-2 to assist in search for personnel of 2-S-7. 1505 MAHAN rejoined formation. 1520 Completed flight operations, resumed zigzagging at 16 knots. 1529 Ceased zigzagging on signal from O.T.C., changed speed to 15 knots. 130 r.p.m. 1537 Formed cruising disposition #123 on signal from O.T.C. 1539 Went to flight quarters. 1540 Received radar contact of planes reported as enemy from CHICAGO. 1544 Changed fleet axis to 073° T., on signal. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 199.8.

A. WEBER, Ensign, U.S. Navy

16 to 18
1615 Went to general quarters. 1616 Commenced maneuvering to launch aircraft. 1649 Secured from general quarters. Set condition of readiness II. 1722 Set condition Yoke below the second deck except for ventilation. 1744 Completed maneuvering for launching and landing aircraft. Changed course to 066° T., 058° psts, 057° psc, and speed to 15 knots, 130 r.p.m. 1747 PORTLAND and PORTER sighted bearing 235° T., approaching the formation. 1800 ASTORIA, INDIANAPOLIS, and CHICAGO left the formation and disappeared bearing 250° T. The search conducted by LEXINGTON aircraft for the survivors of 2-S-7, Lieutenant (jg), J.C. HUNTER and E.W. LANGE, RM3c, was unsuccessful. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 136.

E.A. ROGERS, Ensign, U.S. Navy.

Approved: FREDERICK C. SHERMAN, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

Examined: S.H. DUDLEY, Commander, U.S. Navy, C.W.O. Navigator

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ADDITIONAL SHEET

LEXINGTON Date December 8 19 41

ASTORIA, INDIANAPOLIS, and CHICAGO left formation. 1810 passed through rain squall. 1845 Changed course to 245° T., 230° psttgo, 235° psc. 1903 secured from General Quarters. 1917 Shifted steering pump motors. 1945 Published findings and sentence of a Deck Court Martial in the case of KAWALKO, J., Pvt., USMC, Offense, Neglecting on watch, Specifications proved by plea. Sentence: to be confined for a period of 20 days and to lose pay amounting to twenty dollars ($20.00). 12-8-41 Approved by convening authority. Average steam 285. Average r.p.m. 130.5.

E. MURRAY, Ensign, U.S. Navy

KAWALKO, J., Pvt., USMC, was examined this date and found physically qualified for confinement and was confined at 2015 by order of the Captain in execution of sentence of Deck Court. 2022 Changed course left to 235° T., 227° stg, 220° psc. Also increased speed to 20 knots, 175 r.p.m. on signal from Commander Task Force XII. 2055 Changed course left to 070° T., 059° stg, 057° psc, and slowed to 15 knots, 130 r.p.m. on signal from Commander Task Force XII. 2140 KAWALKO, J., Pvt., USMC, was released from confinement while ship is at sea by order of the Captain. [illegible] left the formation to assist in search for survivors of 2-S-7 crash. [illegible] Commenced zigzagging according to standard plan on signal from Commander Task Force XII. 2340 Increased speed to 20 knots, 175 r.p.m. on signal from Commander Task Force XII. Average steam 285, average r.p.m. 140.7.

L.S. LOCKETT, Ensign, U.S. Navy

Approved: Frederick C. Sherman, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

Approved: J. H. Hurley, Commander, U.S. Navy.

EXHIBIT NO. 103

ENTERPRISE AIR GROUP

CEAG/A16/Pb/
(579)

At Sea,
December 15, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander ENTERPRISE Air Group.
To: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. ENTERPRISE

Subject: Report of Action with Japanes Air Force at Oahu, T.H., December 7, 1941.

Reference: (a) Articles 712 and 874, U.S.N. Regulations.

1. At 0615 December 7, 1941 I took off from ENTERPRISE, whose position at that time was approximately 215 miles due west of Oahu, with a mission of searching a sector 058°-095° true for a distance of 150 miles, and then to proceed to Ford Island. Ensign P. L. Teaff, USN in airplane 6-S-2 accompanied me. My passenger was Lieut-Comdr. Bromfield Nichol, USN. Tactical Officer attached to the staff of Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, who had been ordered to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet immediately after my arrival at Ford Island.

At about 0720 I sighted a tanker to starboard, proceeding on an easterly course, which upon investigation proved to be the "PAT DOHENY" of Los Angeles, belonging to the Richfield Oil Co. Continuing on my track of 090° I sighted and passed the U.S.S. THRESHER accompanied by the U.S.S. LITCHFIELD at about 0740. At about 0810 I passed Kaena Point abeam to port distance 20 miles. At 0820 passed Barber's Point to seaward and at this time I noticed approximately a squadron of planes circling Ewa Field in column. Believing them to be U. S. Army pursuit planes I gave them a wide berth, decreasing my altitude to about 800 feet and continued toward Ford Island Field. At a point mid-way between Ewa Field and Ford Island I noticed considerable "AA" fire ahead. At almost the same instant I was attacked by Japanese planes from the rear without warning. Recognizing the insignia of one plane that had completed a dive on me - I immediately dove toward the ground zig-zagging. My passenger did not have sufficient time to man the free gun. My fixed guns were loaded and charged but I had no opportunity to use them. The planes that attacked me appeared to be low-wing monoplane fighters with retractable landing gear. My wing man was attacked at the same time but was not hit and stayed with me, circling low over a cane field to the North of Pearl City. It was immediately evident that I was under AA fire regardless of which direction I went. I did not have sufficient fuel to return to the ship had I been able to get away from the island. Hoping that I would be recognized as friendly I decided to make a low approach to Ford Island Field

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Report of Action with Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T.H., December 7, 1941. (Cont'd)

- -

and land - I had no alternative it seemed. From this point on until I had landed I was subjected to heavy AA fire from ships and shore batteries in spite of making recognition maneuvers and the fact that my wheels and flaps were down for landing. My wing man turned away just prior to landing. I could not communicate with the Ford Island Field control tower. I estimate my time of landing to have been about 0835. Inspection of the plane revealed several bullet holes through the wings but no serious damage.

2. Lt.Comdr. Nichol and I then proceeded and reported to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. I informed him of the position of the ENTERPRISE and our mission.

3. Shortly after this I witnessed a dive bombing attack on the Navy Yard which appeared to be in the vicinity of Ten-Ten dock and the dry-dock. The attacking planes came in down-sun making shallow dives (about 45° - 50°). The average release heighth being about 1000', although in some cases releases were made as low as 300 - 400 feet, indicating that their bombs were armed the instant they left the rack. Approximately 18 planes participated in this attack, following each other down from the <u>same</u> direction with a considerable longer interval between drops than is our custom. However the attack was well delivered and none of the planes were seen shot down during their dive. After releasing, their evasive tactics were sound, keeping low and constantly changing course. They were subjected to heavy "AA" fire during the attack. These planes were of a yellowish - silver color, low wing monoplanes, with fixed landing gear and appeared to be similar to the Mitsubishi "Karigane" Mk.II, as illustrated in "Jane's All the Worlds Aircraft". The bombs appeared to be 500 pounders. My only criticism of this particular attack was that they all came in from the same direction instead of making a divided attack, however the ineffectiveness of our AA fire, lack of air opposition and the manner in which they pressed their attacks home in this particular instance combined to make the attack practically perfect. No further attacks were made.

4. I was then ordered to report to Commander Patrol Two or Ford Island. Upon ascertaining the number of planes from the ENTERPRISE Group that had landed safely at this time (13 planes of VS-6 and VB-6) I was ordered to send 9 planes out to search a section 330° - 030° distance 175 miles, and the remaining planes to investigate reports of hostile surface ships and sampans south of Barber's Point

ENTERPRISE Air Group

CEAG/A16/Fb/
(579)

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Report of Action with Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T.H., December 7, 1941. (Contd)

and if found, to attack with bombs and gunfire. I then obtained permission to station myself in the Ford Island Field Control Tower in order to be in direct communication with the planes and the ENTERPRISE as a Coast Guard officer was the only officer detailed to duty there. Due to the low-power of the transmitter in the tower I could at no time communicate with either. The lack of proper communication facilities, telephone and radio, were a contributory cause to the loss of 4 airplanes of VF-6, which were shot down by our own AA fire, during the night. I attempted to transmit landing instructions to them via the tower, but they were unable to hear. It was necessary for them to land due to the lack of fuel. Two of the six landed safely. I then attempted to communicate with the ENTERPRISE via the tower voice set in order to recommend that no more planes be sent in to Ford Island, without success. I then learned that the remainder of the group that had been launched had returned to the ship.

5. Lack of information that hostilities had started with Japan, proper communications, the inability of our ground and ship board forces to recognize friendly planes, or know the proper recognition signals were the contributory causes for the loss of personnel and airplanes of the ENTERPRISE Air Group.

6. No planes were equipped with self sealing tanks or armor - all guns were fully armed.

7. The suddeness and magnitude of the enemy attack caused such a stunning effect upon ground and ship personnel that all aircraft were fired upon regardless of their being friendly. I was under fire until my wheels touched the ground on Ford Island - some of the guns being not more than 50 yards distant from me. The importance of some means of positive identification of own airplanes, other than visual signals cannot be over emphasized. The loss of the four fighters of VF-6 that night is a good example of what happens unless proper communications and means of controlling and identifying aircraft in the air is available.

8. I then received orders to rejoin the ENTERPRISE at sunrise the next morning with our remaining planes. Just prior to the time of our scheduled take-off, a utility plane (JRS) took off, and was immediately fired on by ships and other shore batteries. I had previously arranged that every means available be taken to notify all hands of our scheduled

3



ENTERPRISE AIR GROUP

CEAG/A16/Pe/
(579)

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Report of Action with Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T.H., December 7, 1941. (Cont'd)

- -

departure and route to be taken to the ENTERPRISE. It was necessary to delay take-off for nearly one hour because of continuous heavy AA fire. At 0625 the remaining ENTERPRISE planes took off, armed with 1000 pound bombs and returned to the ship without further incident.

9. All personnel of this group conducted themselves in accordance with the highest traditions of the service and under the circumstances did all that they could possibly do.

10. Lieut. C. E. Dickinson, USN, Scouting Squadron Six, after having been attacked by superior numbers of Japanese planes and under constant AA fire from the ground was forced to bail out, his plane having caught fire. In the midst of the third attack on Pearl Harbor, he made his way to Ford Island Field and immediately upon arrival there manned another plane and participated in the 175 mile search flight. At this time his ordeal of having been shot down was not known to his superiors and no mention of the same was made by him to anyone at the time, he thus displaying a superb courage, stamina, devotion to duty, unexcelled logic and coolness in action. It is requested that this officer be given an official commendation for his performance of duty.

H. L. YOUNG

4

EXHIBIT NO. 104

U.S.S. LEXINGTON WAR DIARY

SECRET

December 7, 1941

LEXINGTON was at sea proceeding as part of Task Force TWELVE, ComCruDesFor (Rear Admiral J. H. Newton) in command, from Pearl Harbor, T.H., to a point bearing 130° distant 400 miles from Midway. Task Force TWELVE included CHICAGO (Flagship), PORTLAND, ASTORIA, PORTER, DRAYTON, FLUSSER, LUDLOW, MAHAN, and LEXINGTON. In addition to LEXINGTON Air Group, there was embarked Marine Scouting Squadron 231 (18 SB2U-3) under command of Major Chappel for station at Midway. The ship was keeping zone plus 10½ time, the 0800 position was latitude 23°-46' N., longitude 170°-26' W., course 285 and speed 17½ knots.

At 0822 a message was received from Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet "Air raid on Pearl. This is no drill!" Commenced zigzagging and prepared to launch combat patrol. At 0900 a message from Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet to all ships in Hawaiian waters advised that hostilities with Japan commenced with an air raid on Pearl Harbor.

At 0840 went to general quarters; started raising steam on all boilers, and warming up all units. These were ready at 0950.

At 0918 received AlNav 142 to execute WPL against Japan. The Force Commander ordered the force to be prepared to proceed to intercept the enemy. At 0930 launched 6 VF as combat patrol. At 1016 launched 11 VB. A message was intercepted from Commander Task Force EIGHT (Vice Admiral Halsey in ENTERPRISE) to Commander Task Force NINE (Vice Admiral Brown in INDIANAPOLIS) and Commander Task Force TWELVE to proceed toward a rendezvous in Latitude 32°-00' N. Longitude 162°-00' W.

At 1050 the formation changed course to 102° and the flight of the Marine Scouting Squadron to Midway was cancelled. Aircraft armament and ship ammunition details were put in war readiness. At 1051 launched 16 VSB to search a 360° sector to 165 miles. Results of search negative. At 1216 increased fleet speed to 20 knots. A contact by Radar bearing 269° distant 43 miles was investigated by the combat patrol and identified as a friendly [illegible].

At 1247 a message from Commander Task Force TWELVE advised his present intentions were to rendezvous with Task Force EIGHT at 1330 tomorrow in Latitude 21°-00' N., Longitude 162°-00' W.

U.S.S. LEXINGTON WAR DIARY

SECRET

December 7, 1941 (Cont'd)

Maintained combat patrol until dusk. At 1500 launched 17 VSB armed with 500 lb. bombs for search between bearings 043° and 162° to 175 miles. No hostile forces were sighted. Scouts sighted one unarmed and unidentified freighter in Latitude 22°-07' N., Longitude 169°-32' W. on course 260° at estimated speed of 9 knots bearing marks letter "K" on stack with a red burgee with blue margin on the bow.

A message from CommanderTaks Force EIGHT to Commander Task Force TWELVE was intercepted which indicated the most probable position of the Japanese raiders was 200 miles south of Pearl at noon possibly withdrawing toward Jaluit at a maximum speed of 27 knots and directing Task Force TWELVE to intercept and destroy them.

At 1630 changed formation course to 210° at 22 knots.

At 1840 (dusk) completed landing all planes. At 1844 formation course was changed to 170°.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

December 8, 1941

Steaming as before as part of Task Force TWELVE under orders to intercept and destroy Japanese raiding force, assumed to the heading toward Jaluit at maximum speed 27 knots, approximate course, 249° (T) from a position 240 miles south of Pearl Harbor.

At 0645 launched nine VF (fighter patrol) and sixteen VS Scouts. Scouts to search a relative sector 084° to 170°, to 315 miles. At 0730 landed 5 VF. At 0832 received message that scout "237" is making a forced landing. At 0840 plane "237", pilot Lieutenant (jg) Hunter, U.S. Navy and passenger, E.W. Lang, R.M. 2c., USN, made a forced landing in the water. Pilot and passenger reported safe in a rubber boat. The

U.S.S. LEXINGTON WAR DIARY

SECRET December 8, 1941 (Cont'd)

accompanying plane made RDF giving a bearing of 149.5° (T) from the LEXINGTON. DRAYTON was ordered to proceed to the location of the crash at best speed and left formation.

At 0941 sighted INDIANAPOLIS bearing 193° (T) distant 15 miles which had formation at 1009 when Commander Scouting Force took tactical command of Task Force TWELVE.

At 1050 set clocks to zone plus 11 time.

At 1055 sent recommendations to OTC that second search start at 1130 between bearings 126° and 193° (T) to a distance of 315 miles, pointing out that this covers enemy's speed from assumed position at noon of the 7th between 20 and 27 knots, west of a bearing 217° (T) from Pearl Harbor.

A message from Commander Task Force EIGHT intercepted at 0900 advised that enemy had withdrawn from Pearl Harbor noon yesterday and directed Task Force TWELVE to return at reasonable speed toward Pearl Harbor, if contact was not made by 1000.

At 1140 relieved the combat patrol

At 1225 completed landing 15 VS planes of first search group.

At 1230 set course 068° at 15 knots.

At 1245 lost sight of PORTLAND and PORTER bearing 268° (T), PORTLAND being delayed while homing overdue aircraft.

At 1250 was informed by OTC that CinCPac had ordered search discontinued and retirement toward Pearl.

At 1428 launched two VF combat patrol, fifteen scouts to search for survivors of "287" crash and one VS to act as inner air patrol.

At 1518 launched 4 VS armed with delay-action fuses in 500 lb. bombs for anti-submarine patrol.

At 1550 received a report by Radar from CHICAGO "Many Bandits, bearing 235° (T) distance 30 miles, closing".

3

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIRCRAFT BATTLE FORCE
U. S. S. LEXINGTON

U.S.S. LEXINGTON WAR DIARY

SECRET.

December [illegible] 1941

Went to general quarters. [illegible] crews commenced [illegible] available [illegible] 10 VF.

At 1618 received report that [illegible] had bombed Japanese cruiser and destroyer. [illegible] reported being attacked. Own fighters sent to assist found U.S. [illegible] - fighters were fired on by PORTLAND but not hit.

At 1740 completed landing all combat patrol, anti-submarine patrol and bombing squadron TWO, latter having made unsuccessful search for survivors of [illegible] crash. Ship took course 068° (T) at 15 knots.

At 1800 INDIANAPOLIS (OTC), CHICAGO, and ASTORIA left the formation at high speed toward 150° (T) and were joined by PORTLAND and PORTER which were in sight to the westward.

Received radio report Johnston Island being attacked by aircraft.

At 2055 the report of attack on Johnston Island was reported as a false alarm.

At 2140 LAMSON, upon orders from LEXINGTON, left formation to join DRAYTON in search of pilot and passenger of 2S7 in rubber boat. Ships remaining in company were LEXINGTON, MAHAN, and FLUSSER.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

December 9, 1941

INDIANAPOLIS, CHICAGO, ASTORIA, PORTLAND and PORTER were about 25 miles west southwest of LEXINGTON. DRAYTON and LAMSON were searching for survivors of crash of 2S7 to south southwestward of LEXINGTON. LEXINGTON'S course was 070° speed 20 knots.

At 0617 launched 4 VF as combat patrol. Sighted INDIANAPOLIS, CHICAGO, ASTORIA, PORTLAND and PORTER bearing 280°

U.S.S. LEXINGTON WAR DIARY

SECRET

December 9, 1941 (Cont'd)

At 0624 launched 16 VSB and 6 VF. Scouts to search a circle to 160 miles radius.

At 0755 INDIANAPOLIS and cruisers previously sighted joined LEXINGTON and the force took cruising disposition 12V, course and axis 070°, fleet speed 15 knots, zigzagging.

At 1211 launched 4 VF relief combat patrol and 14 VSB of Bombing Squadron TWO to search a sector from 1230 position bearing 023° to 117° to 180 miles.

At 1230 landed 4 VF of combat patrol, and 12 VSB of first scout group one of which (2S17) went over the side to starboard and crashed, sinking immediately in Latitude 19°-00'5' N. Longitude 163°-40.8' W. Pilot Ensign R.J.H. Weinzapfel, U.S.N.R., not recovered. Passenger recovered by U.S.S. FLUSSER.

At 1325 landed last of first search. Results of search negative.

At 1610 landed 14 VSB of second search group. Results of search revealed only one ship; the Coast Guard vessel EXPLORER.

At 1830 landed combat and anti-submarine patrol

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

December 10, 1941

Continued steaming as part of Task Force TWELVE, operating to southwest of OAHU with instructions to intercept and destroy any enemy ship in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor.

At 0130 set all clocks ahead ½ hour to zone plus 10½ time.

5

U.S.S. LEXINGTON WAR DIARY

SECRET

December 10, 1941 (Cont'd)

At 0611 launched 4 VF as combat patrol, 4 VSB as inner air patrol, 10 VSB as scouts to search 360° (T) to 60 miles; also launched 1 VSB with CIAG.

At 0843 launched 15 VSB of Marine Scouting Squadron 231 for ferry to Ewa Field, Oahu, T.H.

At 1030 landed 15 VSB and 4 VF.

At 1154 launched 4 VF for combat patrol.

At 1210 fleet course changed to 180° (T).

At 1215 launched 4 VSB as inner air patrol, launched 18 VT to search a circular area of 60 miles radius.

At 1752 landed all planes.

At 1830 changed fleet course to 270° which was held until midnight.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

December 11, 1941.

Continued as part of Task Force TWELVE operating to southwest of OAHU between 100 and 300 miles.

At 0330 DRAYTON and LAWSON joined and took station in anti-submarine screen on LEXINGTON. The Radar was out of commission due to faulty turning device for the antenna.

At 0345 changed fleet course to 000° (T) and at 0415 to 090° (T).

At 0600 launched 4 VSB as inner air patrol.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIRCRAFT. BATTLE FORCE
U. S. S. LEXINGTON

U.S.S. LEXINGTON WAR DIARY

SECRET December 11, 1941 (Cont'd)

Alnavs #149, 150, and 151 were received advising Germany and Italy had declared war on the United States and that the Navy was to execute WPL 46 against Germany and Italy in addition to Japan.

At 0626 NEOSHO, PHELPS and DesRon ONE less AYLWIN were sighted bearing 070°. Formation guide was shifted to CHICAGO and fueling disposition "12F" was taken with axis 050 and course 070°.

At 0646 launched 14 VSB for inner and intermediate air patrol, landing the dawn patrol of 4 VSB at 0707.

At 0713 took course 080° and NEOSHO maneuvered to come alongside. The sea was very rough and wind a force of 26-30 knots from 068°. A speed of 8 knots on course 085° was taken and, although 4 attempts were made to pass the tow lines, the weather prevented completion. Three times the messenger parted and on the fourth attempt the towing line was passed but the towing block tumbled and could not be righted.

At 1140 orders were received to postpone fueling efforts. NEOSHO cast off towing line and ships separated. Took speed 12 knots. Orders were intercepted from CinCPac to proceed toward Midway pending more favorable weather.

At 1247 launched the relief air patrols, 4 VSB for inner and 10 VSB for intermediate.

At 1321 landed the forenoon patrols (14 VSB) and changed course to 290° (T) at 15 knots.

At 1800 CHICAGO reported sighting two submarines. Increased speed to 22 knots while DEWEY and WORDEN proceeded to investigate.

At 1832 resumed fleet speed.

At 1908 changed fleet course to 000° and at 1923 DEWEY and WORDEN rejoined from the southeast.

At 2100 changed course to 290° (T) from 2120 to 2147 received Radar reports of one aircraft which passed to eastward of the force on reported course about 220 at 165 knots.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding

7

U.S.S. LEXINGTON WAR DIARY

SECRET

December 12, 1941

Continued operating as part of Task Force TWELVE in a general southwesterly direction from OAU, withdrawing toward Midway while seeking suitable weather and sea conditions to refuel the force from NEOSHO.

At 0547 changed fleet course to north.

At 0618 launched 14 VSB to form inner and intermediate air patrols while fueling. Fueling course 050° speed 8 knots. Took radio direction finder bearing on a patrol plane reported landed on the water southwest of Barbers Point. At 0745 ASTORIA and DRAYTON left the formation proceeding toward south southeast. At 0913 CHICAGO commenced refueling from NEOSHO. 1006 launched relief air patrols, 12 VT, and landed first patrols at 1100. At 1151 INDIANAPOLIS reported sighting a torpedo wake, maneuvered to east at flank speed for 9 minutes when resumed station. At 1210 PORTLAND reported sighting a submarine bearing 200° from LEXINGTON. Headed to east at flank speed for 5 minutes to avoid area. A search of areas by destroyers and aircraft failed to locate any submarine. At 1235 attempts to refuel the force were discontinued due to temporary damage to fueling gear when CHICAGO cast off hurriedly upon report of submarine activity.

At 1334 launched relief intermediate and inner air patrols and at 1350 landed second patrol groups. At 1530 PORTER, LAWSON, and MAHAN proceeded toward Pearl Harbor. At 1749 landed all planes (14 VSB) of third air patrol group, the force withdrawing to southward and southwestward. At 2310 course was changed to 135° and at 2335 to 080°.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

8

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIRCRAFT, BATTLE FORCE
U. S. S. LEXINGTON

U.S.S. LEXINGTON WAR DIARY

SECRET

December 13, 1941

Continued as a unit of Task Force TWELVE operating to southwest of OAHU. Proceeding toward Pearl Harbor at 20 knots.

At 0615 launched 14 VSB for inner and outer air patrol.

At 1138 commenced launching the air group armed with 500 lb. bombs on VSB, torpedoes on VT, and 100 lb. bombs on VF for ferry to Ford Island, completing launch at 1211.

The LEXINGTON was about to enter the swept channel to the entrance when orders were received not to enter and to remain to southward. The force proceeded southward and westward until 1450 when the approach to enter was commenced at 25 knots.

At 1621 a plane on patrol indicated a submarine about 2 miles to eastward of LEXINGTON. Destroyers dropped 6 depth charges in this area while LEXINGTON continued at 25 knots to entrance.

At 1649 passed entrance buoy to Pearl Harbor, proceeded to Berth F-9 where completed moor, port side to at 1853.

At 1930 a submarine alarm in harbor caused some disturbance but logistic refueling, and replenishing gasoline tanks, and revictualling continued.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding

9

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIRCRAFT BATTLE FORCE
U.S.S. LEXINGTON

U.S.S. LEXINGTON, FLAGSHIP

SECRET

December 14, 1941

At 1357 (Zone plus 10½) got underway from berth F-9 [illegible] Pearl Harbor to join Task Force ELEVEN under orders to raid Japanese forces in Jaluit Island in order to relieve Japanese pressure on WAKE Island and to cover operations of Task Force FOURTEEN (SARATOGA) which was to escort supplies and reenforcements to Wake.

After clearing harbor approach channel, landed all planes of the LEXINGTON Air Group. Available planes included 21 F2A, 32 SBD, and 15 TBD. All planes were on board by 1745 when the ship proceeded to southwestward joining the following ships to form Task Force ELEVEN:

INDIANAPOLIS (ComScoFor, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, USN, commanding Task Force ELEVEN).
CHICAGO (ComCruScoFor, Rear Admiral J. H. Newton, USN)
PORTLAND, [illegible] (ComDesRon ONE), ALDWIN (ComDesDiv TWO), DEWEY (ComDesDiv ONE), DALE, [illegible], FARRAGUT, WORDEN, [illegible], [illegible] and the Fleet oil tanker NEOSHO.

The force proceeded to southwestward at 15 knots during the remainder of the night.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

December 15, 1941.

Continued with Task Force ELEVEN to southwestward at 15 knots. During the day maintained inner air patrol of 6 VSB planes armed with one 500 lb. bomb fused with A.S. fuse. Landed all planes at 1700.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIRCRAFT BATTLE FORCE
U S S LEXINGTON

U.S.S. LEXINGTON WAR DIARY

SECRET

December 6, 1941

Continued operating with Task Force SEVEN proceeding to the southwestward from OAHU. Strong wind from northeast with intermittent rain squalls and variable visibility. At 0618 launched 12 VSB to search the semi-circle ahead of the formation to a distance of 100 miles between bearings 150° and 330°.

At 0757 a contact report was received from plane 232, Ensign Whittier pilot, that enemy carrier bore 210° distant 95 miles from the 0745 position of point option. No amplifying reports were received and it was assumed that plane in contact had been shot down. At 0813 launched 10 VF combat patrol and at 0924 launched attack group composed of 18 VSB, 7 VF and 13 VT. At 0933 landed 232 and 233 who reported the course about 205 at very slow speed. Both planes dropped 500 lb. bombs but both missed. The position was Latitude 12°-54' Longitude 165°-10'W. Further questioning brought out that there was no anti-aircraft fire that no personnel were sighted and the ship seemed dead in the water. It was then concluded that the object reported was probably a barge loaded with dynamite reported adrift on December 8, 328 miles to windward of the contact. The attack group failed to locate the object, returned and was recovered at 1325. A scouting group of 10 VSB were launched to locate the object previously contacted but were unable to locate it. A fighter combat patrol was maintained until 1645, the 18 VSB were ordered by visual to take intermidiate air patrol from 1500 until they were landed at 1700.

Upon contact the NEOSHO had been ordered to continue on course 240° at 13 knots while the remainder of the Task Force operated on easterly and southerly courses. A course to rejoin the NEOSHO was taken at 20 knots.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

U. . . [illegible]

SECRET

December 17, 1941

Continued with Task Force [illegible] southwestward to rejoin NEOSHO. At 0621 launched 10 VS[illegible] to search the sector between bearings 180° and 220° to 100 miles. At 0830 planes reported message drop [illegible] position of the NEOSHO. The CTC was advised that she bore 211° (T) distant 41 miles. The 10 VS[illegible] took up intermediate air patrol.

At 1330 launched 12 VS[illegible] to search a 360° sector to 50 miles for the NEOSHO. At 1717 landed the search group which reported no sight of NEOSHO.

FREDERICK C. [illegible]AN,
Captain, U. . Navy,
Comman ing.

December 18, 1941

Continued with Task Force [illegible]LVIN toward southwestward. At 0618 sighted NEOSHO on the horizon bearing 010°. At 1710 launched 12 VS[illegible] to search the western semi-circle between bearings 180° and 360° to 75 miles. At 0700 took course 110° into wind for fueling and at 0800 NEOSHO came alongside starboard side for fueling. At 0920 the search group returned and took up intermediate air patrol. At 1342 launched 13 VS[illegible] as intermediate air patrol to search western semi-circle to 100 miles returning ½ hour prior sunset. Flight operations took place while refueling from NEOSHO. At 1438 the NEOSHO cast off having delivered gasoline and fuel oil. The afternoon patrol was landed at 1802. An OpNav report was received that Japanese forces had occupied Makin Island in the Gilbert Island group and that a "Yokahama" seaplane tender with 3000 ton aV was based at Butaritari. Also that Arawa Island may have been occupied; that the Japanese submarine commander was at Jaluit and that the commander of AirRon 24 with DesDiv [illegible] and CarDiv [illegible] was based at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshalls.

Received a despatch to the effect that Vice Admiral [illegible] had assumed the duties of Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral [illegible]. Kimmel, relieved.

FREDERICK C. [illegible]AN,
Captain, U. . Navy,
Comman ing.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIRCRAFT BATTLE FORCE
U. S. S. LEXINGTON

U.S.S. LEXINGTON WAR DIARY

SECRET

December 19, 1941

Continued with Task Force ELEVEN to southwestward from Hawaiian Islands. Launched 11 VSB to search the western semi-circle to 100 miles. Thereafter maintained intermediate air patrol. At early daylight took course 100° into wind while PORTAND and CHICAGO refuled from NEOSHO. At 1300 launched 12 VSB to search the western semi-circle to 100 miles. The radioman of one plane reported sighting what he thought was a strange plane in latitude 7°-50' N, Longitude 170°-50' W. At 1400 zone plus 11 time on course about 255°. This report was unconfirmed by the pilot and was considered unreliable. At 1553 discontinued air patrols and landed all planes. At 2030 refueling of the force having been completed, proceeded to west-southwestward at 17 knots; NEOSHO left formation.

Received warning as to fishing vessels rendering aid to enemy forces, with directions to examine, seize or sink vessels engaging in such activities. A message was received that Task Force EIGHT (ENTERPRISE) left Pearl Harbor at 1000 to proceed to westward of Johnston Island as a support group.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy.
Commanding.

December 20, 1941

Continued with Task Force ELEVEN proceeding to west southwest for conducting raid on Japanese forces in Marshall and/or Gilbert Islands. At 0616 launched 12 VSB to search to westward between bearings 150° to 330°, to 150 miles, and to act as intermediate air patrol. At 1340 launched afternoon flight to carry out intermediate air patrol and search of the western semi-circle to 150 miles.

At 1600 a message from Commander Task Force ELEVEN indicated his intentions to carry out attack plan "A" at 0500 zone plus 12 time on Monday, 22 December 1941. This involved an attack on Japanese forces at Makin and Tarawa Islands by LEXINGTON Air Group. At 1620 orders were received that present

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIRCRAFT, BATTLE FORCE
U. S. S. LEXINGTON

U.S.S. LEXINGTON WAR DIARY

SECRET

December 20, 1941

mission was cancelled and that present attack orders were no longer in effect. A later despatch advised that CincPac reported strong air reinforcements possibly including two carriers were being sent to the Marshalls; that the possibility of surprise attack by this force was improbable, and that CincPac had directed this force to proceed to a position to support Task Force FOURTEEN (SARATOGA).

The afternoon search group was recovered at 1754. Fleet course was set 350°(T) speed 16 knots at 1758. Changed clocks to zone plus 12 time at 1900.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

December 21, 1941

Continued with Task Force ELEVEN to north-northwestward to reach a position to support Task Force FOURTEEN.

Weather at dawn was unsuitable for extended search. The usual 150 mile search was modified to an intermediate air patrol which was maintained throughout the day.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIRCRAFT BATTLE FORCE
U. S. S. LEXINGTON

U.S.S. LEXINGTON WAR DIARY

SECRET

December 22, 1941

Continued as before. At 0400 a message from Commander-in-Chief Pacific advised Wake has been attacked by carrier type aircraft at 1300 on December 21. At 0544 fleet course was changed from 325° to 297° and speed was increased to 18 knots. At 0622 twelve VSB were launched to search the western semi-circle to 150 miles, results negative.

At 0850 a message was received from the Task Force Commander that the Force was directed to retire toward Pearl. Upon the return of the forenoon search group at 1000 the Force changed course to 004° heading for a rendezvous with the force tanker, NEOSHO, and escort WORDEN, in latitude 18°-00' N. longitude 178°-00' W.

A six plane combat patrol was maintained between 1030 and 1400. At 1340 twelve VSB were launched to search the northern semi-circle to 150 miles. These returned and were landed at 1700, results of search: NEOSHO and WORDEN located to ENE.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIRCRAFT BATTLE FORCE
U. S. S. LEXINGTON

U.S.S. LEXINGTON, AR D/M

SECRET

[illegible], 1941

Continued with Task Force [illegible] to northward to rendezvous with Fleet Tanker, [illegible]. At 0610 launched 1-VS + for search, first to locate and report [illegible], then to cover the northern semi-circle to 10[illegible] miles, and on return to search the southern semi-circle to 100 miles. At 0700 NEOSHO joined. Weather being too rough to operate cruiser seaplanes, launched 2-VT as inner air patrol at 75%. Fleet fueling course 080° was set at speed 6 knots. At 0930 NEOSHO approached and by 1030 towline was secured. At 1100 wind having hauled ten degrees left, changed course to 070° to launch and land planes. Launched 8-VS as intermediate and 2-VT as inner air patrol and landed the morning search and patrol group. At 1 00 towline to NEOSHO parted due to rough weather. Discontinued efforts to refuel.

At 1310 received report that plane [illegible] 16 had crashed about fourteen miles to north of LEXINGTON. Pilot, Lieut. (jg) J. A. Davis, jr., U.S.N. and passenger V. J. Schmidt, R.M.3c., U.S.N., were not seen to leave the plane which sank. Position of crash Latitude 18°-41' N. Longitude 177°-33' W. Accompanying plane on its return reported that 2316 was testing its machine guns by firing into the water on a dive; that apparently on its pull-out, one wing touched the water. The plane went over on its back and sank in a few minutes with no signs of life of its occupants. LEXINGTON with its [illegible] proceeded at full speed to scene of crash, found nothing and resumed formation.

At 1400 set Fleet course 080° and speed [illegible]. Launched 8-VS for intermediate and 2-VT for inner air patrol, and at 1440 landed mid-day patrols.

At 1640 landed afternoon patrols.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.



U.S.S. LEXINGTON WAR DIARY

December 7th, 1941

Continued as part of Task Force 11 proceeding toward Pearl Harbor awaiting favorable sea conditions for refueling. At 0635 upon orders of Task Force Commander fueling was delayed indefinitely pending better weather conditions. Launched 12 VSB for search of circular area to 100 miles from fleet center. Launched and maintained 2 VF as inner air patrol throughout the day. Damage to rotor winding of after main motor on #1 shaft reduced available full power to an estimated 30 knots. Fleet course 065° at 15 knots was maintained. At 1000 launched 1 VF as intermediate air patrol and landed morning search group. At 1200 the force took an evading course to the south for 4 miles when LALS reported submerged object located by supersonic. Inner air patrol searched with negative results. At 1300 launched 12 VSB for search of circular area to 100 miles from fleet center. At 1600 the force took an evading course to northwestward for 4 miles when PHELPS reported submerged object located by supersonic. Inner air patrol searched area but sighted no submarine. At 1700 landed the afternoon search and patrol group.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

U.S.S. LEXINGTON (CV-2)

SECRET

December 25, 1941

As before cruising with Task Force 8 [illegible] on course 085° approaching Pearl Harbor. At 0430 received [illegible] plus 11 time. At 0644 launched 12 VSB to search area to 100 miles. At 1022 a PBY was sighted 10 miles westward proceeding from south to north. Maintained an intermediate air patrol using VF from 1030 to 1700. Launched search group at 1100. A message from Commander-in-Chief to OpNav was intercepted announcing the arrival of Rear Admiral C. W. Nimitz at Pearl Harbor. At 1543 took evasive action 4 miles noth due to a supersonic contact reported by DENT. At 1830 fleet course was changed to 110°.

FREDERICK C. [illegible],
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

EXHIBIT NO. 105

SECRET

PARAPHRASE OF CODE CABLEGRAM RECEIVED AT THE WAR DEPARTMENT AT 14:33, OCTOBER 21, 1941.

London. Filed 19:20, October 21, 1941.

JAPAN

1. It is thought that Japan will not advance southward, *except* possibly Thailand, because of the danger of becoming embroiled with the United St and Britain, especially in view of the firm stand taken by the U. S. How Japanese troops will be strengthened in Indo-China as follows: 36,000 t now; an estimated 20,000 enroute, and an additional 20,000 included in anese plans.

2. Agreement among all previously divergent opinions in the army navy in order to make certain of their assistance in any future pro launched is one aim of the new cabinet, which is unquestionably geared war. The new Premier is wholly pro-German. It is believed that the will advance on Vladiavostok and the Maritime Provinces the minute S disintegration appears imminent. In the mean time, speeches by the cabinet should be viewed as obscuring their real intent. The Russians still believed stronger in Siberia in spite of possible transfers of troops to other theaters, but the Maritimes and Vladiavostok unquestionably coul captured by the Japs.

3. The above comments were received from the Chief of the British East Intelligence.

RUSSIAN THEATER

1. The head of the British Mission is now stranded in Kuibishev and is well in touch with the situation.

2. Budyenny is apparently relieved of command in the Ukraine if news Marshal Kulik has been made commander at Rostov is true.

3. The Germans have extended their front approximately 12 miles n of Taganrog. An advance from Kalinin toward the north has been b by the Germans, possibly directed at Vologda and the railroad running s from Archangel, according to dependable secret reports. Otherwise, there no important developments in this theater which have been verified by Br official sources.

4. The above cable is for General Miles' personal attention.

L
I. B. #5, 10/22/

Distribution:

Under Secretary of War	State Department (2)
Assistant Secretary of War for Air	Director of Naval Intelligence (
Assistant Secretary of War	Record Section
Chief of the Air Corps (3)	Section File
Chief of the Army Air Forces	Situation Section
A. C. of S., G-3	EE
A. C. of S., WPD	CE
G. H. Q.	FE

PARAPHRASE OF CODE RADIOGRAM RECEIVED AT THE WAR DEPARTMENT AT 1
NOVEMBER 9, 1941

London, November 9, 1941 (filed 5:10p) (1045)

The most likely spot where Japanese may be expected to strike is in Netherlands East Indies. This opinion, from the British Ambassador to T holds that as Japan already controls what she needs of the resources of Fr Indo-China and Thailand she will not proceed against the latter country. attack British Malaya would be a difficult operation and the rumored Bu Road drive would also be too much of an effort. The Netherlands East I could be assaulted secretly from the Mandated Island, and would provide oil which Japan needs. The source reverses his previous view and now bel

Japan no longer feels that she must make every effort to avoid war with the United States and this contemplated operation would confront the United States and the British with an accomplished fact.

LEE.

IB #4 11/10/41

Distribution:

Secretary of War
Under Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War for Air
Mr. Lauchlin Currie
Chief of the Army Air Forces
Director of Naval Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD
China Mission
Office of Lend-Lease Administrator
G. H. Q.
State Department
Chief of the Air Corps
Situation Section
British Empire Section
Far Eastern Section

G–2 COMMENT ON NOVEMBER 9 CABLE FROM LONDON
(IB #4 11/10/41)

1. G–2 is of the opinion that while an attack on the Netherlands East Indies is a possibility, it is by no means probable in view of: (1) the action to be expected of the United States and Britain before even a surprise attack could be driven home: (2) the great danger to Japan of trying to by-pass the Philippines and Singapore: (3) the knowledge Japanese must have that the Dutch have prepared their oil installations for immediate demolition, so that it would be a year or more before they could get the oil anyway.

2. It is significant that the Ambassador has reversed his former view and no longer believes that Japan will do everything possible to prevent war with the United States. Such a development is not unexpected.

PARAPHRASE OF CODE RADIOGRAM RECEIVED AT THE WAR DEPARTMENT AT 22:42, NOVEMBER 21, 1941

London, November 21, 1941 (filed 0045 p. m.)

In order that the source may be protected do not reveal to the British that you have received the following information.

The estimate given below represents the consensus of all British intelligence services as to Japan, on the basis of all information available up to November 18:

Whether or not the government at Tokyo has decided once and for all to take the chance of war with America and Great Britain is still not certain, but Japan's economic situation is making it necessary to come to such a decision. By initiating the present talk, Japan had hopes of discovering some solution to the problem. Now that she has sent her special envoy, the conversations are coming to a head and the chances are that she will make a basic decision of the policy she will follow.

As things stand now, the only action she can take without danger of war with America and Great Britain is to settle the China incident and her alternatives here are (1) block the Burma Road; (2) come to a peaceful settlement with Chungking. From the best available information at present, it does not appear probable that Japan will launch an offensive against the Burma Road.

In the event the current talks come to nothing and if she then makes a decision to go ahead without regard to the consequences of war with the ABD powers, Japan has the alternatives of offensives against (1) *Thailand*. The tin and rubber producing areas are in the vicinity of the Kra Isthmus which would no doubt be defended by the British so that economically, Japan would not get much by occupying Thailand, and she stands to lose much of what she is already getting from that country.

(2) *Malaya*. Japan will certainly occupy Thailand before attacking Malaya, but any drive on the latter country would certainly involve Japan in war with Great Britain and very likely with America also.

(3) *Netherlands East Indies.* It is estimated that Japan has enough oil supplies to last for only nine to twelve months of large scale operations, so that seizure of the Netherlands East Indies would solve a most urgent problem for her. But such a move would not be sound naval strategy and furthermore Japan must know any such attack would bring on war with America and Great Britain. The British believe Japan would occupy Thailand before moving on Netherlands Borneo anyway.

(4) *Soviet Siberia.* Here the main consideration is that Japan is not yet strong enough to start an attack which would undoubtedly cost her plenty in casualties and matériel, and might take a long time. In spite of her offensive preparations, including increase of troops in this area from eleven to 29 divisions, Japan will probably not attack the Maritime Provinces unless and until Russian strength is considerably diminished there.

The estimate concludes that:

(1) In the event of failure of her last attempt to get America to come to a general agreement, Japan will have to make up her mind as to whether she should chance the war which would likely follow further aggressive action on her part;

(2) Japan will probably not attack Siberia at present; she will wait until Soviet strength is decreased;

(3) Japan will continue the war with China except in the event of a general agreement with the United States;

(4) Japan's movement of troops from Tongking to the south indicates that she does not intend at present to try cutting the Burma Road;

(5) From the Japanese viewpoint, her best move, the one with least chance of bringing on a general war, would probably be occupation of Thailand. Securing bases in Siam would also pave the way for later movement against Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies. Furthermore, a Japanese drive into Thailand is indicated by her recent movements.

LEE.

IB #18 4:15P 11/21/41

Distribution:

Assistant Secretary of War	State Department
Assistant Secretary of War for Air	Mr. Lauchlin Currie
Chief of the Army Air Forces	Office of Lend-Lease Administrator, O. E. M.
Chief of the Air Corps	Director of Naval Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	Situation Section
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD	Air Section
G. H. Q.	British Empire Section
4th Army	Far Eastern Section.
China Mission	

[Pencilled notation:] Return to C of S. HLS.

[Pencilled notation:] To Secretary of War. GCM.

BRITISH EMBASSY ANNEX,
Observatory Circle, Washington, D. C., 22nd November, 1941.

Subject:—Japanese Intentions.

SIR: The Joint Staff Mission has received from the British Chief of Staff the following telegraphic summary of an estimate by the Joint Intelligence Committee in London of Japan's probable intentions.

We are instructed to invite you to draw the attention of the United States Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations to this appreciation.

Respectfully,

(Signed) R. D. COLERIDGE,
Commander, R. N.
R. F. G. JAYNE,
Major.
Joint Secretaries,
British Joint Staff Mission in Washington.

Commander L. R. McDOWELL,
U. S. Secretary for Collaboration,
Room 2724, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF ESTIMATE BY J. I. C., LONDON, OF JAPANESE INTENTIONS

1. It is not certain that Japan has reached a decision to risk conflict with Britain and U. S. A., but events are driving her to early decision. Japan hopes that present conversations in Washington may provide a way out. The climax of the conversations now reached by KURUSU'S arrival and fundamental decision on policy is likely to follow their outcome. Meanwhile only course open to Japan which she may think would not involve a risk of war with us and United States is to try to finish war in China.

2. To end China war Japan must either make peace with CHIANG-KAI-SHEK or stop his supplies by cutting BURMA ROAD. Two routes of attack possible. Shortest is from TONGKING to KUNMING, but terrain makes this a very difficut operation. Longer route westward of KWANSI province feasible but operation would take longer time than Japan prepared to give. Latest intelligence indicates that southward movement of forces from TONGKING and CANTON suggest major operation against BURMA ROAD unlikely at present.

3. If Washington conversations fail and Japan decides to proceed irrespective of risk of war with Britain, U. S. A. and Netherlands East Indies, she may attack—

(a) THAILAND,
(b) MALAYA,
(c) NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES,
(d) MARITIME PROVINCES.

4. *THAILAND.* Japan's infiltration into THAILAND and building of communications in Indo China, construction of aerodromes, work on Naval base at CAMRANH BAY, indicates preparation for move into THAILAND. Japan would consider this move least likely to involve action by ourselves and U. S. A. Main strategic advantage only gained if KRA ISTHMUS occupied simultaneously with land move from INDO CHINA. Little economic advantage to Japan in occupation of THAILAND but object of attack would be to secure important bases for further move south.

5. *MALAYA.* Occupation of THAILAND leads logically to attack on MALAYA. This would be certain to involve ourselves probably U. S. A.

6. *NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.* Capture of Dutch BORNEO would remedy Japan's most urgent shortage i. e. oil. Operation would however be strategically unsound from naval point of view and Japan would think it would involve conflict with us and U. S. A. We believe attack would be preceded by occupation of THAILAND.

7. *RUSSIAN MARITIME PROVINCES.* Since beginning of Russian campaign Japanese forces facing Russia increased from 11 to 29 Divisions. Only interest Japan would have in attacking Russia would be the removal of traditional enemy. Operation would be long and expensive if Russian resistance were maintained. Japan now lacks sufficient superiority to make offensive operations against Russia probable unless Russian forces are weakened.

8. *CONCLUSIONS.*

(a) Japan will make last effort at agreement with U. S. A. Decision whether or not to take aggressive action involving major powers would follow failure of conversations.

(b) If such decision is taken THAILAND will be first probable objective involving least risk of major conflict. Occupation of bases in THAILAND including KRA ISTHMUS is a sound strategic preliminary culminating in operation against MALAYA or NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. Recent military movements support opinion that THAILAND is next objective.

(c) Action against Russia likely to be deferred until position of Russia in Far East is seriously weakened.

(d) Operation in China will continue in absence of a general agreement with U. S. A.

(e) Early attack on BURMA ROAD is unlikely in view of latest information of diversion of forces southward from NORTHERN INDO CHINA and CANTON.

EXHIBIT NO. 106

Section A: Admiral H. R. Stark's Letters to Admiral H. E. Kimmel (2144 to 2225).

Section B: Admiral H. E. Kimmel's Letters to Admiral H. R. Stark (2225 to 2257).

SECTION A

Confidential

13 JANUARY 1

DEAR MUSTAPHA: There are things to be said in here which are strictly entr and therefore I suggest you destroy this letter after reading.

I have given you a few days to let sink in the news of your becoming CinC Fleet. I would have given my eye teeth to have seen your expression and t heard your exclamation when it happened, but instead I was just sitting l the scenes congratulating you and the Navy. I confess it came sooner t had anticipated but that it should come, I have long had in the back of my and while rejoicing with you I realize fully the enormous responsibilities on your shoulders in one of the most critical periods in our history, and whe Navy more than any other branch of the Government is likely to have t the brunt.

I would give a good deal to sit down and have a chat with you. I am l J. O. will turn over the personal letters I have written him. They give s slants here that I know and they show the urgency as I see it. In my h opinion, we may wake up any day with some mines deposited on our fron step or with some of our ships bombed, or whatnot, and find ourselves in a undeclared war, the ramifications of which [2] call for our stronge sanest imagination and plans.

I have told the Gang here for months past that in my opinion we were h straight for this war, that we would not assume anything else and persor do not see how we can avoid, either having it thrust upon us or of our d ately going in, many months longer. And of course it may be a matter of or of days. I would like to feel that I could be perfectly complacent if son some one opens the door of my office and reports that the war is on. I hav moving Heaven and Earth trying to meet such a situation and am terribly tient at the slowness with which things move here. Even though I know has been accomplished, there still remains much to be done.

My estimate of the situation—J. O. R. can give you this—McCrea also copy—which I presented to the Secretary and Rainbow 3, both of whic should have, will give you fairly clearly my own thoughts. Of course I want to become involved in the Pacific, if it is possible to avoid it. I have t this out time and time again in the highest tribunals but I also fully realiz we may become involved in the Pacific and in the Atlantic at the same tim to put it mildly, it will be one H--- of a job, and that is one reason why thankful that I have your calm judgment, your imagination, your courage guts and your head, at the seagoing end. Also your CAN DO—rather *can't*.

In King, I believe you have the very best possible man to handle the sit in the Atlantic and that we can give him a free rein. He will lick thing shape and he knows the game from every standpoint and of course in thi it will be [3] fought from every standpoint. On the other si Tommy Hart—I feel equally confident.

I believe in Walter Anderson you have a good man to handle the Battl but I do not commit myself one inch beyond that. Any future advanc beyond that position will depend largely on your recommendation but he s fight a good fight right there, whether or not he goes up. It is unfortun some ways that we could not get the additional stars and rank we wanted Atlantic but we could not and consequently the accommodations had to be in the Pacific. With this you are familiar. Of course Andy feels disapp but he is a good soldier. However, when we mentioned the possibility relieving Snyder next June, I informed him that I would not commit myse that I could not think of committing you, and incidentally, and very incide and in all cases, the White House finally decides. This, of course, is House prerogative and responsibility, and believe me, it is used these days.

I hope Wilson Brown does well. He is fine fiber, as you know. Fran had some misgivings about his health and had him brought to the Navy D ment for a thorough checkup by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. It

necessary that anybody, beside you, should know this. Medicine and Surgery gave him a perfectly clean bill of health but I do think he should be watched while under strain and if there is any sign of his not being able to stand it, he should be relieved. Again, I am giving just you my thoughts. The President knows that I initiated this physical checkup because of my doubts, but beyond just a few of us, it is not known.

[4] What Peck Snyder's final reactions will be, I don't know. We wanted to run this whole schedule differently but our hand was forced. I have always regarded him with a good deal of admiration because of a feeling that above all things he was loyal and would play the game in the last analysis as it had to be played and as you and I have to do. Here's hoping.

I am sending you Savvy Cooke and I feel like I am losing one of my arms. That boy has one of the best brains I have ever run into. I put on his efficiency report that I would make him an Admiral immediately, if I had the authority and believe me, if he were one, I would not consent to his going. I am sending him to sea to protect his promotion chances and am sending him to the Fleet Flagship because of his intimate knowledge and personal handiwork in all that we have done in War Plans and in all that we have been thinking. I feel that he should have a year in command, although were I going to sea myself I would be strongly inclined to take him on my staff. Where we put him he should be available to you in both capacities. His capacity for work is almost unlimited and in addition to all his other fine attributes, I have formed a very strong affection for him, as we all have. He is just as likeable as he can be. Should his ship go to the Navy Yard and you would like to keep him with you during any such periods, it could be arranged.

I am also enclosing a letter to you which I wrote to Tommy Hart and which I am pleased to say he stated gave him a clearer picture of his own situation than even he himself had formed on the spot. That is my excuse for sending it.

Murphy, who is on Richardson's staff, has been with us on three different occasions and is likewise pretty familiar with [5] our thoughts back here.

I have directed McCrea to stop and see you on his return from the Philippines although he can probably add little to what Murphy can tell you. On the other hand I would be glad to have you have a long talk with McCrea that we may get from you any first-hand material you want to send.

Nimitz has written J. O. with regard to several matters which explain themselves so there is no need for repetition on my part.

J. O. has been thoroughly acquainted with the personnel situation. He knows that it has been one of my first thoughts ever since I have been there, as well as Nimitz, and that I have put more time and struggle on it in the White House and on the Hill than on any other one subject.

I am home at the moment laid up with "flu" and have been busy with Mrs. Hull a good share of the afternoon, it now being ten minutes of six and Charlie Wellborn just came in with the mail so I will close. Were I to write you volumes and I feel like it, I doubt if I could add much that you will not realize without my writing.

Just remember that I consider the only reason for my being alive and kicking at the present time is to do everything within my power to serve the Fleet, and I want you to write me fully, frankly, critically, and just think out loud on all subjects wherein the Department can be of help. Nimitz and I are absolutely at one in our common desire to serve and I wish you *all* the luck in the wide world.

[6] Finally you will be glad to know that there is a great deal of fine and favorable comment on your selection from all sides. I have had letters from Admiral Senn and Admiral Craven among others, not to mention the reaction here in Washington.

Again good luck and keep cheerful and God Bless You.

BETTY.

You know how I believe in conferences—keeping your key people informed—taking them into your confidence, and thrashing out common problems—no bulkheads—and here again, I know you will accomplish much.

Again good luck.

Rear Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
USS HONOLULU,
c/o Postmaster Fleet Post Office,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: The following is a telephone call to one of my Aides when I happened to be out:

> "Admiral Train said that the Navy Relief has received no money from the Fleet during the Year 1940. He wondered if it might not be a good idea for you, as President, to ask CinC whether or not a sum may be expected, in view of the necessity of making up the Society's Annual Report."

Can you give me the answer?

Of course you probably have all the "ins" and "outs" by this time of Snyder's stand with reference to his being detached and on which he insisted.

It is over the dam and I won't say anything more about it.

However, you have Pye in his place. I hope the change is an acceptable one to you. Personally I think he may be of even more assistance to you and I told the President you might even want to keep him on after July.

I have always thought Pye one of the soundest strategists we have and when I worked under him during my last cruise, which I often did at one end or the other of the line, I thought his handling of tactical situations outstanding. Particularly were his orders a model of clearness, brevity and effectiveness.

Who gets the Battle Force next June will be largely dependent upon your recommendations. Of course Andy is much interested but I told him flatly that I would promise him nothing, that he was getting a great job where he was going and that the future was largely in the lap of the Gods and Admiral Kimmel.

It always sort of hits me with a thud when people are planning ahead and looking for something in advance rather than giving all they have to the job in hand. Andy happens to be one of those fellows who does give all he has to the job in hand, but my feeling has always been that the job should seek the man rather than the reverse. Thank the Lord that Nimitz agrees with me and if people understood that it has to be that way in the last analysis, it would save a lot of correspondence and delicate situations here.

One of the biggest kicks I got out of your present job was that it was a complete surprise to you and has the overwhelming approval of the Service.

I confess my own job here was something I had not dreamed of. Incidentally, I told Bloch when I expected to stay at sea and he was talking to me about getting three stars or more, that if I was of use anywhere it would be another year right in the billet where I had trained for a year, and as far as I was concerned the only thing that should count was the best interest of the Fleet, that was also would be my best interest, and that I would serve cheerfully anywhere under anybody. That is the kind of a gang I hope you have around you.

Started this just to send you Train's remarks and have gone into something else. Lord, I wish I could see you, or better still, that I could be with you. I would take most any old job down to the lowliest division in the outfit.

Every good luck in the wide world and "keep cheerful."

As every sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, *U. S. Navy,*
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 29 January 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is really a P. S. to my note of this morning.

I just want to let you know I am pressing all I can to take over the Coast Guard and that at last pressure is beginning to tell and I am hopeful I may be able to after the Lend-Lease Bill is out of the road. Please don't mention this to anyone but just keep it in the back of your head as one of those things which might be coming along.

The above is incidental to what I did want to tell you and which you might mention to Bloch and that is I have asked Waesche to exert unusual and continuing vigilance in searching all fishermen, both on home coasts and in the islands, under the guise of looking for narcotics — —; actually to insure against any secreted Japanese mines.

Am still fighting for personnel—I shouldn't have to—but I am—
When I think what I have to go through for almost every additional man for the Navy—and the Army building up to 1½ millions—it just doesn't make sense—

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, *USN*,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 30 January 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Take it for what it is worth.
Copies also to Admiral Bloch, Blakeley, Hepburn, Freeman, King, Hart.

KD

Tokyo
Dated January 28, 1941
Rec'd. 7:10 a. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington,
131, January 28, 8 p. m.

Press reports radio address yesterday afternoon over station JOAK to Japanese in North America by Admiral Nobucasa Suetsugu. Concluding sentence quoted as follows: "Japan dislikes war but if United States persists in its misunderstanding Japan is fully prepared. I ask all of you as Japanese subjects to serve the country in your various positions."

GREW.

TFV

Secret
In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 10 February 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Thank God for Sundays. It is my only day for quiet study and work, and even then I have to kick somebody out of the office, because they long since have learned my habits.

First I want to congratulate you and J. O. on your perfectly splendid letter of 28 January, serial 0140. It is extremely helpful to us all and I hope you will continue in future communications of our similar searching analyses. Just for a moment refresh on your paragraph 3; and permit me to say "check and double check."

I continue in every way I possibly can to fight commitments or dispositions that would involve us on two fronts and to keep from sending more combatant ships to the Far East. I had a two hour struggle (please keep this absolutely secret) in the White House this past week and thank God can report that the President still supports my contentions. You may be amused to know that the Secretary of War, Colonel Stimson, has been of very great assistance to me in this connection in recent conferences. Mr. Hull never lets go in the contrary view and having fought it so many times I confess to having used a little more vehemence and a little stronger language than was becoming in fighting it out this last week for the nth time. Present were the President, Stimson, Knox, Marshall and myself. I mention this just to show you that the fight is always on and that some day I might get upset. But thank God, to date at least, the President has and continues to see it my way.

Here's hoping. Replies to your letter of the 28th (0140) and to J. O.'s letter of the 25th (0129) are just signed.

I continue to press Marshall to reinforce Oahu and elsewhere. You now know that he is sending out 81 fighters to Oahu, which will give that place 50 fairly good ones and 50 of the latest type. I jumped to give him the transportation for them in carriers when he requested it. I hope too, you will get the Marines to Midway, Johnson and Palmyra, as soon as you can. They may have to rough it for a time

until barracks are built, and the water supply, if inadequate, will have provided somehow just like it would be if they had captured an enemy atoll

Speaking of Marshall, he is a tower of strength to us all, and I cou conceive of a happier relationship than exists between him and me. He w to almost any length possible to help us out and sometimes contrary to his advisors.

I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the W House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be nece and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possible could, the Pres just has his own ideas about men. I usually finally get my way but the co effort is very great and of course worth it. I feel that I could go on the this minute and get all the men I want if I could just get the green light the White House. As a matter of fact what we now have, was obtained b finally asking the President's permission to go on the Hill and state our r as I saw them at that time and his reply was "go ahead, I won't veto anyt they agree to". However, the struggle is starting all over again and just rei ber we are going the limit, but I cannot guarantee the outcome.

Regarding the MK VI Mod I Exploder; we have distributed them to the outl stations and will leave the decision up to you as to whether or not they sh be put aboard ship.

Every good wish in the world.

As ever sincerely,

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, *USN*,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P. S. I just realized that a letter I had roughed out in reply to yours of 27th had not been sent so here is just another Sunday cleanup job along one or two other things.

First, I had another hour and a half in the White House today and the P dent said that he might order a detachment of three or four cruisers, a ca and a squadron of destroyers to make a cruise to the Philippines; perhaps g down through the Phoenix and Gilbert or the Fiji Islands, then reaching into Mindanao for a short visit and on to Manila and back.

I have fought this over many times and won, but this time the decision go against me. Heretofore the talk was largely about sending a cruise of sort to Australia and Singapore and perhaps the N. E. I. Sending it to Philippines would be far less objectionable from a political standpoint but objectionable. What I want you to do is to be thinking about it and be prep to make a quick decision if it is ordered.

Spent an hour this afternoon going over your personnel situation with Ni and Kilpatrick and the Doctors and you will hear from Nimitz on this. A co of weeks ago, even before I got your letter, the President told me I was c crowding our ships and that they would be neither healthy, happy or sani with increased complements so we *may* have to ask for the doctors' opi regarding the new complements.

Regarding your setting up a place on shore where your staff can do plan work; anything that you can arrange with Admiral Bloch will be perfectly s factory to me. I don't know just what the Submarine Base facilities are but may be able to put up some additions which would eventually be needed bec of the expected increase in the number of submarines. I will have Moreel into these additions if you will forward to me a sketch lay-out in case you r our help. No one could say just what the public or political reaction might b your shore arrangements, because it might be misrepresented and migh misunderstood. That is the reason I suggest any additional facilities be labe additional facilities for the Submarine Base. It would not actually be a nomer because undoubtedly they will be when the Fleet some day bases h on the West Coast.

I also take it that you can arrange satisfactory communications with Adm Bloch.

Regarding a set of quarters for yourself, it would seem that the best solu and perhaps the only one would be for Admiral Bloch to divert one of the

sets of five houses now building to your use. Will you please communicate this to Admiral Bloch?

I want you to know that we are doing everything possible to reach full agreement with possible Allies. If and when such agreements are concluded we will inform you of them.

I wish we could send Admiral Bloch more local defense forces for the 14th Naval District but we simply haven't got them. If more are needed I see no other immediate solution than for you to supply them. I am moving Heaven and Earth to speed up a considerable program we have for small craft and patrol vesels for the Districts but like everything else, it takes time and "dollars cannot buy yesterday".

I think I previously wrote you that I hope to be able to take over the Coast Guard after the Lend-Lease Bill is on the Statute Books. Of course if war eventuates Admiral Bloch can commandeer anything in the Islands in the way of small craft and I assume he has a full list of what would be available.

All good wishes.

Keep cheerful,

/S/ BETTY.

Secret

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op–10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 25 February 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: I suppose by this time your staff is working smoothly on the beach. It is most important, as I have indicated previously, that as soon as possible you get your Operating Plan for Rainbow III in the hands of Admiral Hart and your own subordinate commanders, including those in command of the Pacific and the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers. Then we can get ready the subordinate operating plans and the logistic requirements, the latter being of special importance to you in your advanced position.

Particularly in connection with your logistic planning, some of us here have wondered as to whether or not you might also put the Commander Base Force and his staff ashore in a status more or less similar to your own. However, this is your job and I just mention it en passant.

Even if we fight this war according to "Plan Dog," we have so designed Rainbow III that a shift to "Dog" (see my despatch of January) will (at least at first) require only minor changes in the tasks of either the Basic Plan or your Operating Plans. The force we would move to the Atlantic possibly would not go at once, and the force left with you will still be great enough to perform both the offensive and defensive tasks assigned you. Of course we all could wish for more.

In making your plans for the more important offensive raids. I hope that you will not fail to study very carefully the matter of making aircraft raids on the inflammable Japanese cities (ostensibly on military objectives), and the effect such raids might have on Japanese morale and on the diversion of their forces away from the Malay Barrier. Such adventures may seem to you unjustified from a profit and loss viewpoint—but, again, you may consider that they might prove very profitable. In either case (and this is strictly *SECRET*) *you and I may be ordered* to make the, so it is just as well for you to have considered plans for it.

I hesitated to take the chance of upsetting you with my despatch and letter concerning a *visit* of a detachment of surface forces to the Far East. I agree with you that it is unwise. But even since my last letter to you, the subject has twice come up in the White House. Each of the many times it has arisen, my view has prevailed, but the time *might* come when it will not. I gave you the information merely as a sort of advance notice.

Secret

The difficulty is that the entire country is in a dozen minds about the war—to stay out altogether, to go in against Germany in the Atlantic, to concentrate against Japan in the Pacific and the Far East—I simply can not predict the outcome. Gallup polls, editorials talk on the Hill (and I might add, all of which is irresponsible) constitute a rising tide for action in the Far East if the Japanese go into Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. This can not be ignored and we must have in the back of our heads the possibility of having to swing to that tide. If it should prevail against Navy Department

recommendations, you would have to implement Rainbow III, and forg later despatch concerning "Plan Dog". This would mean that any rein ment to the Atlantic might become impossible, and, in any case, would be re by just so much as we would send to the Asiatic. And that might be a serious matter for Britain.

I am perfectly delighted over getting some modern Army airplanes i Hawaiian area and jumped at the opportunity to transport them. I wisl would make me a similar offer for the Philippines, in which case I woul make available a carrier, properly escorted, for the duty.

I know little of further interest to bring up for the moment. Our staf versations (and thank the Good Lord there has been little no public leal they are taking place) are nearing their conclusion and we hope will be fi in about ten days. Of course we will make you acquainted with all dec reached just as soon as we can.

I am sending copy of this letter to Tommy Hart, whose mind you now pretty well with reference to his job in the Far East. I have been out office for a few days and I haven't seen Hart's "Estimate of the Situation I do know that War Plans is delighted with what he has sent, and of co always have been because of his grasp of the entire picture.

I am enclosing copy of a memo which is self-explanatory showing yo best estimate of the Far Eastern present situation. Please note the gove sentences where it is stated that a reestimate may have to be necessary a time, but it still looks to us as though this estimate, at least for the mo were sound.

Keep cheerful.

All good wishes and Good Luck

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,

USS PENNSYLVANIA,

[s] BE

[*1*] Sent to W. H. by Capt. Callaghan

Draft

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

11 FEBRUARY 1

Since your thought yesterday morning of the possibility of sending a d ment to the Phillippines via the southern route consisting of approxima cruisers, a squadron (9) destroyers and carriers and perhaps to permit that they were going out there just for a temporary visit and then to r I confess to having pondered a good deal on it last night during the wee hours because, as you know, I have previously opposed this and you hav curred as to its unwisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark in a pr conference when Mr. Hull suggested this and the question arose as to getting out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that you might not losing one or two cruisers (we have 2 out there now), but that you did not to take a chance on losing 5 or 6. Frankly, I breathed a great sight of and thought the issue pretty definitely closed.

You also called it a "bluff" and questioned it from that standpoint. Obvi if we permitted a leak about their coming back, there would be even less, i bluff, and again if we did not permit a leak with regard to their coming we would then certainly look like turning tail and running if somethng pened and we did come back. I believe it pretty thoroughly agreed that not want that force in the Philippines in case of sudden attack, and that were we to consider in emergency increasing our forces in the Far Eas would not send them to Manila Bay but rather to the southard or into East Indies where they would be better supported and not so open to atta

[*2*] As I reported yesterday, recent letters from Hart state he is s up against it for facilities to care for what he has and only recently ha acquired a vessel to make available to him later on to help take care

submarines which are in urgent and immediate need of a Mother Ship. Likewise he is taxed to take care of his Air Force but we are improving these facilities. Sometime after July I want to send him another squadron of bombers. We expect to send four minesweepers (bird class) out in March.

Specifically:—

Sending a small force would probably be no deterrent to Japan and would not increase Japanese difficulties in advancing southward. I feel we would be exposing our force without compensating results.

There is a chance that further moves againt Japan will precipitate hostilities rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan no excuse for coming in in case we are forced into hostilities with Germany who we all consider our major problem.

The Pacific Fleet is now weaker in total tonnage and aircraft then the Japanese Navy. It is, however, a very strong force and as long as it is in its present position it remains a constant serious and real threat to Japan's flank. If any considerable division is sent to Manila it might prove an invitation to Japan to attack us in detail and thus greatly lessen or remove our serious naval threat to her for a considerable period to come. I believe it would be a grave strategic error at this time to divide our Pacific Fleet. We would then have our Fleet divided in three parts, Atlantic, Mid-Pacific, and Western Pacific. It is true we only contemplate a visit out there but we might find recall of this additional detachment [3] exceedingly embarrassing or difficult.

If we are forced into the war our main effort as approved to date will be directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn into a major war in the Far East. I believe the Pacific Fleet should at least at first remain strong until we see what Japan is going to do. If she remains quiet, or even if she moves strongly toward Malaysia, we could then vigorously attack the Mandates and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japan's attack on the British and Dutch. We would also then be able to support spare forces for the Atlantic.

Right now, Japan does not know what we intend. If we send part of the Fleet to the Asiatic now, we may show our hand and lose the value of any strategic surprise. We might encourage Japan to move, rather than deter her, and also we might very well compromise our own future operations.

I feel we should not indicate the slightest interest in the Gilbert or Solomon or Fiji Islands at this time. If we do, the Japanese might smell a rat and our future use of them, at least so far as surprise is concerned, might be compromised. The Japanese could take steps to occupy some of them before we could because she has had long training and is ready for amphibious operations; we are not. If we lose the element of surprise or begin to show interest, for example in the Gilberts, such previous warning may delay our later operations because Japan would well consider nullifying our efforts in this direction.

I just wanted to get this off my chest to you as I always do my thoughts and then will defer to your better judgment with a cheerful Aye, Aye, Sir, and go the limit as will all of us in what you decide. I do think the matter serious.

[4] The establishment of Marine Defense Battalions at Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston and Midway is now in progress. I have not authorized any leak on this because I have questioned such a procedure but if you feel it advisable we could, of course, do so. If Japan occupies Saigon, I am considering recommending we plan our mines in Manila, assume a full posture of defense in the Philippines and send the Fleet Marine Force from San Diego to Hawaii.

Finally I want you to know I am notifying Kimmel to be prepared to send a force such as we talked about yesterday to the Philippines, in case your final decision should be to send them.

I have just read a paraphrase of a telegram of 7 Feb. from the American Embassy at Tokyo, which the State Department has furnished us. In it appears the following:

"Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factor which such risks constitute, the risk should not be taken unless our country is ready to force hostilities."

You undoubtedly have seen the entire despatch and obviously I am picking out that portion which supports my view.

[s] H. R. S.

Op-12-CTB
Secret

FEBRUARY 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the President.
Subject: Analysis of the Situation in Indo-China.

1. The despatches from the Naval Attache in London concerning prospects of an immediate crisis in Indo-China and Singapore seem to be a re-hash of the story by Douglas Robertson in the New York Times of February 2d. I have been watching this situation with extreme care and see no present reason for alarm. We knew in advance the Japanese were sending some ships to Thailand and Indo-China to enforce cessation of hostilities between those states. This has been accomplished. The transfer of peace negotiations on the NATORI to Tokyo indicates to me two things.

(1) The demands by Japan will be far-reaching and

(2) The February 10th date is too soon for an attack, as the negotiations are likely to be rather long-drawn out in Tokyo.

2. A careful study, including an evaluation of information from many sources, leads me to believe that the following is the general plan of Japan:

(a) She has some fear that the British and the United States will intervene if she moves into southern Indo-China and Thailand. Therefore, she wishes first to obtain a full legal right to enter those countries, by getting the consent of the governments to give her concessions in the ports and on shore.

(b) The size of Japanese land forces in Formosa and Hainan is insufficient for occupying Indo-China and Thailand, for attacking Singapore, and for keeping an expeditionary force ready to use against the Philippines. So far as I can tell, an insufficient number of transports is assembled for a major move.

Upon a successful conclusion of the peace negotiations she will assuredly occupy Thailand and southern Indo-China, establish defended naval, land, and air bases, and get ready for further eventualities. She may build up her land forces in Indo-China in readiness for action against Malaya and British North Borneo, or may retain them in Formosa and Hainan. I question her readiness to attack the British before June, but this belief is subject to revision.

(c) Japan desires to move against the British, the Dutch and the United States in succession, and not to take on more than one at a time. At present, she desires not to go to war with the United States at all, in order that she can continue her imports of materials useful for war and for her general economy. If Japan gets a favorable opportunity, and believes the United States has then definitely decided to remain out of war altogether, she will move first against Malaya and possibly Burma, hoping the Dutch will not participate. Her present economic conversations with the Dutch indicate she may be playing for time, and even may intend to conquer the Dutch primarily by economic and political penetration.

(d) Japan is unlikely to undertake hostilities against Britain until she sees the results of Germany's next attack on the British Isles, and of Germany's success in the Balkans. If the Germans succeed in conquering the British Isles, Japan will at once move into Malaya, and possibly into the Netherlands East Indies. If the German attack against the British Isles fails, I believe Japan may await a more favorable opportunity before advancing beyond Indo-China.

3. The above are my present views. They will change if we get information that will warrant change. So far, everything leads me to believe that Japan is playing for a secure advance without too great an expenditure of military energy. The recent reenforcement of her defense in the Mandates indicates the seriousness with which she views the threat by the Pacific Fleet, so long as it remains strong and apparently ready to move against her eastern flank.

H. R. STARK.

Orriginal set by Clipper Lock Box—Confirmation by Capt Lammers 2/28/41

Secret

27 FEBRUARY 1941.

DEAR ADMIRAL HART: Admiral Stark is leaving Washington today for a short trip to the Caribbean, expecting to be back on the job about 13 March. I have just brought to his attention certain information which he has asked me to give to you.

As you know, we are having Conversations here in Washington which we hope will be completed in from two to four weeks. Upon completion of these Conversations Rear Admiral V. H. Danckwerts, R. N., one of the participants, will proceed, I expect by air, to Singapore and possibly Australia and New Zealand to inform officials there and also British CinC, China, of the results of the Conversations.

Admiral Danckwerts has expressed a willingness to stop in Hawaii to talk to Admiral Kimmel and in Manila to talk to you in regard to the same. Admiral Stark thinks this is an excellent plan. He wants me to inform you of this fact and to say that I think Danckwerts is very clever but honest. Ingersoll says he thinks it best for you to listen and talk little.

The Department will inform you of Admiral Lanckwerts' movements and prospective date of arrival in order that suitable arrangements can be made for meeting him.

I expect to return to London as soon as Conversations are finished. Will you therefore acknowledge by radio to Admiral Stark receipt of this letter?

With kindest regards, I am, Sincerely,

R. L. GHORMLEY.

Admiral T. C. HART, USN
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet
USS HOUSTON
(Duplicate to Adm. Kimmel)

Nav-HH.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., 3 March 1941.

Personal and Confidential

DEAR KIMMEL: Your letters—references—

(a) Confidential, official—#P16-3/(0217), of 7 February 1941, subject—Recommended Complements.

(b) Secret, personal, of 18 February, 1941, to Stark, on various matters, and

(c) Confidential, personal, of 16 February 1941, to Nimitz, re Ordnance P. G. and various matters.

have been read carefully considered in the light of the situation which confronts the Bureau of Navigation. No enclosures were received with Bunav copy of Reference (a), nor have such enclosures been received in C. N. O. office so far as I know.

The Bureau of Ordnance is so far behind the requirements of ordnance materials, and is continuing to fall further behind, that drastic measures are necessary if our fleets, even at present strength are to have the necessary ordnance supplies to carry on a war. That drastic measures have already been initiated may be surmised from personnel changes already made.

Soon to be superimposed on our Navy ordnance problems through the administration of the Lend-Lease Bill is the task of procurement, inspection and delivery of enormous—almost astronomical—quantities of ordnance supplies for the British Navy and any allies which may survive to fight the Dictators. I do not know if you have been informed of all the new ordnance plants that are being erected in various parts of the country to start from scratch the manufacture of various items of ordnance.

Furlong can give you some idea of these developments when he reports. He should have had the help long ago of many of the Ordnance postgraduates in the Fleet, and he endeavored to obtain their services but was denied by my Bureau on the well-founded theory that even though many of the Ordnance P. G.'s in the Fleet were not working at their specialty, they were usefully employed, and the Fleet should be saved as much as possible from changes.

With the appointment of a new Chief of Bureau of Ordnance the Secretary directed me to give Blandy all practicable aid in the form of competent officers to assist in producing ordnance supplies. The Secretary is fully aware of Blandy's requirements in personnel and the necessity for taking a considerable number of ordnance post graduates from the Fleet. I will add also that Stark is fully informed on this subject.

In a recent dispatch to you I informed you that Crawford would soon be ordered to the Bureau of Ordnance. He is specially needed to speed up torpedo production, and it is unfortunate that Pye must lose this office from his staff. The designation of the remaining forty or so officers is being left to you with

the idea that you will so arrange detachments and re-allocations to m the damage to fleet efficiency. I will be glad to approve such reassi within the fleet as you consider necessary. The Atlantic Fleet also g a number of Ordnance P. G's.

I note your warning against the detachment of considerable num qualified officers from the fleet and the enormous risk therefrom. I yiel one in my anxiety to have the fleet ready at the proper time and you c assured that I am always ready to bear full responsibility for my acts fully cognizant of the great responsibility which you bear and it is i intention to support you to the maximum extent possible.

As you well know, this country is confronted with a most difficult pr that of determining just how much of our total output shall go to Brit her allies, and how much to keep for ourselves. A wrong guess may we our own problem insoluble. The minimum help needed by Britain is, of that which will keep her actively fighting while we are building up our s No help at all or too little help to Britain resulting in her defeat will increase and complicate our problems of the future.

The situation regarding aviators is not unlike that of Ordnance In order to build up our aviation we must of necessity have the services ified aviators to get all our air training stations going. We know t aviation officers lack a great deal of being ready to serve the fleet wh first report, and we also know you will do your best to provide the ad training and experience needed.

If you will grope backward through your memory as a budget officer realize that the serious shortage of aviators which now confronts us charged largely to our failure to operate Pensacola at maximum capacity those years when we used only a fraction of that station's capacity to pilot seats in the Fleet. I remember also our efforts to obtain funds active duty to a few hundred naval R. O. T. C. ensigns. While it is speculate on what might have been, the present situation is not witl ironical aspects.

Now for a discussion of the enlisted personnel problem. You are n aware that Stark and I have fought stubbornly and constantly to incre authorized number of men in the Navy and to bring ships' complements i to 100% but to 115% in order to train in advance of the readiness of acquired ships the key men for them.

[3] Just about the time we thought we were well underway to that ol the President received information from several sources that our shi being seriously overcrowded. It was obvious that his informants wer had been in the Fleet. Recently, the Captain of the TUSCALOOSA repor his ship was overcrowded and asked for detachment of about 50 extra which had been placed on board. His Division Commander, Pickens, by ment confirmed this opinion and further stated that the same comment to all heavy cruisers.

As the President had cruised in the TUSCALOOSA fairly recentl he and his private physician, Rear Admiral McIntire, were definitely opinion that there were too many men on the TUSCALOOSA for hea comfort. I have taken steps to ascertain how many men were on board the President's cruise and at the time Pickens recommended the remova extra marines.

Recently some bluejacket wrote Senator Downey, of California, a co of intolerable conditions in the PORTLAND due to overcrowding. W matter was referred to me I asked CINCUS to investigate and give i upon which to base a reply. CINCUS's, reply, which you should get fr files and read, confirmed the overcrowding in the PORTLAND and furthe that the number of men in the PORTLAND at the time of the compla less than was being proposed by the Fleet Personnel Board.

You will agree that if the President also receives such comments (doubt many bluejackets or their families write him) Stark and I w a hard time selling him the idea that ships' complements should be in as you recommend in reference (a).

Our recruiting may be prejudiced by similar letters from afloat as i by the following quotation from a letter written by an Inspector of on Major Recruiting Divisions:

"From underground sources it appears that the ships are so crowd men hesitate to ship over. I have had personal letters and contacts fr men to that effect. A relative of mine—a farmer boy from Marylan

I advised to join the Navy six years ago—is a patternmaker first class on the ALTAIR. He writes me for advice about shipping over as living conditions on the ship are almost unbearable. I mention this because it seems to me a matter of concern even though it's none of my personal business."

However, to offset the above unfavorable picture of overcrowding, Commander R. W. Cary, U. S. N., recently executive officer of the CHICAGO, gave me a memorandum of changes made in that ship to increase her living accommodations without apparent overcrowding. I enclose a copy of his memorandum, marked "A", and I will urge on the C. N. O. and Chief of Bureau of Ships to [4] provide the funds and equipment you ask in paragraph 11 of reference (a), not because I believe the President will approve increased complements to fight your ships, but primarily because I believe that every combatant ship should be ready to carry on board as many excess men as possible for training for new construction.

The President now feels so strongly that we will make our ships unhappy by overcrowding that Stark and I will need every bit of assistance and assurance that you can give in order to obtain his consent to carrying more than the present 100% complement on board.

I recently sent you a draft of a proposed letter which should help a little in reducing unexpected detachments. I enclose another copy, marked "B" and request your suggestions.

The failure of many of our men to reenlist when discharged from ships in Hawaiian waters is understandable but very disturbing. While many men may leave that area with the intention of reenlisting after leave in the States, I am afraid we lose a large number of trained mechanics to industry when they come home. The remedy for this is both your problem and mine, and I welcome your suggestions for increasing reenlistments afloat.

I appreciate receiving your letter re broadening the employment of negroes aboard ship. Your suggestions are sound and will be followed here as long as we can withstand the pressure. Two negroes have been appointed to the Naval Academy for the class entering next summer.

Legislation has been initiated asking for 232,000 men in the Navy during normal times, with a limit of 300,000 for emergency. Prospects for passage are favorable. Stark and I wanted to ask for about 500,000 but were turned down by the President who insists on a year by year program. Present Operating Force plan for 1942 will require about 290,000 men.

Legislation has been initiated for going to three-year Naval Academy course, commencing with the class of 1943, which will be scheduled to graduate in June 1942. The Class of 1942 will graduate in February 1942. Prospects for passage favorable.

Before closing this already too long letter, let me assure you that when we get the report of your Personnel Board with its recommendations for increased complements, we will give it serious and sympathetic study, particularly if your Medical Board of Survey of Living Conditions on board indicates that more men can be accommodated without prejudice to health and comfort.

Referring to the large numbers of young Reserve Ensigns being ordered to duty afloat, I know that you will do all in your power to continue their naval education and training. These young men will be useful and valuable in direct proportion to the effort made by our regular officers to train them. [5] We must lean very heavily on them to help meet the requirements of new construction.

In order that the Fleet may comprehend the personnel problem confronting the Navy as a whole, I shall publish to the service in the near future a circular of information as to how we plan to meet the personnel needs of our two-ocean Navy. In spite of anything we may attempt to do ashore we realize that it is on board ship that the most important training must take place.

If you or any of your officers have a formula for manning new construction with nuclei of ship-trained men without getting them from the Fleet,—by all means, let me have it!

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,

/s/ C. W. NIMITZ.

Encl.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, *U. S. Navy,*
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., 28 February 1941.

From: The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.
To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet.
Subject: Transfers to Shore Duty.
Reference: (a) BuNav Manual.

1. The Bureau will furnish to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Commander Base Force, Pacific Fleet, and Commander Train, Atlantic Fleet, the waiting lists for shore duty maintained in accordance with reference (a), Articles D-7024(6), (7), and (8).

2. The shore duty waiting list will be revised and issued quarterly. It will contain only the top men on the list whose transfer ashore may normally be expected during the succeeding twelve months. Fleet Reservists will appear separately on this list as the Bureau will continue to give preference to Fleet Reservists for transfer to shore duty.

3. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, are requested to place men in training as reliefs for men on the shore duty lists so that the latter can be transferred on short notice.

In reply refer to
Initials and No. Op-30C-MD

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, February 20, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation
Subject: Accommodations for Increased Complements of Heavy Cruisers.

1. In accordance with your request, I am supplying the following information gained from my experience as Executive Officer of the CHICAGO in regard to accommodating the increased complements of heavy cruisers.

2. When I left the fleet on December 29, 1940, a complement required for heavy cruisers of the CHICAGO class had not been worked out to the last man, but it appeared to be very close to 1100 men necessary to man the additional batteries installed, and maintain the rate of fire required by modern war conditions. I note, since my arrival here, that the Fleet Personnel Board recommends 1099 men for this class of cruiser.

3. To meet the berthing, messing and other accommodations necessary to accommodate our estimated number of 100 men, the CHICAGO obtained additional bunks and lockers while at the Navy Yard—a sufficient number to bring the total up to 996. This installation was done principally with the ship's force. The arrangement for installing these bunks and lockers was done entirely by the ship's personnel under the supervision of the First Lieutenant who gave it his careful attention and succeeded in getting these in without violating the standard spacing between berths in any one tier of 21", and without finding it necessary to utilize any of the messing compartments. To accomplish this it required an almost complete rearrangement of berths and lockers in each compartment. When this installation had been completed, it was found possible by utilizing office space and other miscellaneous spaces large enough to take from one to three or four berths plus what space was left available in the berthing compartments, to install 113 additional bunks and lockers. This number had been requested from the Bureau of Ships, but I am advised that no action [2] as yet has been taken on that request. If it is approved, and the bunks and lockers are installed, there will be a total of 1,109 bunks and lockers on the CHICAGO.

4. Up to the time that I left the ship, we had had a peak load of some 1,050 men on board. The cafeteria system of feeding this large number of men has proved to be satisfactory. The over-all messing time for this number of men was less than it had been under the old messing system for a lesser number of men, but the actual serving time was slightly longer, amounting in all from 30 to 35 minutes. The mess hall space required was reduced to two messing compartments in place of three as previously used, by the fact that the rate of serving corresponded very closely to the rate of eating by the men, so that as the latter part of the line was served, the earlier part of the line had eaten and cleared the tables. The important feature of the satisfactory operation of

the cafeteria system on any ship, but particularly ships with complements considerably larger than originally designed for, is the organization for the service of the food.

5. Additional washroom and toilet facilities are also required for an increase in complement. This was accomplished in the firemen's washroom, while the ship was at the yard last summer, by a rearrangement of existing installations which permitted the installation of two additional showers, two additional bucket troughs (accommodating about 8 men each), two additional head troughs (approximately 5 seats each), one additional urinal. A similar effort was underway in the deck force wash room at the time I left the ship, but I do not know the extent of the additional facilities this would provide.

6. We found it essential in the tropics to take steps to increase the ventilation of some of the berthing compartments and the mess hall where the steam tables were located. This was accomplished by the ship's force, but it is probable that additional ventilating equipment will have to be installed in view of the recent decision to blank off all air ports on the second deck and below, as well as some on the main deck.

7. The effect of the increased number of men in the berthing compartments on the health of the crew was considered by the medical officer not to be a serious menace, up until the time I left the ship, provided that we were a little more meticulous in the observation of sanitary measures. This involved a careful watch for the appearance of bedbugs, cockroaches and other germ carrying pests and special care in the sterilization of mess gear after meals. It also included the prompt segregation of personnel showing signs of colds, flu and other nose, throat and chest diseases. Although there were two mild epidemics of flu in the fleet during the past Fall, the CHICAGO had comparatively few cases in spite of the fact that I believe it was more crowded at the time than any other ship in the fleet.

8. From my observation of other ships which have had additional berthing facilities installed together with information received from the First Lieutenant, before I left the ship, we were of the opinion that they had not been as successful in the arrangement of their berthing space as we had been on the CHICAGO. This appeared to be due to a failure to plan the arrangement with the same care that the CHICAGO had used.

/s/ R. W. CARY,
Commander, U. S. N.

*CHICAGO Complement	872
TUSCALOOSA Complement	876

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[1] In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10/Dy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, March 22, 1941.

Secret

DEAR KIMMEL: Your letter of February 18th was handed to me upon my return from an inspection of N. O. B., Norfolk, Fajardo, Vieques anchorage, Pillsbury Sound, St. Thomas, San Juan, Guantanamo, various Bahama Islands, Key West, Miami, Jacksonville, Pensacola, Charleston, and Parris Island;—literally, a flying trip.

Ingersoll wrote you to acknowledge receipt of your letter. We have now received answers from the interested individuals here in the Department to the questions you asked. I will take up your letter, paragraph, by paragraph, here goes:—

The Checks for the Navy Relief and Red Cross have been received. You must have had acknowledgments by this time.

Chester Nimitz in his letter to you of March 3—a copy of which I have—seems to have answered all your questions on personnel so that I need not comment any further on that subject; except that, with regard to the Bureau of Ordnance requirements for post-graduate ordnance officers, I can fully understand your point of view in not wishing to have those officers detached from the Fleet. The procurement situation in the Bureau of Ordnance is critical. We made the best decision we could with the picture confronting us. You may expect a similar effort to get legally trained officers in legal jobs.

With reference to the Marines at Palmyra and Johnson you must, have received my confidential serial 019612 of February 26th on the su permanent Marine defense force at Johnson, Midway and Palmyra Of course personnel stationed at Johnson and Palmyra Islands should no the number provided in paragraph 4 of the letter of the 26th until sati arrangements are made for providing the minimum requirements of food and other essential supplies. We concur in your recommendation to s Marines to Palmyra and none to Johnson for the present.

No comment seems necessary on paragraph 8 in view of the fact t detachments have already gone to Australia and New Zealand.

[2] In paragraph 9 you request one Squadron of PT's and one of PTC'S at the earliest possible date. At the present moment I can not g an answer to this question because the demands of the British are su now that I can't even make an estimate of the number of PT's and PTC might be available to be sent to you. I have an order now to give t immediately.

You also speak of the probability that the Coast Guard will be tak shortly. I hope to do that as soon as the 7 billion dollar appropriation li by the Congress and signed by the President.

Completion of the quota of small craft allocated to the 14th District pushed as rapidly as their conversion and readiness for service can be plished. You probably know the TAMAHA and an Oil Barge are route to Hawaii in tow of the KANAWHA.

With respect to paragraph 10; Admiral Blandy furnished in his letter of March 5th, the shipment dates of the remaining bombs to be supplie Oahu area. It will be noted from Blandy's letter that all requirements completed either in the May, 1941, voyage of the U. S. S. LASSEN, ammunition trip about October, 1941. With respect to the bomb sup Oahu, a letter is about to be signed increasing the bombs designated f island and asking you to assist in transporting them from the mainland t Dump storage of bombs in Oahu has already been authorized in advanc availability of magazines.

I believe you have received information on the incendiary bomb sit 5,000 are being procured from the Army and delivery is expected shortl

The answers to paragraph 11 of your letter are contained in our conf serial 05038 of March 18, to the effect that it is the present intention to tute PYRO for LASSEN upon the conclusion of PYRO's next voyage Fleet.

As you know, the Department has taken steps to acquire two more Class C-3 cargo ships (Now building at Tampa, Fla.), for conversi ammunition ships but it is impossible to tell at this date when these vess be ready for service.

Referring to paragraph 12 of your letter, need for destroyers in the Fleet right now is such that we probably will not be able to help you wit tional destroyers for some months, if then; in fact we may have to tak away soon.

[3] In connection with your comments in paragraph 14 and 15 rel complements recommended by the Fleet Personnel Board, the following p comment from the Director of Fleet Maintenance is quoted:

"(a) The Bureau of Ships for some time has been calling attention continued weight increases, which have been taking place on all types c since commissioning, having reached such proportions that effect on r characteristics is now serious. The recent weight additions, made neces improved A. A. defense, D. G. equipment, splinter protection and in ammunition which could not be compensated for by weight removals in ance with the policy established several years ago, have greatly accentua overweight situation to such extent that no further uncompensated should be added until the results of the weight removal survey now und ore obtained.

(b) The Bureau of Ships estimates that for each additional man personal effects 300 lbs additional weight. To provide bunk, locker, me sanitary and other requirements, the total additional weight per man is mately one-half ton. The average increases recommended by the Fleet Pe

Board over the Force Operating Plan represents rather sizeable weight additions as shown by table.

	Over increase men	*Resulting weight added*
BBs	286	143 tons
CAs	228	114 tons
CLs	136	78 tons
DDs	57	28.5 tons

(c) While the decision against recommended increases was based on weight and stability conditions more than on space and cost, the further restrictions on berthing space introduced by sealing of airports on the lower decks has made the space component of more importance than formerly.

(d) The Operating Force Plan has taken into consideration and has allowed increased complements for the additional AA batteries installed.

(e) The Operating Force plan represents the policy of the Department on the number of men which can or should be assigned to the various ships by types.

[4] (f) On a comparative basis the complements now allowed are 10–15% greater than those assigned by the British on similar types of ships.

(g) Correspondence is at present before the Bureau of Ships requesting comment on the maximum number of men which can be accommodated on the various types of ships within acceptable limits of space, weight and stability considerations. The reopening of the case depends largely on the Bureau of Ships reply.

P. S. The report of the Fleet Personnel Board is now in. It is anticipated that it will be recommended for approval to maximum extent permissible within space, weight and stability recommendations of BuShips.

Paragraph 18 of your letter referred to the supply of modern types of planes throughout the Fleet. In this connection Towers states the impression that the Bureau of Aeronautics is relegating fleet aircraft needs to a position of lower priority than the general expansion program, is in error. He says that the Bureau of Aeronautics has exerted and continues to exert every possible effort to provide the Fleet with new replacement airplanes for the old models at a rate only limited by the productive output of the contractors and diversions instituted by *specific directives to* the Bureau of Aeronautics. It is believed appropriate to point out that the Navy Department in the face of long and determined opposition has been successful in establishing the highest priority for the following types and models of naval airplanes now on order for the *Fleet*. This priority (A–1–b) is higher than that accorded any Army aircraft, except the temporary priority given the P40B's which are being sent to the Hawaiian area.

VP	PBY5	197
VSB	SBD-2 & 3	262
VF	F4F	324
VSO	SO3c	260
VSB	SB2c	70
VTB	TBF	108
		1,221

Your paragraph 18 recommends acquisition of two more "sea-train" vessels. Acquisition and conversion of 4 APV's, 2 New Jerseys, 2 Manhattans, was recommended. The President cut out the Manhattans. Acquisition of the 2 New Jerseys as you probably know was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on January 15, 1941, but *funds have not yet been made available.* The New Jersey type is now used for ferrying loaded freight cars from the East and Gulf Coast ports to Havana. The conversion contemplates the removal of numerous [5] stanchions and use of three decks for the loading of aircraft. Capacity of this type after full conversion is estimated to be approximately 60 assembled airplanes of the scout bomber size. No flying on or flying off facilities are involved. I might add that "plans" for the conversion of the Manhattan type contemplating the installation of hangar and flying off deck with an offset island bridge and stack arrangement are being prosecuted. No provisions will be made for airplane landings aboard the Manhattans. Estimated carrying capacity for the Manhattans is 80 planes of the scout bomber class when the entire flight deck is loaded; under these conditions the planes could not, of course, be flown off.

In answer to your comment in paragraph 20 on the necessity for additional stores ships and transports, the following obtains:

On 15 January, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy approved recommendations for three additional store ships (AF). The President cut it to two. The status of legislation authorizing and appropriating *money* for these two vessels is indeterminate at the present moment. It is hoped these vesels will be acquired sometime during the current fiscal year.

The six transports intended for assignment to Base Force are being converted and made ready for use on the West Coast. It is expected that all of these vessels will report for duty by June or July, 1941. In addition to their intended employment for training Marines in landing operations, it may frequently be necessary for forces afloat to use one or more of those transports to meet transportation requirements between Hawaii and the Island Bases. In addition to these ships, negotiations are being completed now for the charter of the Matson Line ship WEST CRESSEY. She should be available within a short time and ComTwelve is being instructed regarding her loading. It is planned to keep her under charter for transportation of supplies to Hawaii until the CAPE LOOKOUT is completed and ready for service.

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to OincUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or sent by despatch. As you know, ONI 49 contains a section devoted to Japanese trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and the volume of shipping which moved over each route.

[6] This chart was corrected in the Spring of 1940. The date appearing on the chart is the date 1939, which was the last complete year for which export and import data on commodities was available at the time the chart was revised.

Every good wish as always.

Keep Cheerful.

Unload all you can on us.

Give us credit for doing the best we can under many conflicting and strong cross currents and tide rips—just as we do you—and,

Best of luck,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

In reply refer to Initials and No. 11932
Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Washington, 4 April 1941

DEAR KIMMEL: It has been sometime since I have dropped you a line, but like you, have been literally sawing wood seven days a week and there has been nothing of real importance that I could tell you until the Staff Conversations were over. Yesterday I sent an official letter to you and to King and to Tommy Hart covering this subject.

I made a two weeks inspection trip in the West Indies and our activities in the United States South of Washington, and just about as I got back the President shoved off, so I had had no close liaison with him until his return this week. Spent over three hours with him day before yesterday and another hour yesterday. My official letter on the staff conversations had some thoughts in it as a result of that Conference. I may tell you and Hart and King, in the strictest confidence, and I mean by that, nobody but you and Hart and King, that I read to the President the official secret letter which I mailed you three yesterday and received his general assent to it.

I realize that you all, just as much as I, are vitally interested in the matter of "timing". Something may be forced on us at any moment which would precipitate action, though I don't look for it as I can see no advantage to Mr. Hitler in forcing us into the war unless, of course, Matsuoka agrees to fight at the same time. On the surface, at least, the Japanaese situation looks a trifle easier, but

just what the Oriental *really* plans, none of us can be sure. I have had several long talks with Admiral Nomura and unless I am completely fooled, he earnestly desires to avert a Japanese crisis with us. We have been extremely frank with each other.

I am enclosing a memo on convoy which I drew up primarily to give the President a picture of what is now being done, what we would propose to do if we convoyed, and of our ability to do it. It concerns you directly in the detachment from your command of what I believe to be necessary for King to have, to do the job. I feel it is only a matter of time before King is directed to convoy or patrol or whatever form the protective measures take.

You may not agree with me on this move. I can only hope that I am right. The situation is obviously critical in the Atlantic. In my opinion, it is hopeless except as we take strong measures to save it. The effect on the British of sinkings with regard both to the food supply and essential material to carry on the war is getting progressively worse. Without our giving effective aid I do not believe the British can much more than see the year through, if that. The situation is much worse than the average person has any idea.

Our officers who have been studying the positions for bases in the British Isles have returned, and we have decided on immediate construction of 1 destroyer base and one seaplane base in Northern Ireland. We are also studying Scotland Iceland bases for further support of the protective force for shipping in the northward approaches to Britain.

I am also enclosing a memorandum, which I regard as vitally secret and which I trust you will burn as soon as you have read it, covering the President's talk with Ghormley and me yesterday.

I hope and I believe that the foregoing gives you the picture pretty much as I have it to date without going into the Balkan situation, labor troubles, bottlenecks and the million other things which you undoubtedly can glean quite well from the press.

I might add that I am thoroughly in accord with your recent letter to Nimitz, can assure you of Nimitz' support, and that the letter was helpful from every standpoint.

We handed the State Department and the Attorney General something to unravel when we took over the German, Italian and French ships last weekend. I had about as busy a 24 hours and about as interesting as I have had for sometime. I find that I stuck my neck out only in taking over the four Danish ships in the Philippines, but at least we have them and even if there was no law to support my action, I am glad I did it and the Big Boss, when I "fessed" up, approved. As a matter of fact, most of it was in hand before he knew about it. This letter is really long enough or I would tell you how we started the ball rolling and what a splendid job the Coast Guard did on short notice. Of course, the pity of it is that we could not have done it months ago before the sabotage took place. We have been pressing to do it for sometime and when I got word Saturday afternoon of the sabotage on a couple of ships, we jumped the gun.

Am sending copies of this letter to King and to Hart, although King is pretty familiar with affairs here because of his proximity and an occasional visit which is a great help.

I just realized I had not touched on what we refer to as "practice cruises" which detachments from your force have recently made to Australia and New Zealand. I think there will be more of this to come; my hope is they will be confined to positions on the Jap flanks and that they will have some of the benefit which the President and the State Department expect from them. Of interest to you is that we are directing King to make similar visits to Cape Verde, the Canaries and the Azores; of course with a very few units.

Coast Guard has just been directed to turn over to the British 10 of its 250 foot cutters.

Rainbow 5 should be on its way to you all shortly.

Keep cheerful. All good wishes.

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Secret 1 APRIL

OCEAN ESCORT IN WESTERN ATLANTIC
(West of Longitude 30° West)

HALIFAX CONVOYS BEFORE FEBRUARY 15, 1941

Usual British Escort; 1 XCL—occasionally augmented by 1 BB or 1 CC
Last Summer British occasionally augmented the 1 XCL by 1 large SS
Westbound traffic has had no ocean escort.
Ships over 12 knots go it alone.
Ships under 12 knots put in 9 or 6 knot convoys.

BERMUDA CONVOYS BEFORE FEBRUARY 15, 1941

Without escort until they join Halifax convoys some hundreds of miles f Halifax.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

About February 15th British Chiefs of Staff stated that hereafter all c from Halifax must be escorted. Minimum strength of ocean escorts

1 BB or
1 CC or
1 CA or
1 XCL plus 1 large SS

This statement was made before the recent cruise of GNEISENA SCHARNHORST changed the picture.

U. S. NAVY PLAN

Our concept for the minimum strength of ocean escorts, so long as dange GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST or similar vessels remains, is:

1 BB plus XCL plus 2 to 4 DDs.
If BB be not available substitute 2 CAs.

Obviously this escort might be weaker than German attackers, and th covering operations in the general area by heavy ships and carriers are ne at times.

To keep present flow of traffic moving, 2 to 3 convoys a week, 7 escort ur necessary.

In the Staff Conversations the British stated they will make available United States for assisting in the above work:

10 XCL
2 DD (Old)
8 SS

The proposed war deployment of the Atlantic Fleet, as at present cons is:

(a) Northwest Escorts, based in Northern Ireland (Admiral Bristol):
9 DD
18 ODD
42 VPB (possibly 54)

(b) Ocean Escorts, Western Atlantic:
3 BB
2 CA
2 DL
7 DD
4 ODD
4 DMS

(c) Striking Force, based Bermuda:
2 CV
2 CA
4 DD
6 VPB

(d) Southern Patrol, based Trinidad:
4 CL (7500 ton)
Several 327 Coast Guard cutters

(e) Gibraltar Submarine Force:
12 OSS

(f) Bay of Biscay Force, based England:
9 OSS

(g) North Atlantic Coastal Frontier:
12 VPB plus Canadian corvettes of an unknown number.
(h) Caribbean and Panama Coastal Frontiers:
1 PG
9 DD
24 VPB
8 OSS

At the present time 1 BB is under regular navy yard overhaul, and one is under emergency repairs; these are due for completion respectively 19 May and 28 April.

The RANGER must go under three months overhaul April 17th. From 5 to 10 DD and 1 or 2 cruisers must remain under overhaul most of the time.

Consideration of the above shows that the Atlantic Fleet is unable to provide the minimum ocean escort considered necessary. Shortages will be especially bad until June first. With the GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST at large, I consider 2 carriers, at least 2 cruisers, and 4 destroyers the minimum for an effective striking force.

To provide a proper degree of safety for convoys in the Western Atlantic, and to provide an important striking unit for catching raiders, the following reinforcements in the Atlantic are necessary:

3 BB (IDAHO, NEW MEXICO, MISSISSIPPI)
1 CV (preferably LEXINGTON)
6 DL.
12 DD
4 CL (new), (although this Division might come later).

If this movement is made, it should be done with the utmost possible secrecy.

The possible effect of this transfer as regards Japan is realized, but must be accepted if we are to take an effective part in the Atlantic.

Secret 12212

In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 19 April 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Recent correspondence regarding cruise to the Northwest; Detachments for the Atlantic; Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1; etc., etc.;—well I can sort of visualize and hear you saying "Why the Hell doesn't Betty make up his mind on what he wants to do?"

First, I will put at this point rather than at the end of this letter.

"Keep cheerful" and help me to keep my sense of humor which is a little taxed sometimes.

And again:—

Just remember "We are doing the best we can."

I wrote you about the Australian Detachment. The President said (and incidentally when I open up to you this way I don't expect you to quote the President and I know there is nobody who can keep things secret better than you can); "Betty just as soon as those ships come back from Australia and New Zealand, or perhaps a little before, I want to send some more out. I just want to keep them popping up here and there, and keep the Japs guessing." This, of course, is right down the State Department's alley. To my mind a lot of State Department's suggestions and recommendations are nothing less than childish (don't quote me) and I have practically said so in so many words in the presence of all concerned, but after 13 months they finally got it going. Of course I recognize some merit, if exercised with some discretion—and that is where Navy has to count on F. D. R. for reserve; so we did not have to send ships into Singapore and we did keep them on a flank to be in position to go to work or to retire if something broke.

Interruption—The thought just flashes across my mind that Savvy Cooke is now with you. He has much background. I know you will talk to him freely, just as I always have.

To that extent, namely, more or less in position if something broke, I acquiesced in the Australian Cruise with far more grace than I would have otherwise. I am not insensible to the advantages of a cruise of this sort, as well as to the disadvantages of interruption in training.

Now when the question of "Popping up everywhere" came and having in mind keeping on the flank, I said to the President: "How about going North?" He said; "Yes, you can keep any position you like, and go anywhere."

There was a little method in my madness as to the Northern cruise; I thought for once, if I could, I would give the State Department a shock which might make them haul back, and incidentally, that Northwest cruise has many good points. It still conforms to the flank, and a detachment on an occasional sortie up in an unexpected direction might be good ball, and if you ever want to make such a cruise yourself on your own initiative, don't hesitate to ask. Of course you can see what a striking force of the composition I gave you, and known to the Japs, would mean to them, in view of their unholy fear of bombing. This striking detachment would have been right in position for most anything.

I had a broad inward smile when the State Department in effect said; "Please, Mr. President, don't let him do it"; or words to that effect. It was a little too much for them.

The above very briefly touches the high points of this episode and gives you its inception and its calling off.

I realize sometimes it might be less upsetting to you mentally not to tell you these things and then have them called off. On the other hand, I never can prophesy just what will come and in order that you may be prepared, I endeavor to keep you informed as we go along. You can just assume, or begin to guess, what goes on sometimes in between drinks.

Now let's take up the letter we sent you regarding the Detachment coming to the Atlantic and without checking up, I believe it was 3 BB, 1 CV, 4 CL and 2 squadrons of destroyers. This was the first echelon for the "Battle of the Atlantic." The entire world set-up was gone into very carefully and this detachment was one of the first means of implementing what we had every reason to anticipate here. It was agreed to, authorized and directed in its detail by the President. It was also cancelled by the President, and he gave the specific direction to bring only the one CV and I division of destroyers, with which you are now familiar. The reason for the change was that the President did not want, at this particular moment, to give any signs of seriously weakening the forces in the Pacific, and it is my opinion that this will hold until there is some further clarification, incident to Matsuoka's return to Tokyo and this further illumination on the Russo-Japanese Treaty. Don't interpret this in any sense as a change in the general idea of Plan Dog which the President again recently reiterated to me, and which still holds. He does not, however, even while adhering to that Plan, want to give Japan any encouragement or lead right now as to our intentions. I am telling you, not arguing with you.

You have received the word with regard to the 4 minesweepers.

We are starting the "T" Class submarines, now in the Atlantic, into the Pacific. You will have to look out for them some way or other until a Tender is ready, which we anticipate will be sometime in August,—the USS *PELIAS*.

The foregoing is just to give you a little inside information on recent events. I have really nothing new to add. The situation here is a little more hectic than usual, particularly because of the effect on the public of the situation in the Balkans, and the Near East. Your estimate of this situation probably will, differ little from ours; that it is critical is obvious.

For months I have been making recommendations along some lines now much in public discussion. To those who have final authority and responsibility the time seems not yet ripe for their adoption.

Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1 specifically implements the President's thoughts which he has been debating in his own mind for sometime. Whether or not it will actually be put into effect, or altered, I cannot say. King is in this morning. His order is ready. The President is examining this situation further today as a result of conversations with Mr. Hull, who is counselling something less aggressive. I will add a P. S. when this is typed Monday.

I had hoped that with the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill we could look forward to some unity on Capitol Hill but just at present there seems to be far from that desired unity on vital issues. What will be done about convoy and many other things, and just how much a part of our Democratic way of life will be handled by Mr. Gallup, is a pure guess. From that you might think I am getting a little bit cynical, but believe it or not, that is not the case, and I am sawing wood as usual and am still cheerful.

The President has on his hands at the present time about as difficult a situation as ever confronted any man anywhere in public life. There are tremen-

dous issues at stake, to which he is giving all he has got. I only wish I could be of more help to him.

Hoping you are cheerful and with all good wishes, Sincerely,

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. Navy
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS *PENNSYLVANIA.*

P. S. I am sending copy of this letter to Tommy Hart, King returned from Hyde Park and as a result Hemispheric Plan No. 1 goes by the board, and a substitute, with no teeth, is being prepared today.

BETTY.

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op–10–Dy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, April 26, 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is just to get you mentally prepared that shortly a considerable detachment from your fleet will be brought to the Atlantic.

You will recall from my last letter what that detachment was and what the President cut it to, but only for the time being, awaiting some further clue to the Japanese situation.

Not only do I anticipate the reinforcing of the Atlantic by the 3 BBs, 1 CV, 4 CLs and 2 squadrons of destroyers, but also by further reinforcements.

King has been given a job to do with a force utterly inadequate to do it on any efficient scale.

I am enclosing a copy of his last order which implements the changed Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1 and is now known as Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 2 or WPL–49.

Even the Press and those who wanted to go all out in the Pacific are now rounding to and clamoring for an all out in the Atlantic. You know my thoughts with regard to this which were set down in my Memo about what is now known as Plan Dog and which will shortly be covered by Rainbow 5.

Action on the above, that is transfer to the Atlantic, may come at any time and in my humble opinion is only a matter of time.

No other news for the moment and this letter is the result of a long conference yesterday in the White House.

I am sending a copy as usual to Tommy Hart.

I am just in receipt of your letter. We will send you the Public Relations Officer. I shall also go over the personnel situation again with Nimitz. I think we all see eye to eye in what we want to do and I agree with you that key men just should not be removed short of extreme emergency.

Sincerely,

[S] BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA.

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op–10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 15 May 1941.

Confidential

DEAR KIMMEL: This is in reply to your letter of May 5, 1941, which it was a pleasure to receive.

The present plans for the Secretary's trip are briefly as follows: The party will consist of the Secretary; Captain Frank E. Beatty, U. S. N., Aide to the Secretary; Mr. Rawleigh Warner of Chicago, Illinois, a personal friend of the Secretary's; and Mr. John O'Keefe, private secretary to the Secretary. It is expected that the party (if Secretary can get away) will leave here May 24, 1941, and, accompanied by Rear Admiral A. W. Fitch, U. S. N., will depart from San Francisco at near dawn in XPB– 2Y–1 on May 26, 1941, reaching Pearl Har-

bor, T. H. late the same day. The Secretary is looking forward with muc pation to the trip. As you know, he is keenly and intelligently intereste entire Naval Establishment, and the Fleet in particular. I am sure tl the Secretary and you will profit from the visit.

The above arrangements are, of course, only tentative. I am inform the President will speak to the country on May 27, 1941. In view of this a mild suspicion that some change in the Secretary's plans may be ne

All of us here are aware of your difficulties in connection with the lo many of your experienced men. Our proposal to automatically exten ments during war and national emergency was introduced in the Se Chairman Walsh on January 14, 1941, but has not been introduced in th as Mr. Vinson is apparently opposed to it. The matter is not as simp appears on the surface. The Selective Service Act provides that a man i in the Service for a year's training must be discharged at the end of tha unless the Congress meanwhile "has declared that the national interes periled." Nimitz feels, and I agree, that Congressional action to fre enlisted personnel can best be accomplished by basing our demands on t grounds provided for in the Selective Service Act, i. e., when "the national is imperiled." Accordingly, we are introducing legislation which will that whenever the Congress shall declare that the national interest is in all enlistments in the regular Navy or Marine Corps which are in force time and which will terminate during such emergency shall continue during the emergency, and that men detained in the Service in accordan the above shall, unless they extend their enlistment, be discharged not la 6 months after the date of termination of the emergency. At the same t legislation, as proposed, [2] provides for a suspension of Secti of the Act of March 3, 1875, which provides for pay and a quarter retained in the Service beyond the normal expiration of their enlistme

Meanwhile, you have by this time the Department's dispatch about th sions of revised statutes of Section 1422, Act of March 3, 1875. It i that this will help relieve the situation to a certain extent.

On May 6, the Bureau of Navigation issued circular letter No. 55–41 to do with the subject of transfer of enlisted personnel in forces afloat. letter, it was stated that, until further notice, the tsansfer of enlisted p from forces afloat will, in general, be by rating and not by name. This venes Navigation's policy, which has been in effect for some time—that ing men from sea to shore duty, using length of Sea Service as a basis transfers. The change will permit you to retain your experienced n transfer those whose service can best be spared.

As to nucleus officer personnel, Navigation advises that it is often diff account of urgency in issuing orders, to request nominations from force but every endeavor is being made not to detach experienced officers whe be avoided. We will be glad to receive your ideas on the subject of crews when they have been prepared, as you suggest, "in a more definit

Your plans for the landing at San Clemente have been received in tl Department. Fleet Training has studied them with interest. I have brief of the intended operations submitted to me, and I think the exer be of much value to all concerned. Needless to say, we are pressing prep to the end that our landing forces will be well equipped; shortages remed

Your remark about the use of AKs in connection with landing opera concursed in. We have been able to get two craft suitable for this purp the Maritime Commission. Unfortunately, the conversion of these ship be completed until the fall of 1941.

As suggested, I have informed the material bureaus of your idea availing themselves of shipping facilities between the coast and Pearl I have done this by furnishing personally each of the Chiefs of Bureaus co with a copy of your letter. I am sure you can count on their active coo in this important matter. Yards & Docks, for one, shares your concer the matter of transportation, particularly to the outlying bases. Two old Railway Steamships—the Ex-ANCON and Ex-CRISTOBAL—have alr cently been acquired and are to be operated for our account by the Mats They will help but not solve the problem. How do you feel about familie personnel (and Army) continuing to remain in Hawaii.

At the moment, there are no additional patrol craft that can be f the Fourteenth Naval District. As you no doubt know, effort is now bei to acquire a number of sampans, which should be of assistance in this

DesDiv Eighty (80) is at Pearl Harbor, and 4 AMCs are going forward from San Diego under escort of the TIPPECANOE. We are also giving consideration to supplying some 165' coast guard bots for this duty. I must confess that our preliminary survey in this regard does not appear to be promising. I am keenly aware of your anxiety to save wear and tear on your destroyers, as well as releasing them from patrol duties for the mose important duty of perfecting themselves in other phases of their training.

All of us in the Department are bending every effort to be prepared for war when and if it comes. I know you are likewise using your best effort to make the Fleet seady for all eventualities. Acquaint me with your troubles—I will do what I can—always wishing it were more.

All good wishes—keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

[S] BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 14 May 1941

MEMORANDUM

For Commandant, First Naval District
Third Naval District
Fourth Naval District
Fifth Naval District
Sixth Naval District
Eighth Naval District
Tenth Naval District
Eleventh Naval District
Twelfth Naval District
Thirteenth Naval District
Fourteenth Naval District
Fifteenth Naval District

You will recall my previous letter of 3 October 1940, in which I stressed readiness and not to be taken aback should somebody suddenly start depositing mines on our front doorstep, etc. etc.

I might add that I have no inside information as to what is going to happen or when, but it seems to me now, as it did then, that it is a case of only

WHEN?

The trend of events, and public opinion certainly all tend increasingly this way.

If and when we do get in, my hunch is that Hitler would certainly, if one way or another, attack our shipping wherever he thought it would be profitable, either from a material or psychological standpoint.

I am cognizant of how the sweeper-small craft-net program has lagged, am doing what I can about it; but it never seems enough.

This is just again to remind you all of the seriousness of the present situation and of the necessity of our being ready, to the utmost extent, to use what we have or what we can improvise, should the issue suddenly be drawn.

Plans and machinery for convoy are pretty well in hand but here, too, there may be hitches or slips which, in the last analysis, may only be found by actual practice. However, convoy games on paper by those who must handle the details should be good mental exercise, and may bring to light certain correctable deficiencies.

What will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess; but here, too, there is only one safe course; that is to be prepared, so far as humanly possible. Though the danger of mines, raiding and diversions, and even of sporadic or stunt air attack, may be more remote in the Eastern Pacific, we cannot discount it, and hence should likewise be bending every ounce of effort of which we are capable not to be caught napping in that area. Japan may come in the second Germany does—possibly preplanned joint action. Russia is still a ?

I might add that some months ago (and less than that) our studies here in the Department indicated that if we did not get into this war by March we would be fairly well off in the local defense picture; later it was put at April with assurances that in any case I could feel fairly comfortable by the first of May. Now I am told the latter part of May or maybe some time in June or the first of July. It continues to be just "Around the corner." I think the time is here now for even more personal strenuous effort by all of us, in responsible positions.

Keep cheerful. Heap all the abuse you want to on my head, if it will help any to achieve our common objective.

I trust you are all constantly checking ways for speeding up readiness in every department.

[s] H. R. Stark
H. R. STARK.

Copy to Admiral King, Kimmel, Hart

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10-Dy.

(Received 2 June)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, May 24, 1941.

Secret

DEAR KIMMEL: I recently saw your letter with regard to ammunition. Regret the holiday in training caused by non-delivery and hope we can prevent recurrence.

We appreciate fully your personnel troubles. I have gone over them with Nimitz and trust your thoughts regarding non-disturbance of key personnel can be complied with.

I am sending you a secret despatch this afternoon with regard to occasional visits by small units of your Fleet to the west coast in the interests of morale. While you have not suggested this, my hope is that it will be conducive to contentment. Of course how closely an approved schedule for this could be followed in these times I do not know. I have just finished talking to the President about it and you can rest assured that so far as possible we will see it through. We would leave any press releases on this subject to you, as it is something for which your gang should look to you.

You have probably been surprised over the movements of transports, Marines, hospital ships, etc., to the east coast, which you have, or will have shortly received. Please keep the following with regard to it highly secret, known only to your trusted few whom I assume you keep informed regarding such matters. In this I include Bloch.

Day before yesterday afternoon the President gave me an over all limit of 30 days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for, and to take the Azores. Whether or not there would be opposition I do not know but we have to be fully prepared for strenuous opposition. You can visualize the job particularly when I tell you that the Azores recently have been greatly reinforced. The Army of course will be in on this but the Navy and the Marines will bear the brunt.

I know your reaction will be "Why didn't we get the transports and assemble such a force months and months ago." My only answer to that is that such thoughts are water over the dam, and I am confronted with the problem *as is* and not one as I would like to have had it, and for which I would like to have been ready long ago. I simply could not get authority to acquire and prepare the necessary train.

King of course is active and operating in connection with Atlantic problems—our own and the British. He has nothing like what he would like to have or what we would like to give him if we had it to give. I do not contemplate *for the moment* ordering anything additional to the Atlantic except auxiliaries

in connection with the Azores task and except possibly later four CA's as per Rainbow 5. However, I am not the final "Boss of this show".

In the last 48 hours we have been following the situation closely in Crete; and yesterday and last night the Naval situation to the eastward and southward of Greenland.

My personal feeling is that it is only a matter of time until the British hold on the eastern Mediterranean is very much confined or non-existent.

Only history will throw a full light on the Crete incident. Criticism will be rife but without full knowledge of the facts or at least more than we have at present I am withholding final judgment.

German raiders (as you probably will have learned before this) both surface and sub-surface are now working well inside the generally accepted limits of the Western Hemisphere, in fact to the westward of the 40th meridian. The British escorts therefore get thinner and thinner. The situation is not good. Last night's naval engagement and its train of events will come out in due time.

We are immediately confronted with taking over a considerable number of merchant ships for the Azores task—something I wanted to do as long as over a year ago. Also the Army is asking me to man 26 of their ships. I have been in touch with Admiral Waesche for the last 24 hours and that fellow has come across 100% and is agreeing to furnish 1800 men and 100 officers, which is literally a God-send from our standpoint. These men will include surfmen. The lot should man about 5 transports depending of course on the size of the transports selected.

We have an expedition of flying boats going to Iceland for temporary basing and for reconnaisance of the east coast of Greenland.

In addition we are sending three arctic ships to the Scoresby Sound area to look for German meteorological or radio stations and to remain there during the Summer, besides two other vessels and an Army contingent which are proceeding with the construction of an air field and plane base on the southeast coast of Greenland.

The Army also has an expedition studying Labrador with a view to the possibility of flying planes to that point then to Britain via Greenland.

The ammunition situation on which we are depending on the Army for supply, is bad. Even getting enough for the Azores is a problem. It promises not to get better before Fall.

The Force which we are preparing to go to North Ireland and Scotland on the outbreak of war is coming along in good shape so far as the Navy is concerned but the Army has neither the equipment, the ammunition nor the aircraft to defend these bases; fall again being the earliest date when they can do this for us. Meanwhile we will try and find some way of solving it with Marines and British help if we are in the war before that time. God knows what will happen if we are not in by that time though personally I give the British a longer time than do most people here in their ability to hold out. I most emphatically do not believe they can hold out indefinitely without *effective* aid from us. We are being pressed for ammunition and material from the South American Republics:—not a happy situation—and not to mention British requests for more DD's etc.

The above are rambling thoughts for a few minutes conversation with you, Tommy Hart and Admiral Bloch. I will not try to put them in more logical sequence or dress them up further, simply assuming that you can straighten out the picture yourself as we more or less see it here.

Keep cheerful,

Sincerely,

———— ————.

P. S. When I last wrote to you I indicated by doubts as to the Secretary leaving at this time. Personally I couldn't see how he could. He came to that same conclusion himself and you have been informed.

Tell Bloch that I knew it would raise "H" with towing barges to Palmyra and other islands when we ordered the two tugs to the Canal Zone but that they are essential for the Azores operations.

Referring to your letter of 15 May to Admiral Nimitz of which I have a copy:—I am quite in agreement with your thoughts. The despatch about holding men over-time was not with the idea of telling you to do it but with the idea that if you found it necessary you would have department backing. I think your own estimate is quite correct.

As regards freezing men for the duration—this is something which for years I have thought the Country should have on the statute books and during the

present emergency I have brought the point up many times but without
I am not through trying but I doubt if we can get in a period short of v

/s/ E

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Op–10D– Hu *Washington, 20 June*

DEAR ADMIRAL: At my conference this morning with Admiral Stark he s
he knew just as soon as you left he would think of something which he n
tell you while you were here.

I think what he wanted was simply to plant the thought in your mind o
screen around Pearl Harbor in case of an air attack such as has been use
British around some of their Scotland shipyards or closed harbors.

From what I understand it is something similar to the California smu
and leaves a black blanket and a very uncomfortable one, according to
Kirk, over the area immediately concerned.

The Germans did this at Brest, thereby preventing any accurate bom
even vision of the targets.

The Admiral asked me to get this off as he had to go to conference and
to catch you before you left San Diego; also to give you his best wishes i
all of us here join.

Respectfully,

/s/ J. L. Mc

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
% Commandant, 11th Naval District,
San Diego, California.

In reply refer to Initials and No. HRS/clp

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Washington, June 26,

DEAR KIMMEL: Colonel Maas is going to report for duty with you shortl
He was just in to say goodbye.

He was one of our staunchest supporters and strongest friends, particu
opposition to a single air force, for the United States.

He will fly from San Francisco to Hawaii in one of our 4-engine bombe
were all glad to have him do it and give him a good picture of that type
which he has so strongly supported.

He is not asking for any favors because of his Congressional imp
Nevertheless, I wanted to let you know he is coming and feel that his servi
the Staff to Comairbatfor may be very helpful from many standpoints.

We had a very interesting talk yesterday afternoon from Jimmy Roosev
agreed it was well done. As you may know, he just completed a th
thousand mile flying trip with Major Thomas of the Marine Corps.

This afternoon Wellings is talking.

Am asking Lee to take down the interesting points of both talks to send
Some of them, I feel, will be useful and you should know.

You were made an information addressee on our despatch to Tommy H
reference to the next move which Japan might make. We feel strongly h
her attitude, at the moment at [2] least, will continue to be one of
and wait".

Our information on the German-Russian operations are so uncertain
moment that it would be useless to give them to you. We feel it w
at least a few more days to give any sort of picture.

Every good wish, as always,
Sincerely,

/s/ I

Admiral HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA.
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op–10 Hu

(Received 9th July)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 3 July 1941.

Secret

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Have just written a letter to Tommy Hart and think the following from it might be of interest to you:

"I am still hoping you will be able to put over your thoughts about denying passage of the Japanese through the Eastern part of the Malaya Barrier; but I know from experience in the last War, as well as in this one, that what you say about 'trade and raider consciousness' is very pertinent.

"After a careful study of the ADB report we find that we are unable to approve it. Army and Navy War Plans are drawing up a letter to the British rejecting it, and requesting a new conference be held that will give a practical and realistic operating plan to carry out the purpose of ABD–1. The report has all the faults you mentioned, both in your official and your personal letters, and I do not believe it necessary for us to accept any such ineffective plan. Of course, I will forward you a copy of our joint letter to the British, which should be ready within a few days."

Have just finished a Budget session and am hoping to give you some of the things you want.

I really have no interesting news other than has been communicated to you by radio.

Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

———— ————.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P. S. It looks to us at the moment as you will judge by a despatch you will receive ere this as though the Germans had persuaded the Japs to attack Russia within the next month. It is anybody's guess and only time will tell.

/s/ HRS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Secret OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Op–10 Hu *Washington, 7 July 1941.*

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Referring to the last sentence, paragraph 4–E:

I think if I were the skipper of our cruiser and a foreign man-o-war told the Dutchman to stop I would tell the Dutchman to disregard the order of the foreign man-o-war. Moreover I would lay my ship fairly close to the Dutchman and between the Dutchman and the foreign man-o-war, and let the latter do his worst.

This is not an order; it is just a thought which I wanted to transmit to you.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA.
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P. S. Your imagination may produce something better. I hope it can. My imagination just now is almost beyond the elastic limit. It was working overtime last night in the White House conference, and will again before the night is over.

Keep cheerful.

———— ————.

Op-10D-MD

JULY 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL HART, ADMIRAL KIMMEL, ADMIRAL KING, COMMANDANTS OF ALL NAVAL DISTRICTS

In an excellent paper which I recently read, I was struck by the paragraph quoted below and am sending it to you for further circulation or such use as you care to make of it.

"It is to be noted that the unity and effectiveness of effort that has characterised German operations has been due not only to the organization of the Higher Command and to careful planning and training. *In a large measure, it appears to be due to the fact that the personel of all ranks, including the highest, is imbued with a spirit of soldierly submergence of self in the accomplishment of the common undertaking.* It is suggested that it might tend toward the removal of some sources of friction in our Services if a secret letter on the subject were issued to officers of the higher ranks, down to and including the grade of Colonel in the Army and Captain in the Navy."

The lines italicised particularly struck me.

I am not aware of sources of friction in our Services at the present time. While differences of opinion are bound to crop up, not only between the different Services, but between forces of our own Service, they are, so far as I know, being ironed out. Certainly there is the will here in Washington to pull together which is bearing fruit, and which should ever grow stronger in purpose and effectiveness.

There are many leaves which we can take out of the German book—as well as many not to take.

H. R. STARK

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 24 July, 1941.

Secret

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Haven't much to write about; as a matter of fact the letter I dictated to Tommie Hart this morning contains what little I have and it is darned little I admit.

This is more just to let you know I am thinking about you than anything else.

We are pushing recruiting just as hard as we can and for budgetary purposes you will be glad to know the President has okayed a figure of 553,000 enlisted men and 105,000 marines. Please give us a "not too badly done" on that. But what a struggle it has been. If we could only have gone full speed two years ago but that is water over the dam and I am only hoping and praying we can take care of what we have in sight to man.

I have asked Blandy to acquaint you with the trouble Tommie Hart has had with his mines firing after having been down several hours.

Believe it or not, except for a day or two of scorching heat, we are having delightful summer weather in Washington. However, my fingers are crossed as it is only July.

Am sending under separate cover a copy of the August number of "Coronet". Be sure to unfold the picture of the mountain mirror on page 86. Mrs. Hull said I should make sure you did not overlook it.

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, *U. S. Navy,*
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

Secret

Op-10 Hu 24 JULY 1941.

DEAR TOMMIE: Things are happening out your way and according to schedule from dope we have had in the last couple of weeks.

Yesterday, before Nomura went to the State Department, I had a two-hour talk with him; very interesting, as my previous talks with him have been, and of course he is worried. I believe him to be genuinely sincere in his desire that Japan and the United States do not come to an open rupture. Of course, I have that same desire, but there are many flies in the ointment, and in my talks with him I have not minced matters one particle, or minimized the difficulties, or in any way condoned Japan's present course of action, or hesitated to discuss perfectly frankly the shallowness of some of the reasons she is putting out in defense of her actions. We have had very plain talk. I like him and, as you know, he has many friends in our Navy. Nomura dwelt at length on his country's need for the rice and the minerals of Indo-China. My guess is that with the establishment of bases in Indo-China, they will stop for the time being, consolidate their positions, and await world reaction to their latest move. No doubt they will use their Indo-China bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road. Of course, there is the possibility that they will strike at Borneo. I doubt that this will be done in the near future, *unless* we embargo oil shipments to them. This question of embargo has been up many times and I have consistently opposed it just as strongly as I could. My further thought is that they will do nothing in regard to the Maritime provinces until the outcome of the German-Russian war on the continent is more certain. If Russians are well beaten down, I think it highly probable that they will move into Siberia. Meanwhile, they are merrily going their way and just where it all will end I do not know.

I had a talk with the President after the Cabinet meeting last Friday and again yesterday after my chat with Nomura, and have succeeded in securing an appointment with the President for him today. I hope no open rupture will come, particularly at this time, but it would be wishful thinking to eliminate such a possibility or to think that conditions are getting better rather than worse. However, we can still struggle for something better, and I want you to know that I am.

[2] Your people who have been laying mines must have had an interesting time, but just what the Devil the cause is is a conundrum still. BuOrd went to work on it and did not stop for several hours. I hope the despatch sent you might give some clue but, of course, we shall be very apprehensive until we know. I mentioned it to Admiral Moore of the British Navy who was in here yesterday, and he said that they had the same trouble some time back and found the cause in a defective joint which permitted salt water to set up electrolytic action with sufficient current to fire the mine, and had to recall all the mines that were made in that particular lot. Of course, our mines had not previously had that trouble, and I hope the trouble will be found in faulty assembly which can be readily cured. Any way, here's hopin'.

I was disturbed no end to learn that some of your net equipment had not arrived at Cavite. As soon as we got your despatch, I immediately put Ray Spear on the job. He got in touch with Johnny Greenslade and found that eight (8) carloads of the flotation barrels had been loaded in the Navy Cargo Ship HERCULES (This ship is being operated by the Matson Lines as agents for the Navy Department.), due to depart from San Francisco July 20. He also found there were seven (7) carloads of barrels en route, by rail, due to arrive in the San Francisco area on July 20. Arrangements were made to delay the sailing of the ship a day in order to load this additional shipment on board. This has been done, and the ship sailed on July 21 and is due to arrive at Cavite on August 10.

With the arrival of these barrels, you will have all but 250, which are destined for the 16th Naval District. The Bureau of Ordnance is doing its utmost to get these moving. The contractor (a firm in Conshohocken, Pennsylvania) has fallen down on deliveries. They undertook to deliver 100 per day. So far, they have only been able to deliver about half that number. Ordnance informs me that the 250 drums will leave Conshohocken some time this week.

You are now undoubtedly familiar with the Iceland situation, and I am glad to say the Force is back, and just when the next contingent will go has not yet

been decided. In both the Far East and the Atlantic, there is plenty of potential dynamite.

I may say that the State Department still agrees about the gunboats remaining in China, but of course, it is my understanding that they could not well be removed at this season anyway.

I wish I had more small craft to send you for District service, and that goes for practically every District we have. The small boat program was one of the most difficult I had to get authorized and to get money for. We have several hundred District craft under construction but, like everything else, time is a vital factor. We are just doing the best we can with this proposition. The craft we have converted have been expensive, costly of upkeep, and not too satisfactory, though I am hoping they will get by until replaced by better material.

[3] I think I previously told you I have been pressing for months to take over the Coast Guard, but Morgenthau has successfully resisted until finally he has given away in certain spots; for example, he has just consented to turn over the Coast Guard in the Hawaiian Area to our control. Also, we hope to get seven of their large cutters, which will help a great deal in the Atlantic where King is pressed to the limit to perform the tasks given him. I am trying to get their 165-foot craft which also should be of assistance in the 14th Naval District. Waesche, Head of the Coast Guard, sees everything from our standpoint and is a great help. Mr. Morgenthau in many ways has been more than helpful to the Navy Department, but when it comes to letting go of the Coast Guard, he draws in. However, we shall keep on trying.

I am late now for a conference, and I don't know if I had a lot of time I could really give you anything worth while, but I feel a little remiss if I don't drop you a line.

Harry Yarnell is here and said he saw Caroline recently and that she is fine. My little brood are all well.

With every good wish in the wide world to you as always.

Sincerely,

———— ————.

Admiral T. C. HART, *USN*,
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
USS HOUSTON,
c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California.

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10-MD
Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, July 25, 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: I forgot to mention to you yesterday that you may be called upon to send a carrier load of planes to one of the Asiatic Russian ports. I don't know that you will, but the President has told me to be prepared for it, and I want you to have the thought.

We spent a great deal of time on the letter which you will shortly get, relative to the training of pilots. Before sending it, I had King's complete Okay. As a matter of fact, he didn't change a word of it. I hope it will be equally satisfactory to you.

Sincerely,

———— ————.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Secret
Op–10 Hu

Rec'd. 8 Aug. 1130

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 2 August 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: I am grateful for your letter of the 26th of July. We shall go after it paragraph by paragraph but it may take a little time. It is a good summary and we are glad to get an occasional check of this sort.

Also would be glad if you could give us occasionally a little personnel interest as well as material and I would more than welcome a little conversational "thinking out loud" on how the morale of the Fleet is holding, how the visits to the West Coast are working out from that standpoint, how the target practices are coming along, etc. etc.

We nor the British have no one at the front in the Russian-German war though both the Army and Navy have made every effort to this end. From the press, therefore, you have about as much information as we have. There is no doubt they are willing to pay the price where the stakes are worth it. The next month or six weeks should clarify the picture.

I have written to Savvy Cooke who has been good enough to write me occasionally giving me his ideas which, as you know, I value so highly having gotten the habit when he was heading War Plans here. I am always glad to hear from him. I have asked Savvy to show you my letter if he thinks there is anything in it worth while. Am enclosing copy Bloch might find something interesting. Good luck

Keep cheerful.

BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, *U. S. Navy,*
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Tell Ad. Bloch—I have just directed sending him 12 P. T's—40 knot-craft.
HRS.

Copy Adm. Kimmel
Secret
Op-10 Hu

31 JULY 1941.

DEAR SAVVY: I am grateful to you for your letters and hope that regardless of the unsatisfactoriness of my answers or my failure to answer, you will continue to write;—it seems like old times.

This is going to be short and general. I think you should burn it after showing it to Kimmel.

Some of the things that you have asked, and some of the things which Kimmel has recently asked, and which I will answer as soon as I can, are things for which I have been striving to get answers in Washington. The press on many of these points really gives you as much information as I have.

Within forty-eight hours after the Russian situation broke, I went to the President, with the Secretary's approval, and stated that on the assumption that the Country' decision is not to let England fall, we should immediately seize the psychological opportunity presented by the Russian-German clash and announce and start escorting immediately, and protecting the Western Atlantic on a large scale; that such a declaration, followed by immediate action on our part, would almost certainly involve us in the war and that I considered every day of delay in our getting into the war as dangerous, and that much more delay might be fatal to Britain's survival. I reminded him that I had been asking this for months in the State Department and elsewhere, etc. etc. etc. I have been maintaining that only a war psychology could or would speed things up the way they should be speeded up; that strive as we would it just isn't in the nature of things to get the results in peace that we would, were we at war.

The Iceland situation may produce an "incident". You are as familiar with that and the President's statements and answers at press conferences as I am. Whether or not we will get an "incident" because of the protection we are giving Iceland and the shipping which we must send in support of Iceland and our troops, I do not know. Only Hitler can answer.

The Far Eastern situation has been considerably changed because of the entrance of Russia into the picture.

Personally, I threw into the arena that we consider along with the British a point protectorate over the Dutch East Indies, as a move calculated to prevent further spread of war in the Far East. It is a debatable question. Certainly there can be no joy in our camp over the occupation of Indo-China. I think it is fairly safe to say [2] opinion here in general holds that Japan will not go into the N. E. I. Incidentally, we are not nearly so dependent on raw materials from the Near East as the Public envisages. The real problem is a British one—and hence our consideration.

As you probably know from our despatches, and from my letters, we have felt that the Maritime Provinces are now definitely Japanese objectives. Turner thinks Japan will go up there in August. He may be right. He usually is. My thought has been that while Japan would ultimately go to Siberia, she would delay going until she had the Indo-China-Thailand situation more or less to her liking and until there is some clarification of the Russian-German clash. Also she may concentrate on the China "incident". Of course, embargoes or near embargoes may cause any old kind of an upset and make a reestimate of the situation necessary.

Regarding the Philippines, as you know, even since I came here I have urged increasing their defenses. The Navy's contribution has not been great, but it has been about all Hart can handle with the facilities he has or which we have been able to make available. Still, the increase is a factor, namely 28 PBYs and 11 modern submarines.

We are delighted with the Army move putting the Filipinos in harness; we recommended this. Also it is being supplemented by a considerable number of planes, fighters and bombers. The Philippines are not too easy a proposition to crack right now, and in a couple of months the Army will have 50,000 odd men there under arms. But that is two months away.

As for sending the Fleet to the Far East, I still have literally to fight for every auxiliary ship I get. Tonnage now making the British Isles is less than they need for their maximum effort. There just isn't enough shipping in the world to go around. If we cannot properly support the Near East and the British Isles, it is obvious we could not support our Fleet in the Far East, unless we very greatly slowed up in the Atlantic.

Our trade with South America has been greatly restricted and the pressure from there is another thing I have to contend with.

Recently we asked for some small ships of very moderate draft to supply our forces in Iceland. We simply had to get them, but were told we would have to give up an equivalent tonnage from our recent acquisitions with which I think you and Kimmel are familiar and among which, for example, are the four transports to train marines on the West Coast plus AKs, AEs, AFs, etc., etc. Thank the good Lord, I was able to get the President to hold this in abeyance pending a chance for Jerry Land and me somehow or other, to work it out without taking anything away from the Navy.

Whenever we have a tanker available for ten days or so, we immediately try and help Maritime out. If we send something anywhere and the ship is coming back with any space available we offer Maritime the spare cargo space. The world shipping situation is plain [3] rotten. Sometimes I wonder that with the opposition we have had, (and it is good, intelligent opposition) that we have gotten as far as we have. If any of our cargo ships are coming from Hawaii to the Coast light, we should offer the space to Maritime.

The pressure, incidentally, to give what we have in ships, guns, ammunition, material, and what not, to those actually fighting is constant, and increasing. Several times recently I have been approached for destroyers and the Lord knows what not. Marshall's troubles in this respect are legion and of course the fellow at the front wants frequently what we most lack, particularly such things as 50 caliber ammunition, anti-aircraft weapons, patrol vessels, fire control, guns for merchant ships, etc., etc.

Do not think for a minute that I am not terribly disturbed about our lack of Radar on which I started pushing the scientific gang before I had been here a month, and also the production gang, so that I should think they would hate to hear me mention the subject.

Mike Robinson called me up this morning and said he was sending me a twelve page explanation of what they have done in the last year. From the Fleet standpoint and mine, and of course from Mike's too, we all want more tangible evidence. The fact that our new aircraft carriers will not be available until 1944 is something that is awfully hard to stomach, and I confess to considerable indigestion because of it, but whether or not there is a suitable remedy, I do not know.

The converted LONG ISLAND is promising for her size, in fact better than we had hoped for. We have six more converting which will have much longer decks and be superior in every way. We are keeping at this as a stop-gap but here again it was not easy to get the ships. They will, in all probability, go to the British, if we are not in the war when they are completed. In fact we are doing the work on Lend-lease.

I have been much distressed over the operating troubles we have had with our new planes. Of course they are gradually being eliminated but it takes time. I still am glad for the 200 PBY repeats we early made and which are coming along. Of course they haven't got what the later ones will have in range and performance, etc. Also, performance will be handicapped by armor and protective features; but we will have them, and they have not delayed the newer models.

Towers will have given you all the picture on the air game. He went out a good deal at my insistence. With regard to the air, I know also that the training situation has been a good deal of a nightmare. If anybody can convince us of a better solution than the one we recently sent out, we would be glad to get it.

To some of my very pointed questions, which all of us would like to have answered, I get a smile or a "Betty, please don't ask me that". Policy seems to be something never fixed, always fluid and changing. There is no use kicking on what you can't get definite answers. God knows I would surrender this job quickly if somebody else wants to take it up and I have offered to, more than once. Some [4] generous souls have been charitable enough to ask me to stick. I shall, as long as I think I can be of use, or rather that they think so.

We are doing what we can for China and taking unheard of chances on neutrality; or rather unneutrality. This along with sanctions on Japan make her road certainly not less easy.

Reverting to Japan again and to her holding off in Siberia until the Russian-German situation somewhat clarifies, I also think it possible, if not probable, that one of the reasons for Indo-China, and her pressure on Thailand, is a better position for an "all out" to clean up in China. I take my hat off to the Chinks.

As to the war and what people in this country are thinking; I hesitate to say. However, I believe that the proportion of our population which feels we should enter this war is relatively small, and that with the majority it is still more or less an academic question, perhaps largely because of its distance from us. Whether or not that sentiment might change over night, I don't know.

We are somewhat of a volatile people but I am afraid that the many events which have happened with no resultant definite action on our part, are having their effect. Had the Tutuila been hit and sunk it might have created a wave of public opinion which would have meant something. As it is, nobody seems to give much of a damn about it, although the principle involved is the same, even though there was no loss of life, or sinking. On the other hand, I believe the people would follow the President in any positive action—such as escort—which he might take.

We shall give aid to Russia. However, nothing, to date, has shaken my original estimate that the Germans will take their limited objectives. She is having much more difficulty than she anticipated. Of course I could hope the cost will be crippling. Only time will tell.

I have urged propaganda wherever we could use it, particularly in South America, in France and in Africa. French Africa still has a semblance of independence against anyone who may attack it. There is no doubt in my mind that the Germans could have cleared up in the Near East had they gone in that direction instead of to Russia. What will follow the Russian campaign is still a question mark. Certainly British strength is far from what it should be in the Near East area.

Believe it or not, I am still keeping cheerful, doing the best I can; chafing that I can not do more and wide open to suggestion.

Before you destroy this letter I would be glad, if you [5] think there is anything of interest in it, to have Admiral Bloch as well as Admiral Kimmel look over it; in fact I was going to write Kimmel, so will let this partly serve.

Will not attempt to edit this "thinking out loud" on a busy morning. Please be charitable as to its lack of continuity. etc. etc.

With all good wishes and good luck.

Sincerely,

Captain CHARLES M. COOKE, Jr., USN.,
USS Pennsylvania,
% Postmaster San Francisco, California.

P. S. I apologize for the "short" in the second paragraph. Just got to rambling.

P. S. #2. On second thought, I am enclosing an extra copy of this for Kimmel which he can show to Admiral Bloch, though I confess one fellow's estimate is as good as another and I really wonder whether this letter is worth while, but anyway, as you know, it comes with all good wishes and good luck to you all.

Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; t
thing that is factual.

Keep cheerful.

One more P. S.—I am sending Kimmel the copy of this letter. W
to thinking out loud I was really talking to you all including Admiral
whom I am also sending a copy.

I

[1] In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIO
Washington, August 2

Personal & Confidential

DEAR KIMMEL: I have your despatch giving your reaction to the
requested from you for the commissioning of two new squadrons of pat
and the squadrons for the HORNET, plus certain additional men req
Kodiak and Dutch Harbor. This picture is set down on the enclosed

We know how tight the personnel situation is; also the seriousne
Pacific situation which continues to deteriorate. We have tried to lo
whole situation as it exists at present and as it will continue to confron
or no war, with the expansion now taking place in planes for the
if you will, call them replacements, because losses are bound to occur
get in).

The training problem we have already gone over with you.

The greater part of the burden of supplying personnel for the squad
forming has been placed on the Atlantic Fleet. We have the Atlan
practically at the elastic limit with the demands just made on it w
greater than the demands made on you, and in a situation where they
operating, in many respects, on a war time schedule—keeping the rout
from Iceland under surveillance as one example.

As we see it here, after complying with Bunav's despatches, you wou
with 112% of your allowance of aviation machinist mates, 119% of
metalsmiths, 118% of aviation ordnance men and 105% of all radiom
is an overall picture of numbers in each rating group from the Base For
of 30 June. We realize that the distribution of ratings in each rati
leaves considerable to be desired.

[2] The shore establishments, including four main flight training
have only 61% allowance of aviation ratings, including radiomen. Furth
tion there is just not practicable. Rather must the complements of
training centers be increased to approximately 100% in numbers, by
in order to maintain the training schedule of those stations, and to p
stations to function at maximum capacity, which they must do to meet t
production schedule necessary for your needs.

To man new squadrons we recently called on the existing units in the
for 298 aviation ratings. In addition the Atlantic Fleet is supplying 105
ratings for advanced bases.

Manning these new squadrons is of paramount importance and we
take precedence over duplicate flight crews for existing squadrons.
crews will come in due time, provided we do not neglect training now,
never came if we continue to curtail the training program. Intensive
in aviation ratings and radiomen (qual-air) must be undertaken afloat
in supplying trained personnel for the expansion program. The sam
of all ratings.

Now here's another shock: Patrons 91, 92, and 93 will be formed th
this calendar year and additional rated men will have to be supplied
Tuck it in the back of your head.

Taking up Comairscofor's despatch of 18 August:

1. We are complying with his recommendation (a) that insofar as
we recruit from Patwings Atlantic.

2. We will not reduce your qual-air radiomen below one per patr
In making this concession it is necessary to ask that you increase th
which radiomen are qualified for duty in patrol planes in the Pacific

3. Due to the installation of special blind landing instruments it is c
that radiomen with aircraft experience should be assigned to Dutch Ha
to Kodiak.

[3] 4. Comairscofor's recommendation (d) applies with equal force to either coast. Inasmuch as Patron 84 will be stationed in the Atlantic, we thought it better to organize it in the Atlantic. Of course this picture might change. We can only handle it as far as we can see.

I wanted to give you the above and then ask you to transfer yourself to my seat and what I am up aaginst here, and tell me whether or not you think our original order the best all-around solution to an obviously vexing and difficult problem.

The Atlantic Fleet is worse off in aviation ratings than the Pacific due to the greater demands which we have made on it. The Atlantic continuously fighting fog, long hours, and night work. Many of the Atlantic units are operating from advanced bases along the northern route—Iceland, Newfoundland and New England, with some operations in Greenland.

Nimitz is sending you a despatch today holding up execution of Bunav's serials 1450, 1394, 1397 and 1406 of August 11th until September 15th.

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by despatch. I would be glad to get your reply at the earliest practicable moment. We shall endeavor not to renew demands on you prior to 15 September.

It is a time when a "feller needs a friend", no matter where he is sitting, in the Atlantic, in the Pacific or in Washington.

I am just back from the meeting in the Atlantic. Am wading into a mass of mail which accumulated during my two weeks of absence. Will drop you a line giving you the best picture I can in a day or two. Meanwhile, many thanks for your letters which I found waiting, which were extremely interesting, and which I shall circulate to all concerned. Particularly did I enjoy the interesting news in your letter of 12 August.

[4] I have just dictated the above in the presence of and with the help of Nimitz, Forrest Sherman, Brainard and Ramsey (Towers being away). Ingersoll, I am glad to say, is getting a much-needed vacation. All join me in sending you good luck and best wishes to all hands.

Keep cheerful!

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

Unit	Hornet		VB-8		VF-8		VS-8		VT-8		VP-83		VP-84		N. A. S. Kodiak		Dutch Harbor		Project Roger		Total	
Rate	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A
ACMM	1	1	1	2	-----	6	1	2	1	2	3	3	3	3	3	-----	1	-----	-----	-----	14	19
AMM1c	3	3	2	2	-----	9	2	2	2	3	4	4	4	4	4	-----	1	-----	-----	1	22	28
AMM2c	3	3	2	3	-----	10	2	3	3	2	5	6	6	5	4	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	25	32
AMM3c	4	4	3	4	-----	21	3	4	3	4	7	6	6	7	5	-----	-----	-----	-----	1	31	51
Total	11	11	8	11	-----	46	8	11	9	11	19	19	19	19	16	0	2	0	0	2	92	130
ACM	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	1	0	0	1	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	1	1
AM1c	1	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	1	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	2	0
AM2c	1	1	-----	-----	-----	1	-----	-----	1	1	0	1	1	0	2	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	5	4
AM3c	2	3	-----	-----	-----	1	-----	-----	-----	1	1	1	1	1	2	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	6	7
Total	4	4	-----	-----	-----	2	-----	-----	1	2	2	2	2	2	5	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	14	12
ACOM	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	1	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	1	1	-----	1	-----	1	-----	-----	-----	3	2
AOM1c	-----	-----	1	1	-----	3	1	1	1	1	1	-----	-----	1	1	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	5	7
AOM2c	1	-----	2	1	-----	4	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	10	9
AOM3c	-----	1	2	2	-----	5	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	10	16
Total	1	1	5	4	-----	13	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	-----	1	-----	-----	-----	28	34
CRM	1	1	-----	1	-----	1	-----	1	1	-----	1	2	2	1	1	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	6	7
RM1c	4	4	1	1	-----	1	1	-----	-----	-----	4	3	3	4	-----	-----	1	-----	-----	1	14	14
RM2c	5	4	3	3	-----	-----	3	3	3	3	7	7	7	7	1	-----	2	-----	-----	2	31	29
RM3c	6	6	4	3	-----	2	3	4	3	4	9	9	9	9	3	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	37	37
Total	16	15	8	8	-----	4	7	8	7	7	21	21	21	21	5	-----	3	-----	-----	3	88	87
Total	32	31	21	23	0	65	20	23	21	24	46	46	46	46	30	0	6	0	0	5	222	263
NAP's	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	16	-----	16	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	3	-----	35
Grand total	32	31	21	23	0	65	20	23	21	24	46	62	46	62	30	0	6	0	0	8	222	298

Legend: P—Pacific Fleet
A—Atlantic Fleet.

(Rec'd. 3 Sept.)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, August 22,]*941.*

In reply refer to Initials and Nos. HRS/mjf
Secret

DEAR KIMMEL: When I left I asked Ingersoll to reply to your letter. The enclosed draft I have just inherited. In order to get it off to you in the next clipper, I am sending it along as is, except for some pencil notes (both red and black) which I have just added.

I know you want results, not excuses. So do I. I am doing everything from pleading to cussing with all the in-between variations and hope the picture presented is not too unsatisfactory.

I realize that in addition to this letter I have two more of yours to answer which I shall try to get at the first of the week, if I can clear up urgent, current material now on my desk. Still wading into the pile I found on my return.

There is much doing in the Atlantic in the formative stage. Thank God we should have things in full swing before long and with plans fairly complete. It has changed so many times—but now I think we at last have something fairly definite—may-be.

To your own situation I am giving every thought I know how. You may rest assured that just as soon as I get anything of definite interest, I shall fire it along.

My best to your fine District mate, (Admiral Block) and to all with you, and as always—

Best of luck—wish you were close by

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.
USS Pennsylvania, Flagship, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

SECRET

August 19, 1941

DRAFT w/ Red and black pencil notes from H.R.S.

Dear Mustapha:

Your letter of 26 July 1941 arrived in the Navy Department on the eve of my departure for distant parts. It was fine to hear from you, and I appreciate your laying before me so frankly the thoughts that are going through your mind.

My reply to you has been delayed for two reasons:

1. There was unsufficient time between the receipt of your letter and my departure to prepare a reply, and

2. So many of the points you raised I had hoped to have the answers for upon my return to the Navy Department.

I can readily understand your wish to kept informed as to the Department's policies and decisions and the changes thereto which must necessarily be made to meet the changes in the international situation. This, we are trying to do, and if you do not get as much information as you think you should get, the answer probably is that the particular situation which is uppermost in your mind has just not jelled sufficiently for us to give you anything authoritative.

So far as the Russian situation is concerned, and the degree of cooperation that will prevail between that country and ourselves if and when we become active participants in the war, little can be said at the moment. Some slight aid is being sent to Russia. Five bombers and 200 P-40's have already been allocated. The bombers will be flown to Russia via Iceland and the British are supplying bottoms for the fighters and naval escorts for same. On 11 August 1941, the Russian Mission, headed by Ambassador Oumansky, and assisted by a Lieutenant General of their Army and a Captain of their Navy, was received by Secretary Knox. The Ambassador stated that his country had pressing need for all manner of military supplies, planes - and anti-aircraft guns in particular. He announced that "quantities" of bombs, ammunition, and machine tools were needed. The Secretary explained to the Mission that the material they needed was largely of Army origin, and that there

were no reserve stocks in the country from which to draw. The Secretary summarized his remarks by saying that, since the President had made the decision to give aid to Russia, the Navy could be counted upon to cooperate to the utmost.

You are correct in stating that "the new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be fully explored." This will be done. The conversations which took place at sea between the Chiefs of Staff on 11-12 August somewhat helped to crystalize thought on the matter. Specifically, no decision was reached as to whether or not England would declare war on Japan if the Japanese attack the Maritime Provinces. Neither can I forecast what our action would be if England declared war on Japan as a result of the latter's attack on the provinces in question. Of course, Japanese action against the Maritime provinces remains a decided possibility. The results of such aggressive action, of course, lies in the realm of conjecture. However, it is my own thought that if Japan gets embroiled with Russia over the Maritime provinces, such action could hardly react other than to somewhat relieve the pressure now being exerted by Japan to the southward.

If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, I very much suppose that we would follow a course of action similar to the one we are now pursuing in the Atlantic as a neutral. It is, of course, conceivable that we would lay down a Western Hemisphere Defense plan with reference to the Pacific.

We are in complete agreement about developing Guam and bolstering the defenses of the Philippines. The Army is sending everything it can out there. As you know, we are sending Tommy some PTs. More aid would be sent him if it were possible to do so. I fear, however, that it is pretty late to start on Guam anything more than we already have in hand. We will make all the progress we can, remembering that "Dollars Cannot Buy Yesterday."

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In discussing the priorities in connection with preparatio for a Pacific War, for your convenience, I shall quote the paragraphs in order from your letter and comment on each with follow.

Paragraph 2(a) of your letter. Transports and Light Destr Transports. During the Commander-inChief's visit to Washington, all the transports, including the light destroyer transports, were transferred to the Atlantic. The necessity for this is recognized. Never theless, we still need transports in the Pacific and the need is even greater now (in point of view of time particularly) because most of our trained marines went with the transports and we are faced with an immediate training problem in addition to a possible war situation. The Department has initiated action to complete the HARRIS and ZEILIN and to acquire and convert four more transports for the Pacific, but, so far as is known, has done nothing about replacing the light destro transports (APD's). These vessels were originally conceived and deve oped for a Pacific campaign. They are especially suitable for use in attacks on atolls and may be the only means of readily attacking thos positions. While by no means discounting their usefulness in the Atl tic, the need for them in the Pacific is paramount. If at all possib they sould be returned to this ocean at once. If this cannot be done and only if it cannot be done, additional destroyers must be converte as soon as possible. Work on the large transports must also be exped and completion dates anticipated if possible.

Comment. We all recognize that the APD's were developed with a Pacific campaign in mind. We withdrew them to the Atlantic wi great reluctance, and you can count on their being returned to the Pacific at the earliest opportunity. Likewise, work is being pushed on the HARRIS and ZEILIN. I must confess that progress on those ship has not been wholly satisfactory. ↓ I more than confess - admit it - the whole thing has been a headac It was these old crocks or nothing - Slow as they have been - I am glad o 'em over - At least we will have 2 we could not get now - Every AP has been a struggle - I am keeping the APD's open - don't ga hope - YET -

SECRET

ROUGH DRAFT FOR ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S LETTER August 16, 1941

Paragraph 2 (b) of your letter - Marine Equipment. The Sixth Defense Battalion does not now have its full equipment, particularly AA guns and .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. The remaining units of the Second Marine Division were stripped of much of their equipment to fit out the reenforced regiment that went East. There is practically no marine ammunition now on the West Coast. It is practically certain that these units will fight before the Army will and their needs must be given priority. We can't fight an amphibious war in the Pacific without ammunition for the marines.

We are going ahead with the preparation of a camp in Oahu for five thousand marines. When they come, they should be fully equipped for amphibious warfare. The transports etc., should be ready at the same time. An estimate of when the needed equipment and men will be available would help us in our planning.

Comment. In reference to the 3" AA guns, and the .30 caliber machine guns of the Sixth Defense Battalion, reports received at Headquarters, Marine Corps indicate that that organization has had all of its initial allowances in those weapons since 7 July 1941; that is, 12 - 3" AA guns, and 30 - .30 caliber machine guns. The shortage in .50 caliber AA machine guns should be remedied by September, 1941.

An outline of the present situation in reference to Marine equipment and related matters, as well as an estimate as to when this equipment will be available is contained in CNO Serial 083312 which was forwarded to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet about 25 July 1941. It is believed that this presents as complete a picture as is possible at this time. The bulk of the shortages in equipment and ammunition lies in items which must be procured from the Army. Existing stocks in the United States are at present much too low to meet the requirements of all Services. Proportionate allocations of new equipment for all Services have been made by the Joint Board, and the Navy and Marine Corps may expect their proportion to be delivered from the manufacturers more steadily and consistently in the future than heretofore.

The general shortages in ammunition for the Marine Forces are likely to exist for some time, however, mainly due to the fact that quantity production will not obtain until late in the present calendar year. In the event of an acute emergency, it is believed that sufficient ammunition to fill immediate requirements of the Second Division.

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as it exists today may be specially obtained from the Army.

The present outlook indicates that sufficient personnel will be available by 1 October 1941, to form for expeditionary duty a reinforced regiment from the Second Marine Division, and also leave within the Division a nucleus for training of its remaining units. It is hoped that the Second Division can be completed in personnel by January, 1942.

Paragraph 2 (c) of your letter - Ammunition Facilities. The condition of ammunition handling and stowage facilities ashore are in general satisfactory at the present time. Stowage facilities have been completed, are in the process of construction, or are about to be started to handle assignments of service reserves of gun ammunition, bombs, mines, and torpedoes. This includes igloos already completed and others now under construction at Westloch and at Lualualei.

New construction authorized and about to be undertaken includes four powder magazines and four shell houses at Lualualei, and barricaded stowage for live mines, two new mine anchor buildings and a new mine assembly building at Westloch.

New construction needed to complete stowage and handling facilities includes extension of Westloch dock to a maximum of two thousand feet and the construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch to accomodate target practice ammunition which cannot be stowed in vessels of the Fleet. This latter construction has been recommended to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in recent correspondence and we have no word yet on what action he has taken.

Comment. The Bureau of Ordnance has had all ammunition storage items requested by the Commander-in-Chief provided, except:

(a) Extension of ammunition pier at West Loch. Funds have been obtained to extend the ammunition pier from 600 feet to 1500 feet. Since no authorization will be required to extend the pier from 1500 feet to 2000 feet, the Bureau of Ordnance expects to divert the necessary funds temporarily from other projects for this extension, to avoid delay. The funds required are $250,000, which will eventually be obtained from Congress to repay the project robbed.

(b) No funds are available for the construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at West Loch. No authorization has been obtained for the construction of these magazines. The Bureau of Ordnance will have these magazines included in the next authorization bill to be presented to Congress and will have the necessary funds requested for their construction. The funds required are estimated as at $210,000.

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The following was supplied by the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks:

"The construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch is a new item not previously presented to the Department and we are awaiting word from the Commandant as to his recommendation. The construction of these buildings will necessitate the purchase of additional land."

Paragraph 2 (d) of your letter. The importance of building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board. For the present Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor should be regarded primarily as a "restricted availabiltiy" yard. Overhaul of ships here should not include battleships and cruisers or other ships for extensive regular overhauls. The facilities of the yard should be confined to emergency and low priority overhaul, regardless of overhead costs.

Comment. ~~Building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.~~ The Bureau of Ships shortly expects an appropriation from Congress (Supplemental 1942) to take care of, among other things, all navy yard facilities necessary to repair and maintain the 1946 fleet in war. Pearl Harbor is funded in the amount of $20,000,000 for this purpose, which includes the cost of an additional major battleship dock. This dock, together with the other facilities which will be accomplished with the money, will bring the yard up to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board Report. The time involved in expanding Pearl Harbor to the extent indicated above is as follows:

12 months for 50% of the facilities.
18 months for the remainder of the facilities.
22 to 24 months for the dry dock.

Note: The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Fleet Maintenance - Operations control making ships available for overhauls and set the priority for work at the Navy Yard Pearl Harbor.

The Bureau of Ships has increased the special stocks at this Yard of spare propellers and shafting - it has under procurement, additional stock in tubing for boilers, condensers, superheaters and heat transfer apparatus; additional stock of generators and ice machines.

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The Shore Establishments Division intends to augment the working force as the capacity and work load are increased.

Relative to the repair facilities at the Pearl Harbor Yard, the Bureau of Yards and Docks has issued instructions to expedite all of this work to the greatest practicable extent.

The recommendation to confine the activities of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to emergency and low priority overhauls can be accomplished by transferring regular overhauls of Battleships, Carriers, Cruisers, and Destroyers to West Coast yards but this recommendation is not concurred in for the following reasons:

(1) The Greenslade Board report, approved by the Secretary of the Navy on May 14, 1941, recommended that the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard be built up to take care of 20 per cent of the fleet in the Pacific when the two-ocean navy was in existence and that the yard be capable of handling "full overhauls and damage" with simultaneous drydocking facilities for 2 Battleships, 1 CB, 1 CB, 1 CA, 1 twin DL and a DL marine railway. Pertinent to this is a letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shore Establishments Division) dated June 26, 1941 in regard to building up the facilities at Pearl Harbor and noting that no Battleships or Carriers were scheduled for overhaul at Pearl Harbor in 1943. The third paragraph of this letter is quoted herewith:

> "It is believed it is necessary that capital ships be overhauled at Pearl Harbor if that Yard is expected to perform the war task that has been assigned.
>
> It is, therefore, recommended that in the next revision of the availability schedule, a start be made toward an equitable diversion of the overhaul of Battleships and Carriers from Puget Sound to Pearl Harbor."

~~The Director, Fleet Maintenance Division~~ It is believed that only by actual overhaul and repair of Capital Ships, Destroyers, and Cruisers can the Pearl Harbor organization be trained and made capable of repairing

these ships in an emergency, together with development of necessary facilities.

(2) Repairs to British Naval vessels, particularly the larger types of ships, is absorbing a large percentage of the repair facilities of continental U.S. yards and it is expected that the demands will increase. East Coast yards are being used primarily for this work but it has been found necessary - due to full schedules of these yards - to send some British ships to Puget Sound and Mare Island.

If these latter yards are fully scheduled with our own ships (as can be expected if all Battleship, Carrier, Cruiser, and Destroyer overhauls are transferred to them from Pearl Harbor) it is problematical whether British ships can be repaired and overhauled at the rate that this is now being undertaken.

The foregoing comment ~~by Fleet Maintenance~~ is substantially in accord with your letter L9-5 (50) over L9-3 Serial 01176 of 1 August 1941.

Paragraph 2 (c) of your letter. Provide more and more personnel to the Fleet for training. The personnel situation has been presented to the Bureau of Navigation and that Bureau is thoroughly familiar with our requirements. We cannot provide experienced personnel for new construction next year unless we obtain recruits and train them intensively at once. I realize that recruiting has fallen off and that the Department is doing all it can but we are losing trained men faster than we are getting new recruits. As I stated in a recent letter we could use 20,000 more men in the Pacific Fleet right now. - God knows - and God knows - I wish we could send 'em -

Comment. The present rate of recruiting is about 9,300 men a month. According to the best estimates, about 12,000 recruits are required in order to meet the requirements of the service on June 30, 1942 based on present allowances. (This estimate is subject to variables such as changes in dates of commissioning ships and stations.) Therefore the Navy will lack a proximately 32,000 men necessary for Navy requirements on June 30, 1942. It is estimated that this will be enough men to

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fill complements and allowances on that date to an average of about 92%. The fleets are now filled to about 94% of complements. This centage will drop due to large recent increases in aviation squadro allowances. It is estimated that Navigation can replace losses in Fleets with recruits to maintain them at about the same percentage men aboard to complements as at present. Should be 100+

The recent large withdrawals from the Fleets have been to the necessity of supplying the crews for the large number of aux vessels recently acquired and for the assembly of men for advanced stroyer, Submarine, and Aviation Bases. These demands were superim upon the demands for the regular building and usual purchasing prog

The above estimates are based on a monthly rate of recr of 9,300. Recruiting is now on the increase and additional men over the 9,300 monthly will be furnished to the Fleets. We are spending $1,000,000+ in advertising - hope to speed it up.

Paragraph 2(f) of your letter. Need for a hospital sh the Pacific Fleet and for completion of new hospital at Pearl Harbo

Comment. It is contemplated assigning the SOLACE (AH IROQUOIS, to the Pacific Fleet upon readiness for service, which sh in the latter part of August, 1941. Further, it is contemplated transporting Mobile Base Hospital No. 2 from New York to Oahu in th U.S.S. PROCYON (AK19) departing New York early in October; she is a 15-knot ship and will call at San Diego to debark some personnel an stores there en route.

So far as the new hospital is concerned, the contract this has been let and presumably the work is underway.

Paragraph 2(g) of your letter. Urgency for small craft the Fourteenth Naval District for patrol purposes, to relieve the l on our limited number of destroyers.

Comment. The project is now underway to send twelve P the 14th Naval District as soon as the boats can be prepared and tr portation provided. This shipment will follow the six MTB's going the 16th Naval District via the GUADALUPE scheduled to depart from York Yard about 15 August or as soon thereafter as practicable.

Wish I had more - they will be coming - I know Ka too - but we are doing the best we can - and I am hi all the time.

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Paragraph 2(h) of your letter. The need for acquiring advanced base material and assembling it at Mare Island.

Comment. The project of assembling advance Base Material has been raised to an A-1-a priority, and the assembling of this material is going ahead satisfactorily.

our highest priority

SECRET

Paragraph 2(i) of your letter. Correspondence has gone forward urging that all available light craft in the Pacific be fitted with depth charges, listening gear, etc. This is important.

Comment. In this connection, I quote verbatim the remarks of the Fleet Maintenance Division in order that you may have the entire picture:

"The status of placing depth charges and under-water sound equipment on light craft is as follows (taken up by classes):

AMs and DMSs - These vessels have depth charges and echo-ranging equipment authorized; some have the equipment installed and those ships that have not yet received their echo-ranging equipment will get Model QC Series commencing in September 1941. Too slow I know - but I have been doing my d—'st.

AVDs - Stability conditions on these ships are not good and the addition of depth charges, racks, or Y-guns, and echo-ranging equipment will necessitate compensating weight removal. It is understood that the desired equipment can be installed providing the towing reel on the fan tail is permanently removed. A lightweight echo-ranging and listening gear equipment, Model WEA, has been developed which weighs about 1300 pounds, with deliveries commencing in October 1941.

The following are the requirements for the WEA equipment:

(a) Power supply 115 volts D.C.

(b) Head room required for hoist train equipment about 70 inches.

(c) At least 24 inches between frames of ships to accomodate pedestal.

(d) Remote control of train by means of cables and sheaves, using hand wheel at operating position.

The above equipment is suitable for any installation in AMs (Bird Class) and in most converted yachts. Additionally, this equipment can be installed in any other types of ships having adequate space and power supply.

A lightweight listening equipment (Model JK-9), about 1300 pounds, has been developed and contract awarded for 230 sets; delivery

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commences in August 1941 at a rate of 10 each week. The following are the requirements for installation of the JK-9 equipment:

(a) Power supply 115 volts D.C. or 24 volts D.C. (Two types of motor generators available, producing 115 volts, A. C). Overall dimensions of motor generator set 29½ x 13½ x 11-3/4 inches.

(b) Maximum head room required for hoist train mechanism about 96 inches.

(c) Only limitation or frame spacing is that is pass the 4-inch projector shaft.

(d) No remote control - hand hoist and train directly connected to projector shaft.

This equipment is for listening only (no echo-ranging feature) and is suitable for use in any type of ship having adequate space and power supply. Space allotted to the equipment must provide for the hoist-train equipment (overall dimensions 7'-9" x 26½ x 20"), receiver (overall dimensions 19" x 12" x 15-1/8") and sufficient space for the operator.

APDs - The APDs have the depth charge tracks installed and now carry 24 - 300 pound depth charges. The stability conditions of these ships is so unsatisfactory that they will require 50 tons of fixed ballast. The installation of the NEA echo-ranging equipment, described under AVDs, above can be accomadated in these ships.

AMs and AVPs - The question of installing depth charge and echo-ranging and (or) listening equipment on these types has been referred to the Bureau of Ships for study and recommendation as to the practicability of accomplishment.

It should be pointed out that draft and stability conditions of these vessels is critical and instructions are about to be issued limiting their displacements. Informal information from the Bureau of Ships indicates that compensatory weight reduction must be made on practically a pound-for-pound basis in order to install the desired equipment. The installation of echo-ranging, or listening equipment is dependent upon the delivery schedule as outlined above under AVDs.

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It is to be noted that the lightest depth charge rack now developed (carrying six 300 pound depth charges) weighs about 150 pounds. As each depth charge with its equipment weighs 420 pounds, t total weight of depth charges and track to be compensated for will b about 4000 pounds. The weight of the lightest underwater sound equip is about 1300 pounds as is explained above under AVDs.

PEs, PCs, PYs, and YPs. All these vessels have depth charges, the number depending upon the size of the vessels. Some of these vessels are equipped with both depth charge racks and Y-guns.

Echo-ranging and (or) listening equipment has been authorized and will be installed as soon as the equipment can be prov

Paragraphs 3 and 3 (a) of your letter. Communications. T supply of communication, radio, and sound equipment to the fleet and Shore Stations leaves much to be desired, although a great improvemen has been noted in the last year.

Specifically it is noted that the Kaneohe Air Station was acquired, built, commissioned, and actually operated prior to the receipt of any radio apparatus, except some which we diverted from it intended advance base use.

Comment. Here is quoted in their entirety the remarks of Chief of the Bureau of Ships:

"During the fiscal year 1941 the Bureau of Ships placed contracts for radio and sound material amounting to approximat $110,000,000. The material contracted for included all of the materi listed in the 1941 and 1942 Communication Improvement Plans issued by Chief of Naval Operations and a large amount of additional material r to meet previously unanticipated needs. The funds included in the re 1941 budget were made available in an appropriation bill which became on June 11, 1940, but the bulk of the funds utilized during the year not become available until passage of a supplemental appropriation a c mid September 1940. Considering the time when the necessary funds bec available, and the tremendous increase of procurement effort necessar is felt that the prosecution of the entire program has been as rapid could reasonably be expected under the circumstances. However, it is nised that many needs of the service are of great urgency and that an

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at all in effecting deliveries after needs have been determined is objectionable. Difficulties in obtaining critical materials and components have in some cases caused serious delays in deliveries under contracts but by use of increased facilities all contractors involved have increased rates of production to a considerable extent. It is expected that most of the serious needs for radio and sound equipment will be taken care of within the next few months.

Funds for the initial allowance of radio equipment for the Kaneohe Air Station were included in the regular 1941 appropriation act, which became law on June 11, 1940. Initiation of procurement of radio material for Kaneohe was commenced immediately after the funds became available. Funds for items later added to the allowance became available in September, 1940.

The tabulation below indicates the present situation as regards radio equipment for the Kaneohe Air Station:

Allowed equipment	Installed	To Be Shipped	Expected Date	Remarks
2 TBM	1	1	Jan.1942	
2 TBP	2			
1 TBU		1	Mar.1942	
6 TBW		2	Sept.1941	
		4	Jan.1942	
2 TCA		2	Sept.1941	1 TBO-1 in use
2 TCB		2	Nov.1941	
1 TCC		1	Aug.1941	1 TBR-1 installed
4 RBA/RBB/RBC		4	Indefinite	New type-other receivers available if urgently required
6 RAS	6			
1 DY		1	11 Aug.1941	from NY Wash
1 DP		1	11 Aug.1941	1DN from NYMI
1 Inst. LDG Equip.		1	Sept.1942#40	on priority list; deliveries start Sept.1941
1 RAU		1	Oct.1941	
1 YA		1	Jan.1942	

There are available in the Pearl Harbor pool several more TBR-1 portable equipments which may be utilized to take care of immediate needs at Kaneohe if required. These TBR-1 equipments are not necessarily reserved or intended for advanced base service, but are available for any use at the discretion of the Commandant or the Commander in Chief."

10.

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Paragraph 3(b) of your letter. It took BuEng two years to p "Chinese copies" of NRL's Radar on six ships.

Comment. Here follows the remarks of the Bureau of Ships ar the Director, Naval Communications Division in [illegible].

"The Model XAF RADAR equipment developed by Naval Research L atory was installed in USS NEW YORK 12-18 December, 1938, and was teste at the same time as the Model CXZ Radar equipment developed by RCA Mfg Co., and installed in USS TEXAS. These tests continued through March 1939. Report of tests was received from Commander Atlantic Squadron 8 April 1939. As a result of these tests, the equipment was returned to Naval Research Laboratory for modifications indicated as necessary. For example, the equipment had no calibrating feature installed. A conference was held with representatives of all interested officers of the Department as a result of which it was decided to proceed with the procurement of a limited number of these equipments. The size and wei of the equipment were at the time important factors in the decision. Conferences were held with contractors without delay and a specificati was prepared. The requisition was issued 28 July 1939 and the contrac was awarded 16 October 1939 to RCA Mfg. Co. The time between the date of requisition and date of contract was utilized by the RCA Mfg. Co., to inspect the model, work up estimates, submit bid and by the Bureaus of Ships and Supplies and Accounts to make award. The first equipment was shipped by factory May 21, 1940. It will be noted that the time for dilivery of the first equipment by contractor was approximately 1 months from the date of completion of tests in USS NEW YORK and 7 mont after date of contract. The last equipment was shipped by contractor on June 20, 1940. The dates of installation of this equipment were dictated by the dates of availability of the vessels concerned. A matter over which this Bureau does not have control. According to the records of this Bureau, however, installation of the first equipment was completed August 24, 1940, and the last on October 14, 1940, and the last date being approximately 18 months after the receipt of the report on NEW YORK tests.

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" The Model XAF RADAR, built by Naval Research Laboratory, was tested afloat during the late winter and early spring of 1939. This test indicated that additional equipment should be purchased for trial. A study was made to determine the practicability of installing the equipment afloat; this study isclosed that only ten (10) ships could accomodate the large antenna array without first making extensive alterations to ships or without experiencing serious interference to the radio beam from the ships' structures. Chief of Naval Operations requested procurement of ten (10) production models of the XAF. The earliest that funds could be obtained to manufacture the Model CXAM (copy of NRL Model XAF) was during fiscal 1940. Due to the higher unit cost of the equipment and the extraordinary expenditures of radio funds in connection with "neutrality enforcement", the Bureau of Ships could manufacture but six (6) complete units. When additional funds were made available by emergency appropriations, fourteen (14) Model CXAM-1's were ordered as "stop-gap" equipment pending completion of development of an improved detector - the Model SC." *Long winded - what he wants - is Radars and more Radars.*

Paragraph 3(c) of your letter. For years BuEng prevented research by NRL in any form of radio recognition device and hence retarded the production of such apparatus. The Fleet is still without it though it is under manufacture.

Comment. In this connection, the Chief of the Bureau of Ships states:

" The need for a satisfactory recognition device in the fleet has been recognized by the Bureau of Ships as being the single greatest one since the time of the last war and every idea advanced by the fleet, the Naval Research Laboratory or other laboratories that appeared to offer promise has been thoroughly investigated. This research has fully covered the fields of ultra violet, visible, infra red, radio and sound spectrums. Many systems which were developed to a point which warranted service tests have been tested in the fleet and all have been reported unsatisfactory by the fleet even after modification by NRL and other

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laboratories in accordance with the wishes of the fleet. There has been no lack of funds in this connection. The NRL has been engaged continuously since its establishment in efforts to develop a recognition system. That portion of the statement relating to the preventing of research by NRL in any form of radio recognition device is not one of fact."

It can be concluded that very substantial additions to Fleet Radar installations will be made before the end of the calendar year.

Paragraph 3(d) of your letter. We must have the IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) for aircraft at once. The program lags and on June 14th only 56 were on order from Canada with indefinite delivery date. See "Aviation" below.

Comment. In regard to the foregoing, the Bureau of Aeronautics remarks as follows:

"Currently, the Bureau of Aeronautics is concentrating on the earliest practicable development and procurement of suitable RADAR equipment for aircraft. Recognition equipment will be installed in all service aircraft at the earliest opportunity. One hundred (100) ABA (American recognition) sets are now due for delivery, and they will be distributed to the fleet in the most effective manner possible. Material is being assembled for 1500 American ABA sets which will be put in production by General Electric as soon as a satisfactory service test is completed. 356 British I.F.F. sets have been requested; 56 of these sets are being delivered to the Atlantic Fleet and delivery is rapidly being completed."

The tentative plan for initial RADAR installations in aircraft is as follows:

A brief summary of nomenclature is:

a. ASV MK II - British search equipment suitable for VPBs.

b. ASA - American search equipment including high altitude altimeter, suitable for VPB's.

c. ASB - American search equipment, expected to be suitable for 2 and 3 place planes.

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d. ASV - MKII (Fleet Air arm modified), British search equipment for use in large single engine planes.

e. ABK - American recognition equipment.

f. IFF - British recognition equipment.

g. AYA - American high range altimeter.

h. AYB - American low range altimeter.

i. AI - MK IV - British Interception equipment - multi-place airplanes.

Search equipment (long range British ASV or American ASA) will be installed in all PBY-5 and subsequent VPB models. Initial installations are being made.

It is expected to install ASB (small search equipment) with a low range altimeter in one plane of each section of VTB's. All TBF airplanes will have space reserved for this. It is expected to reserve space in all new VSB and VSO airplanes for the American ASB, and where practicable install this equipment in current types.

Initial installation is now being made of the experimental model of the ASB in an SBD airplane. If successful, a number of these planes will be made available as soon as the equipment is provided.

Steps have been taken to obtain models of the British MK II ASV equipment (modified for Fleet Air Arm) for reproduction purposes. It is expected to supplement manufacture of American ASB equipment with an American version of the modified MK II.

Radio Altimeter (high altitude) will be installed as part of the American search equipment in all VPB airplanes. It is planned to equip one airplane of each section of VTB's with high altitude altimeters and another airplane of each section of VTB's with a low range altimeter for use with the ASB equipment (as indicated in paragraphs above re search equipment.).

Recognition equipment will be installed in all service airplanes at the earliest opportunity. The first 100 American ABK equipments are now due for delivery.

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Interception equipments. Provision for these equipments will be made in a certain number of F4U airplanes as soon as the development in the United States and abroad of models suitable for use in single engine, single place airplanes permits. Pending this development, a test installation is being made of a British LK IV equipment in an SBD airplane. If successful, a number of these planes will be made available for use as interceptors as soon as this equipment can be obtained from either British or American source.

Projects have been initiated to design search and interception antenna structures which are most readily demountable and which are streamlined as much as practicable. Development of American search and interception equipment will stress ready removal provisions in order to result in maximum of operational flexibility.

Plans for further installation of Radar in carrier and cruiser airplanes are dependent on installation difficulties and initial performance. A more comprehensive plan may be expected to be published about January, 1942."

The Bureau of Ships remarks:

"Deliveries have begun on 104 Model AEA LT equipments for aircraft together with 32 model BE/BF equipments for shipboard use. These will be given service tests in the fleet together with 3 Model BI equipments for shipboard use. The first BI equipment is due at NRL September 22, 1941. The contractor is assembling material for 1500 additional AEA equipments and further production will be authorized just as soon as tests justify the step. All of the above is of American design but because of design and operational features it will not operate with corresponding British ship, shore or aircraft types. To provide for this contingency two each of the latest British ship, shore and aircraft equipments are being flown to the United States and will be modified for production in the United States and supplied to all forces likely to operate with British forces. These sample equipments are due within a few days according to advices from the Naval Attache', London. The 56 equipments mentioned in the paragraph to which this comment is directed are for Support Force Aircraft and eight are now in the process of being installed."

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SECRET

Paragraph 3(e) of your letter. Radar equipment for submarine is highly important. I am not informed as to exact status of this but understand development is not entirely satisfactory. There is evidence that German subs are equipped with Radar.

In general, Naval shipboard radio and sound equipment is so elaborate that it cannot be manufactured expeditiously. BuEng should have type plans for apparatus of such a nature that they can get results from industry and not make each new piece of apparatus a research job. Agree

Comment. An omni-directional aircraft detection equipment was tested in GRAYLING on 2 August 1941. Although the results of the test were somewhat discouraging, the equipment showed sufficient promise to warrant its manufacture. It is believed that the development of a directional antenna system will greatly improve the performance of the submarine equipment; this project will be prosecuted. Yes - but when -

Contracts have been awarded for the manufacture of 10-cm surface-ship detection equipment for submarines. This equipment is due for delivery about January 1942. The equipment which is being designed for making night attacks while the submarine is surfaced, is expected to be capable of taking accurate ranges and bearings on capital ships at distances in the order of 10,000 yards.

In order to expedite the manufacture of radio and sound equipment, the Bureau of Ships has frozen on current designs. The delay in procurement of radio and sound equipment is not entirely due to the "elaborate" design; the "priority ratings" for raw materials that the Navy Department is assigned greatly affects the production of equipment. The Bureau of Ships also is procuring modified commercial radio equipment.

It has not been conclusively determined that the German submarines are equipped with Radar. It is, however, highly probable that they are so equipped because it is known that these craft operate with much facility at night.

Paragraph 4(a) of your letter. Pre-Fleet Training. Two units under the Fleet at San Diego, one for patrol squadrons and one for carrier squadrons. More pilots for battleships and cruisers, for training on board ship. Particular emphasis on double complements for patrol squadrons; anticipation of enlisted personnel numbers and training in all categories, particularly patrol squadrons; building up the supply of spare airplanes; accomplishing the training without any further drain on combat readiness of active squadrons.

16.

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Comments. In this connection, the Chief of the Bureau of A tics remarks:

"On 28 July, I signed a letter that embodied measures for t improvement of aviation training of pilots and other members of fligh crews in the intermediate stage that occurs between primary school an fleet squadrons. I hope the effect will be salutary and beneficial i the immediate future. VP-13 will be held at San Diego to launch an i tensive transitional training program in combination with the Trainin Test and Acceptance Unit already in operation for patrol planes. It recognized that further drains on combatant squadrons are undesirable but the training centers must continue to function or the supply of pilots for the organization of new squadrons will not be adequate. E experienced aviation officer in the training establishment ashore wil be released for duty in fleet squadrons as soon as he can be replaced. The majority of the expansion of the aeronautical organization afloat will be accomplished without disturbing pilots already in fleet squad

Aside from transitional training in the larger patrol plane pilots and enlisted members of flight crews must be trained in fleet squadrons whose primary task is their preparation for duty in active batant squadrons. Although every squadron on the West Coast may be assigned this duty, it will be necessary for Patrol Wings ONE and TWO in the Hawaiian area to absorb any excess in personnel that cannot be trained effectively because of insufficient numbers of aircraft and q fied personnel.

There will be an advanced carrier training organization at San Diego in accordance with my letter of 28 July. Additional new VO pilots will commence reporting to the Fleet during August. Any of th pilots who cannot be trained expeditiously on board ship should be re in the advanced carrier training squadron at San Diego for more flyin particularly gunnery, at the discretion of the Fleet.

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The priority accorded to the Army and British heavy bomber programs has been the cause of our most urgent attention. The final action on priorities was decided at a conference between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War which was attended by representatives of the Army Air Corps, the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Office of Production Management. The net result was an A-1-b award to approximately 2,000 (plus or minus 500) additional naval aircraft, and brings a total of 3,596 naval aircraft into the highest priority classification given to aircraft. One hundred per cent spare aircraft are now planned for fleet carrier and ship-based squadrons, and fifty per cent spare aircraft have been requested for patrol squadrons.

In connection with the foregoing, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation remarks:

"The Chief of Naval Operations in his confidential letter, Op-22-B5,(SC) P11-1, Serial 081322 of July 28, 1941, directed Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet to establish as quickly as practicable within their respective fleets, the following units;

(a) Advanced Carrier Training Group, Pacific and Advanced Carrier Training Group, Atlantic--for the Pacific Fleet, in San Diego and for the Atlantic Fleet, in Norfolk, Virginia--Purpose of these groups is to give advanced carrier training to newly graduated naval aviators, fresh from training centers, prior to assignment to carrier units in the two fleets.

(b) Transition Training Squadron, Atlantic and Transition Training Squadron, Pacific--Purpose of these squadrons is to give advanced patrol plane training to newly graduated naval aviators, fresh from the training centers, prior to assignment to Patrol plane units in the two fleets. These squadrons also train experienced aviators in the operation of the model PB2Y airplanes in the Pacific Fleet and the model PBM airplanes in the Atlantic Fleet.

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Experienced Naval Aviators have already been ordered to report to these training groups and squadrons when they are formed by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic. These aviators will oversee and administer the training of the personnal ordered to these units.

By the letter referred to above, Chief of Naval Operations has indicated that during the months of August to December, 1941, inclusive, a total of 130 additional pilots for battleships and cruisers will be ordered to bothtfleets. Also, for the same period, 334 carrier pilots and 598 patrol plane pilots will be ordered to the above mentioned. training units for assignment to each fleet.

After January, 1942, the training centers will be turning pilots out at such a rate that at all times thereafter, we will always have sufficient pilots under advanced and transition training or in the operating aviation units to meet all the fleet requirements, including double complements of patrol squadrons.

Based on present estimates, the output of Class "A" Group IV Schools training aviation ratings and radiomen (qualair) will be approximately 27,096 enlisted men (Navy) from August 1941 through June 1942.

Sixty-five (65) percent of the graduates of these Class "A" Schools have been marked for Pensacola, Corpus Christi, Jacksonville and Miami, until about 8,170 graduates have been fed into the flight training centers, filling their allowances (in total numbers) by about January 20, 1942.

This will leave an estimated balance of 18,926 Class "A" School graduates for the Forces Afloat and other shore establishments by June 30, 1942.

The allowances of patrol plane squadrons have been increased 220% over the 1941 allowances."

Paragraph 4(b) of your letter. New Torpedo Planes. Highest priority — A-1-a — instead of present priority which is A-1-b. There are only half enough torpedo planes now and they are obsolescent, while war reports demonstrate that there may be no single item of greater naval importance.

SECRET

Comment. The A-1-a rating for torpedo planes was not satisfactory to the War Department and the Office of Production Management without unacceptable reduction in priority of other naval aircraft. There is good reason to question whether a higher priority for torpedo planes would have expedited their delivery. The Navy Department will continue to exert maximum effort to expedite the production of VTB for the Fleet.

Paragraph 4(c) of your letter. Conversions for Carrier Landing Training. Auxiliary aircraft carrier conversion was dropped because of time and cost factors. These can be greatly reduced by requiring only the characteristics needed for landing taining. The need for these ships is extreme. Aircraft carriers should not, and in war cannot, be used for this purpose, while new pilots must be properly trained before joining active squadrons if combat readiness is not to be jeopardized.

Comment. The conversion of the U.S.S. ARKFIELD and U.S.S. MT. VERNON to auxiliary aircraft carriers with landing features incorporated is contemplated. Steps are now being taken to procure material and equipment. The actual conversions will be initiated whenever present services of these vessels as transports can be concluded. It is probable also the the U.S.S. WEST POINT will be included in the above category.

Paragraph 4(d) of your letter. A.S.V. (Anti-Surface Vessel) Equipment. This is of the highest potential value. Apparently none will be available for patrol planes until December. It can be carried by other planes, as shown by reports of British torpedo plane operations. It should be provided for every plane that can carry it and much earlier deliveries are essential.

There is an aircraft RADAR project set up in the Bureau of Aeronautics with the objective of providing all necessary equipment that can be carried and operated efficiently in aircraft with due consideration for other essential equipment. The training of RADAR operators is underway so that by the time the equipment arrives there will be trained personnel who are essential for its successful operation. ASV sets will be provided as alternate installations in all carrier planes that can accommodate them and all patrol planes will be ASV-equipped. Every possible source of supply, including British and Canadian, is being investigated to accelerate the program. Three hundred Canadian ASV equipment sets are expected at the monthly rate of one hundred sets commencing 1 October, 1941.

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Paragraph 4(e) of your letter. I.F.F. (Identification, Friend or Foe) Equipment. This is absolutely complementary to and essential for effective use of the Radar for aircraft defense of the Fleet. Without it, the Radar cannot differentiate between friendly and enemy airplanes. There is no definite information on deliveries. No delay whatever is acceptable.

Comment. This subject has been discussed elsewhere in this letter. However, it should be remarked that the Interior Control Board is setting up essential requirements for RADAR equipment on board ship. The Board has been advised to incorporate the identification feature in ship control and fire control sets since ~~there is good reason to believe that~~ identification is a very necessary part of the RADAR installation.

Paragraph 4(f) of your letter. Engines for New Patrol Planes (PBY-6's). Nose section failures have been occurring. Every effort is being made to find and cure the trouble. This should be continued, for it will be no help to the Fleet or to any destination of these planes to get new planes that can't fly in place of older planes that can.

Comment. The Bureau of Aeronautics and the engine manufacturer have been advised of the nose section failures in the engines of VP-14. The loose-coupled shaft in these engines will eliminate the restrictions on operating the engine within the present critical speed range. However, this does not apply to VP-14 but this squadron is being supplied new heavier nose sections which the bureau believes will correct present deficiencies if engine speeds are kept outside the critical range. Only three planes outside VP-14 have encountered failures in the light nose sections. The heavy noses will be shipped from the factory at the rate of ten per week beginning August 11, 1941, with first deliveries to VP-14.

Paragraph 4(g) of your letter. Landplane Field at Johnston Island. This was removed from the project by the Department. It should be put back. It is needed not only as an adjunct to local defense but, more importantly, as an aid to defense against expeditions headed eastward and as a stepping stone for landplane support of expeditions headed westward.

Comment. Funds in the amount of $750,000 for this project are available and the necessary construction work has been authorized.

Paragraph 4(h) of your letter. Keahi Lagoon Development. This will be of very great value to patrol planes in the Hawaiian area. It is the best location for operations of these planes and no other place is suitable for planned patrol plane expansion in this area. Inclusion of facilities for Navy patrol squadrons in this development should be undertaken immediately.

SECRET

Comment. The Navy Department has included Keahi Lagoon as one of the Navy-sponsored developments for commercial seaplanes in the Hawaiian area in its recommendations to the Department of Commerce. The War Department has an appropriation of approximately $3,300,000 for this project and arrangements are being made for additional funds for the dredging which is expected to commence very soon. Navy patrol plane facilities are not included in the prospective plans for this location. Any special facilities for naval patrol planes for the present at least must be of a temporary nature.

Paragraph 4(i) of your letter. Development of the U.S.S. Barber's Point. This approved development is very urgently needed. There is a strong tendency to turn down many aviation shore facility items in this area on the basis that they will be available when Barber's point construction is finished. This makes it more than ever mandatory to expedite the work.

Comment. Your comment on the need for this development is supported whole-heartedly in the Department and will receive the most careful attention until it meets the Fleet's need. Funds for Barber's Point in the amount of $18,605,000 will be available in August and work begun immediately if the bill, now pending in Congress, is passed by the Senate and signed by the President. The bill has already passed the House and has been approved by the Naval Affairs Committee of the Senate.

I have gone into the subjects you raised in some detail because I want you to be fully advised. Don't hesitate to tell us how you think we can help. We want to be of all assistance possible, and helpful criticism is always in order.

You no doubt have seen in the press about our conference at sea. Aside from being a most historic occasion, it was most helpful. It is to my deep regret that time and distance precluded your being present.

With all good wishes, I am

Sincerely,

/S/ Betty

(Rec'd. Clipper 3rd Sept.)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 28 August 1941.

Secret

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op–10 Hu

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Have been trying to get a letter off to you for a week, although what I have already sent you covers fairly well our situation to date. I do, however, want once again to thank you for your splendid letter of August 12th which has been so thoroughly enjoyed by everybody. It gave us a great close-up of the Fleet which was more than welcome.

As of today we have about 262,000 men. Reenlistments for the year to date average something over 70% and the same is true for the month of July. Our advertising campaign for men is bearing fruit and we hope next month to get at least 10,000, and our best hopes might realize 11,000. Our goal is not less than 12,000. Tommy Holcomb expects to reach his allowed 75,000 in March. The goal for enlisted men (Navy) is all I can get, regardless of deficits or what not.

I shoved off the letter on RDF just as it came to me and with the rough notes I had made, and I really should apologize for its form, but the substance was there and that letter, together with the previous table which had been sent out by BuShips will, I believe, give your people the best picture we have.

I note what you say about not resting until you get the patrol vessels you have requested in official correspondence. I might add "neither will I". You know I am keenly alive to your needs. At present we are constantly fighting material shortage and priorities. You are thoroughly familiar with the building program and the dates of completion so no need to comment on it. We are ahead of schedule at present but the steel situation grows more critical daily and at last I believe the blocks are going to be put on unnecessary civilian needs. Our *small* ship program was the most difficult to get started. I was perfectly delighted the other day when some one told me they had tried to buy an electric refrigerator but it could not be had. Another example: I ordered an electric heater for the cottage at the Lake direct from the Westinghouse wholesale people here in Washington, who inform me it is well I got my order in when I did because it was the last one and no more would be manufactured. It has taken a long time to get the psychology started. I say started, because the country still is to a considerable extent, asleep to the efforts required.

[2] I am perfectly delighted with your reaction to the recent directives from the Office of Fleet Training relative to target practices. Of course, Lee was tickled to pieces over your enthusiastic comment.

I have talked not only to Nimitz but also to Carpender, who came down to see me after I had given Nimitz your notes with regard to personnel. You will have heard from Bunav direct.

I am delighted also over your comment about the reaction facilities and hope the good work in this connection may continue to expand until the situation is satisfactory.

I am told an official letter was sent to you on the Defense Battalion situation so will not repeat here.

Once again, thanks for the human side of the news.

With regard to the general situation in the Pacific about all I can say is the Japs seem to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can only intimate to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them but just what they are going to do I don't know.

I told one of their Statesmen this morning that I felt another move, such as one into Thailand, would go a long way towards destroying before the American public what good-will still remained. As you know, I have had some extremely frank talks with them.

I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender.

There is much talk of the Japanese barring ships carrying arms to Russia. I am delighted that when Admiral Hart asked us to make the Sulu Sea a closed area we did not do it although there was some pressure here for it. One of my principal reasons against doing it was because of the precedent which it might establish, and thus give the Japs something to hang their hat on if later they wanted to make a similar pronouncement regarding the Sea of Japan. We have to go through one of those holes in the wall to get to the Russian

Maritime Provinces. This also brings up the case of the so-called neutrality zone encircling the Western Hemisphere. But that, like the recent closing of the Canal to Japanese ships, is water over the dam and I won't bother you with my troubles on those pronouncements.

Regardless of the will to do all you want in the line of permanence of personnel, please keep in mind the tremendous expansion we are up against, and the many ships which have to be commissioned. Notwithstanding the fact that at least some of us foresaw that, regardless of our efforts, there just has to be considerable compromise in the arduous task of building up and manning the so-called Two-Ocean Navy, not to mention all the other stuff from AKs and APs to AMs and ATs.

[3] Not in the way of an excuse, because I am not making any, but just giving reasons, I checked up on one of the battleships in the last war which had been in commission about a year. It has a complement of 65 officers, but of this number had only 13 regulars, including paymasters and doctors, in the entire outfit. The other 52 were all Reserves and temporaries. Nevertheless, I am told those 52 filled their billets very well and that they had a fine ship. I think history has got to repeat itself, and the only thing I see to do is loyally to attempt to solve our present situation and do the best we can with what we have, and I know of no one better than yourself to tackle the job. That is why you are where you are.

I expect all the kicks and forceful reasons you can send me for change and help and I will go just as far as it is humanly possible to do and so will everybody else in the Department.

We all know that Naval personnel will rise up and do better under great difficulties than they will when things are easy and serene (if they ever were).

You will be glad to know that the vibration troubles which, to put it mildly, were cause for concern in the WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA are nearing solution.

I am delighted the West Coast visits are proving so helpful. I hope they will not have to be stopped but only time will tell.

I do not recall for the moment whether or not in previous correspondence I acknowledged receipt of your letter of 30 July regarding using one of your carriers for ferrying planes to the Russians. This is just one of the headaches we have here.

Mrs. Hull ought to be reminding me that she has a mother for whom she has to get dinner because it is 1830. My day is just beginning.

Keep cheerful and as always every good wish in the wide world to you all and best of luck.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS Pennsylvania,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

Op-10-MD
Secret

SEPTEMBER 22, 1941.

DEAR TOMMY: Considerable has happened since I last wrote to you.

So far as the Atlantic is concerned, we are all but, if not actually, in it. The President's speech of September 11, 1941 put the matter squarely before the country and outlined what he expected of the Navy. We were ready for this; in fact, our orders had been issued.

In addition to the incidents cited by the President, other and probably equally compelling reasons lay behind his decision. For some time, the British have found the problem of getting supplies across the Atlantic a difficult one. They have never had enough ships suitable for escort duty. Their forces are thinly spread and, as a result of casualties, the spreading has had to be thinner and thinner as the campaign has progressed. If Britain is to continue, she has to have assistance. She will now get it openly. King's forces, too, are thinly spread, working as he is from 20 South to the Iceland area.

In a nutshell, we are now escorting convoys regularly from the United States to points in the Iceland area, where these convoys are picked up by the British and escorted to the British Isles. In addition to our own escort vessels, the Canadians

are participating. Both forces (Canadian and our own) are operating under King's direction.

This will be a boon for the British. It will permit them to strengthen their forces elsewhere, both with heavy and light ships, particularly in critical areas through which convoys for the Near East, via the Cape of Good Hope, must pass. It will further help the British to meet the ever-present threat of a raid on troop or merchant ship convoys by heavy units, in that it will narrow the area in which the British heavy units will be required to be responsible. Moreover, ships for other possible activities, such as duty in the Mediterranean, etc., will thus be released.

[2] The area which we regard as "our ocean" is roughly outlined as follows: all west of a line 10° West Longitude to Latitude 65° North, thence by rhumb line to a position 53° North, 26° West, thence south on 26°. Unless the Axis powers withdraw their men-of-war from this area, contacts are almost certain to occur. The rest requires little imagination.

The GREER incident created quite a stir. Senator Clark (Missouri) pushed a resolution through the Senate which called for the log of the ship. This, we will not furnish. Mr. Nye (North Dakota) submitted a resolution calling for an investigation by the Naval Affairs Committee into the whole incident. The enclosed is a statement I propose to make—and pretty well gives you the story.

Iceland has, of course, in recent months, taken on much significance for us. Since the President's speech, it has taken on *added* significance. Since July, we have had 4500 marines there, and on Monday last we landed some 6000 Army. While this Army convoy was enroute, the Germans had by far the strongest concentration of U-boats that they have ever had in the North Atlantic. It was so strong and so active that it raised the very devil with a British-escorted convoy, the Germans claiming 28 ships sunk. About half that number is more nearly correct, and admitted by the British. Our own Army troop convoy was in the immediate vicinity of the attack and had to be re-routed by despatch several times in an effort to avoid the area of action. At that, seven SS contacts were had. We should have gotten at least one SS, which was attacked under favorable circumstances.

As to conditions in your part of the world, Mr. Hull has not yet given up hope of a satisfactory settlement of our differences with Japan. Chances of such a settlement are, in my judgment, very slight. Admiral Nomura is working hard on his home government and, while he appears to be making *some* progress, I am still from Missouri. It looks like a dead-lock; but I suppose as long as there is negotiation there is hope.

The press is making much at the moment of the way the Far Eastern situation has apparently quieted down. One cannot help being impressed with the optimistic note of the editorial writers and columnists in this regard. For my own part, I feel that false hopes are being raised. While on the surface the Japanese appear to be making *some* effort at reaching a satisfactory solution, I can not disregard the possibility that they are merely stalling for time and waiting until the situation in Europe becomes more stabilized. If Russia falls, Japan is not going to be easily pried away from her Axis associations. [3] She will no doubt grab any opportunity that presents itself to improve her position in Siberia. If Russia can hold out (which, at the moment, hardly appears possible), I feel that there might be more hope of some sort of an agreement with Japan.

The same sort of false hopes are being raised in our press with reference to the German-Russian situation. There is no question but that the Greece and Crete incidents delayed Germany's move on their Eastern front. I think it quite probable that they intended to move against Russia earlier in the year. If the delay incident to the two campaigns noted above have introduced sufficient delay in their time table, which, coupled with Russian resistance, will permit the Russians to carry on some sort of a front this winter, then possibly those two debacles were not entirely without compensation. The Hun is after the Russ Army. It has proved far more of a stumbling block than Hitler had imagined. However, the Germans are making steady progress. The Russian losses in men and material are great, and production of essential war materials is being much lessened. When the Harriman mission returns from Moscow (Admiral Standley is our senior Navy member), we will probably get some real news. Harry Hopkins saw only Stalin. The Russians Military Mission that is now in the United States has presented very large requests for war materials, and it makes our own planning an ever changing affair.

You now have our reply to your official recommendation concerning the withdrawal of the Marines from China. We recognize the soundness of all your arguments, pro and con, and we put some weight on those questioning withdrawal. We feel that a complete withdrawal of our forces from China would create a reaction in that country and in Japan and in our own, that would be bad. So, for the moment at least, we will hang on. I know you will open it up again by letter or despatch if you consider it should be again reviewed; and it very well may be—there is little that is static in this old world at present.

I would be less than frank if I did not tell you that I am not fully supported in the above view. Tommy Holcomb wants to withdraw, lock, stock, and barrel. I can easily see his point of view. He wants to avoid, if at all possible, "blood letting". In this, he is supported by Colonel Peck. That officer feels that all or none of the marines should come out. Peck is against leaving a "token force". He feels that to do so, we are inviting trouble and that the "token force" can be of little support to the local police. In that, I agree. But, something bigger is at stake. So far as China is concerned, we have "our foot in the door"—the door that once was "open", and if I had the say to, it would remain there until I was ready to withdraw [4] it—or until the door opened to such a point that I could gracefully withdraw if and when I saw fit. I agree that proper timing may be extremely difficult. You may be right that they should come now. I hope I am right in holding on. Ultimately, I hope we may both see alike. I don't enjoy not being 100% with you.

You know how I have long felt about reinforcing the Philippines. The enclosed memorandum shows what is in the wind. Personally, I am delighted, and I am sure you will be, too. I think it should have a pronounced effect in prevention—or, if not, then in execution.

We are awaiting with interest your reply to our despatch about additional aircraft for you and our proposition about giving you some additional long-range submarines. It is, I take it, largely a question of your upkeep facilities.

Take care of yourself. Keep cheerful! And every good wish in the wide world.

Sincerely,

[s] BETTY

Admiral T. C. HART, USN
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet
% Postmaster, Asiatic Station,
San Francisco, California.

Secret

Memorandum for Admiral Stark:

SEPTEMBER 12, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: You asked me about what we are doing for the Philippines:

August 26: There sailed from San Francisco part of a regiment of antiaircraft troops and some reserve supplies.

September 8: There sailed from San Francisco the remainder of the antiaircraft regiment, a tank battalion of 50 tanks, 50 of the latest pursuit planes, and the personnel to man them, which brings the modern pursuit planes in the Philippines up to 80.

September 18: 50 self-propelled mounts for 75 cannon to be shipped from San Francisco, and 50 more tanks.

Today The squadron of nine Flying Fortresses landed in Manila after successfully flying the route Midway, Wake, New Britain, Dutch East Indies.

September 30: Two squadrons (26 planes) of Flying Fortresses will leave San Francisco for Hawaii en route to the Philippines.

October: A reserve of pursuit planes will have been in process of shipment, about 32 in October, rising to a total of 130 by December.

November: Probably a reserve of six to nine of the super Flying Fortresses, B–24 type planes will be transferred to Manila. These planes will have an operating radius of 1,500 miles, with a load of 14,000 bombs, which means that they can reach Osaka with a full load and Tokyo with a partial load. They have pressure cabins and can operate continuously 35,000 feet for bombing.

December: Another group of Flying Fortresses, some 35 planes, goes to Manila.

A group of dive bombers, some 54 planes, also goes.

A group of pursuit, some 180 planes, along with two additional squadrons t build up the previous pursuit group, will be dispatched.
A 50% reserve is being established for all these planes.

G. C. M.
Chief of Staff.

You may have had word of this already:
I gave original to Mr. Stimson.

(Rec'd 4 Oct.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 23 September 1941.

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

Secret

DEAR KIMMEL: This is in reply to your letter of 12 September. I have sen you a copy of my letter of 22 September to Tommy Hart which gives some o the picture as I see it up to that date.

At the present time the President has issued shooting orders only for th Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-area.

The situation in the Pacific generally is far different from what it is in th Atlantic. The operations of raiders in the Pacific at present are not very wid spread or very effective. Most of the merchantmen in the Pacific are of Unite States or Panamanian flag registry. Instittuing any steps toward eliminatin raiders outside of waters close to the continents of North and South Americ might have unfavorable repercussions, which would not be worth the cost to th United States in the long run. The longer we can keep the situation in th Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned.

One of the things you did not mention is what action the United States an the United Kingdom would take were Japan to attack Siberia. The policy o either government under such circumstances has not yet been clarified. In th meantime we are preparing an agenda for staff conversations with the Russian

In reply to question (a) your existing orders to escorts are appropriate und the present situation. They are also in accordance with Art. 723 U. S. Nav Regulations; no orders should be given to shoot at the Present Time, oth than those clearly set forth in this article. I believe there is little possibili of an Italian or German raider molesting a naval ship, but there might be a other "Robin Moore" incident in the Pacific, in which case the President migh give orders for action in the Pacific similar to those now in effect in the Atlanti but that is something for the future.

Art. 723, U. S. N. R. reads as follows:

"The use of force against a foreign and friendly state or against anyone with the territories thereof, is illegal.

The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of th State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizen against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, [2] whereby the Sta or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for th application of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, b must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perfor their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no ca shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application the right of self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a la resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accompli the end required. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishme for acts already committed."

Regarding question (b), we have no definite information that Japanese su marines have ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alask or our Pacific Coast. They may have been near Wake recently. The existi orders, that is not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive s areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States ter tory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such su marines would appear to be our next stop. Keep us informed.

We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt until next year.

The operations of the Pacific Fleet ought not to be considered separately from the operations of the Asiatic Fleet and the British and Dutch forces in the Far East. Furthermore, the Japan-Soviet situation requires considerable attention from Japan's naval forces. While offensives by the Pacific Fleet in the Central Pacific may not draw important Japanese naval forces in that direction, they ought to have an important effect in pinning the Japanese Navy to northern water, or to bases in the Western Pacific, and thus divert them away from the Philippines and the Malay Barrier. By copy of my letter to Admiral Hart you now know that the Army is building up its Philippine Garrison, and plans important increases in Army air forces in the Philippines. Dutch and British air and land forces are also gradually increasing in strength. We are now informed by the British that they plan to send the Battleships ROYAL SOVERIGN, RAMILIES and RESOLUTION to arrive on the East Indian Station by late December; to retain there the REPULSE until relieved by the RENOWN in January; and to send one or two modern capital ships to the East Indian Station early in the new year. These, with one carrier, and a total of four eight-inch cruisers and thirteen six-inch cruisers (seven modern) ought to make the task of the Japanese in moving southward considerably more difficult. It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has taken no action by that time.

[3] I may be mistaken, but I do not believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet is likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under circumstances that now seem possible.

The NORTH CAROLINA and the WASHINGTON are not as yet finally completed and have had no target practice. We ought to put aside any thought that these two battleships will be of any practical use to us before the end of next March, and I would consider it most unwise to reach any final decision now as to which Fleet they ought ultimately to be attached. At present, the need for them is far greater in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, particularly if we are to make possible the movement of British naval forces from the Atlantic to the Far East Area.

With regard to the first and last paragraphs on page two, I believe that, in all probability, the Pacific Fleet can operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly can be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty.

The following despatch has just been brought to my attention. You no doubt have seen it but I will quote it as a reminder.

"Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunaga Retired in interview published in Hochi States Japanese should face future with calm confidence in ability Army Navy repel air attacks x Japan need not worry about weak ABCD powers encirclement plans x quoted as stating he has flown over Guam total sixteen times once this year without sighting single American plane x American air power Far East negligible x prior retirement Matsunaga served twelve years as aviator Commander Ryujo Acagi Tateyama Air Station now Director Japan airways."

In connection with the foregoing would it not be possible for your force to "carefully" get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?

Keep Cheerful.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

P. S. I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying *that conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse.* As I see it we can get nowhere towards a settlement and peace in the Far East until and unless there is some agreement between Japan and China—and just now that seems remote. Whether or not their inability to come to any sort of an understanding just now—*is*—or—*is not*—a good thing—I hesitate to say.

Copy to Admiral Hart.

29 SPETEMBER 1941.

P. S. #2: Admiral Nomura came in to see me this morning. We talked for about an hour. He usually comes in when he begins to feel near the end of his

rope; there is not much to spare at the end now. I have helped before but whether I can this time or not I do not know. Conversations without results cannot last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might, the situation could only grow more tense. I have again talked to Mr. Hull and I think he will make one more try. He keeps me pretty fully informed and if there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know.

Our transports which recently landed a contingent of Army in Iceland will, God willing, in another day be clear of the submarine concentration through which they have had to run and we will breathe easy with regard to them. However, it is a continuous game now and yesterday I am glad to state we delivered our first big convoy to the British after having gone through safely from Newfoundland well into the Eastern Atlantic. We also have a combatant force going up to strengthen the Iceland situation for the next few weeks because of the British situation and the possibility of a sortie of a German contingent which is under surveillance.

I saw a photograph of your picture. It looks great and I think it is a fine thing to have it recorded; the boys will be proud of it always.

[s] BETTY

Secret
Op–10 Hu

Received 28 Oct.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 17 October 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours but from our despatches you know about all that we do.

Personnally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility"; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.

If I recall correctly I wrote you or Tommie Hart a forecast of the fall of the Japanese Cabinet a couple of weeks ago after my long conference with Nomura and gave the dope as I saw it.

You will also recall in an earlier letter when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in August, I said my own judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. I think this whole thing works up together.

With regard to merchant shipping it seemed an appropriate time to get the reins in our hands and get our routing of them going. In other words, take the rap now from the Hill and the Press and all the knockers, so that if and when it becomes an actual necessity to do it, it will be working smoothly.

We shall continue to strive to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it can be kept going I don't know, but the President and Mr. Hull are working on it.

The stumbling block, of course, is the Chinese incident and personnally without going into all its ramifications and face-saving and Japanese Army attitude, civil attitude and Navy attitude I hardly see any way around it. I think we could settle with Nomura in five minutes but the Japanese Army is the stumbling block. Incidentally, the Chinese also think that they will lick Japan before they get through and are all for keeping going rather than giving way anywhere. A nice setup for not sounding the gong.

Kitts was in this morning and I shall have a long talk with him before he goes back.

Off hand without going into the "ins" and "outs" I see no reason for your stopping your normal visits to the Coast. The ships concerned constitute self-contained task forces. We have left it up to you and I am just giving you my reaction.

We have no other news yet regarding the torpedoing of the KEARNY except that she was hit and is proceeding slowly to Iceland. She was deflected from an American escorted convoy to a Canadian escorted convoy which was being hard pressed. Of course losses are bound to be in order. My hope is that they can be kept to a minimum with the curve ever favoring our end.

In August for the first time there was a slight net gain in shipping. Our effort, of course, is to have that confirmed in subsequent months for two reasons—accelerated shipbuilding and better protection to convoys with results—decreased sinkings.

I know how you and Admiral Hart must be pleased with the Army increased air in the Philippines. The Island of Wake is a vital link in this connection. If it is put out of commission it stops Army air reinforcements. I hope we can maintain the integrity of these Island bases and push as fast as possible their completion. You have all the dope that I have on this and know the studies that are being made for alternate routes.

You will be glad to know that recruiting is still on the increase and I can assure you I have your personnel situation always on my conscience as well as most every other situation affecting everything afloat.

Keep cheerful!

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Will add a P. S. in the a : m., want this to make the clipper.

H. R. S.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o *Postmaster, San Francisco, California.*

P. S. Very little news from the Kearny, and we are asking her nothing, feeling that she will notify us as soon as she can. Radio silence may be essential. All we do know is that she was torpedoed in the forward fire room and is now making 8 knots. Not a thing on casualties or beyond the bare facts given above. I will release everything to the press as soon as I can, so you should know almost as soon as I do.

Pinky Schuirmann made up an estimate for me yesterday on the Jap cabinet situation, which sums up my thoughts better than I have been able to set them down. He and I see very much eye to eye on this. I am enclosing copy of what he gave me.

Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of a reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these Island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability and my advice to him was not to worry.

He also thought it advisable that I release him at this time from the aerial photographs I wanted him to get of the mandates, stating that they might be detected and might complicate the international situation I agreed, and he stated that he would endeavor to make them later.

I have nothing else for the moment.

I will send copy of this to Tommy Hart as usual, and I assume also, as usual, that you will show Bloch.

H. R. S.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, October 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the C. N. O.

I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese political thought or action.

The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic maneuvering, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties.

Prince Konoye has been Premier and Konoye Cabinets in office for the most of the last five years. Time and again he and his Foreign Ministers have expressed disapproval of the acts committed by the Japanese Military, but remedial action has not been taken.

Konoye was Premier when the attack on China began, he declared Japan's policy was to beat China to her knees.

The most that can be claimed for the last Konoye Cabinet is that it may have restrained the *extremists* among the military not that it has opposed Japan's program of expansion by force. When opportunities arise, during the coming months, which seem favorable to the military for further advance, they will be seized.

At the present time the influence of the extremists goes up and down depending on the course of the war in Russia.

The same bill of goods, regarding the necessity of making some concession to the "moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extremists" has been offered to the United States since the days when Stimson was Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador.

Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or may move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what cabinet is in power.

/s/ R. E. SCHUIRMANN.

CW/vt

Secret

OCTOBER 27, 1941.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL KIMMEL: During Commander Kitts recent visit here, he and Admiral Stark discussed the enclosed secret memorandum for the Secretary of State. Admiral Stark wished the enclosed copy to be forwarded to you and has directed me to do so because of his own absence from the city in connection with the observance in Chicago of Navy Day.

Very respectfully,

CHARLES WELLBORN, Jr.,
Commander U. S. N.
Aide to Admiral Stark.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
% Postmaster, San Francisco, Cal.

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[1] Secret

HRS/HU

8 OCTOBER 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This morning you asked me what I thought would be the advantages and disadvantages of abolishing the combat zones around the British Isles and elsewhere. You also inquired as to the possibility of United States naval craft escorting all the way across the Atlantic; also as to the disadvantages and advantages that would occur should Hitler declare war on the United States.

The chief advantages to abolishing the combat zones, would, as I see it, be:

(a) It would permit American flag vessels to enter British ports. This would be of some importance now but of much greater importance as the United States Merchant Marine increases in size. The United Kingdom is handicapped for man-power. Any great increase in their Merchant Marine might mean reduction in their output of munitions. Therefore, there can be no question but that it would be advantageous from the war effort standpoint if the United States flag vessels, manned by American crews, could increase the shipping both to the British Isles and to other military areas. Moreover since our ships, particularly those which we are now building, are generally faster than British cargo ships, submarine losses might be expected to decrease.

(b) It is impracticable for the ocean escorts based in North America, whether United States or British, to make the entire trip across the Atlantic under normal circumstances. Furthermore, due to the fact that a large number of submarines have been operating in the Western Atlantic Area, no United States escort vessels could now be sent to the British Isles unless they were replaced in the Western Atlantic Area by British escort vessels. Were some of our ships to operate in British waters it would have the advantage of raising British

Morale, encouraging resistance to the Germans by subjugated peoples and peoples in fear of subjugation, and would give the American people a stake in the decisive war area.

(c) A special feature of the situation discussed in subparagraph (b), would probably be the deterring effect on Italy with relation to a further war effort, and the encouraging effect on the French to resist German demands.

[2] (d) The effect on the German people might be to lower their morale and thus reduce their wor effort. This, of course, might be offset to considerable extent, if, in the near future, they were to succeed in completely defeating the Russian Armies.

(e) It seems probable that Germany would declare war on the United States. The possible disadvantages of this are referred to in the succeeding paragraph. The advantages of declaration of war would be that the United States would be given a free hand in the operation of its armed forces; it would gain important belligerent rights over neutral shipping and commerce; and is would permit the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets to be employed for eradicating German raiders in the Pacific Ocean. It would give encouragement to resistance to the Germans by subjugated peoples and peoples in fear of subjugation. The United States could take appropriate action against enemy subjects, spies and agents within its borders. It would also permit specific offensive plans to be made by the United States Army and Navy. It would tremendously enhance the war effort put forth by this country and we could plan well into the future for the defeat of Germany with some assurance which we cannot now do.

The disadvantages would be:

(a) Until the present strength of the armed forces is materially increased by the programs now under way, the results which would be immediately apparent might be disappointing to the American and other peoples.

(b) A declaration of war by the United States against Germany unless Germany had previously declared was against the United States, might bring Japan into the war as an active belligerent. This would be without question a decided disadvantage because the United States would then be engaged in actual hostilities on two fronts; something we may have to accept, but every effort should be made to avoid this situation. I might add that I believe efforts in this behalf will best be served by our continued strong stand against Japanese aggression.

(c) It is questionable if sentiment in South America will actively support the United States until this country is in a position to make a much stronger effort by land and sea than it is now able to do and until the results of its participation are apparent.

(d) A declaration of war would cause the loss of many of our contacts for information which we now have in Germany, Italy, and elsewhere in Europe. This, however, should not be a determining factor. I simply set it down, as one of the disadvantages.

[3] It has long been my opinion that Germany cannot be defeated unless the United States is wholeheartedly in the war and makes a strong military and naval effort wherever strategy dictates. It would be very desirable to enter the war under circumstances in which Germany were the aggressor and in which case Japan might then be able to remain neutral. However, on the whole, it is my opinion that the United States should enter the war against Germany as soon as possible, even if hostilities with Japan must be accepted.

It must be recognized that if Germany declares war on the United States and if the United States in consequence declares war on Germany, the United States must at the same time declare war on all nations who are Allies of Germany. This is particularly true in the case of Italy, as no distinction could be made at sea between German and Italian vessels. Such action probably would have a very marked effect on the morale of the Italian people. It might be possible not to declare war on such nations as Finland where the possibility of United States forces coming in contact with Finnish forces are remote. However, there are Finnish merchant vessels in operation in the Atlantic Ocean. I do not include Japan as an Ally of Germany—at least—Not Yet.

The foregoing has been hurriedly set down following your call. I thought it better to write it than to give it to you over the phone.

I might finally add that I have assumed for the past two years that our country would not let Great Britain fall; that ultimately in order to prevent this we would have to enter the war and as noted above I have long felt and have stated that the sooner we get in the better.

P. S. I did not set down in the attached notes what I have mentioned to you before, namely, that I do not believe Germany will declare war on us until she is good and ready; that it will be a cold-blooded decision on Hitler's part if and when he thinks it will pay, and not until then.

He has every excuse in the world to declare war on us now, if he were of a mind to.

He had no legitimate excuse in the world (except to serve his own ends) to invade the countries he has.

When he is ready, he will strike, and not before.

Secret
Op–10–MD

NOVEMBER 4, 1941.

Memorandum for—
Admiral King.
Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Hart.

I am just about to get out something like the enclosed and thought you might be interested.

With regard to the *Salinas*, she was hit by two torpedoes, one fairly well aft and one about half way between the first hit and the bow. The submarine then came up on her quarter and fired three more torpedoes, two of which went astern and one ahead. At this time the *Salinas* fired at her—thinks she hit her—and the *Dupont* is believed to have finished off the submarine. This information came by despatch. Detailed reports are not yet in. We are, of course, soft-pedaling any matériel news and have mentioned nothing regarding any sinking or alleged sinking of submarines. We are constantly making submarine contacts, they having concentrated in our part of the northern passage for some time past.

One of the destroyers reported getting a great deal of oil to the surface after a bombing of a submarine, but her written reports likewise are not yet in.

Regarding the REUBEN JAMES, she went down so quickly that we know little. A despatch states that she was hit forward about abreast No. 1 stack. The explosion was so violent that it is possible a magazine was set off. The whole forward end of the ship was detached and sunk almost immediately—and the aft part about 5 minutes later.

When the stern sank, a number of depth charges let go, adding to the number of casualties. Rescue operations were greatly hampered by oil, darkness, presence of submarine, and cold. We published the casualty list this morning.

[2] We have a report that the safety pins on the depth charges had previously jarred loose. This, of course, is being looked into by the Bureau of Ordnance. The above is about all I know at present.

Lessons learned will, of course, be communicated after reports are in and study made.

My best to all hands.

Keep cheerful!

H. R. STARK.

NOVEMBER 4, 1941.

A release announcing the torpedoing of the SALINAS has just been made, she having safely arrived at St. Johns.

The SALINAS was torpedoed on 29–30 October 1941, the day before the REUBEN JAMES was torpedoed. Initial reports showed her speed to be reduced to 5 knots and she had a long voyage to make the nearest port. Obviously, to have made public her damaged condition would have meant a direct invitation for further attack on her in the submarine infested waters through which she had to pass. Secrecy, therefore, was essential and every effort was made to maintain it.

Relative to the above, the following incident occurred:

One of the girls employed in the Navy Department reported to the Officer in Charge of the Office where she worked that she heard two officers telling about the torpedoing of a naval vessel, the SALINAS. She said she could not help but hear them and wondered if it were true.

It should be unnecessary to elaborate on this. Loose talk in public places, over the telephone, in the home, at a party, or anywhere else, except in strictly official circles, may bring disastrous results, the magnitude of which could only be weighed by what happened to be at stake.

It should not be necessary to add that this must stop. Any one worth his or her salt must realize the potential danger of carrying outside his or her office to anyone, *whose business it is not*, anything regarding naval plans or operations, movements or damage to ships, etc.

This memorandum has been intentionally withheld until the SALINAS arrived in port.

(Mimeographed and distributed to Department.)

Secret 22408

In reply refer to Initials and No I.p-10D-MD Received via clipper 14 Nov

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, November 7, 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is in reply to your letter of October 22, 1941. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are in a fine fettle.

Ok on the disposition which you made in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is—What next?!

I note the great desirability of *many* things for the Pacific Fleet—particularly destroyers and cruisers. We *just* haven't *any* destroyers or cruisers to give you at the moment, nor is the prospect bright for getting any for you in the near future. I fully appreciate your need for them. We could profitably employ twice the number we now have if they were available. I will not burden you with a recital of King's troubles, but he is up against it for DDs for escort—and defense against raiders.

The NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON are not expected to be available before March. As pointed out in my letter of September 23, 1941, I do not think any permanent assignment of either, or both of these ships can be made at this time. We are assigning them to King now in the interest of training—arriving etc.

With the possible exception of one division, it is our intention to send the long-range submarines to the Pacific as they come along. As you no doubt know, twenty-seven (27) of the 1525-ton SS are due for completion in calendar 1942.

Due to the urgency for providing the destroyers of the Atlantic Fleet with high-speed anti-submarine searching equipment, 27 of the 29 Model QC retractile domes and projectors have been diverted from mine craft of the Pacific Fleet and Local Defense Force destroyers in the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleet. Inasmuch as the power stacks, controls, etc., for the 29 QC equipments need not be installed in the Atlantic Fleet, it will be necessary for the manufacturer to produce only 27 additional retractile domes and projectors in order to complete the QC equipments required for the ships from which the equipment has been diverted. The Bureau of Ships is being requested to expedite procurement of the additional domes and projectors. This additional procurement should not require a great deal of time since the manufacturer is tooled for this production

Two of the original order of 29 complete QC equipments will be delievered to the Pacific Fleet. Additionally, two preliminary models (one at Mare Island and one at Norfolk) can be made available to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as soon as installation plans for this new type of retractile dome equipment can be completed by the Navy Yards concerned.

I note your criticism of the Gunnery Radar. The Model FA fire control RADAR is the first production equipment for the Navy. This equipment is unsatisfactory because of its low-power output and the short life of the vacuum tubes. Only ten production models were manufactured; these were manufactured for the purpose of tooling the shops for later and improved models could be developed and manufactured. The FA equipment was installed in eight HONOLULU Class Cls, WICHITA, and Radio Materiel School, Bellevue.

The improved fire control equipment is the Model FC. This equipment employs magnetron generators and has a very much higher powered output. It should be understood, however, that because of the high frequencies used by fire control RADAR, long ranges on aircraft cannot be obtained. The long range aircraft detection equipment is intended to be used for the purpose of tracking aircraft until the aircraft are within range of the fire control RADAR. Fire control RADAR will detect and range on aircraft at ranges greatly in excess of the ranges of the antiaircraft guns.

Relative to the two Seatrain vessels which we recently acquired and which are now undergoing conversion for use in transporting Aircraft, they now have readiness dates of December 2nd and December 16th. It is our present intention to assign one to the Train of the Atlantic Fleet and one to the Base Force, Pacific, but if we have to send planes to the Near East, we may have to use these ships for this purpose. We are also going to take over the remaining other 3 vessels of this type and propose to use them un-converted for anticipated transport of planes to Europe-Russia-China-? May have to charter them rather than take them over—in order conserve Navy personnel.

You asked about merchant ship conversions for carrier landing training operations. The field from which to get ships for this purpose is, as you know, extremely limited. However, the best of these have been earmarked for conversion to AVG's as soon as they can be made available. Right now the ones we have in mind are engaged in an *important duty*. Conversion will take 12 to 15 months.

[3] Your study of the installations and defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra arrived in the Department yesterday. It is being routed to War Plans for study. I had an opportunity to skim through it hurriedly, and it looked like a very good paper. It will be of much help to us.

In connection with the aircraft routes to the Orient via a southerly detour, I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I write to Admiral Bloch.

Admiral Lyster, the Fifth Sea Lord, recently visited us. He is quite a chap and impressed us as knowing his job, and being a very able officer. I am enclosing, as being of possible interest to you, copies of the notes which he gave to us as a result of his observations on the manner in which we employ our aircraft.

In addition, I am sending a copy of the notes made by Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten as the result of his observations in the fleet. He, too, impressed me as being a very capable officer. I am sure much good will result from the observations of both of these officers.

Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worser and worser"! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies can not go on forever—particularly if one party can not live with the set up. It doesn't look good.

All good wishes.
Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

British movement of BB to far east area—I hope—will be completed in December.

Secret 22915 received Clipped 20 Nov.
In reply refer to Initials and No. Op–10D–MD

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, November 14, 1941.

removed conf. letter 182
on Fortification Guam

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is in answer to yours of October 29, November 6 and 7, 1941. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are going strong.

I have not been able to get very much *definite* information about Mr. Hallet Abend. I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum which Public Relations had given me about him. I am told by an officer who recently returned from the Asiatic Station that he enjoyed a *good* reputation as a correspondent out there. This same source stated that the Japs had beaten him up in Shanghai and destroyed a manuscript of a book he was about to submit to his publishers.

I had previously seen the clipping from the New York Times, which you sent me, the authorship of which is credited to Mr. Abend. The way the yarn was written, one could easily spot it as a "phoney".

Just what we will do in the Far East remains to be seen. Attached hereto is a copy of our Estimate, which was recently submitted by General Marshall and

me to the President. You can see from it our ideas on the subject. Whether or not our advice will be followed remains to be seen.

If Mr. Churchill's speech of Monday last, given at the Lord Mayor's house, is *the* expression of British policy, it would seem there might be considerable truth in the information given to you by Mr. Abend.

Your estimate of the Japanese bases and forces in the Mandates has been received in the Department. It will be carefully studied. From a hasty examination, it appears to be a very complete paper.

I have taken up with Van Keuren the subject of the listening gear for ships you listed in your letter of November 6. Like Radar, the delay in getting this gear was caused by *getting* or, rather, *not getting* into production. At last, we are "over the hump" and [2] listening gear is coming on rapidly. Deliveries *are* underway, and four (4) or five (5) sets will go to Pearl Harbor by each ship from now on. By mid-December you should have received about 2[illegible] sets. Of course, you can divert these for installation as you see fit.

With regard to the VSO's going to the Asiatic. These will go out, crated, in a merchant ship. Instructions to do this have been issued to Com. 12. You should receive a copy of the order to do this in due time.

Regarding your comments about the desirability of having fight deck merchant ships for use in training aviators for carrier duty:—I agree with you 100%. The trouble is that we just can't get the ships to convert into carriers. The converted SS MORMACMAIL (now the USS LONG ISLAND) is *far* from satisfactory. She should have twenty (20) knots and actually hasn't sixteen (16) knots. She just doesn't have speed enough. She *can* be operated if conditions of wind are such as to give her the required apparent wind across the deck. Unless this condition prevails, she is almost worthless as a carrier.

Incidentally, five (5) of this type are being converted in our yards for the British under Lend-Lease. The large fast ships which we now have and which *could* be converted for the duty you have in mind are currently engaged in an *important mission* (transporting British troops to the Middle East—*obviously most secret*) and will be so engaged for a number of months. I would give a lot if we had those ships *now* converted to carriers and fully equipped for combat purposes.

The only other ships under U. S. registry out of which we could get twenty (20) knots (if we had them) are the four (4) Matsons and the three (3) Moore-McCormicks now engaged in the South American run. We have had our eye on the NORMANDIE. Thus far, State Department and President are adamant. I suppose they *think* that to take her over would, in some way, drive Vichy closer to Germany. All in all, a dismal picture for the converted carrier idea prevails.

The General Board has recently completed a study on Guam. I am enclosing a copy of this paper for your study. I would appreciate getting your reaction to it. Of course, *if* Guam were fortified and developed at the moment, we could make much use of it. One item to which I have been giving much thought and upon which I would like your advice—what do you think of going ahead *now* with the construction of a landing field out there? The thought I have is that we could construct such a field which *might* be of service to us. To be sure, we *might* lose it, but we could build into it provisions for its at least temporary destruction.

[3] The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Washington has been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan will come of his visit. I note this morning in the press despatches a listing of a number of points by the Japan Times and Advertiser upon which concession by the United States was necessary for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis." Complete capitulation by the United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such divergent points of view.

With all good wishes! Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

[1] Secret
Serial 0130012

WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:
Subject: Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attache. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang-Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kuming is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident." If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal.

[2] Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided these troops are adequate in quality and numbers.

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of Naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

[3] The only current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached its projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang-Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

[4] (a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff Conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or South of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

[5] (c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.

(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

[6] That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

_____, *Chief of Staff.*

_____, *Chief of Naval Operations.*

Secret
In reply refer to Initials and No. HRS/Hu Sec #6

received 3rd Dec
#23593 Clipper

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 25 November 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is in answer to yours of 15 November. If I didn't appreciate your needs as well as Tommy Hart's and King's I would not be working almost literally eighteen hours a day for all three of you.

We have sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a two ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason that almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy. It was on the basis of inadequate forces that ABC-1 and Rainbow 5 were predicated and which were accepted by all concerned as about the best compromise we could get out of the situation actually confronting us.

I agree with you for example that to cruise in Japanese home waters you should have substantial increase in the strength of your fleet but neither ABC-1 or Rainbow 5 contemplate this as a general policy. After the British have strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious conditions, opportunity for

raids in Japanese waters may present themselves, but this will be the exception rather than the rule.

It might interest you to know that King strongly recommended his taking the destroyers which we now have in our West Coast ports, and the Secretary was sold on it; however it has been successfully resisted to date. King said that if they were out with you on the firing line he would not make such recommendation, but where they were he thought they were legitimate prey. He, too, you know is up against it for sufficient forces to perform his tasks. Just stop for a minute and realize that into his heavy routine escort work he has added at the moment large U. S. troop transports for Iceland on the one hand, British on another in Northern waters, and still another of 20,000 which have been brought over and are now on their way to Cape Town and possibly to Durban because of submarines operating off Cape Town. Obviously these troop movements are highly secret. We are at our wit's end in the Atlantic with the butter spread extremely thin and the job continuously increasing in toughness.

Regarding personnel, we have at last succeeded in getting the President to authorize our use of draftees. I have been after this for months. Now that I have got permission it will take some time to get it through the Congress as we have to have special [2] legislation to use our funds for this purpose. It has been my hope to use draftees wherever possible in District work and Air Stations, tugs, net layers, mine layers, mine sweepers, etc. etc. Navigation is working to see just how many such men can be replaced, thus releasing men to the Fleet.

Believe it or not, the REUBEN JAMES set recruiting back about 15%. We are increasing our advertising campaigns extensively; not only that, but Navigation is hiring civilian managers to assist in recruiting. Draftees however constitute something sure and I only wish I could have gotten them months ago. The President in giving final approval said he just hated to do it; but sentiment is fast getting out of my system, if there is any left in it on this war.

Regarding permanence of personnel I have been over with Nimitz in detail some to the recent changes and he will write you the details. There is a problem here as well as elsewhere; and while we expect you and want you to hammer away on your own difficulties, just occasionally remember that we fully realize our only existence here is for the Fleet and that we are doing the best we can with increasingly vexing problems.

Your letters at least give us ammunition, if not much comfort.

I asked Nimitz last week to give me the figures showing the percentage of men now on board on the basis of the old complements. Enclosed is a table he has just handed me. It may be poor consolation but at least it is something to know that the Fleet has more men now than at any time since the last war. I do not have the data for the last war. This does not mean that we are at all satisfied with it, but it is something I have been following. I assure you every effort is being made to improve it. It is steadily improving, but all too slowly to satisfy any of us.

One thing I forgot to mention was your "the Pacific Fleet must not be considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the Shore Establishment." I'll hand that one to King. Once in a while something happens which gives real interest. I think I'll have a gallery ready to see King when he reads that, particularly after a recent statement of his that he noted he was getting fewer men and had less percentage of complement than did the Pacific Fleet, etc. etc.

Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

[S] BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, *USN*,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

[3] P. S. I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From

many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be "anything".

/S/ HRS.

Summary—Nov. 25, 1941

Type	Complement fiscal year 1939	Complement recommended by fleet BD	Present complement	Number on BD	% on BD as of Oct. 31 where available otherwise September 30	
					To 1939 complement	To present complement
BBs	19,351	26,563	22,244	19,870	102.68	89.32
CVs	6,990	7,602	7,258	6,902	98.74	91.68
CAs	12,164	18,508	15,878	14,067	115.64	88.59
CLs	11,490	15,860	14,156	12,896	112.23	91.09
DDs (1850 Ton)	3,119	3,990	3,119	2,826	90.60	90.60
(1500 Ton) (8 at 102)	1,536	1,920	1,536	1,346	87.63	87.63
(18 at 191)	3,438	4,392	3,438	3,138	91.27	91.27
(4 at 196)	784	1,000	784	728	92.85	92.85
(8 at 178)	1,424	1,952	1,424	1,312	92.13	92.13
(10 at 187)	1,870	2,480	1,870	1,717	91.82	91.82
(13 at 200)	2,400	3,000	2,364	2,171	90.46	91.83
(1200 Ton) (Asiatic)	1,644	1,898	1,716	1,673	101.76	97.49
(4 at 132)	528	584	536	446	84.46	83.20
(33 at 126)	3,906	4,626	4,209	3,704	94.82	88.00
SSs (4 at 29)	174	192	180	230	132.18	127.78
(22 at 39)	858	946	858	891	103.84	103.84
(23)	1,203	----------	1,203	1,390	115.54	115.54
(6 at 54)	324	348	324	375	115.74	115.74
Patrol Vessels	1,062	----------	1,078	1,109	104.42	102.87
OGLALA	282	----------	320	290	102.83	90.62
ISABEL	84	----------	84	82	97.61	97.61
Totals	76,631	----------	84,849	77,163	103.39	90.94

SECTION B

[1]

COMMANDER CRUISERS, BATTLE FORCE

UNITED STATES FLEET

Confidential

U. S. S. HONOLULU,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., January 27, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: I received your letter of 13 January. You may be sure that I will keep you fully, frankly and probably even critically informed of the situation out here.

During even the brief time that I have had to survey the situation, I am particularly impressed with the lack of Army equipment, for the task of defending this base. This matter has been fully covered in recent official correspondence. I think the supply of an adequate number of Army planes and guns for the defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the highest priority. I will expand on this later. It is sufficient at this time to state that a secure base here is of paramount importance. I have discussed this matter fully with McCrea and he has taken notes on my ideas, and I am sure that he will present them fully.

We have been together long enough so that I am sure you are quite familiar with my methods of doing business. You know how I appreciate the value of conferences. I agree that it is essential to keep the principal subordinates within the command, fully informed of the circumstances as they develop. I shall follow such a policy.

As you know, the Fleet Personnel Board, with Theobald at the head of it, has been giving long and careful study to the personnel requirements of the ships of the different types. I shall probably be required to make recommendations on this subject shortly after I take over. It appears wise to now fill all ships with personnel to capacity, both on account of the needed increase in complement to man the ships, and to train men for new construction.

[2] I now come to a point which I have discussed fully with Joe and with which we are in complete accord. Richardson believes and recommends that under present conditions I should move ashore with my staff. I believe, from my conception of what a campaign in the Pacific under present policies will amount to, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and his staff should be quartered ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District, at least in the initial stages of the campaign. Facilities on the Fleet flagship are not sufficient to provide living and working accommodations for the personnel required on the staff. It is neither desirable nor practicable to scatter the staff through other ships of the Fleet. As I see it, the only solution lies in having them assembled ashore in the district. I have looked into this matter to a certain extent and believe that existing facilities within the district, particularly at the Submarine Base, are such that the staff can be quartered there. It appears that certain modifications and additions to the present communication set-up will have to be provided, in order that a complete communication set-up will be available. Facilities for office space, quarters for officers and enlisted men of the staff can be made available with little rearrangement of what now exists in the Submarine Base. Of course, that would be of a temporary nature. As soon as I have investigated this whole thing more fully and have had an opportunity to visualize the picture more completely, I believe that the correct solution to the whole problem will lie in the erection of a separate building to house the complete requirements of the Commander-in-Chief's staff ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District. I am not prepared to give you the details of this at this writing. Incidentally, in connection with the requirements of the Commander-in-Chief, I believe that he himself should be assigned to one of the official quarters now in the Fourteenth Naval District.

You appreciate, of course, that this question of housing the staff ashore, has not passed much beyond the preliminary investigations. As you know, however, I have already obtained quarters for the War Plans Section in the Submarine Base and that section of four officers and all the files necessary for their work will be moved into those quarters very soon after 1 February. If further study of the Pacific set-up, as I visualize it, [3] substantiates my present ideas, and if the quarters I have in mind in the Submarine Base show that they can take my staff, I shall move from the PENNSYLVANIA to those quarters as soon as they can be made ready. In that connection, of course, you understand that the present facilities on board the PENNSYLVANIA will remain intact and that I shall arrange matters ashore so that my entire staff and myself can move on board the PENNSYLVANIA within a few hours. I shall, of course, be on board the PENNSYLVANIA whenever tactical exercises are conducted and during any other times when I feel the necessity for it. My staff battle organization will require training on the PENNSYLVANIA, and I shall embark on that ship for enough fleet work to keep them trained for any emergency.

If I move ashore and find that the arrangement as I now visualize it is the correct one, I shall have plans drawn up for a permanent Fleet Center ashore. I shall submit the plans to the Bureau and request funds for its immediate construction.

Things are buzzing around here, and I am taking every opportunity and a lot of Joe's time, to get his points of view on many vital questions that are involved in this job. I was sorry to hear that you had an attack of the flu, but happy to know, from the press reports of the arrival of the KING GEORGE V, that you were able to get to sea in the Chesapeake to greet the new Ambassador.

That seems to be about all for this time; but I am sure that I shall have a lot more to tell you in our continued correspondence.

My kindest regards and best wishes to you and your good wife, as always.

Most sincerely yours,

s/ H. E. Kimmel.
H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

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[1] CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET

Secret U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *18 February 1941.*

DEAR BETTY: Your letter of 29 January reached me on 14 February, and your letter of 10 February arrived on board on 16 February. You will note that the delays were due to interference with clipper schedules.

A check has already been sent to the Navy Relief for $39,000.00 and one to the American Red Cross for $9,900.00. This was done by Richardson just prior to his detachment. I trust that the Navy Relief has received it by now.

I will inform Bloch in regard to the search of fishermen and think it an excellent idea. I believe this search has been in effect here for some time.

Nimitz has written me to put not more than 100% complement on any type of ship. I will pass this along to Calhoun, but with the present rates of supply and attrition I see small chance of exceeding 100%.

I wrote Nimitz today in regard to the Bureau of Ordnance requirements for post graduate ordnance officers to be employed on shore, and asked Nimitz to show you the letter when he receives it. You will note that I took occasion in this letter to reiterate the need for additional enlisted personnel in all types of ships. From my standpoint there is every urge to train just as many men as is possible. This is in addition to the need for men in existing ships. The new construction program will, in a reasonable time, make inordinate demands on the Fleet. I would repeat here what I said in my letter to Nimitz, that the condition of the Fleet within the next few months may be of much greater importance to the Nation than the completion of the two-ocean Navy in 1946.

I was delighted to learn about the Army fighters. The first contingent is now on its way, together with certain equipment for the outlying islands. In addition to the fighters I believe it of the highest importance to send just as many Army bombers and adequate supplies of bombs to Oahu as the Army establishment can support with the greatest effort. The need for Army anti-aircraft guns should also be stressed. Active and immediate steps are being taken to coordinate the Army and Navy air effort as well as the ground crew defenses of Pearl Harbor. [2] I had a couple of interviews with Short and find him fully alive to the situation and highly cooperative. I recommend that you keep continuous pressure on this question of Army reinforcement of Oahu.

The full complement of Marines has landed at Midway. We utilized Crudiv EIGHT, Desdiv ELEVEN, and the ANTARES to transfer troops, baggage, equipment, etc. You will have received our statement of the conditions existing at Johnson and Palymra. In this I tried to give you a complete picture, together with the only possible solution I see with the forces available. The transfer to these islands of the maximum numbers you indicated may carry with it very difficult complications, as a sudden call in the midst of the operation might involve serious consequences. As I gather from researches, the orders involve a drastic change from the original conception of the forces to be supported at Johnson and Palymra. I think our recommenadtion to send 100 Marines to Palymra and none to Johnson for the present, should be accepted.

Will study, prepare plans, and be ready for a quick decision in case orders are received for a detachment of cruisers, destroyers, and a carrier to make the proposed cruise to Manila or elsewhere. From my standpoint this appears to be a most ill-advised move. Our strength in destroyers and cruisers is already limited. A carrier can ill be spared if we are to carry out other poposed plans. While my political horizon is limited, I believe we should be prepared for war when we make this move.

The detail of local defense forces for the Fourteenth Naval District will have to be made from the Fleet. This is a further drain on our small craft. In this connection I am recommending in separate corerspondence that you send out one squadron of PTs and one squadron of the new PTC sub-chasers at the earliest possible date. I presume Bloch has his plans for commandeering local craft, but I will check with him and also inform him of the probability that the Coast Guard will be taken over shortly.

Bill Halsey has been bombarding the Bureau of Ordnance in an attempt to get an increased supply of bombs. The copy of their reply, which I think you should read, leaves us with very little hope for early alleviation of this most unsatisfactory condition. In separate corerspondence, which will go forward at the same time as this letter, we are recommending the shipment of these bombs to Oahu in advance of the preparation of regultaion proof stowages. I think we must accept the hazard and possible [3] deterioration which may ensue from shelter stowage. The total lack of incendiary bombs should be remedied at the earliest date.

The subject of reserve ammunition for the Fleet has been covered in various letters. I feel that the number of ammunition ships in commission and being converted is still entirely inadequate to handle the situation.

I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay. We need anti-submarine forces,—DDs and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when they arrive.

After a thorough investigation, we are proceeding to fit existing facilities at the Submarine Base to permit shore basing my staff and myself. Just when I will move ashore depends upon the supply of essential equipment. I have only one object, that is to so place myself and my staff that we can best accomplish the task before us.

To revert once more to the question of enlisted personnel, Theobald's board, in my opinion, has contributed more to the Fleet than any single factor in a very long time. It did a most excellent job and, in the absence of positive evidence that they are wrong, we should accept their recommendations. I have ordered the Medical Board, the members of which represent all types of ships, and have told them to expedite their proceedings. I propose to give you their findings by despatch.

Before the report of the Fleet Personnel Board reached your office, I sent you a despatch outlining the minimum complements prescribed by the Board for each type of ship. In reply I was informed by despatch that the complements recommended exceeded those assigned in the Force Operating Plan for 1942, and was instructed not to install bunks, lockers, and messing facilities in excess of the complements already arrived at by the Department. I am so convinced that the complements recommended by the Fleet Personnel Board are the minimum required to serve the ships in a campaign, and that the findings of the Medical Board will not declare the larger complements to be contrary to standards of health and comfort, that I sent another despatch last night asking for a reconsideration of your decision. Bunks [4] and lockers do not add greatly to the weight of a ship and are not unduly expensive. It is my frank opinion, as stated in the most recent despatch on this subject, that even if complements are not increased immediately to the limit recommended, it is better to install bunks and lockers now rather than do so in the confusion of mobilization, for I am convinced that if we take part in this war we shall most certainly have to build up our complements as recommended by the Fleet Board.

The Bureau of Navigation has forwardeed me a long list of officers of post graduate training, now afloat, wanted by the Bureau of Ordnance for duty ashore. These officers occupy important command, gunnery, and staff positions. I realize the necessity for expediting ordnance projects and I want to help in every way I can. But the number of experienced officers in the ships at the present time is dangerously low. I can not view the detachment of additional experienced officers but with the greatest concern. I have asked the Bureau of Navigation to give me an opportunity to comment on the detachment in each case of officers with ordnance experience, prior to final action.

I also hope that drastic steps can be taken to stop the continuing turnover of personnel, particularly qualified personnel. The detachment and changes of qualified enlisted men concerns me almost as much as the detachment of qualified and experienced officers.

I come to another question of the highest importance,—the supply of modern type planes throughout the Fleet. I am forwarding under separate cover a copy of a letter written to the Bureau of Aeronautics on this subject. I have gathered the distinct impression that the Bureau of Aeronautics is primarily concerned with the expansion program and that the supply of planes and personnel to man the Fleet takes a secondary place. Obstacles are offered to most of Halsey's recommendations. I cannot subscribe to these views. We must have the most modern planes in our carriers and other surface vessels, in fact in all the aeronautical organization afloat. I realize of course the necessity for personnel ashore, particularly in the aeronautical organization, to train new personnel and to produce the material. But the balance should be maintained, and in any event the latest type planes should be supplied the Fleets. The forces afloat have repeatedly recommended the acquisition of two or more "seatrain" vessels to transport airplanes. I am not familiar with the technical difficulties involved, but if it is at all possible to do so—and Halsey in- [5] sists that it is—I think this work should be undertaken at once. The recent required use of carriers to transport Army planes to Oahu illustrates the necessity for providing some means for airplane transport. Transporting planes and equipment by carrier is highly expensive, both in lost training of flyers and non-availability of carrier for other duty.

We are going ahead with Plan Dog and RAINBOW THREE. Prior to the receipt of the letters received in the mail yesterday we had given priority to Plan Dog, but as you state you wish priority to be given RAINBOW THREE, we will do so.

The necessity for additional store ships and transports is accentuated by placing Marines on the outlying islands and I hope nothing will stand in the way to promptly supply those now planned, and to further increase them as soon as practicable.

I shall decide upon the distribution of the exploders after consultation with Withers and Draemel.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,

/S/ H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy.
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

P. S. We receive through radio and other intelligence rather reliable reports on the positions of Japanese merchant ships, but we have no definite information on the important Japanese *trade routes.* Can you send us the latest information you have on this? I am initiating separate correspondence on this topic.

I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?

HEK.

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[1] CinC File No.
SECRET
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

U. S. Submarine Base,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 22, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: So far I have not felt the need for a Public Relations Officer on my Staff. Situated as we are, the majority of this work has been very successfully handled by the District under Admiral Bloch. We have been in perfect accord as to what should and should not be released. From the standpoint of the newspaper and publicity men the situation may not be as satisfactory as it is from my standpoint. I can see where the services of a man like Waldo Drake could be of great value to the Service. So my answer is that if you can

send Waldo Drake out here to serve on my staff, I will be very glad to have him. An individual with less experience might do more harm than good.

We have been very much gratified at the responses to the items I enumerated in my letter of February 18. However, there is one outstanding deficiency that still exists in the Fleet—namely, permanency of personnel. The detachment of officers and men continues. I have written at length to Nimitz on this subject. I understand in some degree the personnel problem that confronts you and Nimitz. I feel that the establishment of a nucleus of trained and experienced officers and men in each ship of the Fleet is vital. This nucleus should include the Captain, Executive Officer, Heads of Departments and as many other key officers as the Bureau feels they can retain in the ship for the duration of the emergency. For the enlisted personnel the same principle should govern, particularly as regards Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers First Class. We cannot produce a satisfactory state of battle efficiency unless we have some degree of permanency in this nucleus of personnel. We must have on board a certain number of officers and men who know the ship, know the organization and who can whip the new personnel into shape by guiding their efforts. I know that you and Nimitz are doing all that you can but I cannot refrain from calling your attention to it once more.

Is it not possible to obtain legislation which will stop the discharge of qualified men and permit them to remain in their present billets?

I have now been established in my office on shore for some little time and things are working very smoothly. I am of course prepared to move aboard ship on very short notice.

[2] I know you are cognizant of the condition in the Carriers, as I have detailed it in various official correspondence. The effect of detachment of a carrier or any light forces from this command will affect the operations out of all proportion to the apparent fighting strength of the forces detached. This I know you will understand and in anything that you do I know you will carefully weight all the factors involved.

Admiral Danckwarts spent a couple of days with us and gave me considerable information which is of value. I did not, however, commit myself in any way and tried to avoid talking too much.

My kindest regards and best wishes to you.

We are all cheerful.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL.

P. S. I must urge you once more to do all in your power to fill the ships with enlisted personnel to the limit of their capacity. Our ideas on this subject have been submitted in great detail. The last submitted about two weeks ago was the report of our medical board on this subject.

/s/ KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

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[1] Confidential
Via Clipper Air Mail

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. SUBMARINE BASE,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., May 5, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: I have your despatch in regard to the proposed visit of the Secretary. I am forwarding an official letter on this subject in this same mail. I think we will be able to give him an interesting time out here. I indicated the time that he might spend at sea if he so desires. I imagine, however, when we make up the final schedule he will probably want to spend more time in port than I have indicated in my official letter. There are a great many developments in and around the Pearl Harbor area that he should see and in which I am sure he will be very much interested. A perfectly enormous amount of work has been accomplished in this district and it is all going ahead full blast at the present time.

We had planned rather extensive tactical maneuvers for Task Forces ONE TWO and THREE which involved a trip to Midway by Task Force ONE and to

Palmyra by Task Force TWO. When I received your letter in regard to certain ship movements we decided to curtail these operations and to maintain Task Forces ONE and TWO in the immediate vicinity of Oahu. I do not want to be caught short in the event of any sudden demands.

Tell the Secretary that I will be very pleased indeed to see him. I am endeavoring to keep you informed primarily by official correspondence of the needs of the Fleet. I believe you are fully cognizant of all the problems. As you know, our principal problem out here is one of supply, particularly to outlying bases. Our food ships, store ships, oilers and ammunition ships are barely adequate now and this would be the cause of concern in the event of hostilities. I know you are doing all you can along this line. The transports are coming along very slowly. Brown goes to the Coast with a minimum force, starting in a few days to look over the progress of the landing force needs and to conduct the scheduled exercise at San Clemente. It looks now as though King's estimate that an AK will be required to accompany each division of transports to transport equipment, particularly landing boats, is absolutely correct. I feel that in any landing exercises that we may undertake, it should be done only when we have ample equipment and personnel to pursue our objectives to a successful conclusion, even in the event of the loss of very important units. In other words the landing should not be attempted until we have what amounts to an overwhelming force capable of a simultaneous landing.

[2] We are losing quite a percentage of experienced enlisted men who, upon the expiration of their enlistment, go into civil life to accept the high wages now prevailing. This is a cause of concern and I repeat again something should be done to retain these men. The only method I can see is by congressional legislation of some kind. We are attempting to use every bit of Fleet transportation from the West Coast to Honolulu to bring personnel and supplies out here. I believe you might help things if you would indicate to the material bureaus the shortage of shipping in order that they might go out of their way to meet our demands as to cargo such as bombs and ammunition. The type of incident I have in mind is the shipment of the supply of bombs from N. A. S., San Diego, which we finally straightened out with the Bureau of Ordnance after the exchange of several despatches.

I hope Nimitz is taking our idea of nucleus crews seriously. This applies to officers as well as men. We must have sufficient experienced men in key positions in the ship who know the ship in order to properly train the young reserve officers and the recruits. Of course, this is over and above the urgent necessity to keep these ships in a condition to meet an emergency. Briefly I think if some twenty percent of the complement could be considered permanently assigned to the ships that it would help things enormously. I shall send forward our ideas on this subject in a more definite form shortly.

I know the demands upon you for patrol craft of all descriptions but I must again bring to your attention the urgent need in this area for some patrol craft fitted with listening gear and carrying a few depth charges. The demands upon destroyers would then be somewhat relieved and they fould have time to perfect themselves in other phases of their training.

My kindest regards and best wishes to you always.

Most sincerely yours,

/s/ Kimmel.
H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Air Mail

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

[1] Cincpac File No.

Confidential U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *May 16, 1941.*

DEAR BETTY: The ammunition situation continues unsatisfactory and is a source of concern to me in regard to gunnery school and target practice ammunition as it effects training, and mobilization and reserve service ammunition as it effects the general readiness of the Fleet. The problem as we see it here is

chiefly one of transportation, since in general the ammunition is available but i where we can get at it.

Late in the winter I asked that guunery school ammunition be delivered the Hawaiian Area not later than 2 June, 1941 and that certain target practi amunition be delivered here for use early in the gunnery year. Action on tl request was an order to assemble gunnery school ammunition at N. A. D. Ma Island by 15 May 1941, with the request that it be delivered to Pearl Harb by vessels of the Fleet since no other transportation was available, and an ord for shipment of a large part of the required target practice ammunition by PYI and LASSEN from the East Coast by loading various vessels of the Base For with gunnery school amunition as it is assembled at Mare Island during th month, we are in a fair way of getting enough of it here by 2 June to commen gunnery school firings.

In view of the fact that PYRO and LASSEN were not scheduled to arrive befo the end of July I requested by despatch that target practice ammunition shipped by rail across country so that it too could be transported here by vess of the Fleet, stating that we could use this ammunition as soon as delivered. Th request was not approved for reasons best known to the Department. Since t LASSEN is now scheduled to arrive here about 21 July, with a part of this amm nition, and the PYRO about 11 August, with the remainder, there will be a peri of approximately two months during which the Fleet will be deprived of gu nery training except for gunnery school firings.

Since PYRO and LASSEN are already loading on the East Coast no furth action to expedite shipment of target practice ammunition appears feasible, a we shall have to accept the handicap in training imposed by the lack of this amm nition. This is already water over the dam and I mention it only because I fe the time has come when the long haul of ammunition between the East and We Coasts by amunition ships should cease and full use be made of rail transport tion to place needed amunition at West Coast ports where we can get at it. O viously in the event of hostilities water transportation of ammunition from t East to the West Coast will be too slow and risky.

The shortage of machine gun ammunition, particularly .50 caliber, has plac us in a very serious position. Upon the urging of the Department I recommend a cut to the minimum possible allowance per gun for annual training and pr posed to transfer all type gunnery school machine gun allowances to the Fle Machine Gun School. Type gunnery [2] school allowances of machi gun ammunition have since been eliminated entirely, and we now find ourselv in the position where the Fleet Machine Gun School has only enough ammu tion to last until 10 June. On that date we shall be forced to close down t Fleet Machine Gun School unless more ammunition is made available.

I stress the urgent need for early delivery of target ammunition in amp quantities because the turnover of personnel continues high and I can see improvement in the near future. The only way we can counteract this and gi adequate training to large masses of green personnel is to provide ammuniti for frequent firings.

I have stressed gunnery school and target practice ammunition because up the opening of hostilities they may be considered our first requirement, and w can only hope that the last increments of mobilization supply, which are on the way, arrive in time. So far as mobilization supply is concerned the battleshi and heavy cruisers are well fixed. The light cruisers and destroyers are sti short, particularly in 6", 5" anti-aircraft and depth charges, although a munition orders indicate that by midsummer deficiencies will be made up. this connection it is suggested, when forces are moved from the Pacific to t Atlantic, that the Bureau of Ordnance be informed as early as it is practicable do so, in order that final increments of mobilization ammunition, and target pra tice ammunition for that matter, loaded in ships for delivery to Pearl Harbor m be diverted at West Coast ports and not brought out here.

The situation in regard to reserve service ammunition is entirely unsatisfactor Here again I realize it is largely a matter of transportation and that reser service ammunition must come after mobilization ammunition. When PYB becomes available as a ship of the Base Force she can be used in shuttle tri to the coast to bring up our reserve supply. We are making every effort to tran port ammunition of all kinds in vessels of the Fleet, and I am happy to no that the Naval Air Station San Diego was permitted to give up some aircra bombs for transportation out here in ENTERPRISE. Also an order to ship 1,0 depth charge from Howthorne was a great help. These will be transported ships of the Fleet.

Once we are over the midsummer hump we shall be in a much better position, *provided* the inevitable does not happen first. Even then, however, the supply of reserves will be critical and the use of rail transportation urgent.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely,

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to Rear Admiral Blandy.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinC File No. A16/0828
Secret
From: CinC
To: OpNav
Subj: Survey of Conditions in Pac. Ft.

26 MAY 1941.

I. PERSONNEL.

(a) *Stability.* A most important, perhaps the most important factor in the day by day readiness of the Pacific Fleet is the question of stabilizing personnel—both officers and men. The Fleet is doing all it can, and is making good progress, in absorbing new men and training new officers, but facts are facts and neither the Fleet nor the individual ships can be a coordinated war machine if the present rapid turnover of personnel is continued.

(b) *Permanency of Officer Personnel.* Regular and experienced officers have been detached at an alarming rate. Cooke, for example, who came to the PENNSYLVANIA the latter part of February, is fourth on the list of twelve battleship captains in time on present billet. Executive officers are going, if anything even more frequently. The situation is no better in cruisers. There appears to be a tendency to give priority in importance to shore duty over sea duty; witness, transfer of officers skilled in fire control and gunnery to production and inspection jobs ashore, and the all too frequent detachment of commanding and executive officers and [2] heads of departments from ships of all types. Expansion of the Forces Afloat does call for sacrifice in permanency of assignment in the Fleet, but we cannot afford to replace our experienced officers with reserves, most of whom are untrained, if we are to be ready for serious business. It does seem that much can be done toward stabilising the experienced personnel we now have. Ordering captains, executives and heads of departments of the various types, well knowing that they will be eligible for selection and promotion within six months is an example of a condition readily susceptible of correction.

(c) *Permanency of Enlisted Personnel.* The situation is well known to the Department, as indicated by a recent directive to take full advantage of the law and retain men whose enlistments expire outside the continental limits of the United States. The drastic trend in reduction of reenlistments in the Navy as a whole in the month of April is of serious import to the Fleet. Even in the Pearl Harbor area the wages offered ashore are so attractive and the jobs are so many that skilled men whose enlistments expire are tempted not to reenlist. A recent survey of Battleship Division THREE indicates that of the men whose enlistments expire between 1 June and 31 August 1941, 68.9% *do not intend to reenlist.* This is in line with a recent report of the Bureau of Navigation showing a reduction in reenlistments for the month of April from 83.09% to 69.53%. The Commander-in-Chief has requested the Bureau [3] of Navigation to initiate legislation to hold for the duration of the war all men now enlisted in the Navy. He does not look with favor upon the directive mentioned in the first sentence of this sub-paragraph. It is discriminatory and does not apply equally to all Fleets or even to all ships of the Pacific Fleet, since some ships overhaul on the Coast while others overhaul at Pearl Harbor. The Fleet must and gladly will train and provide men for new construction and outlying stations to the limit of its capabilities, but it should be unnecessary to assign to shore duty so many experienced petty officers as we now find ashore. There is an urgent necessity that a continuous supply of recruits be furnished for training. It should be pointed out that since September, with new men started coming in in large numbers, all vessels have had to absorb recruits in a large proportion. In the Fleet as a whole, complements are now made up of over 25% of men with the maximum of a year's service, and in some ships the

figure approaches 50%. In the case of newly acquired transports, cargo s tankers and the like, the complements are almost 100% reserve, with little p ous Naval training. Present conditions are worse rather than better when ships in large numbers are added to the Navy. The situation will be extre acute if we are then at war. It is obvious that there are limitations on capacity of active ships for supplying the large numbers of officers and required to man the Navy now building, unless the immediate [4] figl capacity of the ships is seriously crippled.

Long range planning, with reasonable foresight as to future needs, i imperative necessity. It would appear that training activities ashore mus greatly expanded, as the physical capacities of the ships limits the number can be trained in the Fleet. The possibility that we may have to provide quarter, ashore, a pool of trained men for new construction should be care examined, and provision now made for it, if found necessary.

A problem of immediate importance is brought about by a recent letter the Bureau of Navigation which states that between now and September 3,080 men, more than half of whom are rated, will be taken from the Flee new construction and for this purpose allocations are made in the ratio of Pacific Fleet to 28% Atlantic Fleet. Unless a readjustment is made in t figures to correspond to the recent readjustment in the relative strengths of t Fleets, the Pacific Fleet will be seriously stripped of experienced men and be unable to furnish some of the ratings demanded.

(d) *Health and Morale.* The desirability, if international conditions pe of health and recreation trips to the Coast by Task Forces, each of which be no more than one-fourth the strength of the Pacific Fleet as now constit must be given serious consideration.

[5] (e) *Assignment of Flag Officers.* It is particularly desired that Admiral Pye be retained as Commander of the Battle Force. Admiral Py able, vigorous, and loyal; and is an officer whom I would select, above all otl as Commander Battle Force.

(f) *Uniform.* There is too much change and experimentation at this t It is not important whether rank is shown on the sleeve or on the shoulder khaki uniform, nor is it important whether the eagle of the cap device fac left or to right. As for the khaki working uniform the Commander-in-Chief is vinced that it lessens the dignity and military point of view of the wearer has a tendency to let down the efficiency of personnel. Reports from the air squadrons are to the effect that from any considerable altitude they are ur to detect the color of the uniform on ships at sea.

II. AVIATION.

(a) *Aviation Training.* The following requirements for aviation have urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:—

(1) Newly graduated pilots for carriers, battleships and cruisers should be ordered to San Diego for indoctrination in Fleet squadron work and familia tion with latest types of planes.

(2) Replacement carrier groups should be built up at San Diego, for ir trination of new graduates and for rotation with groups already in carriers.

[6] (3) The rating of Aircraft Radioman should be established.

The following requirements are in process of correction but progress is slow:

(1) The level of experience of pilots in the Fleet is very low and the t number is too low.

(2) The level of experience of aviation ratings in the Fleet is low and allowances are not filled.

(3) The rating of Aircraft Bomber, though approved, has not yet established.

(b) *Aviation Material.* The following items which apply to aviation ar process of correction but progress is too slow:

(1) Carrier torpedo planes are obsolescent and spare carrier torpedo pl are too few.

(2) Replacement of other carrier planes with more modern types is not completed and the replacement planes are not yet fully modernized.

(3) There are not yet enough spare carrier planes of the new types the stock of spare parts and engines is too low.

(4) Deliveries of ordnance and radio equipment for new planes have too slow.

(5) Cruiser planes are obsolescent and deliveries of replacements have been too slow.

(6) Modernized patrol planes are not yet available in quantity. There are none in the Hawaiian area and there is no early [7] prospect for replacement of those of the older type now in the Hawaiian area.

(7) There have been no deliveries of special radio equipment for patrol planes, corresponds to RADAR for ships, which will enormously increase the potentialities of these planes.

(8) There is a serious shortage of aircraft machine gun ammunition.

(9) No armor-piercing bombs, antiaircraft bombs or aerial depth bombs are yet available.

(10) There is a very serious shortage of aircraft torpedoes and of equipment for their maintenance and overhaul.

(11) Completions of new carriers and new patrol plane tenders are too slow.

(12) Provision for bombs and for refueling planes at outlying bases is sketchy.

(13) There has been serious delay in deliveries of equipment under the cognizance of other Bureaus than Yards and Docks in connection with the construction of new air stations and bases.

In addition to the afore-mentioned items the following have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:

(1) Aircraft overhaul at N. A. S., Pearl Harbor, now limited to patrol planes, should be expanded to provide for all planes now based in this area. Transfer to and from West Coast for overhaul is impracticable.

(2) Additional barracks should be established at N. A. S. Pearl Harbor.

[8] (c) *Separate Air Force.* This ever present question is again being brought to the fore, in view of Mr. Scrugham's recent utterances. It is vital that the Navy's air service remain as it is. Our naval aviation is generally recognized, throughout the world, as being the best equipped, best trained, and most advanced of any naval air service. This has been brought about by the mutual recognition of the intimate relationship between air and surface sea forces, particularly in far-flung operations distant from established bases. Effective cooperation, in naval operations, between air and surface craft requires the closest kind of coordination, predicated upon precise knowledge of each other's capabilities, limitations, and tactics. This can only be attained by day-by-day operations, association, and exchange of ideas as an integral part of one organization. It is vital that this relationship continue, even at the expense (though this feature is greatly exaggerated) of some duplication of effort between the Army and the Navy. Mr. Scrugham's chief complaint, which deals chiefly with duplication of facilities at coastal air stations and the proximity of those stations to each other, is not a valid one. The services perform separate functions; the Army in extending the range of coastal batteries and the Navy in extending the mobility and coverage of ships in off shore search. The proximity of the fields to each other is largely a matter of the vagaries of Congress and the [9] availability of land. The United States, due to its physical separation from its most probable enemies, has less need for a concentrated, offensive, air striking force than other nations. The present GHQ air force, however, amply supplies this need. It may be noted, in passing, that, in spite of the fact that the Air Corps is a part of the Army, the strong tendency within that Corps for separation, has prevented the development of effective cooperation between ground and air forces. A separate air corps would make the situation much worse—for the Navy it would mean the death of naval aviation.

The British have found it necessary to place their coastal air command under the direct control of the Navy. Aside from discoordination of operations, this command was suffering from lack of proper types.

III. *MATERIAL, GENERAL.*

(a) *Priorities.* The Navy is at present suffering from a shortage of material and is experiencing difficulty in having this shortage corrected. The principal items, and those that directly affect our early readiness, are (1) small arms and machine gun ammunition for airplanes and the Fleet Marine Force; (2) airplanes, especially those equipped with modern armor and armament; (3) close-range antiaircraft guns, especially a 1.1", Bofors, and Oerlikon; (4) ammunition in general, particularly adequate reserves, and bombs of all kinds. Our ability to correct these deficiencies is [10] limited by two factors, (1) aid to Great Britain, and (2) rapid expansion of the Army. Both of these limiting factors are admittedly of great importance and are entitled to proper weight in any system of

priorities, but, from the point of view of the Fleet, it appears that there tendency to overlook the *time* factor. A priority system based on relative qu ties needed by the three competing agencies, Britain, Army and the Navy, prove fatally defective, if the *time* of beginning active operations is overlo As the situation appears now, the Navy may be called on for active operatio contact with well equipped opposing forces, yet is prevented from obtaining v necessary needs by the magnitude of the needs of Britain and the Army. are going into action first, our needs must be filled ahead of the Army's and sine qua non needs such as small arms and machine gun ammunition, m airplanes, and modern close-range antiaircraft guns, must be filled ahe Britain's. There is a minimum need for the Navy without which it can not at all. Irrespective of how small that need may be relative to the quantit demands of others, it must be filled *first*.

It is important to bring out this point now, since it is understood tha Army is basing its procurement program on a 4,000,000 man Army. If al tion be based on relative quantities, under such a program, the Navy wil little consideration. The [*11*] imminence of active operations shou the criterion. Of course, the Navy Department is in a better position to j that than we are, but we've been led to believe we were pretty close to wa several occasions, but we still didn't get the items we need.

(b) *RADAR Equipment.* Such excellent results are being obtained fron few RADAR's furnished that we should install now the equipment which work, and not wait for something better to be developed. Delivery of RA should be accelerated.

IV. *COMMUNICATIONS.*

The need for establishment of confidential call signs is urgent. With present system of calls the text of a message may sometimes be inferred f the radio calls used. The danger of the present system is that codes ma compromised, as well as information disclosed. The cryptographic aid sec of opNav should immediately get out confidential call signs and more cry graphic aids.

V. *OPERATIONS.*

(a) *Fleet Operations.* With the recent detachment of many of the most r ern and effective units, the adequacy and suitability of the forces remainin accomplish the tasks to which they may be assigned is very doubtful.

In the Pacific, our potential enemy is far away and hard to get at. He no exposed *vital* interests within reach of Pearl Harbor, and has a syster defense in the Mandates, Marianas, [*12*] and Bonins that requires l ing operations, supported by sea forces, against organized land positions ported by land-based air. This is the hardest kind of opposition to overc and requires detailed preparation and rehearsal. It also requires a prepon ance of light force and carrier strength, in which we are woefully deficien the Pacific. Our present strength is in battleships—which come into play after we have reduced the intervening organized positions. They (battlesh will have to be used to "cover" the intervening operations and prevent interfer therewith, but their real value can not be realized until the intervening o sition has been overcome and a position obtained from which solid strength be brought to bear. The Japanese are not going to expose their main fleet u they are either forced to do so by our obtaining a position close enough to thre their vital interests or it is advantageous for them to do so by our having "br our backs", so to speak, by going up against their land positions and attri operations.

The foregoing discussion is brought out to emphasize that the role of l forces, and particularly carriers, in the Pacific, is far more important tha casual evaluation of relative strength would suggest. Under RAINBOW the Pacific Fleet (perhaps justifiably, in view of the Atlantic situation) i reduced in light force and carrier strength that its capabilities for offen [*13*] operations of a decisive nature are severely crippled. Quick re may only be hoped for—common sense dictates that it is largely hope, b principally upon the idea that Japan will make a fundamental mistake, that bold action may be able to take advantage of it.

In the Pacific, with enemy vital interests so far away, and no bases of our within striking distance, the logistic problem is acute. We have not, at pre sufficient ammunition, provisions, cargo ships or tanks to support active op tions in the Western Pacific—where the real battleground will be. We are ha

difficulty, even now, supporting the construction and defense activities of our own outlying bases. More auxiliary vessels are needed, now, for that purpose, and future needs must be anticipated to allow for acquisition and conversion of the ships. Our past experience, in this regard, has not been a happy one—the lag between acquisition and entrance into service being six months to a year. Repair and maintenance facilities at advanced bases can not be created overnight, nor can the Fleet remain long without them.

(b) *Fourteenth Naval District.* The defense of the Fleet base at Pearl Harbor is a mater of considerable concern. We should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get more antiaircraft guns, airplanes, and RADAR equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this over Continental and expanding Army needs.

[*14*] The naval forces available to the Commandant are meager to the point of non-evistence. A Fleet base is a place of rest, recreation, and resustenance and must afford protection of the Fleet at anchor and during entrance and egress independent of the units of the Fleet. If units of a fleet must be employed for its own defense, in its base, its freedom of action for offensive operations is seriously curtailed—possibly to the point where it is tied to the base by the necessities for defense of that base. The need for patrol boats and other small craft, especially those equipped with listening devices, is urgent. The Fleet must be relieved of those functions which properly belong to the District. The Fleet does not have the destroyers or other vessels to take over those duties. The situation has been brought to the Department's attention by letter. It is now much more serious as many destroyers have been detached from this Fleet.

(c) *Marine.* The necesity for closely coordinated training of Marines and the ships which will support their landing operations is readily apparent. Operations of this character require detailed training and realistic rehearsal. At present, the Marines and their training ground (San Clemente) are in one location and the ships in another, 2000 miles away. We need a training ground for landing operations and a camp for a substantial portion of the Fleet Marine Force in the Hawaiian area. This need will be worse, if we get in war in the Pacific, because we will not only need a training ground and [*15*] large camp site for Marines, but also must train and rehearse, as the campaign progresses, Army forces as well.

Kahoolawe is practically undeveloped and can be used as an Hawaiian San Clemente. A camp site for 5,000 Marines has been selected and recommended for acquisition. This program should be pushed.

The Sixth Defense Battalion should be brought to Hawaii now in order to relieve the Seventh Defense Battalion at Midway where the latter has been stationed for some months. Equipment for this battalion should be provided as soon as possible. Other defense battalions now in the Hawaiian area are being used for other outlying bases.

(d) *Logistic Support.* Ships to transport men and materials to and from the Coast and to supply the outlying islands is urgent.

There is similar urgency in the need for ships to transport aircraft. Aircraft carriers should not be used for this purpose in peacetime and cannot be so employed in war. Action has repeatedly been requested.

VI. *NATIONAL POLICY.*

(a) Although largely uninformed as to day-by-day developments, one cannot escape the conclusion that our national policies and diplomatic and military moves to implement them, are not fully coordinated. No policy, today, is any better than the force available to support it. While this is well recognized in [*16*] principle, it is, apparently, lost sight of in practice. We have, for example, made strong expressions of our intention to retain an effective voice in the Far East, yet have, so far, refused to develop Guam or to provide adequate defense for the Philippines. We retained the Fleet in Hawaii, last summer, as a diplomatic gesture, but almost simultaneously detached heavy cruisers to the Atlantic and retained new destroyers there, and almost demobilized the Fleet by wholesale changes in personnel.

We should decide on what we are going to do about the Philippines, now, and provide for their defense, if retained. It is easily conceivable that 50,000 troops and 400 airplanes on Luzon, might prove a sufficient deterrent to Japan to prevent direct action. We should develop Guam and provide for its defense commensurate with its state of development. It is foolish to develop it for some one else to use.

The military branches of the government should be told, by the diplom branch, what effect it is desired to produce and their judgment as to the me available and the manner of its accomplishment should be accorded predomi weight.

Our Hemispheric Defense policy must comprehend the fullest cooperation tween participating nations and our commitments limited by our available fc A strong component of that force is bases. No Hemispheric Defense policy does not provide for our free use [17] and development of South Amer bases (and local military and logistic suport) can be effective.

VII. INFORMATION.

(a) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly chan situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of po reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unabl evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of v force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affec his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is dist ing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so neces to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the internati picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowl of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishin timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to ma improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his pos courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applic to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive trainin a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirabilit interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to r impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situa particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island develop thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific F be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructi

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commande Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important development they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

VIII. *PUBLIC OPINION.*

(a) As preparation for war, the current mental and moral preparatio our people, as reflected in the newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. back into a war, unsupported or only half-heartedly supported by public opi is to court losing it. [19] A left-handed, vacillating approach to a serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and firmnes national character without which we cannot succeed. The situation dem that our people be fully informed of the issues involved, the means neces and available, and the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, must go with ships, planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of resources. To tell our people anything else is to perpetrate a base decep which can only be reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution.

/s/ H. E. KIMME

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 4 June 19

Confidential
Memorandum for Admiral Stark

The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding General, Hawa Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in regard to joint ac of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides:

(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands ag enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corp sisted by Navy fighters which may be available.

(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the Base. Briefly, when an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy ships and when located in the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.

The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the conditions are steadily improving and it is felt they are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatisfactory until certain equipment has been supplied and the personnel drilled in its use.

There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21 heavy bombing Army planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bombers in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable to do so.

There are not now a sufficient number of Army pilots to man all the Army planes in the Islands.

[S] H. E. KIMMEL.

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COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Secret PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *July 26, 1941.*

DEAR BETTY: When the proposed visit of the Under Secretary was announced my staff prepared a list of topics which might be of interest for discussion while Mr. Forrestal and his party are here. Not knowing the purpose of Mr. Forrestal's visit or whether he is informed concerning the general nature of our war plans and our problems I decided it better to combine these notes into a letter to you and believe quicker action can be obtained in that way. Following are the principal items of which I have been thinking:

(1) The importance of keeping the Commander-in-Chief advised of Department policies and decisions and the changes in policies and decisions to meet changes in the international situation.

(a) We have as yet received no official information as to the U. S. attitude towards Russian participation in the war, particularly as to the degree of cooperation, if any, in the Pacific, between the U. S. and Russia if and when we become active participants. Present plans do not include Rusisa and do not provide for coordinated action, joint use of bases, joint communication systems and the like. The new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be fully explored and full advantage taken of any opportunities for mutual support. Pertinent questions are:

(1) Will England declare war on Japan if Japanese attack Maritime Provinces?

(2) If answer to (1) is in the affirmative, will we actively assist, as tentatively provided in case of attack on N. E. I. or Singapore?

(3) If answer to (2) is in the affirmative, are plans being prepared for joint action, mutual support, etc.?

(4) If answer to (1) is negative, what will England's attitude be? What will ours be?

(5) If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, what is attitude in regard to Japanese shipping, patrol of Pacific waters, commerce raiders, etc.?

(b) Depending upon the progress of hostilities, the Russian situation appears to offer an opportunity for the strengthening of our Far Eastern defenses, particularly Guam and the Philippines. Certainly, no matter how the fighting goes, Japan's attention will be partially diverted from the China and Southern adventures by either (1) diversion of forces for attack on Russia or (2) necessity for providing [2] for Russian attack on her. It is conceivable that the greater the German success on the Eastern front, the more Russia will be pushed toward Asia, with consequent increased danger to Japan's "New Order" for that area. In my opinion we should push our development of Guam and accelerate our bolstering of the Philippines. The Russo-Axis war may give us more time.

(2) Priorities in connection with preparation for a Pacific war:—

(a) *Transports and Light Destroyer Transports.*—During the Commander-in-Chief's visit to Washington, all the transports, including the light destroyer transports, were transferred to the Atlantic. The necessity for this is recognized. Nevertheless, we still need transports in the Pacific and the need is even greater now (in point of view of time particularly) because most of our trained marines went with the transports and we are faced with an immediate training problem in addition to a possible war situation. The Department has initiated action to complete the HARRIS and ZEILIN and to acquire and convert four more transports for the Pacific, but, so far as is known, has done nothing about replacing the light destroyer transports (APD's). These vessels were originally conceived and developed for a *Pacific* campaign. They are especially suitable for use in attacks on atolls and may be the only means of readily attacking those positions. While by no means discounting their usefulness in the Atlantic, the need for them in the Pacific is paramount. If at all possible, they should be returned to this ocean *at once.* If this cannot be done, and only if it cannot be done, additional destroyers must be converted as soon as possible. Work on the large transports must also be expedited and completion dates anticipated if possible..

(b) *Marine Equipment:* The Sixth Defense Battalion does not now have its full equipment, particularly AA guns and .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. The remaining units of the Second Marine Division were stripped of much of their equipment to fit out the reenforced regiment that went East. There is practically no marine ammunition now on the West Coast. It is practically certain that these units will fight before the Army will and their needs must be given priority. We can't fight an amphibious war in the Pacific without ammunition for the marines.

[3] We are going ahead with the preparation of a camp in Oahu for five thousand marines. When they come they should be fully equipped for amphibious warfare. The transports etc., should be ready at the same time. An estimate of when the needed equipment and men will be available would help us in our planning.

(c) *Ammunition Facilities:* The condition of ammunition handling and stowage facilities ashore are in general satisfactory at the present time. Stowage facilities have been completed, are in the process of construction, or are about to be started to handle assignments of service reserves of gun ammunition, bombs, mines, and torpedoes. This includes igloos already completed and others now under construction at Westloch and at Lualualei.

New construction authorized and about to be undertaken includes four powder magazines and four shell houses at Lualualei, and barracaded stowage for live mines, two new mine anchor buildings and a new mine assembly building at Westloch.

New construction needed to complete stowage and handling facilities includes extension of Westloch dock to a maximum of two thousand feet and the construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch to accommodate target practice ammunition which cannot be stowed in vessels of the Fleet. This latter construction has been recommended to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in recent correspondence and we have no word yet on what action he has taken.

(d) The importance of building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board. For the present Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor should be regarded primarily as a "restricted availability" yard. Overhaul of ships here should not include battleships and cruisers or other ships for extensive regular overhauls. The facilities of the yard should be confined to emergency and low priority overhaul, regardless of overhead costs.

(e) Provide more and more personnel to the Fleet for training. The personnel situation has been presented to the Bureau of Navigation and that Bureau is thoroughly familiar with our requirements. We cannot provide experienced personnel for new construction next year unless we obtain recruits and train them intensively at once. I realize [4] that recruiting has fallen off and that the Department is doing all it can but we are losing trained men faster than we are getting new recruits. As I stated in a recent letter we could use 20,000 more men in the Pacific Fleet right now.

(f) Need for a hospital ship in the Pacific Fleet and for completion of new hospital at Pearl Harbor.

(g) Urgency for small craft in the Fourteenth Naval District for patrol purposes, to relieve the load on our limited number of destroyers.

(h) The need for acquiring advanced base material and assembling it at Mare Island.

(i) Correspondence has gone forward urging that all available light craft in the Pacific be fitted with depth charges, listening gear, etc. This is important.

(3) *Communications.* The supply of communication, radio, and sound equipment to the Fleet and the Shore Stations leaves much to be desired, although a great improvement has been noted in the last year.

(a) Specifically it is noted that the Kaneohe Air Station was acquired, built, commissioned, and actually operated prior to the receipt of any radio apparatus, except some which we diverted from its intended advance base use.

(b) It took BuEng two years to put "Chinese copies" of NRL's Radar on six ships.

(c) For years BuEng prevented research by NRL in any form of radio recognition device and hence retarded the production of such apparatus. The Fleet is still without it though it is under manufacture.

(d) We must have the IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) for aircraft at once. The program lags and on June 14th only *56* were on order from Canada with indefinite delivery date. See "Aviation" below.

(e) Radar equipment for submarines is highly important. I am not informed as to exact status of this but understand development is not entirely satisfactory. There is evidence that German subs are equipped with Radar.

[5] In general, Naval shipboard radio and sound equipment is so elaborate that it cannot be manufactured expeditiously. BuEng should have type plans for apparatus of such a nature that they can get results from industry and not make each new piece of apparatus a research job.

(4) *Aviation Requirements.* These items, all of which have recently been taken up with the Department, are summarized briefly:—

(a) *Pre-Fleet Training.* Two units under the Fleet at San Diego, one for patrol squadrons and one for carrier squadrons. More pilots for battleships and cruisers, for training on board ship. Particular emphasis on double complements for patrol squadrons; anticipation of enlisted personnel numbers and training in all categories, particularly patrol squadrons; building up the supply of spare airplanes; accomplishing the training without any further drain on combat readiness of active squadrons.

(b) *New Torpedo Planes.* Highest priority—A–1–a—instead of present priority which is A–1–b. There are only half enough torpedo planes now and they are obsolescent, while war reports demonstrate that there may be no single item of greater naval importance.

(c) *Conversions for Carrier Landing Training.* Auxiliary aircraft carrier conversion was dropped because of time and cost factors. These can be greatly reduced by requiring only the characteristics needed for landing training. The need for these ships is extreme. Aircraft carriers should not, and in war cannot, be used for this purpose, while new pilots *must* be properly trained before joining active squadrons if combat readiness is not to be jeopardized.

(d) *A. S. V. (Anti-Surface Vessel) Equipment.* This is of the highest potential value. Apparently none will be available for patrol planes until December. It can be carried by other planes, as shown by reports of British torpedo plane operations. It should be provided for every plane that can carry it and much earlier deliveries are essential.

(e) *I. F. F. (Identification, Friend or Foe) Equipment.* This is absolutely complementary to and essential for effective use of the Radar for aircraft defense of the Fleet. Without it, the Radar cannot differentiate between friendly and enemy airplanes. There is no definite information on deliveries. No delay whatever is acceptable.

[6] (f) *Engines for New Patrol Planes (PBY–5's).* Nose section failures have been occurring. Every effort is being made to find and cure the trouble. This should be continued, for it will be no help to the Fleet or to any destination of these planes to get new planes that can't fly in place of older planes that can.

(g) *Landplane Field at Johnston Island.* This was removed from the project by the Department. It should be put back. It is needed not only as an adjunct to local defense but, more importantly, as an aid to defense against expeditions headed eastward and as a stepping stone for landplane support of expeditions headed westward.

(h) *Keehi Lagoon Development.* This will be of very great value to patrol planes in the Hawaiian area. It is the best location for operations of these planes and no other place is suitable for planned patrol plane expansion in this

area. Inclusion of facilities for Navy patrol squadrons in this developme should be undertaken immediately.

(i) *Development of the N. A. S. Barber's Point.* This approved developme is very urgently needed. There is a strong tendency to turn down many aviati shore facility items in this area on the basis that they will be available wh Barber's Point construction is finished. This makes it more than ever mandato to expedite the work.

My kindest regards and best wishes always.

Most sincerely yours,

/S/ H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Cincpac File No.
Secret

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *July 30, 1941.*

DEAR BETTY: In acknowledging receipt of your letter of 25 July as to t possibility of using a carrier for transporting a load of planes to one of t Asiatic Russian ports, I want to give some of my own views as to such a undertaking.

Whether or not planes are to be supplied to the Russians may be outside m province, but I do remain keenly aware of our own deficiencies in aircraft. is quite an undertaking for the United States to supply planes to any quarter the globe in which fighting against Axis Powers may occur.

My views against diversion of carriers from their proper duties to act aircraft transports are well known. If planes must be sent from the Unit States to Russia, the question of flying them out via Alaskan and Easte Siberia fields should be most fully inquired into. That appears to be t most logical method of effecting delivery.

Should it be finally determined to use one of our carriers as a transport, t time chosen should be one in which all three Pacific Fleet carriers are availal for operation. This is essential in order to minimize the danger to the carri transport.

The port of destination should certainly not be to the westward of the Japa Kurile-Kamchatka line.

I entertain no doubt that such an operation, if discovered, (as is high probable), will be tantamount to initiation of a Japanese-American War. we are going to take the initiative in commencing such a war, I can think more effective ways for gaining initial advantage.

A carrier sent on such an operation manifestly must be protected. Aft careful consideration, I am constrained to feel that the minimum escort a covering force provided should be the entire Pacific Fleet. I also feel th combatant air or naval forces of a potential enemy encountered should engaged at once rather than wait for them to gain an initial advantage throu destroying any part of my own fighting strength.

In short, it is my earnest conviction that use of a carrier to deliver aircra to Asiatic Russian ports in the present period of strained relations is to inv war. If we have decided upon war, it would be far better to take direct offensi action. If for reasons of political expediency, it has been determined to for Japan to fire the first shot, let us choose a method that will be more advantageo to ourselves. Certainly an operation such as that proposed is far less likely bluff Japan into acquiescence or inactivity than it is to disturb her to the poi of hostile use of bombs, torpedoes and guns.

Sincerely,

H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

[1] Cincpac File No.
Confidential

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *August 12, 1941.*

DEAR BETTY: Your news about the approval of 533,000 men and 105,000 Marines for the Navy is good news. I agree with everything you said in your letter on the subject and I certainly give you and Nimitz full credit for getting them under the conditions which exist. We should lose no time in getting our ships filled up. I am ready to accept draftees if we cannot get them by voluntary enlistments quickly.

I forwarded to Furlong all the information you gave me about Tommy Hart's trouble with mines. We are waiting for Blandy's report, which I have not yet seen. I should like to have it at an early date.

Thanks very much for the copy of Coronet which you sent to me. I turned to page 86 and was somewhat shocked at the appearance of the photograph on that page. However, I sent it on to Dot and know that she will be pleased as I was to receive it. Please give my regards to Mrs. Hull.

I note Ghormley's views on the importance of RDF, or RADAR as we call it. I think I can assure you that the officers of the Fleet are fully alive to the importance of this development. We have stressed its use in every exercise and are constantly drilling and training with it. We have had men transferred to the ships so equipped to the limit of the capacity of ships having them. Army personnel have been trained aboard ships. I think you understand from our letters as well as from my verbal remarks to you on this subject how important we feel this development to be. I believe the numbers of the equipment in the Fleet is far behind what it should be. I shall permit nothing to interfere with its installation in the ships as we receive the gear. It should be given the highest priority in manufacture, supply and installation. We have not yet received any purely gunnery RADAR. In this connection, stress should be laid upon what the British call "IFF" (Identification, Friend or Foe) for installation in ships and planes; to the ASV (or RADAR in a plane to spot surface vessels); to the AI (RADAR in a plane to spot other planes). I don't know when we can expect these various types of RADAR but I do know that we need no urging in the Fleet to do anything within our power to get and use all the various types of RADAR that have been developed.

Many thanks for the news about the detail of the twelve PT's to the Fourteenth Naval District. This is a good start but neither Bloch nor I will rest easy until we get the various patrol vessels we have requested in official correspondence. I do hope you will impress on the Secretary the vital importance of this [2] matter. We need more ships of all types for a successful Pacific campaign but I believe we need submarines, destroyers, carriers and cruisers even more than we need battleships. This is a vast ocean.

You have approved our plan for putting guns and marines on Wake. The first detachment of 165 Marines, one battery of 5" and one battery of 3" are now on their way. We will send the additional guns when transportation becomes available. A recent survey of the men required to man the defenses of Wake plus the other outlying islands indicates the desirability of forming another defense battalion for service in this area. I feel that there is no doubt that an additional defense battalion to provide periodic reliefs and replacements will be necessary. We will give you an official letter on this subject shortly.

We have received the Department's plan in regard to the Marine Division and transports and your ideas as to the composition of the 5,000 men to be stationed in Oahu. We agree in general with all the plans but we would like the men, equipment and transports now. I know that you also would like them and will get them just as quickly as it is humanly possible to do so. I find that some of the defense battalions already out here are shy in equipment. The anti-aircraft guns for Wake are not equipped with directors. The battalions are short in .30 caliber and .50 caliber machine guns and ammunition. I do think that the few machine guns required by these battalions should be spared from other activities and I hope that the ammunition situation will be remedied very shortly.

The recreation facilities at Pearl Harbor are coming rapidly to a state where they can and are being used by the men of the Fleet. Baseball, softball and football fields, though by no means entirely adequate have been commissioned and

we have large numbers of men who occupy these fields daily. The swimn pool at Aiea is filled to capacity at all times. We can use at least two more p of this same size. The Fleet Recreation Center was partially commissioned the first of August and will be in full operating condition within another w It has been crowded with men from the day it was opened. The facilities clude a very large soft drink and sandwich stand, an enormous bar where l is served, and a large number of chairs and tables in a very pleasant surrou ing. It includes ten bowling alleys, eleven pool tables, a reading and wri room, all of which have been in commission from the first of August. stadium will be in commission within the week. It is suitable for boxing wrestling tournaments or ship's entertainments and for the movies. It will approximately 6,000 men and movies can be shown to approximately 4,000 at one time. About a thousand families are now living in the houses built that purpose. All of the [3] remainder will be in commission by first of January. These houses are being finished daily and are occupied as s as completed. Bloch is going a great job.

The visits to the West Coast have been very successful and have, I beli helped all hands. The are worth while and I believe should be continued as l as the international situation permits. I have watched the international situa in relation to the cruises to the West Coast and shall not hesitate to cancel t if, in my opinion, the situation so warrents. You will probably have infor tion sooner than I do which will warrant the cancellation of such cruises ar shall of course expect advices or orders from you on this subject.

The Honolulu people have been very fine in their continued efforts to enter the officers and men of the Fleet in their homes and on their plantations. entertainment of enlisted men by the Honolulu people has been on a scale wl taxes their capacity and is still going on. They deserve great credit for ev thing that they have done, except the increase in rentals.

We recently submitted a letter dealing with the permanency of detail Captains and Executive Officers of battleships. This letter was prepared Admiral Pye at my instigation. I forwarded it with my hearty approval. letter strongly recommends that no officer be assigned as Captain or Execu Office of a battleship unless it is reasonably certain that he will remain in t billet for not less than two years. Specifically, it recommends that no off coming up for selection within the period of his detail be assigned to eit of these two billets. I consider this a matter of first importance. If you r the letter to the Bureau of Navigation you will see that no Captain or Execu Officer now in these ships has been there for as long as a year. The exact ti are set forth. We cannot expect satisfactory progress unless we make the tc of duty of our officers sufficiently long for them to give something to the I know this is an old story but it is an old story which is much to the discr of our service. The recommendations from battleships apply with equal fc to heavy and light cruisers. In these ships the Captains in general comply v the specifications set forth because they are taken from the more junior o In the case of Executives I fear the situation is about the same as it is in bat ships. Brown is now making a survey of the Captains and Executives in crui and I expect to forward that shostly to the Bureau of Navigation.

In another recent letter to the Bureau of Navigation we made specific rec mendations in regard to the Commanding Officers of destroyer divisions squadrons. I am happly to say that Nimitz has informed me that he will ca out our recommendations in regard [4] to the destroyer division squadron commanders. I wish to add that I have not yet had time to hear fi the Bureau of Navigation in regard to the battleship Captains and Executi

I feel that gunnery in the Fleet is better than we have any right to exp considering the enormous changes in personnel and the lack of permanency the officers. We have of course stressed battle procedures above everything and you well know how much more experience and training it takes to be p pared fos battle than for a target practice. Recent reports that have come me on the firing of SRP "B" are very encouraging. The reports are fragment and I hear most about the ships that have made high scores. For example, LOUISVILLE has three "E" turrets, six "E" five-inch guns and one "E" th inch gun. I know this because I went aboard the LOUISVILLE a couple of d ago. Other ships are doing very well indeed.

Recent directives from the Office of Fleet Training have put our target pr tices on a much fore realistic and practical basis. We feel that in the even hostilities we will be forced to make very few changes, if any, in these directi We are scheduling our services and area assignments in accordance with th

directives now and I hear from all sides that it is considered much more satisfactory than anything we have ever had before.

To summarize, I feel that the morale of the officers and men of the Fleet is very satisfactory, that eveyone is working to the limit of his capacity, that we are never going to be satisfied; but that we all feel that we are making progress and beginning to get some dividends from our efforts.

What we need more than anything else right now is men. I have recently written Nimitz that this Fleet can use 20,000 additional men today. I will not go into that further at this time because I know that both you and Nimitz know this just as well as I do.

Keep cheerful. We are ready to do our damnedest.

Yours as always,

H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA (Flagship)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *22 August 1941.*

Personal
Secret
Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR BETTY: I mailed today an official letter on the condition of the material readiness of the fighting squadrons in the Pacific Fleet. I wish to call your attention particularly to the unsatisfactory conditions disclosed in this letter.

We now have on hand and operating from carriers 41 F4F-3 and F4F-3A fighting planes (of which 6 are currently under overhaul or major repair) and 17 obsolescent fighting planes. This makes a total of 52 fighting planes available for 3 aircraft carriers and 2 Marine fighting squadrons in the Pacific Fleet. Our operating allowance, not counting spares, is 90.

I think you should take some drastic action to remedy this deplorable condition.

My kindest regards as always.

Most sincerely yours,

/S/ H. E. KIMMEL.

12 September 1941 Admiral Stark wrote the following note on above letter and returned to Admiral Kimmel.

DEAR MUSTAPHA:
See our serial 0136723 of 12 sept.
Best we can do.
Keep cheerful.

/S/ BETTY.

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[1] UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *August 26, 1941.*

CinC File No.
P16-1/MM/(96)
Serial 01342
Confidential

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Expansion Program—Personnel for.
References:
(a) CinCpac Conf. disp. 182351 of August 1941.
(b) BuNav serials 1386, 1394, 1397, 1406 and 1450 of August 11, 1941.
(c) BuNav Conf. disp. 201824 of August 1941.

1. Transfer orders dated August 11, 1941 from the Bureau of Navigation to Commander Base Force Subordinate Command, as enumerated in references (b),

require a total of 222 rated men from the Pacific Fleet for transfer to U. S. HORNET squadrons, two new Atlantic patrol squadrons and the Naval . Stations, Kodiak and Dutch Harbor. The Pacfic Fleet has only a bare minim of such ratings to meet present operating requirements. Similar ratings needed for advanced training groups now in the process of being formed in Pacific. The Commander-in-Chief has had no previous warning of this he demand upon the Pacific Fleet. As indicated in reference (c), transfer of th ratings is being held in abeyance pending departmental reconsideration.

2. Of these 222 rated men a total of 88 radiomen qualified in aircraft is requi and a total of 61 aviator machinist's mates in the experienced class namely chi first and second class is required. In order that a bare minimum of one qual radioman be assigned each operating plane requiring such a rate for the p formance of its mission, a total of 437 such ratings is required in the Pac Fleet. According to the latest available figures there are a total of 324 such r ings in the Pacific Fleet and the transfer of 88 in accordance with reference (will leave a total of 236 or 54% of the minimum needed for safety and abil to carry out the mission of all operating planes requiring such ratings. Figu in regard to aviation machinist's mates indicate a total of 988 chief, first a second class allowed, whereas there are only 722 now holding these rates the Pacific Fleet or 73%. Removal of 61 such ratings as required in refere (b) will reduce the percentage to 67%. These percentages will be further redu by the transfer of such ratings to the advanced training groups now form in the Pacific. These ratings of qualair radioman and chief, first and sec class aviation machinist's mates must be considered key personnel in the ae nautical organization. Safety of operations and ability to carry out the miss depend on such ratings. The reduction of the percentage of these key men v adversely affect readiness for war of Pacific Fleet aviation.

[2] 3. The Commander-in-Chief has repeatedly pointed out to the Bur of Navigation the increasingly serious situation which is resulting from ra expansion of all phases of Naval activities without sufficient increases in av able men in the Fleet to train for purposes of meeting the personnel requi ments of this expansion. The current practice of constantly withdraw trained men from the Fleet cannot continue if the Fleet is to remain in a sa factory state of readiness. The huge building program, both aircraft and surf vessels, will require more trained personnel for manning than can possibly obtained under the current program of draining already under-complemen Fleet units. At least two years are required to train acceptable petty offic The consequences of continuing along the present apparently unplanned path v be dire. The critical shortage with which the combatant air units of the Fl will be faced if the subject transfers are made is merely the beginning o deplorable situation which will certainly develop unless there is adequate pl ning for training personnel to meet the demands of expansion. The Pacific Fl can and will train the required ratings if given the material. Class "A" scho must be immediately enlarged to cover the entire program. Induction of recru must be enormously increased.

4. The Commander-in-Chief is convinced that the building program and training program are not synchronized. Unless intra-departmental coordinat and review of the entire question of supplying personnel for the expanding Na are effectively undertaken, the current condition cannot be sensibly improv

5. It is therefore most urgently recommended:

(a) That, in meeting the *immediate* demands of expansion, the distribut of available personnel in the Navy be reviewed and a program be established the acquisition of required ratings from the forces both afloat and ashore in s a manner as to avoid the depletion of any ratings below an acceptable minim in any combatant organization; this review to form the basis for the reconside tion, requested in reference (a), of current orders for transfer of aviation ratin

(b) That the entire expansion program be reviewed in order to determine detail the rate at which personnel will be required properly to man the n units.

[3] (c) That, through the immediate and adequate expansion of Class " service schools and the supply of additional recruits to the Fleets and sh stations, the training of men be undertaken now in sufficient numbers to m the maximum demands as they occur.

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL

Copy to:
BUNav
BuAer
Combasefor Subcom

[1] Cinc File No.
Personal
Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *August 26, 1941.*

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR BETTY. I have your letter of 21 August dealing with the question of aviation personnel required to man new patrol plane squadrons and the squadrons for the HORNET plus certain additional men required for Kodiak and Dutch Harbor. I have some appreciation of the problem which confronts you and I wish to state that I yield to no one in my desire to be of the maximum assistance to the Navy as a whole, but my immediate responsibility is the Pacific Fleet. You must bear with me if I present the viewpoint and opinion as viewed from where I sit. I know that you have never wanted anything else and you can rest assured that you will never get anything else from me.

In the first place, the orders for the transfers directed in the various Bunav serials left no time for consideration and to make the best distribution of transfers. The situation changes so rapidly in personnel and almost invariably for the force that I can see no answer except to make my protest and gather the facts based on the very latest figures. As we set forth in the official letter which is now on its way to you, we now have in the ratings of aviation machinist's mates: chiefs, first class and second class, just 73% of complement. When transfers directed by the serials in question are completed we will have 67% of complement in these ratings. The excess is entirely in third class ratings. We can spare these ratings with least resultant harm to the organizations. We have been trying to build up these ratings against the time when we could look forward to double crews. You know full well that the chiefs, first class and second class, are the men that bear the brunt of maintaining the planes and insuring their safe and efficient operation. I think when you lump the third class ratings into a picture to indicate an overcomplement the picture is not accurate. We make no protest on the transfer of third class ratings and will be glad to comply under the existing circumstances.

[2] On the basis of one (qualair) radioman for each plane, we now have 74% of the number required. After transfers are completed we will have 54%. I note in the directive for transfers to the HORNET that 16 (qualair) radiomen are required for the Utility Unit.

Transfers required take long-time men, leaving us with all the short-timers which is an added handicap. We are now attempting to organize our pre-Fleet training units at San Diego who require most of all the ratings I have just mentioned.

Our percentages deduced from the Base Force reports of 30 June vary by some 11 to 16% from the figures given in your letter and they are uniformly lower than your figures.

If after you have read this letter you still feel that we should make the transfers required by Bunav serials 1386, 1394, 1397, 1406, and 1450, we can complete the transfers from the Pacific Fleet by 30 September, with the bulk completed considerably earlier than that and at the same time insure the ratings are taken from activities which will result in the least harm in the various organizations.

If you can assure me that we wont be fighting the Japs within the next six months I will gladly make the transfers without the least protest. We can, will, and have been, training men in this Fleet just as rapidly as the existing facilities, including the number of recruits supplied, permit. I will not say anything further about the need for additional men because you have my views in a great many communications on the subject and I know you are doing everything within your power to improve the situation.

I will take steps to insure the preliminary planning necessary to an expeditious execution of the orders contained in the various serials and will give the order to go ahead just as soon as you indicate by dispatch or otherwise what your judgment dictates.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL.

[1] CinC File No.
Secret

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *September 12, 1941.*

Dear "BETTY": We all listened to the President's speech with great interest. With that and King's operation orders, of which we have copies, the situation in the Atlantic is fairly clear. But what about the Pacific?

I noted that Bidwell's Southeast Pacific Force has shooting orders for *surface* raiders east of 100° West, which seems to clear that up as far as raiders are concerned, but just how significant was the restriction, limiting offensive action to "surface raiders"? Of course I know that the possibility of German or Italian submarines in that area is slight and Japanese improbable, but the question arises as to just how much we can discount the threat of Japanese action. This uncertainty, coupled with current rumors of U. S.-Japanese rapproachment and the absence of any specific reference to the Pacific in the President's speech, leaves me in some doubt as to just what my situation out here is. Specific questions that arise are:

(a) What orders to shoot should be issued for areas other than Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-areas? This is particularly pertinent to our present escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. So far, my orders to them have been to protect their convoy from interference; to avoid use of force if possible, but to use it if necessary. These orders, at least by implication, preclude taking the offensive. Shouldn't I now change them to direct offensive measures against German and Italian raiders? In view of the delicate nature of our present Pacific relations, with particular reference to their fluidity, I feel that you are the only one who can answer this question.

(b) Along the same lines, but more specifically related to the Japanese situation, is what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity. As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless you are in the defensive sea area. Should we now bomb contacts, without waiting to be attacked?

[2] The emphasis, in the President's speech, on the Atlantic also brings up the question of a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong Pacific Fleet is unquestionably a deterrent to Japan—a weaker one may be an invitation. I cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the "status quo" out here is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must be reduced, and, in event of actual hostilities, must be increased if we are to undertake a bold offensive.

Our present shortage of carriers, cruisers and destroyers gives me much concern, as it is these types that must bear the brunt of our early operations. Later, we'll need a superiority in all types, as, according to reports, new Japanese BB's, CV's and CA's are coming out and the balance is going against us. We cannot carry the war very far into the Pacific until we are able to meet the Japanese Fleet on at least equal terms. Pertinent to the maintenance of the "stitus quo" and, if necesary, later hostilities, is the disposition of the NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON. I feel that their movement to the Pacific, now, would have a tremendous effect on Japan and would remove any impression that *all* our thoughts are on the Atlantic. If we can't do it now, we should at least be prepared to do it later if the situation deteriorates.

When we get into a shooting war with Germany there will be an increased demands for escorts in the Pacific. In view of the immense distance involved and the character of probable opposition, this, in the main, means cruisers. We may need additional cruisers and I cannot see how we can handle the job properly if our cruiser strength is reduced. We now have three cruisers on escort duty to Manila. My orders are to escort to Manila but not to escort on the return trip. Bidwell in the Southeast Pacific has two cruisers.

I feel better now that we have gotten something at Wake. The success of the Army flight has re-emphasized its importance, and, while by no means "impregnable", its present defensive strength is considerable and will require the exposure of quite a force to capture it. It is even possible [3] that should its capture be an early objective of Japan, such an effort might be supported by a substantial portion of their Combined Fleet, which would create, for us, a golden opportunity *if we have the strength to meet it.* Do not misunder-

stand me—I don't discount the Atlantic problem—but from where I sit, I discount the Pacific problem even less. Until we can keep a force here strong enough to meet the Japanese Fleet we are not secure in the Pacific—and the Pacific is still very much a part of the world situation.

I know you have these thoughts in mind and share my concern, but I am not sure but that there are some in Washington who might be inclined to overlook them.

Please let me have your views on the questions raised herein. With regard to offensive action against raiders in the Pacific and submarines off Hawaii, etc., I presume I will get official orders, if any change in present policy is desired.

Sincerely,

/s/ KIMMEL.

[1]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *October 22, 1941.*

#1
Secret

DEAR BETTY: On receipt of your despatches following the change in the Japanese cabinet we made the following dispositions:—

Continued to maintain the patrol of two Submarines at Midway.

Despatched twelve patrol planes to Midway.

Despatched two submarines to Wake. They will arrive there on 23 October.

Despatched the *CASTOR* and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with additional marines, ammunition and stores.

The *CURTISS* arrives at Wake on 21 October with gas, lube oil and bombs.

Prepared to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, replacing the six at Midway from Pearl Harbor.

Despatched additional marines to Palmyra.

Placed Admiral Pye, with the ships making a health cruise, on twelve hours notice after 20 October.

Had six submarines prepared to depart for Japan on short notice.

Put some additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.

Delayed the sailing of the *WEST VIRGINIA* until about 17 November when she is due to go for an overhaul to Puget Sound and deferred final decision until that time.

With minor changes I propose to continue the health cruises to the Pacific Coast until something more definite develops. The despatch in regard to the submarines for Manila went forward to you today.

I previously pointed out to you the great desirability of many things in the Pacific Fleet. If you will bear with me I want now to repeat some of them once more. The urgency for additional patrol craft in this area is as great as ever. Such craft are not [2] worthwhile unless they can operate in trade wind seas which result from winds from 15 to 35 knots blowing almost continuously. The 12 PT's which you sent to us I fear will be of very little use in this area. We sent them on an average day to make a trip from Oahu to Molokai. The reports of this trip have gone forward officially. They were practically useless in this sea and could not make more than 10 knots. Several of them had to turn back and a few personnel were quite seriously injured from being thrown about. We need something much more substantial to be of any use out here. In this connection I noted that the Department diverted the listening gear allocated to the four-stackers (DM's) in this Fleet to Atlantic destroyers and we will get no listening gear for these craft until a new contract is made. I had fondly hoped that all these craft would be fitted with listening gear by the first of December.

In order to get anything like the capabilities of the heavy ships of this Fleet made effective we require at least two more squadrons of destroyers. Every exercise we plan we find the destroyers are lacking. You can well understand of course, that two squadrons is, in my opinion, a very modest request. We can use many more.

I have been struggling with the availability of battleships and am concerned about the long interval between overhauls that will result if we continue to have only one battleship overhaul at one time. I am loath to reduce the operational

forces by more than that particularly as the interim availability further reduces the number available for operations. Two more battleships out here, particularly if they could be the *NORTH CAROLINA* and *WASHINGTON*, would ease the situation enormously. We have indications that one new battleship has been commissioned by the Japanese and rumors that an additional one will soon be placed in commission. Such a contingency will further disturb the balance of power in the Pacific.

We can use all the long range submarines that you can send us. They can be most effective in keeping destroyers and other patrol craft occupied near the Japanese bases, homeland, and trade routes.

We should have more cruisers because we can expect that Jap raider activities will result from employment of a considerable number of converted merchant types as well as old cruisers in this work. Then, too, our own planned offensive operations require cruisers and more cruisers. The least you can do for us is to leave us with the cruisers we have. I can easily keep three or four more divisions profitably occupied when war breaks.

The type of operations we have planned in the early stages of the war puts a premium on aircraft operations from carriers. We [3] have only three. One of them is occupied part-time in training activities at San Diego. I note in a letter signed by Ingersoll and received today that the chances of getting a merchant ship converted to a carrier for training purposes at San Diego are very poor. I feel that this matter should be pushed; that we should have at least one such vessel in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. Until we do get such a ship we are required to occupy a considerable time of a carrier at greatly increased cost, diversion from active operations and reduction in the efficiency of the carrier. These carrier training vessels will be useful so long as the war lasts and will pay for themselves many times over.

We had information some time ago that you were converting two sea train vessels for use in transporting aircraft. What has become of them? Are they operating in the Atlantic and so you propose to send a carrier to San Diego to ferry planes.

I feel that the training in the Fleet is coming along very well. The shooting so far has been very good by any standards. We are developing the use of radar and our principal handicap at the present time is lack of material and lack of trained personnel. Both are being remedied at a satisfactory rate. We have had no experience yet with the use of gunnery radar. The first sets are now being installed. The gunnery radar installed in the *HONOLULU* Class is a bitter disappointment. Thel have been able to get surface ships at ranges not in excess of twenty thousand yards, on a big ship, and around twelve thousand on a destroyer. This radar is apparently useless for the detection of aircraft. Luckily, this type is being installed in the *HONOLULU* Class only. It is useful only for short range work against surface craft at night or in low visibility. I presume steps are being taken to eliminate or radically improve this type of radar.

The radar installed in the battleships and carriers is well worthwhile and we have got highly creditable results from its use.

The new big drydock here has been pumped out and the contractors' forces are now in process of cleaning it out preparatory to finishing off the bottom. I am informed that an emergency docking will be possible any time after about the 15th of November, although the dock will not be entirely completed until sometime later than that.

The recreation facilities are being added to and I believe the men are in much beter shape now than they were a few months ago. The shooting has, I believe, served to increase their confidence in themselves, to a considerable degree.

[4] I sent forward to you today an exhaustive study on the installations and defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra. I hope it will be of assistance in deciding what you want done out here. I feel that a comprehensive plan is essential if we are to get coordinated results in the shortest time. This we tried to give you.

You will note that we recommend two full defense battalions over and above the requirements of the Islands now occupied in order to provide two balanced forces to occupy any desired location on short notice. Until such time comes these personnel can be used to rotate the defense battalions at the various permanently garrisoned islands.

The investigation of an alternate land plane route to the Eastward of the Marshalls and on to Australia has my hearty approval. We may be able to get some quick results from the expedition to Christmas Island sufficient to permit the routing of four-engine land plane bombers from Oahu to Christmas to Suva to

Noumea and on to Australia. Additional stepping stones are, of course, highly desirable. In this connection, however, it must be remembered that there are not enough ships now available to handle our own island developments. Without greatly augmented shipping facilities we cannot possibly assume the additional burden for the Army.

My best regards to you always.

Most sincerely yours,

[S] H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET—FLAGSHIP

Secret

PEARL HARBOR, *T. H., October 29, 1941.*

DEAR BETTY: I had Mr. Hallet Abend for lunch with me today. He has just completed a tour for the Reader's Digest and his travels took him to Singapore, Manila, Java, Dutch East Indies, Australia and New Zealand. He gave us some very interesting information. The most vital information was information which he had received from officials in Australia and New Zealand that if Japan attacks Russia the British Empire will declare war on Japan. He was also assured that the Dutch East Indies would follow Great Britain and that the dutch are anxious that the war start. They feel that the present set-up in the world gives them a better chance now than they will ever have again, so long as Japan has her bases in Indo China.

At the present writing it appears that the most probable direction for Japanese adventures is to the Northward. If they do embark on such an adventure and Britain and the Dutch East Indies declare war on Japan, what will we do?

I have no means of knowing the accuracy of the statements. It may be that the idea was planted with Mr. Abend as a propaganda measure and he was told by the officials who informed him that he could pubish it after he got to the United States. I am informing you in order that you may run it down, and also in the hope that you may give me some inkling of what we will do in such a contingency.

My kindest regards and best wishes, always.

Most sincerely yours,

[s] H. E. KIMMEL.

P. S. The officials told Mr. Abend that this information came from the Privy Council but he was not privileged to use this.

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

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[1] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.
Personal and Confidential PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *November 6, 1941.*

DEAR BETTY: I have just signed a communication to you setting forth our estimate of the Japanese bases and forces in the Mandates. This estimate represents meticulous observations, principally by radio, over a long period of time with what we conceive to be reasonable deductions therefrom. I think there can be no doubt that the Japanese have expanded very large sums and much effort in their attempt to strengthen the Mandates and provide numerous operating bases for submarines and aircraft. The numbers of aircraft are of necessity an etsimate, but with adequate operating bases for both submarines and aircraft, additional forces can be very quickly moved into the Mandates, depending upon the situation.

You will note, of course, that our estimate differs considerably from the one prepared in the Navy Department. I doubt very much if the Navy Department's effort has had the care expended upon it that we have given to the one we submitted.

I must call your attention again to the anti-submarine effort that will be required in this area and at sea if our operations are to be carried on with reasonable security. You have approved installation of sound gear in the DM's, in the AM's, the AVP's, certain AT's, and the AVD's. At the present writing, the following vessels of these classes are lacking in sound gear and we have been furnished no date from the Department on which we can expect deliveries of same.

DM's: PRUITT, TRACY, PREBLE, SICARD, DORSEY, LAMBERTON, BOGGS and ELLIOT.
AVP's: TEAL, PELICAN, SWAN and AVOCET.
AM's: BOBOLINK, GREBE, KINGFISHER, RAIL, ROBIN, SEAGULL, TERN, TURKEY, VIREO,
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ and ~~XXXXXXXX~~
AT's: NAVAJO and SEMINOLE.
AVD's: HULBERT, BALLARD, THORNTON, WILLIAMSON, GILLIS and McFARLAND.

[2] In other words, we have in this area *29 ships* which can be fitted with sound gear and which are not so fitted. This is a very large number of potentially useful submarine hunters.

I note that you plan to send 24 VSO's to the Asiatic Fleet in January. I presume that you now plan to send those VSO's crated, in cargo vessels. Unless the situation changes materially I strongly recommend against sending them in a carrier.

I have frequently mentioned the very great desirability of having a flight deck merchant ship for use in training aviators for carrier duty. On reflection, I have changed my mind to the extent that instead of providing one carrier of this type for each coast, we should provide about ten such carriers for each coast. Such ships operating in conjunction with cruisers or even destroyers, have a very great potential value. Of course, the mercantile aircraft carriers I am now recommending should be fully equipped for combat purposes—something that I did not contemplate when we recommended the carrier for flight deck training only.

My kindest regards and best wishes, always.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL.

P. S. I have forwarded today by air mail the comments of Com–14, the Commanding General, and myself on the subject of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Oahu. You will note that we have presented several objections and feel that in any event the Commander-in-Chief, Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, and Commander Base Force have no place in such an operating center. I feel that the quarters and buildings we have requested for these agencies should be proceeded with forthwith; no matter what decision is finally made in regard to an operating center the buildings we have requested will be necessary.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

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[1] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.
Secret PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *15 November, 1941.*

DEAR "BETTY": In repeated correspondence I have set forth to you the needs of the Pacific Fleet. These needs are real and immediate. I have seen the material and personnel diverted to the Atlantic. No doubt they are needed there. But I must insist that more consideration be given to the needs of the Pacific Fleet.

In case of war in the Pacific we shall have a problem difficult of solution under any circumstances; one requiring a major effort to bring the war to a successful conclusion. During preparation for such an effort we must be in a position to make Japanese operations costly and of limited effectiveness. The strength of this fleet limits our freedom of action and lack of modern equipment in ships we now have limits their effectiveness.

We must be in a position to minimize our own losses, and to inflict maximum damage to Japanese fleet, merchant shipping, and bases. We should have sufficient strength in this fleet for such effective operations as to permit cruising at will in the Japanese Mandated Island area, and even on occasions to Japanese home waters. We should have the strength to make any enemy operations against Wake a highly hazardous undertaking. To do these things substantial increase of the strength of this Fleet is mandatory.

Greater permanence of personnel is required to obtain that ship, unit and fleet efficiency so essential for readiness to fight. Reduction of changes to a minimum especially in key positions, must be accomplished. Detachment of officers and men has already dangerously reduced efficiency of this fleet and they continue. Well qualified officers are in many instances, detached to fill billets much less important, in my opinion than those filled in this fleet. Battleship Captains must be chosen for proficiency regardless of seniority.

This fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill complements; it can utilize an additional 10,000.

[2] If this fleet is to reach and maintain a satisfactory degree of readiness for offensive action, the foregoing requirements must be met; and it must not be considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the shore establishment.

With best wishes,

H. E. KIMMEL.

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[1]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Ser. #8

S-e-c-r-e-t

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *December 2, 1941.*

DEAR BETTY: We had your despatches in regard to reinforcing the outlying islands with Army pursuit planes and Army personnel. With regard to the use of Army pursuits on the island bases, some time ago we investigated the feasibility of putting some kind of fighters on the outlying islands and decided at the time that our best chance of quickly reinforcing the islands and to make the minimum demands upon the supplies in the island that we should send a minimum number of ground crews to Wake and Midway in order when the time came, to be in a position to fly off the Marine planes from a carrier or to send them direct from Pearl to Midway in the case of the SBD's. At the time your despatch in regard to Army pursuits was received we had the WRIGHT at Wake discharging the Marine ground crews and she arrives at Midway tomorrow, December 3, to discharge Marine ground crews there.

Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, with three heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, will fly off 12 Marine fighting planes for Wake tomorrow morning after which he returns to Pearl. We have been covering his advance by 2 VP squadrons operating from Johnston, Midway and Wake. Upon the completion of the movement we now plan to return one VP squadron to Pearl and leave the other one at Midway awaiting further developments. I will hold the Marine SBD's at Pearl awaiting further developments as they can fly under their own power from Pearl to Midway.

During all the period that I have been in command the question of the development of supply and defense of these outlying bases has been a very difficult one. We cannot expect to supply Wake quickly and expeditiously until we have a space to put a ship alongside for loading and unloading. The Commandant of the District has been and is exerting every effort to obtain this objective. As you know, ships have been delayed in unloading at Wake for as

long as 28 days, due to bad weather, and it is not unusual for a ship to take as much as 7 or 8 days. This, in the face of any opposition, presents an impossible situation. Present facilities at Wake must be improved, particularly as to storage of fuel oil, aviation gas, food and ammunition. This work should not stop and the 1,000 defense workers at Wake are essential to keep this work moving as rapidly as material can be supplied. A recent estimate by Bloch sets the time for the completion of the ship channel to about the first of May. I hope, and so does he, that this date can be anticipated. At the present time we cannot support more personnel on Wake than we now have there. As you will remember, we put six 5" guns and twelve 3" [2] anti-aircraft guns, together with a number of machine guns on the island, well knowing that we did not have sufficient marine personnel to man them. However, I think good progress has been made in organizing the defense workers to assist in the manning of the battery at Wake. In case the present situation should ease, we can readily withdraw the Marine fighters from Wake in order to decrease the demands upon the facilities there and also in order to keep up the training of the pilots of these planes.

The situation at Midway is somewhat better than at Wake. You will note from our report of the defenses submitted today that we have shipped three of the four 7" guns to Midway. Also we have shipped, or are shortly shipping, four of the 3"-50 anti-aircraft guns to Midway. These, in addition to the batteries already installed there, which comprise six 5"-51's and twelve 3" anti-aircraft. You will also note from our official letter submitted today that the defenses of Johnston and Palmyra, while not what we would like to have, are nevertheless not entirely inadequate.

Your despatches in regard to the use of Army personnel and the organization of Army defense forces to be used in outlying islands is being given earnest consideration. I know you appreciate the difficulties of mixing Army, Marine Corps and Navy personnel in a small island base. I believe you will subscribe to the principle that all these outlying bases must be under Navy command and the forces there must be subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief without any qualification whatsoever. I anticipate some difficulties along this line when Army personnel is injected into the picture unless a very clear directive is isssued jointly by the War and Navy Department. On inquiry and conference with the Army I find that the Army in Hawaii has no guns, either surface or anti-aircraft, available for outlying bases. They can supply some .30 caliber machine guns and rifles. I have frequently called to your attention the inadequacy of the Army anti-aircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area with particular reference to the shortage of anti-aircraft guns. So far, very little has been done to improve this situation. With nothing but .30 caliber machine guns and rifles the replacement of Marines by Army at outlying bases now will result in an increased number of Marines in Oahu with no suitable equipment as Army would require all of the Marine equipment now in the islands. The Marines in the outlying islands are trained, acclimated and efficient beyond standards immediately obtainable by the Army even if they took over the present Marine equipment. We cannot appreciably increase the number of military personnel in the outlying islands unless we remove the defense workers. We cannot afford to remove the defense workers if we expect ever to reach a satisfactory condition in the islands. Essential items include, as I have previously stated, [3] provisions to berth a ship at Wake, completion of air fields at Palmyra and Johnston and completion of fuel, gasoline, food and ammunition housing at all bases. I am proposing in official correspondence that: (2) the Army organize 3 defense battalions of approximately 800 men each; that steps be taken in Washington to supply them with guns, both surface and anti-aircraft; supply them with 37mm or .50 caliber machine guns; to make up a well balanced defense battalion; that prior to the time the equipment of these organizations is supplied that they drill with the five inch guns of the Fourth Defense Battalion now at Pearl as long as the equipment is available here. If it is decided to supply these battalions with some other caliber of guns, that sufficient number of guns of the type to be used be shipped to Oahu to be utilized. for training purposes. (b) that these Army defense battalions be held in readiness to (1) furnish replacement to presently occupied islands (2) to relieve battalions in presently occupied islands (3) to garrison islands to be occupied.

The Marine garrison's now at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra should be retained there for the present. They will not be withdrawn until arms and equipment for the Army defense battalions have been received and the Army trained. At this time a decision can be made according to the situation then existing.

That the Army organize three 18-plane pursuit squadrons and keep them in an expeditionary status; maintain the ground crews organized and ready to man them; maintain the planes ready to be transported by carrier when ordered.

The Army has orders to defend Canton and Christmas. We are turning over to them two five-inch 51 guns for use at Canton. These they will man with Army personnel and supplement with some obsolete anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. The expedition is now due to leave here on December ninth.

The Army is also sending some obsolete guns and a garrison to Christmas. I will let you know more definitely what they sent when I find out exactly.

I feel that we cannot determine the defenses of Canton and Christmas until we find out how much personnel can be maintained there. Meanwhile the Army is sending some forces there.

[4] In view of the foregoing I am unable to understand the reason for the despatches from the War and Navy Department directing us to utilize the Army in the defense of the outlying bases, as we can hope for no relief from this quarter until they have been supplied with suitable equipment.

I feel the wiser course is to continue to organize Marine defense battalions and supply them with the necessary equipment. I believe we can train Marine defense battalions just as rapidly as the Army can do so and probably as rapidly as the equipment can be supplied. If there is any prospect of the immediate supply of considerable quantities of suitable equipment I can see some reason for injecting the Army into the picture.

I think it would be well for you to read the despatch sent by the War Department to the Commanding General on this subject. It differs considerably from the one you sent to us in that the War Department says they will take over the defense of some outlying bases from the Navy in accordance with an agreement to be reached by the Commanding General and myself. Your despatch left me with the conviction that the Army was to reinforce the Naval and Marine forces on the outlying bases in case of necessity. I feel that this should be clarified.

We have one transport in commission which, due to a delay in the sailing of the WHARTON we are now obliged to use for one trip to transport essential Naval personnel from the West Coast to the Fleet. The other transports, to a total of six, are in various stages of completion. The Marines at San Diego are in urgent need of transport training and will not be ready to come to Hawaii until some time in February. I can see very little chance for any overseas expedition even on a small scale until that date. Eventually this war will require a much greater number of transports and supply ships in the Pacific. We are working on an estimate of the requirements. This estimate, in addition to some thirty or forty transports and an equal number of supply ships must also include a thirty to fifty percent increase in the fighting strength of the Fleet before we can occupy the Marshalls and Carolines in an advance across the Pacific.

With these considerations in mind I am at loss to understand the considerations which injected the Army into the picture.

[5] My kindest regards and best wishes, always.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL

P. S. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment made the statement in conference that his pursuit planes could not operate farther than 15 miles from land. If this be the case, I can see very little use for Army pursuit planes in an outlying island. This, added to the inability of this type plane to land on a carrier, makes them practically useless for an overseas expedition of any kind. Except for the four-engined Army bombers, we must depend upon Navy and Marine Corps planes to support any overseas expedition and to man outlying bases. This is and has been one of my reasons for urging the supply of all types of carrier planes.

P. S. You will note that I have issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area.

H. E. K.

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy*,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

[6] P. S. In connection with the development of outlying bases by the Army, I must invite your attention to the fact that when the War Department issued orders to the Commanding General out here to develop these bases they authorized him to charter ships and to take all other necessary steps to insure

the early completion of the project. He has already taken over three large inter-island vessels and has caused some army transports and other shipping to be diverted to the supply of Christmas and Canton. He has also chartered a number of smaller vessels such as tugs and sampans.

I feel he has done an excellent job. I feel that the Navy personnel in this area with equal authority would have their efforts much facilitated. I do not know the considerations which prompted the Navy to turn over the development of the island bases to the Army I do know that it has complicated our problems considerably.

The Commanding General is keeping me informed of what he is doing but frequently the information is so late that I have been unable to plan adequate protection. I am sure it is no fault of his because he informs me as soon as he himself is informed. I have nothing but the highest praise for the way General Short has taken hold of this problem which dropped in his lap.

H. E. KIMMEL.

[7] P. S. From correspondence which General Short has furnished me I note that the Army is engaged in developing air fields in Fiji and New Caledonia. This will involve questions of supply and protection both of shipping and the fields themselves. The Australians I understand are loath to assume the protection of the field in New Caledonia. The Navy is bound to be involved in these affairs. I fear we may become so much concerned with defensive roles that we may become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion of effort for defense will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the offensive.

With regard to the escort of convoys by using a single cruiser to escort not to exceed 8 ships, we endeavor to limit the number of cruisers so occupied at one time to four. We now find that routing via Torres Strait to Manila, we are going to have seven cruisers continuously occupied with convoy duty. This without any consideration for such protection as may eventually be required from San Francisco to Oahu. I realize of course that the demands for trans-Pacific escorts may decrease if it becomes impossible to route ships to Manila but it will still be necessary to supply the Asiatic Fleet and our allies in the Far East.

/S/ H. E. KIMMEL.

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[1] Ser. #9
Secret

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *December 12, 1941.*

Dear Betty: Thanks for your letter. The Secretary is here and I have given him verbally as complete an account of the action last Sunday as I could. Pye, Bloch and General Short were present during the interview. Briefly, we had considered an air raid on Hawaii as a very remote possibility, particularly at the time that it occurred. There were 10 VP's in the air that morning but they of course could not adequately cover 360° of arc and their primary effort was directed against the submarine menace which everyone fully recognized. In our endeavor to avoid wearing out both personnel and planes, we had made periodic sweeps to the Northward and Westward but none were made on the morning in question. You, of course, are familiar with the exchanges of VP squadrons and the teething trouble that such new squadrons always experience.

Full precautions were taken by all ships at sea and I am happy to state that no casualties were incurred by any of them. The submarines were promptly and I hope effectively, dealt with. We believe that since the action started we have accounted for several submarines. A task force commanded by Newton, including one carrier, was between here and Midway and about 400 miles from Midway, South of the line of islands. This task force included 1 carrier, 3 CA's and a squadron of destroyers. Brown, in the INDIANAPOLIS, with 4 DM's was in the vicinity of Johnston Island. Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, with 3

CA's and 9 DD's was about 200 miles west of Oahu. The MINNEAPOLIS, with 4 DM's, was in the operating area to the Southward of Oahu.

The approximate locations of these forces are shown on the chart and in the statement enclosed herewith. The Army anti-aircraft guns were not manned. The condition of readiness of their planes is being reported by General Short.

The ships in harbor opened fire very promptly but the first attack wave was practically unopposed. The fact that all ships were able to open fire so promptly during the breakfast hour indicates that the ships in harbor were alert and prepared.

No amount of explanation can alter the results which are included in a letter which I am sending along to you today, giving in such detail as is now possible, the damage sustained. Prompt and vigorous action was taken in an attempt to intercept and destroy the attacking force. The Fifth Column activities added great confusion and it was most difficult to evaluate the reports received.

[2] We gave Halsey, Brown and Newton our best information and estimates. Our first estimate, based on very meager information indicated a carrier might be to the Northward. Halsey had hardly steadied on a course in that direction when he intercepted a message as to strong enemy forces approaching Barber's Point and promptly diverted his ship and search to the Southward. A false report of a transport landing troops at Barber's Point was picked up by an enemy ship and rebroadcast.

For a time, indications seemed to point more definitely to a carrier, to the Southward than to the Northward and I advised the forces at sea that enemy carriers might be in both directions. Radar information was conflicting; but that indicating planes to the Southward was strongly supported by R. D. F. bearings (not bilateral) of two Japanese calls showing carriers in that direction. Probably they were made by enemy ships planted there for the purpose; although some possibility still exists that a carrier may have been there.

We will endeavor to give you a complete account of our efforts when time permits. Up to now we have been far too busy in handling matters of the moment and planning for the future to collate and analyze the vast amount of conflicting matter that came in at the time.

I am enclosing an estimate of the situation, which will show you our present ideas on what we hope to accomplish. Needless to say we have been up to our ears in getting re-oriented; so much so that we have scarcely had time to feel the terrific shock.

The Secretary is taking with him photographs of the type of submarine which entered the harbor. This submarine 74' x 5½', bolted together in 3 sections and capable of 24 knots submerged, can pass under or around most nets. The Pearl Harbor anti-submarine net was down at the time the raid started. The submarine carried photographed silhouettes of Oahu from every angle of approach; and, among other things in its locker, it had an American Ensign. I shall forward shortly, considerable detailed information of this vessel.

Charts and other things from crashed planes, as well as information gained from the submarine prove that this raid was planned for months. Details had been worked out with the greatest care. Each pilot, judging from material from unburned or partially burned planes, carried a book of silhouettes of our ships. The charts of Pearl Harbor in planes were as good as anything we have. [3] They showed the berths for all types of our ships. I entertain no doubt that the loss of the OGLALA was entirely due to the fact that she was in the PENNSYLVANIA'S normal berth.

The inspiring thing in all this business is the conduct of officers and men. During the action it was magnificent and their efforts since have been untiring and effective. As destroyers were clearing the harbor, they were boarded by men from sunken ships anxious to do their part. Numerous instances have been reported to me of mass volunteering from sunken ships to go to sea in ships that were left. Marines, hearing of attacks on Midway and Wake, have insisted on being sent there.

Morale of all officers and men is high. They have but one thought and that is to be able to get at the enemy.

My kindest regards and best wishes to you always.

Most sincerely yours,

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

EXHIBIT NO. 107

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX TO NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE AT NAVY PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS

(Reports (formerly Top Secret) advisory to the Secretary of the Navy in Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations. See Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations, Vol. II, for official Navy action (formerly Top Secret) on the reports)

Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES FLEET, THIRD ENDORSEMENT TO REPORT OF FURTHER PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION BY ADMIRAL H. K. HEWITT, U. S. NAVY

[1]

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Navy Department, Washington 25, D. C.

FF1/A17
Serial: 002008
Top Secret
Third Endorsement to Adm. Hewitt's Report to SecNav dated 12 July 1945.
From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Report of Further Pearl Harbor Investigation by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy.

1. I concur in general in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General as expressed in the second endorsement. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:

(a) I am of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant trial by court martial of any person in the Naval Service, in that the evidence will not sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the Navy.

(b) With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceedings, I am still of the opinion, which I have previously expressed, that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, though not culpable to a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, were nevertheless inadequate in emergency, due to the lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties.

(c) Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior strategic judgment may not result in future errors. The action has been taken in the case of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. No further action is recommended.

[2] (d) For the reasons stated by the Judge Advocate General, I consider it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, or either one of them, to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, nor are court martial or other proceedings (prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan) advisable because such proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of information which would be detrimental to current military operations and to national security measures.

2. I concur in the opinion of Judge Advocate General that the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel to trial before a General Court Martial, should Admiral Kimmel so insist. However, this action should not be taken until after the completion of hostilities with Japan.

3. I concur in the suggestion of the Judge Advocate that this record be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel; that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything contained in this record and prior records as soon as that may be done without prejudice to security; that if Admiral Kimmel insists, a General Court Martial will be convened to try him for alleged offenses he may have committed on or before December 7, 1941.

4. As to Admiral Hewitt's deductions from war experience—paragraph 28, page 180—I am unable to concur fully with (a) thereof but do concur fully with (b) thereof. Nor am I able to concur fully in his paragraph 29 (page 180)—which parallels his paragraph 28 (a)—for the reason that he himself sets forth in substance at various places in his "findings" and "conclusions", namely, that while the system of command was that of mutual cooperation it was, in reality, incomplete and inadequate implementation of that system which was at fault There is the further fact that, given the information which was available in Washington, it is reasonable to assume that the system of mutual cooperation would have been fully alerted and made to function effectively.

[s] E. J. King
E. J. KING.

THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S

SECOND ENDORSEMENT

ON

THE REPORT OF FURTHER PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION

BY

ADMIRAL H. K. HEWITT, U. S. NAVY

[1]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
Washington, D. C., 10 August 1945.

Top Secret

Second Endorsement

From: The Judge Advocate General.
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and
Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Report of further Pearl Harbor investigation by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy.

1. Subject report clarifies obscure points and supplies omissions in the earlier investigations. It is considered that this and former investigations, taken together, present as clear a picture of the pertinent facts as will ever be adduced. With this report, therefore, I believe the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack should be considered completed.

2. Admiral Hewitt's report brings out and confirms a distinction which impressed me at the time of studying the earlier investigations, a distinction which does much to clarify thinking on the question of placing responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster. It appears that there was no lack of appreciation on the part of any of the responsible officers that war was coming, and coming quickly, during the critical period immediately preceeding 7 December 1941. The point on which those officers failed to exercise the discernment and judgment to be expected from officers occupying their positions, was their failure to appreciate, from the information available to them, that Pearl Harbor was a likely target for aerial attack and their failure to take the necessary steps to prevent or minimize such a surprise attack. Each of these officers, in estimating the critical situation, demonstrated a poor quality of strategical planning, in that he largely ruled out all possible courses of action by which the Japanese might begin the war except through an attack in the Western Pacific.

3. I do not believe that the lack of more complete understanding and co-operation between Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had any great affect on the ultimate result; for it is abundantly shown that they each entertained the same fallacious views, and closer understanding would most likely merely have strengthened those views. Likewise, I submit that the importance of information from Japanese sources has been overemphasized; for had more basically sound principles been observed, the Pearl Harbor disaster would not have occurred. The security of Pearl Harbor was the very core of our

Pacific strategy, a fact which did not receive sufficient consideration in the strategic concept of responsible officers.

[2] 4. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:

(a) As is more fully developed in the answer to question (b), it is not believed that there is sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of any of the officers concerned of any offense known to naval law.

(b) Under the facts of this case, there are only two offenses which are worthy of consideration: (1) Neglect of Duty and (2) Culpable Inefficiency in the Performance of Duty. Under either charge it would be necessary to define the duty of the officer concerned, and to show that it was his duty to follow a course of action other than the one he did. In my opinion this would be impossible, as the acts of omission of these officers do not rise above the status of errors of judgment. No clearly defined duty can be established which was neglected or improperly performed. As stated by Fleet Admiral King, in his endorsement on the findings of the Court of Inquiry, the evidence in the case boils down to the fact that the acts of the officers in question "indicate lack of superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency." "Lack of Superior Judgment" is not an offense triable by general court-martial.

(c) The charges and specifications for any court-martial proceedings must be filed not later than a date "six months after the termination of hostilities in the present war with Japan as proclaimed by the President or as specified in a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, whichever is the earlier." Public Law 77—79th Congress, approved June 7, 1945. There are serious doubts as to the constitutionality of this and the earlier extensions of the Statute of Limitations enacted by the Congress since 7 December 1941 and applicable to trials arising out of the Pearl Harbor disaster as a violation of the Constitutional prohibition against *ex post facto* laws. Admiral Kimmel has executed a waiver of the Statute of Limitations for a period of six months past the end of the present war, and therefore the question of the validity of the Congressional extensions is not controlling in his case. However, as it has become apparent since the time that Admiral Kimmel was requested to execute this waiver that other officers are also blameworthy, it is my opinion that the Navy Department would be acting in an inequitable manner in instituting any proceedings against Admiral Kimmel on his waiver, unless Admiral Kimmel himself so requests.

[3] (d) The requirements of 39th Article for the Government of the Navy and Section 346 of Naval Courts and Boards pertaining to the rank of members of a general court-martial will make it most difficult to constitute a court for the trial of the officers here concerned during war time or during a period of six months after the cessation of hostilities. Many of the officers of appropriate rank, both on the active and the retired lists, would be disqualified because of interest in the subject matter, the probability of being called as a witness, or by virtue of having been connected with one of the investigations into the matter. If more than one of the officers in question are brought to trial, an entirely new court would be necessary in each case, as members who had tried a former case arising out of the Pearl Harbor attack would be subject to challenge. The Summoning of the necessary witnesses would result in temporarily removing from their duty stations many of the key officers in the naval organization. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that any such court martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and would be detrimental to the war effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six months immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the naval service.

5. Notwithstanding the difficulties pointed out above, I am of the opinion that the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel tried by general court-martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist. In August 1943, Secretary Knox sent Admiral Kimmel a memorandum from which the following is quoted, "I feel that it would be to the best interests of all concerned if you should now agree not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial upon my assurance that the trial will be had at the earliest practicable date." And in Admiral Kimmel's waiver he agreed, "I will not plead, nor permit any attorney or other person on my behalf to plead, the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court-Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before Dember (sic) 7th, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter."

6. I suggest that this record be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel; that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything contained in this record and prior records as soon as that may be done without prejudice to the public interests; that if he insists, a general court-martial will be convened to try him for alleged offenses he may have committed on or before December 7, 1941; and that his decision be abided.

/s/ T. L. Gatch.
T. L. GATCH.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY'S FIRST ENDORSEMENT ON THE REPORT OF FURTHER PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION BY ADMIRAL H. K. HEWITT, U. S. NAVY

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Washington

First Endorsement.

To: The Judge Advocate General.
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Record of proceedings and Report of further Pearl Harbor investigation by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN.

1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation.

2. The endorsement by the Judge Advocate General will include his opinion (a) as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant court-martial or other proceedings, (b) as to the offense or offenses which might be made the subject of court-martial or other proceedings, assuming the sufficiency of the evidence concerning such offense or offenses, (c) as to the date prior to which any such court-martial or other proceeding must be instituted, and (d) as to the practicability of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, particularly in view of the regulations concerning the composition of a court and in view of the necessity of obtaining testimony from witnesses engaged in operations against the enemy.

3. The endorsement by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations will include his opinion (a) as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant court-martial or other proceedings, (b) as to the practicability of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, particularly in view of the regulations concerning the composition of a court and in view of the necessity of obtaining testimony from witnesses engaged in operations against the enemy, and (c) as to the advisability of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, particularly in view of the possibility of disclosure of information relating to current and prospective military operations and to national security.

FORRESTAL.

REPORT OF FURTHER INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR, 7 DECEMBER 1941, BY ADMIRAL H. K. HEWITT, U. S. NAVY

12 JULY, 1945.

From: H. Kent Hewitt, Admiral, U. S. Navy.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Report of further investigation in the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

Reference:

(a) Report of Commission appointed by the President to investigate and report the facts relating to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December, 1941.
(b) Record of examination of witnesses having knowledge of the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Ret.).
(c) Public Law 339, 78th Congress.
(d) Precept appointing Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, 13 July 1944.

(e) Record of proceedings and report of Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.
(f) First Endorsement, dated 2 November 1944, by the Judge Advocate General, and Second Endorsement, dated 6 November 1944, by Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, to record of proceedings of Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.
(g) Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20 October 1944.
(h) Letter 3 December 1944 from Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, to the Secretary of the Navy, on report of Army Pearl Harbor Board.
(i) Procebt 2 May 1945 appointing H. Kent Hewitt, Admiral, U. S. Navy, to conduct further Pearl Harbor investigation.
(j) Memorandum 18 May 1945, concerning the scope of the further investigation and approval thereof by the Secretary of the Navy.
(k) Precept 6 July 1945 amending reference (i).

Enclosure:

(A) Report of further investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
(B) Record of proceedings of this investigation and exhibits therein.

1. The precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 2 May 1945, reference (i) as amended by reference (k), directed that Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN,, make a study of the previous investigations, that such further investigation as might appear to be necessary be then conducted, and, that upon completion of the investigation a report be submitted to the Secretary of the Navy setting forth the findings and conclusions reached.

2. Review of the previous investigations disclosed that various matters of importance, principally concerning intelligence, had not been investigated thoroughly. The subjects proposed for further investigation were approved by the Secretary of the Navy on 21 May 1945.

3. Counsel in this investigation was John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting were Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, III, USNR, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR. The reporters were Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR, and Chief Yeoman Raymond E. Reese, USNR. These men took a special oath to maintain the security of the information developed during the investigation.

4. During this proceeding, which commenced 14 May 1945, the testimony of 38 witnesses, some of whom had testified previously, was taken on 26 day, at Washington, D. C., at San Francisco, and at Pearl Harbor. 81 exhibits were received.

5. Delivered herewith are the report of this further investigation (Enclosure A), and the record of proceedings and exhibits therein (Enclosure B). In preparing this report, an effort has been made to present, in one document, the essential facts within the scope of this inquiry which have been developed by this and preceding investigations.

H. KENT HEWITT.

REPORT BY ADMIRAL H. K. HEWITT ON FURTHER PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION

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[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

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[1] INTRODUCTION—PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS AND SCOPE OF THIS INVESTIGATION

A. *The Roberts Commission.*

Pursuant to Executive Order dated December 1941, a Commission, headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts, conducted an investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The Commission reported its findings on 23 January 1942 and concluded:

"1. Effective utilization of the military power of the Nation is essential to success in war and requires: First, the coordination of the foreign and military policies of the Nation; and, second, the coordination of the operations of the Army and Navy.

"2. The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the War and Navy Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully advising them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations with Japan.

"3. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof.

"4. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled their obligations by consulting and cooperating with each other and with their superiors, respecting the joint defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier; and each knew of, and concurred in, the warnings and orders sent by the other to the responsible commanders with respect to such defense.

"5. The Chief of Staff of the Army fulfilled his command responsibilities by issuing a direct order in connection with his warning of probable hostilities, in the following words: 'Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.'

"6. The Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled his command responsibility by issuing a warning and by giving a direct order to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, in the following words:

" 'This despatch is to be considered a war warning.'

and

" 'Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned.'

[2] "7. The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area, in fulfillment of their obligation to do so, prepared plans which, if adapted to and used for the existing emergency, would have been adequate.

"8. In the circumstances the responsibility of these commanders was to confer upon the question of putting into effect and adapting their joint defense plans.

"9. These commanders failed to confer with respect to the warnings and orders issued on and after November 27, and to adapt and use existing plans to meet the emergency.

"10. The order for alert No. 1 of the Army command in Hawaii was not adequate to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages.

"11. The state of readiness of the Naval forces on the morning of December 7 was not such as was required to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages.

"12. Had orders issued by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations November 27, 1941, been complied with, the aircraft warning system of the Army should have been operating; the distant reconnaissance of the Navy, and the inshore air patrol of the Army, should have been maintained; the antiaircraft batteries of the Army and similar shore batteries of the Navy, as well as additional antiaircraft artillery located on vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, should have been manned and supplied with ammunition; and a high state of readiness of aircraft should have been in effect. None of these conditions was in fact inaugurated or maintained for the reason that the responsible commanders failed to consult and cooperate as to necessary action based upon the warnings and to adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy commands in Washington.

"13. There were deficiencies in personnel, weapons, equipment, and facilities to maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods of time, but these deficiencies should not have affected the decision of the responsible commanders as to the state of readines to be prescribed.

"14. The warning message of December 7, intended to reach both commanders in the field at about 7 a. m. Hawaiian time, December 7, 1941, was but an added precaution, in view of the warnings and orders previously issued. If the message had reached its destination at the time intended, it would still have been too late to be of substantial use, in view of the fact that the commanders had failed to take measures and make dispositions prior to the time of its anticipated receipt which would have been effective to warn of the attack or to meet it.

[3] "15. The failure of the officers in the War Department to observe that General Short, neither in his reply of November 27 to the Chief of Staff's message of that date, nor otherwise, had reported the measures taken by him and the transmission of two messages concerned chiefly with sabotage which warned him not to resort to illegal methods against sabotage or espionage, and not to

take measures which would alarm the civil population, and the failure to reply to his message of November 29 outlining in full all the actions he had taken against sabotage only, and referring to nothing else, tended to lead General Short to believe that what he had done met the requirements of the warnings and orders received by him.

"16. The failure of the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to confer and cooperate with respect to the meaning of the warnings received and the measures necessay to comply with the orders given them under date of November 27, 1941, resulted largely from a sense of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military and naval circles, and in the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East. The existence of such a view, however prevalent, did not relieve the commanders of the responsibility for the security of the Pacific Fleet and our most important outpost.

"17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooperative action on their part, it was a derelection of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense reuired by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each, that the was not reuired to inform himself of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department.

"19. Causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were:

Disregard of international law and custom relating to declaration of war by the Japanese and the adherence by the United States to such laws and customs.

Restrictions which prevented effective counterespionage.

Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressive action in the Far East, and on antisabotage measures.

[4] Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the antisabotage measures instituted by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Nonreceipt by the interested parties, prior to the attack, of the warning message of December 7, 1941.

"20. When the attack developed on the morning of December 7, 1941, the officers and enlisted men of both services were present in sufficient number and were in fit condition to perform any duty. Except for a negligible number, the use of intoxicating liquor on the preceding evening did not affect their efficiency.

"21. Subordinate commanders executed their superiors' orders without question. They were not responsible for the state of readiness prescribed."

B. *Admiral Hart's Investigation.*

Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February 1944, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of witnesses having knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese attack. Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.

C. *Naval Court of Inquiry.*

Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith to investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify.

A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN (Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, USN, as Judge Advocate, was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its

findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. Th Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses wer committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons i the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committe or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedin should be had. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 Jul 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944.

[5] The Court of Inquiry concluded:

"Based on finding II, the Court is of the opinion that the presence of a lar number of combatant vessels of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 Decembe 1941, was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander-i Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and maint nance schedules.

"Based on Finding III, the Court is of the opinion that the Constitution requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the Congress, no blow may b struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, prevented the Commande in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from taking offensive action as a means of defense in th event of Japanese vessels or planes appearing in the Hawaiian area, and that imposed upon him the responsibility of avoiding taking any action which migh be construed as an overt act.

"Based on Finding V, the Court is of the opinion that the relations betwee Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N., and Lieut. General Walter C. Short, U. S Army, were friendly, cordial and cooperative, that there was no lack of interes no lack of appreciation of responsibility, and no failure to cooperate on the pa of either, and that each was cognizant of the measures being undertaken by th other for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the degree required b the common interest.

"Based on Finding VI, the Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies in pe sonnel and material which existed during 1941, had a direct adverse bearin upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor on and prior to 7 Decembe

"Based on Finding VII, the Court is of the opinion that the superiority of th Japanese Fleet over the U. S. Pacific Fleet during the year 1941, and the abilit of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial advantag not attainable by the United States up to 7 December 1941.

"Based on Finding VIII, the Court is of the opinion that the defense of the Pea Harbor Naval Base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy wa to assist only with the means provided the 14th Naval District, and that th defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. The Court is furth of the opinion that the defense should have been such as to function effectivel independently of the Fleet, in view of the fundamental requirement that th strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured demands that the defens of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided for and conducted as t remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the base, or for tha of the vessels within its limits.

[6] "Based on Findings IV, VIII and IX, the Court is of the opinion tha the duties of Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U.S.N., in connection with the defens of Pearl Harbor, were performed satisfactorily.

"Based on Finding IX, the Court is of the opinion that the detailed Navi Participation Air Defense plans drawn up and jointly agreed upon were com plete and sound in concept, but that they contained a basic defect in that navi participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging t and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December thes plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise tha there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected withi narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning.

"The Court is further of the opinion that it was not possible for the Com mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to make his Fleet planes permanently availabl to the Naval Base Defense Officer in view of the need for their employment wit the Fleet.

"Based on Finding X, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's actio taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensiv instructions for the security of the Pacific Fleet at sea and in the operating area is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Flee and that the steps taken were adequate and effective.

"Based on Finding XI, the Court is of the opinion that, by virtue of the information that Admiral Kimmel had at hand which indicated neither the possibility nor the imminence of an air attack on Pear Harbor, and bearing in mind that he had not knowledge of the State Department's note of 26 November, the Navy's condition of readiness on the morning of 7 December, 1941, which resulted in the hostile planes being brought under heavy fire of the ships' anti-aircraft batteries as they came within range, was that best suited to the circumstances, although had all anti-aircraft batteries been manned in advance, the total damage inflicted on ships would have been lessened to a minor extent and to a degree which is problematical; and that, had the Fleet patrol planes, slow and unsuited for aerial combat, been in the air, they might have escaped and the number of these planes lost might thus have been reduced.

"The Court is of the opinion, however, that only had it been known in advance that the attack would take place on 7 December, could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects, and that, beyond the fact that conditions were unsettled and that, therefore, anything might happen, there was nothing to distinguish one day from another in so far as expectation of attack is concerned.

[7] "It has been suggested that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned. The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of this is questionable when it is considered that it could not be known *when* an attack would take place and that, to make sure, it would have been necessary to impose a state of tension on the personnel day after day, and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules of ships and planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and 7 December.

"Based on Finding XII, the Court is of the opinion that, as no information of any sort was at any time either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that Japanese carriers or other Japanese ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December, 1941, the attack of 7 December at Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and that when it would take place was unpredictable.

"Based on Finding XIII, the Court is of the opinion that the action of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in ordering that no routine, long-range reconnaissance be undertaken was sound and that the use of Fleet patrol planes for daily, long-range, all-around reconnaissance was not possible with the inadequate number of Fleet planes available, and was not justified in the absence of any information indicating that an attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time.

"Based on Finding XIV, the Court is of the opinion that the shore-based air warning system, an Army service under the direct control of the Army, was ineffective on the morning of 7 December, in that there was no provision for keeping track of planes in the air near and over Oahu, and for distinguishing between those friendly and those hostile and that, because of this deficiency, a flight of planes which appeared on the radar screen shortly after 0700 was confused with a flight of Army B–17s en route from California, and that the information obtained by Army radar was valueless as a warning, because the planes could not be identified as hostile until the Japanese markings on their wings came into view.

"Based on Finding XV, the Court is of the opinion that by far the greatest portion of the damage inflicted by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was due to specially designed Japanese torpedoes, the development and existence of which was unknown to the United States.

"Based on Finding XVI, and particularly in view of the Chief of Naval Operations' approval of the precautions taken and the deployments made by Admiral Kimmel in accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October 1941, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's decision made [8] after receiving the dispatch of 24 November, to continue the preparations of the Pacific Fleet for war, was sound in the light of the information then available to him.

"Based on Finding XVII, the Court is of the opinion that, although the attack of 7 December came as a surprise, there were good grounds for the belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere, and that the same considerations which influenced the sentiment of the authorities in Washington in this respect, support the interpretation which Admiral Kimmel placed upon the "war warning mes-

sage" of 27 November, to the effect that this message directed attention away from Pearl Harbor rather than toward it.

"Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December, 1941 he did not transmit immediately the fact that a message had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.

"The Court is further of the opinion that, had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken.

"Finally, based upon the facts established, the Court is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service."

[9] Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, commented in detail on the findings of the Court of Inquiry in the Second Endorsement thereto. He concluded, in part:

"Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God", beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It is true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until it was too late to repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by the Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers. and it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action they might have taken.

"(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. His attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early and accurate information as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all important developments as they occurred by the quickest and most secure means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture of the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information available in Washington, particularly in the following respects:

"(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26 November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking relations.

"(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain intercepted Japanese messages inquiring as to dispositions of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.

"(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the "Winds message". Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is clear that it [10] did reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together with the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization.

"(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the '1:00 p. m. message' received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. It appears that had this message been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of its significance, it *might* have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.

"(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense of intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.

"(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the 'war warning' message on 27 November, the 'hostile action possible at any moment' message on 28 November, the 3 December message that Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These messages must be considered in connection with other facets of the situation, and Admiral Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be given due consideration. After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open to him:

"(1) He could have used patrol craft which were available to him to conduct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.

"(2) He could have rotated the 'in port' periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the Japanese task less easy.

[*11*] "(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have been fully operational.

"The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, they indicate lack of superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency."

D. *Army Pearl Harbor Report.*

Pursuant to Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, an Army Board conducted investigation into the Japanese attack, and on 20 October 1944 submitted its report to the Secretary of War. The Army report discussed, among other things, various matters involving the Navy, such as the Navy's command relationships at Hawaii, the "tapping" of the telephone wires of the Japanese consul in Hawaii by Naval Intelligence, information secured by Navy radio intelligence as to the location and movements of Japanese naval forces, the Navy's responsibility for long range reconnaissance ("The heart of the defense of Oahu"), and the entrance of Japanese submarines into Pearl Harbor on and allegedly prior to 7 December 1941. The Army report commented critically as to (a) the Navy's failure to conduct long range reconnaissance, (b) the Navy's failure to advise General Short of the presence of a Japanese task force in the Jaluits in late November 1941, (c) the Navy's failure to advise General Short of certain messages, relating to the destruction of codes by the Japanese during the first week of December 1941, and (d) the Navy's failure to advise General Short of the sinking of a Japanese submarine on the morning of 7 December 1941, prior to the air attack. The Army report included a finding that relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were not satisfactory, as a practical matter, although cordial. Concerning intelligence generally, the Army report stated, at page 232:

"The Japanese armed forces knew everything about us. We knew little about them. This was a problem of all our intelligence agencies. This should not come to pass again. Our intelligence service must be brought in line with the part which we are to play in world affairs.

"We must know as much about other major world powers as they know about us. This is an absolute condition precedent to intelligent planning by those charged with formulating our international policies and providing for our security. Our intelligence service should be second to none in its efficiency. It must not be inferred that this is the exclusive function of the M. I. D. It is a national problem.

[12] "In the past our intelligence service has suffered from lack of funds, lack of interest, and legal obstacles and regulations. Steps should be taken to correct all of these."

After consideration of the Army Pearl Harbor Report, Fleet Admiral King, in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated 3 December 1944, stated in part:

"The Army Board finds it difficult to understand the relations between the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, the Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier, the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the local Air Commander (Rear Admiral Bellinger). The Board makes the comment 'The Army had a difficult time in determining under which of the three shells (Kimmel, Bloch, or Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and responsibility.' My comment as to this is that there are some unavoidable complexities in the Command relationships between a fleet, a frontier, and a fleet base in the frontier. However, in this case, there was no possibility of misunderstanding the fact that all naval forces were under Admiral Kimmel. He and General Short should have been able to work out better arrangements for cooperation than they did. The reasons why they did not have been discussed in paragraphs 4 and 5 above.

"The Army Board stresses the point that General Short was dependent upon the U. S. Navy for information as to what the Japanese Navy was doing and for estimates of what the Japanese Navy could do. This view is obviously sound. It was a naval responsibility to keep not only General Short but also the War Department fully acquainted with the estimate of the Japanese naval situation. There was some failure to pass on to General Short and the War Department information which should have been given to them by the Navy, but the basic trouble was that the Navy failed to appreciate what the Japanese Navy could, and did, do.

"The Army Board reports on three matters which should be further investigated by the Navy. These are:

"*a.* It was stated that the War Department received information from some naval agency that on or about 25 November radio intercepts had located a Japanese task force, including carriers, in the Marshall Islands. About 1 December it was reported that this force assumed radio silence. It is noted in the Record that this information never got to General Short. There is some reference to this incident in the Record of the Naval Court, but it was not followed up, presumably because the officer who was Director of Naval Intelligence at the time was not called as a witness. The matter is probably not of importance, since even if there actually was a Japanese force in the Marshalls it apparently had nothing to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, for the sake of completing the naval Record, this matter should be pursued further.

[13] "*b.* The Army Board is of the opinion that Japanese midget submarines operated freely inside of Pearl Harbor for several days prior to the 7th of December, for the purpose of obtaining information. This opinion is based on the testimony of an official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who apparently reached his conclusions by a study of certain captured Japanese charts which were made available to F. B. I. by Naval Intelligence. So far as is known, there is no real ground for the supposition that Japanese submarines were able to roam around Pearl Harbor at will, but since the allegation is made in the Army Record, it is advisable to clear up any doubt that may exist by further naval investigation.

"*c.* There is reference to the fact that information was obtained from naval and F. B. I. espionage over telephones and cables in Hawaii, but no record of what this information was. This should be cleared up.

"The Army Board finds that the Chief of Staff of the Army was at fault in that he failed to keep General Short informed of the international situation and that he delayed in getting critical information to General Short. In these respects, the Army Report parallels the Naval Court findings as to the Chief of Naval Operations. The Army Board further finds that General Marshall was at fault and that he failed to keep his Deputies informed of what was going on, so that they could act intelligently in his absence; in that he did not take action on General Short's report on 28 November that he had established 'Alert No. 1'; and in that he lacked knowledge of conditions of readiness in the Hawaiian Command.

"The Army Board finds that General Short was at fault in that he failed to place his command in an adequate state of readiness (the information which he had was incomplete and confusing, but it was sufficient to warn him of tense relations), in that he failed to reach and agreement with local naval officials for

implementing joint Army and Navy plans and agreements for joint action, in that he failed to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy, and in that he failed to replace inefficient staff officers.

"I find nothing in the Record of the Army Board to cause me to modify the opinions expressed in my endorsement on the Record of the Naval Court of Inquiry, except in relation to the cooperation between Admiral Kimmel and General Short. In view of the extensive and explicit discussion of this phase of the matter by the Army Board, I am no longer of the opinion that cooperation between these two officers was adequate in all respects. The cordial, but informal, contact which they maintained evidently was not sufficient to coordinate the means at their disposal to the best advantage. However, as already pointed out, this fault was part and parcel of the [14] general blindness to Japanese potentialities in the Central Pacific which was the basic cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The many details discussed by the Army Board and the Naval Court are useful in showing how this blindness redounded to our disadvantage, but they do not, in my opinion, prove anything more than that the two naval officers in the high commands concerned—Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel—failed to display the superior judgment they should have brought to bear in analysing and making use of the information that became available to them.

"I recommend that the Secretary of the Navy cause further investigation to be made in the matter referred to in paragraph 8 above; namely, the alleged radio contact with a Japanese force in the Marshall Islands, the alleged presence of Japanese midget submarines inside Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December, and the substance of information obtained by naval and F. B. I. telephone and cable intercepts. I do not think it necessary to reconvene the Court for this purpose, The proposed investigation could be made by another Court, or by an investigating officer, for attachment to the Record of the original Court of Inquiry."

E. *Findings of the Secretary of the Navy and Further Investigation.*

Upon review of the previous investigations, the Secretary of the Navy found that there were errors of judgment on the part of certain officers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington. The Secretary further found that the previous investigations had not exhausted all possible evidence and that the investigation directed tby Public Law 339 of the 78th Congress should be continued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts should be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted. The Secretary stated that his decision would be reviewed when the investigation was finally complete, in the light of the evidence then at hand.

The precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 2 May, 1945, and amended 6 July, 1945, directed that Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, make a study of the previous investigations, that such further investigation as might appear to be necessary be then conducted, and that upon completion a report be submitted to the Secretary of the Navy setting forth the findings and conclusions reached.

Review of the previous investigations disclosed that various matters of importance, principally concerning intelligence, had not been investigated throughly. The subjects proposed for further investigation were approved by the Secretary of the Navy on 21 May, 1945.

Counsel in this investigation was John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting were Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, III, USNR, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR. The reporters were Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR, and Chief Yeoman Raymond E. Reese, USNR. These men took a special oath to maintain the security of the information developed during the investigation.

[15] F. *Witnesses in this Investigation.*

At Pearl Harbor in 1941:

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet. (R. 182)

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, In charge of Communications Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District. (R. 43; R. 541)

Vice Admiral Willian W. Smith, USN, Chief of Staff, CincPac. (R. 335)

Vice Admiral Charles H. McMorris, USN, War Plans Officer, CincPac. (R. 298)

Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany, USN, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, CincPac. (R. 168)

Vice Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger, USN, Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings, Commander, Patrol Wing Two, Commander, Task Force Nine, Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. (R. 471)

Captain John B. Earle, USN, Chief of Staff, 14th N. D. (R. 451)

Mr. George Street, Manager, RCA, Honolulu. (R. 411)

Rear Admiral Irving H. Mayfield, USN, District Intelligence Officer, 14th N. D. (R. 554)

Captain Thomas H. Dyer, USN, Cryptanalytical and Decrypting, Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet. (R. 418)

Captain Joseph Finnegan, USN, Translator, Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet. (R. 554)

Commander Wesley A. Wright, USN, Assistant Communications Officer, CincPac, on temporary duty with Com 14 Communications Intelligence Unit. (R. 442)

Lieutenant (jg) Farnsley C. Woodward, USN, Cryptanalyst, Communications Intelligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R. 541)

[*16*] Colonel Alva B. Laswell, USMC, Translator, Communications Intelligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R. 541)

Captain William W. Outerbridge, USN, Commanding Officer, USS WARD. (R. 87)

Lieutenant Commander Monroe H. Hubbell, USNR, Commanding Officer, USS CONDOR. (R. 428)

Richard W. Humphrey, RM3c, USNR, Bishop's Point Radio Station.

Lieutenant Oliver H. Underkofler, USNR, Communications Office, 14th N. D. (R. 465)

Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, USNR, District Intelligence Office, 14th N. D. (R. 376)

Commander Harold S. Burr, USNR, Com 14 Liaison Officer at General Short's Headquarters. (R. 376)

Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department. (R. 387)

At the Philippines in 1941:

Captain Redfield Mason, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet. (R. 68)

Commander Rudolph J. Fabian, USN, Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, Corregidor. (R. 68)

At Washington, D. C. in 1941:

Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, USN, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence. (R. 389)

Captain Arthur H. McCollum, USN, In charge of Far Eastern Section, Foreign Branch, ONI. (R. 10)

Captain Laurence F. Safford, USN, Communications Security Section. (R. 97; R. 529)

Captain Alwin D. Kramer, USN, ONI and Communications Security Section. (R. 128)

Mrs. Dorothy Edgers, Research Analyst, ONI. (R. 511)

[*17*] Lieutenant Commander Francis M. Brotherhood, USNR, Communications Security Section. (R. 143)

Lieutenant Frederick L. Freeman, USN, Communications Security Section. (R. 149)

Lieutenant Commander Allan A. Murray, USNR, Communications Security Section. (R. 433)

Lieutenant Commander George W. Linn, USNR, Communications Security Section. (R. 140)

Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Pering, USNR, Communications Security Section. (R. 148)

Other witnesses:

Captain William R. Smedberg, III, USN, now Assistant Combat Intelligence Officer, Staff, Cominch. (R. 4)

Lieutenant Commander Leo Reierstad, USNR, now in charge of a translating unit in Op-16-FE. (R. 158)

Lieutenant (jg) Joseph M. Conant, USNR, Translation sub-section head in Op-16-FE. (R. 158)

Commander Walter Karig, USNR, Lieutenant Welbourn Kelley, USNR, authors of "Battle Report." (R. 80)

Lieutenant Commander Gilbert E. Boone, USNR, head of Op-20-GL. (R. 554; R. 607)

[18] G. *Exhibits Received in this Investigation.*

Received in this investigation were the following exhibits:

Number	Description	Record Page
1	Precept convening investigation	1
1A	Modification of precept, directing report of findings and conclusions	575
2	Narrative statement by counsel of previous Navy investigations	2
3	CinCPOA Weekly Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 8 December 1944, relating to the attacking force.	5
4	A translation of a captured Japanese submarine chart, showing courses and location of U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor.	8
5	CinCPOA Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 20 October 1944, containing description of Japanese midget submarines.	9
6	ONI document "ONI 220-J, Japanese Submarines"	9
7	Berthing plan at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941 (Ex. 60 of Naval Court)	9
8	Photostatic copies of Com14 and Com16 dispatch estimates of Japanese fleet location and movements, 26 November 1941.	12
9	ONI Bulletin of 1 December 1941, Japanese fleet locations	17
10	McCollum memorandum estimating situation as of 1 December 1941	21
11	"Battle Report"	22
12	FCC radio intercepts regarding "winds" code (Ex. 65 of Naval Court)	31
13	Collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches	56
14A 14B 14C 14D	Photostatic copies of captured Japanese submarine chart, showing courses and location of U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor.	60
15	Collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches (Ex. 63 of Naval Court)	66
16	Copies of dispatches sent from RI unit, Corregidor, regarding Japanese fleet movements	75
17	Photostat of captured Japanese submarine chart used for Plate V of "Battle Report"	83
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18	Log of conversation between WARD and CONDOR on the morning of 7 December 1941	91
19	Tentative copies of Communication Intelligence Summaries, for 1 November 1941 to 6 December 1941, at Pearl Harbor.	103
20	Message from Tokyo establishing the hidden word code	135
21	Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin of 27 November 1941 concerning composition of Japanese Navy.	185
22	Daily Communication Intelligence Summaries, 14 October 1941 to 5 December 1941, given to Fleet Intelligence Officer (Captain Layton) for delivery to Admiral Kimmel.	194
23	Memorandum of 1 December 1941 from Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral Kimmel, estimating Japanese ship locations.	211
24	November 24th dispatch from CNO to CincPac (Ex. 15 of Naval Court)	238
25	"War Warning" (Ex. 17 of Naval Court)	247
26	Layton Intelligence reports from 6 October 1941 to 2 December 1941	259
27	Paraphrased copies of dispatches from various intelligence agencies delivered to CincPac	264
28	Memorandum from Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral Kimmel regarding proposed Army aerial reconnaissance of Mandated Islands.	266
29	Intercepted Japanese consular dispatches delivered to Fleet Intelligence Officer about December 10th.	272
30	Two Japanese panorama views of Pearl Harbor with Japanese log on reverse side, recovered from submarine (returned to Captain Layton).	279
30A	Photostat of Japanese log on reverse of exhibit 30	279
30B	Translations of exhibits 30 and 30A	280
31	Panorama sketch of Pearl Harbor from position five miles south of Pearl Harbor, recovered from submarine (returned to Captain Layton).	280
31A	Photostats of exhibit 31	280
32	Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from Japanese midget submarine (returned to Captain Layton).	281
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32A	Photostat of exhibit 32	281
33	Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from Japanese submarine, showing defensive installations (returned to Captain Layton).	290
33A	Photostatic copy of exhibit 33	291
34	Staff Instructions, CincPac, 1941	293
35	U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46).	295
36	Letter of 9 September 1941 from CNO to CincPac, approving Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five.	297
36A	Letter of 25 July 1941 from CincPac to CNO, submitting Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five.	297
37	Photostatic copy of schedules setting forth utilization of patrol planes of Pacific Fleet from 17 November to 31 December and approved 22 November 1941.	368
38	Transcripts of intercepted telephone calls of Japanese Consul and Vice Consul in Honolulu from October to 2 December 1941 (Consul's marked 38A; Vice Consul's marked 38B).	379
39	Copy of intercepted "Mori conversation"	382
40	ONI Summaries of messages sent by Japanese Consul in Honolulu from 1 December to 6 December 1941.	385
41	File of work sheets on Jap diplomatic traffic (incorporated in other exhibit)	420
42	Paper showing part of decryption process of Japanese "PA" code	421
43	Duty Officer, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, information sheets	430
44	Extract from signal log of gate vessel of 7 December 1941	430

[18] G. *Exhibits Received in this Investigation*—Continued
Received in this investigation were the following exhibits—Continued

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45	Extract from quartermaster's log of gate vessel of 7 December 1941	431
46	Extract from log of Signal Tower, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, of 7 December 1941	432
47	Collection of documents, containing Annex VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements, to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.	457
48	Collection of dispatches regarding submarine contacts at Pearl Harbor in November and December, 1941.	461
49	Bellinger "Estimate of Situation"	474
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50	Letter from ComTaskFor 9, to CinC, 20 December 1941, on reconnaissance prior to attack	481
50A	Dispatches cited in exhibit 50	482
51	ComTaskFor 9 letter of 22 October 1941, file 0026	483
52	ComTaskFor 9 letter of 16 January 1941	484
53	ComPatWing 2 letter to CNO, of 11 December 1940	488
54	Watch and duty schedules of Patrol Wings One and Two prior to attack	496
55	RCA Communications, Inc., statement, listing certain Japanese cable messages from Honolulu in November and December, 1941.	542
56	Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via RCA, among those listed in exhibit 55, received by Navy 5 December 1941.	544
56A	Pages 7 to 12 of exhibit 56, containing messages not decrypted until after the attack	600
57	Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via RCA, among those listed in exhibit 55, received by Navy after the attack.	550
57A	Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via RCA, received by Navy on night of 7 December and subsequently translated.	601
58	Collection of dispatches from Naval Communication files relating to Japanese fleet movements and locations during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941.	555
59	Collection of Japanese plain language news broadcasts	555
60	Collection of memoranda relating to messages received at Naval Communications in various Japanese code systems.	556
61	Memorandum of Naval Communications, surveying work sheets processed by Navy of Japanese purple system.	557
62	Report from DIO, 14th N. D., to Director of Naval Intelligence, of 19 April 1942, relating to coded dispatch traffic of Japanese Consul General, Honolulu.	569
63	Certified collection of documents relating to anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.	602
64	Copy of ltr. from Secretary of War to Secretary of Navy, dated 7 February 1941, relating to air defense at Pearl Harbor.	603
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65	CincPac secret letter of 7 August 1941 relating to the organization of the Orange fleet	603
66	Map showing the location of ships present at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941	603
67	Telephone log of radio unit at Pearl Harbor, showing calls made and received on 7 December 1941 as to Jap fleet locations.	603
68	Photostatic copies of memoranda relating to questioning of captain of Japanese captured submarine.	604
69	Pacific Fleet Weekly Intelligence Bulletin for 11 June 1945, containing description of midget submarines and method of transport to Pearl Harbor.	604
70	Selected collection of Pearl Harbor dispatches, miscellaneous subjects, taken from CincPac Headquarters.	604
71	Collection of dispatches relating to proposed Army reconnaissance in November of 1941	604
72	Collection of dispatches of December 7 and 8, 1941, from CincPac	605
73	CincPac secret letter of 12 December 1941 reporting damage to ships at Pearl Harbor as result of attack and other details.	605
74	Photostatic copy of War Diary of Com 14 from 7 December 1941 to 1 January 1942	605
75	War Diary of USS WARD; War Diary of O-in-C, Net and Boom Defenses, 14th N. D.; War Diary of USS CONDOR; excerpts from diary of O-in-C, Net and Boom Defenses, 14th N. D., WARD, and CONDOR.	605
76	Photostatic copy of 1st and 2nd endorsements on Com 14 letter of 30 December 1941 relating to early morning submarine contact on 7 December 1941.	606
77	Collection of correspondence relating to combined operating center for Army and Navy	606
78	Typewritten translation and copy of intercepted Japanese communication contained in exhibit 20, and notes relating thereto.	611
79	Photostatic copy of page 44 of volume containing translations of files of operations orders, orders, memos, and serials dealing with Japanese Navy plans, recovered from Jap CA NACHI.	613
80	Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater	613
81	Collection of photostatic copies of ONI memoranda dealing with organization and locations of Jap fleet as estimated during November and up to December 1, 1941.	613

[23] I

THE WAR AND DEFENSE PLANS

A. *U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five.*

On 26 July 1941, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Exhibit 35) was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five) in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet were concerned. It was approved 9 September 1941 by the Chief of Naval Operations (Exhibit 36). The plan provided in part:

"INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION

"0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day."

"CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS

"1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:

"a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the 'Free French' are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

"1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or

"2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

"NOTE: As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan." * * *

[24] "CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

"1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as follows:

"Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East."

"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

"Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action

"1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

"1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

"a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

"b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

"c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

"d. The principal defensive efforts to be:

"1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.
"2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.
[25] "3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.
"1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:
"a. Capture of Guam.
"b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.
"c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
"d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.
"e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.
"f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.
"1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:
"a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.
"b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the Mandates.
"c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main base in Halmahera).
"d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.
"e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.
"f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area." * * *

[26] "PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

"CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN—MISSION

"2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:
"a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;
"b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;
"c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;
"d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west as longitude 155° east;
"e. Defend Samoa in Catagory 'D';
"f. Defend Guam in category 'F';
"g. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces;
"h. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;" * * *.

"CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS

"2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:
[27] "a. Phase I—Initial tasks—Japan not in the war.

"b. Phase IA—Initial tasks—Japan in the war.
"c. Phase II, etc.,—Succeeding tasks.
"2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:
"a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
"b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
"c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.
"d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
"e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific southern and a similar force to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier, on M-day.
"f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier on M-day.
"g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the equator as far west as longitude 155° East.
"h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
"i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.
"j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
"k. Continue training operations as practicable.
"l. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.
"m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

[28] "Phase IA

"2203. Phase IA tasks are as follows:
"a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.
"b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been completed.
"c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the northern Pacific.
"d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering operations.
"e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.
"2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids against Japanese shipping in waters between Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
"f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.
"g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.
"h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian Area and the West coast.
"i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.
"j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier as necessary.
"k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division.
"l. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island area."

"PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

"CHAPTER I. PHASE I

"Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force)

"3141. *Task Force Nine* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.
[29] "3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific southern and Pacific northern naval coastal frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.
"3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I)." * * *

"PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

"CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS, PHASES I AND IA

"Section 1. Phase I

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

"Operation Plan No. 1–R5." * * *

"I. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five.

"2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan." * * *

"Annex I

United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

"Patrol and Sweeping Plan." * * *

"1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.

[*30*] Phase I.

"2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

"(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.

"(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.

"(c) Covering.

"(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.

"(e) Routing shipping." * * *

"3. (d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

"(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and unkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

"(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

"(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander *Task Force Three*, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

"(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

"(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

"(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

[*31*] "(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

"(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O–1)." * * *

B. *Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Orange 14ND–JCD–42*

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and FOURTEENTH Naval District (14ND–JCD–42), was signed and placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District (Exhibit). The plan was based on the joint Army and Navy basic war plans, and was to constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans,

and mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the plan was by mutual cooperation which was to apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy would operate in coordination until and if the method of unity of command were invoked. The tasks asigned were as follows:

"14. *TASKS.*

"a. *Joint Task.* To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

"b. *Army Task.* To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

"c. *Navy Task.* To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces."

The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone was defined as "The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the Hawaiian Costal Frontier" (Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu).

The plan provided that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, should provide for the following:

"17. *ARMY.* The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

"a. The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS—WHEELER FIELD—LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.

[32] "b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

"c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

"d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

"e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

"f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18.*a.*), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

"h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18.*e.*

"i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by 'Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940'.

"j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

"n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[33] "o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

"18. *NAVY.* The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

"a. An inshore patrol.

"b. An offshore patrol.

"c. An escort force.

"d. An attack force.

"e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.

"f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

"g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D. C. A. and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of the OAHU-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

"h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

"i. Distant reconnaissance.

"j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

"k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

"l. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 *i.*, a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

"m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

"n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

"o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

[*34*] "p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto."

C. *Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.*

Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated 28 March 1941, and approved by Admiral Bloch and General Short 2 April 1941, (Exhibit 47), dealt with joint security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base. It stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and before a general mobilization for war, there were adopted the following agreements:

Paragraph II, in respect of joint air operations, provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available, these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

Paragraph III provided for joint communications, and, among other things, that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade and the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center; that subsequently, when the Army aircraft warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit it to their respective organizations.

Paragraph IV related to joint anti-aircraft measures, the arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages, Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, and Army Aircraft Warning Service. It provided that the latter service was to be expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and, "during the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable."

[35] D. *Joint Estimate Covering Army and Navy Air Action in the Event of Sudden Hostile Action Against Oahu.*

On 31 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bellinger, Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two), and Major General F. L. Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph I of the estimate included a "Summary of the Situation," which indicated that relations between the United States and Orange were strained, uncertain, and varying; that in the past Orange had never preceded hostile action by a declaration of war; that a successful sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long period; that a strong part of our fleet was constantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offensive action; and, that it appeared possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service.

Paragraph II of the estimate embraced a "Survey of Opposing Strengths," indicating, among other things, that Orange might send into the Hawaiian area one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinating their actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise.

Paragraph III of the estimate dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." It stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two; that it appeared the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack, most likely launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. It was further pointed out that a single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust; that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier"; and that in a dawn air attack there was a high possibility that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using.

Paragraph IV of the estimate considered "Action Open to Us." It was stated that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period, and, as a practicable measure, could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence [36] indicated that a surface raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. Reference was made to other types of action open in the event of a surprise attack on ships in the operating area or on the islands, and pointed out that none of the outlined courses of action could be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred.

Paragraph V contained "Decisions." The primary decision was that the Naval Base Defense Air Force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile action against Oahu or fleet unis in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures. A number of subsidiary decisions were made, including decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an air combat group, the assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions of conditions of readiness. The search and attack group was to be under the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force-Commander Patrol Wing Two, and, in accordance with current conditions of readiness, included patrol squadrons and Army bombardment and reconnaissance squadrons.

[37] E. *Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1–41, and Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan.*

Admiral Bloch, as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued his Operation Plan No. 1–41, on February 27, 1941 (Exhibit 53 of the Naval Court). The Task Organization prescribed was: (a) Destroyer Patrol (Commander Inshore Patrol) consisting of two destroyers, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, and an A/B boom

and minesweeper, (b) Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two) in conjunction with the Army, (c) Antiaircraft Defense (District Marine Officer) in conjunction with the Army, (d) Harbor Control Post (District Operations Officer) in conjunction with the Army. This plan directed attention, among other things, to the Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, and stated:

"By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be established as necessary for the joint protection of Pearl Harbor Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

"In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will arrange to coordinate joint effort; to set conditions of readiness; to hold required drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear" signals.

Assumptions.

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

(1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.

(2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction in the channel.

(3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.

(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:

(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area—probable.

(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR—possible.

(3) A combination of these two—possible."

Annexed to Operation Plan 1-41 were: A detailed Inshore Patrol Plan, called Annex "A;" a detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, called Annex "Baker;" a detailed Anti-aircraft Defense Plan, called Annex "C;" a detailed Harbor Control Post Plan, called "D;" and a detailed Communications Plan, known as Annex "Easy."

Annex "Baker," the detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, dated 9 April 1941, was prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. It divided the Task Organization into (a) Search and Attack Group, consisting of patrol squadrons and other planes, including Army reconnaissance squadrons, and (b) an air combat group. This plan was made in accordance with the Joint Estimate, dated 31 March 1941, which is digested above. The Naval Base Defense Air Force was, according to this plan, to [38] locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against Oahu or Fleet units in the operating areas. The plan was effective upon receipt and became operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu. It might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness, prescribed in Addendum Two to this plan, would be taken as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for Army units, and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (ComFOURTEEN) for Navy units. The condition of material readiness was to be signified by a letter, such as "E," signifying that all aircraft were conducting routine operations and none were ready for the purposes of this plan, and the condition of operational readiness by a number, such as "5," signifying that all types of available planes would be ready in four hours. It was also required that a dispatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day, be made by each unit assigned by this plan to a task group, stating the number of planes and readiness.

[39] F. *Pacific Fleet Letter on Security of the Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.*

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, from the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued in February, 1941 and reissued in revised form on 14 October 1941.

This order provided that the Security of the Fleet was predicated on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present existing conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor;

(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.

Security measures were prescribed covering:

A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.

B. Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air patrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet or Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) for screening heavy ships, other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas, as directed by Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, an air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force, an air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times. There also was to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

C. Sortie and entry.

D. Operating areas.

E. Ships at sea.

F. Ships in port.

The security provisions covering defense against air attack (G), described the principal Army anti-aircraft gun defenses of Pearl Harbor, and directed that Marine defense battalions would assist the Army in manning them; and provided that in the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; it prescribed air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor. It further provided that the senior officer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure berthing so as to develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire; and that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval [40] Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft, arranging through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and the Navy, and coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Embarked (exclusive of CincPac) of the condition of readiness to maintain, and by holding drills, etc.

Three conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition III read as follows:

"Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."

The procedure to be followed by the task forces in the event of an air attack was also set forth: the Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency sortie order, sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and submarines for sortie; the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a striking unit, etc.; and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating that an attack was in progress or imminent, inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, launch air search for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.

The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set forth. It was provided that the ship attacked was, among other things, to originate a plain language dispatch containing the essential details; various actions were to be taken by other ships; and the Patrol Wings were to assume readiness for search and for offensive action, to carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander, and to prepare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius from the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding daylight period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. It was further provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack," that "(3) it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means."

[41] G. *Execution of Plans Prior to 7 December 1941.*

(1) The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow 5 provided that the day of execution of the plan was to be designated as W-Day, and that the day upon

which hostilities opened with Japan would be J-Day, which might or might not coincide with W-Day. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, W-Day had not been designated.

(2) The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan had been signed and placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. It will be recalled that under this plan the method of coordination of Army and Navy effort was "by mutual cooperation" and not "unity of command." It will be recalled further that under this plan the Army task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; and to support the Naval forces; and, that the Navy task was to patrol the coastal zone and control and protect shipping therein; and to support the Army forces; and, that the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance.

(3) Annex VII, Section 6 of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which provided for joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war (including joint air operations and for the use of Army aircraft by the Navy for long distance patrol when Navy forces were insufficient), was to become effective when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action. No such agreement was made prior to the attack on December 7th.

(4) The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, which provided for an Inshore Patrol consisting of two destroyers, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, and an A/B boom and minesweepers, a Base defense air force, anti-aircraft defense, and a harbor control post, although effective as to the inshore patrol was not in operation as to the base defense air force.

(5) The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, dated 9 April 1941, which was an annex to the Naval Base Defense Force Plan and which had been made in accordance with the joint estimate of Bellinger and Martin, dated 31 March 1941, was effective upon receipt. It was to become operative without a signal in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu and it might have been made operative by dispatch. It was not made operative until the attack on 7 December 1941.

(6) The Pacific Fleet Letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, which recognized the possibility of a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor and which set forth security measures including patrols to be conducted both by destroyers and by aircraft, was in effect during 1941, and in revised form after 14 October 1941.

[42] H. *Admiral Kimmel's Views as to the Possibility of a Surprise Air Attack.*

It appears from the War and Defense Plans, above summarized, that it was believed that prior to a declaration of war there might be a surprise attack by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor or a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas. The possibility of a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor had been expressed as early as 24 January 1941 by the Secretary of the Navy, in a letter to the Secretary of War (Exhibit 64), a copy of which was received by Admiral Kimmel shortly after he assumed command of the Pacific Fleet. In that letter, the Secretary of the Navy wrote:

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor . . . The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probabilities are considered to be: (1) air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire."

In his testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel indicated some confusion as to his agreement with and his evaluation of the above letter by the Secretary of the Navy. He testified that he had felt that the most probable form of attack on Pearl Harbor was by submarine, and that a bombing attack was the second most probable, but that he had been of the view that there was no danger of an air torpedo attack because the water was too shallow. He then corrected his testimony, characterizing his previous testimony as erroneous, and stated that he had regarded an air attack as no more than a possibility.

It appears clearly that Admiral Kimmel at all times during his command of the Pacific Fleet was of the view that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility. Thus, in a letter by Admiral Richardson, prepared in collaboration

with Admiral Kimmel, on 25 January 1941 (Exhibit 70, Naval Court), it was stated in part that the security of the Pacific Fleet would be predicated on certain assumptions, including an assumption that Japan might attack without warning and the further assumption that Japanese attacks might be expected against shipping, outlying positions, or naval units, and that surprise raids on Pearl Harbor were possible. Again, in a letter of 18 February 1941, concerning the adequacy of local defense (Exhibit 30, Naval Court), Admiral Kimmel stated, "I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility." And, as previously pointed out, the Fleet Security Letter, reissued on 14 October 1941, predicated the security of the Fleet on two assumptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor. This, Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court, referred to a surprise air attack.

In connection with Admiral Kimmel's statement before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he thought there was no danger of an air [43] torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor because the water was too shallow, several letters from the Chief of Naval Operations should be noted:

On 15 February 1941 (Exhibit 49, Naval Court), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to CincPac regarding anti-torpedo baffles for protection against attacks on Pearl Harbor. This stated that the shallow depth of water limited the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor and the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limited the practicability of the present type of baffles. The letter indicated that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet might be assumed necessary successfully to drop torpedoes from planes and that the desirable height for dropping is 60 feet or less. There were various other considerations stated. The recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief were especially desired. A similar letter was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of various Naval Districts, including the Fourteenth, on 17 February 1941 (Exhibit 54, Naval Court).

The reply to the request for recommendations and comments was made on 20 March 1941, in a letter by Admiral Bloch, stating that the depth of water at Pearl Harbor was 45 feet, and for that and other reasons, he did not recommend anti-torpedo baffles. CincPac agreed, until such time as a light efficient net were developed.

In June, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent another letter to the Commandants of Naval Districts, copy to CincPac and others, referring to recent developments, and to experience at Taranto, which stated that no minimum depth of water could be assumed safe as regards torpedo attack if there were sufficient water around a ship to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo, but that such an attack in 10 fathoms or more was more likely than in shallow water (Exhibit 55, Naval Court). The torpedoes at Taranto, it was said, were launched in thirteen to fifteen fathoms although some may have been in eleven.

Admiral Kimmel testified that on this correspondence he based his opinion that there was no chance of an air torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor—and that even after the June letter, he did not think that torpedoes would run in such shallow water. He pointed out that the Navy made no effort to place such nets in Pearl Harbor. He later stated that he did not think an aerial torpedo attack would be made because he did not think such torpedoes would run in Pearl Harbor and did not give this a great deal of consideration for that reason.

[44] I. *Adequacy of Forces to Carry Out Tasks Assigned.*

The adequacy of forces assigned to the Pacific Fleet for carrying out the tasks assigned in the war plans was the subject of testimony before both Admiral Hart and the Naval Court of Inquiry. From the testimony it appears that although there were shortages concerning which Admiral Kimmel had extensive correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations, there was general agreement by the witnesses to the effect that the Fleet was considered adequate to carry out the initial tasks assigned in the war plans. The initial tasks, it will be recalled, were primarily defensive in nature. As will appear subsequently in this report, the number of fleet patrol planes in the Hawaiian area was not sufficient to enable a 360 degree reconnaissance to be flown daily from Oahu for more than a few days, but was sufficient for air reconnaissance of the more dangerous sectors to have been flown for at least several weeks. To this extent, therefore, the patrol planes assigned to the Pacific Fleet were a limiting factor as to the Fleet's ability to carry out one of the initial tasks assigned in the war plans, namely, to "maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches of Oahu . . ."

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan stated that the Navy through ComFOURTEEN, would provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu. Admiral Bloch had no air forces assigned to him and had to rely upon the Fleet planes, which were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, for the accomplishment of this task. Thus naval patrol planes could be and were used for long distance reconnaissance from Oahu only when they were made available by Admiral Kimmel for that purpose.

[45] J. *Command Organization.*

(1) *Methods of Coordination Between Army and Navy Commands.*

According to "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935," (Exhibit 6, Naval Court), the operations of Army and Navy forces were to be coordinated by one of two methods:

(a) Mutual cooperation, or,

(b) The exercise of unity of command.

(2) *Coordination Between Army and Navy Commands in Hawaii.*

The command organization in the Hawaiian area was designed to function through "mutual cooperation" between the Army and Navy. This was the normal method of coordination according to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy (Exhibit 6, page 5), and applied to the defense of Pearl Harbor as well as the entire Hawaiian area.

(3) *Desirability of Unity of Command.*

(a) *Unity of Command for Hawaii considered in Washington.* Admiral Stark testified before the Naval Court that, prior to 7 December 1941, he had given much thought to the question of unity of command in Hawaii but that no satisfactory solution or decision had been reached as far as the Navy Department was concerned. It had been the topic of many conversations with the Chief of Staff of the Army, but it was anticipated only for amphibious operations (page 29, Naval Court). He and the Chief of Staff of the Army could have placed unity of command into effect at Hawaii, subject to the approval of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy (page 39, Naval Court). However, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy" (Exhibit 6, Naval Court) does not indicate that the approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy would have been required.

(b) *Unity of Command for Hawaii considered at Pearl Harbor.* Admiral Stark testified that Admiral Kimmel, as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in mutual agreement with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, could have placed unity of command in effect in Oahu (Naval Court, page 39; Exhibit 6, page 5). Admiral Kimmel testified (Roberts Commission, page 538; Naval Court, page 226) that he had never had any discussion with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on the desirability of putting unity of command into effect in the Hawaiian area, but did state that where command is vested in one agency, much better results can be obtained than when responsibility is divided.

Admiral Kimmel testified that so far as the authority of ComFOURTEEN to accomplish unity of command was concerned, ComFOURTEEN did not have the authority without reference to him and that he would not have approved this nor accepted the responsibility for Army action without reference to the Navy Department.

[46] Under the Naval Base Defense Plan (Exhibit 53, NC), unity of command was vested in the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force over all offensive air operations and under the Army Air Commander for all defensive air operations, but only *after* the plan had been activated.

(c) *Weakness of "Mutual Cooperation."*

(i) *Air Command.* Admiral Bellinger testified that the weakness of the air defense plan was that there was no one officer in command until after the plan was activated. The Bellinger-Martin estimate (Exhibit 49) he believed to be sound, but said that it lacked sanction and that the missing sanction was unity of command.

(ii) *Recommendation of Joint Command Center.* In an endorsement dated 6 December 1941 from the Director, Radio Liaison Division, to the Director, Naval Districts Division, advocating a combined operating center for the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor (which was not established prior to the attack), Admiral Hooper stated "The most perfect set-up for command is one in which the supreme commander is exercised by one officer best equipped of any for the task . . . Because our defense is under two officers, Army and Navy, we must try and arrange matters so that when component parts of the commands are

interwoven these two can function as nearly as possible as one." (Exhibit 77.)

The recommendation for a Joint Command Center in Hawaii was originated by a dispatch from OpNav to ComFOURTEEN on 15 October 1941 (Exhibit 77), requesting that consideration be given to the construction of a combined operating center sufficient in size and facilities to accommodate in time of emergency staffs of all essential operating activities of both Army and Navy in Hawaii. An informal joint working committee had been formed in Washington to endeavor to improve cooperation of Army and Navy shore defense activities by the formation of joint command centers. A reply to the above-mentioned dispatch strongly recommending against such a move is contained in a letter from ComFOURTEEN to CNO, via CincPac, enclosing a letter from General Short to ComFOURTEEN and an endorsement by CincPac.

General Short stated that while he was strongly in favor of combined operating centers for equivalent units of Army and Navy forces, he did not believe that all of the operating centers should be combined into one single building, because it was necessary that Army headquarters be located in separate command posts for efficiency of individual operation. It was also undesirable from communication and security standpoint. He suggested that, as an alternative, additional space for Navy units be constructed adjacent to the existing command posts for equivalent Army units.

[47] In the basic letter (Exhibit 77) ComFOURTEEN recommended that no steps be taken to concentrate the Army and Navy in a common building and believed that the best interests of the CinC Pacific Fleet would be served by one building with only agencies of the Fleet therein.

The CinC Pacific Fleet in his endorsement to this letter stated that the mission of the Army and the Fleet were considerably different, the operation of one being defensive and local, while the operations of the other were offensive and far-flung. Strategic, rather than tactical, cooperation was indicated and therefore the necessity for rapid receipt and exchange of information and arrival at quick decision was of less importance. He was of the opinion that the establishment of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Hawaii was not only unnecessary, but definitely undesirable.

(4) *Disagreement concerning Unity of Command at the Outlying Islands.*

The evidence in the previous investigations and in this investigation indicates that there was some consideration of unity of command at outlying islands during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941. This occurred as a result of dispatches by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac on 26 November 1941 (Exhibits 18 and 40, Naval Court), in which it was advised that the Army had agreed to reenforce Midway and Wake with Army personnel and to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and 25 at Wake provided that Admiral Kimmel considered this feasible and desirable. It was stated that it would be necessary for Admiral Kimmel to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to Midway and Wake on aircraft carriers, that the planes would be flown off at destination and that the ground crews would be landed in boats. Admiral Kimmel was directed to confer with the Commanding General concerning this matter, and to advise as soon as practicable.

It appears that this subject was considered at some length in conferences held by Admiral Kimmel on and after 27 November 1941. The discussion of unity of command as to these islands was summarized by Vice-Admiral Smith in his testimony in this investigation. He said that Admiral Kimmel asked the Army what he could expect of Army fighters at Wake, and that General Martin of the Army Air Force replied that the Army did not allow such planes to go more than 15 miles offshore. Admiral Kimmel then stated that the Army planes were, therefore, no good to him.

General Short stated that if he manned those islands, he must command them and "Kimmel replied, 'Over my dead body. The Army should exercise no command over Navy bases.' General Short replied, 'Mind you, I don't want these islands. I think they are better manned by Marines. But if I must put planes and troops on them, then I must command them.'" (Page 352, record of this investigation).

[48] Admiral Kimmel's concern over the question of command at the outlying islands was indicated by his dispatch of November 28th to the Chief of Naval Operations, advising of the proposed reenforcement of Midway and Wake with Marine fighter planes and that he would investigate more thoroughly the feasibility and practicability of relieving them with Army planes. In this dispatch he stated, "All outlying forces must be exclusively under Naval command"

(Exhibit 76, Naval Court). Similarly, in a letter of 2 December 1941 to Admiral Stark (Exhibit 50 of the Naval Court), Admiral Kimmel advised that the dispatches in regard to the use of Army personnel were being given earnest consideration, that he believed Admiral Stark would subscribe to the principle that all these outlying islands must be under Navy command and the forces there subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief without any qualifications whatsoever, and that he expected some difficulties along this line when Army personnel were injected into the picture unless a very clear directive were issued jointly by the War and Navy Departments.

It appears that Midway and Wake were reenforced with squadrons of Marine planes, and that therefore, unity of command under the Navy, actually existed at those islands. No solution of the command problem, in the event of possible future inclusion of Army forces, was reached.

[*49*] *Findings*

1. The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either including or excluding Japan.

2. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive tasks to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions in the Marshalls and raids on enemy sea communications and positions, and various defensive tasks, including the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions.

3. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to the Fleet various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet security at the bases, at anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the communications and territory of the Associated Powers by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, the establishment of defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway, and guarding against surprise attack by Japan.

4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes included among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes the maintenance of the maximum patrol plane search practicable in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

5. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on W-day, which, it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day that hostilities opened with Japan. W-day was not fixed prior to the attack.

6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was based on the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted the basis of subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans. The method of coordination under the plan was to be by mutual cooperation until and unless unity of command were invoked.

7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army's task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers, and to support the naval forces. The Navy's task was to patrol the coastal zone (which included Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu), and to patrol and protect shipping therein, and to support the Army forces.

8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navy in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was that the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, should provide for distant reconnaissance.

[*50*] 9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District.

10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was an agreement between the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war.

11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided, among other things, for joint air operations and provided that when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made available, the latter would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing search operations.

12. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan also provided that the Army was to expedite the installation of its aircraft warning service, and that prior to the completion of that service the Navy, through the

use of radar and other appropriate means, would endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as might be practicable.

13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take steps to make available to the other the air forces at his disposal, in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the plan.

14. The Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN did not effect any agreement prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant placing Annex VII, Section VI, in operation.

15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided among other things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction with the Army. One of the assumptions was that it was possible that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, that it was probable that there might be a surprise submarine attack on ships in the base area, and that a combination of both forms of attack was possible.

16. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin stated, among other things, that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack that would most likely be launched from carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles. The estimate also stated that any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of [*51*] fast ships accompanied by a carrier. This Estimate came to the attention of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.

17. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. This plan, which was designated Annex "Baker" to the Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, made specific provision for joint air operations by the Army and Navy. The Plan was effective upon receipt. It was to become operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack, or might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime conditions of readiness for aircraft were to be as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for Army units, and by ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, for Navy units.

18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, which was reissued by Admiral Kimmel in revised form on 14 October 1941, provided that the Fleet's security was predicated on several assumptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, or a combination of the two. This letter also stated that a single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures, including provisions for defense against air attack. It provided, among other things, that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and that he should take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, and arrange through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort by the Army and the Navy.

20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures were to include intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol, and an air patrol. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of fleet operating areas as directed by Aircraft Scouting Force, one covering the entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and one during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to the attack of 7 December 1941 were the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, under which the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance, and the Pacific Fleet security letter, under which the only aircraft patrol from Oahu was a daily search of fleet operating areas, a search during entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

[*52*] 22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, in estimating probable enemy (Japanese) action, visualized that one of the enemy defensive efforts would be "destruction of *threatening* naval forces"; that initial action would include "possible raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and *other outlying* United States *positions*"; and that the initial Japanese deployment would include "raiding and observation

forces *widely distributed in the Pacific*, and that *submarines* in the *Hawaiian area*. . . ." (Underscoring supplied.) The possibility of an attack on Hawaii was, therefore, included but in no way emphasized.

23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of command of the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a *possibility*. Neither he nor the key members of his staff appear to have considered it as a serious *probability*.

24. The method of command established in the local plans was that of "mutual cooperation." The relations between the responsible commanders were cordial. However, there was not in existence, prior to the attack, any permanent operating setup which could ensure the constant and timely exchange of information, decisions, and intended courses of action so essential to the efficient conduct of joint operations, particularly in an emergency. A recent proposal looking to the establishment of a Joint Command Center had been the subject of adverse recommendations by the responsible local commanders, both Army and Navy.

25. In accordance with "Joint Action," unity of command for the defense of Oahu could have been placed in effect by local agreement between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District. The latter, however, would naturally not make such an agreement without the approval of his immediate superior, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The question of unity of command for outlying islands was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in connection with a proposal for reenforcement of Wake and Midway by Army planes. General Short's position was that if Army forces were involved, the command must be his. Admiral Kimmel maintained that the command of naval bases must remain with the Navy. The islands were reenforced with Marine planes.

[53]

II

JAPANESE ESPIONAGE AT HAWAII

The center of Japanese espionage at Hawaii was the Japanese Consulate General located in Honolulu. As a matter of regular routine, information was collected by the Consulate General concerning the location and movements of United States ships in and around Pearl Harbor and concerning defense preparations. This information was forwarded by the Japanese Consulate General to Tokyo and elsewhere in coded messages sent via commercial communication companies. A collection of such messages, which has been decrypted and translated, appears in Exhibit 13 of this investigation and in Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court. This collection of messages does not include every such message, but does fully illustrate the type of espionage reports which were made. Subsequent to the attack, the incoming and outgoing message log of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu was recovered and translated. These logs indicate the nature of all of the communications to and from the Japanese Consulate General and show the frequency with which espionage reports were sent by the Consul during 1941. A copy of the log is set forth in Exhibit 62.

It is to be noted that the espionage reports submitted during 1941 by the Japanese Consulate General became increasingly more detailed and, in the first week of December, 1941, indicated the likelihood of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The possession of all of those messages by the American intelligence services prior to the attack would have been of inestimable value. Some of them, as will appear later, were obtained prior to the attack. Those obtained, however, although indicating Japanese interest in the location and movements of ships in and from Pearl Harbor, did not include those messages, particularly during the first week of December, 1941, which indicated the likelihood of an air attack. It may also be noted at this point that those Consulate messages which were obtained prior to 7 December 1941 were decrypted and translated in Washington but not at Pearl Harbor.

Illustrative of the type of message sent earlier in 1941 is a report from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 10 March 1941, which describes various vessels seen in Pearl Harbor (Translated by Navy, April 5—Document 1, Exhibit 18). The Japanese interest in the location of ships in particular areas of Pearl Harbor is demonstrated by a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 24 September 1941, requesting reports of vessels in five sub-areas of Pearl Harbor, and

requesting reports of warships and aircraft carriers at anchor and tied up at wharves, buoys and docks. Particular request was made for mention of the fact when there were two or more vessels alongside the same wharf (Army translation, October 9—Document 2, Exhibit 13). The Japanese Consul at Honolulu established a code to refer to the location of vessels in particular areas (Navy translation, October 10—Document 3, Exhibit 13). Tokyo on 18 November 1941 requested a report on vessels anchored in certain areas and it directed that the investigation be made with great secrecy (Army translation, December 2—Document 9, Exhibit 13). A report was sent by Honolulu to Tokyo on 18 November 1941 setting forth the warships in the harbor in certain areas, commenting on the [54] presence or absence of aircraft carriers, and describing in detail the course of certain destroyers which were observed entering the harbor (Army translation, December 6—Document 10, Exhibit 13). On November 20th, Tokyo requested a comprehensive investigation of the Fleet bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation (Army translation, December 6—Document 7, Exhibit 13).

On 24 November 1941, Honolulu reported to Tokyo concerning the Fleet practice of leaving Pearl Harbor, conducting maneuvers, and returning, that the Fleet had not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers at Lahaina Road, that destroyers and submarines were the only vessels anchored there; that battleships seldom entered the port of Hilo, Hanalei or Haneo; that virtually no one had observed battleships in maneuver areas; and, stated that the Fleet maneuvered for one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest and pointed out that aircraft carriers maneuvered by themselves. This also mentioned the times when cruisers and other ships left Pearl Harbor and how long they were away, and generally how long they remained at Pearl Harbor when anchored there (Army translation, December 16—Document 23, Exhibit 13).

On November 28th, Tokyo requested intelligence, which was described as being of major importance, concerning the movements of battleships out of the harbor, pointing out that if such movements were reported but once a week, the vessels could have traveled far, and that Honolulu was to use its own judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements. As to capital ships, it was requested that reports of the entrance or departure and length of time at anchor from the time of entry into port until departure be made (Army translation, December 8—Document 13, Exhibit 13). On November 28th, Honolulu reported to Tokyo concerning the B–17 planes at Midway and range of anti-aircraft guns, observations of maneuvers by troops, prospective reinforcements of troops at Honolulu during December or January, and advised of the presence of a carrier usually about 15,000 feet south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance of the harbor (Army translation, December 8—Document 16, Exhibit 13).

The messages sent by the Japanese Consul during the week of 1 December to 7 December 1941, are of particular significance. A message of December 1st reported on ship maneuvers and described the place where maneuvers were held as about 500 nautical miles southeast of Oahu, and stated the reasons why that conclusion had been reached. This message set forth the "usual" schedule for departure and return of the battleships and stated that they left on Tuesdays and returned on Fridays, or left on Friday and returned on Saturday of the following week, and that all ships stayed in port about a period of one week. In view of their importance, five other messages sent during the first week in December, 1941, are quoted in full:

From: Tokoyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
December 2, 1941 (translated by Army 30 December 1941)
J–19
#123 (Secret outside the department)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of [55] utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with antimine nets.

From: Honolulu (Kita)
To Tokyo
3 December 1941 (translated by Navy 11 December 1941)
(PA-K2)
#245 (in 2 parts, complete) (Military Secret).

From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:

I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

Meaning		Signal
Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units.	Preparing to sortie	5
A number of carriers	Preparing to sortie	2
Battleship divisions	All departed between 1st and 3rd	3
Carriers	Several departed between 1st and 3rd	4
Carriers	All departed between 1st and 3rd	5
Battleship divisions	All departed between 4th and 6th	6
Carriers	Several departed between 4th and 6th	7
Carriers	All departed between 4th and 6th	8

2. Signals.

I. Lanikai Beach House will show lights during the night as follows:

[56]

	Signal
One light between 8 and 9 p. m	1
One light between 9 and 10 p. m	2
One light between 10 and 11 p. m	3
One light between 11 and 12 p. m	4

II.

Two lights between 12 and 1 a. m	5
Two lights between 1 and 2 a. m	6
Two lights between 2 and 3 a. m	7
Two lights between 3 and 4 a. m	8

(Part 2)

III. Lanikai Bay, during daylight.

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House will indicate the following:

Times	*Signal*
1900–2000	3
2000–2100	4
2100–2200	5
2200–2300	6
2300–2400	7
0000–0100	8

V. K.G.M.B. Want Ads.

A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.

B. CHIC . . CO farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium at a point halfway between Lower Kulu Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20°40′ N., longitude 156°19′ W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received:

[57]

Times	*Signal*
From 7–2	3 or 6
From 8–9	4 or 7
From 9–10	5 or 8

From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
5 December 1941 (translated by Navy 10 December 1941)
(PA-K2)

#252

(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239 arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.
(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.
(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

8 battleships.
3 light cruisers.
16 destroyers.

Four ships of the Honolulu class and_____were in dock.

From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941 (translated by Army 8 December 1941)
PA-K2

#253 Re the last part of your #123.

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually [58] made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.
2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

From: Honolulu.
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941 (translated by Army 8 December 1941)
PA-K2
#254.

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were —— and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:
9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.)
2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

Findings.
[59] 26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was effective and, particularly during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941, resulted in the frequent transmission to Japan of information of great importance concerning the Pacific Fleet, the movements and locations of ships, and defense preparations.
27. Certain reports sent by the Japanese Consul General via a commercial communications company at Honolulu in the week preceding the attack indicated the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

28. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which did not indicate the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by Army and Navy radio intercept stations and were decoded in Washington, D. C. prior to the attack; that others which were obtained at Honolulu by Naval Intelligence prior to the attack were, with the exception of a few unimportant messages, in a code which could not be decripted there before December 7th; and, that three messages intercepted by Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and at San Francisco, which indicated the likelihood of an air attack, were forwarded to the War Department for decryption but were either not received there prior to the attack or were not decrypted prior to the attack. If the United States intelligence services had been able to obtain and to decode and translate promptly all of the espionage reports sent by the Japanese Consul General during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, the information so obtained would have been of inestimable value.

[*60*]

III

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE AND EVENTS PRELIMINARY TO THE ATTACK

A. *The Organization of Naval Intelligence in General; Sources of Information, and Relations with the Pacific Fleet.*

The Office of Naval Intelligence, which was under the Chief of Naval Operations, consisted of two main branches—Domestic and Foreign. The Domestic Branch had to do with internal espionage and other subversive activities of foreign nationals or organizations inimical to national and particularly naval welfare. It maintained branch offices in various of the principal cities of the United States, including Honolulu. The Foreign Branch was organized into a number of sections, of which one was the Far Eastern Section. The Director of Naval Intelligence was Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Jr. The officer in charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Foreign Branch was Commander Arthur H. McCollum.

The primary sources of information which the Far Eastern Section had were Naval Attache reports from Japan and China, observers' reports from various ports in the Far East, reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet and from the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, including reports as to radio intelligence, and reports of investigations conducted by the domestic branch of ONI, particularly from Honolulu, and State Department reports at Washington. A most important part of the information provided to the Far Eastern Section was supplied by a unit at Washington known as OP–20–G. This was under the command of Commander Laurence F. Safford and supplied information obtained from communication or radio intelligence. This section was staffed both by Communication officers and Intelligence officers. The information received by OP–20–G was supplied to Lt. Comdr. Alvin D. Kramer of ONI, who was working with that section, and was transmitted by him to the head of the Far Eastern Section and to the Director of Naval Intelligence.

The section known as OP–20–G was concerned with the interception, decryption, and translation of Japanese messages. In addition it was responsible for furnishing the Navy's own codes and ciphers and for the supervision of the security of the Navy's own communications. Japanese messages were intercepted by various methods, including radio interception by a number of radio intercept stations located in the United States, which transmitted the Japanese communications, as intercepted by them, to OP–20–G for decryption and translation. In addition to reports from intercept stations located in the United States, this section received reports from communication intelligence units located at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. This unit was concerned with the plans and intentions of foreign governments, principally Japan, and with intelligence relating to naval operations in the Atlantic. The communications intelligence organization at Pearl Harbor, which had subsidiary stations at Oahu, Midway, Samoa, and Dutch Harbor, was concerned primarily with the dispositions and [*61*] plans of navel forces in the Pacific and with surveillance of Japanese naval communications. The communications intelligence unit in the Philippines, which was located at Corregidor, was concerned with Japanese naval communications and Japanese diplomatic communications. The Officer in Charge of the communications intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor was Lt. Comdr. Joseph J. Rochefort. The officer in charge of the communications intelligence unit at Corregidor until September, 1941 was Lt. Comdr. Rudolph J. Fabian. He remained thereafter assisting that unit.

Japanese diplomatic communications were in various codes, such as the code known ase "purple" code, the "red" code, the "J–19" code, the "PAK 2", and the "La." code. The so-called "purple" code contained the most important Japanese diplomatic messages. Messages in this and in other diplomatic codes were intercepted and read at the Philippines primarily for the purpose of local information. They were sent, as intercepted, to the Navy Department in one of the Navy's own codes. All intercepted diplomatic traffic was sent to Washington whether or not it was deciphered and read at the Philippines. None of this information was sent from the Philippines to Pearl Harbor. The unit at Pearl Harbor was intercepting and decrypting no Japanese diplomatic traffic. It had been directed to concentrate on Japanese naval systems. The unit at Washington was charged with the general control of the units at Corregidor, Pearl Harbor, and at Washington, and handled the Japanese diplomatic systems and also handled some Japanese naval systems.

Intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic received by the Washington unit was pooled with similar traffic intercepted by the Army and was decrypted and translated by the Navy and the Army on an alternate day basis. The resulting information was distributed daily by ONI to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to others in the Navy Department. The President and the State Department similarly were furnished this information daily.

It appears that, although the Navy enjoyed considerable success in decrypting Japanese diplomatic communications, the Japanese naval codes were not being read. Information obtained by radio intelligence, therefore, from Japanese naval traffic was based almost entirely on so-called "traffic analysis" and not upon reading of the message themselves.

The units at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines advised the Washington unit of the results of their traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and of the estimated location and movement of Japanese naval forces, and also exchanged information with one another on that subject. The units also exchanged information on technical subjects, that is, pertaining to codes and ciphers and keys for decyphering codes.

Information developed from the reading of the "purple" messages was not sent to the Pearl Harbor unit as such. It does appear, however, that various of the warning messages and other dispatches sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based upon information derived from the Japanese diplomatic messages.

[62] Thus it appears that the knowledge of the Comander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet as to the status of diplomatic relations with Japan depended primarily upon the messages sent to him by the Chief of Naval Operations. The information received by the radio intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor as to the location and movement of Japanese naval forces was, however, brought directly to the attention of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet daily by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, as was other material of an intelligence nature.

B. *The Approach of War: Intercepted Communications Available at Washington, and Messages Sent by CNO to Admiral Kimmel.*

It should be noted that the Japanese communications which were intercepted and decoded and translated by the War and Navy Departments, as set forth in this section, were not sent to Admiral Kimmel. Various of the messages sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Chief of Naval Operations were based on these Japanese communications.

(1) *The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and October 16th dispatch.*

On 16 October 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to Cinclant, CincPac and CincAF (Exhibit 13, Naval Court), reading as follows:

"The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation X If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti American X If the Konoye cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third adees inform appropriate army and naval district authorities X Acknowledge"

On 17 October 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 38, Naval Court). In this letter, Admiral Stark advised that things had been "popping"

here for the last twenty-four hours, but from the dispatches Admiral Kimmel knew about all that they did. He said, "Personally, I do not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the 'possibility;' in fact, I tempered the message handed me considerably. Perhaps I was wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend."

[63] Admiral Stark continued that Admiral Kimmel would recall that in an earlier letter, when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in August, Admiral Stark had said that his own judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. In this letter he said that he thought this whole thing worked up together. He stated that efforts would be made to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it could be kept going, he did not know, but the President and Mr. Hull were working on it. To this letter was annexed a postscript, stating in part, "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships as far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry."

Also annexed was a memorandum of 17 October 1941, by Rear Admiral Schuirmann, estimating the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet. The substance of this analysis was that the military would determine Japanese action whether to attack Russia or move southward, and would make this decision on the basis of opportunity and what they could get away with, and that it would not be determined by the cabinet in power.

(2) *Japanese messages concerning German attitude; Nomura's desire to resign.*—On 18 October 1941, the Navy translated an intercepted Japanese communication from Berlin to Tokyo, dated 1 October 1941, which stated that the Germans were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Japan's postion, particularly because Japan was not advising Germany of the negotiations with the United States, although the United States was advising England (Document 4, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

A Japanese message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 16 October 1941, was intercepted and translated on 17 October 1941. In this Toyoda advised Nomura that although he had been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-United States negotiations, he had, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early in October, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent revival of the movement for revision of the neutrality act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message that if the Roosevelt Administration continued to attack the Axis powers, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany, Italy, and the United States, which, under the Three-Power Agreement, might lead Japan to join immediately the war against the United States. It was indicated that such a message was being considered and there were reasons which would not permit of postponement (Document 3, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

[64] On 22 October 1941, Nomura sent a message to Tokyo which was intercepted and translated on 23 October 1941, in which he said that he was sure that he, too, should go out with the former cabinet; that he knew that the Secretary of State realized how sincere he was and yet how little influence he had in Japan; that there were some Americans who trusted him and who said that things would get better for him, but that their encouragement was not enough; that among his confreres in the United States there were some who felt the same way, but they were all poor deluded souls; that the instructions could be carried out by Wakasugi; that Nomura did not want to be the bones of a dead horse; that he did not want to ocntinue "this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people;" that he was not trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor, that was the only way open for him to tread; and that he sought permission to return to Japan (Document 5, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

On 23 October 1941, a message from Tokyo to Washington of the same date was intercepted and translated, which stated that the efforts Nomura was making were appreciated; that, as he was well aware, the outcome of those negotiations

had a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government would proceed; that as such it was an exceedingly important matter; that they were placing all of their reliance on Nomura's reports for information on this matter; that for these reasons they hoped that he would see fit to sacrifice his personal wishes and remain at his post (Document 6, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

(3) *Action taken by Admiral Kimmel.*

Admiral Kimmel advised, in a letter of October 22nd (Exhibit 14, Naval Court), that the action taken included maintaining two submarines for patrol at Midway, dispatching twelve patrol planes to Midway, preparing to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, and to replace the six at Midway from Pearl Harbor, sending two submarines to Wake, and sending additional Marines and stores there, dispatching additional Marines to Palmyra, placing Admiral Pye and his ships on twelve hours notice, getting six submarines ready to depart for Japan on short notice, putting some additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.

On 7 November 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 74, Naval Court) in reply to Admiral Kimmel's letter of October 22nd. He stated, among other things, "O. K. on the dispositions which you made in connection with recent change in the Japanese cabinet. The big question is—what next?!" Also, "Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets 'worser and worser'! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever—particularly if one party cannot live with the setup. It doesn't look good."

[65] (4) *The first Japanese deadline message; Japanese interest in American ships.*

On 5 November 1941, the Navy translated a message from Tokyo to Washington, reading as follows:

"(Of utmost secrecy).

"Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

"This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only."

During the first half of November, there were translated in Washington various intercepted Japanese communications concerning ships and planes at Manila and Seattle (Documents 1–8, Exhibit 68, Naval Court). According to one of these messages, which was dated 5 November 1941, the Navy General Staff wanted investigation done at Manila as to the conditions of airports, types of planes and numbers of planes there, warships there, machinery belonging to land forces, and the state of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.

(5) *Arrival of Kurusu; Stark and Marshall recommendations as to ultimatum.*

The situation existing early in November was summarized by Nomura, in a report to Tokyo, dated 10 November 1941, intercepted on November 12th (Document 8, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) by reference to a report from the legal adviser to the Japanese Embassy, who had conferred with Senator Thomas and Secretary Hull, that the United States was not bluffing, that if Japan invaded again, the United States would fight with Japan, that psychologically the American people were ready, that the Navy was ready and prepared for action. Nomura also reported that he had a conversation with "a certain Cabinet member" who had said that Nomura was indeed a dear friend, that he would tell him alone this: that the American government was receiving reports that Japan would be on the move again and did not believe that Nomura's visit to the President or the coming of Kurusu would have any effect on the general situation. Nomura said that he had explained how impatient the Japanese had become since the freezing, how eager they were for a quick understanding, how they did not desire a Japanese-American war, and how they hoped for peace until the end. The Cabinet member replied, however, that the President and Secretary of State believed "those reports." [66] Nomura also said that his friend had stated that the United States could not stop because if Japan moved, something would have to be done to save the "face" of the United States.

Admiral Stark was not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan would come from Kurusu's

visit. His opinion was that it would be impossible to reconcile the Japanese and American views. Admiral Stark so advised Admiral Kimmel by letter dated 14 November 1941 (Exhibit 39, Naval Court). With this letter, Admiral Stark also sent to Admiral Kimmel a copy of a memorandum, dated 5 November 1941, by Admiral Stark and General Marshall, for the President. This was concerned with the belief of Chiang-Kai-Shek that a Japanese attack on Kumming was imminent and that outside military support was the sole hope for the defeat of that threat. The memorandum considered whether the United States would be justified in undertaking offensive operations against the Japanese to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. The memorandum stated that the Fleet in the Pacific was inferior to the Japanese Fleet and could not undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. It pointed out that by the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines would become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The recommendations were in general that all aid short of war be given to China and that no ultimatum be given to Japan.

(6) *Further and Final Japanese "deadline messages."*

At this time, information was received in Washington that the Japanese Government had established a further and final deadline for the completion of diplomatic negotiations. This consisted of two messages from Tokyo to Washington, which were intercepted and translated by the Army, as follows:

(a) A translation on 17 November 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), of a dispatch, dated November 16th, the highlights of which were:

"* * * The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

"What you say is of course so * * * but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725 (in which Togo says that conditions within and without Japan will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States) * * * try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient * * * the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how [67] short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution."

(b) On 22 November 1941 (Document 11, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), a translation of a dispatch of the same date, reading in substance:

"To both you Ambassadors.

"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone."

(7) *The November 24th dispatch to CincPac and others.*

On 24 November 1941 (Exhibit 15), a dispatch (which before the Naval Court Admiral Stark said was based in part on the "deadline" intercept—page 775), was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincAF, CincPac, ComELEVEN, ComTWELVE, ComTHIRTEEN, and ComFIFTEEN for action, reading:

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately"

[68] On 25 November 1941 (Exhibit 47, Naval Court), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel in response to his letter of 17 October 1941, on the inadequacy of local defense forces in Hawaii (Exhibit 46, Naval Court). Admiral Stark stated that CincPac had taken cognizance of his responsibilities in connection with tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and that the forces available in the Hawaiian area, both Fleet and local defense forces, and the actual operations of our own and hostile forces would indicate the numbers of Fleet Vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local defense tasks. Admiral Stark's letter continued by summarizing the situation in regard to increasing the local defense forces and, among other things, pointed out that the Department had no additional airplanes available for assignment to the FOURTEENTH Naval District. A marginal note on a copy of this letter, apparently written in Hawaii, stated, "In other words, look to the Fleet. They seem to forget that the Fleet has offensive work to do."

On 25 November 1941 (Exhibit 16, Naval Court), Admiral Stark also wrote a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel stating, among other things, that Admiral Stark agreed with Admiral Kimmel that, for example, to cruise in Japanese home waters, Admiral Kimmel should have a substantial increase in the strength of his fleet, but pointed out that neither ABC–1 nor Rainbow–5 contemplated this as a general policy; after the British strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious occasions, opportunity for raids in Japanese waters might present themselves, but this would be the exception rather than the rule. A postscript to this letter stated that both Mr. Hull and the President confirmed the gravity of the situation indicated by the message which Admiral Stark sent a day or two before. It stated further that neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack; that from many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us; and there were some who thought it likely to occur. Admiral Stark further stated: "I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not the time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. . I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely * * * I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be anything."

(8) *Dispatches concerning reenforcement of Wake and Midway.*

On 26 November 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 40, Naval Court) was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac stating that the Army had offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station, if Admiral Kimmel considered that desirable; also, that the Army proposed to prepare, in Hawaii, garrison troops for advances bases which Admiral Kimmel might occupy, but was unable to provide any antiaircraft units. Admiral Kimmel was instructed to take this into consideration and [69] advise when practicable the number of troops desired and recommended armament.

Also on 26 November 1941, another dispatch (Exhibit 18) was sent to CincPac which stated that in order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use, OpNav had requested the Army, and the Army had agreed, to station twenty-five Army pursuits at Midway and a similar number at Wake, provided CincPac considered this feasible and desirable; that it would be necessary for CincPac to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on aircraft carriers, and that the planes would be flown off at destination; that ground personnel would be landed in boats and essential spare parts, tools and ammunition would be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels; that the Army understood that these forces must be quartered in tents; that the Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies; that the stationing of these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to the Philippines; and, that additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary. A question was raised as to whether or not Navy bombs at outlying positions could be carried by Army bombers which might fly to those positions in order to support Navy operations. CincPac was directed to confer with the Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable.

(9) *Intercepted Japanese communications of November 26th and 27th.*

On November 26th and 27th, there were available in Washington additional intercepted Japanese messages, all of which had been sent from Tokyo, as follows:

(a) A Navy translation on 27 November 1941 (Document 14, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message to Nanking, dated 15 November 1941, in the so-called "Purple" code, addressed to "Naval authorities" which stated:

"We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a while."

(b) A Navy translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 13, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message to Washington, dated 19 November 1941, stating that:

"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

"(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, 'HIGASHI',

"(2) Japan-Russia relations, 'KITA',

"(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), 'Nishi'.

[70] "The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end. Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco."

(c) An Army translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 9, Exhibit 68, Naval Court), of a message to Manila, dated 20 November 1941, in the "purple" code, marked "Strictly Secret" and stating:

"Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the type of draft—presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay." (Near Manila, P. I.)

"Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as to Tokyo."

(d) An Army translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 12, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message to Washington, dated 26 November 1941, in the "purple" code, which stated:

"To be handled in Government Code.

"The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your request to him. At that time we will use the following code:" (Codes were then set forth.)

(10) *The State Department note of November 26th and Japanese reaction thereto; the war warning of November 27th.*

The diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese representatives, Nomura and Kurusu, came to a head on 26 November 1941. At that time, the State Department presented a proposal to the Japanese and that Department reported to the Navy Department,, among others, that it had no further hopes of composing matters with the Japanese. The Japanese reaction to this proposal appears from dispatches which were subsequently decrypted and translated. They are as follows:

(a) An Army translation (Document 17, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message from Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, dated 26 November 1941,, in the "purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent," which stated:

"At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

"HULL said, 'For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on

[71] the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th.' So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

"A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called 'four principles.'

"B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggressive treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

"(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

"(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG-KAI-SHEK.

"(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China..

"(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

"(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.
"(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.
"(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)

"In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands, and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so."

[72] (b) An Army translation (Document 16, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message from Washington to Tokyo, dated 26 November 1941, in the "purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent," message #1180, reading:

"From NOMURA and KURUSU.

"As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our 'B' proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

"We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

"In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire back instantly."

(c) An army translation (Document 18, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 28 November 1941, in the "purple" code, reading:

[73] "Re your #1189.

"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering

and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can." (Note: The man is the Navy Minister.)

On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from CNO, which has been termed the "war warning." It read:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines (printed in ink, "Thai") or Kra Pennsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an approprate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 X Inform District and Army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform British X Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage"

(11) *The dispatch of November 28th:*

On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a dispatch to CincPac for information which was received on November 29th (Exhibit 19, Naval Court), which repeated a dispatch which had been sent by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:

[74] "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate message is being sent to G–2 Ninth Corps area re subversive activities in the United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers"

The Navy dispatch continued that WPL–52 was not applicable to the Pacific area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as then in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further:

"Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur"

(12) *Intercepted diplomatic communications. November 29 to December 6, 1941.*

On 30 November 1941, there was a Navy translation of a message from Tokyo to the Japanese emissaries in Washington, dated 29 November 1941 (Document 19, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), requesting that they make one more attempt to discuss the situation with the United States, and to state that the United States had always taken a fair position in the past; that the Imperial Government could not understand why the United States was taking the attitude that the new Japanese proposals could not be the basis of discussion, but instead had made new proposals which ignored actual conditions in East Asia and which would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government; that the United States should be asked what had become of the basic objectives that the United States had made as the basis for negotiations for seven months; and that the United States should be asked to reflect on the matter. The emissaries were directed in carrying out this instruction to be careful that this did not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.

[75] Also on 30 November 1941, there was a Navy translation of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation from Kurusu in Washington to Yamamoto in Tokyo, in which a telephone code was used (Document 20, Exhibit 63, Naval Court). This indicated that Kurusu expected a long message ("probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals"); that the President was returning apparently because of the speech of the Japanese Premier which Kurusu said was hav-

ing strong repercussions here; that Kurusu said that unless the Premier and others used greater caution in speeches, it would put the Japanese emissaries here in a very difficult position; that care should be exercised, that Yamamoto said that they were being careful; that Kurusu wanted the Foreign Minister told that the emissaries here had expected to hear something different—some good word—but instead got this (the Premier's speech); that the Japanese-American negotiations were to continue; that Yamamoto wanted them to be stretched out; that Kurusu needed Yamamoto's help to do this, and that both the Premier and the Foreign Minister would need to change the tone of their speeches and that all would have to use some discretion; that Yamamoto said the real problem that the Japanese were up against was the effect of happenings in the South.

There were four significant Japanese communications intercepted on 1 December 1941, as follows:

(a) Navy translation—(Document 21, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
1 December 1941
(Purple CA)
#865 Re my #857

"1. The date set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)

"2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

"3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter."

[76] Army translation—(Document 22, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941
Purple
#986 (Strictly Secret (To be handled in Government Code)
(Part 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department)

"1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

"Judging from the course of the neogtiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional idealogical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States

was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer [77] continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause."

(Part 2 of 2)

"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."

(c) On 1 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, dated 30 November 1941 (Document 6, Exhibit 13), which in substance stated:

The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan, and that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the north. . . . Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

(d) Army translation—(Document 23, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 28, 1941
Purple
#1214 To be handled in Government Code.
"Re my #1190.

"So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like [78] this are appearing in the papers: 'Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese', and 'America Scorns a Second Munich.' .The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

"This we must carefully note."

On 3 December 1941, there was available the Army translation of a report by Kurusu and Nomura to Tokyo, dated 2 December 1941 (Document 25, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which stated:

"Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233. Thereupon we said: 'Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th.' The Under-Secretary then said: 'I want to to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world.' Thereupon we replied: 'The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than

forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights or wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation. Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny.' Under-Secretary WELLES said: 'I am well aware of that.' I continued: 'We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proferred on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in [79] the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve.' The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: 'The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here.' Then he continued: 'In regard to the opinion that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary.' I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room. Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1238."

There were various intercepted Japanese communications of interest available on 4 December 1941, as follows:

(a) Navy translation—(Document 26, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Toyko
To: Hsinking
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#[illegible]

"* * * In the event that Manchuria participates in the war * * * in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

"A summary follows:

"1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

[80] "2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

"3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

"However, the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

"4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonise Russia."

(b) Navy translation—(Document 27, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#1227

(This raised the question of a possibility of a conference between persons in whom the leaders have confidence to have the' make one final effort to reach some agreement. The meeting to be held at some midway point, such as Honolulu * * * It was said that this last effort might facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.)

(c) Navy translation—(Document 29, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#875 Chief of Office routing.

"Re your #1232

"Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

"There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have [*81*] increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement."

(d) Navy translation—(Document 31, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#1243

"If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the consuls."

On 5 December 1941, there were available translations of additional intercepted Japanese communications dealing with the diplomatic negotiations, as follows:

(a) Army translation—(Document 33, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#1243

"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand."

(b) Navy translation—(Document 34, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#1225

(This is a report of conversations held by Japanese representatives with Secretary Hull on December 1st, which referred to the Japanese Premier's speech, the President's return, Japanese troop movements, and apparent agreement as to the impossibility of reaching an agreement.)

[82] (13) *Intercepted Japanese espionage messages between 29 November and 6 December 1941.*

During this period there were available to the Navy and to the Army in Washington translations of intercepted Japanese espionage reports concerning Manila, San Francisco and Honolulu. From these it appeared that the Japanese were interested in the movements of ships to and from those ports. The messages relating to Honolulu were as follows:

(a) On December 3rd, the Navy Department translated a communication from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 15 November 1941 (Document 24, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which stated that since relations between Japan and the United States were most critical, the "Ships in the harbor report" should be made irregularly but at the rate of twice a week and that extra care should be taken to maintain secrecy.

(b) On December 5th, there was available at the War Department a translation of a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 18 November 1941, requesting reports on vessels in certain areas of Pearl Harbor, and directing that the investigation be made with great secrecy (Document 37, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

(c) Also available on December 5th at the Navy Department was a translation of a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 29 November 1941, stating that reports had been received on ship movements, but in the future Honolulu was also to report even when there were no movements (Document 36, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

(d) On December 6th, there was available at the War Department a translation of a message from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 18 November 1941, (Document 40, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), reporting on ships anchored in Pearl Harbor and in certain areas of the harbor, and pointing out that the Saratoga was not in harbor and that the Enterprise or some other vessel was in a particular area. This message also reported on the course of certain destroyers which had been observed entering the harbor.

(14) *Intercepted message advising of fourteen-part reply by Japanese and first thirteen parts of reply—6 December 1941.*

On 6 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted Japanese communication (Document 38, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), from Tokyo to Washington, which read:

"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

[83] "2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions."

Also on 6 December 1941, the Navy translated the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply (Document 39, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which had been sent from Tokyo to Washington in the Japanese diplomatic code. It may be noted that the translations of parts 8 and 9 of the reply which were originally indicated as Navy translations were corrected so as to indicate that they were translated by the Army. These 13 parts which are not set forth here, but particularly part 13, disclosed that the Japanese were of the view that the American proposal, viewed in its entirety, could not be accepted by the Japanese as a basis of negotiations.

The message concerning delivery of the Japanese reply, and the first thirteen parts of that reply, were received in the Navy Department by 3 p. m. on 6 December 1941. After decryption and translation by about 9 p. m. on December 6th, they were distributed by Lt. Comdr. Kramer to the White House and to the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of War and Secretary of State apparently also received copies and a meeting was called of the three Secretaries for ten o'clock on the following morning.

(15) *Communications intercepted on 7 December 1941.*

The Japanese communications which were translated and available on the morning of 7 December 1941 included the following:

(a) From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo
December 3, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#1256. Re your #875

"I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending [84] upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to—even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once."

(b) From: Washington

To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#1272

"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

"(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the 'introducing' at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these individuals.

"(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us——(MESSAGE INCOMPLETE)——"

(c) From: Budapest

To: Tokyo
December 7, 1941
LA
#104 Re my #103

"On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

"Relayed to Berlin."

[85] (d) Navy translation—(Document 39, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
7 December 1941
(Purple-Eng)
#902 Part 14 or 14

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."

(e) Army translation—(Document 41, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington.
December 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent—Very Important)
#907 To be handled in government code.

Re my #902.

"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time."

(16) *Delivery of Part 14 and the 1 p. m. message and action taken.*

The evidence indicates that Part 14 of the Japanese reply, which required decoding but not translation, was received between 0305 and 0700 on 7 December 1941, and that it and the first 13 parts were distributed [86] by Lt. Comdr. Kramer to Admiral Stark's office between 0900 and 0930, and then to the White House and to the State Department. The "1 p. m. delivery message" was not distributed at this time. Kramer testified that he returned to the Navy Department at about 10:20 and found that message and certain other messages, such as a message which directed the destruction of Japanese codes, still on hand and another which thanked the Ambassador for his services. This material, Kramer testified, was delivered to Admiral Stark at about 10:30, and then to the White House and to the State Department.

The evidence indicates that the "1 p. m. message" was decrypted and was available in Japanese in the Navy Department prior to 0700 on 7 December 1941, and that because there was no Japanese translator on duty it was sent to the Army for translation at about 0700. It is not clear when the Army returned the translation of that message. Kramer stated that it was not in the Navy Department when he left to distribute the fourteen-part reply between 0900 and 0930 that morning, but that he found it upon his return to the Navy Department at about 10:20. It would appear, therefore, that the Army returned its translation of the "1 p. m. message" some time between 0900 and 1020 on 7 December 1941. It further appears that several hours' advance notice of the contents of that message may have been lost because there was no Japanese translator on duty at the Navy Department on that Sunday morning, and because it was necessary to wait for an Army translation.

Prior investigations developed the fact that, after consultation with Admiral Stark that morning, General Marshall sent a message to various Army commands, including the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. The message read:

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."

The prior investigations also developed the fact that the Army radio was unable to raise Hawaii that morning and accordingly sent that message by commercial cable in code. The message, according to General Short's prior testimony, was received by the Signal Officer at Hawaii at 1145, and decoded some four hours after the attack.

Whether or not the Army message would have reached the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, prior to the attack if a Navy translator had been on duty on the morning of 7 December 1941, or if the Army had immediately translated and returned the "1 p. m. mesage," is speculative. It is, moreover, also speculative as to what action might have been taken by General Short or Admiral Kimmel had they received that Army message prior to the attack.

[87] (17) *Messages sent to Admiral Kimmel between 29 November and 7 December 1941.*

The messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel during this period dealt primarily with the destruction of codes by the Japanese and with the advisability of destruction of United States codes at Guam. The messages are discussed subsequently in this report.

(18) *Admiral Kimmel's failure to transmit information to subordinate commanders.*

It appears from the testimony secured by Admiral Hart in his investigation that Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor on 5 December 1941 with a powerful force consisting of the Lexington, Chicago, Portland, and five destroyers, to deliver a squadron of planes to Midway. He testified that on that mission he gave no special orders regarding the arming of planes or regarding preparation for war, other than the ordinary routine. He said that he never saw, nor was he ever informed of the contents of the October 16th dispatch, concerning the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, of the November 24th dispatch advising of the possibility of a surprise aggressive movement by the Japanese in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, or the November 27th war warning. He said that except for what he read in the newspapers, he did not learn anything during the period November 26th to December 5th which indicated the increased danger of hostilities with Japan.

Admiral Bellinger, who was commander of Task Force Nine, consisting of the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified in this investigation that he never saw nor did he learn the contents of the October 16th, November 24th, or November 27th dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations.

[88] C. *The Interception of Japanese Telephone and Cable Messages.*

It appears that in Washington, D. C., the Navy was receiving information obtained from intercepted Japanese telephone and cable messages. For example, on 30 November 1941, the Navy decrypted and translated a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation in code between Kurusu in Washington and Yamamoto in Tokyo (Document 20, Exhibit 63, Naval Court). And, on 10 October 1941, the Navy decrypted and translated a cable message from Honolulu to Washington, in which a code was established for reporting the location of vessels in Pearl Harbor, which message had been photographed in the cable office in Washington and thus obtained by the Navy (Document 3, Exhibit 13).

For many months prior to the attack, the Office of Naval Intelligence at Honolulu had been tapping the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul and of the Japanese Vice Consul. For a period of time also the home telephones of these officials had been tapped. The taps on the lines of the Consulate were removed on 2 December 1941 by direction of Captain Mayfield, who was then the District Intelligence Officer. The evidence indicates that he took this action because he was fearful that the existence of such telephone taps would be discovered by the Japanese Consul. His fear arose from the fact that an FBI tap on the lines of a Japanese official of the NYK Line had been detected by a telephone company employee who had advised the District Intelligence Office of this. A representative of the District Intelligence Office subsequently had informed the local FBI office. It was learned that the FBI office had complained to the telephone company concerning the disclosure of its tap. In light of this situation, Captain Mayfield directed that the Navy taps be removed.

It appears that no important military information was intercepted by means of the Navy Intelligence taps on the lines of the Japanese Consulate General. Exhibits 38A and 38B of this investigation consist of photostatic copies of the notes made of the telephone conversations over the Japanese Consul General's line and the Japanese Vice Consul's line during the period 1 October 1941 to 2 December 1941.

Subsequent to 2 December 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation apparently continued its telephone taps and in this fashion on or about 5 December 1941 learned the contents of a telephone conversation between a man named Mori in Hawaii and a person in Japan. The fact of this conversation was brought to the attention of the District Intelligence Officer, and on 6 December 1941, a transcript of the conversation was furnished to him and arrangements were made for a representative of the District Intelligence Office to listen to the recording of the telephone conversation; this, however, was not done until after the attack. A transcript of the telephone conversation, with marginal notes made by the District Intelligence representative after the attack, in Exhibit 39 of this investigation. It may be noted that it appears from prior investigations that this conversation was brought to the attention of General Short [89] on the evening of 6 December 1941, and apparently nothing could be made out of it and no action was taken concerning it. There is no evidence indicating that this telephone conversation was brought to Admiral Kimmel's attention prior to the attack.

In the conversation, there was mention of the flights of airplanes daily, the number of sailors present, the attitude of local Japanese, the local construction

projects, the size of the local population, the precautionary measures taken at night time, the use of searchlights at night, the emphasis in Honolulu newspapers on the southern advance of Japan into French Indo-China, the visit of Kurusu, the local climate, the visit of Litvinoff, the Russian Ambassador, the recent return of a Japanese from Honolulu to Japan, and the number of Japanese in the United States Army. The person in Japan inquired for information about the United States Fleet. Mori stated that he knew nothing about the Fleet, and that since they tried to avoid talking about such matters they did not know much about the Fleet. He said he didn't know whether all of the Fleet had gone, but that the Fleet present seemed small, and it seemed that the Fleet had left. The person in Japan then inquired whether that was so and what kind of flowers were in bloom in Hawaii. Mori stated that the flowers in bloom were the fewest out of the whole year, however that the hibiscus and the poinsettia were in bloom. He later stated that the Japanese chrysanthemums were in full bloom.

There is some reason to believe that the statements concerning flowers in the Mori telephone conversation were the use of code words indicating the absence or presence of ships in Pearl Harbor. In this connection, the Operation Order for the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 3) provided for the use of a radio broadcast code in which the statement "The cherry blossoms are in all their glory" would signify that there were "No warships in Pearl Harbor." This lends support to the theory advanced by representatives of the District Intelligence Office in their testimony to the effect that the primary purpose of the Mori telephone conversation over the trans-Pacific radio was to provide information to Japanese Fleet units which would be listening in on that frequency.

The espionage reports submitted by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu have been previously discussed. It will be recalled that in those coded messages considerable information was given of the movement of ships and location of ships in Pearl Harbor and of defense preparations at Oahu. Certain messages sent during the first week of December, 1941, indicated the likelihood of an attack by air on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu transmitted its messages via commercial companies using the various communications companies alternately. During the month of November, the McKay Radio Company handled the messages primarily, and during the month of December, 1941, RCA was transmitting the messages.

[90] Prior to December, 1941, efforts had been made by the District Intelligence Officer to get access to the files of the communications companies and thus to secure copies of the Japanese Consul General's messages. These efforts were without success, in view of the legal prohibitions against the disclosure of such messages. During a visit by Mr. Sarnoff, President of RCA, the District Intelligence Officer requested him to cooperate with the Navy by making such messages available, and pointed out the importance to the country of giving the Navy access to such messages.

On 5 December 1941, RCA Communications, at Honolulu, turned over to Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer, copies of some messages which had been sent by the Japanese Consul via RCA on the third and fourth of December. These messages, with the exception of a few unimportant plain language messages, were in code. Captain Mayfield turned them over to the FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit, headed by Lieutenant Commander Rochefort, for decryption and translation. That organization had not been working on Japanese diplomatic traffic Efforts were immediately made to decrypt and to translate those messages. The messages so received by Captain Mayfield and turned over to the FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication Intelligence for decryption and translation were not identified in any record made at the time. Lieutenant Woodward, who did the decryption of them, has identified, to the best of his recollection, the messages received on December 5th as those set forth in Exhibit 56 and at pages 7–11 of Exhibit 56A of this investigation.

Various Japanese codes were used in the messages, including the "LA" code, which was the simplest and evidently the least important. The messages in that code, and the plain language messages, were decoded and read prior to the attack. The "LA" code messages so read are pages 1–5 of Exhibit 56. They contained no important military information. One, for example, reported the departure of a transport and another related to the cost of sending families home to Japan.

The testimony of Lieutenant Woodward, who decrypted the messages, of Colonel Lasswell and Captain Finnegan, who translated various of the messages, of Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the unit, and of Admiral Mayfield, who was District Intelligence Officer, indicate that no information of military importance was obtained prior to the attack from any of the Japanese Consulate's messages. It has been testified that various of the other messages received on 5 December 1941 were in a Japanese code known as the "PA" or "PA–K2" system and that efforts to decrypt these were not successful until after the attack. The messages, as identified by Lieutenant Woodward, will be found at pages 6–23 of Exhibit 56 (supplied by the Radio Intelligence Unit) and at pages 7–12 of Exhibit 56A (supplied by the District Intelligence Office). They were as follows:

(1) December 3rd to Tokyo—Advising that a freighter in military service departed on the second and that a named ship arrived on the third (p. 10, Exhibit 56A).

(2) December 3rd to Tokyo—Advising that the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders left port. The balance of the message was not recovered (p. 8, Exhibit 56A).

[*91*] (3) December 3rd to Tokyo—In connection with the handling of expenses for steamer passage to Japan.

(4) December 3rd to Tokyo—Advising of a change in method of communicating by signals, so that each of the numbers one to eight had a certain meaning as to departures and dates of departure of ships, which numbers were to be communicated by lights in beach houses, by the use of a sailboat, by certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio station, and by bonfires at certain points if the previous signals could not be made (p. 12, Exhibit 56).

(5) December 3rd to Tokyo and elsewhere—Regarding money taken in for sale of tickets (p. 16, Exhibit 56).

(6) December 3rd to Tokyo—Advising that the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders departed the third (p. 22, Exhibit 56).

(7) December 3rd to Tokyo and San Francisco—Advising that a transport had sailed for the Mainland and that a ship had arrived from San Francisco (p. 20, Exhibit 56).

A photostatic copy of the December, 1941, bill of RCA Communications at Honolulu, covering the Japanese Consul General's messages in November and December, 1941, was received from the District Intelligence Office at Honolulu (Exhibit 55). This indicates that there were four radiograms sent on November 2nd, two on November 13th, four on December 1st, and two on December 2nd. The testimony concerning these is to the effect that they were not received or read prior to the attack, that they were received later and were thought to be in more complex codes, probably machine codes, as there were no indicators by which they could be identified.

It further appears from Exhibit 55 that there were various other radiograms charged to the Japanese Consul General for December 4th and 5th, and three for December 6th. The testimony concerning these indicates that none was obtained prior to the attack.

The two messages listed on the RCA bill for December 4th, according to Lieutenant Woodward, were among a group of messages received on the night of December 7th (p. 4–5, Exhibit 56A). It was later learned that one advised Tokyo that an English gunboat arrived on the third and departed and that the sailors had come ashore and had received mail at the British Consulate; the other advised that a light cruiser had departed hastily on the fourth (Exhibit 57).

The five radiograms listed on the RCA bill for December 5th were received after the attack and were actually two messages to Tokyo, the second having been sent also to San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D. C. The first message reported the arrival on the morning of the 5th of three battleships, which had been at sea for eight days, also that the LEXINGTON and five cruisers had left the same day, and that eight battleships, three cruisers, and sixteen destroyers were in port. The second message has not been translated. It relates to funds of the Consulate General (Exhibit 57).

[*92*] The three radiograms charged for December 6th were actually two messages in the "PA–K2" code (Exhibit 57). The first, which was translated after the attack, was sent to Tokyo and to Washington at 6:01 p. m. on 6 December 1941. It set forth the ships observed at anchor on the sixth and stated:

"* * * 9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

"2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm."

The other message of December 6th, which was filed at 12:58 p. m. that day, was, after decryption, translated by Joseph Finnegan, now a Captain, U. S. N., who reported for duty in the radio intelligence unit on the 9th or 10th of December, 1941. He translated that message (Exhibit 57) as follows:

"From: KITA
"To: F. M. TOKYO 6 DEC. 41.

"Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123

"1. The army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis NC on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparation for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

"2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the nonuse of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further."

Captain Finnegan admitted in his testimony that the last sentence of the first paragraph of his translation was an incorrect translation. As appears from an Army translation of that message (Exhibit 57), that sentence, correctly translated, was as follows:

"I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places."

As previously noted, among the messages turned over to the District Intelligence Officer and to ComFOURTEEN Communication Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation on 5 December 1941, was the [93] message from Honolulu to Tokyo dated 3 December 1941, which established a system of signals to be used from Oahu by means of lights at beach houses, the use of a sailboat, by want ads on a radio station, and bonfires. This message was in the possession of the Radio Communications Intelligence Unit from 5 December to 10 December 1941, at which time it wsa successfully decrypted and translated. The Japanese Consul General's signal message of December 3rd was not only in the possession of the Navy at Pearl Harbor prior to the attack, but was also in the possession of the Navy Department at Washington prior to the attack. A copy of that message as contained in the Op-20-G files at the Navy Department, indicates that it was translated on 11 December 1941, and that it had been intercepted by an Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Va. (Document 22, Exhibit 13). In fact, however, that message was decrypted and translated in rough form prior to 1 p. m., 6 December 1941, by Mrs. Edgers, a translator assigned to the Op-20-G Unit, Navy Department. She testified that she believed that it was shown that afternoon to Kramer and that he examined it in rough form. Kramer did not recall this but did recall going over the message thoroughly on December 8th. Evidently further work on this message was deferred on December 6th because of the pressure of work on the thirteen parts of the Japanese fourteen-part reply which were being decrypted that afternoon and evening.

It should be noted that a message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated 2 December 1941, was intercepted by the Army radio intercept unit at Fort Shafter, Hawaii (Document 24, Exhibit 13). This message stated that in view of the present situation the presence of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers was of utmost importance, that there should be daily reports, that there should be reports whether or not there were observation balloons above Pearl Harbor, or an indication that they would be set up, and whether or not the warships were provided with anti-mine nets. The message apparently was forwarded from Fort Shafter by mail to the Army. The Army translation of the message bears a note that the message was received on December 23rd and translated on 30 December 1941, by the Army. It has been testified by Brigadier General Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, that no decryption was done at Fort Shafter, but that all intercepted traffic was forwarded to Washington for decryption and translation.

Finally, it appears that the two highly significant messages sent by the Japanese Consul General during the afternoon of December 6th were both intercepted by the Army intercept station at San Francisco and forwarded to the Army in Washington by teletype (Docs. 14, 15, Exhibit 13). Both of these were in the Japanese

code known as the "PA–K2" code and are indicated to have been translated by the Army on Monday, December 8, 1941. According to Captain Safford, the longer message, stating that there was "considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack" against Pearl Harbor, and that the battleships did not have torpedo nets, could have been decrypted in about an hour and a half; and the shorter message, which stated in part that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet air arm, could have been decrypted in less than an hour.

[*94*] D. *The "Winds Code" and the Alleged "Winds Message."*

In the latter half of November, 1941, the Japanese Government by messages to Washington and elsewhere established two codes to be used for communication between Tokyo and elsewhere. The first has been referred to as the "winds code." In that code certain Japanese words were to be added in the middle and at the end of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcasts and could also be used in Morse code messages, which words would apparently be weather reports. Thus, the Japanese words "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" which meant "East wind rain," would actually mean that Japan-United States relations were in danger. Words were also supplied for Japan-Russian relations and for Japan-British relations. The existence of this code was brought to the attention of the Navy Department late in November through the interception and decryption of Japanese messages establishing the code, and also through information to the same effect received from other sources such as the United States Naval Attache at Batavia. It appeared that the use of the code words would indicate a breaking off of diplomatic relations or possibly war between the countries designated.

The Japanese also established, late in November, 1941, a code system which has been referred to as the "hidden word code." This code was not discussed in previous investigations. The establishment of the code was first learned through the interception and decryption in Washington, D. C. of several Japanese diplomatic communications which had been sent from Tokyo on and after 2 December 1941 (Documents 6, 8, 12, 17 and 20, Exhibit 13). This code was intended to be used, when telegraphic communications might be severed, as a means of informing Japanese diplomats of the situation concerning the country in which they were located. Thus the word "KODAMA" meant Japan, the word "KOYANATI" meant England, the word "MINAMI" meant United States, and the word "HATTORI" meant that relations between Japan and another country, to be identified by a code word, were not in accordance with expectations. It may be noted that the meaning of the last word, as set forth in the Navy translation of the "hidden word code," differs from the meaning which the War Department cryptanalyst testified should have been given to the word. According to his testimony, the word should have been translated as meaning that relations were on the verge of crisis or that hostilities might commence.

Prior investigations conducted by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry resulted in findings that prior to 7 December 1941 there had been a "winds code message" by the Japanese in which the code words relating to the United States were used, and that this message had been intercepted by the Navy Department prior to the attack and communicated to the Army, but that no copy of it could be found in the Army or Navy files. It appears that these findings were based primarily on the testimony of Captain Safford and of Captain Kramer of the Navy Department.

It should be noted that a Japanese message using the "winds code" words relating to the United States, if received on 3 or 4 December, or at any other time prior to 7 December 1941, would have conveyed no information of importance which the Navy and War Departments did not already possess. Such a message would have indicated either a break in diplomatic relations or possibly war with the United States. That both the Navy Department and the War Department, and Admiral Kimmel as well, were already aware that a break in diplomatic relations or war with the United States was imminent, is clearly established by the [*95*] November 27th "war warning" to Admiral Kimmel, and by the repetition on November 28th by the Navy of the Army's warning dispatch to General Short.

In view, however, of the findings by the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board that a "winds message" relating to the United States was received about 3 December 1941, and that no copy of it could be found, further investigation on this point was deemed necessary.

(1) *Prior investigations.*

(a) *The Naval Court of Inquiry:*

In the "Addendum" to its findings, the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry stated concerning the "Winds Code" as follows:

"From 26 November to 7 December, 1941, there was much diplomatic dispatch traffic intercepted between Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington which had a bearing on the critical situation existing and which was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. A message dated 19 November, 1941, Tokyo to Washington, translated on 28 November 1941, and referred to as 'The Winds Code' was as follows:

" 'Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

" 'In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

" '(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.*

" '(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KOTANOKAZE KUMORI.**

" '(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.***

" 'This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

" 'Forward as urgent intelligence.'

[96] "The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 28 November, 1941, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations, information to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commandant 16th Naval District; and Commandant 14th Naval District, substantially the same information as outlined above. On 5 December, 1941, the United States Naval Attache, Batavia, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations substantially the same information. These messages stated that at some future date information would be sent by Japan indicating a breaking off of diplomatic relations or possibly war between countries designated.

"All officers of the Communication and Intelligence Divisions in the Navy Department, considering the expected information most important, were on the lookout for this notification of Japanese intentions. On 4 December an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was received in the Navy Department. Although this notification was subject to two interpretations, either a breaking off of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, or war, this information was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat.

"It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this code, and apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy Department that the execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth this message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made by the Navy Department to ascertain whether this information had been obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat.

"Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, although Admiral Turner stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that Admiral Kimmel had it. This message cannot now be located in the Navy Department."

(b) *The Army Pearl Harbor Board:*

The "Top Secret" and separate portion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board's report referred to the "Winds Message." The report stated that a winds execute message reading "War with the United States, war with Britain, including the Netherlands East Indies, except peace with Russia" had been received in the Navy Department on 3 December 1941; that the Navy admitted that that message was received prior to December 6th; that the War Department files contained no copy of the message. The report referred in this connection to testimony by Captain Safford, who stated that such a message had been received by Commander Kramer, who had been [97] notified by Brotherhood of its receipt, and that it had been seen by Safford at 8:00 a. m. on December 4th. Safford stated that no copy of the message could be found in the Navy Department files.

The Army report further stated that on December 5th, Admiral Noyes called Colonel Sadtler, at 9:30 a. m., saying: "Sadtler, the message is in." Apparently based on Sadtler's testimony, the report also stated that Sadtler did not know

*East wind rain.
**North wind cloudy.
***West wind clear.

whether this meant war with the United States, but believed it meant war with either the United States, Russia or Great Britain; that he discussed it with his superiors and was instructed to confer with Admiral Noyes; and that he telephoned Admiral Noyes, who said that he was too busy and would have to confer with Sadtler later. Sadtler then saw various officers in the War Department, all of whom did not think that any further information should be sent to Hawaii.

It also appeared that the Army Board had received testimony on this matter from Colonel Bratton, who said that Sadtler, acting on behalf of Colonel Bratton, had arranged for the FCC to monitor Japanese broadcasts. Apparently Bratton testified that no information reached him before December 7th which indicating a break in relations with the United States and that he did not think that any such information had reached anyone else. He referred to an FCC intercept which was not the message for which they had been looking.

(2) *The basis of the previous findings that there was a Winds Execute message prior to the attack.*

The basis for the Army Pearl Harbor Board finding that a "winds message" relating to the United States had been received appears, to the extent known by the Navy, in the above summary of the top secret portion of the Army Board's report. That indicates that primarily the basis for the finding was the testimony of Captain Safford. In addition to Safford's testimony, there was apparently testimony by Sadtler of a conversation with Admiral Noyes in which he referred to a "winds message" but not to the contents of that message.

Captain Safford testified before Admiral Hart and before the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry. His testimony was the primary basis for the Naval Court of Inquiry's findings that a "winds message" relating to the United States had been received. In addition to his testimony, the Naval Court of Inquiry had testimony from Captain Kramer bearing on this subject which tended to support the finding.

In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford said:

"On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the 'Winds Message', and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent. Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my [*98*] presence. I was gven the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p. m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do you think of the message?' Admiral Noyes replied, 'I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander in Chief.' Admiral Wilkinson stated, 'I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man, with a lot of things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander in Chief that he be given this warning and I intend to send it if I can get it released by the front office.' Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left a few minutes later. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I thought that this message of warning had been sent, and did not realize until two years later, when I studied the Roberts report very carefully, that McCollum's message had not been sent. In order to clarify the above statement and my answer to a previous question, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the 'Winds Message'. The 'Winds Message' was a name given by Army and Navy personnel performing radio intelligence duties to identify a plain-language Japanese news broadcast in which a fictitious weather report gave warning of the intentions of the Japanese Government with respect to war against the United States, Britain (including the N. E. I.), and Russia. We received a tip-off from the British in Singapore in late November, 1941, which was immeditely forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, with an information copy to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. We also received a tip-off from the Dutch in Java through the American Consul General and through the Senior Military Observer. The Dutch tip-off was handled in routine fashion by the coding rooms of the State Department, War Department, and Navy Department. The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the 'Winds Message' when it should be sent, and this was done. From November 28 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept stations, as follows: N. E. I. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S. Army at Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corrigedor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept stations in the continental United States were directed to forward all Tokyo plain-language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran up bills of sixty

dollars per day for this material alone. The 'Winds Message' was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 (Washington Time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the 'Winds Message' was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that were listening for it. The other nations and other Navy C. I. units, not hearing the 'Winds Message' themselves and not receiving any word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed [*99*] that the 'Winds Message' had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese Government was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the Dutch at Java, and the Americans at Manila were just as surprised and astonished as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts in Hawaii. It is apparent that the War Department, like the Navy Department, failed to send out information that the 'Winds Message' had been sent by Tokyo. The 'Winds Message' was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch. There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message really meant because it came in a different form from what had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who came down that evening and identified the message as the 'Winds Message' we had been looking for. The significant part of the 'Winds Message' read: 'HIGASHI NO KAZEAME. NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The negative form of KITA NO KAZE KUMORI'. The literal translation of these phrases is: 'EAST WIND RAIN. WEST WIND CLEAR. NEITHER NORTH WIND NOR CLOUDY'. The meaning of this message from the previously mentioned tip-off was: 'War with the United States. War with Britain, including the N. E. I., etc. Peace with Russia.' I first saw the 'Winds Message' about 8:00 a. m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., came into my office with a big smile on his face and piece of paper in his hand and said, 'Here it is!' as he handed me the 'Winds Message.' As I remember, it was the original yellow teletype sheet with the significant 'Winds' underscored and the meaning in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom. Smooth copies of the translation were immediately prepared and distributed to Naval Intelligence and to S. I. S. in the War Department. As the direct result of the 'Winds Message,' I prepared a total of five messages, which were released between 1200 and 1600 that date, ordering the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers by certain activities on the Asiatic Station. As a direct result of the 'Winds Message,' McCollum drafted the long warning message, previously referred to, which was disapproved by higher authority, but which the Navy Department C. I. Unit believed had been sent. Both Naval Intelligence and the Navy Department C. I. Unit regarded the 'Winds Message' as definitely committing the Japanese Government to war with the United States and Britain, whereas the information of earlier dates had been merely statements of intent. We believed that the Japanese would attack by Saturday (December 6), or by Sunday (December 7) at the latest. The following officers recall having seen and having read the 'Winds Message': Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant (jg) F. L. Freeman, U. S. N. The following officers knew by hearsay that the 'Winds Message' had been intercepted but did not actually see it themselves:

Commander L. W. Parke, U. S. N.
Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R.
Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N.
Major F. B. Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve * * *."

[*100*] "The 'Winds Message' was last seen by myself about December 14, 1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were assembled by Kramer, checked by myself, and then turned over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission, according to my understanding at the time."

Before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Captain Safford repeated in substance his prior testimony and stated that Lieutenant Murray or possibly Kramer brought him the message; that he couldn't determine from what Navy intercept station the message had come; that he had a vague recollection of a second "Winds Message", but had been unable to find any trace of it until he testified before Admiral Hart; that since that time he learned that the FCC had intercepted a "Winds Message" at Portland, but that he did not recognize that message. He did not recall any of the FCC intercepts contained in Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of

Inquiry, none of which indicated a break with the United States. He stated further than despite repeated search since November, 1943, no copy of the "Winds Message" could be found in the files; that Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood had told him that he knew the disposition of them, but did not care to tell Safford. Also Safford said that he knew what had happened to the Army copies of that message through very "second hand and devious sources." He also repeated his prior testimony to the effect that about the middle of the first week in December, 1944, Commander McCollum had drafted a long dispatch which included information about the "Winds Message," and which dispatch had not been sent out.

Commander Kramer in his testimony before the Naval Court, said that on December 3rd or 4th he had been shown a "Winds Message" by the watch officer and took it immediately to Captain Safford, who took it to Admiral Noyes. This was a plain-language message and, as shown to him, contained the phrase translated as "East Wind Rain" which meant strained relations or a break with the United States. The message had been on teletype paper and indicated that it had come through an USN intercept station.

Among the witnesses before the Naval Court of Inquiry who testified that so far as they knew there had never been a "Winds Message" relating to the United States were Admiral Stark, General Marshall, and Admiral Noyes. Neither Admiral Wilkinson nor Commander McCollum, who were alleged by Safford to have had knowledge of the "Winds Message," was a witness before the Naval Court of Inquiry, as both were at the time actively engaged in combat operations.

(3) *Evidence Obtained in this Investigation Concerning "Winds Message."*

(a) *Testimony of Captain Safford:*

Captain Safford testified that in the Fall of 1943 it appeared that there was going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. He realized that he would be one of the important witnesses and that his memory was vague. Accordingly, he began looking around to get [*101*] information in order to prepare a written statement which he could use in his testimony. He noticed that in the Roberts report there was no reference to the "Winds Message" or to the dispatch which McCollum had drafted. Safford then began talking to everyone who had been around at the time to see what they could remember, and to see if they could give him leads so that it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of memory. He talked the thing over with various of the Army people.

Safford testified that he had written to Brotherhood and that Brotherhood had written back saying that he didn't care to tell Safford about the disposition of the copies of the "Winds Message," but when Brotherhood returned to the United States, Safford asked him about it and found out that there had been a misunderstanding. Brotherhood had been referring to the false "Winds Message" (Document 2 of Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court), which apparently related to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast.

Safford stated that he had information "third hand" concerning the Army's copies of the "Winds Message," and that he thought it might be confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadtler before the Army investigation. He stated that his information from the Army came through W. F. Friedman, a cryptanalyst in the War Department, and that the information was that the copies of the "Winds Message" had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall. Safford also stated that Colonel Bratton of the War Department had had some question about the message and had asked Admiral Noyes by telephone for a copy of the original of the "Winds Message," but that Admiral Noyes had refused to comply on the grounds that the Navy translation was correct. This, he said, should appear in Colonel Bratton's testimony before the Army investigation. He also stated that a Captain Shukraft of the Army knew that the "Winds Message" had been received.

Safford testified that he had talked with Kramer shortly before his testimony during this investigation, and that contrary to his earlier impression, Kramer told him that the "Winds Message" and various other intercepts relating to Japan had not been turned over to the Roberts Commission, but about 9 December 1941 had been collected and shown to Under Secretary Forrestal, during the absence of Secretary Knox. He also said that Kramer told him that he did not recall the "Winds Message" specifically. Safford also stated that the reference in McCollum's message to the "Winds Message" was very short and was the last item in McCollum's draft dispatch.

Safford testified that it now appears more likely that the "Winds Message" was received early in the morning of December 4th, Washington time, rather than the night before, because the watch officers who were on duty recollected

only the false "Winds Message," and not the "true 'Winds Message.'" The vagaries of high frequency radio, he said, resulted in the message being intercepted only on the East Coast of the United States, and that such conditions were not unusual. He pointed out that they had to call on Corregidor to cover the Tokyo-Berlin circuits because the combined efforts of intercept stations on the East Coast, [102] West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide better than about fifty percent coverage. Although he had no knowledge as to which Naval station allegedly intercepted the message, his first guess was the station at Cheltenham, Maryland, and his second guess was Winter Harbor, Maine. He stated that the logs of those stations and of the Navy Department had been destroyed during one of the numerous moves and no record had been kept.

Referring to the message telephoned by the FCC to Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood at 9:05 p. m. on December 4th (Exhibit 65, Naval Court), he said that this was the "false" message which appeared on the surface to use the "winds" code words relating to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast. This message, he said, Brotherhood telephoned to Admiral Noyes and later Kramer took one look at it and said it was not what was wanted and threw it into the waste basket. He said that that message was received twelve hours or more after what he referred to as the "true winds message."

Safford identified Document 4, Exhibit 65, as a true "winds" message relating to England, which was intercepted on 7 December 1941 after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Safford testified that he had been advised that the Dutch had been monitoring for a "winds" execute message, but that prior to the attack they had intercepted no such message.

(b) *Captain Kramer's testimony:*

Captain Kramer said that he had testified previously concerning the "winds" message but wanted to go over that previous testimony in the light of thinking it over since that time. He said that he had had no recollection of a "winds" message at the time it was first mentioned to him, the spring of 1944, but after receiving from Safford some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it, he did recall a message some days before 7 December 1941, about the middle of the week, and did recall being shown such a message by the watch officer and walking with him to Captain Safford's office and being present while he turned it over to Captain Safford. Captain Kramer thought that that message had been a "winds" message, but did not recall the wording of it. He said it might have been one using the code words referring to the United States, as he previously testified, but he was less positive of that now than he had been at the time of his previous testimony. The reason for this revision of his view was that on thinking it over, he had a rather sharp recollection that in the latter part of the week preceding the attack there was still no specific mention of the United States in any of the Japanese traffic. For that reason he was under the impression when he testified during this investigation that the message referred to England and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too. He just didn't recall.

Captain Kramer testified that on the morning of December 7th, a Japanese "hidden word" code message was received and was hurriedly translated by him as he was about to leave the Navy Department to deliver other messages. The message as translated by Kramer was, "Relations between Great Britain and Japan are not in accordance with expectations" (Exhibit 20). In his [103] haste, Kramer overlooked the word "MINAMI" which was contained in the Japanese Message and which referred to the United States. He testified that after he returned to the Navy Department and shortly before 1 p. m. on December 7th, he discovered his mistake and made a penciled correction on the file copy of the translation. He testified further that he believed that he made several telephone calls about fifteen minutes before the attack and advised the officer in charge of the Far Eastern Section of ONI and an officer of G-2 of the War Department. The copies of the translation in the Navy Department's files do not disclose any correction of the translation (Exhibit 20). Kramer testified concerning this that a number of copies of the translation were made at the time, and that undoubtedly his correction was made on another copy which has since been discarded.

Captain Kramer also stated that he had been under the impression until he testified before this investigation that the "hidden word message" of 7 December 1941 had been a "Winds Message," but now recognized it as a "hidden word message." He stated that he thought that the "hidden word message", which he identified as having been received on 7 December, was among the group of mes-

sages shown to Mr. Forrestal about 9 December 1941, when he hastily reviewed a folder of that traffic for Mr. Forrestal. This was done, he said, because of the fact that previously Mr. Forrestal had not seen such material.

(c) *Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood's Testimony:*

Lt. Comdr. Brotherhood testified that he was one of the four watch officers who were on watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week of December, 1941. He said that he had never received an intercept or message wherein the "Winds Code" words relating to the United States were used. He said that about December 4th, he received a telephone message from the FCC in which the words apparently relating to Russia were used; that he called Admiral Noyes, who commented that the wind was blowing from a "funny" direction, and that he, Brotherhood, did not think at the time that it was an actual "Winds Message." Brotherhood stated that shortly before he testified in this investigation, he had had a conversation with Safford who stated that Brotherhood had called him about December 4th or 5th and had told him that such a message had arrived. Brotherhood said he did not recall the telephone conversation and that he believed, therefore, that he had called Captain Safford at that time.

(d) *Lieutenant Commander Linn's Testimony:*

Linn testified that a 24-hour watch was maintained in Captain Safford's section; that he was senior officer of that watch, and was one of the four officers who stood that watch during the first week in December, 1941. Any intercept which had come into that section, he said, would have had to come through one of the four watch officers. He was familiar with the "Winds Code" and he never saw any intercept [*104*] prior to 7 December 1941 in which the "winds" code words relating to the United States were used.

(e) *Lieutenant Commander Pering's Testimony:*

Pering testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing watch during the first week of December, 1941, in Captain Safford's section. He knew of the existence of the "winds" code and he never saw any intercept using the code words relating to the United States.

(f) *Lieutenant Commander Murray's Testimony:*

Murray testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing a twenty-four hour watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week in December, 1941. He testified that no "winds" code execute relating to the United States ever came to his attention during that week. He said that after the attack, Linn had told him that a "winds" message had come in on 7 December 1941.

(g) *Lieutenant Freeman's Testimony:*

Freeman testified that he was in a section which disseminated to ONI intelligence received from the field radio intelligence units; that his unit worked very closely with Captain Safford's unit, and that every effort was made to monitor for a "winds" message. Freeman was one of the officers mentioned by Captain Safford, in his testimony before Admiral Hart, as having personal knowledge of the receipt of a "winds" message relating to the United States. He testified that he never knew of any intercept of a "winds" message relating to the United States.

(h) *Captain McCollum's Testimony:*

Captain McCollum testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code; that he had no knowledge of any message transmitted which contained the words relating to the United States; that the message which contained the words apparently relating to Russia had been received during the first week of December, 1941, but that in his opinion that was a bona fide weather report. He said further that during the first week of December, 1941, he drafted a dispatch summarizing the situation which he wanted to have sent out; that he remembered no reference to any "winds" message in that dispatch; and, that the dispatch was based on a memorandum of his dated 1 December 1941 which did not refer to a "winds" message (Exhibit 10). He did not know whether or not his draft dispatch had been sent out. It had been submitted to Admiral Wilkinson.

(i) *Admiral Wilkinson's Testimony:*

AdmiralWilkinson testified that his only recollection of the "winds" code was that some time after the attack, some one, possibly Commander McCollum, had mentioned to him that a message using a "winds" code had been received. Possibly, he said, it was the message received on the 7th using the words relating to England. He did not recall anything about the long dispatch which McCollum had drafted and which [*105*] Captain Safford had testified Admiral Wilkinson had endeavored to have sent out.

(j) *Captain Mason's and Commander Fabian's Testimony:*

Captain Mason, who was Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet, and Commander Fabian, who was in the Radio Intelligence Unit at Corregidor, both testi-

fied that intensive efforts had been made there to monitor for any Japanese broadcasts using the "winds" code, and that nothing was received wherein the words relating to the United States were used. In this connection, it should be noted that it was the view of the Navy Department that the unit at Corregidor, because of its geographical location, was in a much better position to intercept Japanese radio broadcasts than were the units at Pearl Harbor or Washington (see Exhibit 8).

They also testified that close liaison was maintained with British Intelligence services in the Philippines, that the British had been monitoring for a "winds" message also, and that had such a message been received by the British, they most certainly would have been advised of its receipt, but that they received no information from the British as to the receipt of a "winds" message prior to the attack.

(k) *Captain Layton's Testimony:*

Captain Layton, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code; that efforts were made to monitor for the use of that code; and all available Japanese language officers were placed on continuous watch on several circuits and were to cover all known news broadcasts emanating from Japan; that he checked up each day with Commander Rochefort and that no "winds" intercept was received prior to 7 December 1941, nor did they receive any dispatch from any source stating that such an intercept had been heard.

(l) *Captain Safford recalled:*

Captain Safford was recalled and testified that he never had a conversation with Colonel Sadler concerning the existence of a "winds" message. He stated that he could not recall distinctly whether or not he received a call from Brotherhood about December 4th in which Brotherhood advised of the receipt of a message apparently using the Russian "winds" code words. He had had a vague idea that there was another "winds" message, and, he said, the FCC intercept seemed to fill the bill. He said further, however, that until 1944 he did not recall having seen, or knowing of the FCC intercept in which the words relating to Russia were used.

(m) *Mr. Friedman's Testimony:*

Mr. Friedman, a cryptanalyst of the War Department, stated that prior to 7 December 1941 he had no information as to whether or not a "winds" message had been intercepted. He said that he had had several conversations with Captain Safford concerning the subject, the first one about a year and half ago, and none later than six months prior to his [*106*] testimony in this investigation. He said that Safford had indicated in the course of the early conversations that there had been a "winds" message, but that no copies could be found in the Navy's files, and that his theory was that it had been intercepted by a Navy East Coast station. Mr. Friedman also testified that about a year and a half ago he had a conversation with Colonel Sadler, who had indicated that a "winds" message had come in on the 4th or 5th of December; that he had been notified either directly or by somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes, that the message was in; that there had been some question about the exact Japanese words which had been used, and that Sadler had not seen the message himself, and Mr. Friedman thought that Colonel Sadler also told him that they had tried to get a verification from Admiral Noyes but had not been successful, whereupon the G–2 authorities simply passed the matter over since there was apparently nothing to substantiate the existence of the message. Mr. Friedman said that he had asked Sadler whether he had ever seen a copy of that message, and Colonel Sadler said that he had not, but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. Mr. Friedman testified that he regarded this as highly inconceivable, but that in conversation with Captain Safford he probably just passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started, and that he had no idea that Safford would repeat that statement. Mr. Friedman had no knowledge, directly or indirectly, concerning the existence of a "winds" message relating to the United States, apart from his conversations with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler.

(n) *Captain Rochefort's Testimony:*

Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, testified that they monitored for any "winds" code message, covering all known broadcasts from Tokyo on a twenty-four hour basis, and that results were nil. He testified further that he had made an exhaustive search into all available Navy records and could find no trace of any "winds" message prior to 7 December 1941.

[107] **E. *Information Concerning the Organization of the Japanese Navy.***

(1) ***ONI Report of 29 July 1941.***

On July 29th, the Office of Naval Intelligence issued a revised report, which had been prepared by Commander McCollum, dealing with the organization of the Japanese Navy. This stated that, as a result of information which had been received, it was possible to give a much more complete picture of the organization of the Japanese Navy. It stated that the Japanese naval forces afloat were organized into two main commands—the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval Forces in China. The Combined Fleet included:

(a) First Fleet, or Battle Force.
(b) Second Fleet, or Scouting Force.
(c) Third Fleet, or Blockade and Shipping Control Force.
(d) Fourth Fleet, or Mandated Islands Defensive Force.
(e) Submarine Force (also called the Sixth Fleet).

The *Combined Fleet and First Fleet*, under the command of Admiral Yamamoto, consisted of various BatDivs, a CruDiv, three CarDivs and two destroyer squadrons. BatDiv 3 (KONGO, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA) was included. The carrier divisions were CarDiv 3 (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU); CarDiv 5 (RYUJO, HOSHO); and CarDiv 7 (CHITOSE, CHIYODA, MIZUHO).

The *Second Fleet*, under the command of Vice Admiral Koga, included various cruiser divisions, two carrier divisions and two destroyer squadrons. (CarDiv 8 (CHIKUMA and TONE) was included. The carrier divisions were: (CarDiv 1 (AKAGI and KAGA), and CarDiv 2 (SORYU and HIRYU).

The *Third Fleet* included CarDiv 6 (NOTORO and KAMIKAWA MARU) and various minelayer and minesweeper divisions, a base force and sub-chaser squadrons.

The composition of the *Fourth Fleet* or Mandates Fleet, and of the *Submarine Fleet* and of the *Japanese Naval Forces in China* was also given. (Exhibit 81.)

(2) ***Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin Number 45–41.***

On 27 November 1941 (when the "war warning" was received), the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, distributed Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin Number 45–41 (Exhibit 21). This bulletin dealt with the organization of the Japanese Navy and with Japanese Forces and installations in the Mandated Islands. It was a revision of the ONI bulletin above summarized and replaced that bulletin on the subject of the Japanese Fleet. This stated:

"The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable [108] specialization within the various commands, as shown below:

Major Fleet Commands

1. Combined Fleet		
1. First Fleet	(Battle Force)	3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2 Desrons
2. Second Fleet	(Scouting Force)	4 Crudivs, 2 Desrons, etc.
3. Third Fleet	(Blockade & Transport Force)	Small Craft.
4. Fourth Fleet	(Mandate Defense Force)	1 Desron, 1 Subron and many small units.
5. Fifth Fleet	?	?
6. Sixth Fleet	(Submarine Fleet)	6 Subrons
7. Carrier Fleet	(Aircraft Carriers)	5 Cardivs
8. Combined Air Force	(Seaplane tenders, etc.)	4 Airrons, & shore based planes.
II. Japanese Naval Forces in China.	(Staff Headquarters)	1 PG and 3 DD's
1. First China Exped. Fleet.	(Central China)	Gunboats
2. Second China Exped. Fleet.	(South China)	1 CA, 1 CL and small craft.
3. Third China Exped. Fleet.	(North China)	Torpedo Boats, etc.
4. Southern Exped. Fleet.	(Saigon)	1 CL, transports and mine craft.

The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-war-time footing."

The *Combined Fleet and First Fleet* as listed in this bulletin included three BatDivs, among which was BatDiv 3 (HIYEI, KONGO, KIRISHIMA and HARUNA—as to the latter it was stated that it had been inactive during 1941 and was probably undergoing major repairs). Also included was a cruiser division and two destroyer squadrons.

The *Second Fleet* included four CruDivs and two destroyer squadrons. One of the CruDivs was CruDiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA).

The composition of the *Third, Fourth* and *Sixth* (Submarine) Fleets was given in some detail in this bulletin. As to a *Fifth Fleet*, it stated "The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown. The flagship has been reported at Maizuru."

[*109*] The composition of the *Carrier Fleet*, with the KAGA as flagship, and consisting of ten carriers and sixteen destroyers, was listed as follows:

CarDiv 1: AKAGI, KAGA (F) and a destroyer division.
CarDiv 2: SORYU (F) and HIRYU and a destroyer division.
CarDiv 3: RYUJO (F) and HOSHO and a destroyer division.
CarDiv 4: ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU and a destroyer division.
CarDiv –: KORYU and KASUGA (MARU).

As will appear subsequently, the forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 included six carriers, the KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1), the SORYU and HIRYU (CarDiv 2), and the ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU. The latter two carriers had been identified as CarDiv 4 in the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin, as CarDiv 3 (annexed to the First Fleet) in the earlier ONI bulletin, and as CarDiv 5, in Exhibit 3, which sets forth the composition of the attacking force.

Also included in the attacking force were the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA (two of the battleships of BatDiv 3) which had been listed in the intelligence bulletins as assigned to the Combined Fleet and First Fleet, and the TONE and CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8) which had been listed in the intelligence bulletins as assigned to the Second Fleet.

[*110*] *Information Concerning the Location and Movements of Japanese Naval Forces.*

The evidence indicates that there were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing such information, and had access to radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force received some general information concerning Japanese movements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

(1) *Information available at the time of the "War Warning."*

The procedure for handling radio intelligence information concerning Japanese movements was set forth in a dispatch of 24 November 1941 from OpNav to CincAF, information ComSIXTEEN, CincPac, ALUSNA Chungking, ASTALUSNA Shanghai, and ALUSNA Tokyo (Exhibit 8). This dispatch stated that Japanese naval movements as reported by the individual information addresses were often conflicting because of their necessarily fragmentary nature and that since ComSIXTEEN intercepts were considered most reliable, it was suggested that other reports be carefully evaluated and sent to ComSIXTEEN for action and to OpNav for information and, that after combining all incoming reports, ComSIXTEEN was to direct dispatches to OpNav, info CincPac, based on all information received and indicating the ComSIXTEEN evaluation.

The Japanese naval situation as estimated by ComFOURTEEN on 26 November 1941, was set forth in a dispatch of that date to OpNav, information CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN. This dispatch stated that for the past month the Commander of the Second Fleet had been organizing a task force consisting of Second Fleet and other units and, after discussing various other units, stated: "There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in

the Marshalls which comprise Airon 24, at least one carrier division unit, plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls."

On the same day, ComSIXTEEN sent a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav, ComFOURTEEN and CincAF, discussing in considerable detail the estimate of ComSIXTEEN concerning the location and probable movements of Japanese Fleet units (Exhibit 8). This stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had indicated that the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Fleet was directing some units of the First, Second, Third and Fourth Fleets in a loose-knit task force organization that apparently would be divided into two sections. One section expected to operate in the South China area, was referred to in the dispatch as the "first section." The "first section" was estimated to consist of CruDiv 7, AirRon 6, Defense Division 1, Desron 3, and Subron 6. The "second section" consisted of units expected to [*111*] operate in the Mandates. The "second section" was believed to include Crudiv 5, Cardiv 3, RYUJO and one MARU. It was indicated that BatDiv 3 might be included in the "second section," but that this could not be clarified yet. The dispatch further stated: "Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in the Mandates X Our best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area." The evaluation was considered to be reliable.

During this time, the Office of Naval Intelligence was issuing fortnightly summaries of current national situations. The summary for 1 December 1941 (Exhibit 9) was distributed by air mail. The statements therein as to the Japanese naval situation, which portion was prepared by the Far Eastern Section of ONI, were based upon information which had been received at least three or four days prior to the date of the document. This stated:

"Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

"The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc."

(2) *Admiral Kimmel's sources of information after the "war warning."*

The ComFOURTEEN communication intelligence unit continued the practice, which had been followed for some time past, of preparing daily communications intelligence summaries for submission to Admiral Kimmel via Lt. Comdr. Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer. Photostatic copies of the communication intelligence summaries from 14 October to 14 December 1941, [*112*] constitute Exhibit 22 of this investigation. Lieutnant Commander, Layton, who presented these summaries to Admiral Kimmel, also prepared daily intelligence reports which were distributed to various members of CincPac's staff. The intelligence memoranda were not given to the Admiral or Chief of Staff because they saw the basic material upon which the reports were based. The intelligence reports by Layton for the period 6 October to 2 December 1941, constitute Exhibit 26. None was prepared after December 2nd, according to Layton.

The daily communication intelligence summaries together with the dispatches received by Admiral Kimmel from other organizations during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, constituted the only sources of information which he had during that period concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces.

(3) *Information received by Admiral Kimmel after the "war warning."*

The critical period commenced on 27 November 1941, when the Japanese force, which was to attack Pearl Harbor, secretly left Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island and,

in radio silence, proceeded undetected toward Pearl Harbor. The Japanese force, which included three of Japan's Carrier Divisions, CarDiv 1, AKAGI, KAGA; CarDiv 2, HIRYU, SORYU; CarDiv 5, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU; BatDiv 3, first section, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA; CruDiv 8, CHIKUMA; and other lighter vessels, cruised for ten days to a point 200 miles north of Oahu, where the planes were launched for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

It will be recalled that the November 24th dispatch from CNO in part had stated that the diplomatic situation and statements of the Japanese Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicated that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility. The "war warning" of the 27th had stated that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days and that the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

The information which Admiral Kimmel subsequently received as to the location and movements of Japanese naval forces was as follows:

28 November 1941:

The Naval Attache at Shanghai reported in his dispatch 270855 the sightings by the master of a foreign vessel, which had left Hong Kong en route to Shanghai, of many transports proceeding south singly or in small groups.

[*113*] The November 27th ComFOURTEEN radio intelligence summary delivered on November 28th, stated that in general traffic volume was a little below normal, due to poor signals on certain frequencies and that the Tokyo-Takao circuit was unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic was heard, intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama and Saigon were active as originators. The main Tokyo originator was the intelligence activity which sent five dispatches to the major commanders. The direction finder activity was very high. As to the Combined Fleet, it was said that there was still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address he had been fairly inactive as an originator. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, originated many messages to the Third Fleet and other units. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated that there was nothing to indicate any movement. As to the Fourth Fleet Commander, it was said that he frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandate, and also that there was no further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates. The Commander Submarine Force, it was stated, was still in the Chichijima area. Concerning air forces in general, it was indicated that an air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU and that "Carriers are still located in home waters." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

It appears, therefore, that as of this time the ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN, and Washington radio intelligence units were of the opinion that the major portion of the Japanese carriers were in "home waters;" that ComFOURTFEN was of the opinion that a carrier unit was in the Marshalls, and that ComSIXTEEN expected CarDiv 3 to operate in the Mandates. The evidence disclosed that the term "home waters" was understood differently by the Far Eastern Section of ONI, which prepared the 1 December 1941 ONI estimate, and by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet. Captain McCollum testified that the term meant the normal cruising grounds of the Japanese Fleet, roughly west of the 180 meridian of longitude and north of the southern end of Formosa, and included the Kurile Islands but not the Aleutians. Captain Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that "home waters" meant to him, and was understood by Admiral Kimmel to mean, the drill grounds of the Inland Sea and approaches to Kyushu, the coastal offshore area, the Isei Bay Area in general the waters surrounding Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, but not including northern Japan and the Kuriles, to a point about 60 miles east of Japan.

29 November 1941:

On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a dispatch to CincPac for information which was received on November 29th (Exhibit 19, Naval Court). This repeated a dispatch which had been sent by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:

[*114*] "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but

hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilitizes cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not alarm civil population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate message is being sent to G–2 Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in the United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

The Navy dispatch continued that WPL–52 was not applicable to the Pacific area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as then in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further:

"Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur"

On the 28th of November, ComFOURTEEN addressed to OpNav, information CincAF, and stated:

"Following received by British Consul from usually reliable source X Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on One December without ultimatum or declaration in order to get between Bangkok and Singapore X Attackers will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa X Main landing to be made at Songkhola X" (Singora)

ComSIXTEEN in a dispatch of the 28th addressed to CincAF, OpNav, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, stated that an unidentified ship believed to be a light cruiser had apparently relieved the KASHII as flagship, Southern Expeditionary Fleet; that this ship was now in the Camranh Bay-Saigon area.

OpNav, in dispatch 281633, addressed CincAF, info CincPac, ComSIXTEEN, ComFOURTEEN, and supplied information from State Department, from Saigon, dated November 26th, which stated that five days previously [*115*] Orange troops and supply vessels began to put in at Saigon, taking up all available quay space; that 20,000 troops had landed and that 10,000 had arrived from the north by rail during the same period; that the total troops in South Indo-China totaled 70,000. It observed that there was an estimate of some 128,000, but considered that too high. It reported that many trucks had landed and were moving troops and supplies to the interior. It observed that this movement is of large proportions and indicates hostilities against Thailand may begin soon. It also forwarded information from Hanoi, also from the State Department, dated November 26th, that said supplies and military equipment, particularly railway, rolling stock, gasoline, landing at Haiphong even recently augmented and are being transshipped south. Among recently landed artillery are anti-tank guns; that the Japanese had recently purchased a considerable number of native boats along the coast of Tongking Province. It was reported they desired to purchase 500. These boats were being sent south. Further reports from Hanoi, dated November 25th, said that the American Consul had received reliable information that the Governor General had ascertained from an agent that around 1 December, without either declaration of war or ultimatum, Nippon Navy will attack Kra Isthmus. Simultaneously the Army would advance on Thailand; that great increased troop landings and movements were noted south; that during last few days about 4,000 men have landed. On November 25th and 26th, 1,500 would go south by special train; that in Tongking there were approximately 25,000 Jap troops and at Gillam there were approximately ninety airplanes. Dated November 26th, Hanoi, was the report that on early November 25th the Haiphong mayor had advised all interested persons that the Japanese intended to sequester all freight en route to China, that the Japanese had demanded keys to all warehouses by noon November 25th.

The ComFOURTEEN radio intelligence summary of the 28th, delivered the 29th, stated generally that traffic volume was normal, communications to and from South China and between the Mandates and the Empire were very heavy. No tactical traffic was seen. The suspected radio intelligence net was very active and was becoming more so. Much traffic was directed to the Tokyo direction finder command from various stations and this command also originated messages of high precedence to the major fleet commanders. It was said that

"This activity is interpreted to indicate that the radio intelligence net is operating at full strength upon U. S. naval communications and IS GETTING RESULTS." As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that there was no indication of movement of any of its units. As to the Third Fleet, there was little activity from its units save for the Commander in Chief. The bulk of the Fourth Fleet was said to be still at Truk. The Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief, Second, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleets. There was little indication of submarine activity. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

[*116*] The ComSIXTEEN communication intelligence unit sent a dispatch on the 29th noting various recent developments from radio intelligence, such as various encrypted addresses noted in the preceding two days traffic, that various additional units now appeared to be associated with the "first section" (South China area), referred to in ComSIXTEEN's November 26th dispatch, that the Hiyei (which in fact was en route to Pearl Harbor) and Kongo appeared to be associated definitely with the "first section," but no movement from the Takao area had been noted, and, that the Cinc Combined Fleet was to leave the Kure zone that day, the Sasebo zone on December 1st, and enter the Bako zone on the 2nd.

30 November 1941:

On 30 November 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch to CincAF for action and to CincPac for information (Exhibit 76, Naval Court), which advised in part:

"Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra by overseas expedition X * * * Desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt of this dispatch X * * *"

A second similar dispatch was also sent on the same day (Exhibit 77, Naval Court) requesting a daily report from CincAF, even if there were no contacts and the information were all negative.

The communication intelligence summary of the 29th delivered this day stated generally that traffic volume was above normal, and that the traffic to South China was still very high. A good share of the traffic was made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to major commanders both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the major commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo radio Yokosuka (near Tokyo) sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The direction finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. The Navy Minister originated his usual AlNav, and the naval general staff addressed Commanders, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and the South China Unit. A unit which had been addressed as the 103rd air group originated one dispatch whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls and it was apparent that he had no navy call list. One address was "Eleventh Air Fleet." Since this had appeared before, it was evidence that the use of Kantai was intentional in making positively known the existence of an air fleet. Its composition was unknown. The dispatches indicated that various units were under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, including Cardiv 3, and the Third Fleet.

Associated with the Third Fleet were two battleships but their assignment was not yet definite. Various messages were sent by the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, and he held extensive communication with [*117*] the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Bako. The Cinc Fourth Fleet was relatively inactive. He was still in the Truk area. There was some traffic for Commander Submarine Force, who was at Chichyima the previous day, and also some traffic from the Commander in Chief, China Fleet.

1 December 1941:

A copy of a dispatch by CNO to CincAF, 301709, was received by CincPac, referring to the previous dispatch which had directed an air search on the line Manila to Camranh Bay, directing that a report be made daily even if the information were all negative (Exhibit 77, Naval Court).

A dispatch from OpNav, dated 1 December 1941, was also received referring to a Thailand-Japanese intrigue aimed at forcing the British to attack Thai as a counter-move to a Japanese landing in Kota Bharu, whereupon Thai would declare war and ask Japanese help.

A dispatch of 1 December from ComSIXTEEN advised of radio intelligence information indicating that various units under Cinc Third Fleet were in the

Takao area and that Cinc Second Fleet had shifted from Kure to Sasebo apparently en route to South China waters.

The communication intelligence summary for November 30th, delivered on December 1st, stated generally that traffic volume was less than for the past few days, that the traffic consisted largely of dispatches bearing old dates. No reason could be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for the past few days had prevented the repetition of dispatches. The number of dispatches originated on the 30th was very small. The only tactical circuit heard was one with the carrier AKAGI and several MARUs. As to the Combined Fleet and First Fleet, it was stated the Chiefs of Staff of those Fleets were in Kure. In the same message, the Chief of Staff, Second Fleet, was not listed in any location. Other traffic indications were that he was at sea. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, sent one dispatch to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force, but also included the KONGO and HIYEI, which it was said placed them as members of his task force. (The HIYEI was actually en route to Pearl Harbor.) As to the Third Fleet, it was said, "No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway." The Fourth Fleet was believed to be still in the Truk area. It was said that the continued association of Jaluit and Commander Submarine Force, plus his known progress from the Empire to Chichijime to Saipan made his destination obviously the Marshalls; also that since one of his large units arrived in the Marshalls some time ago, that unit could not agree with ComSIXTEEN that there was not a submarine concentration in that area. "Every evidence points to a concentration, not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there, but also a good proportion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force." It was also said that "the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this has not been confirmed." This communication summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel and Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer.

[*118*] A dispatch was received from ComSIXTEEN, addressed to OpNav, information CincAF, CincPac, and ComFOURTEEN, to the effect that a reassignment of all Japanese naval calls had occurred at midnight.

2 December 1941:

On 2 December 1941, ComSIXTEEN reported that Cinc Second and Cinc Third Fleets were in the Takao area, and, that broadcasts to fleet units were being sent by Takao or Bako in addition to Tokyo. Also reported was the fact that the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok had requested permission to destroy codes.

CincAF also reported that a patrol plane had spotted nine submarines on a southerly course in the South China Sea between Camranh Bay and the Philippines. Also that three submarines were sighted 070 from Saigon, 180 miles, heading south, and that twenty-one transports, with air patrol overhead, were at Camranh Bay.

A report from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised of the arrival of 14,000 troops sailing from there the week ending the 22nd.

The communication intelligence summary for the previous day stated generally that all service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000 1 December. Previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicated an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appeared that the Japanese Navy was adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000 1 December indicated that an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromise. Either that, or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual were pending. It should be noted that the sentence in the above summary reading "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale" was underscored in red pencil commencing with the words "service calls." Captain Layton testified that to the best of his recollection this was underlined by Admiral Kimmel at the time.

The summary further stated as to the First Fleet "nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters." As to the Second Fleet,

it was stated "This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China;" Takao did not appear to play an important role in the traffic; consequently, the assumption was made that this fleet was passing up Takao. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated there was "nothing to report except that the [*119*] same associations of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces continued. As to Fourth Fleet, "No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area." As to Fifth Fleet, "Nothing to report." As to submarines, it was stated a large number of the Submarine Force was believed to be in the area eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijime and Saipan. As to Combined Air Force, it was stated "No change." As to carriers, it was said "No change." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

In accordance with the request of Admiral Kimmel, Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, prepared a memorandum for the Admiral dealing with the location of the Japanese Fleet. This memorandum was prepared, according to Layton, on the evening of 1 December, and was submitted by him to Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941. The original memorandum is Exhibit 23. The memorandum bears certain notations in red pencil which, Layton testified, were inserted by him on December 2nd prior to submission of the memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, and which reflected the later information received after preparation of the memorandum on the night of December 1st–2nd. It also bears certain lead pencil notations which Layton identified as the handwriting of Admiral Kimmel. This memorandum, according to Layton, summarized his best estimate of the location of the Japanese Fleet, based on all information available to him and to Admiral Kimmel up to and including 1 December 1941.

Layton's estimate stated that from the best available information, units of the Orange (Japanese) were "*thought*" to be located as listed in the memorandum. In the Kure-Sasebo area he listed the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet and Commander in Chief, First Fleet, with six battleships, "(?)", and other units. He listed the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, at Nagara initially and then corrected it in red to indicate that it was at Takao. Also in the Kure-Sasebo area he located Cruiser Division 8.

In the Shanghai area, Layton's estimate located the Commander in Chief, China Fleet, the Shanghai base force, and an air group.

In the Bako-Takao area, Layton listed Third Fleet submarine squadrons and various destroyers and the Commander of the Combined Air Force with numerous air groups and the KASUGA MARU (thought to be a converted carrier with 36 planes). He estimated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, had been en route to Takao (this he corrected in red pencil to indicate that he was at Takao) with a cruiser division, destroyers, and with "Cardiv 4—two CV and four DD; Cardiv 3—two CV and 3 DD; Batdiv 3 less HARUNA—3 BB (maybe 2 BB)" and, he added in red pencil, certain cruisers and Destroyer Division 2.

In the Hainon-Canton area, Layton located the Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet and various cruisers and destroyers and transports. In the French Indo-China area, he located the Commander in Chief of an Expeditionary Fleet with various ships including 21 transports and some base forces among others. In the Mandates area, he located at Palao an air group [*120*] and base force; at Truk, the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet with cruisers and destroyers, and a base force and an air group. At Saipan, he located the Commander in Chief of the Submarine Force with possibly submarines and various air groups and a base force. In the Marshalls area, he located various air groups and the carrier "KORYU? plus plane guards", and several submarine squadrons and base force.

Layton's memorandum did not make any reference to the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 of the Japanese Fleet (which in fact were en route to attack Pearl Harbor). According to Layton, on 2 December 1941, during his conference with Admiral Kimmel, the Admiral noticed and commented on the absence of information concerning Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. In his testimony, he described the conversation on this point as follows:

"Mr. SONNETT: Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?

"Captain LAYTON: As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean

to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect." . . .

"Mr. SONNETT: Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?

"Captain LAYTON: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.

"Mr. SONNETT: He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?

[*121*] "Captain LAYTON: This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

3 December 1941:

It will be recalled that on December 3rd dispatches were sent by CNO to CincPac and others advising that Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London, had been ordered to destroy the "purple" machine and most of the codes and ciphers.

Layton testified that at the time Admiral Kimmel asked him what the "purple machine" was; that he did not know and made inquiry; that he advised Admiral Kimmel that it was the Japanese diplomatic electrical coding machine; that he did not then know whether or not the Japanese consul at Hawaii had such a machine; and, that he subsequently learned that the Japanese consul there did not have such a machine.

The communication intelligence summary delivered on the 3rd, covering the 2nd, stated generally that the most prominent factor in the traffic was the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it had appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao radio received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. It was stated that ComSIXTEEN had reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area, and that Takao radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. The broadcast, it was said, was not uncovered at ComFOURTEEN and contrary to the location report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances, Takao radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. It was said that "Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units, has left Empire waters, but is either not close enough to Takao for good communications or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao." It was further stated, "The change of calls on December 1st has prevented this office from making definite statement as of this date of the units now in the southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area." Also it was pointed out generally that "There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo." As to the First Fleet, it was stated that despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appeared relatively quiet and that "from inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal combined fleet staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing indicates one combined fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets, and apparently in company, while another combined fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets." As to the Second Fleet, it was stated "No units have stood out prominently in [*122*] the last two or three days. This is probably due to lack of new identifications, but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company." As to the Third Fleet, it said there was nothing to report. As to the Mandates, it was said that the association of submarine force and Fourth Fleet continued.

Concerning carriers, this summary stated, "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

4 December 1941:

On 4 December 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (Exhibit 21, Naval Court) to NavStaGuam for action, and to CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, and ComSIXTEEN for information stating:

"Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CINCAF CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN COMSIXTEEN and OPNAV X Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain X Report crypto channels retained."

ComSIXTEEN advised, in a dispatch received on December 4th, that seven transports had been sighted off Saigon on 15 November 1941, and on the 20th a seaplane carrier northeast of Amoy.

The Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised, in a dispatch received 4 December, that several large liners had been carrying supplies and personnel to the Carolines, that 3,000 laborers had landed at Jaluit and that certain islands were being specially developed.

The Naval Attache, Tokyo, advised in a dispatch received this day that a transport loaded with aircraft and another with naval personnel had left Yokahama on 27 November 1941.

The previous day's communication intelligence summary stated under the heading "General," that traffic volume was normal with receiving conditions good. The present state of call recovery did not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slowed up identification of even these units. Very few units had been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to the Commanders in Chief, Combined, Second, and Third Fleets. Tokyo intelligence originated nine [*123*] dispatches to the same addresses. It was stated that the presence of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, in Taiwan waters was not revealed by radio traffic. It was stated that it was the impression that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway, but that this was not verified by radio intelligence means. It was also stated that there were some Fourth Fleet units in the Marshall Islands but their identity was not known. It was stated also that there was "no information on submarines or carriers." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

5 December 1941:

There were no dispatches of an intelligence nature received by CincPac. The previous day's communication intelligence summary stated that in general traffic volume was normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao radio instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that there were two fleet broadcasts now in operation. So far only a few messages had been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Tokyo intelligence originated messages to the Chiefs of Staff, China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force, and same. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders. As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated "The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which CincSecond Fleet is still copying." As to the Fourth Fleet, it was stated that the Commander in Chief sent a message to various units and that no further check could be made on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls and that Jaluit appeared many times in the day's traffic, being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo radio and an oil tanker. As to South China, it was stated that Bako continued as an active originator addressing many mes-

sages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China commanders, all units in that area were quiet. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

6 December 1941:

Several dispatches dated 6 December 1941 were found in the CincPac files, but it does not appear whether or not they were received prior to the attack. One was an OpNav dispatch authorizing CincPac to direct the destruction of secret and confidential documents at our outlying islands "in view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands." (Exhibit 22, Naval Court). Other dispatches dated the 6th, from the Naval Observer at Wellington, advised of Japanese destruction of codes; from the Assistant Naval Attaché, Shanghai, advised of the departure south of Japanese troops and increase of Japanese gendarmerie force in Shanghai; and, from CincAF, advised of a
[*124*] 25-ship convoy, a 10-ship convoy, and 8 ships, off Saigon, French Indo-China, all of which appeared to be headed in a westerly direction, also 30 ships and a cruiser were sighted in Camranh Bay.

The radio intelligence summary for 5 December, which was delivered on the 6th, was the last summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel before the attack. It stated in general that traffic volume was hevay. All circuits were overloaded with Tokyo broadcasts going over full 24 hours. Tokyo Mandates circuit in duplex operations. These were several new intercept schedules heard. It was noted that some traffic being broadcast was several days old which indicated the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization. There were many messages of high precedence which appeared to be caused by the jammed condition of all circuits. A plain language message was sent by the captain of the OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao, probably for further relay, addressed to the Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau saying, "In reference to the Far Eastern crisis what you said is considered important to this end, but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon."

As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that neither the Second nor Third Fleet Commanders had originated any traffic. They were still frequently addressed but were receiving their traffic over broadcasts. It was stated that "They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."

There was no traffic from the Third Fleet, but some traffic to that fleet. There was also some traffic to the Fourth Fleet addressed at Jaluit, strengthening the impression that the Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet, was in the Marshalls. As to South China, there was much traffic addressed to the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, by Sama. Bako continued as an active originator with many dispatches to the Second and Third Fleets. The Commander Combined Air Force appeared to be busy with the movement of air corps, several of which were moving probably to Indo-China.

[*125*] *Findings.*

29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire information from coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese Government and its representatives. Through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages and their decryption and translation in Washington, D. C., prior to the attack, knowledge was obtained on the Government's actual views concerning the diplomatic situation, of the Japanese Government's intention to wage war, and of the fact that hostilities were impending and imminent.

30. The information acquired in Washington through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly disseminated at Washington by Naval and military Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations, to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State Department, and to the President.

31. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon the Chief of Naval Operations for information as to the status of the diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese, and had requested to be kept fully informed on this subject.

32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelligence at Washington were not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as such. Reasons advanced for this course of action were that the Japanese might intercept the naval messages and learn of the Navy's success in decrypting Japanese codes; that the volume of intercepted messages was so great that the transmission of them, particularly during the critical period, would have overtaxed the Navy's communications facilities; and, that it was the duty of the

Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate such information and to advise CincPac of the important facts learned.

33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on the information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages.

34. The warnings sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during November (particularly the "war warning" of the 27th) and early December, 1941, indicated in unmistakable language that the diplomatic negotiations had ceased, that war with Japan was imminent, and that Japanese attacks might occur at any moment.

35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indicating interest in the location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were more specific than other intercepted messages indicating Japanese interest in the movements of ships to or from other ports.

[*126*] 36. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully advised of certain other information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages after the November 27th "war warning," which made further evident the termination in fact of the diplomatic negotiations and the Japanese intention to wage war.

37. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message in which the Japanese Government instructed its representatives to present to the State Department at 1 p. m. the Japanese Government's final reply terminating the diplomatic negotiations. Mention was made of the fact that 1 p. m. Washington time was about dawn at Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East. No one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor.

38. This so-called "1 p. m. delivery message," which consisted of one sentence, had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at Bainbridge Island in the State of Washington and forwarded to the Navy Department by teletype. It was decrypted and available in the Navy Department at about 0700 on December 7th. It was sent to the Army for translation because there was no Japanese translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. The translation, which could have been done by a qualified translator in a few minutes, was not received from the Army until after 0900.

39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant information several hours before the attack, and there were available means whereby the information could have been transmitted to Admiral Kimmel immediately, including a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army, Admiral Stark initially was not disposed to, and did not, send any message to Admiral Kimmel. Instead he relied on the transmission of a message by the War Department to General Short, which was to be furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.

40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider it necessary to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of 7 December and that he had not telephoned at any time previous to the attack, but that one regret which he had was that he had not telephoned a message that morning to Admiral Kimmel or paralleled the Army message on the naval radio system.

41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941, which was received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were presenting an ultimatum at 1 p. m., that they were under orders to destroy their code machine, that it was not known just what significance the hour set might have but that the addressees were to be on the alert accordingly, and that the naval authorities were to be informed.

42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack, on November 24th, that "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility," and, on November 27th, that "an aggressive movement by the Japanese is expected [*127*] within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo."

43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention to probable Japanese objectives to the southward and southeastward of Japan, and did not specifically mention Pearl Harbor, both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. They did not regard such an attack as probable.

44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1941, which were to be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representatives information concerning the status of relations between Japan and the United States, and other countries. These were known as the "winds" code and the "hidden word" code. The "winds" code was designed to indicate a break in diplomatic relations, or possibly war, with England or the United States or Russia by the use in weather broadcasts of certain Japanese words signifying wind directions.

45. The interception of a "winds" message relating to the United States during the first week of December, 1941, would not have conveyed any information of significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already have.

46. No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States was received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom such a message would have come had it been received in the Navy Department. No such message was intercepted by the radio intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines, although intensive efforts were made by those organizations to intercept such a mesage. The evidence indicates further that no such message was intercepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence Officer of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such message. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony to the effect that a "winds" code message was received prior to the attack was given by Captain Safford, in charge of Op-20-G, a communications security section at the Navy Department, who stated that such a message was received on December 3rd or 4th, that it related to the United States, and that no copy could be found in the Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford named, in addition to himself, three other officers who, he stated, recalled having seen and read the "winds" message. Each of those officers testified that he had never seen such a message. The only other testimony to the effect that a "winds" message was received was by Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to Op-20-G, who said that he recalled that there was a message but could not recall whether or not it related to the United States or England or Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this [*128*] investigation, Captain Kramer erorneously thought that a "hidden word" message intercepted on the morning of December 7th had been a "winds" message.

47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted "hidden word" code message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the necessity of delivering other messages, including the "1 p. m. delivery message," he overlooked a code word relating to the United States and translated the message as meaning only that "relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations." He testified that he later discovered the error and a few minutes before 1 p. m. on December 7th, he telephoned the correction to his superior officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence and to an officer of Army Military Intelligence.

48. Except for the omission of the United States, the "hidden word" code message was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect previous diplomatic interceptions which indicated that the message was to convey the idea of a crisis involving the countries in question.

49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior to the attack included, in addition to the Chief of Naval Operations, the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.

50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General and the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were tapped for some months prior to the attack. These were discontinued on 2 December 1941 because the District Intelligence Officer feared that the existence of such taps might be discovered, resulting in undesirable complications. No information of military or naval significance was obtained by means of the telephone taps.

51. On 6 December 1941 the local representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence Officer a transcript of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation between a person in Honolulu named "Mori" and a person in Japan. This was examined by the District Intelligence Officer. It was decided that the conversation should be further studied by a Japanese linguist of the District Intelligence Office, who was to

listen to the recording of the conversation. This was not done until after the attack. The transcript furnished on December 6th indicated that the person in Japan was interested, among other things, in the daily flights of airplanes from Honolulu and in the number of ships present. During the conversation, references were made to flowers, which, it now appears, may have been code words signifying the presence or absence of ships, and a method of conveying information to the approaching Japanese ships, which presumably would have been listening in on the conversation. Prior investigations indicate that the "Mori conversation" was also brought to the attention of General Short on 6 December 1941.

[*129*] 52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable messages from and to the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via a commercial communications company, were obtained during the first week of December, 1941. This was the first time that such messages had been obtained. The messages were in code and efforts were made immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some messages were decrypted before the attack. These contained no information of particular significance.

53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means of the telephone taps or through the interception of messages of the Japanese Consul General indicated the likelihood of war or of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

54. One of the Japanese Consul General's messages, which was obtained by the District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5 December 1941 to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, was a message dated December 3rd. This message was in a Japanese code known as the "PA–K2." It was decrypted and translated by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor after the attack. The message was one in which the Japanese Consul General advised of a change in a method which had been established for communication by visual signals from Oahu, whereby lights in houses on the beach, the use of a sailboat, certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio station, and bonfires, would convey information as to the presence or absence of various types of warships of the Pacific Fleet. Although the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor was unable to decrypt this message prior to the attack, the message was decrypted and translated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by a civilian translator in Op–20–G of the Navy Department in Washington. That section had received the message from an Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Virginia. Captain Kramer testified he had no specific recollection of having seen this translation prior to the attack, but the evidence indicates that the rough translation was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the pressure of work on other important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was taken on the translation until 8 December 1941.

55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu received a coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the existing situation, the presence of ships in port was of utmost importance, that daily reports were to be submitted, that the reports should advise whether or not there were observation balloons at Pearl Harbor, and whether or not the warships were provided with anti-torpedo nets. This message was intercepted by an Army radio intercept station at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded by mail to the War Department for decryption and translation. The translation supplied by the Army indicates that the message was translated on 30 December 1941.

56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu sent two messages in the "PA–K2" code which indicated the likelihood of an air attack. The first reported that there were no signs of barrage balloon equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in all probability there was considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, and that the battleships [*130*] did not have torpedo nets. The second message reported on the ships at anchor on December 6th, and stated that it appeared that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet air arm. These messages were not obtained by Naval Intelligence at Honolulu prior to the attack. They were, however, both intercepted by an Army intercept station at San Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to the Army. The translations of these messages furnished by the Army indicate that they were translated on December 8th. They could have been decrypted and translated in the Navy Department in about an hour and a half.

57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing such information, and had access to radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force received some general information concerning Japanese movements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

58. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.

59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence bulletin was distributed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to his command. This bulletin set forth the available information concerning the organization of the Japanese Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin on the same subject and pointed out that the principal change was a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This arose from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces. The bulletin stated, among other things, that the Japanese Carrier Fleet consisted of ten carriers which were organized into five divisions, each having two carriers.

60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer, who received it primarily from the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. Such information also was contained in dispatches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D. C.

61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others. These included summaries of the information concerning Japanese naval forces which had been received from the Radio Intelligence Units at Pearl Harbor and at the Philippines.

[*131*] 62. On November 26th, ComFOURTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav, information to CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN, which summarized the information as to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. The dispatch indicated that the Commander Second Fleet had been organizing a task force comprising units of various fleets. This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, which included at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier), plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. The estimate was that a strong force might be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts might operate from Palo and the Marshalls.

63. The radio intercepts by the radio intelligence unit located in the Philippines were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable because of the location of the unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, in a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav and others, commented on the above dispatch of ComFOURTEEN and stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had indicated that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was directing various fleet units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into two sections. The first section was expected to operate in the South China area. The second section was expected to operate in the Mandates. It was estimated that the second section included "Car Div 3, RYUJO, and one MARU." This dispatch also stated that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates, and that their best indications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. It was stated that this evaluation was considered to be reliable.

64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting reports from the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which were received by Admiral Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of important Japanese naval forces to the southward of Japan. These, however, did not report the movement of carriers.

65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor continued the practice of preparing daily summaries of the information received through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications, which were submitted to Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the following morning. Admiral Kimmel received and initialed these summaries daily on and after 27 November. On December 6th, he initialed the summary dated December 5th, which was the last one he received prior to the attack.

66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a communication intelligence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among other things, that there was no further information on the presence of a carrier division in the Mandates and that "carriers were still located in home waters." The next day, he received the November 28th summary which indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese radio intelligence net was [*132*] operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval communications and "IS GETTING RESULTS." There was no information set forth in the summary as to carriers. On the following day, Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29th, which, among other things, indicated that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st, Admiral Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated as to carriers that the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been confirmed.

67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received stated that all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on 1 December; that previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941. This summary stated, and was underscored by Admiral Kimmel, that "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale." It also stated, among other things, that a large number of submarines were believed to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan, and as to carriers that there was "no change."

68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request. This contained Layton's estimate, on the basis of all available information, of the location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako-Takao area Carrier Division 4 and Carrier Division 3, which included four carriers, and the "KASUGA MARU" (believed to have been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "KORYU (?) plus plane guards" in the Marshalls area.

69. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate. The reason was that Layton considered that the information as to the location of those carriers was not sufficent to warrant a reliable estimate of their whereabouts.

70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the following conversation:

"Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect." * * *

[*133*] "Captain LAYTON: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location."

"Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers:

"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, si over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident t carrier traffic is at a low ebb."

72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on Decem 4th stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summ delivered on December 5th made no mention of carriers. The summary delive on December 6th stated, in part, "No traffic from the Commander Carriers Submarine Force has been seen either."

[*134*] Confidential

IV

RECONNAISSANCE

A. *The Responsibility for Long Distance Reconnaissance.*

1. *The Navy's obligation.* Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense P (Exhibit 80), which was in effect prior to the attack, the Navy was responsi for long distance reconnaissance.

Annex VII, Section VI, to the joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan m provision for joint air action by the Army and Navy for defense against hos raids or air attacks to a declaration of war. Under this agreement, if naval aircraft were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operati and Army aircraft were made available, the Army aircraft were to be u by the Navy. This plan was implemented by the Naval Base Defense Air Fo Plan, under which Admiral Bellinger would command the Navy and Army pat planes. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan were not operative prior to the att An agreement between the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN t threat of a hostile attack was imminent was a prerequisite to the operation Annex VII, Section VI. No such agreement was made prior to the attack.

2. *Control of the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.* The Pacific Fleet patrol pla were actually under the control and operating in accordance with the ord of Admiral Kimmel. Thus, on November 22nd he approved the schedules for employment of those planes, which remained in effect up to the time of attack. His responsibility for the operations of the patrol planes, which w under the command of Commander, Task Force Nine, of the Pacific Fleet, further indicated by the fact that he directed search operations by those pla at Midway and Wake.

Admiral Bellinger, who commanded Task Force Nine, which consisted of Pat Wings One and Two of the Fleet, was under the command of ComFOURTE only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was activated for the purp of drills.

The responsibility for the employment of the fleet patrol planes was, as Admi Kimmel testified before the Naval Court, his responsibility and was accep by him. He testified further that Admiral Bloch had asked for the dispatch patrol planes for a search if he had felt that it was necessary. In this connect it should be noted that on October 17, 1941, Admiral Bloch had asked for cert Fleet utility planes to be used for inshore patrol and that they were not ma available to him (Exhibit 46, Naval Court). It should be noted that ComFO TEEN had no planes assigned to him.

Admiral Bellinger testified that he was responsible for the operation of Fleet planes in accordance with the orders of Admiral [*135*] Kimm He said, however, that it was not his responsibility to decide whether or not l range reconnaissance should be conducted. Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, who the Fleet Air Officer on CincPac's staff in 1941, testified before Admiral H that his duties were primarily, if not almost entirely, concerned with techni training and logistic matters .

3. *Conferences after 27 November 1941 concerning reconnaissance.* There no evidence that on or after 27 November 1941 the necessity or advisability of l distance reconnaissance was specifically discussed between Admiral Kimmel a any member of his Staff or Task Force Commanders. Admiral McMorris, War Plans Officer, testified that he thought the subject was discussed, but t he could recall no specific conference dealing with this subject. Admiral Bellin

testified that there was no such conference in which he participated. Admiral Kimmel's testimony before the Naval Court was to the effect that on November 27th he decided not to conduct long range reconnaissance. It is significant that Captain Layton, who was the Fleet Intelligence Officer, stated that he did not tell Admiral Kimmel prior to December 7th that aerial reconnaissance from Oahu would be advisable in view of the available intelligence because he knew that reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet patrol planes. He said that he was not familiar with the extent of the reconnaissance, but definitely believed that reconnaissance was being conducted. Neither the Chief of Staff nor the Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations Officer could recall any discussion of the advisability or necessity for long range reconnaissance from Oahu between November 27th and December 7th.

B. *Reconnaissance Conducted from Oahu.*

Although the schedules for the Fleet patrol planes (Exhibit 37) did not provide for any reconnaissance from Oahu, the Fleet Security Letter (Exhibit 8 NC) directed that there be a patrol of the Fleet operating areas. The Fleet operating areas were thirty miles to the south of Oahu.

During the period 30 November to 7 December 1941, certain searches were flown from Wake and Midway. The extent of these searches appears in Exhibit 50A of this investigation. One squadron had been sent to Midway on the 30th of November and searched en route; another squadron had been sent from Midway to Wake on the 1st of December and returned to Pearl Harbor prior to the attack, searching en route (Exhibit 50, 50A).

Prior to 7 December 1941 the last daily long distance reconnaissance flown from Oahu was in the summer of 1941. According to Admiral Bloch's previous testimony some time during the summer of 1941, on the basis of some intelligence or information which he could not recall, he asked Admiral Kimmel to direct reconnaissance on a section towards Jaluit and this was done for several days. Admiral Kimmel recalled that such reconnaissance had been flown for a few days on the line from Jaluit to Pearl Harbor and stated that they had in mind that they might catch a submarine on the surface out there and perhaps any other vessel there. Despite thorough examination of the available records of Patwing Two, of the CincPac operation files, of the ComFOURTEEN files, of the CincPac secret dispatches for 1941 and confidential and restricted dispatches for June, July, and August, 1941, no record of this reconnaissance could be found. None of the witnesses examined recalled the reconnaissance or the reasons for it.

[*136*] C. *Proposed Army Reconnaissance to Jaluit.*

In the Army report it was stated that on November 26th the Army directed General Short to send two B–24's to Jaluit on a reconnaissance mission to look for various things, including ships. However, the Army report does not state whether this reconnaissance actually took place.

Before the Roberts' Committee, General Gerow said that reports had been received of Japanese concentrations in the Mandated Islands and they assumed that every effort was being made to identify any Japanese movements in that direction. He stated that those two B–24's were sent out with an idea of trying to confirm information that had been received from other sources. If no reconnaissance at all were done after the Army's message to General Short which directed such reconnaissance as he deemed necessary, General Gerow said that would have been considered a failure to obey orders.

The status of this reconnaissance has been quite definitely confirmed by Captain Layton's testimony in this investigation. In the latter part of November, 1941, Captain Layton stated, either Admiral Kimmel directed him to establish contact with the Hawaiian Air Force pertaining to this reconnaissance or else his opposite number, Colonel Raley, came to him with the information of the pending reconnaissance and requested his assistance towards delineating the appropriate objectives and to furnish the pilots and crews with intelligence material for briefing. He was also requested to assist in the projected reconnaissance. The reconnaissance unfortunately never materialized, he stated, because only one plane arrived and there were delays due to uncompleted camera installations. He was never informed that one plane had arrived, but later learned that it was destroyed in the attack on Hickam Field. The Navy was extremely anxious that the reconnaissance be made at the earliest possible date, and Admiral Kimmel,

upon receipt of Captain Layton's memorandum concerning information he h obtained at the conference, asked him how soon the reconnaissance might expected. Captain Layton relayed Colonel Raley's answer to the Admiral the effect that the delay was due to non-installation or non-completion of stallation of cameras and the time was still not definitely fixed. A photostat copy of a memorandum of November 28th from Captain Layton to Admiral Kimm concerning this reconnaissance appears in the record as Exhibit 28. Furthermo Captain Layton was questioned as to his knowledge of any discussion concerni the possibility of the use of Navy planes for this reconnaissance. Captain Layt replied that it was not discussed with him, but he thought that PBY "Catalina could not be used because their appearance over the Marshalls would have be an overt act, while the Army planes, on the other hand, would have been flyi ostensibly from Wake to Port Darwin en route to the Philippines. Captain Layt was particularly anxious that this reconnaissance be carried out to check on h information as to the presence or absence of air strength and carriers and su marines and naval concentrations in the Marshalls area, including Truk. Th was an ideal opportunity to establish the reliability of existing intelligence Japanese naval dispositions and developments in the Mandated Islands.

Admiral Bellinger recalled nothing concerning the proposed Army reconnai sance flight over the Mandated Islands.

[137] D. *The Direction to Execute an Appropriate Defensive Deploymer*

Among the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet by the Basic Navy War Pl was to protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denyi the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere. It will be recall that the Pacific Fleet War Plan, which was designed to implement the Na Basic War Plans, provided, among other things, that in the event of war wi the Axis Powers, including or excluding Japan, the patrol planes of the Paci Fleet were to conduct the maximum reconnaissance possible of the approach to Oahu. The Pacific Fleet Plan was not ordered to be executed prior to t attack. On the 27th of November, however, in the war warning, which advis that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within a few days, the Chief Naval Operations had directed Admiral Kimmel to "Execute an appropria defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-4

On the following day, the Chief of Naval Operations, in his dispatch whi repeated the Army dispatch advising that hostilities were possible at any m ment, had directed that Admiral Kimmel was to "Be prepared to carry out t tasks assigned in WPL-46."

Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court that as the result of t "war warning," he continued the security measures already in effect (supr page 64); carried out the planned movements of carriers to Wake and Midwa with reconnaissance en route; carried out reconnaissance at Midway and Wak increased security measures in fleet operating areas southward of Oahu; an on November 28th, issued an order directing extreme vigilance against subm rines in operating areas and depth bombing of all contacts, suspected to hostile, in certain of the operating areas (page 5, Exhibit 70). There is evidence of any other specific action taken by Admiral Kimmel after 27 N vember 1941, in order to carry out the direction contained in the war warni or the direction in the message of November 28th. It does appear that so f as the Fleet patrol planes at Oahu were concerned, their training continu along the same lines which had been followed prior to the "war warning."

The testimony by Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer, and others this investigation, is to the effect that the establishment of long distance a reconnaissance from Oahu would have been an "Appropriate defensive deplo ment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

It is interesting to note that the memoranda prepared by the War Pla Officer on November 30th and 5 December 1941, setting forth the action to taken if war developed with Japan in twenty-four or forty-eight hours, co tained no provision for the establishment of reconnaissance from Oahu (E hibit 69A and 69B, Naval Court). As Vice Admiral Smith, Chief of Sta testified, what they were thinking about in the Pacific was not the defense Pearl Harbor. They were thinking about the Fleet and the readiness of t Fleet.

E. The Reconnaissance that Could Have Been Flown.

A review of past reconnaissance during Admiral Kimmel's tour of duty sheds no light on this problem because he testified that he had never attempted to cover any large sector by long range reconnaissance and that a patrol out to 300 miles was almost useless unless as a guard against an air raid, although any patrol has some value as far as surface ships are concerned. However, his predecessor, Admiral Richardson, had established a distant patrol, "in view of the fact that constant and repeated warnings were received of the possible outbreak of the war in the immediate future" (p. 1053, Naval Court). This patrol, he said, was designated to cover [*138*] a given sector adequately and was rotated daily. The sector which was primarily covered more adequately and frequently than any other was from 170° to the westward to about 350°. That to the eastward was not covered.

Admiral Richardson also testified that this patrol would not have been adequate to positively detect an approaching combat force having as its intention the delivery of an attack early in the morning, but that it certainly would have made the attack more difficult. These patrols were discontinued when or shortly before Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson.

Admiral Bellinger's testimony on the reconnaissance that could have been flown during the critical period is obviously the most valuable on the subject. He stated that after October 28th, while there were 107 VP assigned to all units of Aircraft Scouting Force, only eighty-one were available. Of these, fifty-four had just arrived and were the PBY–5 type, with limited available spare parts. The number of plane crews did not quite equal the number of planes available. If one could consider eighty-one planes available, and assuming that there would have been none lost because of breakdowns requiring spare parts, it would have been practicable to use one-third, about twenty-seven planes, for daily patrol. Each plane could cover a sector of eight degrees with a radius of 700 miles, totalling approximately 216 degrees daily. This, however, would have been the absolute maximum because of the lack of sufficient crews and spare parts. 144 degrees could have been covered daily based on the use of eighteen planes daily of the fifty-four new PBY–5's. Actually, on 7 December 1941 there were in all only sixty-one planes available at Oahu, one squadron of which had just returned from Midway and Wake and required overhaul. This left forty-nine planes actually available, one-third of which would have been able to cover 128 degrees.

Admiral Bellinger testified that if he had received a directive from Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941, to conduct 360 degrees reconnaissance with the available Navy planes, it would have been possible to maintain such reconnaissance for not more than four or five days. His estimate of the duration of the daily 128-degree search was that it could have been flown until the failure of planes and the lack of spare parts reduced the planes to such an extent that further reconnaissance was impossible. It appears that such reconnaissance could have been carried on for an indefinite period and Admiral Bellinger's "vague" estimate was that it could have been carried on for several weeks.

Admiral Davis testified before Admiral Hart that: "There were not enough planes and pilots to establish and maintain a long range, 360 degree search indefinitely, or even for more than a limited time. There were, however, enough to approximate this by using relatively short range planes in the least dangerous sectors, and by obtaining some assistance by available Army aircraft, so that I think it could have been undertaken, had it been considered essential, on the basis that reenforcements could have arrived before personnel and matériel fatigue set in. Unless reenforcements arrived, it could not have been maintained."

[*139*] *F. The Sectors Which Would Have Been Covered.*

Had partial reconnaissance been flown from Oahu during the first week of December, 1941, it appears that the northern sectors would have been covered. Admiral Bellinger testified that he considered the northern sectors as the most dangerous sectors primarily because of the prevailing winds which would facilitate carrier-based plane operations in that sector. He stated that had the normal plan been carried out after the attack, on December 7th patrol planes would have searched the northern sector, and that some few planes did search that sector. But there had been searches made to the south because of information received from CincPac to the effect that a radio bearing indicated that the attacking force was to the south.

[*140*] *Findings.*

73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources, only practicable way by which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, could h obtained information as to the location or movements of Japanese naval for from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by long distance air reconnaissar

74. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had the obligati through Com 14, to conduct distance reconnaissance, and under Annex VII, Sect VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, naval forces were to be supp mented by available Army aircraft if the naval aircraft were insufficient for l distance patrol and search operations. As previously pointed out, the latter p was not in operation because an agreement between the Commanding Gene and Com 14 that threat of a hostile attack was imminent was a prerequisite no such agreement had been made prior to the attack. The Naval Base Defe Air Force Plan, which implemented the agreements for joint Army-Navy action, similarly was not operative prior to the attack.

75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The o Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet pat planes.

76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimr and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, wh were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operatic They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.

77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decl on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.

78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kim and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning", as to advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The V Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could re no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admi Kimmel had no such discussion with him.

79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger, Commander, Fleet Patrol Plan and General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, which was u as a basis for the joint Army-Navy agreements, was prophetic in its estim that in the event of attack on Hawaii, the most likely and dangerous form of tack would be an air attack to be launched at dawn from carriers about 200 m from Oahu. This estimate stated that the action open as a counter-meas included daily patrols as far as possible from Oahu, to sectors through 360 degr to reduce the possibilities of surface or air surprise. It further stated that s

[*141*] patrols could be effectively maintained with the personnel and mate available at the time (March, 1941) for a very short period and that s patrols were not practicable unless other intelligence indicated that a surf raid was probable within narrow limits of time. According to Admiral Bellin it was realized by the responsible officers of the Pacific Fleet that another cou of action which was always open was to fly a patrol of less than 360 degr with the available aircraft, covering the more dangerous sectors.

80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the southward of Oahu being carried out prior to the attack, in accordance with the provisions of Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas.

81. No distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the critical per 27 November to 7 December 1941. The last previous distant reconnaissa flown from Oahu appears to have been for several days during the summer 1941 on a sector toward Jaluit. This reconnaissance had been directed by Admi Kimmel at Admiral Bloch's request.

82. Late in November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a reconnaissa flight from Oahu to Jaluit and Truk, with the Navy assisting by providing int gence. The reconnaissance was not flown because the Army planes were made ready prior to the attack.

83. The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of tecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroy hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the ene the use of land positions in that hemisphere. Under the provisions of Pac Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, when that plans became effective, the Pac Fleet patrol planes were to maintain maximum patrol plane search against ene forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area, having due regard for t required for overhaul and repair of planes and for conservation of personne

84. In the war warning of November 27th, which advised that negotiations with Japan had ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within a few days, the Chief of Naval Operations directed tht Admiral Kimmel "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46."

85. The dispatch of November 28th repeated an Army dispatch, which, among other things, advised General Short that Japanese future action was unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment. The Navy dispatch directed that Admiral Kimmel was to undertake no offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act and that he was to "be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL–46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."

86. The establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu would have been an "appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46."

[*142*] 87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.

88. Prior to the attack, requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet to the Navy Department to increase the number of patrol planes assigned to the Fleet. Some new replacement planes had been sent to the Fleet during October and November, 1941. Additional planes, as evidenced by the prompt arrival of reenforcements after December 7th, could have been made available by the Navy Department, but at the expense of defenses in other areas. The Navy Department presumably knew that the number of planes available at Oahu were not sufficient to conduct 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days. The evidence in prior investigations indicates that after November 27th, responsible officers in the Navy Departmeent thought that reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu to the extent practicable with the planes available there.

89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles.

90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.

91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched.

[*143*]

V

THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

A. *Prelude: Japanese Submarines on 7 December 1941.*

At 0342, 7 December 1941, the USS CONDOR, a minesweeper, sighted a submarine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. This was in a defensive sea area where American submarines had been restricted from operating submerged. When sighted, the submarine was proceeding toward the entrance Buoys. It was about 100 feet from and on a collision course with the CONDOR, but turned sharply to port. The CONDOR simultaneously turned to starboard.

The CONDOR reported the incident by blinker to the USS WARD between 0350 and 0358. The WARD was a destroyer of the Inshore Patrol then engaged in patrol duty off the entrance to the harbor. The CONDOR then continued on its assigned mission. The message to the WARD read:

"Sighted submerged submarine on westerly course, speed 9 knots."

After receiving this visual signal, the WARD made a sonar search for about an hour and a half, without result. It then communicated by radio with the CONDOR, asking:

"What was the approximate distance and course of the submarine that you sighted?"

At 0520 the CONDOR replied:

"The course was about what we were steering at the time 020 magnetic and about 1000 yards from the entrance apparently heading for the entrance."

In response to further inquiries made by the WARD between 0521 and 0536, the CONDOR advised again that the last time it had sighted the submarine was at about 0350 and that it was apparently headed for the entrance. On receiving the message giving the submarine's course as about 020 magnetic, the

captain of the WARD realized that his search had been in the wrong directi
He then continued searching, but again without result.

The CONDOR made no report of the incident, except to the WARD. T
captain considered that the identification at that time was not positive enou
to make a report to other than the Senior Officer Present Afloat. The Sen
Officer Present Afloat, Lieutenant Commander Outerbridge, who comman
the WARD, made no report to higher authority. The captain of the WA
thought that the CONDOR might have been mistaken in concluding that it
seen a submarine.

The radio conversation between the WARD and CONDOR was overhe
and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, a ra
station then under the jurisdiction of the Commander, Inshore Patrol, 1
N. D. (Ex. 18). Since the conversation was solely [*144*] between
ships and was not addressed to the Section Base and no request was made t
it be relayed, the Bishop's Point Radio Station did not relay or report it
higher authority. The loudspeaker watch on the same frequency, which
maintained in the Communications Office, 14th N. D., did not overhear or int
cept the WARD-CONDOR conversation.

At the entrance to Pearl Harbor there was stationed a gate-vessel char
with opening and closing the net at the entrance. This anti-torpedo net w
according to Admiral Bloch's previous testimony, 45 feet in depth. The deep
part of the channel was 72 feet. A Japanese submarine subsequently recove
was about 20 feet from keel to conning tower.

The instructions of the Captain of the Yard were that the net should be k
closed from sunset to sunrise and opened only on orders from him, from
Assistant Captain of the Yard, or from the Yard Duty Officer who could
reached via the signal tower (Exhibit 43). The log of the gate-vessel indica
that the net was opened and closed a number of times during the night
December 6–7. At 0458 on the 7th, the gate was opened and the CROSSBI
and the CONDOR stood in. It was not until 0846 that the gate was clos
The Commanding Officer of the CONDOR testified that at 0532, when
CONDOR came in, conditions of visibility were very good and were "approach
daylight conditions."

The log of the signal tower for December 6–7, 1941 records the closing of
gate at 2250 on 6 December, which was followed by an entry at 0600 that
ANTARES was reported off the harbor (Exhibit 46).

The USS ANTARES, with a 500-ton steel barge in tow, arrived off Pe
Harbor from Canton and Palmyra at about 0605, when it exchanged calls w
the WARD. At 0630 the ANTARES sighted a suspicious object, which appea
to be a small submarine, about 1500 yards on its starboard quarter. T
ANTARES notified the WARD and asked it to investigate, and several minu
later, at about 0633, observed a Navy patrol plane circle and drop two sm
pots near the object. (Exhibit 73)

The WARD complied and at 0640 sighted an unidentified submarine one po
off its starboard bow, apparently following the ANTARES in to Pearl Hart
General Quarters were sounded and all engines ordered full ahead, increas
the WARD's speed from five to twenty-five knots. At 0645 she opened
with guns 1 and 3, firing one shot from each gun. The attack lasted only
or two minutes. The first shot, at a range of approximately 100 yards, pas
directly over the conning tower; the second, from No. 3 gun, at fifty yards
less, hit the submarine at the waterline junction of the hull and conning tow
At about this time, the ANTARES, observing the fire of the WARD, also no
the Navy patrol plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charges at the s
marine. The submarine heeled over to starboard and started to sink. T
WARD ceased firing and then dropped depth charges. A large amount of
appeared on the surface. The submarine went down in 1,200 feet of wat
(Exhibit 74).

[*145*] At 0651 the WARD sent a radio message to the Commandant, FOU
TEENTH Naval District (Exhibit 18):

"We have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in defensive sea are

The captain of the WARD, after reflecting that this message might not be int
preted as showing a surface submarine contact, at 0653 sent the following supp
mentary message:

"We have attacked fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarine op
ating in defensive sea area."

This message was received by the Bishop's Point radio station, relayed to the Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Inshore Patrol, and delivered by the Communications Watch Officer, FOURTEENTH Naval District, to the ComFOURTEEN Duty Officer. The Duty Officer notified the ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff at 0712 and, at the latter's direction, the Duty Officer of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, at 0715.

The ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff informed Admiral Bloch. Because of numerous previous reports of submarine contacts, their reaction was that the WARD had probably been mistaken, but that if it were not a mistake, the WARD and the relief ready duty destroyer MONAGHAN, which was dispatched, could take care of the situation, while the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to whom they had referred the information, had the power to take any other action which might be desired.

The CincPac Staff Duty Officer was given the report at about 0720 by the Assistant Duty Officer. After several attempted phone calls to ascertain whether Admiral Bloch knew of the report, the Staff Duty Officer received a phone message at 0740 from the duty officer of PatWing 2 that a patrol plane had reported that a submarine had been sunk in the defensive sea area; simultaneously, another phone call from FOURTEENTH Naval District advised the CincPac Staff Duty Officer that Admiral Bloch had been informed of the sinking and had ordered the ready duty destroyer out to assist the WARD and the standby destroyer to get up steam. The Staff Duty Officer then phoned Admiral Kimmel and gave him both messages and the information as to the action taken by Admiral Bloch. About this time, Captain Ramsey, of PatWing 2, phoned again and the Staff Duty Officer suggested he make his search planes available in case the Admiral wanted them.

Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court that between 0730 and 0740 he received a report that a submarine had been attacked off Pearl Harbor. He said that he was waiting for an amplification of this report when the air attack commenced. He also stated that the officer who reported the sinking of the submarine should have broadcast in plain language, but that he had reported in code, which caused delay. Admiral Kimmel also testified that after 27 November 1941, there had been about a half-dozen of such reports, and hence amplification of the report was necessary.

[*146*] The evidence indicates that the reports by the WARD were in plain language but that a request for verification by the WARD was later sent in code by the ComFOURTEEN Communication Officer at the direction of the ComFOURTEEN Duty Officer. The WARD's reply to that request was also in code and was deciphered at about the time when the air attack commenced.

A Japanese midget submarine entered Pearl Harbor and, after the air attack had commenced, fired both of its torpedoes, one of which exploded on the beach of Ford Island, passing between the RALEIGH and the CURTISS, and the other buried itself, it was believed, in the mud near the berth of the UTAH. This submarine was sunk by the CURTISS and recovered from the harbor some weeks after the attack. It had been so thoroughly destroyed that nothing of intelligence value could be obtained from it. Whether or not this was the submarine which had been sighted by the CONDOR could not be determined. No other submarine was detected in the harbor.

Another Japanese midget submarine was beached off Bellows Field, Oahu, and captured on the next day, along with its commanding officer. Various documents were recovered from this submarine including a chart of Pearl Harbor, on which was laid out a course into the harbor, around Pearl Harbor, and out of the harbor (Exhibits 32A, 33A). On this chart (Ex. 33A) were indicated the positions of various ships in the harbor. The charted positions differed substantially from the actual berthing arrangements on December 7th. This fact led the Army Pearl Harbor Board to conclude that the submarine had been in the harbor for reconnaissance prior to December 7th.

The conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board that the Japanese midget submarines "must have been in the harbor a few days before the attack and evidently were moving into and out of the harbor at will" (Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, page 155) is based wholly on the legends appearing on the Japanese maps (Exhibits 32, 32A, 33, 33A) captured in the midget submarine that was sunk off Bellows Field, and on the testimony of Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in charge at Honolulu on 7 December 1941, which, in turn, is likewise based solely on the legends appearing on the same maps (Rep. APHB, page 155). At the present time, Mr. Shivers is Collector of the Port at Honolulu, and is in a precarious physical condition due to a serious heart ailment. Mr. Shivers was inter-

viewed in Honolulu during the first week of June, 1945, and he stated, as appears in the Army Pearl Harbor Board report (page 155), that his concl that Japanese submarines had been in Pearl Harbor prior to the attack was l on an examination of the maps in question, and that he had no other inform to sustain his conclusion. Mr. Shivers likewise had no further informati supply in respect of the intelligence situation or the intelligence information was available in Honolulu prior to 7 December 1941, except to say that he mystified that the ONI tap of the telephone line of the Japanese Consula Honolulu was lifted on 2 December 1941, pursuant to an order issued by Ca (now Rear Admiral) Mayfield, the DIO. Since Mr. Shivers' statements we different from those given by him in his testimony of record before the Pearl Harbor Board, and since the basis of his, and the conclusion of the Pearl Harbor Board, are shown to be erroneous by a careful study of the le on the maps in question, on which those conclusions were based, and sinc health was so precarious, it was deemed not necessary to call him as a wit

[*147*] For the following reasons, it appears that the Japanese midget marine from which was obtained the chart of Pearl Harbor was not i harbor on that day, and probably had not been there on any prior occasion

(a) The following facts lead to the conclusion that the recovered chart an attack *plan* rather than an actual track and log of events:

(1) The characters marking certain points on the chart (Exhibit 33 and were in Chinese ideographs which give no indication of tense. For inst the notation which has been variously translated as "Enemy ship sunk" "Attack and sink enemy ships" could have been the future meaning. Simi the notation translated as "Fixed position," could mean "Position to be fi a natural course of action before entering the channel.

(2) The times marked on the chart were unquestionably Tokyo time (This is confirmed by the computation, on the back of the chart, of the of dawn and sunrise at Pearl Harbor on December 8 (Tokyo time).

(3) Based on (2), times along the track were all in daylight, comme at the channel entrance at dawn.

(4) The northwesterly portion of the track, to the northward of Ford Is passed through an area which was, and had been, occupied by a numb ships moored to buoys, and could not have been followed by a submarine.

(5) The courses and notations were much more neat and meticulous any that could have been made during the passage of narrow and cro waters by the navigator of a two-man submarine.

(6) The major Japanese operation plan for the Pearl Harbor attack, s constructed by a captured Japanese yeoman, and confirmed generally by tured documents, provided that the midget submarines were to enter the h and after the initiation of the air attack were to attack with torpedoes. times on the chart were in conformity with this, since, converted into olulu time, there was a waiting period inside the harbor entrance from 05 0840 and the turning point south of Ford Island was timed 0900.

(b) The submarine had its full allowance of two torpedoes when recover

(c) The submarine commander, on interrogation, stated that he had fail his mission (Exhibit 68).

(d) The information on the chart was of a nature that could more re be obtained by civilian observers from the area surrounding Pearl Harbor by dangerous submarine reconnaissance. As has appeared earlier, the Jap Consul General had been communicating just such intelligence to Tokyo.

(e) Notations on the chart indicate that the submarine commander rec intelligence reports as late as December 5th.

[*148*] Intelligence information recently received indicates that the m submarines were carried by and launched from mother submarines (Ex 69). They were carried on the main deck abaft the conning tower and se to the pressure hull by means of heavy clamps. The midgets used in the Harbor attack were 41 feet in length, had a reported cruising range of 1 180 miles at their most economical speed of 4 to 6 knots, did not have a transmitter, and carried a crew of two men. They were armed with two pedoes and apparently carried the same designation number as their m subs. The exact number with the Japanese task force is not definitely kn but there is substantial proof that there were at least five.

The midget submarine beached off Bellows Field from which the chart recovered bore the designation of "I–18," apparently that of its "mother." the recovered chart, at various points along the sides of the entrance ch

from Hammer Point to Hospital Point, are notations in faint pencil, "I–16," "I–20," I–22," "I–18," "I–24." From information received, it is now known that these are the designations of the submarines which carried the five midgets known to have been present. The times on the recovered chart indicate a waiting period in the narrow harbor entrance area from 0115 to 0410 (0445 to 0840, Hawaiian time). It therefore appears to be a logical assumption that the five midget submarines were to lie in wait in the narrow entrance channel, approximately in the positions indicated, with the object of torpedoing ships attempting to sortie, thus blocking the channel; and that after the initial air attack had been completed, they were to proceed around Ford Island and complete the destruction. The midget submarine which was sunk west of Ford Island apparently followed just such a plan. Confirmation of this assumption is found in a captured copy of the Japanese Plan for this operation, wherein the following initial task is assigned to the Sixth Fleet (Submarine Force): "Will observe and attack American Fleet in HAWAII area. Will make a surprise attack on the channel leading into PEARL HARBOR and attempt to close it. If the enemy moves out to fight he will be pursued and attack."

B. *Suspicious Submarine Contacts Prior to 7 December 1941.*

It was suspected in Washington for some time prior to December 7th that our Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was being kept under observation by Japanese submarines, there having been, over a period of six months, reports by our destroyers of such contacts. The Fleet also received reports that Japanese submarines were reconnoitering the approaches to Pearl Harbor. The number of such reports at Pearl Harbor prior to the attack was placed by one witness at from ten to fifteen, several of which occurred in the immediate vicinity of the entrance to Pearl Harbor. The contacts were on underwater sound contacts, which were not confirmed by sightings.

A search of the files of CincPac has resulted in locating dispatches that refer to three suspicious contacts during the five weeks preceding Pearl Harbor:

(1) On 3 November 1941, an oil slick area in latitude 20–10, longitude 157–41 was observed by a patrol plane, and crossed by Task Force One; an air search of a fifteen mile area by the patrol plane, a sound search of an unspecified area by the USS WORDEN and an investigation by [*149*] the USS DALE produced negative results (Exhibit 48; dispatches 031920, 032035, 032133, 032330, 040042).

(2) On 28 November 1941, after the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had issued an order requiring extreme vigilence against possible hostile submarines, restricting submerged submarine operations to certain areas, and providing that all submarine contacts in other areas suspected to be hostile were to be depth bombed, the USS HELENA reported that a radar operator, without knowledge of the CincPac alert, was positive that a submarine was in a restricted area (Exhibit 48; dispatch 280835). A search by a task group with three destroyers, of the western border and the northern half of that area, pursued from 281050 to 281845, when abandoned by 290900, produced no contacts (Exhibit 48; dispatches 281050, 281133, 281704, 281845).

(3) During the night of 2 December 1941, the USS GAMBLE reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20–30, longitude 158–23, which was lost in a change of range, that was evaluated to have been too rapid to indicate the presence of a submarine (Exhibit 48; dispatch 022336). An investigation, ordered to be made by Desron 4 (Exhibit 48; dispatch 030040), apparently was negative.

C. *Detection of Aircraft by the Army Radar System.*

It appears from the prior investigations that about 0702 on the morning of 7 December 1941, two Army privates on duty at a mobile radar unit on the northern part of Oahu discovered an unusually large response on the radar in a northerly direction and from about 136 miles. This information they reported, at about 0715, to an Army officer on duty at the Army Information Center. The Army officer stated that he had some information to the effect that a flight of Army B–17's was due in that morning, and he thought that the planes detected by the radar were those Army planes. He did not suspect enemy planes and made no effort to report to his superior.

The evidence indicates that neither this information nor any other information as to the direction from which the planes approached or on which they departed was transmitted to the Naval authorities on the day of the attack.

D. *The Air Attack.*

The Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor, according to most observers, sta at 0755. It began with dive bombing and strafing of the Naval Air Statio Ford Island, and at the Army's Hickam Field. This was followed at Pearl Ha by attacks on major units of the Fleet, launched by torpedo planes and bombers, and was accompanied by strafing. Next there occurred two dist horizontal bombing attacks from high altitudes, the last immediately prece a final intensive dive bombing attack. Almost simultaneously with the rai Pearl Harbor, the Japanese attacked [*160*] the Kaneohe Bay Naval Station and Ewa Field at Barber's Point was strafed. Approximately 150 pl took part in the attack on Pearl Harbor. The raid is reported variously to l ended at from 0940 to 1130 and some Japanese planes are known to have l over Oahu after 1200.

The CincPac Staff Duty Officer learned of the inception of the air raid du his second telephone converstion of the morning with Admiral Kimmel, w he was advising of a report by the WARD, after its submarine reports, tha had detained a sampan. He immediately told the Admiral of his receipt f the signal tower of this message:

"Japanese are attacking Pearl Harbor X This is no drill."

E. *Location of Pacific Fleet Units.*

At the time of the attack, the forces of the Pacific Fleet were, accordin Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 73), disposed partly in port and partly at sea follows:

(1) *In Pearl Harbor:*

(a) Task Force One, Vice Admiral Pye commanding (less one battleship, light cruiser and one destroyer) comprising five battleships, four light cruis seventeen destroyers, two light cruisers, and four mine layers.

(b) Task Force Two (under the command of Vice Admiral Halsey, who at sea with units thereof constituting a separate task force—Task Force Eig comprising three battleships, eight destroyers, one light cruiser, and four m layers.

(c) Task Force Three (less detached units under command of Vice Adm Brown at sea, and less a separate task force—Task Force Twelve—which at sea under Rear Admiral Newton's command) comprising two heavy cruis and four mine layers which were under overhaul.

(d) Five submarines and the submarine tender PELIAS of Task Force Se

(e) The TANGIER, HULBERT, CURTIS, and THORNTON, and Patrol Squ rons VP 11, 12, 14, 22, 23, and 24 (a total of about sixty planes) of Task F Nine.

(f) Marine Air Squadrons VMSB 232 and VMJ 252 (a total of twenty pla at Ewa, Oahu.

(g) Two destroyer tenders and the Base Force, consisting of the ARGON plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, and planes of Base Force Aircraft Squadr VJ-1, VJ-2, and VJ-3, as follows: 19 J2F, 9 JRS, 2 PBY-1, 1 J2V.

(2) *At Sea:*

(a) Task Force Eight (Vice Admiral Halsey commanding) consisting of aircraft carrier (ENTERPRISE), three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers cated 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, standing to eastward, was returnin Pearl Harbor after landing a Marine Air Squadron at Wake Island.

(b) Task Force Three (Vice Admiral Brown commanding), less units in p consisting of one heavy cruiser and one mine laying squadron, less two of divisions, was exercising with landing boats at Johnston Island.

[*152*] (c) Task Force Twelve (Rear Admiral Newton commanding), c narily a component of Task Force Three, consisting of one aircraft carrier (L INGTON), three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, located about 425 m southeast of Midway, was proceeding on a westerly course to land a Ma Air Squadron on Midway Island.

(d) One heavy cruiser and one mine laying division, ordinarily a part of T Force Three, were engaged in "normal operations" at sea southwest of Oah

(e) Four submarines of Task Force Seven, somewhere at sea en route to P Harbor.

(3) *At other places:*

(a) At Midway Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and Patrol Squ ron VP-21 (consisting of twelve planes) of Task Force Twelve.

(b) At Wake Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and a Marine Squadron.

(c) At Johnston Island (in addition to Task Force Three, undergoing exercise), two Base Force PBY–1 planes.

(d) At Mare Island, five submarines of Task Force Seven.

(e) At San Diego, four submarines of Task Force Seven.

To sum up: At Pearl Harbor, there were eight battleships, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, two old light cruisers, one old cruiser mine layer, eight destroyers, five submarines, twelve mine layers, two destroyer tenders, one submarine tender, four aircraft tenders, various auxiliary and repair ships, and 111 aircraft of various types, of which nine were under overhaul. At sea, there were two aircraft carriers, eight heavy cruisers, fourteen destroyers, four submarines, and one mine layer squadron less one division. At other places, there were thirteen submarines, fourteen Navy Patrol planes and one Marine Air Squadron.

Except as to Task Forces Eight and Twelve, which were on special missions to reenforce Wake and Midway Islands, the dispositions of Pacific Fleet Units as noted above were in accordance with a previously worked out fleet employment schedule.

[153] F. *Condition of Readiness.*

(1) *The ships in port:*

The testimony in previous investigations showed some confusion as to the condition of readiness which was in effect on ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. It appears, however, that whether or not Condition III, as prescribed in the Pacific Fleet Letter on security of the Fleet, was in effect, the condition aboard the battleships was in excess of that condition. Each of the battleships had two 5-inch anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned. While the Fleet letter on security fixed responsibility on the senior officer present in each air defense sector for fire control in his sector, no particular damage control organization was prescribed in that letter or functioning on the ships in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. The evidence in prior investigations indicates that the anti-aircraft batteries of the ships were quickly manned and, considering the circumstances, were effectively used against the Japanese attackers.

(2) *The aircraft of the Pacific Fleet:*

The condition of readiness in force as to the Fleet aircraft was Baker 5 (50 per cent of the assigned aircraft to be ready on four hours notice) with machine guns and ammunition in all planes not undergoing maintenance work. Three squadrons (one at Midway, one at Pearl Harbor, and one at Kaneohe) were in condition Afirm 5 (100 per cent assigned aircraft to be ready on four hours notice). This was augmented on December 7th by specific duty assignments which required six planes from Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN and from Patrol Squadron TWENTY-FOUR (at Kaneohe) and from Patrol Squadron TWELVE (at Pearl Harbor) to be ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. On the morning of December 7th, three patrol planes of a squadron based at Kaneohe were in the air on morning security patrol armed with depth charges, three were ready for flight on 30 minutes notice, and four on four hours notice; and four planes of a squadron at Pearl Harbor were in the air conducting tactics with submarines and one plane was ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.

G. *Reaction to the Attack.*

The hostile character of the attacking planes was not recognized until the bombs fell, but there followed an immediate and general realization of that fact, and a prompt application of such defensive measures as were then capable of being carried out. General Quarters was sounded in all units ashore and afloat and, as has been pointed out above, anti-aircraft batteries were manned and, considering the damaged condition of the ships, employed to the fullest possible effect. There was, however, an unfortunate lapse of time before damage control measures on the ships in Pearl Harbor could be carried forward, resulting in the suffering of much damage that might otherwise have been prevented or minimized. The damages so quickly suffered included a partial breakdown of the communication system, preventing an accurate interchange of necessary information, including radio direction bearings of the attacking force. The futility of the attempted countermeasures in locating and attacking the Japanese striking force was due, in [154] large part, to a flood of wild and con-

flicting reports as to the location and strength, and probable intentions, of
of the Japanese force.

The evidence obtained in the previous investigation demonstrates clearly
the officers and men of the Pacific Fleet met the attack, individually and joi
with great heroism.

[*155*] H. *Composition and Movements of the Attacking Force.*

The chief source of information concerning the Japanese force which atta
Pearl Harbor is a Japanese prisoner of war who was captured on Saipan d
the Marianas Campaign. The POW was a chief yeoman in the Japanese N
attached to the staff of the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, Adr
Yamamoto. The reconstruction by the POW of the events preceding and lea
up to Pearl Harbor has been substantiated and verified by other informa
including that contained in a copy of Japanese Combined Fleet Operation C
No. 1, recovered from the Japanese cruiser NACHI that was sunk in Manila
The prisoner's reconstruction of the orders to the striking force is containe
Exhibit 3.

The movements of the striking force were provided for in the Japanese S
Operation Order No. 1, dated 1 November 1941, which stated that war woul
declared on the United States on X-Day, expected to be in the early or m
part of December, and that on or about X-16 Day the carrier task force w
depart its base and proceed by way of Tankan Bay (Hotokappu Bay), Etc
Island and the Kuriles for Pearl Harbor, where it would deliver a sur
attack. Japanese Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 3, date
November 1941, fixed as X-Day 8 December 1941, E. L. T. (Exhibit 3).

The Japanese striking force actually left Saiki Anchorage near the B
Channel some time between November 20 and November 22, 1941, East Longi
Time, and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island. At the latter pla
assembled and fueled, and departed on or about 28 November 1941, E. L
and headed eastward under heavy front. The force proceeded in an eas
direction heading on course about 085°, to a point in longitude about 170°
then turned southeast on course about 135 degrees, and proceeded to a
northwest to due north of, and approximately 200 miles from, the islan
Oahu, where it arrived early in the morning of 8 December 1941, E. L. T.
that position the Pearl Harbor attack was launched. Following the at
the striking force retired initially to the northwest, on a heading of about
to a point about longitude 170° E., thence to the southwest, irregularly on var
headings to a point near 140° E., and thence northwest to Kyushu (Exhib
page 16).

The striking force consisted of three of Japan's five carrier divisions,
KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1); HIRYU and SORYU (CarDiv 2); SHOK
and ZUIKAKU (sometimes referred to as CarDiv 3, sometimes as CarD
and sometimes as CarDiv 5): the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA (two of the ba
ships of BatDiv 3); the TONE and CHIKUMA (CarDiv 8), and of va
destroyers and submarines.

Cooperating with the foregoing striking force was a large part of the Japa
Sixth (Submarine) Fleet. That fleet left the Japanese Inland Sea abou
November 1941, E. L. T. At the time of the attack, many Japanese submar
were concentrated at the mouth of Pearl Harbor for the purpose of ma
torpedo attacks on any United States ships that attempted to escape from
air attack in the harbor. As previously pointed out, the evidence indicates
only one midget submarine succeeded in entering the harbor.

[*156*] I. *The Casualties and Damage.*

The facts as to the casualties and damage appear fully in the record o
Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry:

(1) An examination of reports in the Bureau of Personnel showed that t
were 3,963 casualties as a result of the Japanese Pearl Harbor attack, of w
896 were wounded and 3,067 were either killed, dead of wounds, or are mi
and declared dead.

(2) The damage to fleet units in Pearl Harbor was extensive. The Battle
ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, OKLAHOMA, and WEST VIRGINIA were sunk
the NEVADA beached to prevent its sinking. The auxiliary vessels UTAH
OGLALA were also sunk. All other battleships in the harbor, PENNSYLVA
MARYLAND, and TENNESSEE, the Cruisers HELENA, HONOLULU,
RALEIGH, the destroyers SHAW, CASSIN, and DOWNES, and the auxili
CURTIS and VESTAL, were seriously damaged.

(3) The damage to airplanes was as follows:

Type	No. present Dec. 7	No. on hand after raid	No. usable after raid
Patrol	69	45	11
Fighters	24	15	0
Scout bombers	60	29	14
Torpedo bombers	2	2	0
Battleship and cruiser planes	92	82	11
Utility and transport planes	54	48	16
Totals	301	221	52

[157] *Findings.*

92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air attack on Pearl Harbor, there were reports of suspected and actual hostile submarine activity. The second advised of a surface and depth charge attack on a submarine. Only the latter report reached responsible officers. Due to reports on previous days of sound contacts with submarines, confirmation was sought. The action initiated by ComFOURTEEN, in dispatching the ready duty destroyer, was in accord with the provisions of the Fleet security letter.

93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was not received by Admiral Kimmel or by Admiral Bloch prior to the air attack.

94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The one midget submarine known to have been in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th was sunk after making an ineffectual attack.

95. Evidence of the approach of a large flight of planes from the northward, obtained by Army enlisted men operating a radar installation for instruction purposes, was not communicated either to the Navy or to responsible Army commanders.

96. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFOURTEEN had no previous warning of the air attack, which was initiated by the enemy at 0755. The attack was skillfully executed, and resulted in serious losses of life and damage.

97. The battleships each had two 5'' anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements of Condition III as prescribed in the Fleet Security Letter. As to Fleet aircraft based at Oahu, seven were in the air (3 on morning security patrol armed with depth charges and 4 engaged in tactics with submarines); ten were on 30 minutes notice; and the balance of forty-four on four hours notice.

98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had been issued in September, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, with one exception, were all in port and were etither sunk or damaged. Due to the fortunate coincidence which resulted in the aircraft carriers being at sea, they were uninjured.

99. It has been learned, since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor left Saiki Anchorage, near the Bongo Channel sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles. The force then assembled and fueled. It departed on or about 28 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded in an easterly direction to about 170° West Longitude, then southeast to a point about 200 miles from Oahu.

100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions, among which were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the attack, the Fleet Intelligence Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel that he could not reliably estimate the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2.

[158] 101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu.

[159]

VI.

A. FINDINGS

1. The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either including or excluding Japan.

2. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive tasks to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions in the Marshalls and raids

on enemy sea communications and positions, and various defensive tasks, inc
ing the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pa
area and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the Eas
Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions.

3. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to the F
various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet security at the base
anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the communications and territor
the Associated Powers by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, the es
lishment of defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway, and guar
against surprise attack by Japan.

4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes inclu
among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes the maintenanc
the maximum patrol plane search practicable in the approaches to the Hawa
area.

5. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on W-day, wh
it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day that hostilities ope
with Japan. W-day was not fixed prior to the attack.

6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was based
the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted the basis of subsidi
peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans.
method of coordination under the plan was to be by mutual cooperation until
unless unity of command were invoked.

7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army's task was to h
Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and against hostile sympathiz
and to support the naval forces. The Navy's task was to patrol the coastal a
(which included Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required
the defense of Oahu), and to patrol and protect shipping therein, and to supp
the Army forces.

8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navy in the Joint Coastal Fron
Defense Plan was that the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, sho
provide for distant reconnaissance.

9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in effect on 11 April 1
by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandi
FOURTEENTH Naval District.

[160] 10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense P
was an agreement between the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District,
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to joint defensive measu
for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against hos
raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war.

11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provid
among other things, for joint air operations and provided that when naval for
were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and Army aircr
were made available, the latter would be under the tactical control of the na
commander directing search operations.

12. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan a
provided that the Army was to expedite the installation of its aircraft warn
service, and that prior to the completion of that service, the Navy, through
use of radar and other appropriate means, would endeavor to give such warn
of hostile attacks as might be practicable.

13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provi
that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the thr
of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, e
commander would take steps to make available to the other the air forces at
disposal, in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with
plan.

14. The Commanding General and ComFOURT5EN did not effect any agreem
prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficien
imminent to warrant placing Annex VII, Section VI. in operation.

15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided, among ot
things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction with the Army. One of
assumptions was that it was possible that a declaration of war might be prece
by a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, that it was probable that th
might be a surprise submarine attack on ships in the base area, and that a c
bination of both forms of attack was possible.

16. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin stated, am
other things, that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu wo
be an air attack that would most likely be launched from carriers which wo

probably approach inside of three hundred miles. The estimate also stated that any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. This Estimate came to the attention of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.

17. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. This plan, which was designated Annex "Baker" to the Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, made specific provision for joint air operations by the Army and Navy. The plan was effective upon receipt. It was to become operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack, or might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness for aircraft were to be as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for Army units, and by [*161*] ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, for Navy units.

18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, which was reissued by Admiral Kimmel in revised form on 14 October 1941, provided that the Fleet's security was predicated on several assumptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, or a combination of the two. This letter also stated that a single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures, including provisions for defense against air attack. It provided, among other things, that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and that he should take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, and arrange through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort by the Army and the Navy.

20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures were to include intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol, and an air patrol. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of fleet operating areas as directed by Aircraft Scouting Force, one covering the entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and one during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to the attack of 7 December 1941 were the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, under which the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance, and the Pacific Fleet security letter, under which the only aircraft patrol from Oahu was a daily search of fleet operating areas, a search during entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, in estimating probable enemy (Japanese) action, visualized that one of the enemy defensive efforts would be "destruction of *threatening* naval forces": that initial action would include "possible raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and *other outlying* United States *positions*"; and that the initial Japanese deployment would include "raiding and observation forces *widely distributed in the Pacific*, and that *submarines* in the *Hawaiian area*. * * *" (Italics supplied.) The possibility of an attack on Hawaii was, therefore, included but in no way emphasized.

23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of command of the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a *possibility*. Neither he nor the key members of his staff appear to have considered it as a serious *probability*.

24. The method of command established in the local plans was that of "mutual cooperation." The relations between the responsible commanders were cordial. However, there was not in existence, prior to the attack, any permanent operating setup which could insure the constant and timely exchange of information, decisions, and intended courses of action so essential to the efficient conduct of joint operations, particularly in an emergency. A recent proposal looking to the establishment of a Joint Command Center had been the subject of adverse recommendations by the responsible local commanders, both Army and Navy.

[*162*] 25. In accordance with "Joint Action," unity of command for the defense of Oahu could have been placed in effect by local agreement between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District. The latter, however, would naturally not make such an agreement without the approval of his immediate superior, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The question of unity of command for out-

lying islands was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in c
nection with a proposal for reenforcement of Wake and Midway by Army pla
General Short's position was that if Army forces were involved, the comm
must be his. Admiral Kimmel maintained that the command of naval ba
must remain with the Navy. The islands were reenforced with Marine pla

26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was effective and, particularly dur
the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941, resulted in the frequ
transmission to Japan of information of great importance concerning the Pac
Fleet, the movements and locations of ships, and defense preparations.

27. Certain reports sent by the Japanese Consul General via a commer
communications company at Honolulu in the week preceding the attack indica
the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

28. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent by the Ja
nese Consul General at Honolulu, which did not indicate the likelihood of an
attack on Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by Army and Navy radio interc
stations and were decoded in Washington, D. C. prior to the attack; that oth
which were obtained at Honolulu by Naval Intelligence prior to the attack w
with the exception of a few unimportant messages, in a code which could
be decrypted there before December 7th; and, that three messages intercep
by Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and at San Francisco, which in
cated the likelihood of an air attack, were forwarded to the War Department
decryption but were either not received there prior to the attack or were
decrypted prior to the attack. If the United States intelligence services had b
able to obtain and to decode and translate promptly all of the espionage repo
sent by the Japanese Consul General during the period 27 November to 7 Decem
1941, the information so obtained would have been of inestimable value.

29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire information fr
coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese Government and its represe
tives. Through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages and th
decryption and translation in Washington, D. C., prior to the attack, knowle
was obtained of the Japanese Government's actual views concerning the dip
matic situation, of the Japanese Government's intention to wage war, and
the fact that hostilities were impending and imminent.

30. The information acquired in Washington through the interception
Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly disseminated
Washington by Naval and Military Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operati
to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State Department, and to the President.

[*163*] 31. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon
Chief of Naval Operations for information as to the status of the diploma
negotiations with the Japanese, and had requested to be kept fully inform
on this subject.

32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelligence at Wa
ington were not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as su
Reasons advanced for this course of action were that the Japanese might in
cept the naval messages and learn of the Navy's success in decrypting Japan
codes; that the volume of intercepted messages was so great that the tra
mission of them, particularly during the critical period, would have overta
the Navy's communications facilities; and, that it was the duty of the Ch
of Naval Operations to evaluate such information and to advise CincPac
the important facts learned.

33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operati
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on the information obtai
from intercepted Japanese messages.

34. The warnings sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during
vember (particularly the "war warning" of the 27th) and early December, 19
indicated in unmistakable language that the diplomatic negotiations had ceas
that war with Japan was imminent, and that Japanese attacks might occur
any moment.

35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander-in-Ch
Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indicating interest in
location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were more specific than other in
cepted messages indicating Japanese interest in the movements of ships to
from other ports.

36. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully advised of cert
other information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages after the Nov

ber 27th "war warning," which made further evident the termination in fact of the diplomatic negotiations and the Japanese intention to wage war.

37. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message in which the Japanese Government instructed its representatives to present to the State Department at 1 p. m. the Japanese Government's final reply terminating the diplomatic negotiations. Mention was made of the fact that 1 p. m. Washington time was about dawn at Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East. No one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor.

38. This so-called "1 p. m. delivery message," which consisted of one sentence, had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at Bainbridge Island in the State of Washington and forwarded to the Navy Department by teletype. It was decrypted and available in the Navy Department at about 0700 on December 7th. It was sent to the Army for translation because there was no Japanese translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. The translation, which could have been done by a qualified translator in a few minutes, was not received from the Army until after 0900.

[*164*] 39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant information several hours before the attack, and there were available means whereby the information could have been transmitted to Admiral Kimmel immediately, including a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army, Admiral Stark initially was not disposed to, and did not, send any message to Admiral Kimmel. Instead he relied on the transmission of a message by the War Department to General Short, which was to be furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.

40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider it necessary to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of 7 December and that he had not telephoned at any time previous to the attack, but that one regret which he had was that he had not telephoned a message that morning to Admiral Kimmel or paralleled the Army message on the naval radio system.

41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941, which was received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were presenting an ultimatum at 1 p. m., that they were under orders to destroy their code machine, that it was not known just what significance the hour set might have but that the addressees were to be on the alert accordingly, and that the naval authorities were to be informed.

42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack, on November 24th, that "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility," and, on November 27th, that "an aggressive movement by the Japanese is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo."

43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention to probable Japanese objectives to the southward and southeastward of Japan, and did not specifically mention Pearl Harbor, both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. They did not regard such an attack as probable.

44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1941, which were to be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representatives information concerning the status of relations between Japan and the United States, and other countries. These were known as the "winds" code and the "hidden word" code. The "winds" code was designed to indicate a break in diplomatic relations, or possibly war, with England or the United States or Russia by the use in weather broadcasts of certain Japanese words signifying wind directions.

45. The interception of a "winds" message relating to the United States during the first week of December 1941, would not have conveyed any information of significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already have.

[*165*] 46. No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States was received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom such a message would have come had it been received in the Navy Department. No such message was intercepted by the radio intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the Phillippines, although intensive efforts were made by those organizations to intercept such a message. The evidence indicates further that no such message was

intercepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the Fl Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Inteligence Officer of the E Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such messa The Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Communications, and t Director of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony to t effect that a "winds" code message was received prior to the attack was giv by Captain Safford, in charge of Op20–G, a communications security section the Navy Department, who stated that such a message was received on Decemb 3d or 4th, that it related to the United States, and that no copy could be fou in the Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Capt Safford named, in addition to himself, three other officers who, he stated, called having seen and read the "winds" message. Each of those officers tes fied that he had never seen such a message. The only other testimony to t effect that a "winds" message was received was by Captain Kramer, an inte gence officer assigned to Op–20–G, who said that he recalled that there was message but that he could not recall whether or not it related to the United Sta or England or Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this investi tion, Captain Kramer erroneously thought that a "hidden word" message int cepted on the morning of December 7th had been a "winds" message.

47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted "hidden word" co message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the necessity of deliv ing other messages, including the "1 p. m. delivery message," he overlooked a co word relating to the United States and translated the message as meaning o that "relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expec tions." He testified that he later discovered the error and a few minutes b fore 1 p. m. on December 7th, he telephoned the correction to his superior officer the Office of Naval Intelligence and to an officer of Army Military Intelligence.

48. Except for the omission of the United States, the "hidden word" code m sage was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect previous diploma interceptions which indicated that the message was to convey the idea of a cri involving the countries in question.

49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Commander-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior to the attack included, in addition to the Chief Naval Operations, the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Nav District, and the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.

[*166*] 50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of t FOURTEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul Ge eral and the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were tapped for some months pri to the attack. These were discontinued on 2 December 1941 because the Distr Intelligence Officer feared that the existence of such taps might be discover resulting in undesirable complications. No information of military or naval s nificance was obtained by means of the telephone taps.

51. On 6 December 1941 the local representatives of the Federal Bureau Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence Officer a tra script of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation between a person in Hon lulu named "Mori" and a person in Japan. This was examined by the Distr Intelligence Officer. It was decided that the conversation should be furth studied by a Japanese linguist of the District Intelligence Office, who was to list to the recording of the conversation. This was not done until after the attac The transcript furnished on December 6th indicated that the person in Japan w interested, among other things, in the daily flights of airplanes from Honol and in the number of ships present. During the conversation, references we made to flowers, which, it now appears, may have been code words signifyi the presence or absence of ships, and a method of conveying information to t approaching Japanese ships, which presumably would have been listening in the conversation. Prior investigations indicate that the "Mori conversation" w also brought to the attention of General Short on 6 December 1941.

52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOU TEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable messages from and to the Ja anese Consul General at Honolulu, via a commercial communications compan were obtained during the first week of December, 1941. This was the first ti that such messages had been obtained. The messages were in code and effo were made immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some messages we decrypted before the attack. These contained no information of particul significance.

53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means of the telephone taps or through the interception of messages of the Japanese Consul General indicated the likelihood of war or of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

54. One of the Japanese Consul General's messages, which was obtained by the District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5 December 1941 to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, was a message dated December 3rd. This message was in a Japanese code known as the "PA–K2." It was decrypted and translated by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor after the attack. The message was one in which the Japanese Consul General advised of a change in a method which had been established for communication by visual signals from Oahu, whereby lights in houses on the beach, the use of a sailboat, certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio station, and bonfires, would convey information as to the presence or absence of various types of warships of the Pacific Fleet. Although the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor was unable to decrypt this message prior to the attack, the message was decrypted and translated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by a civilian translator in Op–20–G of the Navy Department in Washington. That section had received the message from an Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Virginia. Captain Kramer testified he had no specific recollection of having seen this translation prior to the [*167*] attack, but the evidence indicates that the rough translation was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the pressure of work on other important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was taken on the translation until 8 December 1941.

55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu received a coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the existing situation, the presence of ships in port was of utmost importance, that daily reports were to be submitted, that the reports should advise whether or not there were observation balloons at Pearl Harbor, and whether or not the warships were provided with anti-torpedo nets. This message was intercepted by an Army radio intercept station at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded by mail to the War Department for decryption and translation. The translation supplied by the Army indicates that the message was translated on 30 December 1941.

56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu sent two messages in the "PA–K2" code which indicated the likelihood of an air attack. The first reported that there were no signs of barrage balloon equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in all probability there was considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, and that the battleships did not have torpedo nets. The second message reported on the ships at anchor on December 6th, and stated that it appeared that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet air arm. These messages were not obtained by Naval Intelligence at Honolulu prior to the attack. They were, however, both intercepted by an Army intercept station at San Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to the Army. The translations of these messages furnished by the Army indicate that they were translated on December 8th. They could have been decrypted and translated in the Navy Department in about an hour and a half.

57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing such information, and had access to radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force received some general information concerning Japanese movements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

58. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.

59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin was distributed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to his command. [*168*] This

bulletin set forth the available information concerning the composition of t Japanese Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin on the same subject and point out that the principal change was a further increase in the number of fl commands. This arose from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seapla tenders into separate forces. The bulletin stated, among other things, th the Japanese Carrier Fleet consisted of ten carriers which were organized i five divisions, each having two carriers.

60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning the locati and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained by the Commander Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer, who received it p marily from the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. Such informati also was contained in dispatches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Ph ippines and from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washingt D. C.

61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of Naval telligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others. These included su maries of the information concerning Japanese naval forces which had be received from the Radio Intelligence Units at Pearl Harbor and at the Philippin

62. On November 26th, ComFOURTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav, inform tion to CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN, which summarized the informati as to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. The dispatch indicated that t Commander Second Fleet had been organizing a task force comprising units various fleets. This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a stro concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, which included least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier), plus probably o third of the submarine fleet. The estimate was that a strong force might preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts might oper from Palao and the Marshalls.

63. The radio intercepts by the radio intelligence unit located in the Philippi were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable because of the location of unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav and others, commented on the above dispatch ComFOURTEEN and stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had in cated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, was directing various fl units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into two s tions. The first section was expected to operate in the South China area. T second section was expected to operate in the Mandates. It was estimated th the second section included "CarDiv 3, RYUJO, and one MARU." This dispa also stated that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the supposition th carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates, and that their best dications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. was stated that this evaluation was considered to be reliable.

64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting reports fr the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which were received by Admi Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of important Japanese naval forces the southward of Japan. These, however, did not report the movement of carrie

[*169*] 65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harb continued the practice of preparing daily summaries of the information receiv through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications, which w submitted to Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, for transmittal to Admi Kimmel on the following morning. Admiral Kimmel received and initialed th summaries daily on and after 27 November. On December 6th, he initialed t summary dated December 5th, which was the last one he received prior to t attack.

66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a communication inte gence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among other things, th there was no further information on the presence of a carrier division in t Mandates and that "carriers were still located in home waters." The next d he received the November 28th summary which indicated, among other thin the view that the Japanese radio intelligence net was operating at full streng upon U. S. Naval communications and "IS GETTING RESULTS." There w no information set forth in the summary as to carriers. On the following d Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29th, which, amo other things, indicated that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate co mand of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st, Admi

Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated as to carriers that the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been confirmed.

67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received, stated that all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on 1 December; that previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941. This summary stated, and was underscored by Admiral Kimmel, that "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale." It also stated, among other things, that a large number of submarines were believed to be east of Yososuka-Chichijima and Saipan, and as to carriers that there was "no change."

68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request. This contained Layton's estimate, on the basis of all available information, of the location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako-Takao area Carrier Division 4 and Carrier Division 3, which included four carriers, and the "KASUGA MARU" (believed to have been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "KORYU(?) plus plane guards" in the Marshalls area.

69. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate. The reason was that Layton considered that the information as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a reliable estimate of their whereabouts.

70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the following conversation:

[*170*] "CAPTAIN LAYTON: As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect." * * *

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said,, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kuro area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location." * * *

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers:

"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the 1st of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."

72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 4th stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summary delivered on December 5th made no mention of carriers. The summary delivered on December 6th stated, in part, "No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."

73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources, the only practicable way by which the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, could have obtained information as to the location or movements of Japanese naval forces from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by long distance air reconnaissance.

[*171*] 74. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had the obligation, through ComFOURTEEN, to conduct distant reconnaissance, and under Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, naval forces

were to be supplemented by available Army aircraft if the naval aircraft w
insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations. As previously poin
out, the latter plan was not in operation because an agreement between the C
manding General and ComFOURTEEN that threat of a hostile attack was im
nent was a prerequisite and no such agreement had been made prior to the att
The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, which implemented the agreements
joint Army-Navy air action, similarly was not operative prior to the attack.

75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The o
Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet pa
planes.

76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimr
and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after
November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, wh
were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operati
They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.

77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he deci
on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.

78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel
members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning," as to
advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The W
Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could re
no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet planes, who had
been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admi
Kimmel had no such discussion with him.

79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger, Commander, Fleet Patrol Pla
and General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, which was u
as a basis for the joint Army-Navy agreements, was prophetic in its estimate t
in the event of attack on Hawaii, the most likely and dangerous form of att
would be an air attack to be launched at dawn from carriers about 200 miles fr
Oahu. This estimate stated that the action open as a counter-measure inclu
daily patrols as far as possible from Oahu, to sectors through 360 degrees, to red
the possibilities of surface or air surprise. It further stated that such pat
could be effectively maintained with the personnel and matériel available at
time (March, 1941) for a very short period and that such patrols were not practi
ble unless other intelligence indicated that surface raid was probable wit
narrow limits of time. According to Admiral Bellinger, it was realized by
responsible officers of the Pacific Fleet that another course of action which w
always open was to fly a patrol of less than 360 degrees, with the available aircr
covering the more dangerous sectors.

[172] 80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the southward
Oahu was being carried out prior to the attack, in accordance with the provisi
of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating are

81. No distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the critical per
27 November to 7 December 1941. The last previous distant reconnaissance flo
from Oahu appears to have been for several days during the summer of 1941 o
sector toward Jaluit. This reconnaissance had been directed by Admiral Kimm
at Admiral Bloch's request.

82. Late in November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a reconnaissa
flight from Oahu to Jaluit and Truk, with the Navy assisting by providing inte
gence. The reconnaissance was not flown because the Army planes were
made ready prior to the attack.

83. The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of protect
the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroying hos
expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use
land positions in that hemisphere. Under the provisions of Pacific Fleet Operat
Plan Rainbow Five, when that plan became effective, the Pacific Fleet pat
planes were to maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in
approaches to the Hawaiian area, having due regard for time required for ov
haul and repair of planes and for conservation of personnel.

84. In the war warning of November 27th, which advised that negotiations w
Japan had ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within a f
days, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that Admiral Kimmel "execute
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assig
in WPL-46."

85. The dispatch of November 28th repeated an Army dispatch, which, amo
other things, advised General Short that Japanese future action was unpredi
able but that hostile action was possible at any moment. The Navy dispatch

rected that Admiral Kimmel was to undertake no offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act and that he was to "be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL–46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."

86. The establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu would have been an "appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46."

87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.

88. Prior to the attack, requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet to the Navy Department to increase the number of patrol planes assigned to the Fleet. Some new replacement planes had been sent to the Fleet during October and November, 1941. Additional planes, as evidenced by the prompt arrival of reenforcements after December 7th, could have been made available by the Navy Department, but at the expense of defenses in other areas. The [173] Navy Department presumably knew that the number of planes available at Oahu were not sufficient to conduct 360° reconnaissance daily for more than a few days. The evidence in prior investigations indicates that after November 27th, responsible officers in the Navy Department though that reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu to the extent practicable with the planes available there.

89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128° to a distance of about 700 miles.

90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.

91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched.

92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air attack on Pearl Harbor, there were reports of suspected and actual hostile submarine activity. The second advised of a surface and depth charge attack on a submarine. Only the latter report reached responsible officers. Due to reports on previous days of sound contacts with submarines, confirmation was sought. The action initiated by ComFOURTEEN, in dispatching the ready duty destroyer, was in accord with the provisions of the Fleet security letter.

93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was not received by Admiral Kimmel or by Admiral Bloch prior to the air attack.

94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The one midget submarine known to have been been in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th was sunk after making an ineffectual attack.

95. Evidence of the approach of a large flight of planes from the northward, obtained by Army enlisted men operating a radar installation for instruction purposes, was not communicated either to the Navy or to responsible Army commanders.

96. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFOURTEEN had no previous warning of the air attack, which was initiated by the enemy at 0755. The attack was skillfully executed, and resulted in serious losses of life and damage.

97. The battleships each had two 5" antiaircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements of Condition III as prescribed in the Fleet Security Letter. As to Fleet aircraft based at Oahu, seven were in the air (3 on morning security patrol armed with depth charges and 4 engaged in tactics with submarines); ten were on 30 minutes notice; and the balance of forty-four on four hours notice.

[174] 98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had been issued in September, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, with one exception, were all in port and were either sunk or damaged. Due to the fortunate coincidence which resulted in the aircraft carriers being at sea, they were uninjured.

99. It has been learned, since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor left Saiki Anchorage, near the Bongo Channel, sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles. The force then assembled and

fueled. It departed on or about 28 November 1941, East Longitude Time, a proceeded in an easterly direction to about 170° West Longitude, then southe to a point about 200 miles from Oahu.

100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions among wh were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the attack, the Fleet Intellige Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel that he could not reliably estimate location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2.

101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles north of Oahu.

[*175*] B. CONCLUSIONS.

1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were signed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack, including attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the lo air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainb Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defe plans presupposed agreement between the local commanders that an attack v imminent. Neither of these was the case prior to the attack.

2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mut cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the local Army a Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack, which p supposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese int tions and movements of Japanese naval forces.

3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Jo Command. While there was a considerable exchange of information betwe various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system ensure such exchange.

4. Current and detailed information which was obtained by the Japanese as the location and movements of American naval forces and as to the preparati being made for defense against an attack on Pearl Harbor contributed to success of their attack.

5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Na and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japan Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations, and its intention wage war, by means of interception, decryption, and translation of Japan diplomatic messages.

6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Na Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged. T information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese na movements was available to intelligence officers of the War Department in Wa ington. The War Department had information which led that Department believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. T appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General She information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissa to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among oth things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance v not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.

7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic messa a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used in radio broadcasts in order convey information to its representatives as to the status of relations betwe Japan and other countries, no message was intercepted prior to the attack wh used the code words relating to the United States.

[*176*] 8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercep Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the Na Department.

9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all import developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him imp tant information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the St Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expe tious means, information of the "1 p. m." message and its possible import, w unfortunate.

10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.

11. The available information in the possession of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other important messages.

12. Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu, no information was obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area.

13. Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio intercept stations of the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. Certain other messages which were intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December 1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack, apparently because the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such work.

14. The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu.

[*177*] 15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army during certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and, although not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of the approach of Japanese aircraft.

16. The principal basis for estimates of the location of Japanese naval forces was the intelligence obtained by the Navy from traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications.

17. A carrier attack could not, with certainty, have been prevented, for the following reasons:

(a) Certain prevention of such an attack requires interception and destruction of the carriers before attack planes can be launched.

(b) The forces necessary to insure such interception and destruction, anywhere in the vast area which would have had to be covered, were not available, and could not have been expected to be available.

(c) If the Japanese task force had been detected at nightfall, the probability of its successful interception and destruction prior to the following dawn would have been small.

18. Prior warning of an impending air attack, even as little as one half hour, would have served considerably to reduce the effectiveness of the attack, for the following reasons:

(a) Ships' antiaircraft batteries would have been fully manned and ready. It is to be noted that the antiaircraft fire was more effective against the subsequent attacks than the initial air attack.

(b) Enemy character of the approaching planes would have been immediately appreciated and they would have been engaged at once.

(c) The maximum condition of damage control readiness would have been set, thus facilitating the isolation of damage received.

(d) Many planes could have been in the air, in readiness.

(e) Ground dispersal of planes could have been improved.

19. The only adequate means of assuring detection of an approaching carrier attack was by 360° distant air search from Oahu. Sufficient planes were not available to carry out an all-round distant air reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.

[*178*] 20. A thorough appreciation of the danger, the capabilities of the available planes, and the importance of the defense of Pearl Harbor might have justified the allotment by the Chief of Naval Operations of additional patrol planes

to the Pacific Fleet. Although the additional planes, if assigned, would not ha
been sufficient for a 360° daily search, they would have increased the ar
which could have been effectively covered and might have acted as an indu
ment to such employment. Admittedly, in making over-all plane assignmen
it was necessary for the Chief of Naval Operations to weigh the prospecti
needs of the Pacific and the Atlantic, where hostilities with Axis submarines we
already in progress.

21. Partial air reconnaissance, covering a sector of some 120 degrees, co
have been maintained daily from Oahu for a considerable period of time wi
the Fleet patrol planes controlled by Admiral Kimmel and could have be
designed to cover the most probable approach bearings from which an atta
might have been expected. Such reconnaissance would have had a reasonal
chance of success.

22. Neither the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, Pac
Fleet, nor the key members of the latter's staff, seem to have given seric
consideration after 27 November 1941 to the possibility or probability of an
attack on Pearl Harbor or of its possible effect.

23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to t
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to t
southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japan
attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which was receiv
by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December 1941 indicated, howev
that on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call sign
that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estima
could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that the
was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positi
information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the moveme
which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded are
of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air atta
should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions
reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonal
were open to him were:

(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the m
probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent bas
with available planes and crews.

(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at le
during the dangerous dawn hours.

(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships
port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.

(d) Installation of antitorpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.

[179] (e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to interc
possible attack forces.

(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into p
at irregular intervals.

(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of antiaircraft defense and aircr
warning installations.

24. Admiral Kimmel's estimate as to the probability of submarine attack
the Hawaiian area was justified by subsequent events.

25. Throughout his incumbency as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admi
Kimmel was energetic, indefatigable, resourceful, and positive in his efforts
prepare the Fleet for war. In considering the action which he could have tak
it should be noted that:

(a) Establishment of the maximum plane reconnaissance would have me
the stoppage of aircraft training which was of great importance to the na
expansion program, and might have resulted in wear and tear on planes a
crews which would have reduced their later effectiveness.

(b) Higher conditions of readiness would have interfered with the rest a
relaxation residable in port for the maintenance of personnel efficiency.

(c) Failure to install antitorpedo nets was influenced (1) by information fr
CNO which made it appear that effective drops of aircraft torpedoes with
depths of water and length of run available in Pearl Harbor were not probabl
(ii) the interference such nets would have caused in harbor operations due
crowded conditions.

(d) The presence of two carrier task forces at sea at the time on necessary ferry trips did, in a way, provide striking forces and some reconnaissance.

(e) In view of the submarine menace and the concentration of antiaircraft batteries, it was questionable whether ships were safer in port or at sea.

26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer. This information was of no immediate interest to the Army unless it in fact indicated imminency of an air attack, an assumption which was not necessarily logical. In any event, confirmation was not received until the air attack had commenced.

[*180*] 27. More effective action would have been taken both before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor had there been in existence in the Hawaiian area a suitable operating agency for the adequate exercise of joint command functions. This omission was the fault of no one person, but of the existing system.

28. War experience has shown that:

(a) The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person; that is, there must be "unity of command."

(b) In planning and executing joint operations, responsible commanders of the different services, who are to act jointly, and the principal members of their staffs, must be in close physical touch, and not entirely dependent on telephonic, radio, or similar communications. In no other way can a full exchange of information and ideas be assured nor the possibility of misunderstanding be prevented.

(c) Command organizations which are to function effectively in an emergency must be in active operation prior to such emergency.

29. Based on the foregoing, military command of outlying stations, such as Hawaii, should, even in peacetime, be established under the principle of "Unity of Command." The commander exercising such joint command should be assisted by a joint staff, capable of advising him in the functions of both services concerned.

H. K. HEWITT.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY'S 3RD ENDORSEMENT (ON NAVAL COURT OF INQUIRY)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 1 December 1944.

Third Endorsement to Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.

Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944.

1. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General, and the Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I find that the evidence obtained to date indicates that there were errors of judgment on the part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark. I am not satisfied, however, that the investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence.

2. Further investigation into this matter will be conducted by an investigating officer, and, in addition to the subjects recommended for further investigation by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet in the Second Endorsement, will include the taking of the testimony of Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum, and such other investigation as may appear to be necessary in order to ascertain all of the relevant facts relating to the Japanese attack. Pending the completion of the necessary further investigation into this matter, I withhold decision as to the institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.

FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF U. S. FLEET 2ND ENDORSEMENT (ON NAVAL COURT O INQUIRY)

Cominch File

[1] UNITED STATES FLEET

Headquarters of the Commander in Chief

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington 25, D. C., 6 November, 194

FF1/A17-25

Serial: 003224

Top Secret

Second Endorsement to Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inqu

From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Op tions.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese ar forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, dered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.

1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the Judge Ad cate General in the First Endorsement and to the following remarks.

2. (a) As to Facts I and II (page 1156), the routine practice of rotating u of the Fleet, so that each vessel had approximately two-thirds of its time sea and one-third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely scheduled upk periods in port were required, not only for keeping the ships in good mechan condition, but, also, for giving the personnel sufficient recreation to keep th from going stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified in hav one task force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter whic discuss later on.

(b) In Fact III (page 1158) the Court points out that, because of constitutio requirements, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until afte hostile attack has been delivered, unless there has been a declaration of war Congress. The great advantage which this gives an unscrupulous enemy obvious. This requirement made it impossible for Admiral Kimmel and Gen Short to employ the offensive as a means of defense, and, therefore, was a defi handicap.

[2] (c) Fact IV (page 1159) sets forth that the Commandant of the 1 Naval District (Admiral Bloch) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of P Harbor. Admiral Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval measures cerned with local defense.

(d) Fact V (page 1160) sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Sh were personal friends; that they met frequently; that their relations were cor and cooperative in every respect; that they frequently conferred, and invaria conferred when messages were received by either which had any bearing on development of the United States-Japanese situation, or on their several pl in preparing for war. Each was informed of measures being undertaken the other in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purpo This is important, in that it refutes the rumors which have been prevalent si the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did cooperate with one another.

(e) Part VI (page 1160) sets forth the information that the Navy Departm and the War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of defensive installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to c with a carrier attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that the Secret of War, on 7 February 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importa

of the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet a hostile attack. It is made clear that Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that the base at Pearl Harbor should be capable of defense by local Army and Navy forces, leaving the Fleet free to operate without concern as to the safety of the base. It is further made clear that both the War and the Navy Departments had given full consideration to this matter and had been unable, during 1941, to augment local defenses to an adequate degree, because of the general state of unpreparedness for war.

[3] (f) Fact VII (page 1165) sets forth that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the President on 5 November 1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time, and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the United States Pacific Fleet. The Court, also, points out that owing to security policies in the two countries, it was easy for Japan to conceal her own strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed a free opportunity to obtain information as to our own strength and dispositions. My comment is that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement that United States forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration of war, or actual attack, must always place the United States distinctly at a disadvantage during the period of strained relations.

(g) Fact VIII (page 1167) stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base are necessary for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided, and opportunity given for repair and replenishment and for rest and recreation of personnel. The Court points out that it is foreign to the concept of naval warfare to require seagoing personnel to assume responsibility for security from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks that this concept imposes upon the Army responsibility for base defense, and that the United States Army fully understood this responsibility. My comment is that this principle is sound enough, but it cannot be carried to an illogical extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because, in principle, this is not normally a Fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor *should* have been strong enough for self-defense. The [4] fact that it *was not* strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the employment of the Fleet, but, nevertheless, he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for, employing the Fleet in defensive measures.

(h) Fact IX (page 1169). This section of the Findings outlines the plans made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor. It points out that the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned responsibility for distant reconnaissance, that no planes were assigned to him, but that the 69 patrol planes belonging to the Fleet were to be made available to him in case of necessity. The Court remarks that the basic defect of this section of the plan lay in the fact that the naval participation in long range reconnaissance depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this circumstance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the fundamental requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must be independent of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks that the effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, that it was not possible for Admiral Kimmel to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer (because of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My comment is that the Court seems to have over-stressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was sound policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of Admiral Kimmel, whose responsibility it was to allocate all the means at his disposal as best he could between the Fleet and the base defense forces.

[5] (i) Facts X and XI (page 1171) set forth the states of readiness of the forces at Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of readiness was predicated on certain assumptions, which included the assumption that a declaration of war might be preceded by surprise attacks on ships at Pearl Harbor or surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, or by a combination of these two. The measures prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local patrols, daily search of operating areas by air, certain extensive antisubmarine precautions, the netting of the harbor entrance, and the maintenance of "aug-

mented Condition 3" on board vessels in port. "Condition of readiness No. provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and antiairc batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court points out this state readiness did permit ships to open fire promptly when Japanese planes attac Local Army forces were in "Alert No. 1" which provides for defense aga sabotage and uprisings, with no threat from without. With respect to this ph of the matter I offer the comment that "condition of readiness No. 3" is norm maintained in port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this condit enjoy a considerable measure of protetcion by reason of adequate local defe forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was aware of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I discuss furt later on. I also note from this section of the Findings that Army and N aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes moored on the water, were in condition to take the air promptly. Some patrol plane squadrons were "day-off for rest" status; some patrol planes were in the air for local patrol exercises; 50 percent were on 4 hours notice (page 669). This is further indi tion of the lack of appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the dest tion of large [6] numbers of United States aircraft. This section of Findings, also, points out that there were no long range reconnaissance in ef on 7 December, a matter which I will refer to again later on. It will be no that the last paragraph of Fact XI (page 1176) reads:

"The Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 Decem 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could h added little, if anything, to their defense."

This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur, reasons set forth later on.

(j) Fact XII (page 1176). The Court sets forth that attack by carrier airc can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to launching of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a carrier bef she can launch her planes, her location must be known and sufficient force m be at hand. The Court points out that in this instance Japanese carriers sa at an unknown time from an unknown port, and that it is an established that no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or rece from any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on t way to Hawaii during November or December 1941. The Court deduces, states as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7 December, under the circ stances then existing, was unpreventable and unpredictable as to time. I co that there was no direct and positive knowledge that the Japanese attack f was en route to the Hawaiian area. However, as discussed later on, there information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted wi fairly narrow limits.

[7] (k) Fact XIII (page 1178) discusses the difficulty of long range re naissance with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel, and points out Admiral Kimmel, after weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no rou long range reconnaissance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to h been Admiral Kimmel's feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were used routine reconnaissance they would have been rapidly worn out and, theref unavailable for Fleet purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decisio make in this matter. There were many factors to be considered, and it is easy to put one's self in his place. However, after considering all of the in mation that was at his disposal, it seems to me that he was not on enti sound ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance, particul as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immedia preceding the Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means available did permit an all-around daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to de the approach of carriers before planes could be launched. However, there certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covere some extent. And it would appear that such partial cover would have logical in the circumstances as known to Admiral Kimmel in late November early December. A pertinent matter in this connection is that when Adm Richardson was Commander in Chief he provided for distant reconnaiss

by patrol planes, using the few at his disposal to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation. He considered the arc between 170° and 350° to be of primary importance, and believed the most probable direction of attack was from the southwest. These patrols were discontinued when, or shortly before, Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson (pages 683, 1053, 1055).

(l) Fact XIV (page 1182). This section sets forth the fact that the Army had assumed responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process of installing radar and other [8] elements of the air warning system, but that the whole system was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not in condition to function. The system was partially in use for training, and it so happened that a mobile radar station did pick up the approaching Japanese planes when they were about 130 miles away, and reported this fact to the Information Center, where the only officer present was an officer under training, who assumed the planes to be a flight of Army bombers known to be en route from the United States. He made no report of the matter. My comment is that this is indicative of the unwarranted feeling of immunity from attack that seems to have pervaded all ranks at Pearl Harbor—both Army and Navy. If there had been awareness of the states of tension that existed in Washington, and awareness of Japanese potentialities, it appears that the air warning system, embryonic as it was, could have been used to give at least an hour's warning before the air attack struck.

(m) Fact XV (page 1186) states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The Court points out that, though the harbor entrance was well protected against breakthrough by enemy submarines or small craft, there were no antitorpedo baffles within the harbor for the protection of individual ships, because it had been assumed that aircraft torpedoes could not be made to run in the extremely shoal water of Pearl Harbor. The decision not to install torpedo baffles appears to have been made by the Navy Department (page 1187). Proposals to use barrage ballons and smoke were considered but rejected for technical reasons. It is evident, in retrospect, that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated.

(n) Fact XVI (page 1188). In this section of the Findings the Court traces the deterioration of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain information given to Admiral Kimmel on the subject. The more important items are as follows:

[9] (1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for the Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action against Japan.

(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that the Japs would attack the United States.

(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO stating that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful and that indications were that a *surpise aggressive movement in any direction*, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.

(o) Fact XVII (page 1193). In this section the Court sets forth certain information, which was known in Washington and which was transmitted to Admiral Kimmel, which the Court holds to have established the fact that the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere. The summary of the information on which this is based is as follows:

(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO beginning with the words, "This despatch is to be considered a war warning," and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days; [10] that there were indications of an amphibious movement against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo: and directing Admiral Kimmel to execute an appropriate defensive deployment.

(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War Department Message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated; that Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any time; and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act, in case hostilities could not be avoided.

(3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information dressee in a despatch to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, directing hin scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.

(4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been deci to relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.

(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the Dep ment was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a Japanese attac Pearl Harbor at the time.

(p) Fact XVIII (1196). This section of the Findings deals with informa that became available in Washington during the period beginning 26 Novem It is set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which been in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued, con to an end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information a Japanese intentions during this period came to the attention of the Navy Dep ment are set forth as follows:

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UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FF1/A17-25

Serial: CC3224

6 NOV 1944

[redacted]

Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.

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(1) A number of messages ~~in Japanese codes~~ received here from [illegible] during and prior to this period, ~~were decoded~~ in the Navy Department but were not sent to Admiral Kimmel. These messages are summarized in the Addendum to the Court's Finding of Facts at the back of Volume 5 of the record. The text of the messages is set forth at length in Volume 5, beginning at page 692. These messages indicate definite Japanese interest in dispositions at Pearl Harbor, and mention, in some cases, a desire to know where United States ships were berthed. Admiral Stark testified that he considered it undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel these despatches, because to do so might jeopardize the secrecy which it was necessary to maintain as to the ability of the Navy Department to ~~break the Japanese codes~~ [illegible] them. This contention has some merit, in my opinion. It was Admiral Stark's responsibility to protect the sources of this information. However, it was equally his responsibility to give Admiral Kimmel a general picture of the information contained in these messages. Admiral Stark says that he considered that the despatches he did send to Admiral Kimmel gave an adequate picture of what was known and inferred as to Japanese intentions. As set forth under "Opinions," the Court holds that the information given to Admiral Kimmel was not an adequate summary of the information at his disposal. I have to concur in this view.

(2) In addition to the foregoing the Court goes at length into the handling of the "14 part message", originated in Tokyo and addressed to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. The first 13 parts were received in the Navy Department on 6 December ~~and were broken down~~ at 2100, on that date. They set forth the Japanese views as to certain United States proposals for resolving matters under dispute between the

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UNITED STATES FLEET
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6 NOV 1944

TOP SECRET

Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.

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countries, and leave no doubt that the United States proposals were unacceptable to Japan, but do not come to the point of indicating a break in relations. At or about 0700, 7 December the 14th part of the message was decoded. This part of the message said that the Japanese Government had finally lost hope of being able to adjust relations with the United States and that it was impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. This part of the message was delivered at about 0900, 7 December, to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930 to the White House, and at 0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox. Secretary Knox was conferring with Mr. Hull at the State Department.

(3) At about 1030 on 7 December, the so-called "1:00 p.m. message" was decoded in the Navy Department. It directed the Japanese Ambassador to deliver the 14 part message to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m. on that day. This message was of significance because 1:00 p.m. in Washington was dawn at Honolulu. This message was delivered at once to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and immediately thereafter to the State Department, where the official who received it was asked to point out to Mr. Knox and Mr. Hull the significance of the "1:00 p.m. time of delivery". In my opinion, the foregoing indicates that at about 10:30 on 7 December (0500 Honolulu time) the Navy Department, or at least, some officers therein, appreciated that the information just received pointed to the possibility — even to the probability — of a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor. General Marshall states that this message came to his attention about 11:00 a.m., and that he immediately telephoned to Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn General Short that a break with Japan was imminent, and that an attack against Hawaii could be expected soon. Admiral Stark demurred at first, as to the

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need for sending this message, but after brief consideration asked General Marshall to include in his proposed despatch directions to pass the contents to naval commanders. General Marshall sent a despatch to the effect that the Japanese were presenting "what amounts to an ultimatum at 1:00 pm., Washington time, on 7 December; that Japanese are under orders to destroy their codes immediately; and that while the War Department does not know the significance of the hour set for delivering the note, you are to be on the alert accordingly and to inform naval authorities of this communication." He sent this via commercial radio, which was then the usual means of communicating with the Hawaiian Department. The despatch left Washington at 12:17 on 7 December (6:47 a.m. Honolulu time) and arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 a.m. Honolulu time. This was 22 minutes before the attack began. By the time the message had been decoded and delivered to General Short, the attack was already underway. The Court states that if the most expeditious means of delivery had been used (plain language telephone) this information could have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. The Court remarks that even in this event there was no action open, nor means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome, since there was already in effect a condition of readiness best suited to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of Pearl Harbor naval base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu. I cannot go along with this reasoning of the Court. Even two hours advance warning would have been of great value in alerting planes and in augmenting the condition of readiness existing on board ship.

(4) On 3 December (the date is not specified in the Findings; it is stated in Exhibit 20) Admiral Kimmel was

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6 NOV 1944

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informed that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes. Admiral Kimmel says (his statement, page 28) that "the significance of this despatch was diluted substantially by publication of the information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu," and that he did not regard it as a clear-cut warning of Japanese intentions to strike the United States.

(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch directing the destruction of secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those necessary for current purposes, which were to be kept ready for instant destruction in event of emergency (Exhibit 21). This was followed on 6 December by authorization for outlying islands to destroy secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency". (Exhibit 22)

(q) Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts (Volume 5). In this section the Court sets forth matters which have already been discussed in the three preceding sub-paragraphs; and, in addition, touches on the matter of the so-called "Winds message". This Japanese message, originating in Tokyo on 19 November, was intercepted and translated in the Navy Department on 28 November. It set forth that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)" certain code words would be inserted in the middle of the daily Japanese short wave news broadcast, and directed that when these words were heard codes were to be destroyed. This message was received in various places, including Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel had it. A monitor watch was set at various places to look out for the expected "weather forecast". On 4 and 5 December, the Federal Communications Commission monitored the expected "weather forecast" which was sent from Tokyo twice, first at 2200 on 4 December, and again at 2130 on 5 December. The code words appearing in this implementing message meant that

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Japanese relations with Russia were in danger. These two messages have been preserved in the files of the Federal Communications Commission. In addition to this indication that the Japanese were about to break relations with Russia, there is evidence (Volume 5, page 746) that Captain Safford, on duty in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications, saw on 4 December, a "yellow slip" on which was written a different version of the implementing code, which meant that relations with the United States and Great Britain were in danger. Captain Safford thinks that this message was intercepted by an East Coast station, but he was not sure. No written trace of the message referred to by Captain Safford could be found in the files of the War Department or the Navy Department. There is considerable testimony in the record as to what was done with the "Winds message". Various officers testified that the implementing despatches were transmitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of Naval Communications, but Admiral Stark and Admiral Noyes testified that they do not remember hearing anything about them. It is an established fact that none of the forecdes of the implementing messages were ever sent to Admiral Kimmel. However, as noted in paragraph 2(p)(4) above, the Court finds that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel was informed on 3 December that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London, to destroy certain codes.

(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII on page 1196) that on 26 November a note, couched in strong terms, was delivered by the United States State Department to Japanese representatives. The stipulations contained therein were drastic, and likely to be unacceptable to Japan. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note, nor of its contents until after the attack. The Court points out that Admiral Kimmel in May 1941 had particularly asked the Chief of Naval Operations to keep him informed of the diplomatic situation in order that he might be "informed of all important developments as they occur by the quickest secure means available."

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(s) Fact XIX (page 1200). The Court points out that it is a prime obligation of command to keep subordinate commanders constantly supplied with information, and that Admiral Stark, having important information in his possession, during the critica period from 26 November to 7 December, failed to transmit this information to Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington. I am in thorough accord with this view of the Court.

(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most important phases of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department. In this connection it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling information of the enemy. It appears from the record that Rear Admiral Wilkinson the then Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. I assume that the Court believes that all essential information was obtained, despite the fact that Admiral Wilkinson did not testify; however, it appears to me that the failure to obtain his testimony was unfortunate.

3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion.

(a) In the Opinion based on Finding II (page 1201), the Court expresses the view that the presence of a large number of combatant vessels in Pearl Harbor on 7 December was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules. I do not entirely go along with this opinion. Had all of the information available in the Department been proper evaluated and properly disseminated, I am inclined to believe that Admiral Kimmel's dispositions on the morning of 7 December would not have been as they actually were on that occasion.

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(b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI (page 1202) the Court expresses the view that deficiencies in personnel and materiel which existed in 1941 had an adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor, on and prior to 7 December. I offer the comment that, obviously, the Army and Navy were short of men and materiel at the time and that available means were spread thin throughout the various areas of probable hostility. The shortage of means available to Admiral Kimmel must be taken into consideration. However, the pertinent question is whether or not he used the means available to him to the best advantage. In my opinion, he did not. The fault lay in the fact that he was not fully informed by the Navy Department of what was known as to probable Japanese intentions and of the tenseness of the situation, and further, that his judgment was to some extent faulty and that he did not fully appreciate the implications of that information which was given to him.

(c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII (page 1202), the Court holds that the defense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with means provided to the 14th Naval District, and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. As I stated above, I think this is a narrow view of the question, and that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that, in view of the weakness of local defenses, the fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in general.

(d) The Court holds (page 1203) that Admiral Bloch performed his duties satisfactorily. I concur.

(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX, (page 1203), the Court states that naval defense plans were complete and sound in

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concept, but contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December, these plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning. I cannot go along with this view. As I have already stated, there could be no question that available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened. I doubt that, with the force available, it would have been possible to intercept and destroy the Japanese carriers before they launched their planes, except by lucky chance. However, I do think that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the dangers of the situation, not entirely due to his own fault. This had a bearing on the amount of damage that was incurred by the Fleet when the Japanese did attack.

(f) The Opinion, based on Fact X (page 1204), expresses the view that Admiral Kimmel's action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Fleet at sea, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet and that the steps taken were adequate and effective. I concur in this.

(g) The Opinion, based on Finding XI (page 1204), as to the effect that the measures taken for the security in port were adequate and proper, and that only had it been known in advance that the attack was to take place on 7 December, could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects. The Court takes note of suggestio that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manne and expresses the view that no such course of action could have bee carried out as a matter of routine. I concur in this. The questio at issue is whether or not indications called for a tightening up of precautions as 7 December approached. I think they did.

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(h) In the Opinion, based on Finding XVIII (page 1207), the Court holds that Admiral Kimmel was justified in not providing for routine long range reconnaissance in the absence of any information indicating that the attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time. I have already discussed this phase of the matter. I think that if all available information had been placed at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, and that if he had evaluated it properly, he would have found it necessary to do something about long range reconnaissance in the few days immediately preceding the 7th of December.

(i) In the Opinion, based on Fact XVII (page 1207), the Court expresses the view that there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere. I concur that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations. As a matter of fact, the Japanese did begin to operate in the Far East on 7 December. However, it was not illogical to suppose that an attack on Pearl Harbor would be regarded by the Japanese as one of the initial steps in a campaign, and there is ample evidence that all concerned were aware of this possibility — a possibility that was strengthened by information received in Washington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel.

(j) In the Opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX (page 1207), the Court expresses the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical period from 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had received regarding the Japanese situation, and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that a message had been information

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received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. I note from the first endorsement that the Judge Advocate General takes exception to this Opinion, on the ground that the evidence shows that Admiral Stark and his principal advisers did not construe this message as indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area. While I concur in the view of the Judge Advocate General as to the construction which Admiral Stark placed upon the message in question, nevertheless, I note that Commander Kramer (attached to the Communications Division of the Navy Department) did take steps to invite the attention of the Secretary of the Navy to the fact that 1:00 p.m. Washington time meant dawn at Honolulu, and midnight in East Asia (page 14 of Top Secret Addendum to the Findings). It, therefore, seems evident, though Admiral Stark did not have his attention drawn to the possible significance of this message, nevertheless the implications were appreciated by at least some officers of his office. The Court further expresses the view that had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. I take no exception to this expression of opinion. However, it is a fair conclusion that if Admiral Kimmel had been given all of the information available at the Department, he would have been in a position to judge the situation better than he did.

4. In the final Opinion and Recommendation (page 1208) the Court finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter. I concur that there is not adequate evidence to support general court martial proceedings, but this does not bar administrative action, if such action is found appropriate.

5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor

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incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God", beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It is true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until it was too late to repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by the Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action they might have taken.

(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. His attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early and accurate information as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all important developments as they occurred by the quickest and most secure means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture of the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information available in Washington, particularly in the following respects:

(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26 November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking relations.

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(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain intercepted Japanese messages inquiring as to dispositions of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.

(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the "Winds Message". Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is clear that it did reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together with the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization.

(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the "1:00 p.m. message" received on the morning of 7 December although the implications were appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. It appears that had this message been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of its significance, it might have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.

(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense of intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.

(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the "war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December

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concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These messages must be considered in connection with other facets of the situation, and Admiral Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be given due consideration. After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open to him:

(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to conduct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.

(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the Japanese task less easy.

(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have been fully operational.

6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.

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7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors.

8. In my serial 003191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my views concerning how much of the record bears such a relation t present military operations as to require high security classification.

E. J. King

E. J. KING

King & Richardson endorsements Court's findings
Hatch

GE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S FIRST ENDORSEMENT (ON NAVAL COURT OF INQUIRY)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
Washington 25, D. C., November 2, 1944.

st Endorsement

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
j: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July, 1944.

. Forwarded for comment and recommendation.

. The weighing of conflicting evidence and testimony is peculiarly the function a Court of Inquiry or Board of Investigation, and not that of the reviewing horities. Where the testimony is such as will reasonably support either two or more different conclusions, it is not within the province of the Judge vocate General to attempt to substitute his evaluation of the evidence for t of the Court. But where there is no creditable evidence in a record to port a finding or opinion, or where the weight of evidence is so preponderantly one side that it appears unreasonable to reach a contrary conclusion, the ge Advocate General must hold, as a matter of law, that such a finding pinion is not supported by the evidence adduced. See CMO 9 of 1928, P. 8; O 12 of 1937, P. 8; CMO 5 of 1936, P. 11.

. Attention is invited to the following portion of Finding of Fact XVIII:

In the early forenoon of 7 December, 1941, Washington time, the War and vy Departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break diplomatic relations was imminent, and, *by inference and deduction, that an ack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon.*"

. This Finding, standing alone, may be misleading, in the sense that it may vey an impression that the Court concluded that responsible officials of the r and Navy Departments did in fact make the inference and deduction derscored above. The fact that the Court, in phrasing this Finding, used the t tense of the verb "appear", and used the expression "appeared to indicate", her than "should have indicated" lends support to this construction. Such an impression would not be supported by the record, as the great preponderence of the evidence before the Court refutes any such conclusion. It is te clear from the evidence that the responsible officials of the Navy Depart-nt had evaluated the information available to them in Washington to ans that a hostile move by the Japanese could be expected, not in the Hawaiian a, except by submarines, but rather against Guam, the Phillipines, and British Dutch possessions in the Far East.

Those witnesses who, on 7 December, 1941, held positions in the Navy partment which qualify them to speak authoritatively as to the prevailing nion there just prior to the attack, are all in substantial accord that the Chief Naval operations and his assistants had not deducted or inferred that an ack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. On the contrary, the sensus in the Navy Department was that any attack would probably come the Far East, and the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor was given omparatively low probability rating. Those witnesses who stated that the ormation available to the Navy Department clearly indicated, by inference deduction, that an attack on Hawaii could be expected, were all officers who e not on duty in the Navy Department at that time, or occupied subordinate itions. Their testimony is opinion evidence, undoubtedly unconsciously ored by hindsight, and arrived at by a process of selecting, from the great mass ntelligence reports available to the Chief of Naval Operations, those which the light of subsequent events proved to be hints or indications of Japanese entions.

Therefore, any finding, opinion or inference that the responsible officials the Navy Department knew, prior to the actual attack, that an attack on wall was impending, is not supported by the evidence. The Court recognizes fact, as shown by its finding (last paragraph of Finding XVII) that:

These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testifying ore the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7 December came a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, there were good grounds for their ef that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere."

[3] 7. The foregoing remarks apply equally to the underscored porti the Opinion expressed by the Court (P. 1207) that:

"Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and respo for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment ex of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, i tant information which he had regarding the Japanese situation, and espe in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediate fact that a message had been received which appeared to indicate that a in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, *that an attack in the Hawaiian might be expected soon.*"

As has been previously pointed out, the message herein referred to wa construed by the Chief of Naval Operations and his principal advisers as cating an attack in the Hawaiian area.

8. It is noted that the Court finds (Finding of Fact XVIII) that the ti which the War and Navy Departments had information indicating a bre diplomatic relations on 7 December 1941, and the possibility of hostile acti the Japanese on that date, was "in the early forenoon of 7 December, Wa ton time." It is not considered amiss to comment in further detail on thi ing, in view of a widespread misconception in some quarters that this inf tion was known in Washington on 6 December 1941. The evidence befor Court establishes, beyond any doubt, that the information referred to wa available to any responsible official in Washington prior to approximately 10 the morning of 7 December 1941.

9. The Judge Advocate General feels constrained to comment on the app contradiction between the Opinion expressed by the Court that the Chief of Operations failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in faili transmit certain information to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, an final Opinion that "no offenses have been committed nor serious blame inc on the part of any person in the naval service." That this is only an app and not a real, incongruity, is shown by the Opinion that "had this imp information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjectu to what action he would have taken." This statement, as well as the Fi of Facts and Opinions taken as a whole, indicate [4] that it was th clusion of the Court, although not clearly expressed, that the evidence ad did not prove that Admiral Stark's failure to transmit the information in qu to Admiral Kimmel was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by the on 7 December, 1941, and that any causal connection between this failu Admiral Stark's part and the disaster would be entirely speculative. S conclusion is fully supported by the testimony in this record.

10. Subject to the foregoing remarks, the proceedings, findings, opinion recommendations of the attached Court of Inquiry are, in the opinion Judge Advocate General, legal.

T. L. Gatch
T. L. GATCH,
The Judge Advocate Gene

ADDENDUM TO COURT'S FINDING OF FACT (NAVAL COURT OF INQUIRY)

[1] In the Finding of Facts, No. XVIII, the Court has referred to "c other important information" as being available in the War and Navy D ments. This information was obtained by intercepting Japanese message breaking their diplomatic codes. The Court has been informed that these are still in use and. if it became known to the Japanese Government that had been broken by the United States, the codes would be changed and, consequence, the war effort would be adversely affected.

For this reason, the Court has refrained from analyzing or discussin details of the information in its Finding of Facts but feels that its report not be complete without a record of such details. The Court, therefore, su the following record in this addendum and transmits it to the Secretary Navy for filing with other highly secret matter referred to as such in the r of the Court's proceedings.

Highly secret messages, hereinafter mentioned, were intercepted by the and Navy Departments during the very critical period 26 November to 7 Dece 1941, and prior thereto. The method of handling these messages in the Department was as follows:

he Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Naval Communications
ated directly under the Chief of [2] Naval Operations. They were
onsible to see that all messages were transmitted to him in order that
night be kept conversant at all times with existing conditions.
fficers in Intelligence and Communications, Divisions of Naval Operations,
ained on duty night and day. They made every effort to obtain all possible
omatic and military information, in order that high officials of our govern-
t might be kept fully informed.
essages were translated and placed in a folder immediately upon receipt or
rcept. The important messages were marked with a clip and taken by a des-
ted officer to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the
ectors of War Plans, Naval Intelligence, and Naval Communications, and to
Chief of the Far Eastern Division of Naval Intelligence. The Director of Naval
lligence, Captain Wilkinson, kept himself constantly informed regarding
messages. He checked as to whether or not the Chief of Naval Operations
seen the important ones and in many cases took them personally to the
f of Naval Operations and discussed them with him.
nmediately after the receipt of the note of 26 November, 1941, from the Secre-
of State, the Japanese representatives in Washington sent a message to
yo which was intercepted by the Navy Department. This is Document 17,
ibit 63, which gave to Tokyo the following stipulations contained in the
:
a) The recognition of Hull's "four principles".
b) (1) Conclusion of mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Moscow,
shington, The Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.
c] (2) Agreement between Japan, United States, England, The Nether-
ds, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indochina and equally
conomic treatment in French Indochina.
d) Complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French
dochina.
e) Japan and the United States both definitely to promise to support no re-
e but that of Chiang Kai-shek.
f) The abolition of evtraterritoriality, the concessions in China, and other
irements bearing on reciprocal trade treaty, rescinding freezing orders,
ilization of yen, etc., and for Japan to amend her tripartite pact with Ger-
y and Italy.
he Japanese representatives added in their report to Tokyo the following:
th dumbfounded and stated to Hull we could not even cooperate to the extent
ven reproving this to Tokyo."
o information regarding the delivery of this note or of its contents was
smitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders
at.
rom 26 November to 7 December, 1941, there was much diplomatic dispatch
ic intercepted between Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in Washing-
which had a bearing on the critical situation existing and which was not
smitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific. A message dated 19 November,
, Tokyo to Washington, translated on 28 November, 1941, and referred to as
e Winds Code" was as follows:
Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
n case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and
cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be
ed in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.
1] "(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO
ZEAME *
2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.**
3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.***
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast
each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all
papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
Forward as urgent intelligence.
he Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 28 November, 1941, sent to the
f of Naval Operations, information to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet;
mandant 16th Naval District; and Commandant 14th Naval District, sub-

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East wind rain.
**North wind cloudy.
***West wind clear."

stantially the same information as outlined above. On 5 December, 194
United States Naval Attache, Batavia, sent to the Chief of Naval Oper
substantially the same information. These messages stated that at
future date information would be sent by Japan indicating a breaking
diplomatic relations or possibly war between countries designated.

All officers of the Communication and Intelligence Divisions in the
Department, considering the expected information most important, we
the lookout for this notification of Japanese intentions. On 4 Decembe
intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was received in the
Department. Although this notification was subject to two interpreta
either a breaking off of diplomatic relations between Japan and the U
States, or [5] war, this information was not transmitted to the
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat.

It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-Chief
cific and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this code
apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy Department tha
execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth
message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made b
Navy Department to ascertain whether this information had been obt
by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat.

Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, although Admiral T
stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that Admiral Ki
had it. This message cannot now be located in the Navy Department.

It is a matter of general knowledge that Japan has had for many ye
thorough system of espionage throughout the world and continuously s
and received information regarding the location and movements of U
States naval vessels. There were certain messages received in the Navy
partment which showed very clearly that Japan, at this critical period,
particularly desirous of obtaining exact information from two sources, na
Manila and Honolulu. Messages between Tokyo, Manila, and Honolulu in
ing especially about planes, ships, their places of anchorage, etc., in the
ports, were intercepted. Similar messages were sent to Japanese officia
Honolulu clearly indicating that Japan was most [6] desirous o
taining exact information as to ships in Pearl Harbor.

The important messages having special reference to Pearl Harbor we
follows:

(a) On 15 November, 1941, Document 24, Exhibit 63, an intercept from T
to Honolulu, translated in Navy Department, 3 December, 1941, states: "As
tions between Japan and the United States are most critical make your 'shi
harbor report' irregular but at rate of twice a week. Although you al
are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."

(b) On 18 November, 1941, Document 37, Exhibit 63, an intercept from T
to Honolulu, translated in Navy Department on 5 December, 1941, st
"Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area
Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, and areas adjacent thereto. Make your inves
tion with great secrecy." Note by Navy Department on this message, "M
Bay" probably means "Manila Bay."

(c) On 18 November, 1941, Document 40, Exhibit 63, an intercept
Honolulu to Tokyo and translated in Navy Department 6 December, 1941,
information as to ships moored in certain areas in Pearl Harbor and m
ment of ships in and out.

[7] (d) On 29 November, 1941, Document 36, Exhibit 63, an intercept
Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Washington 5 December, 1941, states: "We
been receiving reports from you on ship movements but in future will you
report even when there are no movements."

Admiral Kimmel was not aware of and had no information regarding t
messages.

On 5 November, 1941, Document 7, Exhibit 63, Tokyo to Washington, was i
cepted. This message stresses the necessity of signing an agreement bet
the United States and Japan by 25 November, 1941.

On 22 November, 1941, Document 11, Exhibit 63, intercept from Toky
Washington, stated that the signing of agreement set for 25 November,
could be postponed until 29 November, and in explanation this message st

"* * * There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wante
settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next t
or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if
signing can be completed by the 29th, * * * if the pertinent notes ca

anged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Nether-
s; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until
date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed.
r that things are automatically going to happen. * * *"
intimation of the receipt of this message was transmitted to the Com-
der-in-Chief, Pacific, or to other Commanders afloat, nor was any information
smitted to them regarding contents of the messages mentioned in the follow-
paragraphs.

] On 28 November, 1941, a dispatch, Document 18, Exhibit 63, was inter-
ed between Tokyo and Washington which in part reads as follows:

* * The United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating
osal"—referring to note of 26 November—"* * * the Imperial Govern-
t can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report
ne views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I
send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured.
is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the
tiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instruc-
; * * *" etc.

ne message indicates the position of Japan regarding the note of 26 Novem-
and further indicates that within two or three days negotiations will be
acto ruptured. Further, it emphasizes the importance of delay. Neither the
sage nor any of its contents were transmitted to the Commander in Chief,
fic, or to other Commanders afloat.

n 29 November, 1941, Document 19, Exhibit 63, intercept Tokyo to Wash-
on and translated by the Navy Department 30 November, 1941, directs that
nese representatives make one more attempt to have United States recon-
r and states:

* * please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking
f negotiations."

gain, on 30 November, 1941, Document 20, Exhibit 63, an intercept from
hington to Tokyo, indicated that negotiations were to be stretched out.
ese two messages indicate that the Japanese were sparring for time.

] On 30 November, 1941, Document 22, Exhibit 63, translated by the
y Department on 1 December, 1941, was intercepted, being a message from
o to Japanese representatives in Berlin, reading as follows:

. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of
year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within
period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alli-
as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of
nternational situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between
n and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely
in the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United
es from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying
ugh these negotiations.

. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view
efending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis,
continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views
ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotia-
s rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and
ch Indochina), were completely in opposition to each other.

udging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we
came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional
logical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her
amental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried
etween the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive
ne United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the
blishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in
Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as
Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be
naintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States
the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a
ency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite
nce. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has
been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has [*10*] become
ually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer
nue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a con-
ation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made thi
tude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause whic
that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power i
no be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this t
namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specificall
Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the Eur
war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assista
Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone o
makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotia
What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they con
with England, Australia, The Netherlands, and China—they did so repea
Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those n
and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an en

On 1 December, 1941, the Navy Department intercepted a message from
to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin as follows:

"The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand rup
Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger
war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japa
this war may come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our
sure on the Soviet, but for the time being would prefer to refrain fro
direct moves on the north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how imp
secrecy is."

On 1 December, 1941, document 21, Exhibit 63, was intercepted, being a
sage from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington which rea
follows:

"1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the
ation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the
United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advisin
press and others that though there are some wide differences between
and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is fo
your information).

"2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambas
to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***.
make the necessary representations at your end only.

"3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the cap
an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the Presider
so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please
investigations into this matter.

On 2 December, 1941, Document 25, Exhibit 63, intercept Washington to T
translated by the Navy Department 3 December, 1941, reports that conversa
with the State Department continue; that the Japanese representatives sta
Welles, the Under Secretary of State, that it is virtually impossible for Ja
accept new American proposals as they now stand, and that the Japanese
sentatives feel that the United States is anxious to peacefully conclud
current difficult situation.

On 3 December, 1941, Document 29, Exhibit 63, intercept Tokyo to Washi
translated by the Navy Department 4 December, 1941, requests their repre
tives to explain Japan's increased forces in Indochina.

On 3 December, 1941, Document 33, Exhibit 63, intercept Washington to T
translated by Navy Department 5 December [12] 1941, states:

"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action be
Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of wa
definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand."

On 6 December, 1941, Document 38, Exhibit 63, from Tokyo to Washingto
intercepted, giving notice to the Japanese representatives that a reply cons
of 14 parts to American proposal of 26 November is being sent to them, dir
that secrecy should be maintained and stating that the time of presentin
reply would be sent in a separate message.

The first 13 parts of this reply were intercepted and received by the Nav
partment at about 3 p. m., December 6, 1941, and were translated and made
for distribution by 9 p. m., Washington time, of that date. These 13 parts co
a very strong and conclusive answer to the note of November 26 and state in
"Japan cannot accept proposal as a basis of negotiations."

*JD-1: 6921.
**JD-1: 6710.
***Not available.

Commander Kramer, the officer whose duty it was to distribute this class of ormation, prior to 9 p. m., 6 December, 1941, 'phoned Captain Wilkinson that important message had been received and was being translated. He also tried ommunicate with Admiral Stark and Rear Admiral Turner at their homes but nd them out.

t about 9 p. m., Washington time, Commander Kramer proceeded to the White use with the 13 parts of reply and delivered copy to a White House aide, with request that [13] it be delivered immediately to the President. Kramer n proceeded to the home of Secretary Knox where he personally delivered he Secretary a copy of the Japanese reply. Secretary Knox read the reply, did discuss it in detail with Kramer, but 'phoned the Secretary of War and retary of State.

Kramer then proceeded to the home of Captain Wilkinson and gave a copy him. Kramer told Wilkinson that he had tried to get Stark and Turner. lkinson made several 'phone calls, presumably to Admiral Stark and others. s information regarding receipt of these 13 parts or their contents was not nsmitted to the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet or other Commanders oat.

Kramer then returned to his office in the Navy Department, arriving about 30 a. m., 7 December, and as no other important messages were at hand, went ne and returned to the Navy Department about 7 a. m. Upon his arrival he nd the 14th part of the Japanese reply had been received and decoded. He then ivered a copy of all 14 parts to the Flag Secretary in his office of the Chief of val Operations at about 9 a. m., where he found several officers gathering for onference with Admiral Stark. Kramer then proceeded about 9:30 a. m., to White House and made delivery of the 14 parts of the message. He pro- ded then, at about 9:50 a. m., to the State Department and delivered same to Secretary of the Navy, who was there in conference with the Secretary of te.

t about 10:30 a. m., Kramer returned to the Navy Depart [14] ment ere he found another message had been translated. This message, an inter- t from Tokyo to Washington, was marked "Urgent, very important" and read follows: "Will the ambassador please submit to the U. S. Government (if pos- e to the Secretary of State) our reply to the U. S. at 1:00 p. m., on the 7th, r time." Kramer delivered a copy of this message (hereinafter referred to the "one p. m. message") to the Flag Secretary of Admiral Stark, the latter he time being in conference with several officers.

Kramer then returned to the White House and delivered the "1:00 p. m. mes- e". From there he went to the State Department where the Secretary of Navy was still in conference with the Secretary of State. On arrival he uested one of the State Department assistants to present the message to Secretary of the Navy and to invite his attention to the fact that 1 p. m., shington time, meant dawn at Honolulu and midnight in East Asia.

dmiral Stark had arrived in his office at the Navy Department at some time ween 9 and 10:30 a. m., on the morning of 7 December. Although he testi- that he had no information prior to this time relative to the Japanese reply the note of November 26th, he was informed of the 14 parts and "the 1:00 n. message" not later than 10:30 a. m., of that date. He testified that General rshall 'phoned him and suggested that the information regarding the delivery he 14 parts at 1 p. m. was most important and significant and, in his opinion, uld be transmitted to Commanders [15] in the Pacific. Admiral Stark irst demurred and hung up the receiver. Shortly thereafter he 'phoned General rshall requesting that, in the event he sent the message to the Commanding Gen- ls in the Pacific area, he instruct them to relay this message to naval opposites. The message which General Marshall sent to the Commanding General, Ha- ian Department (Exhibit 48) reads as follows: "Japanese are presenting one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also y are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what nificance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly o Inform naval authorities of this communication."

This message left the War Department at 11:52 a. m., Washington time, was t out over R. C. A. at 12:17 p. m. (6:47 a. m. Honolulu time) and arrived Honolulu's R. C. A. office at 7:33 a. m. Honolulu time. There remained but minutes before the attack for delivery, decoding, dissemination, and action. ut. General Short did not receive the decoded dispatch until the afternoon of ecember, several hours after the attacking force had departed.

Had the telephone and plain language been used, this message could have received in Hawaii before the attack began. Even in this event, however, was no action open to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the atta which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome. was already in effect the condition of readi- [16] ness best suited t circumstances attending vessels within the limits of the Pearl Harbor Base and the Fleet planes in their air bases in Oahu.

Orin G. Murfin
ORIN G. MURFIN,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret), Presid
Edward C. Kalbfus
EDWARD C. KALBFUS,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret), Mem
Adolphus Andrews
ADOLPHUS ANDREWS,
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret), Mem

EXHIBIT NO. 107A

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XVI

THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND ACTION BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

(A) Findings, Conclusions and Order.

On 13 August 1945 Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, in his fourth endorsement to the record of proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry made the official findings and conclusions of the Navy Department, and his order as Secretary assessing responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster.

The endorsement of 13 August 1945 that was signed by Secretary Forrestal has had deleted from it certain "TOP-SECRET" matter since, pursuant to the direction of the President, the findings and conclusions were to be made public. The endorsement with deletions therefrom was made public by the President on 29 August 1945.

The complete endorsement of Secretary Forrestal containing the findings, conclusions and action of the Navy in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster is as follows:

" 1. Pursuant to Executive Order dated 18 December 1941, a commission headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts conducted an investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the commission reported its findings on 23 January 1942. The commission concluded in part that:

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"17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each, that he was not required to inform himself of and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department."

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2. Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated February 1944, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an amination of witnesses having knowledge of facts in connection with the panese attack. Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.

3. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, rected the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the arl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such rsons as the facts might justify.

4. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, N (Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice miral Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold ssmaier, USN, as Judge Advocate, was appointed on 13 July 1944. The urt was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as acticable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected th the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of waii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to clude in its findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be tablished. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to ether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion s that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend ecifically what further proceedings should be had.

5. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 44, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. rtain portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including e findings and opinion of the Court, have been classified "TOP SECRET," d the balance "SECRET."

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6. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate Gener of the Navy, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and by me, was that the evidence secured by the Court did not warrant and would not support the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.

7. In my Third Endorsement to the Record of Proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 1 December 1944, I found that the evidence obtained indicated that there were errors of judgment on the part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark, but that the investigation had not gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, I directed that further investigation would be conducted by a investigation officer and that pending the completion of the necessary further investigation I would withhold decision as to the institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.

8. In order to insure that the further investigation would cove every material question, I directed that a thorough review be made of th prior investigations and that an appropriate summary of all information developed in the prior Naval investigations be prepared. Upon the compl of this review of prior investigations and after examination of the rep of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 3 December 1944, I appointed Admir Hewitt, USN, as investigating officer, and John F. Sonnett as counsel to examine such witnesses and obtain such other evidence as might be necess in order fully to develop the facts in connection with the Japanese atta Pearl Harbor. The further investigation directed by my precept of 2 May was completed on 12 July 1945 and the report by Admiral Hewitt was forwa to the Judge Advocate General and the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations for recommendation and comment.

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9. In his Second Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's Report of urther investigation, dated 10 August 1945, the Judge Advocate General ad- ised, among other things, that he did not believe that there was sufficient vidence to warrant conviction of any of the officers concerned of any ffense known to Naval Law; that the evidence indicated that the officers n question lacked superior judgment rather than being guilty of culpable efficiency; and that "lack of superior judgment" is not an offense triable y general court martial. The Judge Advocate General further advised in is Second Endorsement that: "I am of the opinion that any such court- artial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan is highly mpractical and would be detrimental to the war effort, and further, that ny such proceedings during the six months immediately following the end f hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the Naval service." otwithstanding the difficulties pointed out by him, the Judge Advocate eneral was of the opinion, however, that the Navy Department is morally bligated to order Admiral Kimmel tried by general court martial should dmiral Kimmel so insist. The Judge Advocate General recommended that dmiral Hewitt's investigation be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his ounsel; that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public nything contained in this record and in prior records as soon as that ay be done without prejudice to the public interests; and that if Admiral immel insists, a general court martial should be convened to try him for ny alleged offenses he may have committed on or before 7 December 1941.

10. In the Third Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report, dated 13 ugust 1945, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurred generally in the marks and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General and expressed the pinion that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant trial by court martial

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of any person in the Naval service in that it would not sustain the char
required by the Articles for the Government of the Navy; that with regar
to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceedings, the
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet was still of the opinion that Admiral
Stark and Admiral Kimmel, although not culpable to a degree warranting
formal disciplinary action, nevertheless lacked the superior judgment
necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties, and tha
appropriate action, consisting of the relegation of these officers to
positions in which lack of superior judgment might not result in future
errors, had been taken as to Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, and state
that no further action was recommended. The Commander in Chief, U. S.
Fleet, also advised, in the Third Endorsement, that in any event he
considered it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark or Admiral Kimmel to
trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan because such pr
ceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of information which
be detrimental to current military operations and to national security
measures. He concurred in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General tha
the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel to tria
before a general court martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist, but stat
that this action should not be taken until after the completion of hosti
with Japan. He concurred in the further suggestions of the Judge Advoca
General that Admiral Hewitt's investigation be made available to Admiral
Kimmel and his counsel and that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is fr
to make public anything contained in this record and in prior records as
soon as that may be done without prejudice to national security.

11. The comments of the Judge Advocate General and of the Commande
in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, in their endorsemen
the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry record, and in their endorsements to t

port by Admiral Hewitt, are approved subject to the following remarks:

(a) Court of Inquiry Finding II (1156). This finding states, in substance, that the presence in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 of Task Force One and the battleships of Task Force Two was necessary.

The essential point here rests in Admiral Kimmel's statement to the effect that he would not have had the Fleet in Pearl Harbor had he anticipated an air attack. The Second Endorsement indicates that the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, does not entirely "go along" with the opinion of the Court that the information available to Admiral Kimmel did not require any departure from his operation and maintenance schedules. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, states further in this connection that Admiral Kimmel could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port, and that this would have made the Japanese task less easy. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this finding.

(b) Court of Inquiry Finding III (1156) This finding states that, "Constitutional requirements that war be declared by Congress . . ." make it difficult to prevent an attack and precluded offensive action as a means of defense, and that Admiral Kimmel had the responsibility of avoiding overt acts.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, comments that this gives an unscrupulous enemy a great advantage, and that the Constitutional requirement preventing offensive action as a means of defense was a definite handicap. It does not appear that there was any proximate casual relationship between the Constitutional requirement and the instant disaster. The Constitutional inhibition

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and the injunction as to overt acts did not preclude either long distan reconnaissance or a sortie by the Fleet. Further, it appears that prio to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel did not regard this Constitutional p vision or his responsibility to avoid overt acts as sufficient to preve the issuance of orders to bomb unidentified submarines found in operat- ing areas.

(c) Court of Inquiry Finding IV (1159). This states That Admiral Bloch was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel, and was charged with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor and, consequently, Admiral Bloch had a responsibility for naval measures concerned with local defense.

It should be noted in this connection that Admiral Hewitt found:

> "75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.
>
> "76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, and he had the responsi- bility for their utilization. They were operated after 22 November 1941, in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu."

(d) Court of Inquiry Finding V (1160). The Court here finds that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were friendly, cordial and cooperative; that they invariably conferred when important messages were received, and that each was sufficiently cognisant of the measures being taken by the other.

In this connection the following conclusions by Admiral Hewitt are approved:

> "1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed to meet, with the available means,

various types of attack, including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between the local commanders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the case prior to the attack.

"2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.

"3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint Command. While there was considerable exchange of information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system to ensure such exchange."

The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt indicates that there e informal arrangements for the exchange of intelligence by the y and Navy at Hawaii, which included the transmission to the Army some information concerning Japanese ship movements. The evidence ained both by Admiral Hewitt and by the Naval Court of Inquiry icates, however, that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short was fficiently informed of the degree of readiness put into effect by the er. It appears that after receipt of the "war warning" and prior 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred on several asions. They discussed the reenforcement of Midway and Wake. It s not appear that they discussed the conditions of readiness placed effect or to be placed in effect, or the question or advisability placing in effect air reconnaissance. General Short testified before Naval Court that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel, he placed effect Army Alert No. 1 (the anti-sabotage alert). Admiral Kimmel tified that he did not know what alert the Army had in effect, and t he made no specific inquiry of General Short in this connection.

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That there was not full mutual exchange of intelligence also appears from the evidence. Admiral Kimmel received dispatches after 27 November 1941 relating to Japanese destruction of codes and instructions to United States outlying islands to destroy classified material. He testified before the Naval Court that he did not direct that these be furnished to General Short, and that he did not know whether or not they were furnished to him. General Short testified that he had not seen these dispatches.

In view of these facts, I cannot agree with the above finding by the Naval Court of Inquiry. The system of mutual cooperation, of joi command, was not working effectively - it failed. In this connection th following conclusion of Admiral Hewitt is approved:

> "War experience has shown that: The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person; that is, there must be "unity of command."

However, in respect of the above conclusion of Admiral Hewitt, it is important to point out that the experience of this war has conclusively demonstrated that there is no inconsistency between the existence of two or more separate military or naval organizations as the functioning forces and an effective exercise of unity of command in a theater or in an operation. Practically all of the major operations of this war have been accomplished by two or more distinct military organiz tions, some even belonging to diverse nations, but all acting under a unified command. In such an operation, the commanders of the several forces and their staffs must function in close physical proximity, usually in the higher echelons sharing a common headquarters or command

I do not find, however, that Admiral Kimmel is open to criticism for having failed to advise the Army at Pearl Harbor that a su marine contact had been made on the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly

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rior to the air attack. The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt supports
e following conclusions by him, which is approved:

"26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer. This information was of no immediate interest to the Army unless it in fact indicated imminency of an air attack, an assumption which was not necessarily logical. In any event, confirmation was not received until the air attack had commenced."

(e) Court of Inquiry Finding VI (1160). This states in
bstance that unavoidable deficiencies in personnel and material had
bearing on the effectiveness of the local defense of Pearl Harbor.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out, however, that
e pertinent question is whether Admiral Kimmel used the means available
the best advantage. I concur in this comment of the Commander in Chief
S. Fleet.

(f) Court of Inquiry Finding VII (1165). The Court finds
at Japan had an initial advantage because of the Japanese Fleet's
merical superiority, and the superiority of Japanese espionage.

The comment in the Second Endorsement on this point is confined
the general statement that factors such as those referred to by the
urt will always place this nation at a disadvantage during a period of
rained relations. This finding, of course, in general was correct.
vertheless, as applied to the specific issues here presented, it over-
oks the fact that:

(1) The numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet was well
own to Admiral Stark and to Admiral Kimmel, and this fact was taken into
count in the war plans;

(2) Although unquestionably the United States was placed at a
sadvantage in restraining Japanese espionage activities, the Navy and

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War Departments were nevertheless not without important Intelligence advantages of their own which were not availed of to the fullest extent.

(g) Court of Inquiry Finding VIII (1167). This states that it was the direct responsibility of the Army to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and that the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the Naval District.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, is in agreement with "the fundamental concept of naval warfare" discussed by the Court, but takes a more realistic view on this point. He points out that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that in view of the weakness of local defense, the Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor. With this I concur. It is to be noted, moreover, that under the defense plan the Navy was responsible for the maintenance of distant reconnaissance.

(h) Court of Inquiry Finding IX (1169). The Court finds that the air defense plans were defective because of the necessity for reliance upon Fleet aircraft which could not be made permanently available for local defense.

The Second Endorsement states that the Court has overstressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were Fleet planes; that it was sound policy to place all such aircraft at Admiral Kimmel's disposal; that it was his responsibility to allocate the planes as best he could; that the available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened; that it is doubtful whether with the available forces it would have been possible to destroy the carriers before they launched their planes, except by a lucky chance; that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the situation, not entirely due to his own fault and that this had a bearing on the amount of damage resulting from the attack. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, with respect to this finding.

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(i) Court of Inquiry Findings IV (1159). VIII (1167), IX (1169).

Based on these findings the conclusion of the Court is that Admiral Kloch satisfactorily performed his duties.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This conclusion is approved.

(j) Court of Inquiry Finding X (1171). This holds adequate and effective Admiral Kimmel's provisions for the security of the Fleet at sea.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This finding is approved.

(k) Court of Inquiry Finding XI (1173). The substance of this finding is that Admiral Kimmel was maintaining the highest condition of readiness called for by the information available to him, and that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense.

In the Second Endorsement it is pointed out that in fact the condition of readiness being maintained at the time of the attack was only that condition which is normally maintained when in port. This is maintained on the assumption that the shore defenses are adequate to protect the Fleet. Such was not the case at Pearl Harbor, as Admiral Kimmel knew.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, further states that he does not agree with the conclusion of the Court that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense, and is of the view that the information available to Admiral Kimmel called for a tightening up of the defense precautions as 7 December approached. With the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concur.

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(1) Court of Inquiry Finding XII (1176). The Court here finds that there was no information indicating that Japanese carriers were on their way to attack Pearl Harbor, and that it was not possible to prevent or to predict that attack.

The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states on this point: "There was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits."

It is to be noted that one of the principal matters covered in Admiral Hewitt's investigation was the information available to Admiral Kimmel, particularly during the critical period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. This information, which consisted principally of daily radio intelligence summaries setting forth the results of monitoring Japanese naval communications and estimates by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, is set forth in some detail at pages 112-114, inclusive, of Admiral Hewitt's report. It there appears that there was an unusual change in Japanese naval radio calls on 1 December 1941; that this was regarded as indicating an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale; that on 2 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel conferred with his Fleet Intelligence Officer as to the whereabouts of Japanese fleet units, and that during that conference Admiral Kimmel noticed and commented on the absence of information in the Fleet Intelligence Officer's written estimate as to Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, which consisted of four carriers. (It has since been learned that these four carriers were among the six carriers which in fact were then on the high seas heading toward Pearl Harbor.) The other Japanese carriers were located by the Fleet Intelligence Officer in his written estimate, in Japanese home waters,

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vith the exception of possibly one carrier in the Marshalls. In his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, the Fleet Intelligence Officer described his conversation with Admiral Kimmel on 3 December 1941 as follows:

"Mr. SOMMETT: Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now', or words to that effect."

"MR. SOMMETT: Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Cardive 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardive 1 and 2', and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.

"MR. SOMMETT: He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in a way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

It is to be noted further that, as set forth in Admiral Hewitt's report, the daily communication intelligence summaries received by Admiral Kimmel stated, on December 3rd, that: "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service

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calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb." and that the daily summaries delivered to Admiral Kimmel thereafter, and prior to the attack, indicated that there was no information as to Japanese carriers.

In view of the foregoing, I do not approve the above finding by the Naval Court of Inquiry. I concur entirely in the comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concerning this finding. I am of the view that the information as to the location and movements of the Japanese naval forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the week preceding the attack, coupled with all the other information which he had received, including the "war warning" and other messages from the Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.

(m) Court of Inquiry Finding XIII (1178). It is here stated that Admiral Kimmel's decision not to conduct daily long-range reconnaissance was sound; that there were insufficient planes for this purpose; and that such use of the available planes was not justified.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, in his endorsement to the Naval Court record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter of reconnaissance, and that there were many factors to be considered. He states further, however, that after considering all of the information that was at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, it appears that Admiral Kimmel was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long-range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attacks. This comment adds that it is obvious that the means available did not

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permit an all-round daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched, but that there were, however, certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent, and that such particular cover would have been logical in the circumstances known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. Attention is called to the fact that Admiral Richardson had maintained distant reconnaissance, using the few patrol planes at his disposal, to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation, and that these patrols were discontinued when or shortly before Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson.

In addition to these comments, with which I concur, it may be noted that Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long range patrol in the summer of 1941 on the basis of Intelligence received and reported by Admiral Bloch at that time.

The following findings by Admiral Hewitt in connection with the question of air reconnaissance are approved:

"77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance."

"78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet Patrol planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him."

"87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days."

"89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles."

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"90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor."

"91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched."

"101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu."

(n) Court of Inquiry Finding XIV (1182). This states in substance that the Army radar detection system was ineffective.

The evidence supports the substance of the comment on this finding, which is made in the Second Endorsement; that is, that although the radar detection system in operation at Pearl Harbor was in an embryonic state, nevertheless, even in its then condition it could have and should have served to give at least an hour's warning of the attack. I concur in this comment and also approve the following conclusion by Admiral Hewitt:

"15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army during certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and, although not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of the approach of Japanese aircraft."

(o) Court of Inquiry Findings XV (1186). This states that the best professional opinion in the United States and Great Britain, prior to 7 December 1941, was that an aircraft torpedo attack under conditions of shoal water and limited approach such as those which obtained at Pearl Harbor, was not practicable, and that the Japanese attack was successful principally because of the employment of a specially designed torpedo, which was a secret weapon.

The only comment in the Second Endorsement on this finding is that: "It is evident in retrospect that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated." The principal point upon which the Court of Inquiry seems to rest its findings is the further finding that

it was not believed by American and British naval authorities at that time that torpedoes could be successfully launched from aircraft in waters as shallow as those at Pearl Harbor. As a basis for this view the Court relies upon a letter by the Chief of Naval Operations early in 1941 in which he indicated that torpedoes could not be successfully launched from airplanes in water under a minimum depth of 75 feet (water at Pearl Harbor being approximately 45 feet). It is noted that the Court also refers to a subsequent letter put out for the Chief of Naval Operations in June 1941, by Admiral Ingersoll, which is in conflict with the Court's finding. This letter stated, among other things, that: "It cannot be assumed that any capital or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo." This letter also advised that torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in 13-15 fathoms of water, although several may have been launched in 11-12.

The records of the Navy Department indicated that in April, 1941, there was circulated in the Department an Intelligence report which described the demonstration of an aerial torpedo in England. It appears from this report that the torpedo described was equipped with special wings, and that it required no greater depth of water for its successful launching than the depth at which it made its normal run.

It further appears from the records of the Navy Department that the British reported aircraft torpedo attacks during the year 1940 in which torpedoes were successfully launched in 42 feet of water.

Finally, there is evidence in the record to indicate that nearly a year prior to the actual attack, the feasibility and even the probability of an airplane torpedo attack upon Pearl Harbor was contemplated.

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Secretary Knox's letter of January, 1941, listed an air torpedo attack as second only to air bombing in order of probability in a list of the types of attack upon Pearl Harbor which he considered likely. His letter had been previously cleared with Admiral Stark, and was received in February by Admiral Kimmel.

In view of the foregoing, the finding of the Court of Inquiry is not approved.

(p) Court of Inquiry Finding XVI (1188). The Court here finds that Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet for war, made after receiving the 24 November dispatch, was sound in light (a) of the approval of the steps which he had taken after the dispatch of 16 October which advised that hostilities were possible, and (b) the information then available to him including Admiral Stark's letter of 17 October 1941 and the dispatch of 24 November, 1941, which stated that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Phillippines or Guam, was a possibility.

The Second Endorsement summarises the Court's finding and underscores that portion of the 24 November dispatch which indicated that: "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility...."

It should be further noted that Admiral Kimmel testified that the words, "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam," meant to him that any attack other than on those two places would be on foreign territory, but that the words also included the possibility of a submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands.

The Court refers in its finding to a part of a personal letter

sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel on 17 October, in which Admiral Stark stated: "Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact, I tempered the message handed me considerably." However, the letter also continued: "Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case, after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend." To the letter was annexed a postscript stating in part: "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we made some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry."

It is noted that the Court does not specifically deal with the question of the soundness of Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet, in the light of the highly important information which he received from the Chief of Naval Operations and otherwise during the critical period after the "war warning" of November 27th.

(q) Court of Inquiry Finding XVII (1193). The Court here finds that there were good grounds for believing that the Japanese would attack in the Far East.

In respect of this finding, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations, and that they were in fact initiated there. He notes further that all concerned recognized the possibility that such a

commencement of hostilities would be accompanied by an attack upon Pearl Harbor. He adds that this latter possibility was considerably strengthened by information available at Washington, all of which was not available to Admiral Kimmel.

It appears from the evidence obtained in Admiral Hewitt's investigation that the possibility that the commencement of hostilities by Japan would include an attack upon Pearl Harbor was also strengthened by information received by Admiral Kimmel on and after the war warning of November 27th. The estimates that had been made in the War Plans, which had been approved by Admiral Kimmel, of course contemplated that in the event of war with the Japanese a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was distinctly possible. The information received by Admiral Kimmel as to the location and movement of Japanese naval forces was, at the least, consistent with these estimates. The following conclusion of Admiral Hewitt in this connection is approved:

> "23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December 1941 indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs; that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack . . . ."

(r) Court of Inquiry Findings XVIII and XIX (1196).

These state in substance that Admiral Stark's failure from 26 November to 7 December 1941 to transmit to Admiral Kimmel important information in his possession, obtained from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages,

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nd summarized in the addendum to the Court's findings of facts,
onstitutes a military error.

The comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this
inding was to the effect that Admiral Stark was at fault in failing to
ive Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in
ashington.

The endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, on the
aval Court of Inquiry Record, further pointed out that Rear Admiral
ilkinson, former Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to
he Court as a witness. It was noted that these findings, and the con-
lusions of the Court based thereon, were concerned principally with the
andling of enemy information in the Navy Department, and that consequent-
y, it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have
he testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely re-
ponsible for handling this information. It was concluded that the failure
o obtain this testimony was unfortunate.

With this comment by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I con-
urred. It further appeared to me that the testimony of Captain McCollum,
ho was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and who, according
o other testimony in the record, had important duties in connection
ith the handling of such intercepted enemy information, would be most
elpful. Captain McCollum was also unavailable as a witness to the Court.
ascertained that at the time both Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain
cCollum were actively engaged in combat operations against the enemy,
nd would be so engaged until some date in the future. From the nature
f the duties which these officers were performing in their assignments,
determined that in view of the paramount present needs of the war effort,
heir testimony in this matter could not then feasibly be obtained.

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During his later investigation, Admiral Hewitt was able to obtain the testimony of Admiral Wilkinson and of Captain McCollum, as well as other testimony bearing upon this finding of the Court of Inquiry. The following conclusions of Admiral Hewitt in this connection are approved:

"5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations and its intention to wage war, by means of interception, descryption, and translation of Japanese diplomatic messages."

"6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to the intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready." . . .

"8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the Navy Department.

"9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means, information of the "1 p.m." message and its possible import, were unfortunate.

"10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.

"11. The available information in the possession of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" message, was not disseminated

to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other important messages."

12. The following conclusions by Admiral Hewitt concerning the intelligence secured by tapping the wires of the Japanese Consulate General at Hawaii and by intercepting cable messages of the Japanese Consulate General are approved.

Conclusion 12. "Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu, no information was obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area."

Conclusion 13. "Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio intercept stations of the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. Certain other messages which were intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December 1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack, apparently because the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such work."

13. In its final opinion and recommendation, the Court of Inquiry finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.

With respect to this opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, I concur in the comment expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement that the Navy cannot avoid a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident, and that disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God" beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. Whether or not it is true, as stated in the Second Endorsement, that the Country

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as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to take adequate measures for defense until it was too late to repair the consequences of their failure so to do, it appears that the Navy as a whole, although its ranking officers were fully informed of the most recent developments in the science of warfare, failed to appreciate the true significance of those developments until their impact had been felt by a blow struck at a substantial portion of the Fleet. By the same token, although the imminence of hostile action by the Japanese was known, and the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet and Air Arm were recognized in war plans made to meet just such hostile action, these factors did not reach the stage of conviction in the minds of the responsible officers of the Navy to an extent sufficient to impel them to bring about that implementation of the plans that was necessary if the initial hostile attack was to be repelled or at least mitigated.

That this is so is manifested in the case of the instant disaster in several important respects.

(a) The destructive potentiality of air attack was not properly evaluated, although there was ample information available on this subject in the reports of action by and against the British. That this information was recognized is shown by the inclusion in war and defense plans of appropriate provisions for defense against this type of attack, but that it was not fully appreciated is shown by the fact that these selfsame provisions were not put into effect until the initial attack had been successful.

(b) In respect of unity of command, again all of the plans made adequate provision for joint action, mutual interchange of intelligence, and the fullest utilization of all of the available resources of

both the Army and the Navy; in practice, none of these measures came into being to any appreciable extent prior to the attack.

(d) Within the Navy itself, the organization was such as to submerge the Chief of Naval Operations in a multiplicity of detail pertaining to the procurement and material programs incidental to the rapid expansion of the Navy. This precluded him from giving to war plans and operations the undivided and continuing attention which experience has shown they require, and tended to dull his perception of the critical significance of events.

In making these observations, I am not unmindful of the usual advantage of hindsight, nor do I overlook the fact that this war has proved that any carrier strike, when pressed home with resolution, is almost impossible to deflect. After giving due consideration, however, to all these factors, I am of the opinion that there were, nevertheless, areas in which sound military judgement dictated the taking of action which, though it might not have prevented or defeated the attack, would have tended materially to reduce the damage which the attack was able to inflict. Such action was not taken, and the responsibility must center upon the officers who had it in their power, each within his respective sphere, to take appropriate action.

14. I concur, therefore, with the opinion expressed in paragraph of the Second Endorsement to the Court of Inquiry record that it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action which Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, as the responsible officers, might have taken to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow.

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(a) In paragraph 8 of the Second Endorsement, it is pointed out that Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in Washington, particularly in respect of:

(1) The State Department reply of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese, which was regarded by the Japanese as an ultimatum;
(2) The intercepted Japanese messages inquiring as to the disposition of ships within Pearl Harbor;
(3) The implementation of the "winds" message;
(4) In failing to appreciate the significance of the "one p.m. message" received on the morning of 7 December 1941, and in the failure to transmit it to Admiral Kimmel by the quickest means available.
(5) Finally, it is pointed out in this section of the Second Endorsement that there is a certain sameness of tenor in the communications sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which failed to convey the sense of intensification of critical relations between Japan and the United States.

I concur generally with these comments except as to (3) and (5). In connection with the failure of Admiral Stark to advise Admiral Kimmel of the implementation of the "winds" message, the following conclusion by Admiral Hewitt is approved:

"7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic messages a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used in radio broadcasts in order to convey information to its representatives as to the status of relations between Japan and other countries, no message was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating to the United States."

Although there may be some basis for the comment that prior to 27 November 1941 there was a certain sameness of tone in the communication sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, it should be noted that the message of November 27 was stronger than any message which Admiral Stark sent previously to Admiral Kimmel. That message read as follows:

"THIS DISPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING X NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN LOOKING TOWARD STABILIZATION OF CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC HAVE CEASED AND AN AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY JAPAN IS EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS X THE NUMBER AND EQUIPMENT OF JAPANESE TROOPS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL TASK FORCES INDICATE AN AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITION AGAINST EITHER THE PHILIPPINES (printed in ink, "thai") OR KRA PENINSULA OR POSSIBLY BORNEO X EXECUTE AN APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATORY TO CARRYING OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL 46 X INFORM DISTRICT AND ARMY AUTHORITIES X

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A SIMILAR WARNING IS BEING SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT X SPENAVO INFORM BRITISH X CONTINENTAL DISTRICTS GUAM SAMOA DIRECTED TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES AGAINST SABOTAGE"

Concerning the other comments by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, it might be added that Admiral Stark's omission consisted not only in the failure to transmit fully to Admiral Kimmel certain of the available information, but also in the failure properly and speedily to evaluate that information, particularly on 7 December 1941.

The evidence shows that the State Department reply to the Japanese of 26 November 1941 was in fact regarded by them as an ultimatum; that it was known in the Navy Department before 1 December 1941 that the Japanese regarded the reply as unacceptable; that it was known, as early as 1 December 1941, that the Japanese proposed to strike without warning. It was further known that subsequent to their receipt of the State Department's note the Japanese were directing their emissaries in the United States to do everything in their power to allay any suspicion of a hostile Japanese move. Against this background, there was received on 6 December 1941, in the Navy Department, an intercepted Japanese message to their emissaries here, which stated that a 14-part reply to the State Department's note of 26 November 1941 was being transmitted, and further that a specific time for delivery of this reply would be transmitted from Tokyo by a separate message. This message, together with the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply were all available at the Navy Department by 2100 hours of 6 December 1941. The language of the thirteen parts of the Japanese reply then available indicated that the reply constituted a final breaking off of relations. All this pointed to the conclusion that a surprise attack was to be simultaneous with the delivery of the Japanese message. Thus, while it was not known on 6 December precisely when the attack was to be delivered, there was ample evidence to

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base the conclusion that a surprise move was due within narrow limits of time.

On the morning of December 7th, by 10:30, Admiral Stark had all fourteen parts of the Japanese reply, which in its entirety made explicit the breaking off of relations. He had as well the direction for the delivery of that reply at one p.m., Eastern Standard Time, and there was information available to him that this time corresponded to dawn at Oahu and the middle of the night in the Far East. Although, as found by Admiral Hewitt, no one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor, yet all of these factors pointed to the possibility of such an attack. An acute sensitivity to the tautness of the situation would have dictated at least a plain language telephone communication to Admiral Kimmel, which might have provided a warning sufficient to bring about some material reduction in damage inflicted by the Japanese attack.

(b) I concur with the comments set forth in paragraph 5(b) of the Second Endorsement to the Naval Court of Inquiry record. It is there stated that Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed, did have indications of the increasing tenseness of relations with Japan. In particular, it is pointed out that he had the "war warning" message on 27 November 1940, the "hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that the Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December that the Japanese had ordered destruction of United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands.

In addition, it might be pointed out that Admiral Kimmel in his personal letters, which are a part of the record before the Court, and as well in the war plans approved by him, explicitly recognized the possibility of attack upon Pearl Harbor by air; and, that the information

received by Admiral Kimmel concerning the location and movement of Japanese naval forces after 27 November 1941 should have been evaluated, as previously pointed out, as indicating the continued and increasing possibility of such an attack. It is to be especially noted that while Admiral Kimmel was directed in the war warning message of 27 November 1941, and again on 28 November when the Army message was relayed to him, to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in the Navy Basic War Plan, the chief action taken by him was carrying forward the arrangements for the reenforcing of and continuing the limited air patrols from the outlying islands, ordering on 28 November, the depth bombing of submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area, and engaging in unproductive conferences with General Short. He continued in effect the primary fleet activity of training and the lowest condition of readiness (Condition III) of the fleet in port. He neither ordered long-range air reconnaissance from Oahu to any extent nor advised his fleet air wing commander of the receipt of the war warning message. His failure to take other and more effective action is neither explainable nor excusable by an ambiguity in the meaning of or disagreement as to what would constitute an "appropriate defensive deployment." Admiral Kimmel could have referred to the initial tasks stated in the war plan of maintaining fleet security at bases and guarding against surprise attack by Japan, and if he did not know what was meant by the phrase "appropriate defensive deployment", he should have asked the Chief of Naval Operations for an explanation.

The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states that Admiral Kimmel could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed, and that certain courses of action were open to him, viz:

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(1) He could have used the patrol aircraft available to him to conduct long-range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, and thus made the Japanese task more difficult, whether or not this would have resulted in the detection of the approach of the Japanese carriers; (2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, and thus made it more difficult for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port; (3) He could have maintained a higher condition of readiness under which Naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and damage control organizations fully operational.

Admiral Hewitt's report concludes in part:

"The absence of positive information as to the location of Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open to him were:

"(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews.

"(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.

"(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.

"(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.

"(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible attack forces.

"(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into port at irregular intervals.

"(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and aircraft warning installations."

I concur with these comments as to the various courses of action which Admiral Kimmel could have and should have taken. The evidence indicates clearly, however, that his most grievous failure was his failure to conduct long-range air reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors from Oahu during the week preceding the attack. That this is so is

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manifest from the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt and from his following conclusion, which is hereby approved.

> Conclusion 14. "The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured information, after the receipt of the 'war warning,' as to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu."

During the critical period after November 27 the limitations of the aircraft warning service and of radio intelligence were evident; the only remaining practicable source upon which Admiral Kimmel was entitled to rely for information as to the Japanese naval movements was distant air reconnaissance which, covering the most probable approach bearings, would as Admiral Hewitt concluded have had a reasonable chance of success. The failure to detect the approach of the Japanese task force contributed more to the success of the Japanese attack than did any other single factor.

In addition to the courses of action referred to by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and by Admiral Hewitt, it was, of course, always open to Admiral Kimmel also to take steps to increase cooperation between his organization and the Army command, and to attempt to achieve effective joint command. That conditions were ideal for his accomplishing such an objective is indicated by the evidence in the record and the finding of the Court that the social relationship between him and General Short was excellent. The need for Admiral Kimmel taking such measures existed from the time he took command of the Pacific Fleet. It increased in urgency as the 7th of December, 1941, approached.

15. The Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Naval Court record concludes that:

> "6. The derelictions on thepart of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, they indicate lack of the

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superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.

"7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors."

16. In his endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, states in part:

"I concur in general in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General as expressed in the second endorsement. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:

"(a) I am of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant trial by court martial of any person in the Naval Service, in that the evidence will not sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the Navy.

"(b) With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceedings, I am still of the opinion, which I have previously expressed, that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, though not culpable to a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, were nevertheless inadequate in emergency, due to the lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties.

"(c) Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior strategic judgment may not result in future errors. The action has been taken in the case of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. No further action is recommended.

"(d) For the reasons stated by the Judge Advocate General, I consider it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, or either one of them, to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, nor are court martial or other proceedings (prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan) advisable because such proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of information which would be detrimental to current military operations and to national security measures."

17. The Judge Advocate General in making his endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report states in part:

1. "Subject report clarifies obscure points and supplies

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omissions in the earlier investigations. It is considered that this and former investigations, taken together, present as clear a picture of the pertinent facts as will ever be adduced. With this report, therefore, I believe the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack should be considered completed.

2. "Admiral Hewitt's report brings out and confirms a distinction which impressed me at the time of studying the earlier investigations, a distinction which does much to clarify thinking on the question of placing responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster. It appears that there was no lack of appreciation on the part of any of the responsible officers that war was coming, and coming quickly, during the critical period immediately preceding 7 December 1941. The point on which those officers failed to exercise the discernment and judgment to be expected from officers occupying their positions, was their failure to appreciate, from the information available to them, that Pearl Harbor was a likely target for aerial attack and their failure to take the necessary steps to prevent or minimize such a surprise attack. Each of these officers, in estimating the critical situation, demonstrated a poor quality of strategical planning, in that he largely ruled out all possible courses of action by which the Japanese might begin the war except through an attack in the Western Pacific.

3. "I do not believe that the lack of more complete understanding and co-operation between Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had any great effect on the ultimate result; for it is abundantly shown that they each entertained the same fallacious views, and closer understanding would most likely merely have strengthened those views. Likewise, I submit that the importance of information from Japanese sources has been overemphasized; for had more basically sound principles been observed, the Pearl Harbor disaster would not have occurred. The security of Pearl Harbor was the very core of our Pacific strategy, a fact which did not receive sufficient consideration in the strategic concept of responsible officers.

4. "In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:

(a) As is more fully developed in the answer to question (b), it is not believed that there is sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of any of the officers concerned of any offense known to naval law.

(b) Under the facts of this case, there are only two offenses which are worthly of consideration: (1) Neglect of Duty and (2) Culpable Inefficiency in the Performance of Duty. Under either charge it would be necessary to define the duty of the officer concerned, and to show that it was his duty to follow a course of action other than the one he did. In my opinion

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this would be impossible, as the acts of omission of these officers do not rise above the status of errors of judgment. No clearly defined duty can be established which was neglected or improperly performed. As stated by Fleet Admiral King, in his endorsement on the findings of the Court of Inquiry, the evidence in the case boils down to the fact that the acts of the officers in question "indicate lack of superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency." "Lack of Superior Judgment" is not an offense triable by general court-martial.

* * *

(d) The requirements of 39th Article for the Government of the Navy and Section 346 of Naval Courts and Boards pertaining to the rank of members of a general court martial will make it most difficult to constitute a court for the trial of the officers here concerned during war time or during a period of six months after the cessation of hostilities. Many of the officers of appropriate rank, both on the active and the retired lists, would be disqualified because of interest in the subject matter, the probability of being called as a witness, or by virtue of having been connected with one of the investigations into the matter. If more than one of the officers in question are brought to trial, an entirely new court would be necessary in each case, as members who had tried a former case arising out of the Pearl Harbor attack would be subject to challenge. The Summoning of the necessary witnesses would result in temporarily removing from their duty stations many of the key officers in the naval organization. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that any such court martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and would be detrimental to the war effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six months immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the naval service."

* * *

18. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion, and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General thereto, and the Second Endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, thereto; the record findings and conclusions of Admiral Hewitt, and the Second and Third Endorsements thereto; and on the basis of the foregoing comments, I conclude that:

(a) Then Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch discharged his duties adequately.

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(b) Then Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Admiral Harold R. Stark, particularly during the period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, failed to demonstrate the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties.

(c) Both of these officers having been retired, appropriate action should be taken to insure that neither of them will be recalled to active duty in the future for any position in which the exercise of superior judgment may be necessary.

(d) The appropriate committees of Congress should be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, should be made as soon as such action can be taken without injuring current military operations or the national security.

19. Accordingly, I direct:

(a) Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.

(b) Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.

(c) The appropriate committees of Congress will be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, will be made as soon as such action can be taken without injuring current military operations or the national security.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY"

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(B) Navy's Offer to Rear Admiral Kimmel of Court Martial.

On 7 September 1945 Rear Admiral Kimmel wrote to the Secretary of the Navy stating that he desired "to be brought to trial by General Court Martial in open court at the earliest practicable date". On 28 August 1945 Secretary Forrestal offered a General Court Martial to Rear Admiral Kimmel if the same were still desired by the latter. The letter of Secretary Forrestal to Rear Admiral Kimmel read as follows:

"1. In your letter of September 7th, 1945, to the Secretary of the Navy, you stated 'It is my personal desire to be brought to trial by General Court Martial in open court at the earliest practicable date.'

"2. In his letter to you the Secretary of the Navy gave you his assurance that a trial before General Court Martial would be had at the earliest practicable date that the public interest and safety would permit. In view of the present state of the war and in view of this assurance of the Secretary of the Navy I am disposed to order your trial by General Court Martial in open court in the event that you still desire to be so tried.

"3. It is requested that you advise me promptly whether or not you desire to be tried by General Court Martial."

On 8 September 1945 Rear Admiral Kimmel replied in writing to the Secretary's letter of 28 August 1945, stating that he desired to defer replying to the Secretary's inquiry whether he (Kimmel) still desired a Court Martial until after the pending Joint Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor was completed. This letter read as follows:

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"280 Bronxville Road, Bronxville 8, N. Y., 8 September 1945. From: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Retired). To: The Secretary of the Navy. Subject: General Court Martial in my case.

"1. In view of the agitation for a Congressional Investigation before Congress reconvened and the action of the Senate in ordering a Joint Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor, I wish to defer my reply to your letter of 28 August 1945 until that Investigation is completed."

EXHIBIT NO. 108



Not to be removed from file except with permission of Chief

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

November 2, 1944.

The memorandum at the bottom of this file, a memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck, dated November 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", indexed as 711.94/2512 PS/GD., Confidential File, is a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation.

For purposes of the record there is now being superimposed a memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck, of date February 28, 1944, in which certain pertinent facts are stated and an analysis is made of the contents and true purport of the memorandum of November 27, 1941.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED NOV 1944 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SA/H:SKH:MZS

FW 711.94/2512

FILED NOV 8 1944

February 28, 1944.

On Sunday evening, February 20, Mr. Drew Pearson made in his radio broadcast certain statements regarding Mr. Stanley Hornbeck. Among these, as reported to Mr. Hornbeck on February 21 by the State Department's recorder, was a statement that: "On November 22, 1941 Hornbeck drafted a memorandum stating Japan would not attack this country. Just fifteen days later she did attack Pearl Harbor".

On February 27, Mr. Pearson made in his column of that day certain statements regarding Mr. Hornbeck. There, inter alia, he stated that: "...on November 22, 1941, just 15 days before Pearl Harbor, he wrote an important memorandum to the Secretary of State advising that Japan never would attack the United States."

Such charges warrant attention. What are the facts?

Mr. Hornbeck did not write on November 22, 1941 any memorandum of estimate or prediction. He did on November 27 write a memorandum giving an estimate of "probabilities". Knowledge of the existence of such a memorandum was at some time before the end of August 1942 imparted by someone who had knowledge thereof to some member or members of the press. There appeared in a Washington newspaper in August 1942 under the dateline "By United Press" an article purporting to compare the record of prophecy of Mr. Grew with that of Mr. Hornbeck--unfavorably to the latter. In the course of that article there was given an account of "Hornbeck's 5-1 odds", as follows:

"In contrast to that record [citations of occasions on which Mr. Grew had 'advised the United States to guard against a possible surprise attack'] was the viewpoint of the State Department adviser on political relations, Stanley Kuhl Hornbeck. Hornbeck was of the opinion, even after the truculent statements of Japan's two ambassadors, Kichisaburo Nomura and Sabusu Kurusu, that Japan was bluffing.

"Hornbeck's idea was that Japan would not dare attack the United States, that it was bogged down in China and that the most that need be feared was an intensified campaign against the Burma Road.

"In mid-November, Hornbeck told consultants that if the situation was viewed as a gambling proposition the odds should be 5 to 1 that the United States and Japan would still be at peace a month later. He said it was even money that the United States and Japan would not be at war some months later."

The

The contents of that story indicate that there was a "leak", with apparently prejudicial purpose, somewhere and at some time antedating the moment of the publication of the UP article under reference. It may be presumed that Mr. Pearson has had knowledge of that article or has been told by someone somewhere a story identical with or similar to the story on which the statements in that article were based.

Now what are the facts regarding a memorandum which Mr. Hornbeck is alleged to have written to the Secretary of State on November 22?

To begin with, Mr. Hornbeck did not write on November 22 any memorandum of the type indicated. With regard to a memorandum which Mr. Hornbeck did write (on November 27), see infra.

Mr. Hornbeck had over the years frequently advanced the view that the United States and Japan were moving toward an armed collision and that, unless Japan changed her course or was deflected or brought to a standstill by an encounter with some other country, such a collision was bound some day to occur. During the "exploratory conversations" of the year 1941, Mr. Hornbeck took the position that the only "peaceful settlement" which Japan was seeking was a settlement on her own terms wherein she might have the assent of the United States to her program of conquest in the Far East. By August of 1941 the situation had become definitely threatening. Toward the end of that month, the British Government and the American Government served on Japan a strong warning against further extension of her courses of aggression. From then on it was generally recognized that Japan might embark on acts of force against Great Britain or the United States or both. Officers of the Department of State were in constant touch with officers of Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, exchanging factual data and discussing the possibilities of the situation.

On September 3, in the light of all information at that time available to him, Mr. Hornbeck expressed an opinion that Japan would not attack the United States within the next three months.

On November 3, Mr. Hornbeck advised that the last remaining United States landed armed forces in China be promptly withdrawn.

On

On November 20, Messrs. Nomura and Kurusu presented to the Secretary of State the last of various proposals advanced by the Japanese Government or agents thereof during 1941 for an agreement between Japan and the United States. Six days later, on November 26, the Secretary of State gave to Messrs. Nomura and Kurusu papers which became the last of the statements of counter-proposal made by the American Government during the course of the "exploratory conversations" which had been going on for several months.

On the next day, November 27, Mr. Hornbeck wrote an informal memorandum entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of Situation and Certain Probabilities." That memorandum began with a statement, "The Japanese Government has made certain plans, some of which are absolute and some of which are conditional, for new military operations." He then stated that Mr. Kurusu's mission had had two principal objectives, and that Mr. Kurusu had achieved neither of those objectives. He then moved into the field of "forming conclusions as to what is probable". He stated that in his opinion, "The Japanese intend at this moment to persevere in and to intensify their operations toward 'bringing China to her knees'"; he expressed the opinion that, "The Japanese Government does not desire or intend or expect to have forthwith armed conflict with the United States"; and he said that, "were it a matter of placing bets", he would give odds of 5 to 1 that the United States and Japan would not be at "war" on or before December 15, he would wager 3 to 1 that the United States and Japan would not be at "war" on or before the 15th of January, and he would wager even money that the United States and Japan would not be at "war" on or before March 1. "Stated briefly", he said, "the undersigned does not believe that this country is now on the immediate verge of 'war' in the Pacific." Continuing, he said: "The reasonable probability is that Japan's new military operations of the near future will be directed either toward gaining position in Thailand or operations against Yunnan and the Burma Road or both." And, in conclusion, he said: "There is no warrant for any feeling on our part that the situation in the Pacific has been made worse, as regards the interests of the United States, by refusal on the part of the American Government to make a deal with Japan in terms of 'concessions' by us in return for 'pledges' (qualified and hedged around pledges) by Japan to keep the peace while continuing to make war and to prepare for more war. Japan has been at war in eastern Asia and the western Pacific for several years past. Japan has threatened to make war on each and every one of her near neighbors and even on the United States. No price that we might have paid to Japan would buy or produce peace in the Pacific or security for the United States (and/or Great Britain and/or China and/or Russia) in the Pacific. The

question

question of more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts in Washington."

Examination of the whole content of the memorandum of November 27, 1941 shows that its author was offering not a long-range forecast but an estimate of situation in terms of short-range probabilities; that he nowhere suggested that Japan would not [or that she "would never"] attack the United States; that, although he was of the opinion that the Japanese Government was not intending "to have armed conflict forthwith with the United States", he clearly perceived--and so indicated, as he had done many times before--that the situation was rapidly moving toward such conflict. In suggesting odds of 5-to-1 against "war" within the next three weeks, at 3-to-1 against "war" within the next seven weeks, and at 1-to-1 against "war" within the next fourteen weeks; in affirming that within that period "there may be some armed encounters similar to those to which we have been and are a party in the Atlantic"; and in refraining from even a tentative prognostication beyond that period, he implied that he considered that the sands were fast running out. In stating, in conclusion: "The question of more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts in Washington", he both admitted and affirmed that in the situation then prevailing in American-Japanese relations almost anything might before long happen.

All this is a far cry from the support of the charge that "On November 22 [sic], 1941, just fifteen days before Pearl Harbor he [Hornbeck] wrote an important memorandum to the Secretary of State advising that Japan would never attack the United States."

Especially to be noted regarding this whole matter is the fact that Mr. Hornbeck's memorandum under reference was written not on November 22 (which was during the period while the question of reply to be made to the Japanese proposals of November 20 was under consideration) but on November 27 (which was after the American Government had reached its decision and the Secretary of State had--on November 26-- made this Government's reply).

[Note: The memorandum of November 27, 1941 is in the confidential files of the Department of State under index number 711.94/2512.]

November 27, 1941.

Problem of Far Eastern relations.

Estimate of situation and certain probabilities.

The Japanese Government has made certain plans, some of which are absolute and some of which are conditional, for new military operations.

Mr. Kurusu's mission has had two principal objectives: (1) to obtain, if possible, from the United States, terms of agreement favorable to Japan; (2) to ascertain, if possible, what action, positive or negative, the United States might, may or will take in the event of certain moves by Japan.

The American Government has now given clear indication that it has no intention of making "concessions" to Japan which would be inconsistent with the declared principles and the general objectives of American foreign policy and that it does not intend to condone or give countenance to policies and practice, past and present and future, of aggression on Japan's part.

Mr. Kurusu has not achieved the first objective of his mission.

The Japanese Government has given, during the course of the "exploratory conversations", clear evidence that it is not that Government's intention at the present time to

disassociate

disassociate Japan from the Tripartite Alliance; or to give up its objective of conquering China, conquering other regions in the Far East, and establishing a "new order" and a "co-prosperity sphere" in eastern Asia and the western and southern Pacific. It has persevered in distribution and disposal of its armed forces on a pattern clearly designed for offensive rather than merely defensive operations. It has shown that it clearly intends to persevere in pursuit of its general and its particular objectives by the methods of threat of force or use of force--which means continuance of contribution to instability rather than stability of situation in the Pacific and eastern Asia.

The United States has not shown what action it will take on the positive side in the event of Japan's taking one or another of several possible steps. Mr. Kurusu may have gained certain impressions, but he cannot be sure. Mr. Kurusu has not achieved the second major objective of his mission.

The business of prophesying involves a procedure of examining facts and, as among various developments conceived to be possible, forming conclusions as to what is probable.

The prophecy is an expression by an individual or a group of individuals of an opinion as to what is going to happen.

In

In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese intend at this moment to persevere in and to intensify their operations toward "bringing China to her knees". They have hoped that out of the conversations with the American Government they would extract something which would facilitate their effort toward that objective. Even now, they have not entirely abandoned hope of getting from us either positive or negative action helpful to them in pursuit of that objective.

In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese Government does not desire or intend or expect to have forthwith armed conflict with the United States. The Japanese Government, while launching new offensive operations at some point or points in the Far East, will endeavor to avoid attacking or being attacked by the United States. It therefore will not order or encourage action by its agents (foremost among which are its armed forces) which, if taken, would lead toward use by the United States of armed force by way of retaliation or resistance. So far as relations directly between the United States and Japan are concerned there is less reason today than there was a week ago for the United States to be apprehensive lest Japan make "war" on this country. Were it a matter of placing bets, the undersigned would give odds of five to one that the United

States

States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before the [illegible] (the date by which Secretary Stimson has affirmed that we would be "in the clear" so far as certain dispositions of our forces is concerned); would wager three to one that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before the 15th of January (i.e., seven weeks from now); would wager even money that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before March 1 (a date more than 90 days from now, and after the period during which it has been estimated by our strategists that it would be to our advantage for us to have "time" for further preparation and dispositions). These ventures into the field of speculative prediction are posited on an assumption that our definition of "war" must be the same in reference to activities and events in the Pacific that it is in regard to activities and events in the Atlantic: the indicated wagers are offered on an assumption that, although there may be some armed encounters similar to those to which we have been and are a party in the Atlantic, there will not be a recognized "state of war" such as to disrupt substantially or put an end to the present program of our Army and Navy for disposal within the periods mentioned of equipment and men for "defensive" and general purposes. Stated briefly, the undersigned does not believe that this country is now on the immediate

[illegible]

[illegible] move against Thailand or [illegible] against the Dutch East Indies or [illegible] against China. But, a move against Thailand would be a major operation involving very considerable risk for Japan, and it would be a move from which, once begun, it would be hard for Japan to withdraw. A move by Japan against the Dutch East Indies would involve for Japan a risk of armed embroilment with Great Britain and, possibly the United States; it would involve a risk of developing into a major operation.

A move by Japan now against Thailand would be a move which need not require great effort or involve great risk; if made, it would have a twofold objective, on the one hand an exploration of British and American reaction, and on the other hand a possible gaining of advantageous position in connection with and for operations against the Burma Road and therefore toward bringing closer to an end the "China incident". A move on Japan's part via Indochina into Yunnan and toward putting the Burma Road out of commission (especially by continuous air attack) would involve little risk of embroilment with Great Britain or the United States, would not necessarily involve a major effort, and could be halted or be withdrawn from at any time should developments in

in the general situation render such action advisable in the opinion of Japan's military leaders.

The reasonable probability is that Japan's new military operations of the near future will be directed either toward gaining position in Thailand or operations against Yunnan and the Burma Road or both.

If, when and as Japan makes either or both of those moves, Japan will ipso facto be further disclosing what are her political and military policies and will be further extending herself as regards military disposals and effort and as regards burden and draft upon her national capacity (economic, social, political and military); she will be weakening her position in the event of there coming, later, armed conflict between herself and the United States; she will be exposing herself to naval and air attack on flank and from rear, if and when, by the United States; and she will be adding to the number of her enemies and the weight of ### a public opinion adverse to her in the United States and the British Empire.

There is no warrant for any feeling on our part that the situation in the Pacific has been made worse, as regards the interests of the United States by refusal on the part of the American Government to make a deal with Japan in terms of "concessions" by us in return for "pledges" (qualified

and

and hedged around pledges) by Japan to keep the peace while continuing to make war and to prepare for more war. Japan has been at war in eastern Asia and the western Pacific for several years past. Japan has threatened to make war on each and every one of her near neighbors and even on the United States. No price that we might have paid to Japan would buy or produce peace in the Pacific or security for the United States (and/or Great Britain and/or China and/or Russia) in the Pacific.

The question of more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts in Washington.

PA/H:SKH:FLB

EXHIBIT NO. 109

(Exhibit No. 109 consists of a Guide to Symbols and of Maps submitted by Admiral R. K. Turner showing the location of ships December 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941 and will be found reproduced as Items Nos 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

EXHIBIT NO. 110

SECRET

9 FEBRUARY 1940.

DEAR ADMIRAL: I was glad to get your letter of January 4 and I will follow your suggestion by sending this out by officer messenger.

You want to know, what is in the back of my mind—I will set out for a broad coverage for I am not sure just what you want—so here goes:

As far as what you would do in an emergency, there has been no change in the basic plans with which you are thoroughly familiar from your reading in the Department prior to taking over as CinC, Asiatic. I am told that you also read the CinCUS plans, which makes it unnecessary for me to go into them here except to say there has been no change.

I am in general agreement with the Asiatic Fleet Plan except possibly in the case of the destroyers. The destroyer logistic problems involved in the support of the long continued operations with the cruisers, as contemplated, might prove difficult and might hamper the cruiser operations. One recommendation which has been made to me is that the destroyers should remain at Manila with the submarines and patrol planes as long as practicable and then retire to the eastward. This is for the purpose of harassing enemy shipping in the near vicinity and for operations against enemy steamships which might act again our own and neutral shipping. Retiring destroyers would require such logistic support as might be necessary to permit them to join the Fleet to the eastward of Guam.

It may be that after further study you may desire to change the planned employment of the destroyers. You may want to divide them, using some of them on the operations now planned and the remainder on other tasks. You may even want to recommend a change in the major mission assigned to the Asiatic Fleet in the Basic Plan. Any such remommendations along these lines will of course be given great weight and study.

It is to be borne in mind of course that the present War Plans have been formulated as a result of studies continuing over an extended period by a number of officers. They follow Army-Navy joint plans. In the Navy Basic Plan the Asiatic Fleet Plan has been related and articulated to the U. S. Fleet Plan.

[2] The existing plan,—and for that matter any plan—, should, in my opinion, be changed by only one of two processes,—either after careful thought and investigation of the effect of the change in the Orange Plan as a whole, or, as a result, in time of war or emergency, of the factual aspects of the situation. The changes then made (in war or emergency) may be brought about by the

President, by the Navy Department, or by the responsible Operating Task Force Commander on the spot. It may be that the employment of the United States Fleet itself,—the Joint Asiatic Force—will be changed when the emergency arises. It may be that the employment of the forces of the Asiatic Fleet can not be carried out as planned because of the existing conditions.

I feel that the main problem confronting you as Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, does not lie with what to do when war has been definitely joined. At such a juncture, guided by plans, directives, conditions, and your own considered thought on the problem, I feel confident that you will be able to make decisions essentially correct, and better than they could be made elsewhere. The main problem lies rather, (and this was undoubtedly in your mind when you wrote), with what to do during a period of growing tension which may or may not culminate in war. In this connection it is to be noted that War Plans, as now conceived and prepared, follow the basic premise that war, (actual hostilities), has broken out. This is, of course, by no means always the case. As so frequently exemplified in recent years, armed forces may be employed in varying degrees, without being followed by an actual outbreak of war. Even when actual hostilities do break out they may or may not be accompanied by a formally declared war, and the extent of hostilities may be restricted or may be unlimited.

In view of the actual situation existing today, in the Far East and elsewhere, we might well say that we need "Tension Plans" as well as "War Plans". But to prepare well considered "Tension Plans" we need a planning machinery that includes the State Department and possibly the Treasury Department as well as the War and Navy Departments. Of course, we have planning machinery for the Army and Navy which now provides for a better coordination of planning effort than has existed in the past. We do not, however, have regularly set up planning machinery that brings in the State Department. It is true that we have frequent consultation with the State Department, but things are not planned in advance, and often we do not receive advance information of State Department action which might well have effected our own activities.

It is also true, of course, that the State Department must in a country such as ours feel its way along to a large extent. This is unavoidable. In view of this the State Department is probably unable always to set up, in advance, concrete programs of their intentions.

[3] In the absence of the machinery for, or possibility of, planned coordinated action, I feel that naval commanders must continue—and they do continue to employ their forces in the support of the national purpose and the national policy in such manner and to such extent that they can make the support effectively with the forces available.

It seems to me to be the case, generally in life, that when a confusing and disturbing situation presents itself those who are confused and uncertain tend to orient their ideas and their actions and to rally around anyone capable of taking a decisive attitude and determined action, even though this one himself may be not too certain of what should be done. However, I know this is an unnecessary comment in your case. There is no substitute for good judgment.

A primary objective that continuously confronts naval commanders, particularly those in the "front line trench" as you express it, is the effective support of policy in a manner that does not result in war. The effective support prevents the adversary from being stimulated by the appearance of weakness, but the effective support must of course be tempered by the avoidance of provocative action. I feel that the people of the United States will support firm action as long as it does not go into a degree of jingoism that would serve to provoke the other fellow, and that if in the face of such firm but restrained attitude Japan should step on our toes, that our country will realize that Japan herself has provoked the action.

I realize very well the conflicting considerations with which you are faced. By continuing your forces, or a portion of your forces, at the point of conflict—the "Front Line Trenches" between the Japanese and the United States' interests,—you sustain United States' interests. If as the tension increases, you, or your forces stay on the spot you thereby continue to sustain these interests, may stay the hand of Japan, and may be the means of avoiding war instead of provoking it.

At the same time the longer these forces remain on the spot the greater their danger of being cut off and destroyed. If they leave too early, or leave precipitately, they may be saved but this action may not only fail to give maximum support to our interests but may even be the means of provoking war by a Japan which is apt to respond with aggressiveness to a show of weakness; and to

respond with a hesitating attitude to a show of strength and determination on our part.

On the other hand, if your forces stay on the spot too long in the face of threatening dispositions of Japanese force they may be unduly and inextricably jeopardized. It seems that some degree of exposure of a portion of the forces of the Asiatic Fleet is unavoidable. If we are not willing to expose them, not only will we face the surrender of interests and policies, but we accept a weakened position and loss of prestige, and may even bring on a war, (after we have weakened our position) that we have desired to avoid.

[4] Aside from the forces that must be exposed, for a period at lease, to this increasing threat and danger, I presume that the situation will guide you into keeping other forces of the Asiatic Fleet strategically deposed in a manner that will prevent their being contained by Japanese forces and will permit them to take counter measures against Japanese forces or interests. In this way, of course, they too support the forces exposed.

Undoubtedly the disposition of your forces could be better guided if you could be kept advised in advance of actions contemplated by the State Department. Whenever it is possible to do so, we will keep you so advised, and whenever State Department policies for either temporary or longer contemplated periods can be set forth, I will keep you informed of them.

Under conditions as they are, it seems to me, that you must continue to meet each situation with the adroit firmness that has characterized you attitude and that of your predecessors,—even though exposure of some of the forces of the Asiatic Fleet is necessarily involved. I feet that the Navy Department will continue to support such a firm position. It is the Department's intention to maintain the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific and that fact may have an important moral effect in the support of your own tactful handling of any incident.

We keep the State Department advised of your letters, also the President. They are glad to get your letters. We are continually on the lookout with the State Department for anything of moment and of interest to you. To date nothing has been forthcoming other than what you know from despatches. I feel safe in saying that at present the State Department does not believe war probable in the near future, at least not in 1940; and that any pressure they put on they hope to apply in such a manner as not to precipitate a final crisis. Of course, they are in close touch with Senator Pittman who is the sponsor of an embargo bill. As framed, this will would permit the President to prescribe as to if and when to apply it. In other words, it can be used advisedly along with other forms of pressure. We will make every effort to keep you in touch with the situation, which is now, with the abrogation of the treaty, getting into a stage which will be interesting to say the least.

With reference (in your letter of December 1) to the reversal of our attitude on your proposal relative to defense of Shanghai settlements. I will simply state now that when I sent you the despatch I did so after a conference, at which, I, at least personally understood the stand represented to be a Government stand and one which the State Department fully approved. Somebody reversed. Either I was wrong or the State was wrong in the understanding. However, that is water over the dam and I think it better to let it stay that way. I simply want to let you know that here in the Navy Department we felt we were on sound ground and acting in perfect good faith with the State Department. I had some uncomfortable moments and so did the State Department before the second telegram was sent to you. It is only fair to assume we were both acting in good faith.

[5] You know Harry Yarnell thinks we should never percipitate anything in the Western Pacific unless the principally interested powers (United States French-British-Dutch) act in concert. The possibility of getting such concerted action appears to me to be improbable during the present unpredictable state of affairs in Europe. We have been turning over in our heads whether you could use Hongkong, Singapore, North Borneo, or French or Dutch possessions but there is no indication that any of them would be available. If we have to intern anything and have any option, naturally it would be desirable to select ports in countries which might be with us later, or at least friendly to us.

To return to some of the purely naval aspects of the situation, there have been added certain forces for which the plans now available in the Department do not provide. In regard to patrol planes I presume that they should be added to the local defense forces to work in conjunction with destroyers and submarines and with the Army. I assume that they would remain in Manila Bay for approximately the same time as the submarines, although it may be found

ecessary to send away the tender early in the game. This of course can be etermined only by the man on the spot with full recognition of existing condi- ons. If they have to look for shelter they probably would have more freedom f movement for internment in Singapore, for example, than any other port— nd of course internment in Singapore might well turn out not to be internment the end. It might be possible to have them work their way back home epending on the situation in Guam, Wake, and Midway.

The mining situation is receiving a great deal of thought in particular as result of Smeallie's letter. We have authorization for the construction of ine stowage at Marivales, but it appears impracticable, and may be undesirable, attempt to get money for that purpose at this time. For the present it would ppear necessary to continue this stowage at Cavite.

Another problem arises, however, on the question of mine stowage. The six -class submarines that we sent you are not now fitted to handle submarine tor- edo tube mines but I am advised that they can be so fitted by providing stowage nd handling fittings for mines, both fore and aft. I believe that this work can e accomplished by the submarines being laid up for no longer a period than two r three weeks. It would be highly desirable in my opinion for these submarines be fitted to lay mines and for mines to be available for this purpose at Manila. his would involve a minimum of 48 mines per submarine or a minimum for hich stowage capacity would be required for about 300 of these mines. We ould be glad to have your thought and recommendation on this point.

We have no mines at present suitable for laying by aircraft.

In regard to logistics, provision must be made of course for oil and rendezvous. Ve realize that and the War Plans provide for it. In addition to what provision e can make, I [6] assume you would exercise a prefectly free reign nd would arrange to charter what you would consider to be necessary if suitable essels can be found available.

I have not mentioned the Marines or the Army. I have talked to Holcomb. le does not know himself just what the plan is for the Marines, but states that hat depends almost entirely on arrangements more or less under your control, s for example hooking up with the Chinese, removal, and, in the last analysis, ossible capture.

I have taken up the question of reinforcements for the Philippines by the rmy—both troops and planes. I think Marshall would be glad to send them he had them. I suggested a minimum of 20,000 men and a considerable number f planes. Of course I realize that they would have to be sent out more or less nostentatiously, if we were ever able to send them, and frankly, of this I have ery little hope—just at present *NONE*. Our army seems to be so dispersed, so mall, so lacking in material and so few units available outside of the essentials n Hawaii and the Canal that the outlook for stationing any considerable de- achment elsewhere looks hopeless just now.

The question of the relief of the AUGUSTA is in the mill at present. I am eferring it to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, with the idea of getting he AUGUSTA back for a much needed overhaul and for an increase in her ntiaircraft battery, including other important military alterations. The nigger n the wood pile just now is that the only ship available is the HOUSTON which as been fixed up for more or less quick use by the President whenever he vants to cruise in the Pacific. We are hoping to be able to fix up another ship t no great cost. Whether it will be the HOUSTON, the INDIANAPOLIS or he CHICAGO we will inform you after the threshing it out here. I assume t makes no difference to you. Of course whatever you get will be one of the nodified ships, with the increased antiaircraft battery of 8 guns.

I have had a copy made up of allotments which we have recently sent you al- hough if I remember this has been previously covered.

Please excuse the length of this letter but as it will come by officer messenger have tried to cover what I thought you had in mind about being kept in touch.

As an item of interest the question of whether to stay in the Philippines or et out of the Philippines has recently been debated in the Town Hall program— New York. One of the speakers was Mr. Paul McNutt. I am enclosing a record f that meeting.

My own personal feeling is that we cannot do other than get out unless the Filipinos of their own volition and in no uncertain voice request us to remain. There is a point of honor involved as I see it which must be followed.

[7] Of course I could indulge in some wishful thinking that consistent with the foregoing we could greatly improve Guam for possible future contingencies. What is your opinion on this?

I trust that Carolyn has fully recovered by now and that you and all the little Harts are fine. Your prospective daughterin-law was in the Department the other day and those who saw her said she was an exceptional, highly intelligent, fine looking girl. Am sorry to say I missed her.

Keep cheerful—all good wishes.

Sincerely,

Admiral T. C. HART,
U. S. Navy, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
USS AUGUSTA.

Since dictating the foregoing, I have your letter of 29 Jan.—I would work neither my planes nor my ships not one whit more than I felt the situation called for—in fact I would conserve them just as far as possible.

H. R. STARK.

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22 OCTOBER 1940.

DEAR TOMMY: You will have heard from J. O. Richardson via the HOUSTON before this reaches you and I really haven't much to add.

I was tickled to pieces over your going on to Manila as per your plans and scratched off a despatch with quick approval in which Colonel KNOX thoroughly concurred.

I am delighted that you have practically all important units out of China but here again, we are leaving this entirely to your discretion.

The situation is not good and does not seem to be improving but just how critical it is no one ever knows.

I wish there was something I could give you from the State Department but there isn't. I think I may say safely, however, that there will be no backdown anywhere by the United States in the Far East, unless there is a right-about-face in present day policy.

JO's memorandum to you really gave all my thoughts and this note is just to let you know we are thinking about you and are glad you are on the job. I noted that in acknowledging my last letter you did not use the word "affirmative" which I asked you to send if you approved of the idea to send some heavy cruisers to you.

I am delighted over the prespect of getting our women and children out of the Far East and know what a relief it will be to you to give them the opportunity to come home, and also the knowledge that no more will be permitted to go out.

Every good wish as always.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral T. C. HART,
U. S. Navy, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
USS AUGUSTA.

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[1] Secret

12 NOVEMBER, 1940.

Dear Tommy,

We are pushing ahead as rapidly as possible on the preparation of material and personnel for any eventualities. While there is much still to be done (a condition that will continue to exist for years) I can not say that matters are unsatisfactory, so far as concerns things under my control. But we do not yet know the direction which affairs may take.

For the past three weeks I have been spending many hours, together with a group of officers particularly concerned, in developing a broad estimate of the material situation as it affects possible naval war operations. This estimate, or study, is now in the hands of the President. I do not expect any immediate decision, but do hope that it will serve to clarify matters so that, at least, those in authority will be fully aware of the implications of any particular policy that may be adopted with respect to the war.

Ghormley tells me the British expected us to be in the war within a few days after the reelection of the President—which is merely another evidence of their slack ways of thought, and of their non-realistic views of international political conditions, and of our own political system. They have been talking, in a large way, about the defense of the Malay Barrier, with an alliance between them-

elves, us, and the Dutch, without much thought as to what the effect would be n Europe. But we have no idea as to whether they would at once begin to fight ere the Dutch alone, or were we alone, to be attacked by the Japanese. Then gain, the copy of the British Far Eastern War Plan which Thomas obtained at ingapore, shows much evidence of their usual wishful thinking. Furthermore, hough I believe the Dutch colonial authorities will resist an attempt to capture eir islands, I question whether they would fight if only the Philippines, or only ingapore, were attacked.

The Navy can, of course, make no political commitments. Therefore, we can ake no specific military plans for an allied war. However, as I told you in my espatch, you can perform a useful service by laying, with the British and ossibly the Dutch, a framework for a future plan of cooperation, should we be rced into the war. I rather doubt, however, that the Dutch will talk freely ith you. If they do my idea would be that you would explore [2] the elds of:

Command arrangements,

General objectives,

General plan of cooperative action, including the approximate naval and ilitary deployment.

You are, of course, committed to assist the Army in the defense of Luson. ut with allied bases to fall back on, your direct support of the Army might well all short, in degree, of the support you would afford were we alone to fight apan.

I do not believe Japan will attack us if she can avoid doing so. In fact, I elieve she will go far to avoid hostilities with the United States. It is even oubtful if she wishes, at this time to fight the British or the Dutch. It seems ore likely that she would prefer, while maintaining a position in readiness, o consolidate Indo-China with her positions further north, and to begin a more r less gradual economic penetration of the Netherlands East Indies and Siam. hould we refrain from imposing additional economic sanctions, present condi- ions, including the recent 1,800,000 ton oil contract might be stabilized over a onsiderable period of the future. Our State Department, as you may know, ad a hand in the execution of that contract.

But we never can tell. Should a war develop between Japan and an alliance f British, Dutch and Americans, I believe that Japan will plan to:

(a) Occupy Guam, and reeforce the Mandates with troops, submarines, and ome air;

(b) Establish naval control of Philippine waters by destroying our naval and ir forces, basing her main fleet in the Pescadores and a strong, fast detachment n Halmahera;

(c) Capture Luson with troops now based in Formosa and Hainan;

(d) Capture Borneo, to be followed by a campaign against the Dutch directed rom East to West.

I believe that the allied objective should be to reduce Japan's offensive power hrough economic starvation; the success of the blockade would surely depend pon allied ability to hold the major portion of the Malay Barrier. Your own ction would, of course, be based upon your view as to the most effective method f contributing to the attainment of the ultimate objective.

One thing (and this is for your ears alone) you can depend upon is that we ould support you, probably by sending a naval reenforcement to you at oerabaja or Singapore, and by other means. I would be glad to get your iews as to the size and composition of such a reenforcement; but in making your ecommendation I trust you will keep in mind that our Navy must hold in the id-Pacific, that we may also be in the war against the other two Axis Powers, nd that the collapse of Britain would force us to a major re-orientation toward he Atlantic.

You may well appreciate that I do not welcome such a war (British Collapse).

The naval part of the War Plan, Rainbow III, for this possible war is about ompleted, and will be on its way to you within a short time. We are hoping o send naval attachés to Singapore, Batavia, Soerabaja, Balikpapan, and Ceylon; ossibly one of these officers may bring this plan to you via air transportation.

We are all delighted to be able to put over the dependent thing for you. The tate Department strongly supported us. I can appreciate the coals that must ave been heaped upon you when it was learned that, while we were forcing our ependents home, the Army was sending dependents out.

You know how glad I always am for any opportunity to assist any or all of the Little Harts, as well as the Big Hart, in any way in which I can.

Keep cheerful,

Sincerely

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral T. C. HART,
U. S. Navy Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

P. S. Am sixty today. Here's hoping! The first three score are the hardest!

Admiral HART

18 NOVEMBER 1940.

P. S. Admiral Brownson's name is being submitted to the President on the list going over to him for consideration in connection with the new destroyer. Here's hoping.

Secret
Op-10-MD

AUGUST 28, 1941.

DEAR TOMMY: Since I last wrote you, much water has gone over the dam.

I will not burden you with my recent cruise in the Atlantic and the meeting with the British, except to tell you that is was extremely interesting. I hope and believe much good will result. If nothing else, the fact that we got to know each other very well is bound to be helpful.

This morning, I had a long talk with Mr. Juiji Kasai, member of the Japanese Parliament. I was very frank with him, as I have been with Admiral Nomura, and I find that they both seem to feel very much the same way. I think I have written you how much Admiral Nomura has impressed us with his sincere desire that our countries solve their problems amicably. There is no doubt in my mind but that he has no stomach whatever for the Tri-partite Agreement, and the same applies to Mr. Kasai. I still have some hopes, or, to put it in another way, have not given up hope that peace in the Pacific may be maintained. However, I could wish that hope were not sustained by such a slender thread.

Whether or not the Japanese will go into Thailand, I do not know. There is no doubt but that if they do, the reaction in the United States will be bad. This has been made very plan to our Japanese friends here, and, therefore, to the home government.

I am continuing to urge strengthening of the Army forces in the Philippines, particularly in planes and mechanized equipment, and I hope some tangible results will take shape.

The Russian situation has complicated the entire picture. Ambassador Oumansky and some of their military men from Russia are coming in tomorrow, and I know that their demands will be very urgent.

[2] There is a good deal of a three-ring circus going on hereabouts. Shortages in raw materials become more acute daily. We have our own job of enormous expansion in every department. We are pressed from all over the world to sustain the forces actually fighting at the front and, of course, we recognize the importance of this. All in all, there is a never-ending problem of struggles for priority, and this is only one of the many problems involved—and it is a tough one.

You guessed quite right with regard to our feeling about ADB. We told the British in our recent meeting what we thought of it. They now have our official letters, so one of these days we may be expecting a reply. Incidentally, I was very frank with Admiral Pound with regard to the Command situation which you have pictured in the Far East. I hope the changes which have or will take place will be helpful.

I know about the very indiscreet radio and other leaks with regard to those recently sent to China. I have taken it up with those concerned, and here's hoping for at least some semblance of secrecy on the next one. Anyway, we shall try.

Regarding the location of the fuel oil tanks:—I was ready to accept your recommendation without going back again because, as you know, we said we would leave the decision up to you. However, Ben Moreell felt a little better after I sent the wire and your confirmation of your previous decision.

Not much general news.

We have something over 262,000 men in the Navy, of whom about 40,000 are reserves. Reenlistments for the year have averaged a little over 70 per cent—and still are. We are aiming for a monthly quota of 12,000 recruits, and I hope will attain it this fall. We have, as you may know, put on a very extensive advertising campaign in the South and in the Middle West farm belt. I am more thankful every day that I have Nimitz as a side partner at this time. I hope you enjoyed the letter which the Bureau of Navigation is sending out in the interest of increasing our reenlistments. After all, that is the greatest recruiting ground we have if we can make it effective.

Of course, the heavy expansion puts a terrific burden on the forces afloat, but it seems inevitable that it happens that way. [3] As you know, I started in almost the minute I got here for great expansion in personnel, but, like everything else, it takes TIME.

There is much talk at present regarding possibility of Japanese interference with our sending material to Russia; that is, if it goes between the Japanese Islands and through the Sea of Japan to the Maritime Provinces. I rather doubt if they will take any immediate action, because it seems to me they are in one of those hesitation periods, but, of course, it is something that can not be discounted. Have you any line at all on the efficiency of the Russian submarines in the Pacific. Do you recommend any Staff talks with them? When the question you raised concerning closing the Sulu Sea came up here, I felt it inadvisable to make any proclamation, at least at that time for fear that later on, for some reason or other, the Japanese might use such an action by us as a precedent for their closing the Sea of Japan. However, people don't seem to need much in the way of precedent in these days, that being more of a case of "Can one get away with it?"

We are directing Kimmel today to start his Southeast Force of two light cruisers, which you will recall WPL–51 envisaged. We have a Radar in the Galapagos Area—incidently, another one just at present Southeast of Bermuda. We are starting considerable operations between North America and Iceland and the Good Lord knows if the Germans want an excuse for war, they have plenty. I have had just exactly 11¼ hours at this desk so far today, and I am afraid this letter will be terribly disjointed and loose, but I just felt like sitting down and talking to you for a while. I am going up to the Old Allies Inn for a bite and am coming back to finish up. There seems no end to it. Things move so slowly at times, but I suppose no matter how they move, we would still be impatient. Anyway, here's hoping, and every good wish to you in the wide world, as always.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral THOMAS C. HART, U. S. N.
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
U. S. S. Houston, c/o Postmaster,
San Francisco, California.

[4] P. S. I hope to get up home over Sunday—Labor Day. I realise how much that would mean to you too. I often recall what someone once told me—"In this man's Navy, hard work gets you more hard work"—and no truer words were ever said.

I just had a happy thought and indulged myself in it and called up Carolyn and told her I was writing you. That fine girl had only cheerful things to say, and her voice just sounded glad. She said the best news she had—after being out all day—was to come home and find two letters from you. She also stated that the children are all fine and, in fact, everything was fine. Just what I would have expected from her, so I'll wind up here with good night.

Keep cheerful.

P. S. No. 2. I am taking up with Jerry Land and, in fact, already had before receiving your letter, the question of radio operators in his Merchant ships.

Regarding the docking of the four ships you mentioned:—I knew Jerry had had his troubles on this score, so many departments being involved and hands being tied.

[1] Op–10D–MD

NOVEMBER 1, 1941.

DEAR TOMMY: This will be in answer to yours of September 30 and October 7. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are in good fettle.

I am glad you wrote the official letter about the slowness with which official documents reach you. Of course, I am very sorry that conditions were such that the letter was *required*. I think the situation will be met alright; give us a jolt if it occurs again; it's the only way we can lick it.

I have run down what information I could on the status of the Radar equipment which was slated for the Sixteenth Naval District.

I find that two (2) units SCR-268 and one (1) unit 270-b had been shipped from San Francisco on September 8, 1941. I was later advised that the Department had been informed that the equipment arrived in Manila on September 29, 1941. By this time, I suppose installation is well under way. I am hoping that it will live up to expectations. If it does, it will be a great help.

Your reference to the Russians! I agree that it would be a fine idea to get as much information as possible about them. At the moment, there seems to be little chance of learning anything authoritative. An officer on duty in the Department (in the far Eastern section of O. N. I.) recently returned from temporary duty in London. During the course of his "inquiring around" in the Admiralty, a Britisher in the Intelligence branch remarked of the Russians that they were "Inquisitive, Acquisitive, and Secretive." That seems to about size them up. Our officer stated that the British *just don't* have anything of value on them. The British *think*, however, that the Russian Navy is probably better than we might ordinarily be inclined to think. The secretiveness of the Russians is hard to understand. I suppose, however, so many hands have been turned against them in the past that their current attitude is merely an outgrowth of the past. Even so, they do not permit the foreign attaches and correspondents to go to the front.

[2] Our Moscow Mission, as you no doubt know, has returned. Admiral Standley is enthusiastic about the Russians. He feels that they will hold on for a long time to come. I am informed that General Burns shares his views. I hope they are correct. One thing we *do* know is that they are in need of much material. How that is going to be gotten to them remains a problem which will give us many a headache before it is solved.

I am sorry that the PT situation was not better handled. I trust that the many problems in connection with them can be worked out. The tender situation is in hand, and I hope the fuel arrangements can be satisfactorily handled too.

The Bureau of Ships has informed me that spare parts ample to recondition engines on the station were shipped from Detroit on October 5, 1941. Further, seventy-five percent of the base tools are scheduled for delivery between now and February, 1942. Ships is sending a factory service engineer to Manila. Captain Kintner has just called to say that, depending on the vagaries of transportation, this engineer should arrive some time in November.

As noted above, I trust that the fuel situation works out satisfactorily. For the time being, and until you can get 100 octane gas, BuShips advises that you can use 87 octane at 4/5 load. This, I am informed, is the only type of gas that was available to these craft during their employment in the South last winter.

I hope that the PTs will be of real service to you. The British think they are fine. On the other hand, I quote about them from a recent letter from Kimmel:

"The 12 PTs which you sent to us I fear will be of very little use in this area. We sent them on an average day to make a trip from Oahu to Molokai. The reports of this trip have gone forward officially. They were practically useless in this sea and could not make more than 10 knots. Several of them had to turn back and a few personnel were quite seriously injured from being thrown about. We need something much more substantial to be of any use out here."

We are considering sending you six (6) more PTs and the NIAGARA as a tender. We are asking the Bureau of Ships to get the "FLORENCE D" for employment as you propose. That will let you have the GOLD STAR up your sleeve for velvet.

These boats have shown weakness when pounded into heavy seas. I might add that we know the weaknesses of these PTs. We gave them some grueling tests in fairly heavy weather from New London up around Block Island, down around Fire Island and back. They made a destroyer [3] hump to stay with them, but all the boats which made the race suffered severe structural damage. We deliberately pounded them to see what they would stand and to develop their weaknesses. Profiting by what we learned, we hope to develop a much sturdier craft. Meanwhile, we sent out what we had, hoping they would be of some use.

I trust you will be glad to get the additional SS.

Sorry we cannot give you any more PBTs at the moment. They are just not to be had. The PBTs that we have gotten to date are not, as one might suppose, the result of our "big (May, 1940) money". New production of these will not come off the line until April, 1942. The planes that are *now* leaving the factories are those contracted for and paid for by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands. The VOS we are sending you is a *good* plane. The engines are excellent, and there are no "bugs" in them. Next to the PBY, they are decidedly the best type we have for your purpose. They can carry two 325-pound depth bombs, and that is pretty good. Two hundred forty (240) of these depth bombs are on their way out, and some seven hundred twenty (720) more are to follow shortly. I believe these planes will do good work for you as an inner anti-submarine patrol. It is true that the radio is not as high-powered as we wish it were—but even *that* might be to your advantage. These 24 planes and personnel will complete assembly by about January 1, 1942 at the Naval Air Station, San Pedro, and will be despatched from that point.

With reference to your problem of cooperation with the Army, I suggest that consideration be given to the agreement Kimmel and General Short are now using at Pearl Harbor. The name of the paper, a copy of which you now have is "Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base." Our file room tells me it went out along with Serial 059230 of June 20, 1941.

Your remarks about the ballast in the ST. LOUIS are noted. Mike Robinson states that the need for ballast in that ship came about as the result of endeavoring to introduce extensive improvement and changes in an existing design. The ship was laid down as a development of the BROOKLYN class, with engine and boiler arrangements modified to decrease damage from underwater explosion; the secondary battery was changed from open pedestal mounts to enclosed twin 5''-25 caliber mounts; and finally fire control was extensively rearranged to improve overhead view. Twin 5''38 caliber guns were subsequently developed, and this type was adopted instead of the 5''-25 caliber. This, together with director alterations, put a great deal of topside weight in the ship. The result of these changes was that, while the ST. LOUIS was entirely satisfactory from damage stability point of view under loaded conditions, she was not satisfactory in a light condition, and ballast accordingly had to be added to make her satisfactory to withstand heavy underwater [4] damage under any conditions of load. Subsequent alterations, recommended by the King Board, added more weight; this, of course, required that additional ballast be added. Mike Robinson remarked: "I feel very bad about the whole situation. I hardly think anyone can be *blamed*. If blame there be, it should be on our Naval Treaty Limitations. When one is given 10,000 tons around which to construct a ship, it follows that every effort is going to be made to get as much into the ship as possible. This the constructors did. When the new requirements for heavy anti-aircraft batteries came along, there just wasn't enough reserve stability left in the design to take care of the additional weights." Voila.

I took up the matter of Brooke-Popham's activities and the publicity given the meetings of the United States and British Commanders in the Far East with Admiral Sir Charles Little of the British Joint Staff Mission. A few days since, I had a note from him which said, "We have referred the matter to the Chiefs of Staff in London." It would seem that that reference should take care of the matter.

I referred the matter of your mines to the Bureau of Ordnance. Blandy has just brought in a letter which appears to cover the subject pretty thoroughly. I am enclosing a copy of it, which may be of assistance to you.

I am sorry about Bemis. It was our impression that he would be a good one for that job. You have had tough luck with your commandants.

As for your recommendation about Glassford. I am not prepared to give you an answer at this moment. I appreciate the fact that he has been out there well over two (2) years, but these are unusual times. The Department of State has many reasons why a Flag Officer should be kept on the river. We practically have to go along with them on this, and I can think of no one at the moment better qualified for the job than Glassford. I will discuss with Nimitz the many angles that your recommendation suggests to me and see if we can't work out something.

In your letter of August 19, you recommended that the Department select the officer it desired ultimately to relieve you and send him out forthwith. More recently (September 30) you asked what had become of Horne's and Greenslade's candidacy for your job. All I can say at the moment is that neither of

these officers is available and both are doing important duty in their presen assignments.

Of course, I have been searching my mind for some time for someone wh has *all* the many exacting qualifications for your relief. As you can wel imagine—but, due to modesty, you would probably not admit—the job of find ing someone to measure up to your standards has not been an easy one. Man officers no doubt are *available*, but, in the *important* job you now hold, the run of-the-mine chap just will not do. We have to have the *very best*. To list jus *some* of the necessary qualifications: he must be acceptable to the President an the Secretary; he must be mentally and physically vigorous; he must posses a fine strategical mind; he must be an inspiring leader; he must be possesse of great common sense and balance; he must be able to take care of us in con ferences and guard us with the British while still viewing the problem as a whole; he must have a profound knowledge of the employment of the mos important weapon he will have at his disposal—the submarine; and, finally, must have *complete confidence* in him. Your station is the front line trench an one with no less qualifications than those listed can be considered.

I am considering *Nimitz;* it would be like losing one of my arms here; I hav not even broached it to the Secretary. I am just telling you what is in my mind— if and when you tell me you feel you should be relieved.

I realize 3 years are a long time on the Asiatic—particularly when it stretche out indefinitely beyond a life of service and normal retiring age. It was no easy for me to ask you to continue in the Far East—in lots of ways I hated t do it—but I could think of no one else so well qualified to serve our countr out there in time of stress. Moreover, I did it also because I know your rugge honesty—and that you will unhesitatingly tell me if you think, *for any reaso* I should send out someone else. Please tell me exactly how you feel about it.

With all good wishes.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral T. C. HART, U. S. Navy
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
% Postmaster, Asiatic Station,
San Francisco, California.

[*1*] Secret
(Re6b)
From: The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance
To: The Chief of Naval Operations
Subject: Effect of Sea Growth on Mines with Special Reference to a Mine Re covered in Manila Bay and Reported in a Personal letter from Admira Hart to Admiral Stark

1. A dispatch has been prepared containing essentially the following:

"More detailed report on recovered mine including photographs is requested It is suggested that this mine may have been the one reported lost in Sixteent Naval District letter S76–1 Serial C–0001 dated 5 February 1941. Attention i called to the fact that tests as long as two years off Kitty Hawk and in Florid waters even when resulting in apparent encrustation did not prevent operatio It is suggested that condition of field in Manila Bay be tested by sweeping a fe mines at the end. First so as to make contact with antennae and second so a to cut steel mooring with subsequent inspection under control of personnel traine in mine recovery."

2. More detailed comment has been submitted by Commander J. B. Glennon o the Naval Ordnance Laboratory as follows:

"The following comments are submitted relative to sea growth on mines a Cavite and elsewhere:

"In carrying out mine endurance tests off the coast of North Carolina, th Bureau has encountered the problem of sea growth on all assemblies not prompt recovered. Observation of tests units on return to the Naval Ordnance Labor tory practically always gives an impression similar to, but in lesser degree tha that outlined by Admiral Hart. It generally appears that steel surfaces ar encrusted and horns at times rendered inoperative by a rigid layer of marin growth. Investigation of this feature has shown that the condition of the marin growth changes very rapidly when removed from the sea water, and that growth which readily brush away when under water become rigid obstructions onc

hey start drying out. Thus this dry coating does not give a true picture of the ervice condition.

[2] "Underwater tests on heavily coated mines and floats down seven nonths at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, showed that mine horns and float horns eadily functioned on impact. Mines tested for endurance over considerably onger periods in the same water frequently have been fired by contacting the ntenna with a steel wire. In general, difficulty in firing on the test field due o fouled antenna has never been reported.

"There are four distinct ways in which sea growth might be pictured as inter-ering with the operation of the Cavite mines:

(a) *Heavy coating on the lower antenna.* This antenna serves as mine moor-ng cable and is held rigid under a 300 lb. tension. It is ½" pure copper rope. Rubbing of this rigid wire by passing submarine should brush aside any wet growth that will cling to copper after a few months exposure.

(b) *Heavy coating on upper antenna.* The tension in this antenna is probably ess than 30 lbs. There appears the possibility that brushing contact of a sub-narine might not clear a bright spot through even a wet coating on this antenna. However, irregularities on the submarine can exercise extra stress in passing. More important, this copper antenna is fitted with a horned float.

(c) *Float horns.* Each of these consists of a copper cup surrounding a star haped steel disc. Any sea growth existing on the copper surface of the cup eed only be punctured or brushed aside by a sharp steel point of the star shaped isc when the horn is bumped by a passing ship.

(d) *Mine horns.* These consist of a copper disc within a steel cup. The blunt dge of the copper disc must be driven through any wet sea growth between up and disc. The available force for this blow between a ship and a mine, weighing more than 500 lbs. appears sufficient to brush aside reasonable quanti-ies of wet sea growth as this open space is only ¼" wide.

"So long as any one of these four means of firing remains open, the mine hould be considered dangerous.

[3] "It appears desirable to know whether the mine recovered by fishermen t Cavite was inspected by Naval authorities before or after exposure to the air, f any immersed parts were tested for sea growth resistance what was the find-ng? Did sea growth on mine cling to copper surfaces? In addition, information s desired as to whether the mine was opened and inspected by Naval personnel, were the safety devices or other features tested for performance, was the mine positively identified as a live-loaded unit recently planted, has a report been submitted to the Bureau of Ordnance.

"Commandant Sixteenth District's letter S76-1 Serial C-0001 dated 5 February 1941 reported the laying of two experimental mines off Corregidor on 6 August 1940. One of these was recovered complete on 29 January 1941 and was reported upon in detail. As no mention of sea growth appears in the report, it would seem that this objectionable feature is not always present to an important degree. Photographs of these Cavite mines after six months submergence show no evidence of abnormal sea growth.

"Nothing in the above should be taken to indicate that the Naval Ordnance Laboratory desires to belittle the bad effect of sea growth upon mines, especially those in tropical waters. The Cavite mines will suffer both in firing efficiency and tidal efficiency. The field should be continually augmented with new mines. Present estimates are that the Cavite mines should be considered ineffective 'after one year'."

3. In addition to measures which may be taken to repair deficiencies of the present fields by addition of Mark 6 mines, it is intended to supply new types of mines for use by the Asiatic Fleet in the defense of the same areas. The procurement of these mines has started and shipments will begin at an early date.

/s/ W. H. P. BLANDY.

LWMcK/ELH

Op-100-MD

NOVEMBER 7, 1941.

DEAR TOMMY: Recently, the Fifth Sea Lord, Rear Admiral A. L. St. George Lyster, Royal Navy, visited the United States. He made a careful inspection of our manner of operation of aircraft and our aircraft facilities, both afloat and ashore. On the conclusion of his inspection, he submitted to us his frank observations in the form of the attached notes. I thought they would be of interest

and am sending them along. Admiral Lyster impressed all of us as being a exceptional officer.

In addition, I am sending a copy of the notes made by Captain Lord Loui Mountbatten as the result of his observations in the fleet. He, too, impressed m as being a very capable officer. He is keen, alert, intelligent, and is remarkabl articulate. In brief, he makes a very splendid impression. I am sure much goo will result from the observations of both of these officers.

Events are moving rapidly toward a real showdown, both in the Atlantic an in the Pacific. The Navy is already in the war of the Atlantic, but the countr doesn't seem to realize it. Apathy, to the point of open opposition, is evident i a considerable section of the press. Meanwhile, the Senate is dragging out th debate with reference to the arming of the merchantmen. Whether the countr knows it or not, *we are at war*.

The sinking of the REUBEN JAMES, together with its large loss of life, wil do much to bring closer home this fact. Incidentally, early reports indicate tha she was struck on the port side just about the vicinity of the magzine. It i probable that the magazine exploded, since the forward part of the ship jus disintegrated. There were only two survivors from the forward part of the ship— the boatswain's mate of the watch and the helmsman.

The SALINAS did a good job of getting in—She took two torpedo hits with n loss of life. The submarine surfaced fairly close aboard sometime after th torpedoing and the Salinas thinks she got a shell into her. The submarine sub merged and her position was given a good depth charging by a nearby destroye They think they got her!

You no doubt have noted in the press the conversations going on between th State Department and the Japanese Foreign Office. Mr. Kurusu's trip to th United States has its dramatic appeal, but I am dubious of it having any rea influence.

I hope this finds you in fine fettle. Keep cheerful! With all good wishes.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral T. C. HART, U. S. N.
U. S. S. HOUSTON,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

Enclosures—Mountbatten's notes
Lyster's notes

Secret
Op-10-MD

NOVEMBER 8, 1941.

DEAR TOMMY: We have at last gotten a decision regarding withdrawal of th Marines. I have immediately acquainted you with that fact by radio. The gu boats are still in the balance, and we have requested further word from you o this.

The Japanese situation looks almost like an impasse to me, and I wouldn't b surprised at anything happening in the next month or two. I imagine you picture of that is just about as close as mine. The two points of view appear t me simply irreconcilable. But of this, more should be in the open before long.

I have been pressing Marshall to press the British for more air force in th Singapore area. I won't go into the details, but I think we have very goo grounds from every standpoint, both as to their present position at home, as wel as from their position in the Far East, and their airplane situation in general to insist on their strengthening the Malay barrier. As you know, the Britis Navy is sending marked increases to the Eastern theater. I only wish we coul have gotten all this started some time ago. It might have acted as a very grea deterrent, but, in any case, I feel that the speeding up of these operations a present is vital.

Here's hoping.
Every good wish.
Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral T. C. HART, U. S. N.
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, U. S. S. AUGUSTA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING THERETO

PART 17

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 111 THROUGH 128

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1– 399	1– 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401– 982	1059– 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983–1583	2587– 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585–2063	4195– 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065–2492	5461– 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493–2920	6647– 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921–3378	7889– 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379–3927	9108–10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929–4599	10518–12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601–5151	12278–13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153–5560	13709–14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

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13	7 and 8.
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15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements.

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
8–D	2480 1–5–46	425	Report dated Dec. 13, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
9	256 11–19–45	923	Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
10	279 11–20–45	1000	Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.
11	319 11–21–45	1006	Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.
12	363 11–21–45	1013	Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.
13	387 11–21–45	1019	Study of the air situation in Hawaii dated Aug. 20, 1941, by Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
14	397 11–21–45	1040	Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, entitled "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor" in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject (see exhibit No. 10), enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security).
15	401 11–23–45	1042	Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941, Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941, which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United States.

16	401 11-23-45	1061	(a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (b) Minutes of The Joint Board for Nov. 3, 1941; (c) Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Gerow.
16-A	3839 2-6-46	1077	Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
16-B	4341 2-13-46	1081	Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through the Department of State.
17	402 11-23-45	1083	Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.
18	402 11-23-45	1084	Documents relating to proposed "*Modus Vivendi*," including Secretary Hull's recommendation dated Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit).
19	402 11-23-45	1201	Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan.
20	402 11-23-45	1226	Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents, including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941.
21	402 11-23-45	1246	Two dispatches dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memorandum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21, 1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941. All documents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the Far East.
22	458 11-23-45	1252	(*a*) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government; (*b*) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 160115; (*c*) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President and British Prime Minister.
22-A	1694 12-15-45 2065 12-31-45	1262	Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 ((*c*) above), of proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Sumner Welles. (See p. 556, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of statement made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
22–B	1783 12–18–45	1269	Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells of his conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning proposed parallel action with reference to Japan.
22–C	1783 12–18–45	1275	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Welles, of conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, attended by Welles, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry Hopkins concerning "British-American Cooperation".
22–D	1783 12–18–45	1292	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of conversation between Sumner Welles and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning "British-American Cooperation" at the Atlantic Conference, and Welles' subsequent conversation with the President.
23	476 11–24–45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
24	476 11–24–45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
25	574 11–26–45	1301	Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, reporting reaction in Japan to the Secretary's proposal of Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note). See pp. 766 to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931–1941, for proposal dated Nov. 26, 1941, to the Japanese Government.
26	634 11–27–45	1303	Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State concerning general policy toward Japan (so-called "green light" dispatch).
27	670 11–27–45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941", Introduction (pamphlet edition, 1942), Department of State Publication 1853.
28	670 11–27–45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941", Introduction and Documents (cloth edition, 1943), Department of State Publication 1983.
29	670 11–27–45	1315	"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941", vols. I and II (1943), Department of State Publication 2008.
30	670 11–27–45	1315	"Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew, Simon and Schuster (1944).

31	737 11–28–45	1316	Six dispatches bearing various dates from April 4 to Dec. 2, 1941, from United States diplomatic officials in foreign countries reporting to the Department of State inquiries and comments of Japanese representatives in those countries concerning possible break in United States-Japanese relations.
32	778 11–29–45	1326	Selection of messages between War Department and Hawaiian Department from July 8 to Dec. 7, 1941. Included are certain messages sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur in the Philippines, and to Commanding General, Panama, as well as their replies. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33	778 11–29–45	1334	Selection of Military Intelligence Estimates prepared by G–2, War Department, Washington, D. C., covering period July 7 to Dec. 6, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33–A	2092 12–31–45	1385	Secretary of War's copy of memorandum, dated Oct. 2, 1941, from Col. Hayes A. Kroner to the Chief of Staff, concerning "Japanese-American Relations", bearing note in handwriting of Secretary Stimson.
34	825 11–30–45	1389	Memorandum, dated Oct. 18, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for Chief of Staff, concerning "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet" and proposed message to Army outpost commanders.
35	828 11–30–45	1390	Memorandum, dated Jan. 31, 1942, prepared by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, concerning "Warnings Sent to Hawaii Prior to Dec. 7, 1941", with enclosures.
36	830 11–30–45	1393	Photostatic copy of draft of General Marshall's message of Nov. 27, 1941, to General Short, containing phrase "hostile action possible at any moment", which draft contains a sentence that did not appear in the message as transmitted to General Short. (See Exhibit No. 32 for message sent.)
37	839 11–30–45	1395	Selection of dispatches sent and received by the Navy Department entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
38	841 11–30–45	1409	Paraphrase of message, dated Dec. 3, 1941, from General Miles to Military Attaché, Tokyo, concerning the handling of his codes and secret documents.
39	928 12–4–45	1409	Memoranda for the record on events of Dec. 7, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff; Col. W. B. Smith, Secretary, General Staff; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2; Col. J. R. Deane, Secretary, General Staff.
40	954 12–4–45	1412	Dispatch, dated Dec. 7, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV (07[illegible]645) concerning report of promised armed support to British under certain conditions.
41	988 12–5–45	1413	Information from documentary evidence on interception, decoding, and translating of Japanese messages Nos. 901, 902, 907, 910 (so-called pilot message, 14 part message, 1 o'clock delivery message, and code destruction message).

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
42	990 12–5–45	1416	Copy of Army Regulation No. 10–15, dated Aug. 18, 1936, with amendments up to Dec. 7, 1941, entitled "General Staff—Organization and Duties".
43	997 12–5–45	1422	Instructions dated Jan. 27, 1941, of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff concerning staff conversations to be held with representatives of British Commonwealth.
44	1001 12–5–45	1423	Compilation entitled "Copies of Defense Plans", which contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans, to illustrate defensive measures contemplated against air attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
45	1019 12–5–45	1471	Memorandum, dated Nov. 27, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Far Eastern Situation" and warning messages to outpost commanders.
46	1027 12–5–45	1472	Photostatic copies of replies by General MacArthur and General Short to warning messages of Nov. 27, 1941, with routing slip.
47	1041 12–5–45	1476	Supplementary documents concerning the Nov. 5, 1941 Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President (see Exhibit No. 16), including dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from Ambassador Gauss to State Department; message dated Nov. 2, 1941, from Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt; memorandum for Director of Naval Intelligence concerning "Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 3ØØ85Ø"; dispatch 3ØØ85Ø from Alusna, Chungking, to OPNAV dated Oct. 30, 1941, and another same date, same correspondents; message dated Oct. 28, 1941, from General Magruder, Chungking, to War Department.
48	1044 12–5–45	1481	Two memoranda dated Nov. 17, 1941, by Brig. General Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers", and letter dated Dec. 20, 1941, to Gen. Delos C. Emmons, from General Marshall, concerning unity of command in Hawaii.
48–A	2093 12–31–45	1484	Memorandum, dated Dec. 5, 1941, from General Marshall for General Gerow, concerning coordination of command.
49	1053 12–6–45	1485	Report dated Mar. 27, 1941, of United States-British Staff conversations (ABC–1).
50	1053 12–6–45	1551	Report of American-Dutch-British Staff conversations at Singapore, dated Apr. 27, 1941 (A. D. B.).

51	1053 12–6–45	1585	Report entitled "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2" (ABC–22).
52	1053 12–6–45	1593	Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, concerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
53	1063 12–6–45	1600	Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
54	1067 12–6–45	1627	"Notes on General Council Meeting", Feb. 19, 1941, concerning "Defense Objectives" (revised Feb. 13, 1941).
55	1067 12–6–45	1628	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff", on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of Pearl Harbor was discussed.
56	1076 12–6–45	1630	Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department" by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff.
57	1077 12–6–45	1631	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941", concerning use of planes in proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B–17 bombers that were not dispatched to Hawaii.
58	1088 12–6–45	1632	List of President's appointments with military representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6, 1941; list of President's appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
59	1092 12–6–45	1635	General Marshall's aide memoire to the President concerning "Defense of Hawaii".
60	1094 12–6–45	1636	General Marshall's memorandum for the President concerning "Ground Forces".
61	1112 12–7–45	1640	Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders.
62	1284 12–10–45	1641	Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed.
63	1345 12–11–45	1644	Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General in connection therewith.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
64	1544 12–13–45	1645	Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941.
65	1541 12–13–45	1677	Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated.
66	1642 12–15–45	1680	Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (#61255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, by R. E. Schuirmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters.
67	1642 12–15–45	1682	Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President's return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called "parallel action message").
68	1675 12–15–45	1689	Log of U. S. S. *Boise* for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship on certain dates.
69	1677 12–15–45	1715	Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941.
70	1695 12–15–45	1716	Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the President's statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941.
71	1696 12–15–45	1719	Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract from radio address of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese policies.
72	1696 12–15–45	1721	Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassador's reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand; digest of Secretary of State's news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand.
73	1700 12–15–45	1727	Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of State Department on the matter. No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the

74	1703 12–15–45	1735	Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern offices, advising American citizens to leave the Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 19, 1941.
74–A	2768 1–19–46	1741	Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hostilities.
75	1705 12–15–45	1744	Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining the delivery of the so-called "Ten Point Note" on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note.
76	1709 11–15–45	1754	Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State Minister Meissner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945.
77	1712 12–15–45	1757	Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy, Peiping, China, to State Department presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12, 1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called "green light" dispatch.
78	1724 12–17–45	1768	Navy dispatches concerning "Kra Peninsula Alert (1941)". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
79	1724 12–17–45	1770	Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
80	1724 12–17–45	1774	Office of Naval Intelligence "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations" dated Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, 1941.
81	1724 12–17–45	1837	Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6, 1941.
82	1728 12–17–45	1864	Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP–16).
83	1754 12–17–45	1866	Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (Ø31850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPAC, COM 14, and COM 16, advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts to destroy most of their codes and secret documents.
84	1775 12–17–45	1867	Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo (so-called "Mori telephone call").

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
85	1799 12–18–45	1870	Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through Dec. 3, 1941.
86	1825 12–18–45	1901	Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas.
87	1889 12–19–45	1907	Memorandum, dated Dec. 15, 1945, prepared by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, concerning "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940", with attached documents referred to therein.
88	1912 12–19–45	1937	Sections of document "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, Oct. 23, 1940", concerning duties of "War Plans Division (OP–12)".
89	1938 12–20–45	1937	Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy "For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii".
90	2066 12–31–45	1941	Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories, and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies.
91	2067 12–31–45	1950	Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers and records after outbreak of hostilities.
92	2068 12–31–45	1960	Photostatic copy of pp. 591 to 618, vol. 377, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, containing statement by Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on Jan. 27, 1942.
93	2075 12–31–45	1974	Photostatic copy of p. 2, G–2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941.
94	2078 12–31–45	1975	3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, transmitting the so-called "Ten Point Note" which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull on that date.
95	2091 12–31–45	1987	Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark.

96	2091 12–31–45	1989	Memorandum dated July 16, 1940, and study "Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and certain problems of United States Far Eastern Policy, July 4, 1940", attributed to Stanley K. Hornbeck.
97	2091 12–31–45	2007	Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, concerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda.
98	2093 12–31–45	2014	Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stimson for the President concerning "Japanese Convoy Movement Toward Indo-China".
99	2094 12–31–45	2015	Memorandum dated Sept. 26, 1944, prepared by J. W. Ballantine and M. M. Hamilton, relating their recollection of the delivery of intercepted Japanese messages to Secretary Hull's office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941.
100	2095 12–31–45	2016	Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning "Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay".
101	2095 12–31–45	2023	Log of U. S. S. *Enterprise* from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive.
102	2095 12–31–45	2107	Log of U. S. S. *Lexington* from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
103	2095 12–31–45	2118	"Report of Action With Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941", by Commander, *Enterprise* Air Group to his Commanding Officer, dated Dec. 15, 1941.
104	2095 12–31–45	2122	"U. S. S. *Lexington* War Diary" for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive.
105	2096 12–31–45	2140	Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941.
106	2096 12–31–45	2144	Compilation of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral H. E. Kimmel from Jan. 13 to Dec. 12, 1941.
107	2349 1–4–46	2258	"Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Pearl Harbor Investigations", prepared by Navy Department. It contains endorsements by Secretary James Forrestal, Judge Advocate General, Admiral T. L. Gatch, and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, to the Hewitt Report, and endorsements by the same officials to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry's Findings of Fact.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
107-A	2479 1-5-46	2393	"The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy", including the Fourth Endorsement by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel.
108	2364 1-4-46	2432	Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28, 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", described by him as "a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation".
109	2476 1-5-46	2444	Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941.
110	2477 1-5-46	2444	Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8, 1941.
111	2495 1-15-46	2457	Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence and memoranda.
112	2496 1-15-46	2458	Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
113	2558 1-16-46	2502	Letter, dated Aug. 13, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders, concerning Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, and attached Employment Schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3.
113-A	2807 1-19-46	2532	Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning "Battle Organization and Condition Watches".
113-B	2807 1-19-46	2534	Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, dated Oct. 31, 1941, concerning "Task Forces—Organization and Missions".
113-C	3449 1-31-46	2538	(*a*) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, together with documents which approve same; (*b*) Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing 2 (December 1941).

114	2558 1-16-46	2568	WPPac-46, and letters from Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 25, 1941, promulgating WPPac-46, which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow 5).
115	2558 1-16-46	2601	Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (*a*) Fourteenth Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941; (*b*) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (*c*) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
115-A	3449 1-31-46	2672	Fourteenth Naval District "Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force".
115-B	3450 1-31-46	2677	Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, dated Nov. 27, 1941.
116	2558 1-16-46	2700	Selection of correspondence of Admiral H. R. Stark, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, and others from Feb. 11, 1941, to Oct. 3, 1941, concerning anti-torpedo baffles for protection of ships in harbor against torpedo plane attacks.
117	2559 1-16-46	2707	Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.
117-A	5015 2-20-46	2713	Letter dated Feb. 17, 1941, concerning "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," from Gen. W. C. Short to his Commanders.
118	2559 1-16-46	2714	Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled "Steps to be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours".
119	2559 1-16-46	2716	Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
120	2559 1-16-46	2721	(*a*) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning "Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941"; (*b*) Compilation of dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (*c*) Report of Army-Navy Board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas, Hawaiian area.
121	2561 1-16-46	2727	Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters.
122	2588 1-16-46	2735	Selected correspondence in June and August 1941 of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and Gen. W. C. Short concerning aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
123	2588 1-16-46	2736	Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942.
123-A	5015 2-20-46	2743	Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.)
124	2674 1-17-46	2749	Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29, 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1.
125	2678 1-17-46	2801	Log of the *U. S. S. Wright* from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941.
126	2767 1-19-46	2832	(*a*) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (*b*) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (*c*) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.
127	2768 1-19-46	2867	Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7, 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same subject.)
128	2768 1-19-46	2870	Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii, recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941.
129	2842 1-19-46	2875	Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R. Stark promulgating the plan.
130	2879 1-21-46	2941	Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese and United States air reconnaissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government protesting reported flight of United States planes over Tiawan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's reply to Ambassador Grew.
131	2892 1-21-46	2943	Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army Pearl Harbor Board.

132	2917 1–21–46	2943	Selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 7874–7877, Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Memorandum "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (b) Memorandum "Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941."
132–A	5137 2–20–46	2946	Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 13662–13665 Joint Committee Trarscript): (*a*) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881, 941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (*b*) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug. 19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and Vice-Minister Aman; (*c*) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a peace settlement between Japan and China; (*d*) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the progress of Japanese-American negotiations.
133	2965 1–23–46	2953	Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request. Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Commission and Army Pearl Harbor Board.
134	2965 1–23–46	3124	Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population characteristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee.
135	2965 1–23–46	3171	Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning messages of Nov. 27–28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages.
136	2966 1–23–46	3187	Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War.
137	2966 1–23–46	3187	Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material.
138	2976 1–23–46	3195	Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen. F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii". (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 13.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
139	3006 1-23-46	3196	Two reports dated Oct. 17 and 25, 1941, entitled "G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation" by Lt. Col. G. W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department.
140	3188 1-26-46	3203	Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate General, and related material.
141	3311 1-28-46	3254	File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It".
142	3324 1-29-46	3302	Compilation of Material Relating to so-called "Winds" code. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
142-A	3324 1-29-46	3318	(*a*) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese Weather Broadcast; (*b*) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
142-B	3674 2-4-46	3321	Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.
142-C	3741 2-5-46	3322	Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three messages, two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called "winds" messages, indicating no interception by the British or Dutch Governments of a "winds execute" message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.
142-D	3780 2-5-46	3323	Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called "winds" code.
143	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22 through 25.)
144	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. 26.)
145	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339. 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 27 through 31.)

146	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.)
147	3929 2-7-47	3332	Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U. S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.)
148	3929 2-7-46	3332	Report of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, A. U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.)
149	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)
150	4083 2-8-46	3333	Letter dated Mar. 18, 1944, from Admiral H. E. Kimmel, retired, to Admiral W. E. Halsey, suggesting questions for Comdr. A. D. Kramer concerning the so-called "winds" message.
151	4421 2-13-46	3335	Six memoranda prepared by Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in connection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese messages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
152	4794 2-18-46	3351	Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, "General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941", prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.
153	5009 2-19-46	3353	Prepared statement dated Dec. 1, 1945 entitled "The War Record of Civilian and Industrial Hawaii", with attached Exhibits, submitted to the Joint Committee by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.
154	5013 2-20-46	3430	Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. L. Martin from Aug. 15 to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
155	5068 2-20-46	3435	Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941.
156	5122 2-20-46	3436	Memorandum dated June 21, 1941 prepared by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning "Final Recommendations Far Eastern Intelligence Organization".
157	5201 4-11-46	3441	Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
158	5201 4–11–46	3441	Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
159	5201 4–11–46	3488	Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
160	5240 4–11–46	3502	Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.
161	5241 4–11–46	3508	Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)
161–A	5464 5–23–46	3520	Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.
162	5269 4–11–46	3534	Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.
162–A	5464 5–23–46	3543	Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.
163	5292 4–11–46	3557	Log of the U. S. S. *Helena* from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.
164	5292 4–11–46	3593	Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
165	5292 4–11–46	3643	Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.
166	5468 5–23–46	3648	State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)

167	5468 5-23-46	3652	(*a*) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (*b*) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 26, 1941, relating to the delivery of (*a*); (*c*) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery and text of (*a*); and (*d*) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (*a*) and general Far East matters.
168	5468 5-23-46	3666	Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed *modus vivendi*, which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
169	5469 5-23-46	3696	Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
170	5469 5-23-46	3789	Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.
171	5469 5-23-46	3942	Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
172	5469 5-23-46	3978	Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and antiaircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.
173	5469 5-23-46	3985	Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.
174	5469 5-23-46	4030	Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
175	5470 5-23-46	4115	Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President.
176	5470 5-23-46	4121	Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
177	5470 5-23-46	4132	Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
178	5470 5-23-46	4209	Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
179	5470 5-23-46	4241	Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.
180	5471 5-23-46	4551	Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
181	5520 5-23-46	4565	The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.
182	5537 5-23-46	4702	Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G-2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.
183	5468 5-23-46	4766	Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the *Utah* by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940-45 production of B-17 4-engine bombers.

EXHIBIT NO. 111

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, December 5, 1941.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Australian Minister called to see me last night.

The Minister told me that Sir Keith Murdock, a leading newspaper publisher in Australia, had now suggested that Wendell Willkie visit Australia. You may remember that this matter was discussed some months ago but nothing came of it.

The Minister showed me a telegram which he had received from his Prime Minister stating that if Mr. Willkie were now to visit Australia with the "imprimatur" of the President his visit would be most welcome to the Australian Government.

The Prime Minister in his cable to Mr. Casey expressed the hope that this could be arranged or possibly that you might appoint him your personal representative.

The telegram from the Prime Minister concluded with a message to the effect that the Australian Government "welcomes the leadership of President Roosevelt in these critical times."

I told the Minister that I would have to submit the question to you and that I would let him have any comment which you wished me to make.

Will you let me know what your wishes may be?

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

/s/ S. WELLES.

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

DEAR WENDELL: The enclosed has just come to me from Sumner Welles and I want to assure you that it would give me very great pleasure if you would care to make a short trip to Australia. I could arrange the official procedure any way you like—and because it would follow precedent I could give you special letters as a Special Representative of the President to the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and Australia—in which case you would travel at government expense. Or you could go as a private citizen with the letters from me to the Prime Ministers giving your visit my blessing.

I leave this matter wholly in your hands, as I think you should consult your own convenience—and I think both of us should be extremely careful, if you do go, lest it be said that I am sending you "out of the country"!

It would, of course, be of real value to cement our relations with New Zealand and Australia and would be useful not only now but in the future. There is always the Japanese matter to consider. The situation is definitely serious and there might be an armed clash at any moment if the Japanese continued their forward progress against the Philippines, Dutch Indies or Malays or Burma. Perhaps the next four or five days will decide the matter.

[2] In any event, I do wish you would let me know the next time you come to Washington as there are many things for us to talk over.

Always sincerely,

s/ F. D. R.

[In longhand the President wrote:] This was dictated Friday morning—long before this vile attack started. F. D. R.

Honorable WENDELL WILLKIE,
15 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.

fdr
ggt/dj

Enclosure. Let. from Welles to the President 12/5/41 saying that if Mr. Willkie were now to visit Australia with the "imprimatur" of the Pres. his visit would be most welcome to the Australian Govt.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, December 8, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

The attached letter which you dictated to Wendell Willkie but which did not get out before the Japanese trouble is brought to your attention because I know you will want to change it.

G.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, December 8, 1941.

Memorandum for Sumner Welles:

I have sent the following letter to Wendell Willkie. I will let you know what he says.

F. D. R.

Enclosure.

Transmitting copy of President's letter of 12/5/41 to Hon. Wendell Willkie in re appt. of Mr. Willkie as a Special Representative of the President to the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and Australia.

EXHIBIT NO. 112

DISPATCHES AND OTHER MATERIAL REFERRED TO IN FOOTNOTES TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STATEMENT

[1] *Dispatches and Other Material Referred to in Footnotes in Admiral Kimmel's Statement*

PART I

Page of statement	Footnote	Reference	Page
4	2	Cinc File, P16-3/(0217)	
4	3	Personal letter to Admiral Nimitz, February 16, 1941	
9	5	Dispatch, OpNav to CinCPac, April 4, 1941, 041700	
9	7	Official letter CNO to CinCPac, April 3, 1941, Serial 038612	
10	8	Official letter CNO, May 26, 1941, Serial 060512	
10	9	Official letter CinCPac, July 25, 1941, Serial 063W	
10	10	Official letter CNO to CinCPac, September 9, 1941, Serial 098912	
16	14	Dispatch, OpNav to CinCPac, May 24, 1941, 242130	
16	15	Dispatch, OpNav to CinCPac, May 13, 1941, 132019 Dispatch, CinCPac to OpNav, May 15, 1941, 150625	
19	19	Official letter Com 14 to CNO, October 17, 1941, ND14 (01084)	
20	20	Cominch 1st endorsement to Com14 letter, A16-1/ND14	
21	22	Letter from Com14 to CNO, December 30, 1940 (ND14 (629))	
21	23	Letter from Com14 to CNO, May 7, 1941, (ND14)	
22	24	CNO to CinCPac and Com14, November 25, 1941, Serial 0135412	
[d]			
23	27	Official letter CNO to CinCPac, February 15, 1941, Serial 09330	
24	28	CNO to several Commandants, February 17, 1941, Serial 010230	
24	29	CNO to several Commandants, June 13, 1941, Serial 055730	
28	32	Secret dispatch, CinCPac to COMTASKFOR 3, Com14, December 4, 1941, 040237	

PART II

30	1	Dispatch, CNO to CinCUS, January 21, 1941, 212155	
31	2	Dispatch ALUSNA, London to OpNav, February 3, 1941, 031400, passed to CinCUS as OpNav 032300.	
35	9	CinCPac File No. A4-3/FF12 (13), Serial 01254, August 13, 1941, rec'd OpNav, September 3, 1941.	
35	10	Dispatch, OpNav to CinCPac, May 24, 1941, 242150	
39	16	Dispatch, CinCPac to COMSUBSCOFOR 170354 and 170426, October 17, 1941.	49-
39	17	Dispatch, CinCPac to Com 14, 170319, October 17, 1941, and dispatch, Com14 to CinCPac, 170356.	51-
39	18	Dispatch, CinCPac to COMPATWING 2, 170429, October 17, 1941	
42	21	Dispatch, CNO to CinCPac, November 26, 1941, 270040	
42	22	Dispatch, CNO to CinCPac, November 26, 1941, 270038	
44	23	Message No. 489, November 29, 1941, War Dept. to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.	
[M]			
45	24	Dispatch, CinCPac to OpNav, November 28, 1941, 280627 Official letter CinCPac to CNO, December 2, 1941, Serial 0114W	
47	27	Dispatch, OpNav to CinCAF, info CinCPac, 1 December, 011400	
48	28	Dispatch, OpNav to CinCAF, info CinCPac, November 28, 1941, 281633	
48	29	Dispatch, CinCAF to OpNav, info CinCPac, December 6, 1941, 061255	

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent page of original exhibit.

Dispatches and Other Material Referred to in Footnotes in Admiral Kimmel's Statement—Continued

PART II—Continued

Page of statement	Footnote	Reference	Page[1]
50	32	Dispatch, Com16 to OpNav, info CinCPac, December 8, 1941, 080333	71
53	34	Memorandum for the Roberts Commission from Lt. Comdr. E. T. Layton, Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, dated January 5, 1942.	72
64	43	Dispatch, CinCPac to COMPATWING 2, November 28, 1941, 280450	74
64	44	Mailgram COMTASKFOR 9 to COMPATRONS 21 and 22, November 30, 1941, 292103	75
			75
67	47	Letter CinCPac to CinCUS, January 7, 1942, Serial 059	77
73	51	Dispatch, CNO to CinCPac, November 29, 1941, 282054	95
75	53	Dispatch, CinCPac to Pacific Fleet, info OpNav, November 28, 1941, 280355	96
75	54	Official letter CinCPac to CNO, Feb. 11, 1941, Serial 0243	97
76	56	Dispatch, USS Helena to GR 1.5—info CinCPac, November 28, 1941, 028835	108

PART III

96	35	Dispatch, ALUSNA Batavia to OpNav, December 5, 1941, 031030	109

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

[1] CinC File No.
P16-3/(0217)
Confidential

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *February 7, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Recommended Complements.
Reference: (a) Secnav Rest. ltr. FS/S80/(400525) of 1 June 1940.
Enclosures:

(A) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C)(04447) of 21 December 1940 (Recommended complements for Battleships).
(B) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C)(035) of 18 January 1941 (Recommended complements for Aircraft Carriers, and Tenders and Seaplane Tenders).
(C) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C)(04) of 4 January 1941 (Recommended complements for Heavy Cruisers).
(D) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C)(046) of 25 January 1941 (Recommended complements for Light Cruisers, BROOKLYN and ST. LOUIS class).
(E) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C)(049 of 28 January 1941 (Recommended complements for Light Cruisers, OMAHA Class).
(F) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16(C)(04551) of 31 December 1940 (Recommended complements for Destroyers).
(G) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C)(024) of 11 January 1941 (Recommended complements for Light Mine Layers, Fleet Mine Sweepers, Submarines, Submarine Auxiliaries and Train Ships).
(H) Combasefor Conf. ltr. P16-1/MM/(0103) of 22 January 1941 (Proposed compliments for ships of the Train).
(I) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1/S1(C)(026) of 14 January 1941.

1. The additional armaments which have been placed on combatant ships in accordance with the directive established by reference (a), and the need for manning additional stations incident to reported experience in the present war, required that consideration be given to increasing the complement of ships to meet these added war-time requirements.

[2] 2. Enclosures (A) to (G), forwarded herewith, are the reports of the "Fleet Personnel Board" with Rear Admiral R. A. Theobald, U. S. Navy, as

Senior Member, appointed to determine the complement required to fight and maintain ships of the included types in accordance with the above requirements. These reports are submitted after the board had held exhaustive hearings and made a thorough study for each type. Before arriving at their conclusion the Board took the following steps:

(a) Members of the Board visited each type of ship and observed the stationing of the crews, the manning of batteries and the supplying of ammunition.

(b) Provided for the maximum utilization of the services of each man on board.

(c) Included the assignment of all available flag personnel to ships' battle stations.

(d) In so far as possible considered every phase of battle and justified the demand for each additional man.

3. The Commander-in-Chief concurs in the recommendations of the Board regarding all the complements necessary to fight the ships efficiently, subject to the following comments:

(a) Further study after submission of the report on destroyers, enclosure (F), by the Board makes the following modification in the recommendations for high speed minesweepers (DMs) advisable:

(1) HOVEY and LONG. Increase number of Seamen second class recommended to 10 (add 3) to make total complement 146.

(2) HOPKINS. Decrease number of Seamen first class recommended to one (decrease by 2) and number of Seamen second class to 4 (decrease by 8) to make total complement 138.

(b) The total complement of the Fleet minesweepers (AMs), enclosure (G), may be reduced from 96 to 85. This may be effected by reducing the recommended number of Seamen first class from 16 to 11, and Seamen second class from 18 to 13, [3] and Mess Attendant second class from 1 to 0. This would eliminate the 7 non-watchstanders in Condition II, and require the Type Commander to make readjustments in the stationing of personnel to operate without the other four.

In connection with the recommended complements for Train ships, enclosure (H) is submitted for consideration.

4. The major part of the increases recommended result directly from personnel required to man the additional armament installed in compliance with reference (a), and to provide for increased demands for battle lookouts.

5. A considerable part of the increases result also from the studies made by the Board of the ammunition supply for previously existing armament. The result of these studies and comments thereon are included in enclosure (I). Particular attention is invited to this enclosure, and to the increased number of men required in the ammunition train as a result of this study.

6. The information furnished by the Department regarding the numbers of men assigned to ships of the various types in the British Navy is of great interest. From the differences in complements of similar types in the two services, the following is apparent:

(a) British ships are mechanized to a considerably greater extent than our, or

(b) They accept much lower rates of fire or standards of performance than we are willing to accept.

7. We are forced to operate our ships as they are and the number of men required to man them has been determined by the considered judgement of the best officers we have available. In view of the large numbers of men required for newly commissioned ships, both now and in the future, and in view of the fact that only at sea can men-of-warsmen be adequately trained, every seagoing ship should be filled to capacity now. In this connection it cannot be too strongly emphasized that stabilization of personnel, both officers and enlisted, will contribute more to the efficiency of the fleet than any other single factor.

[4] 8. The study of the Board definitely indicates that the recommended complements can be housed and fed and, until conclusively proved otherwise, should be accepted.

9. Subject to the comments made in this letter, it is recommended that the complements contained in enclosures (A) to (G) inclusive be approved and that the additional men be assigned as quickly as possible by the Bureau of Navigation.

10. By copy of this letter, Force and Type Commanders will initiate necessary changes in existing ships to provide for the additional complement.

11. It is further recommended that the Bureau of Ships provide funds and equipment for the accomplishment of these changes as originated by the Type Commanders.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to: (Less enclosures)
R. Adm. Theobald (Sr. Member Flt. Pers. Board)
All Force and Type Commanders
BuNav
BuShips

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[5]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Confidential

AT SEA, HAWAIIAN AREA, *February 16, 1941.*

MY DEAR NIMITZ: Your letter of 29 January which reached me on 15 February, in regard to the detachment of Ordnance Post Graduates now in the Fleet to provide a supervisory force for shore duty under the Bureau of Ordnance, causes me the greatest concern.

I realize in some degree the necessity for the services of competent personnel under the Bureau of Ordnance. I am, however, faced with a very real situation here in the Fleet. During the past year the detachment of so many competent officers has reduced the number of experienced officers remaining in ships of the Fleet to such a point that I consider it dangerous to make further considerable reductions in our best officer personnel at this time. The Fleet is just now recovering from the heavy officer personnel shake-up which it has experienced.

In general, the Ordnance Post Graduates occupy key positions in the Fleet. They were selected originally for Post Graduate work because of their outstanding qualities. They have quite naturally been placed in positions of responsibility in the Fleet. If you detach them you will detach our best qualified officers, and I can see no source from which qualified reliefs will be furnished. We are now lending every effort to qualify subordinate and reserve officers to fit them for positions of greater responsibility. This process takes time.

While I appreciate to some extent the deficiencies of the Bureau of Ordnance and the urgent necessity to remedy them, I must sound a note of warning that we cannot spare any considerable number of qualified officers from the Fleet without assuming an enormous risk. The condition of the Fleet now and in the near future may well be of much greater importance to the nation than the production of a two-ocean Navy by 1946.

Within all reasonable limits I feel that the existing Fleets should have priority assignment of personnel as well as supply of material. I suggest that you furnish me the names of the Ordnance Post Graduates which the Bureau of Ordnance desires and that I have an opportunity to comment on each case prior to his detachment from the Fleet.

[6] The list of officers which you furnished me includes a large number who are in positions of great responsibility. My staff is now checking the present actual assignment of each officer listed and the importance of his job. I sincerely trust that you will not detach any of them without providing a qualified relief, and even so, such relief cannot reach a reasonable standard of efficiency until many months have elapsed.

While on this subject of personnel, I would like to add that the continued detachment of qualified officers and enlisted men renders it next to impossible for the ships to reach the high state of efficiency demanded by a campaign. This Fleet must be kept ready to fight, and that is impossible unless we stabilize the personnel to a much greater degree than has been done in the past. I realize, of course, that we must have some changes in the normal course of events. I realize also that you agree with everything that I have said herein, that you have many demands to meet, and that you must weigh all factors before reaching a decision.

We have submitted the report of the Fleet Personnel Board, and by now your Bureau has had opportunity to make a study of the recommendations made. I have ordered the Medical Board to report on the health and comfort features as

directed, and they will expedite their proceedings. I cannot urge you too strongly to fill the ships to capacity with both enlisted men and officers.

I request that you kindly show this letter to Admiral Stark.

My kindest personal regards and best wishes.

Most sincerely yours,

s/ Kimmel
H. E. KIMMEL.

Rear Admiral C. W. NIMITZ, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

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[7] 4 April 1941 Top secret
From: OPNAV
Action: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Info: CINCLANT, COMBATFOR, COMSCOFOR, COMBASEFOR, COMDTS NAVY YARDS BOSTON, PORTSMOUTH, NEW YORK, PHILADELPHIA, NORFOLK, CHARLESTON, MARE ISLAND, PEARL HARBOR, PUGET SOUND, NAD PUGET SOUND, MARE ISLAND, OAHU & CAVITE

041700

Except DESDIV 50 (S-27, S-28 and NTS) vessels on routine supply trips fill allowances and obtain supplies required for mobilization. At discretion fleet commanders will accept final increment of mobilization supply ammunition. Strip ship in accordance with orders action Adees. Ships assigned availability for drydocking at Addees discretion. For this purpose ships of the Pacific Fleet are not to return to mobilization ports on the continent.

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[8] 48
Copy
In reply refer to initials and No. Serial 038612
Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, April 3, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.
Subject: Observations on the present international situation.

1. You are requested to disclose the contents of this letter to your seconds in command and to your chiefs of staff, and to no other persons.

2. Staff conversations with the British have been completed and a joint United States-British war plan drawn up. Two copies of the Report (Short title ABC-1) of these conversations are being supplied each addressee by officer messenger. Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, founded on the United States-British plan, is in preparation and will be distributed at an early date. The general nature of Rainbow No. 5 will become evident to you upon perusal of the joint Report. This Report has been approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army and by myself, and, at an appropriate time, is expected to receive the approval of the President. You are authorized to discuss matters pertaining to Rainbow No. 5 with other officers of the Army and the Navy, as may be appropriate.

3. The basic idea of the United States-British plan is that the United States will draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reenforce the Atlantic Fleet, and that the British will, if necessary, transfer naval forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the Malay Barrier. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet would not be reenforced, but would be supported by offensive operations by the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

4. From the viewpoint of the defense of the United States national position, the proposed naval deployment gives adequate security in case the British Isles should fall. From the viewpoint of bringing immediate heavy pressure in the Atlantic, which we consider the decisive theater, the plan leaves something to be desired in the initial stages of the war.

[9] 5. The difficulties are our present uncertainty as to Japanese action, and British insistence on the vital importance of holding Singapore, and of supporting Australia, New Zealand, and India. Their proposals, which I rejected, were to transfer almost the whole of the Pacific Fleet to Singapore to hold that position against the Japanese. In my opinion, the result of such a move on our part would almost surely be a British defeat in the Atlantic, and, thereafter, a difficult period for the United States. I have agreed to the present plan for the initial stages, but have insisted that the deployment at any one time must depend upon the situation which exists at that time. Elasticity and fluidity of planning are therefore assured.

6. There seem to be two principal dangers which immediately threaten the United Kingdom. The first is the very grave threat to its sea communications from submarines, aircraft, and raiders. The recent activity of the large German naval raiders foreshadows a wider, and even weaker, deployment of British surface forces capable of dealing with such raiders. The British are badly deficient in anti-submarine escort craft, and have as yet devised little defense of convoys and single ships against heavy bombers. Shipping is now being lost about three times as fast as it can be replaced. The only remedy, in my opinion, is a radical strengthening of the defense against all three forms of shipping attack, by greater forces and new ideas, to such an extent that the hazard to the attackers will be too great for them to overcome. The entire United States naval strength could be usefully employed in the Atlantic, were it to become possible to send it there.

7. The second great danger is the continued deterioration of British production and morale through heavy bombing. This will become more serious as shipping losses become greater. At the same time the situation in the Mediterranean might become dangerous at any time; on the other hand, in spite of uncertainties, favorable elements are visible in that theater.

8. The Japanese attitude will continue to have an extremely important bearing on the future of the war in the Atlantic. For some time past, Japan has shown less and less inclination to attack the British, Dutch, and ourselves in the Far East. Her people are distinctly tired of the war in China and of the privations they now must undergo. Whether Matsuoka's visit to Berlin and Rome will strengthen the wish of some of them to help Germany, or will deepen their caution against rash action, may be disclosed within the next month. I advise you to watch this situation keenly.

[10] 9. Unquestionably the concentration of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii has had a stabilizing effect in the Far East. I am more and more of opinion that Japan will hesitate to take further steps, perhaps even against Indo-China, so long as affairs do not go too badly for Britain. What the effect on her would be were the United States to transfer a large part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic can, as yet, be only surmised. In any case, we shall rigidly avoid making any indication that we contemplate such a transfer until the last possible moment.

10. The question as to our entry into the war now seems to be *when*, and not *whether*. Public opinion, which now is slowly turning in that direction, may or may not be accelerated. My own personal view is that we may be in the war (possibly undeclared) against Germany and Italy within about two months but that there is a reasonable possibility that Japan may remain out altogether. However, we can not at present act on that possibility.

11. Your Operating Plan for Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 3 will, with little change, be equally effective for Rainbow No. 5. I advise you to study the Report of the staff conversations in order that you will be in a position to to issue your new plans as soon as practicable after receipt of the new Basic Plan, and, if war comes before you receive it, so that you can promptly modify your present orders.

12. In the meantime, I advise that you devote as much time as may be available to training your forces in the particular duties which the various units may be called upon to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived, I believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be required by the special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the United States into war.

/s/ H. R. Stark
H. R. STARK.

cc: Rear Admiral Ghormley.

[11] *Secre*

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, May 26, 1941.

Op-12B-5-McC
(SC)A16(R-5)
Serial 060512
From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Distribution List for WPL-46.
Subject: Promulgation of Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46).
Enclosures: (A) Pages for WPL-46, Registered No. 47, including List of Effectiv Pages.
(B) Receipt form in duplicate.

1. Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46) is promulgated herewitl
2. Report receipt, and check of contents, on the form provided as enclosure (B)
3. The highest priority in the preparation of war plans is assigned to plans re quired by WPL-46.
4. It is desired that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accom plished with the least possible delay. To this end, all planning based upon th directives of WPL-13, WPL-14, WPL-42, and WPL-44 will be discontinued unti plans based upon WPL-46 are completed.
5. Appendix II, Chapter IX, prescribing the composition of the Naval Trans portation Service will be issued a sa change to this plan. If this plan is executec prior to the issue of Chapter IX, specific directives will be issued to provide for th initial sea transportation requirements of the plan.
6. The extreme importance of the security of this Navy Basic War Plan— Rainbow No. 5, cannot be over-emphasized. In this respect, attention is invited to the instructions contained in "The System of War Planning", and in th "Registered Publication Manual".
7. Plans and estimates of requirements for the preparation for war service o vessels to be taken over from private sources, as indicated in the tables of Ap pendix II, will be classified as confidential. Attention is invited to paragraph 1105 of WPL-8.

Original, May, 1941 WPL-46

[12] 8. This plan shall not be carried in aircraft except by authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, and when not in use shall be kept in Class "A" stowage as prescribed in the "Registered Publication Manual".
9. It is forbidden to make extracts from or copy portions of this publicatio without specific authority from the Chief of Naval Operations, except in subor dinate plans based upon this publication.

H. R. STARK.

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[13] *Secret*
Cincpac file no.
A16/WPPac-46 (16)
Serial 063W

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *July 25, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.
Subject: WPPac-46.

1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet beer approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect prior to the receipt of such approval.
2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 of the Plan concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Commanders. At the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting plans for approval by the Commander-in-Chief:

Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Commander Task Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan to the Senior Officer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.)

The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provide for the accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this O–1 Plan by including suitable measures in their O–4 or other plans, rather than to prepare separate supporting plans for this O–1 Plan. The Commander Southeast Pacific Force (Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the plan for operations of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations for approval.

3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval of the Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they will be incorporated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover operations to be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when completed and approved.

[*14*] 5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received by this command.

[s] H. E. Kimmel
H. E. KIMMEL.

[*15*]
Op–12B–2–djm
(SC) A16/EF12 (FF12)
Serial 098912 D–33956
Secret

Sep 9 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: The U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. 5 (Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow No. 5) WPPac–46, review and acceptance of.
Reference: (a) CinCPac Secret let. Serial 064W of 25 July, 1941.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has reviewed subject Plan and accepts it.

2. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

H. R. STARK.

[*16*] 24 May 1941 Top Secret
From: OPNAV
Action: CINCPAC
Info: CINCLANT, COMDG GEN 2 MAR DIV, COMBASEFOR, COMTRANSBASEFOR, COM 11
242130

A courier is being sent to commanding general of the Second Marine Division carrying orders for an organization of a reinforced regiment for duty with the First Marine Division X Direct HEYWOOD, FULLER, BIDDLE, MANLEY, LITTLE, McKEAN, STRINGHAM under appropriate transport commander to combat load this regiment at San Diego at earliest practicable date then proceed Canal Zone transit and report to CINClant for duty on arrival Cristobal X This movement is to be kept in the strictest secrecy X Advise what itinerary you plan to make.

[*17*] 15 May 1941 Top Secret
From: CINCPAC
Action: OPNAV
150625

Following are movements and compositions of task groups:

GEORGE 71: COMCRUDIV 8 in SAVANNAH and MISSISSIPPI; COMDESDIV 15 in LANG, STERRETT, and WILSON; depart Hawaii 19 May arrive Canal Zone 2 June. (Refer your 132019)

GEORGE 72: COMBATDIV 3 in IDAHO and BROOKLYN; COMDESRON 8 in WINSLOW, WAINWRIGHT, and STACK; leave 20 May transit 4 June night.

GEORGE 73: NEW MEXICO and NASHVILLE; COMDESDIV 17 in MORRIS, BUCK, and ROE; depart 20 May thru Canal June 6.

GEORGE 74: PHILADELPHIA leave this area 23 May; DESDIV 3 leave fro
SAN DIEGO 29 May; 30 May meet at sea arrive Taboga Island 8 June.
Forwarding OPORD copy. Can deliver to units concerned without use COM
radio if info similar COM15 0513000 April is received by 18 May from OPNA

[*18*] 13 May 1941 Top Secr
From: OPNAV
Action: CINCPAC
132019
OPNAV Serial 6538 instructions modified as below:
Organize 3 groups each consisting of 1 battleship, 1 light cruiser, 3 DDS fro
units contained in that serial. Wish these groups to leave at intervals of 1
2 days. Fourth group to be composed of 1 light cruiser plus DESDIV 3, latt
DDS to join cruiser at sea prior arrival Panama this group to follow third grou
through canal at 1 or 2 day interval. Utmost secrecy desired about the fa
ships are leaving Hawaiian area or west coast for Atlantic X Wish ships lea
ing Hawaii to go direct to Canal Zone and all groups transit at night. Advi
as soon as possible composition of groups, proposed departure dates, and expect
arrival dates at Canal Zone so arrangements for transit can be made by OPNA
As soon as practicable initiate these movements. Small groups like YORKTOW
can apparently make transit without publicity.

[*19*] A16-1/
ND14(01084)

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 17 October 1941.

Secret
From: Commandant, 14th Naval District
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subj: Re-appraisal of local defense forces of Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontie
Ref:
(a) Com14 conf. ltr. to OpNav of 30 Dec. 1941, Ser. 629.
(b) CINCUS conf. 1st end. to Com14 Ser. 629, CINC File A16(022) of
January 1941.
(c) Com14 conf. ltr. to OpNav of 7 May 1941, Ser. 0430.
(d) CinCPac secret ltr Ser. 038W of 20 May 1941 to OpNav.
(e) Com14 conf. ltr. to OpNav of 31 Oct. 1940 Ser. 510.

1. All of the above references bear on the local defense forces and securi
measures of this area.
2. The only increment that has been made to these forces during the past yea
exclusive of net vessels, is the U. S. S. SACRAMENTO which has no batteri
to speak of, with which the vessel can fight, and no speed with which she can ru
3. Although the writer of this letter is aware that the Department has be
fully informed about the deficiencies in this District, he feels it necessary to aga
bring the subject to attention.
4. Recently, the Commandant endeavored to obtain, without much succe
from the Commander-in-Chief the assignment of certain planes which could
used in connection with anti-submarine patrol. The only planes now availab
for this purpose are Army planes, and the types and numbers are inadequa
for the purpose.
5. The only anti-submarine vessels now in the District are the four destroye
of Destroyer Division Eighty, one being still unequipped with listening ge
and three Coast Guard Cutters. These vessels will not only have to be used f
hunting and tracking down submarines but will also be required for escort a
security patrol in a very extensive front.
[*20*] 6. It is urged that the Department send a number of small, fast cra
to this District equipped with listening gear and depth charges for this purpo
It is further urged that the Department send to this District at least two squa
rons of VSO planes which can be used for patrol against enemy submarines.
7. Nearly all of the failures of the British have been caused by what may
expressed in the cliché "Too little and too late." It is hoped that we may pro
from their errors.

C. C. BLOCH.

[21] ND14/(18)
Serial 096W
Secret

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

My

1st Endorsement to Com-14 secret ltr S-A16-1/ND14 (01084) of 17 October 1941.
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subj: Re-appraisal of local defense forces, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

1. Forwarded.

2. There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the Department to furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District, with forces adequate to his needs may be predicated upon a conception that, in an emergency, vessels of the United States Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A fleet, tied to its base by diversion to other purposes, of light forces necessary for the security at sea, is, in a real sense no fleet at all. Moreover, this fleet has been assigned, in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution of which requires not only all the units now assigned, but as many more as can possibly be made available.

3. The necessities of the case clearly warrant extraordinary measures in meeting the Commandant's needs.

4. Transmission of this document within the continental limits of the United States by registered mail is authorized.

H. E. KIMMEL.

cc: Com-14

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[22] C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14
(629)
Confidential

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT AND NAVY YARD,
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 30 December 1940.

From: Commandant, 14th Naval District.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subj: Situation concerning the security of the Fleet and the present ability of the local defense forces to meet surprise attacks.
Ref:
(a) OpNav dispatch 092135 of October 1940.
(b) OpNav dispatch 182128 of October 1940.
(c) CNO's personal ltr addressed to CINCUS dated 22 November 1940.
(d) Com14 dispatch 150055 of October 1940.
(e) Com14 dispatch 220230 of October 1940.

1. In view of the inquiry contained in reference (a), (b), and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the 14th Naval District to meet surprise hostile attack of an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand.

2. *Aircraft raids.*

Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought by carriers. Therefore, there are two ways of repelling attack. First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Second, by driving off attacking bombers with anti-aircraft guns and fighters. The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distance reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area 59 B-18 bombers. All of these are classified as being obsolete. The model is six years old and the planes themselves are five years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are satisfactory for the purposes intended. New bombing types of planes are expected some time in the future. However, not before July 1941. For distance reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet.

To drive off bombing planes after they have been launched will require bot fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns. The Army has in Hawaiian area, 3 pursuit plnes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are si years old and some of them are four years old. In numbers and models, ther is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P–40 in production to the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can be delivere This does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number doe not appear adequate.

[23] The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor Base b anti-aircraft guns. There are in Hawaii 26 fixed 3" guns and 44 mobile 3" gun There are projected 24 more, to be delivered in 1941. There are no 37-mm an only 109-.50 caliber out of the projected 120 37-mm and 308-.50 caliber machin guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of the 3" guns around Pea Harbor and only a few near other main objectives. In my opinion, it will b necessary to increase the numbers of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to hav any semblance of anti-aircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as t the efficacy of a 3" gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers The Army made no plans for the anti-aircraft defenses of Lualualei or Kaneohe furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of ant aircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor or Honolulu in orde that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited number of ant aircraft barges affoat, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate siz and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian area. Thi number is in addition to 37-mm and .50 caliber machine guns.

In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning cente which will consist of eight radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed an five are mobile. When completed at an indefinite date in the future, this warnin net should be adequate.

3. *DEFENSE AGAINST SUBMARINES.*

The additional defense against submarines would be continued by patrol vessel and aircraft working in conjunction. The District has no aircraft for thi purpose. Recently, there have arrived here three vessels of Destroyer Divisio Eighty which is assigned to the local defense forces. These vessels have listenin gear and, when repaired and ready for service, will be a valuable contribution fo anti-submarine and escort work. No anti-submarine nets are planned, nor ar any considered desirable. Anti-torpedo nets are projected for the entrances o Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. They will probably be delivered about 1 March 194 The net depot will be completed somewhat later.

4. *DEFENSE AGAINST MINES.*

The District has recently built and equipped one sweeping barge and thre tugs are being equipped for towing and energizing the coil. This barge ca probably work out of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor until such time as it is seriousl injured. The District has no vessels available for use as sweepers for anchore mines. A number of minesweepers are being built or purchased, but their deliv ery dates here are uncertain. A large number of sweepers will be required i order to keep the harbors of Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, and Kaneche clear and, i addition, Hilo on Hawaii, Kahului and Lahaina on Maul, and Port Allen an Nawiliwili on Kauai. With the delivery of sweepers now being built or pu chased, the general situation will be improved immeasurably.

[24] 5. *DEFENSE AGAINST BOMBARDMENT.*

The coast defenses of the Army are considered adequate except that Kaneoh receives very little protection from the batteries.

6. *SABOTAGE.*

There are two tank farms, the upper and the lower. The lower is entirel contained in the Government reservation and, by the use of roving patrols, i considered reasonably secure. The upper farm is adjacent to a public highway The farm is surrounded by an unclimable fence and each tank has an earth bern Its chief exposure is along the highway. To counteract this, three elevated sentr stations have been erected, each equipped with searchlights. This enable sentries to keep a continuous lookout over the entire fence line day and night the upper farm is considered fairly secure.

7. *WATER AND ELECTRIC SUPPLY.*

Recently a guardhouse has been erected and an alarm has been made, th Marines alternating with the Army, for constant guard on the water supply.

A constant guard is kept on the electric supply lines through which outsid power is received.

8. An elaborate system of photograph passes, search and examination is in effect. There are over 5,000 Civil Service employees who come into the yard each day. In addition, there are about 5,000 employees of civil contractors and several thousand enlisted men. In addition to the above, there is a constant stream of trucks and vehicles of all descriptions carrying supplies, stores, etc. It is impossible to maintain absolute security without disruption of the work of the yard. However, surprise searches and periodic stops, etc., are in effect in order that the alert may be emphasized. The main gate has been strengthened to prevent rush; there have been two drills for the purpose of giving surprise training to the yard garrison in the event of a surprise riot in the yard. In addition to the above, a survey has been made, not only of the yard, but of all the outlying stations, and every effort is being made to close holes and stop gaps. While the Commandant is not satisfied, he feels that the precautions taken are reasonably effective but that they are susceptible to improvement, which will be made as occasion warrants.

[25] 9. It should be borne in mind that until comparatively recently, none of us in this country had very much conception of what measures were necessary and what provisions were desirable in order to effect any measures of protection against aircraft, against submarines, against mines, and against subversive elements. The officers and men of this command have been alert, zealous, and vigilant in executing all measures under their control in order to properly prepare the District for any exigencies.

10. It should be assumed that the War Department is fully aware of the situation here and that it will proceed vigorously with a view to overcome deficiencies. It may be that they have failed to recognize the necessity for large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. I suggest that the Chief of Naval Operations make inquiry from the War Department as to what their plans are and on what dates they predict that they will be accomplished and then, if the numbers and dates are not satisfactory, these features may be discussed at length.

11. It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view that the War Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agreement between the Army authorities and Navy authorities here, or that the officials of the 14th Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do something in regard to Army matters.

C. C. BLOCH.

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[26] A16/
Serial 022
Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., January 7, 1941.

1st Endorsement to Com14 conf. ltr.
A16-1/A7-2/ND14 (629) of 30 Dec. 1940,
From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Subj: Situation concerning the security of the Fleet and the present ability of of the local defense forces to meet surprise attacks.

1. Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant, 14th Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. As a result of this conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished on which the Commandant, 14th Naval District prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant, 14th Naval District in the opinion that the present Army pursuit squadrons and anti-aircraft batteries are adequate to protect the Fleet at Pearl Harbor against air attacks. When established, the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed total of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area is not considered adequate. With the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area, a materially greater number of larger and longer range anti-aircraft guns are necessary to counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.

2. If neither the increased anti-aircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period, the defense of Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet

which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans fo cooperation with the local defense forces are being made. At present, the con tinuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or anti-aircraft batteries is no contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present condition does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting en tirely the training required by fleet air units which would have to be largel curtailed if constant readiness with fighter squadrons were required.

[27] 3. There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing tor pedo baffles or nets within the harbor to protect the ships moored therein agains torpedo plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the harbo particularly the movements of large ships and the landing and take-off of patr squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the only operating base available to th Fleet in this area, any passive defense measures that will further restrict th use of the base as such should be avoided. Considering this as an impossibilit of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of an enem being able to send a carrier sufficiently near in war time in the face of activ fleet operations, it is not considered necessary to lay such nets.

4. The defense against submarines and mines are considered adequate unde present peacetime conditions, but early installation of under-water sound-sub marine detection system should be made. Also the delivery of the required ship to the 14th Naval District defense forces should be expedited, particularly ship for sweeping magnetic and anchored mines.

5. In this connection, is urgently recommended that local defense forces, ad quate for the protection of Naval installations at Pearl Harbor and the Fleet unit based thereon, be provided the Commandant, 14th Naval District. In order t provide freedom of action for the United States Fleet, and further, to avoid th necessity of detailing important fleet units (because no other ships are available to tasks requiring only part of their full capabilities, it is considered that th forces provided should be sufficient for full protection and should be independen of the presence or absence of the ships of the United States Fleet. It is furthe considered that the provisions of adequate local defense forces for the 14t Naval District should be given high priority than continental Naval District where both the possibility of, and objectives for, attack are much less.

J. O. RICHARDSON.

cc: Com-14

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,
14TH NAVAL DISTRICT,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 7 May 1941.

[28] Via Clipper Mail
Confidential
From: Commandant, 14th Naval District,
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Local Defense Measures of Urgency.

1. A careful study indicates that the only way that submarines can be kep out of an area or destroyed is by the use of:

(a) Small fast seagoing vessels equipped with listing gear, depth charges an guns.
(b) Aircraft.
(c) A combination of (a) and (b).
(d) Mines.

2. In any Pacific war, it appears very obvious that the principal effort of ou enemy will be to concentrate its submarine activity in the area outside and nea Honolulu, Pearl Harbor, the Island Bases and the other ports of the Island The protection supplied by existing arrangements for this area, exclusive of th Fleet, is very weak and unsatisfactory.

3. At the present time, the District Commandant has four old destroyers onl and these vessels, in addition to the anti-submarine activities, also act as escor and patrols in the Coastal Frontier; he has no aircraft and complete reliance has to be placed (exclusive of the Fleet) on Army planes. This necessaril requires much indoctrination of pilots and much training to qualify them fo the recognition of various types of vessels and other matters-pertaining to th sea before they become proficient in spotting and attacking submarines.

4. At the Island Bases, harbors with some degree of security will be at Mid way, Johnston and Palmyra, but it is thought that craft as indicated in sub paragraph (a) of paragraph one of this letter will be required at these place

5. This is particularly true at Wake where it will be a couple of years befor

the harbor is dredged out. The quickest time ever made in unloading a ship at Wake is ten days. Imagine a vessel moored ten [29] days off Wake Island to transfer freight and provisions to the men working there and to the garrison. This would appear to the undersigned as being a submarine picnic. Accordingly, it is believed that at that place it will be necessary to have several of the craft indicated in paragraph 1 (a).

6. Summarizing, the object of this letter is to invite attention to the weakness of the local defense forces in protecting the vital communication lines at Oahu and the island bases and to recommend that every effort be made to supply this District at the earliest possible time with the necessary implements to combat the most probable form of attack.

(C) C. C. BLOCH.

cc: CinCPac.

[30] Attached thereto is a routine slip, CINCUS routing No. 04122, containing a number of unintelligible initialings and bearing the notation under the heading Remarks, "All too true".

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[31] In reply refer to initials and No.
Op-12B-7-dlm.
(SC) A16-1/ND14.
Ser. 0135412.
Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, November 25, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commanderin-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and The Commandant, 14th Naval District.
Subj: Local defense forces, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
Ref.:
(a) CinCPac secret ltr A16/(038W) of May 20, 1941 to CNO.
(b) W. P. L.—46.
(c) W. P. Pac—46.
(d) CNO secret ltr Op-12B-7-djm, (SC) A16-1/ND14, Ser. 070312, of June 23, 1941, to CinCPac, copy to Com14.
(e) Com14 secret ltr (SC) A16-1/ND14 (01084) of Oct. 17, 1941.
(f) CinCPac end. ND14/16, Ser. 096W of no date, to ref. (a).
(g) CNO conf. ltr. Op-22-A2, (SC) A16-3(9), Ser. 0115422 of Oct. 23, 1941.

1. The request of the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in reference (e), for a number of small anti-submarine craft and at least two squadrons of VSO planes for anti-submarine patrol, and the endorsement thereon by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference (f), have been given full consideration by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. The previous letter of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference (a), pertaining to the same general subject, was replied to in reference (d).

3. The Chief of Naval Operations notes that the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in his War Plan, reference (c), has taken full cognizance of his responsibilities in connection with his tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. The forces available in the Hawaiian area, both fleet and local defense forces, in the actual operations of our own and hostile forces, will, of course, indicate the numbers of fleet vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local defense tasks.

[32] 4. Neither the *local defense forces operating plan*—Rainbow No. 5 (Naval District Plan 0-5, Rainbow No. 5) nor the *Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan*, both required by reference (b), have yet been received by the Chief of Naval Operations. The joint plan should indicate what assistance in anti-submarine or other patrols will be rendered by Army Air Forces. A recent joint letter of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, contained in reference (g), provided for joint exercises of Army and Navy Frontier forces and called attention to the necessity of early completion of both defense plans.

5. The augmentation of the local defense forces of the 14th Naval District is proceeding as fast as the availability of ships, funds, personnel, material, and priorities will permit. The current situation in this regard may be summarized as follows:

(a) The Department now has authority to acquire and convert four small and ten larger types of privately-owned vessels for the Naval local defense forces

of the 14th Naval District. These are generally of the yacht type and do n
have very high speeds. The delivery of under-water detection devices is slo
but every effort will be made to give priority for such gear assigned to the
vessels.

(b) The completion of the 173-ft. subchasers (PC) is progressing slowly, a
they will not be turned out in any quantity until about May 1942. Eight of the
due for completion in May 1942, are *tentatively* assigned to the 14th Naval D
trict. The date of completion of the 110-ft. subchasers (PC) is indefinite, due
the engine situation.

(c) The Commandant now has under his command, the Coast Guard of t
14th Naval District. Of the Coast Guard vessels under his command, the f
lowing are equipped with depth charges and under-water detection gear: TANE
RELIANCE, and TIGER.

(d) Ten YMS's, expected to have depth charges and *sound gear when availab*
are tentatively assigned to the 14th Naval District. Two of these are due f
completion in the third quarter.

(e) The Department has no additional airplanes available for assignment
the 14th Naval District. Allocations of new aircraft squadrons which becon
available in the near future will be determined by the requirements of th
strategic situation as it develops.

[*33*] 6. Transmission of this document by the following means is necessar
and is authorized: within the continental limits of the United States by regi
tered airmail; beyond the continental limits of the United States via P. A. A
locked box.

/S/ H. R. Stark
H. R. STARK

Com14 told to comply with paragraph four, * * * of 12/17/41.

[*34*] In reply refer to initial and No.
Op30C1-AJ
(SC) N20-12
Serial 009330
Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, February 15, 1941.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
Subj: Anti-Torpedo Baffles for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks, Pea
Harbor.

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pea
Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that th
relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pea
Harbor. In addition, the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering roo
limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind
planning the installations of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among whic
the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of 75' may be assumed necessary to successfull
drop torpedoes from planes, 150' of water is desired. The maximum heigh
planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250'. Launching speeds ar
between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for drop is 60' or less. About 2
yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but th
may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approachi
and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges an
harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used b
shipping.

[*35*] (f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels
insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airpla
attack from the land side more difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of antiaircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship antiaircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of natural, well-protected anchorages within the harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation baffles would be difficult because of the congestion.

3. As a matter of interest, the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very low launching heights at reported range by the individual aviators of 400 to 1,300 yards from the battleships, but the *depths of water* in which the torpedoes were launched were *between fourteen and fifteen fathoms*. The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic antiaircraft fire. The eastern shore line of the anchorage and moorings were protected by numerous balloon barrages, but there was no trawler balloon barrage to the west. The torpedoes were apparently dropped inside of the nets, probably A/T nets.

[36] 4. It is considered that certain large bays and harbors, where a fleet or large force of heavy ships may be anchored and exposed with a large body of water on an entire flank, should have that flank protected by a series of baffles if the water is deep enough for launching torpedoes there. The main fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow, for instance, has an A/T net extending slightly to the north of a line between Calf of Flotta and Cava Island, protecting the main fleet anchorage. The depth of water where this net is laid is approximately 17 fathoms. On the other hand, constructed harbors, in which practically all available space is taken up by anchorages, and which are relatively deep, probably must depend upon other defense measures. It might be possible and practicable to provide in some places, which are not protected by relatively shallow water, antitorpedo baffles practically surrounding a limited number of berths for large ships, such as battleships or carriers. An extreme example of this is furnished at the present time by the French at Dakar, where double nets surround the Richelieu; she is placed similarly as in a dry dock, and evidently would have to open a section of the net to be hauled clear. The depth of water at Dakar, however, is very shallow.

5. The present A/T nets are very expensive, extremely heavy, are heavily anchored and moored, take up about 200 yards of space perpendicular to the line of the net, take a long time to lay, and are designed to stand up under heavy weather conditions. There is apparently a great need for the development of a light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protective harbors and which can be readily removed. It is hoped that some such net can be developed in the near future.

6. Recommendations and comments of the Commander in Chief are especially desired.

H. R. STARK.

cc: CinCLant
CinCAsiatic

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[37] Op30C1-AJ
(SC)N20-12
Ser. 010230
Confidential.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
February 17, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commandant, First Naval District.
The Commandant, Third Naval District.
The Commandant, Fourth Naval District.
The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.
The Commandant, Sixth Naval District.
The Commandant, Seventh Naval District.
The Commandant, Eighth Naval District.
The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.
The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.
The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Naval Station, Guantanamo.

Subj: Antitorpedo Baffle for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks.

1. In previous correspondence, the Commandants and local joint plannir committees have been requested, where considered necessary, to submit recor mendations concerning the employment of nets and booms in their defenses. I nearly all cases the recommendations received were limited to harbor entrance One of the reasons for this was that the Department, after previously making study of many harbors, submitted certain proposals for consideration by th districts, but did not specifically propose any protection against torpedo plar attacks.

2. The Commandants and local joint planning committees are requested, they have not already done so, to consider the employment of and to make recor mendations concerning antitorpedo baffles, especially for the protection of larg and valuable units of the Fleet in their respective harbors, and especially at th large fleet bases.

3. In considering the use of A/T baffles, the following limitations, among other may be borne in mind:

[38] (a) A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary t successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About 200 yards of torpedo run is nece sary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approacl ing and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffle for tugs, fuel oil barges an harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used b shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure th vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes upon striking baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplar attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attackin planes to come within effective range of antiaircraft batteries before they ca range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship antiaircraft protection, balloon barrage and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well-protected anchorages within the harbo from torpedo plane attack on a number of large ships. Where a large force suc as a fleet is based, the establishment of certain baffles would be difficult becau of congestion.

R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

cc: CinCPac
CinC Atlantic
CinC Asiatic
CO, NavNetDep, Tiburon BuOr
CO, NavNetDep, Newport Op-1

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[39] Op-30C1-AJ
(SC)M20-12
Serial 055730
Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 13, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commandant, First Naval District
The Commandant, Third Naval District
The commandant, Fourth Naval District
The Commandant, Fifth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixth Naval District
The Commandant, Seventh Naval District
The Commandant, Eighth Naval District
The Commandant, Tenth Naval District
The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District

The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District
The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District

Subj: Antitorpedo Baffles for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attack.
Ref: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op-30C1 Ser. 010230 of Feb.17,1941.

1. In reference (a), the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning antitorpedo baffles, especially for protection of large and valuable units of the Fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major Fleet bases. In paragraph three were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles, among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75' may be asumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as 300', and in some cases may initiate dives of considerably less than 75', and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

[40] 3. While no minimum depth of water in which Naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be asumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attack force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information, the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto, were, in general, at thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched at eleven or twelve fathoms.

R. E. INGERSOLL.

cc: ClnCPac; ClnCLant; ClnCAF; Co, NavNetDep, Tiburon; Co, NavNetDep, Newport; Comdt., NavSta Guantanamo; Comdt., NavSta Samoa; BuOrd; Op-12.

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[41] 4 December 1941 Secret
From: CINCPAC
Action: COMTASKFOR 3, COMFOURTEEN, COMPATWING 2} Mailgram
Info: COMBATFOR, COMBASEFOR, COMAIRBATFOR, LEXINGTON} Mailgram
040237

Myser 01825 of 10 Nov marine scoron two three one will base eighteen planes Midway X Lexington provide transportation X On 5 Dec after sortie Pearl form Task Force Twelve under COMCRUSCOFOR consisting of Lexington Chicago Astoria Portland Desron Five less DESDIV Ten X Task Force Twelve proceed by direct route to arrive four hundred miles 130 degrees from Midway at 2230 GCT on 7 Dec X From that vicinity fly off Marine planes to Midway X Return operating area and resume normal operations after planes have arrived Midway X COMTASKFOR Nine direct patrol planes from Midway cover Lexington flying off position provide security while that area and guard Marine plane flight X Communications radio condition 19 guard continuously NPM primary fox X COM 14 inform Midway planes expected arrive about 0200 GCT on 8 Dec and require Midway report arrival to Com 14 by coded dispatch X COM 14 pass this report to COMTASKFOR 12 X Midway submarine patrol will be advised.

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[42] From: CNO
Action: CINCUS, CINCAF, COMROLFOR (Mailgram)
Date: 21 January 1941
212155

The international situation continues to deteriorate X It now appears to me that if war eventuates its general character will be according to plan DOG my

memorandum to the secretary X If this estimate proves correct I contemplat ordering mobilization according to plan RAINBOW Three with following modif cations Atlantic Fleet principal concentration New England and Canada execut all tasks except afirm expect early reenforcement from Pacific and much strongе British Isles detachment X Pacific Fleet waiting attitude or execute assigne tasks in area eastward of 160 degrees east depending on action by Japan X Asiatic Fleet can not expect early reenforcement alert status or carry out task according to circumstances.

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[43] From: Alusna, London Top Secr
Action: OPNAV
Date: 3 February 1941
03140 Passed to CINCUS CINCLANT CINCAF for info as OPNAV 032300

I have been officially informed that Japanese are apparently planning an offe sive on a large scale presumed against Indochina Malay Peninsula or the Dutc East Indies no doubt to be coordinated with attack on Great Britain approximatel February 10. It is definite that the Jap and German relations are becoming mos intimate and that the Japs are conducting a hatred campaign against the Britis even in ordinarily pro-English press also two large Japanese Merchant vess sailings have been cancelled. Reports believed reliable state that all Jap shi ping being called home to be taken over by the government. Request you knowledge of this. The Japanese mediating that Indochina scene meeting aboar Jap cruiser. Price of umpire's services unreliably reported to be bases on th west coast of Siam that are usable by light craft for cutting Singapore commun cations via the Malacca Straits.

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[44] CINCPAC FILE NO. S
A4-3/FF12/(13)
Serial 01254
CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *August 13, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander Battle Force (Commander Task Force ONE).
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force (Commander Task Force TWO).
Commander Scouting Force (Commander Task Force THREE).
Commander Base Force.
Commanding General, Second Marine Division.
Subject: Employment Schedules; U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fisc Year, 1942.
Reference:
(a) Cincus ltr. A4-3/FF1 Serial 1773 of 16 May, 1938.
(b) U. S. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 4CL-41.
(c) Cinpac Conf. ltr. A4-3/FF1-1 Serial 0750 of 8 May, 1941.
Enclosure (Under separate cover): (A) Copy of subject schedule—Action A dressees 10 each, information addressees 3 each.

1. Enclosure (A) has been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and the general directive for preparation of the subject of this letter.

2. Second quarter employment schedules will be submitted for approval by September, printed and distributed by 15 September, 1941, as follows:

(a) Task Force Commanders inform Type Commanders and Commander Ba Force of the times in the schedule to be devoted to inter-type tactics in the respective Task Forces, as soon as practicable.

(b) Type Commanders submit two Task Force Commanders, information Co mander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommendations for type training indica ing priorities in exercises. Commander Scouting Force assign submarines a Patrol Squadrons to Task Forces.

[45] (c) Task Force Commanders and Commander Base Force prepare a submit to Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for approval, the quarter employment schedule coordinating the requirements of types in their respecti Forces.

3. Fleet units in Hawaiian Area are divided for training and operations between three Task Forces, Base Force, and Naval Transportation Service as follows:

TASK FORCE ONE—Commander Battle Force.

Batdivs TWO and FOUR
SARATOGA and planes
Crudiv NINE
Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE
Mindiv ONE, OGLALA
⅓ available submarines
2 Patrol Squadrons

TASK FORCE TWO—Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.

Batdiv ONE
ENTERPRISE and planes
Crudivs THREE and FIVE
Desflot TWO, Desdiv FIFTY
Mindiv TWO
⅓ available submarines
2 Patrol Squadrons

TASK FORCE THREE—Commander Scouting Force.

Crudivs FOUR AND SIX
LEXINGTON and planes
Desron FIVE plus Minron TWO
Transports, Base Force (when present)
Second Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment.
Submarines, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet (to include Subdiv TWENTY-ONE) less ⅔ available submarines.
Aircraft, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, less 4 Patrol Squadrons.

[46] *BASE FORCE*, U. S. Pacific Fleet, less transports (when present).
NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE—Vessels operating under Opnav and Com 14.

4. Units are assigned in accordance with reference (b). Units omitted from reference (b) have been included in the Task Force Organizations for training purposes.

5. Force and Type Commanders may, to suit individual ship requirements, shift units from one Task Force to another, maintaining proportion of upkeep and operating time.

6. One Task Force will be at sea at all times. When Task Forces enter and leave Pearl Harbor the same day, the departing force will clear before the entry of the other force commences.

7. Reference (c) remains effective, when practicable.

8. Schedules will provide for as many tenders and Base Force vessels as practicable to participate in Fleet Tactics during the period 21–25 November, 1941.

9. Operating and upkeep periods are assigned as follows:

	Operating	*Upkeep*
Task Force One		28 Sep–9 Oct
	10–18 Oct	19–31 Oct
	1–10 Nov	11–21 Nov
	22–28 Nov	29 Nov–12 Dec
	13–20 Dec	21–30 Dec
	31 Dec	
Task Force Two	24 Sept–2 Oct	3–17 Oct
	18–26 Oct	27 Oct–9 Nov
	10–17 Nov	18–27 Nov
	28 Nov–5 Dec	6–17 Dec
	18–26 Dec	27 Dec
[47] Task Force Three		20 Sep–1 Oct
	2–10 Oct	11–22 Oct
	23 Oct–1 Nov	2–16 Nov
	17–25 Nov	26 Nov–4 Dec
	5–13 Dec	14–25 Dec
	26–31 Dec	

10. Periods assigned for Fleet Tactics:
Task Forces Two and Three—23–26 Oct.
Task Forces One and Three—22–25 Nov.
Task Forces One and Two—18–20 Dec.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:
Opnav
CincLant
CincAF
Combatships
Comcrubatfor
Cominbatfor
Comcruscofor
Comdesbatfor
Comsubscofor
Comairscofor
Cominron TWO
Compatwing TWO
Compatwing ONE
Com 14

P. C. Crosley,
/S/ P. C. CROSLEY,
Flag Secretary.

[*48*] Date: 24 May 1941 Top Secr
From: OPNAV
To: CINCPAC
242150

The Department in the interest of morale will consider visits of small detac
ments or individual ships to the Pacific Coast. It is not desired that detachmen
of such size make these visits as to indicate the breaking up or reducing
Hawaiian concentration. Your recommendations are requested.

[*49*] Date: 17 Oct 1941 Secr
From: CINCPAC
To: COMSUBSCOFOR
Info to: COM 14
170354

When in all respects ready for war service send two submarines to Wake
Patrol radius fifteen miles of Wake X Direct submarines report contacts and
prepared take offensive action only if attacked or if ordered to do so by CINCPA

Secr

[*50*] Date: 17 Oct 1941
From: CINCPAC
To: COMSUBSCOFOR
Info to: COM FOURTEEN
170426

Direct submarines now operating Midway assume war patrol ten mile radius
Report contacts X Take offensive action only if attacked or if ordered to do
by CINCPAC.

[*51*] Date: 17 Oct 1941 Secr
From: CINCPAC
To: COMFOURTEEN
170319

Direct an alert status in outlying islands.

[*52*] Date: 17 OCT 1941
Originator: COM 14
Action: Naval Air Stations, Midway; Johnston; Palmyra; Marine Detachme
at Wake.
Written up for CINCPAC Info
170356 Secr

In view international situation assume alert status.

[53] Date: 17 OCTOBER 1941 Secret
From: CINCPAC
To: COMPATWING 2 (TWO)
Info to: COMFOURTEEN
170429

When in all respects ready for war service send one squadron patrol planes to operate from Midway until further orders X Carry out daily patrol within 100 miles of island X Report contacts X In addition be prepared on further orders to send six of the above planes to Wake and replace them at Midway by six planes *Form* Pearl X Planes will take offensive action only if planes or bases are actually attacked or on further orders from CINCPAC.

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[54] November 26 1941 Secret
From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: CINCPAC
270049

Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable X Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units X Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament.

Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army.

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[55] 26 November 1941 Secret
From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: CINCPAC
270038

In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station twenty-five Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable X It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an Aircraft Carrier X Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels X Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents X Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies X Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines X Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary X Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations X Confer with commanding general and advise as soon as practicable X

Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army.

[Telegram]

[56] Standard Form No. 14A [Stamped] Secret.
Approved by The President March 10, 1926.
From War Department
Bureau A. G. O.
AG 381 (11-29-41) MC-E
EHB/cdm-1712
November 29 1941
Cablegram
COMMANDING GENERAL,
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.
Sent No. 489, 11/29.

Consult C in C Pacific Fleet reference his dispatch number two eight zero six two seven to Chief of Naval Operations period In view of information contained in above dispatch comma the movement of the two Army Pursuit Squadrons as indicated in War Department cable number four six six comma November two

six comma one nine four one comma will be suspended period These squadro
should however be prepared to move on short notice period Paragraph W
Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific advance bases from t
Navy except for furnishing antiaircraft equipment period Consult C in C Pacif
Fleet reference requirements and areas to be defended period War Departme
has also assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton period
is contemplated that you will form base defense units from the Hawaiian Ga
rison specially organized as task forces for particular areas period If these uni
are moved from Oahu comma necessary replacements from the United States w
be furnished period Report your conclusions and recommendations to the W
Department at the earliest practicable date.

ADAMS.

OFFICIAL: Secret.

/s/ (Illegible)
Adjutant General.

47 AGO Dec 8 1941 Received

True copy:
Based on: WPD 4571-5, 11/29/41.
Green cy w/d & destroyed by
burning. 12/30/41, CDM-1705
[Stamped] Secret..

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[57] Nov. 28, 1941 Top Secr
From: CINCPAC
To: OPNAV
Action: 12
28 Ø 627

Reference Urdis 270040 and 270038; Wright now at Wake to discharge groun
crews and material to operate one squadron of marine planes. It proceeds afte
wards to Midway to land similar items. Arrangements have already been ma
to send each of those places essential ground material for temporary operation
12 B-17 Army bombers, to leave Pearl about Dec. 1st, but at present only 6 su
planes of the 12 on Oahu are in operating condition. An acute shortage of Arm
bombs precludes any shipments to outlying bases but Navy bombs are now ava
able there. These may be used by the Army with minor alterations. Usefu
ness of Army pursuit planes for insular defense is radically limited by the
doubtful capability of operating over 2Ø miles offshore. Their use is possib
but inability to land on carrier freezes them to island where landed, and fle
ibility dispositions is thereby curtailed. Additional antiaircraft guns need
this area for Army & Marine defense battalions. Consider use of Army tro
reinforcements for outlying bases inadvisable as long as Marines are availab
but plans are being made for such use of Army troops. All outlying forces mu
be exclusively under Navy command, 12 marine fighters leave Nov. 28 in carri
for Wake. Expect send other Marine planes to Midway later. On Dec. 1
sending 12 patrol planes to Wake from Midway, and replacing those at Midw
from Pearl. The feasability and advisability of relieving Marine planes wi
Army pursuits will be investigated more thoroughly.

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[58] EG61/(16)
Serial 0114W
Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *2 December 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operation.
Subject: Defense of Outlying Bases.
Reference:
(a) Opnav despatch 270038 of November 1941.
(b) Opnav despatch 270040 of November 1941.
(c) Cincpac despatch 280627 of November 1941.
(d) Opnav despatch 282054 of November 1941.
(e) War Dept. despatch 48 of Nov. 29, 1941.
(f) Cincpac secret serial 0113W of Dec. 3, 1941.
(g) Cincpac secret serial 090W of Oct. 21, 1941.

1. Reference (a) advised that Army pursuit planes, could be made available for Wake and Midway in order to retain 2d Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use. Reference (b) advised that Army could make infantry available to *reenforce* defense battalions now on station, and that Army proposed to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, *might occupy* but that they could provide no anti-aircraft units.

2. Reference (c) outlined certain measures that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had already taken to strengthen the air defenses of Midway and Wake and others, including Army air cooperation, that were in progress. Reference (d) approved of the arrangements made and stated that the War Department would instruct the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in *support* of Marines. It also asked for report on present defenses of outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future. The report is furnished in reference (f).

3. Reference (e) from the War Department to the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, which referred to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's 280627, is somewhat at variance with Chief of Naval Operation despatches in that it states the War Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific advance bases from the Navy except for furnishing AA equipment. It also stated that the War Department has assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands.

[*59*] 4. Reference (g) contained a study by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of the defenses of outlying bases and recommendations as to personnel and equipment therefor.

5. It is not completely clear whether or not the Navy Department has in mind that the Army will ultimately relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. If so, it is assumed that such action would be taken in order to have those battalions and their equipment available to garrison positions taken by assault in the Marshalls and the Carolines. Should such assumption be correct, it is pertinent to note that transports, *trained* assault troops, etc., are not now available to make the seizures. Moreover, the local Army authorities are not only short of anti-aircraft equipment, but of most other armament necessary for defense of an advanced island base. If the Marine Defense Battalions were withdrawn at this time it would be necessary to leave behind most of their equipment, and they would have none for use elsewhere.

6. To clarify the current situation to some extent, certain information and considerations that may not otherwise be readily available in the Department are mentioned below:

(a) Army is not only lacking AA guns for outlying bases, but has a serious shortage on Oahu. It has insufficient suitable guns for replacing Marine 7" and 5" guns without weakening the defenses of Hawaii. By taking 155 mm guns from Hawaii the Marine 5" guns might be replaced but the 155 mm guns would either cover a limited arc or else their mobility would be lost.

(b) Army can spare no .50 caliber machine guns but can supply rifles and .30 caliber machine guns.

(c) Army has a limited number of 37 mm guns, badly needed for defenses in Hawaii, but some few might be made available by weakening the defenses here; particularly as a considerable increase in the number of such guns is expected in the near future. At present there is a marked shortage of ammunition for 37 mm.

[*60*] (d) (1) Army pursuit planes are available in sufficient numbers to send at least one squadron each to Midway and Wake.

(2) The fighting capabilities of those planes is superior to that of Marine fighters or light bombers.

(3) They have no offensive capabilities against hostile surface craft or submarines.

(4) They lack navigational equipment, their personnel are inexperienced in flying over water and are much averse to operations more than fifteen miles from land.

(5) Pursuit planes once having landed at Midway or Wake, cannot fly off to carriers. It would be virtually impossible to take them out of Wake; and a very slow and difficult undertaking to remove them from Midway.

(e) Army has personnel available in sufficient numbers to reenforce or relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. The Marines have been organized, equipped, and trained for work of this particular character. They are already established, habited to the mode of life, and experienced in fitting their activities to accord

with the various other naval activities in these outlying places. It is no flection upon the Army to say that their units would require considerable ti to acquire the proficiency in this specialized work that the Marines already ha

(f) In emergency, Army personnel might replace casualties or reenforce M rines, but it would, for very obvious reasons, be highly preferable to have oth Marines available for that purpose.

(g) No spare armament for defense battalions is available. In fact, so deficiencies in equipment for existing battalions exist; and the recommendatio of reference (g) as to armament for the outlying bases have not been complet filled. Armament and equipment for any new defense battalions have not be assembled.

[61] (h) The bases are being developed to facilitate fleet operations. respective of the source of defense forces, various other naval activities will co tinue at these outlying bases. Placing the defenses in Army hands would bri some difficult problems of command relationships. Such problems would not, course, be insurmountable, but they would be avoided if the Marines are r replaced.

(i) Twelve Marine fighting planes are now on Wake; a squadron of Mari light bombers is in readiness to fly to Midway. These planes are accustomed long operations over water, and from carriers. The bombers have offensi power against surface ships or submarines.

(j) Arrangements exist or will shortly exist on both Midway and Wake f temporary offensive operations of Army B–17 bombers, using Navy bombs. On six such bombers on Oahu are now in operating condition.

(k) Personnel and equipment, up to the limits given in reference (g), a being transferred to the outlying bases as rapidly as available and the cond tions at those bases make feasible.

(l) Prior to receipt of reference dispatches, arrangements for Army coopera tion in certain respects had been made; and close cooperation and liaison w continue.

(m) Essential work is being pushed at outlying bases, and it is not intend to withdraw civilian workers if hostilities develop. Plans have been made incorporate such workers into the defense organization insofar as practicable.

7. From the foregoing, it is concluded that at this time:

(a) Marine armament can be withdrawn from outlying islands to a ve limited extent.

[62] (b) If the Marines are replaced, the personnel relieved, lacki equipment, will be valueless as a defense battalion.

(c) Replacing the Marines will very materially weaken the defenses becau of less proficient personnel.

(d) Considering all aspects of the matter, Marine planes are more valuab in the Advance Bases than Army pursuit planes.

8. The presence of Army forces on outlying bases will inevitably bring up th question of command. Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra are Naval A Stations, designed and built primarily to support Fleet operations. Any oth activities there, including defense, must be subordinate to this purpose. Defen itself exists solely for the purpose of insuring the availability of the bases. Th establishments are small and close coordination of all activities is mandator extending to joint use of material and equipment and even to joint participati by all hands in unusual tasks. This can be accomplished only by unity command, which must be vested in the one officer qualified to insure that th base fulfills its purpose, whether under attack or not and no matter what organ zation operates the defenses. The interests of the Navy are paramount an unity of command must be vested in the Commanding Officer of the Station. Th Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as already brought out in his despatche cannot too strongly emphasize this point.

9. The Commander-in-Chief recognizes that unforeseen events may rapid develop that would necessitate replacement of Marines by Army personnel, pr vided suitable equipment is available. He has had conferences with the Co manding General, Hawaiian Department, on the matter and arrangements a in progress looking toward

(a) Organization of three Army defense battalions of approximately 800 me each (organization along the lines of Marine Defense Battalions):

[63] (b) Training of such units with equipment, Army or Marine, availab on Oahu;

(c) Army steps to obtain requisite armament comparable to that called for reference (g) for use in the Advance Bases;·

(d) Army organization of three 18-plane pursuit squadrons to be kept in expeditionary status with crews, ground crews and equipment ready for transportation, on short notice, to Advanced Bases—planes to be transported by aircraft carrier and flown off near destination.

(e) Bringing aforementioned units to a satisfactory state of readiness and keeping them available for (1) relieving, supporting, or furnishing replacements for Marine Defense Battalions, or (2) for garrisoning other islands or developments not now manned by Marines.

10. In connection with this whole question, the major point for the moment appears to be that the Advanced Bases we now have are, to a greater or lesser extent, going concerns. Their development and provisions for defense have been evolved after much work and study. The international situation is such that active defense against hostile forces may be required on extremely short notice. Any radical change in the defense arrangements should be made only if their is compelling necessity therefor; and a definite indication of clear cut gain for over all operations.

11. The Commander-in-Chief is not aware of the particular circumstances which have opened up the questions under discussion. If additional Advanced Bases in our own or friendly territory are contemplated, it is highly important that further information on the subject be furnished the Commander-in-Chief.

12. If, during the progress of the war, enemy positions are taken and require garrisons they should, of course, be defended by Marine Defense Battalions. It would be preferable to have Marine battalions with full equipment available for such duty without disrupting the defenses of existing bases. At present, our Advanced Bases should be defended by the most competent personnel available, viz, the Marine Defense Battalions. [*64*] If our progress in the war has brought more advanced positions under our control, then the most seasoned and experienced personnel should be in the more exposed positions; and the present Advanced Bases which, by virtue of our forward movement, would be less liable to enemy attack, could be manned by less skilled personnel. Even so, it would be better to have new Marines rather than the Army take over their defense, but the Army should be ready and qualified to do so. In any event, the battalions projected into the new bases must have their full equipment without withdrawing that in the present bases.

13. The foregoing discussion has had particular application to Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. The situation as to Samoa is not greatly different. Construction of Army airfields at Canton and Christmas Islands has brought those places into the picture. The Commander-in-Chief has felt that some defense at Canton should be provided at once against an enemy raider. As the Army has no suitable guns available for the purpose, he has arranged to send two five inch guns with fire control equipment from the Fourth Defense Battalion to meet temporarily the existing situation, pending clarification of the Department's policy regarding Canton. These guns will be manned by Army personnel.

14. Meantime, the Commander-in-Chief is making a study as to minimum requirements for the defenses of Canton. This will be forwarded separately within the next few days. The defenses contemplated will call for not more than two or three batteries of three inch AA guns, not more than two batteries of five inch guns and a limited number of smaller weapons. It is expected that not more than 300 men will be required for manning the defensive armament. It is probable that the requirements for Christmas would be less rather than more than that for Canton.

15. In view of the Commanding General's information that the War Department had assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands, no steps have been taken toward defending Christmas, and agreement has been made locally with Army authorities that Marine equipment now going to Canton would be replaced as soon as possible.

[*65*] 16. It seems aprpopriate to express the growing concern of the Commander-in-Chief over the increase in number of Army and Navy stations that may require support from the Fleet. Such support may involve logistics, keeping open lines of communications, or active defense. Establishments at Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Samoa are already well advanced. Our Army is now engaged in building air fields at Christmas, Canton, Fiji, and New Caledonia, and consideration is being given to other installations in the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands. In addition, discussion has been made from time to time over the establishmet of American bases in the Gilberts, Bismarck Archipelago, and other places.

17. Whether or not the Navy is initially concerned in the building or logistic or defense installations of these far flung establishments, it inevitably will becom involved with them if war develops. Such involvement may seriously interfer with offiensive operations of the Fleet. It can not be too strongly emphasized tha new development of this nature must be curtailed, and only those permitted tha will definitely contribute toward success in the Western Pacific. A Fleet in beln behind a series of defensive positions in the Central and South Pacific can nc contribute very much toward victory over a power some thousands of miles t the westward.

18. To summarize: the Commander-in-Chief considers that the current setup i the existing bases is in accordance with long and well considered plans tha should not now be changed. He intends to:

(a) Continue the Marine Defense Battalions at Wake, Midway, Johnston, an Palmyra;

(b) Continue use of Marine planes at such of those places as circumstance require;

(c) Transfer a battery of five inch guns to the Army for use by Army personne at Canton until the Army can obtain suitable replacement;

[66] (d) Continue cooperation and liaison with local Army authorities t develop and maintain in readiness Army units and equipment that may, on shor notice, reenforce or relieve Marines at aforementioned bases in whole or in par

19. It is recommended that:

(a) Deficiencies in armament at existing Advance Bases, and in existin Marine Defense Battalions, be remedied as rapidly as possible (see refer ence (g));

(b) Fourth Defense Battalion and proposed new Defense Battalion be mair tained as mobile battalions in Pearl Harbor in accordance with existing plans and that the organization and acquirement of equipment for this new additiona battalion be expedited;

(c) At least two additional defense battalions be organized and equipped a San Diego, with plans to use these battalions and those mentoined in (b) abov for garrisoning positions captured in the Marshalls;

(d) An understanding with Army be reached now that in case Army take over defense of Advance Bases, command of such bases will remain in the Nav (see paragraph 8);

(e) Commitments to further island developments in the Central and Sout Pacific be held to a minimum as to number and logistic requirements;

(f) No plans be made for relieving Marine Defense Battalions or air unit until Army has organized, equipped and trained for coordinated action suitabl units for taking over.

20. Transmission via U. S. Registered air mail is hereby authorized.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:
C. G., Haw. Dept.
Com 14

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[67] Date: 1 December 1941
From: Opnav
To: CinCaf
Com Sixteen
Information: CincPac: Com Fourteen

Top Secret-Ultra

~~0114~~00

Ambassador Tsubokami in Bangkok on twenty ninth sent to Tokyo as numbe eight seven two the following quote conferences now in progress in Bangkol considering plans aimed at forcing British to attack Thai at Padang Bessa nea Singora as counter move to Japanese landing at Kota Bharu X Since Tha intends to consider first invador as her enemy comma Orange believes thi landing in Malay would force British to invade Thai at Padang Bessa X Tha would then declare war and request Orange help X This plan appears to hav approval of Thai Chief of Staff Bijitto XX Thai Government circles have bee sharply divided between proBritish and proOrange until twenty five Novembe but now Wanitto and Shin who favor joint military action with Orange hav silenced anti Orange group and intend to force Premier Pibul to make a deci sion X Early and favorable developments are possible unquote

[68] Date: 28 November 1941
From: Opnav
Action: CinCaf
Information: CincPac; Com 14; Com 16
281633

Confidential
Top Secret

Following from State Department: Saigon—November 26—5 days ago Orange troop and supply vessels began to put in at Saigon taking up all available quay space, about 20,000 troops have landed and 10,000 arrived from the north by rail during same period. Troops in south Indo-China total about 70,000. Some estimate 128,000 but this is yet too high. Many trucks landed moving troops and supplies to interior. This movement which is of large proportions indicates hostilities against Thailand may soon begin. Hanoi—November 26—supplies and military equipment particularly railway, rolling stock, gasoline, landing at Paiphong even recently augmented and are being transshipped south. Among recently landed artillery are anti-tank guns. Japanese have recently purchased considerable number native boats along coast Tongking province. Reported they desire purchase 500. These boats are being sent south, Hanoi—November 26—American consul received reliable information governor general has ascertained from agent that around December 1 without either declaration of war or ultimatum Nippon navy will attack Isthmus Kra. Simultaneously army will advance on Thailand. Great increased troop landings and movements south during last few days about 4000 men landed. On November 25 and 26 1500 will go south by special train. In Tongking there are approximately 25,000 Orange troops and at Gialam around 90 airplanes. Hanoi—November 26—Early on November 25 all interested persons advised by Haiphong mayor that Japanese intended sequester all freight en route to China. Nips had demanded keys to all bonded warehouses by noon November 25. Mayor added [69] protest had been lodged by French officials but individuals effected by demand must use own judgment whether or not to comply.

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[70] Dec. 6, 1941 Secret
From: CINCAF
To: OPNAV
Action: 38W
Ø61255
Copies: 12; 13; 16; 38; 388; Navaide; CNO; 2Ø OP.

Report by Cinc China "25 ship convoy with escort of 6 cruisers and 1Ø DD's lat ØS–ØØ N, 1Ø6–ØØ east at Ø316 GMT today. Convoy of 1Ø ships with two cruisers and 1Ø destroyers Ø7–4Ø north, 1Ø6–2Ø east two hours later. All on course west. Three additional ships Ø7–51 north 1Ø5 east at Ø422, course 31Ø. This indicates all forces will make for Kontron"

Sighted by my scouting force anchored Camranh Bay—3Ø ships and one large cruiser.

Info: CINCPAC; COM 16; COM 14

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[71] 8 December 1941 Secret
From: ComSixteen
To: OpNav
Information: CincPac; CinAF; ComFourteen
ØSØ333

The following Japanese distributions are based upon radio call recoveriest since December first and are conservative: There is a heavy concentration of aircraft at Taiwan at the Kaki, Takao, and Taichu Airstations. South China Airforceheadquarters is now in the Saigon area with at least four groups of planes. Strength unknown. Eight Maru Airtenders in South China area estimated distribution as follows: At Takao five, at Saigon one and two at Sama. Intercepts of large volume of high precedence traffic from air activities in Saigon area indicate that extensive operations may be imminent. Radio bearings indicate that Akagi is moving south from Empire and is now in Nansei Islands area.

[72] Secret

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

5 JANUARY 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSION

In accordance with the Commission's verbal directive, the following Summa is respectfully submitted:

In summarizing the frequency of occurrence of the periods when informat was lacking in regard to the location or activity or a group, type or unit the Japanese Fleet during the last six months of 1941, necessitates a gene review of the procedures and methods followed:

1. Due to the distances involved, it is seldom possible to intercept the origi direct transmissions from Japanese Fleet units at sea, consequently intercept depends on those naval communications handled by the more powerful sh stations on broadcast schedules. Approximately 90% of the intercepted tr fic is of this latter nature. A unit may be addressed by other units via dir communication or the ship-shore channels (rebroadcast) whether in port or sea. During tactical exercises ORANGE utilizes medium and low frequenc which are inaudible here. During such periods it is necessary to rely on intercept activities at Guam and Cavite to observe and report on these activit When in port, a unit almost invariably shifts to the low-frequency, low-pow limited range, "harbor frequency" depriving all intercept stations of origina traffic. Thus occurs periods when little definite information is available relat to a unit's activities except that inferred from the traffic addressed it either the routing or association with other units addressed or associations with originator.

2. Changes of call signs, addresses, use of alternate, secret, tactical, and spec calls, greatly complicates the identification of units and the reconstruction the naval organization afloat and ashore. The Japanese Navy shifted its signs on 1 May, 1 November and 1 December, 1941. Shortly after the 1 Nov ber change the Japanese begun using a "blanket broadcast" system in wh no originator or addressee appeared, these being presumably buried in the cip text.

3. It has been a general rule that when a unit was not heard originating tra or using tactical circuits it was presumed to be in port or in a navy yard i relatively inactive status.

4. It is to be noted that for the above reasons the *simultaneous* location *each* Division of Battleships, cruisers, destroyers, carriers, or [73] s marines is not possible. Therefore, the locations of Fleet Flagships and su subordinate units of the above types must be relied upon to establish the p sumed locations or activity of the remainder of the related lower echelons.

5. During the past six months, Fleet Intelligence records show that the casions when uncertainty existed as to the exact location of certain types we

Type	Total days uncertain	Number of periods	Range perio
Battleships	70	Seven	8–14 da
Cruisers (1st Fleet)	Nearly all	Almost continual sence of positive cations.	
Cruisers (2nd Fleet, less CRUDIV 7)	113	Eight	10–20 d
CRUDIV 7 (very active on detached duty)	63	Six	8–16 da
Destroyers	Very indefinite	Seven	9–33 da
Carriers	84	Eight	8–22 da
(If Cardiv 2, formerly very active on detached duty, be excepted from this analysis the following result is more typical.)			
Carriers (less Cardiv 2)	134	Twelve	9–22 da
(In both cases the longest period, 22 days, was in July 1941.)			

Respectfully submitted,

EDWIN THOMAS LAYTON,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,
Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Certified to be a True Copy:

/s/ J. M. LEE,
Comdr., U. S. Navy,
Flag Secretary, Staff, CINCPAC-CINCPOA.

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[74] 28 Nov 1941 Secret
From: CINCPAC
To: COMPATWING 2
Info: COMSCOFOR
COMBATFOR
COM 14
COMBASEFOR
COMAIRBATFOR
28Ø45Ø

Direct 12 patrol planes now at Midway proceed Wake on 1 Dec search enroute X Provide one squadron relieve Midway planes on 3Ø November X After arrival both squadrons direct them comply my 28Ø447 X Present intention return Wake squadron Pearl about 5 December.

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[75] 11/3Ø/41
ORIGINATOR CTF 9
Action: COMPATRONS 21, 22; COMTASKGROUP 9.2
Information: CINCPAC; COM 14; COMSUBSCOFOR; CO NAS Midway: CO NAS Wake 2021Ø3

Operation order 9S1 X Information CINCPAC 28Ø447 and 28Ø45Ø X Task Force 8 ENTERPRISE, CHESTER, NORTHAMPTON, SALT LAKE CITY, 6 DD transporting Marine FigRon which will base on Wake X Planes will be launched 2ØØ miles bearing Ø7Ø from Wake at 2ØØØ GCT on December 3 X Enroute and returning Task Force 8 will pass point 4ØØ miles south of Midway X Departed Pearl forenoon 28 Nov. X WRIGHT expected arrive Midway from Wake 3 December X Mission cover route and provide security for TF 8 while in vicinity of Wake in order to obtain information possible enemy forces in threatening position and provide readily available aerial striking power during period carrier will be launching Marine planes X Tasks PatRon 21 search as indicated: Nov. 3Ø depart Pearl daylight search sector 26Ø–28Ø degrees to longitude 165 degrees thence on track 27Ø to long 172–3Ø thence to Midway; Dec 1 sector 17Ø dash 224 to 5ØØ miles using 8 planes: Dec 2 sector 2Ø9–237 to 525 miles using four planes; Dec 3 sector 2Ø6–248 to 525 miles using 6 planes; Dec 4 sector 17Ø–224 to 5ØØ miles using 8 planes Dec 5 sector 126–168 to 525 miles using 6 planes X PatRon 22 Search as indicated; Dec 1 depart Midway daylight using 2 plane sections sector 226–249 to 525 miles thence on track 238 to far perimeter of 12Ø mile circle from Wake thence to Wake; Dec. 2 sector ØØ9–1Ø2 to 525 miles using 6 planes; Dec 3 take off at 18ØØ GCT sector Ø48–ØØ2 to 5ØØ miles using six planes; one plane be 2ØØ miles bearing [76] Ø7Ø from Wake at 2ØØØ GCT remain with Task Force 8 until 24ØØ GCT unless otherwise directed by visual remaining 5 planes each load with 2 5ØØ pound bombs; unless otherwise directed unload bombs at ØØ23Ø GCT December 4 X On December four X On Dec 4 take off daylight for Midway X On December five take off at daylight for Pearl XRAY critical period entire operation forenoon 3 Dec. X Logistics fuel as required X Special provisions use Zone Ø times X Task Force 9 Basic Communications and Aerological Plans X Frequency Plan FOX COMTASKFOR 9 with FAIRDET at NAS Pearl X Maintain radio silence except for contact reports and emergencies X Arrange for bases to broadcast MO's on schedule without request X.

[77] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSLYVANIA, Flagship

A2-11/FF12
A4-1/VZ
A3/VZ(95)
Serial 59

c/o FLEET POST OFFICE,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., January 7, 1942.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: Airplane Situation, Hawaiian Area.
Reference:
(a) ComAirScoFor Conf. Ltr. Serial 0755 of December 18, 1941, address to OpNav.
(b) ComAirScoFor Conf. Ltr. Serial 0767 of December 24, 1941, address to Buaero.
(c) CincCPAC desp. 041001 of January 1942.
(d) CinCPAC desp. 050547 of January 1942.
Enclosure: (A) ComPatWing TWO Secret Ltr. Serial 0033 of December 30, 19

1. In recent despatches, references (c) and (d), the Commander-in-Chi Pacific Fleet, pointed out the vital need for improvement of the aircraft situati in the Hawaiian area. This letter is written in amplification.

2. The following factors must form the basis for any consideration of aircra requirements here:

(a) *The attack of 7 December will be followed by others.* The enemy h exploited the element of surprise. He can however, use it again, although to lesser extent because of local alertness measures, if adequate search is not mai tained. In any case, his strength in carriers and heavy ships is such that need not depend on surprise. His objectives in the first assault were aircra and ships. There remain untouched the very important and tempting objectiv of fuel supply, navy yard industrial establishment and drydocks, commenci docks and the city of Honolulu. There remains, further, as an ultimate objecti the taking of the island of Oahu itself, retention of which is by no means assur with the forces now available to us.

(b) *Japanese aircraft carrier aviation, with all due allowance for the adva tage of surprise, proved itself on 7 December to be in a very high state of dev opment.* This applies with full force not only to material and to the trainin skill and determination of personnel, but also to the unquestionably brillia manner in which the entire expedition was conceived, [78] planned a handled. This arm of the Japanese fleet has been greatly underestimated. potentialities must be recognized from now on.

(c) *Aircraft for Hawaiian defense must comprise adequate forces for lo range search, for striking and for local interception.* All of these are vital f effective defense. None of these can be effective if any of the three is inadequat It must be assumed that the Japanese will continue to have excellent intelligen reports of our activities here. An organization as perfect as that which pr vided complete information for every minute detail of the first attack cann safely be assumed to have been eliminated. It follows that inability to mainta an effective search can hardly fail greatly to increase the probability of renew attack.

3. The objectives of long range search are to make it possible to strike a enemy force before it can strike Oahu and to give ample advance warning any such attempt. Provision for the first of these objectives covers the secon As will readily be seen by simple mathematical analysis (see enclosure (A) the search should extend out to about 800 miles before planes turn homewa each day in order to:

(a) Make it possible to reach the enemy with an air striking force duri daylight on the day he is discovered, and

(b) Prevent the enemy, if undiscovered on the previous day, from reachi a position close enough for launching aircraft before the succeeding day's sear has reached him.

4. Search requirements are based on the following assumptions:

(a) *Carrier aircraft may be launched 300 miles from Oahu.* There is defini evidence that carrier aircraft were launched and recovered on 7 December 2 and 300 miles respectively from Oahu. These launching and recovery points c be interchanged without increasing the demand on Japanese aircraft enduran

that has already been met. It is possible that even greater ranges might be used by substitution of bombs for torpedoes and with retention near enemy carriers of shorter range types for their local defense.

(b) *Carrier speed for the run-in may be 27 knots.* This speed is not unreasonable and is believed to have been used on 7 December. The enemy can accept the logistic problem in fuel, for he did so.

[79] (c) *It cannot be assumed that any direction of approach may safely be left unguarded.* The fuel problem is no deterrent, for the approach was made from the north on 7 December. Increase in difficulty of the logistic problem would not be proportionately great if even an approach from the east were attempted. At the same time, as discussed above, neglect of any sector is apt soon to be known.

(d) *Air Search visibility is 25 miles.* That is, aircraft during the majority of the search are 50 miles apart, although they are closer together than this from departure until they are 300 miles out. This visibility assumption is obviously optimistic, particularly since clear weather will seldom extend over the entire search area. It is, however, the best (and the most) that can be done with aircraft available unless very large areas are to be entirely neglected. Although each succeeding day's search tends to disclose, at closer range, what might have been missed on the previous day, the long range search should be far more positive than is now possible.

5. The upshot of the foregoing assumptions, *which include perfect visibility,* is that about 50 planes (the number varying slightly with type) are needed daily for search. This number cannot be reduced, as suggested in the enclosure, if and when *reliable* radar equipment for airplanes is *available,* for this equipment will merely serve to counter the effect of poor visibility. Actually, toward meeting at present the minimum requirement of 50 per day, the situation is as follows: With departure of Patrol Squadron Twenty-two for the Asiatic theater and with completion of the current transfer here of three squadrons from the mainland, the number of patrol planes here becomes 67, with 4 of these under repair for at least a month. The number of Army heavy mombers (B–17's) here is 42, with 2 additional expected later. (Note that paragraph 2 of the enclosure is not up to date on these patrol plane and Army bomber figures.) This leaves a total on hand of 109 long range planes.

6. With these it is not possible simultaneously and effectively to maintain necessary long range search operations, to keep available a useful air striking force and to meet constant requirements for special missions, such as covering submarine contacts and guarding convoy approach and departure, without having on hand for search alone at least three times [80] the number of planes that are needed for search on any given day. There is no way of getting around this if material and personnel are to maintain the pace. Neither one nor the other can do more.

7. Search actually being made has had to be reduced to the following basis:

(a) The radius for the long range planes is 700 miles. Neither patrol planes nor B–17's can go farther, with reasonable margin for safe return, while carrying any bombs.

(b) 25 patrol plans and 12 Army Z–17's are being used daily for search (18 B–17's are being held continuously ready as a minimum striking force). The long range searching planes cover total sectors of about 290 degrees. Such relatively ineffectual planes (VSO, VJ and Army B–18's) as are available are used to cover remaining sectors totalling about 70 degrees to distances of 200 or 300 miles.

8. These figures vary somewhat from day to day, but the overall result is that only *four-fifths* of the circle is being covered to a reasonable range, and this with mediocre effectiveness, although available material and personnel are being strained to the limit. Furthermore, the remaining fifth is being covered very poorly, to short and inconclusive ranges. Still further, this essential expenditure of effort leaves no patrol planes available for support of task forces on special missions and none for our outlying island bases, beyond the two each that are now being maintained on an exchange basis at Johnston and Palmyra.

9. To improve the situation outlined above, which is not only critical but dangerous, there should be earliest possible action toward increasing the patrol wings in the Hawaiian area to at least twelve 12-plane squadrons of long range planes. Commander Patrol Wing Two in enclosure (A), and Commander Scouting Force in references (a) and (b), make entirely clear the very great advantages of naval use of long range land planes where this is practicable. The patrol wing increase to twelve squadrons should include the provision that at least one-

half of these planes be of the B–24 type. This is essential not only becaus
their superior characteristics but also because, otherwise, the limited seapl
operating potentialities of this area would be too crowded for war conditions

[*81*] 10. It is realized that this expansion cannot be accomplished imm
ately. Nevertheless, the necessary machinery therefor should be set in motion
at highest priority. Meanwhile, favorable consideration of reference (c), as
for B–24 landplane bombers at once in place of the 17 PBY–3 planes now her
earnestly recommended. This is a small part of the necessary increase, but
pointed out in the reference, it is relatively easy to do and it will make an
portant immediate improvement in the picture.

11. The request of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for a t
of 200 heavy bombers, with which the Commander-in-Chief concurred in re
ence (d), is amply justified. It must be recognized that renewed attack
almost certainly be in force as great or greater than that of the first att
which included at least four aircraft carriers, and it may in addition be divi
The only way in which to have any assurance of decisive effect on major en
attack is to be prepared to strike a heavy blow. But the only available sh
based striking force consists of 18 B–17's, held in reserve daily for this purp
and such patrol planes, neither searching nor undergoing maintenance, as
not in use for special daily missions. The resultant air striking force is liter
trivial. It would be practically useless against surface forces comparabl
those that were in this area on 7 December. Its effect could not possibly be
cisive. With 200 heavy bombers on hand, however, availability of a powe
striking force for all contingencies can be continuously assured.

12. In all of the foregoing, *Hawaiian air defense* alone has been conside
Any plans for any other uses in the Pacific area for the recommended type
aircraft must include provision of appropriate numbers of additional aircraft

13. Returning to the immediate situation: With present limited numbers
searching and striking planes we are constantly confronted with the dilem
resulting from the relative futility of either effective search at the expens
striking force or useful striking force at the expense of search. There is
answer to this except more planes. Unless we are to · [*82*] play the
evitably losing game of local air defense alone, the recommended total incre
for both the patrol wings and the Hawaiian air force must be soon provi
Meanwhile, it is reiterated that *any* immediate increase for either will vit
improve the present situation.

14. Transmission via registered clipper airmail is authorized for this docum

C. W. NIMIT

Copy to:
ComAirScoFor
ComPatWing TWO
BuAero
Opnav
Comdg. Gen'l., Hawaiian Dept.

[*83*]

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 30, 194

PW2/A16–3
(0033)
Secret
From: The Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (The Commander Pa
Wing TWO)
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacfic Fleet.
Subject: Long Range, Landplane, Bombers for Scouting in Hawaiian Area; R
ommendation for Assignment of.
Reference: (a) Comairscofor Confidential Letter A4–1 (0755) dated December
1941.
Enclosure:
(A) Determination of Search Group Requirements.
(B) Memorandum of Air Corps Liaison Officer.

1. By reference (a) the Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, set forth
need for long range landplane bombers for use initially as scouts in protec
searches from Oahu, and stated briefly the advantages and further uses of s
aircraft. It is the purpose of this letter to amplify the presentation of

subject and to present facts which will prove beyond reasonable doubt that the immediate allocation of such equipment to Patrol Wing is vital, not only to defense, but also to future offensive air operations.

2. There are currently 78 PBY aircraft available for flight in the Hawaiian Area, of which 34 are recently received reinforcements. Present search operations require 30 of the available PBY planes to conduct a daily 700 mile radius search from Oahu, covering a 240 degree sector. The remaining 120 degrees is covered daily, with concomitant serious reduction of offensive power by B–17 aircraft of the Army searching to 800 miles; or by B–17 aircraft and VO–VS of VJ aircraft, the latter searching to 200–300 miles, when the B–17s available for search are less than 16. It is evident that such a daily search is only partially effective. The lack of experience and training of Army Air Corps flight crews in performing long range protective search missions over water is a condition which was naturally to be expected. The result of this has the effect of throwing the major part of the burden of search on the Patrol Plane units in this area, and rightly so, for, at the present time, the few long range bombardment aircraft available to the Army in this area, even if used solely as a striking force, are totally inadequate. It is imperative that Hawaiian-based Patrol Wings be provided with sufficient aircraft to take over Oahu searches and to [84] release Army bombers for the stand-by as a striking force. As a guide to the material required a study has been made as outlined in enclosure (A), based upon utilizing PBY aircraft, and upon alternate long range equipment having cruising speeds of 150 and 200 knots. The results of this study are tabulated below:

	PBY	150-knot airplane (4 engine)	200-knot airplane (4 engine)
Radius of daily search	800	840	860
Number searching planes daily (25 mile visibility)	50	54	54
Flight time per search plane-hrs	16.5	11.7	9.0
Total plane hours per month	24,750	19,415	14,580
Total number of planes required	150	162	162
Number of flight crews required	225	243	243
Engine changes per month	82.5	129.6	97.2
Spare engines required	182	286	214
Fuel consumption per month-gal	1,980,000	2,912,250	2,916,000
Average search effectiveness (estimated)	50%	60%	60–70%
With A. S. V. (40-mile visibility assumed)			
Radius of daily search	800	840	860
Number searching planes daily	32	34	34
Flight time per search plane-hrs	16.5	11.7	9.0
Total plane hours per month	15,840	11,934	9,180
Total number of planes required	96	102	102
Number of flight crews required	134	153	153
Engine changes per month	52.8	79.5	61.2
Spare engines required	117	175	137
Fuel consumption per month-gal	1,267,000	1,790,100	1,836,000
Average search effectiveness (estimated)	75%	95%	100%

3. Conclusions which may be drawn from the above tabulations and from the study, enclosure (A), are as follows:

(a) PBY aircraft are *too slow* for the mission required of them. Their lack of speed not only reduces search effectiveness because of their inability to cover the required area during [85] daylight hours, but also because the excessive duration of flight increases pilot and crew fatigue. The only alternative is to provide planes of sufficient speed to conduct the required search in daylight hours.

(b) Regardless of how fast or how many planes are available, the effectiveness of the search is dependent upon visibility. All planes utilized for search should be provided with A. S. V. equipment with which search effectiveness can be increased to near 100%, despite low visibility. Not only would A. S. V. equipment make the search effective but, by permitting wider coverage by each plane, would reduce the numbers of planes and flight crews required. This, combined with shorter flight hours, would reduce fuel consumption, engine changes, spare engines required, and other maintenance, as well as reducing crew fatigue. It is clear that A. S. V. equipment also is a vital requirement and should be provided on a not-to-delay basis.

(c) The PB2Y–3 airplane has a cruising speed of about 150 knots and adeq range. But the operation of 102 PB2Y–3 airplanes presents more difficu than the operation of a similar number of landplane bombers. PB2Y–3s are fast enough. They are not immediately available. While a number of t planes are needed for certain types of missions, the immediate requirement search is for landplanes of yet higher speed.

(d) Surveying the landplane field two types are available; the B–17 and B–24. Experience with the B–17 on search has been disappointing. Their c ing speed at the low altitudes required during search is about 155 knots. In o to search to radius 800, auxiliary tanks must be installed in the bomb bays, cluding the carrying of bombs.

(e) The B–24 airplane most nearly meets the requirements of effective searc this area. Available information on characteristics is given in enclosure Provision of 102 B–24 airplanes would provide not only for effective search also would provide a formidable reserve striking force. It is believed th number of B–24 aircraft could be made available immediately by diversion f Lend Lease aircraft awaiting delivery. Such diversion is considered vital to defense of Oahu.

[86] (f) From actual flight experience of our pilots in B–17–E aircra am convinced that experienced patrol plane crews can readily and in short o take over the operation of four-engine landplane bombers.

(g) Some fields are available and others can shortly be made available in Hawaiian Group which are suitable for, or capable of rapid expansion as ne sary to accommodate 102 B–24 Navy long range landplane bombers. These fi include Kaneohe, Ewa, Maui, Barking Sands on Kaui, and Hilo Airport at Haw

4. *Recommendations:*

(a) It is strongly recommended that at least 102 B–24 bombers be allocate Hawaiian-based Patrol Squadrons, and delivered as rapidly as possible.

(b) Immediate equipping with B–24s of the three patrol squadrons now on West Coast equipping with PBY-5As is recommended as the first increment.

(c) For the second increment, it is recommended that the 17 PBY–3s now this area, 7 of which are now due for overhaul, be replaced with 24 B–24s, Pa Squadron TWENTY-TWO and Patrol Squadron TWENTY-ONE flying the PBY in succession to the West Coast, and, after a brief training period, returning w B–24s.

(d) The following equipment should be provided for these planes on a *no delay* basis:

(1) A. S. V. equipment.
(2) Converter for use with YE homing device.
(3) I. F. F. equipment.

/s/ P. N. L. Bellinger

Enclosure "A"

[87] *Determination of search group requirements*

A. PBY Aircraft

Assumptions

1. Best sustained speed of enemy carrier—27 knots.
2. Enemy carrier can launch an attack at a maximum distance of 300 miles.
3. PBY ground speed during search averages 100 knots.
4. Duration of daylight and dark:

(At Pearl)	Dec. 22	June 2
Daylight	11.0 hrs	13.6 hrs.
Dark	13.0 hrs	10.4 hrs.

5. Daily search must cover a radius such that enemy cannot reach the 300-m launching circle the following morning before the daily search reaches the 8 mile circle.

6. Aircraft depart on search daily at dawn.

Work	22 Dec.	22 June
Launching Radius	300	300
Enemy's night run (27×13)	351 (27×10.4)	281
Enemy's day run before search reaches 300 mile circle:		
$\frac{309}{100}$×27	81	81
Radius to cover effective at dark	732	662

Let a=hours of daylight remaining when plane starts return leg.
Radius of search required is (r) 732+27 (a) 662+27 (a)

[88] Radius of search plus transfer (50 miles for 25 mile visibility) equals distance plane goes before starting return leg, equals hours of daylight minus a, times plane speed.

$$732+27a+50=(11-a)\ 100$$
$$a=2.5 \text{ hrs.}$$
$$662+27a+50=(13.6-a)\ 100$$
$$a=5.1$$

Radius of search (r)	732+27 (2.5)	662+27 (5.1)
Radius of search r	799.5	799.7

Conclusions

1. Radius of search 800 miles. Daily flight time 16.5hrs/plane.
2. For radius of visibility of 25 miles requires 50 search planes daily and a total search force of 150 planes.
3. Since radius of visibility usually averages 15 miles, search effectiveness is about 60%. On 22 December plane flys last 550 miles in darkness. This reduces to 290 miles on 22 June. Effectiveness of search is further reduced by this to an estimated 50% coverage over the entire year.
4. Plane hrs/mo—24,750 hrs.
5. Fuel consumption/mo (at 80 gal/hr)—1,980,000 gal.
6. Engines changes per month (at 600 hrs)—82.5. Spare engines required (220% of monthly changes)—182.

[89] B. *PBY Aircraft with A. S. V. (Radar)*

Intelligence reports (AirBatFor Summary of Air Operations No. 6–41A) stated that British A. S. V. equipment in Coastal Command aircraft has the following performance.

"*Forward antenna system*

Range—30 miles.
Cone of search—60° in azimuth (30° on either side of the beam); directly ahead and almost vertically downward.

Lateral antenna system

Range—80 miles on both sides.
Cone of search—18° in azimuth (9° on either side of the beam); 30° in elevation; 30° in depression."

Weight 290 lbs)

From information received on the A. S. V. equipment being installed in our PBY airplanes, it is understood that the performance is adversely affected by lack of British-made cable and that the performance obtained, for this and other installation reasons, is reduced, actual results varying between 10 and 40 miles range. Equipment installed in PBM airplanes however is reported as effective up to 70 miles, and it is expected that somewhat better results may be expected from PBY airplanes when British cable, now on order is installed. (First shipment sunk). Assuming that A. S. V. equipment may be depended upon for an

effective range of at least 40 miles, the following benefits would result installation of A. S. V. in PBY aircraft:

For 40 mile A. S. V. "visibility"

1. Reduce number of planes required for daily search from 50 to 32.
2. Increase search effectiveness from an average of 50% to about 75%.
3. Reduce plane hours per month for search from 24,750 to 15,840; reduce consumption for search from 1,980,000 to 1,267,000 gallons per month; reduc gine changes per month from 82.5 to 52.8.

[*90*] 4. Reduce total planes required from 150 to 100; spare engine quired from 182 to 117.

5. Reduce crew fatigue and number of plane crews required.

Conclusions

1. *The immediate installation of A. S. V. in search aircraft is vital to cessful protective aircraft search. It will greatly reduce the material and sonnel required for any search.*

C. 150 knot 4 engined aircraft

Assumptions as before, except for 150 knot ground speed of search airc

Work	22 Dec.	22
Launching radium	300	
Enemy's night run (27×13)	351 (27×10.	
Enemy's daylight run before succeeding day's search reached 300 mile circle:		
$\frac{300}{150}\times 27$	54	
Radium to cover *effective at dark*	705	
705 80 27a=150 (11–a) a=4.87	635 80 27a=150 (13.6–a) a=7.5	
Radius of search r=840	r=835	

Conclusions

1. Radius of search 840 miles. Daily flight time 11.7 hours/plane.

[*91*] 2. With A. S. V. equipped planes, requires 34 search planes d (40 mile A. S. V. visibility) and a total force of 102 planes; without A. S. V planes daily (25 mile visibility) and a total force of 162 planes.

3. Search effectiveness 100% with A. S. V.; 60% without.

4. Plane hrs/mo;

With A. S. V. 11,
Without A. S. V. 19,

5. Fuel consumption/mo: (at 150 gal/hr)

With A. S. V. 1,709,
Without A. S. V. 2,912,

6. Engine changes/mo: (at 600 hrs) (4 eng/plane)

With A. S. V.
Without A. S. V. 1

Spare engines required: (220% of monthly changes)

With A. S. V.
Without A. S. V.

D. 200 knot 4 engined aircraft

Assumptions as for A except for 200 knot ground speed of search aircr

	22 Dec.	22 June
Launching radius	300	300
Enemy's night run	351	281
Enemy's daylight run before succeeding day's search reaches 300 mile circle:		
$\frac{300}{200}\times 27$	41	41
Radius to cover *effective at dark*	692	622

[92] 692+80+27a=200 (11-a) a=6.3 r=860 622+80+27a=200 (13.6-a) a=8.9 r=862

Conclusions

1. Radius of search 860 miles. Daily flight time 9 hours.
2. Requires 34 A. S. V. equipped planes daily; or 54 non-A. S. V.-equipped.

Total force required:

With A. S. V. ---------- 102 planes
Without A. S. V. ---------- 162 planes

3. Search effectiveness 100% with A. S. V.; 60% without. All search made during daylight.
4. Plane hours/month:

With A. S. V. ---------- 9,180
Without A. S. V. ---------- 14,580

5. Fuel consumption/month (at 200 gallons/hour):

With A. S. V. ---------- 1,836,000
Without A. S. V. ---------- 2,916,000

6. Engine changes/month (at 600 hours):

With A. S. V. ---------- 61.2
Without A. S. V. ---------- 97.2

Spare engines required (220% of monthly changes):

With A. S. V. ---------- 137
Without A. S. V. ---------- 214

[93] 1. Flight crews should not be required to fly more often than one day in three: i. e., fly one day, rest one day, stand-by one day.

2. Operating policy requires that all available planes not under maintenance be manned and ready for take-off from 30 minutes before to one hour after sunrise, and from one hour before to 30 minutes after sunset. All available planes are on one hour's notice otherwise during daylight, and on 4 hour's notice otherwise at night. This requires services of one crew to stand-by each available airplane on the ground.

3. To provide for special missions in addition to protective search, at least three times the number of aircraft required for daily search should be provided.

4. Initially a minimum of 150% plane crews will be required. The excess over one crew per plane will be utilized to provide a surplus for rest status one day in three and for conducting training until two crews per plane are available.

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[94] *Confidential*

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 30, 1941.

Memorandum to Lieutenant Commander Coe, USN
From: Major W. J. Holzapfel, U. S. A.

The following information on the B-24 airplane is gathered from pilots on the ferry command in the United States and from mechanics who were on the ferry command to England who used this type of airplane:

B-24 is equipped with Pratt and Whitney Twin row engines Model R-1830 with two stage engine driven blowers and developing 1250 horsepower during take-off.

The gas capacity of these airplanes is 3,100 gallons divided into two 1,550 gallon wing tanks. These tanks are not bullet proof. The Consolidated Corporation however is planning on putting in bullet proof tanks which will cut down the gas capacity to 2,490 gallons.

On these trips the thought of fuel economy is never considered. The ai planes were cruised between 29 and 31 inches of mercury, 2,000 RPM at alt tudes of 7–10,000 feet. Carburetor, mixture was set at lean. Fuel consumptic at these altitudes at these settings, which is considered maximum cruising, wa 150 gallons gasoline per hour and the indicated air speed was between 180–2 statute miles per hour.

This airplane has two bomb bays each with 10 bomb stations. Capacity the bomb bays is 8,000 pounds of bombs. The armament is composed of .50 cal. machine guns and 1 .30.

The weight empty of these airplanes is 30,000 pounds. The authorized gro weight of this airplane (maximum limit as set by manufacturer) is 57,0 pounds. However, conversations with a mechanic who made a trip to Englan brought out the fact that one such airplane was once loaded to 72,000 pound and it is reported that the English have loaded one of these airplanes to 83,0 pounds. No difficulties were found in take-off or flying quality of this airplan

/s/ W. J. HOLTZAPFEL

Deferred—Secre

[*95*] Date: 29 Nov 41
Originator: OpNav
Action: CincPac
28Ø54

Arrangements described in your 28Ø627 appear to be best that can be don under the circumstances but suggest advisability of transferring VMF 221 fro San Diego to Hawaii via Saratoga X War Dept will instruct Comgen Hawdep to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Arm troops in support of Marines X War Dept will endeavor to expedite plan for increase of AA defenses but it is doubtful if much improvement is possibl soon X Marine Corps will shortly receive 16 37 MM AA guns and receiv ammunition in February do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake X Request air mail report on present defenses of all outlying bases and increase planned in immediate future

Ref: 11–862; Wright now at Wake . . discharge Marine planes crews an material . . . . . afterwards proceeds to Midway to land similar items . . etc . . .

[*96*] Date: 28 Nov 1941 Classification—Secre
From: CincPac
To: PacFlt
Information to: OpNav (RDO)
28Ø855

Exercise extreme vigilance against submarines in operating areas vicinity Oahu especially during sortie and entrance X Our submarines will conduc submerged operations in areas cast 5 and cast 7 only proceeding elsewhere o surface X Depth bomb all sugmarine contacts suspected to be hostile in Oahu operating areas except areas cast 5 and cast 7.

[*97*] CinC File No.
A4–3/QL/0243
Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *Feb. 11, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Submarine Contact 3–4 February 1941—Report of.
Reference: (a) Base Force Operation Plan No. 1–41.
Enclosure:

(A) Copy of Comdesbatfor Conf. Ltr. file A8 Serial 0187 of 7 Feb. 1941 with its enclosure.

(B) Copy of Comdesbatfor Conf. Ltr. file A8 Serial 0189 of 7 February 1941.

1. Forwarded herewith is the report of the Commanding Officer, U. S. S. DALE, of a sonic contact experienced off Diamond Head on 3–4 February (Enclosure (A)), and a supplementary report thereto (Enclosure (B)).

2. It will be noted that the contact was developed outside the Defensive Sea Area as established by General Order No. 118, and that at no time was there any sonic indication of a contact within that area.

3. The concurrent air operations conducted with the destroyers are shown in paragraph 3 of enclosure (A) and in the supplementary report, (Enclosure (B)).

4. In this connection pertinent parts of reference (a) are quoted herewith to indicate the orders under which the destroyers maintaining the Channel Entrance Patrol operate:

"In case evidence of a submerged submarine is obtained maintain contact and report to Commander Base Force.

"Take no offensive action until directed, unless the submarine enters the Prohibited Area (Defensive Sea Area, General Order one hundred eighteen)."

[98] 5. The Commanding Officer of the DALE is an officer of considerable experience in sonic work. His reports and the despatches incident to the contact indicate that he is convinced contact was established with a submarine. Our own submarines were not operating in the area where the sonic contact was made.

6. It is interesting to note that Destroyers had been on patrol in the particular, and adjacent area since 1800 on 2 February. A submarine in the vicinity when contact was made would, therefore, likely have operated submerged from that time and during previous daylight hours. It is noted too, that contact was retained for about 24 hours, beginning 0600 on 3 February; that a daylight period followed the loss of contact; that a patrol was maintained on the night of 5 February; and a search was conducted on 5 February. This totals a submerged operating period well in excess of anything that might have been expected.

7. When the Destroyer reported that the contact appeared definitely to be a submarine, the Commander-in-Chief was inclined to order depth charges dropped in the area. However, he realized that to do so might create an international incident of serious consequence at the time. As there seemed every reason to expect that contact could be maintained, and that the suspected submarine would eventually be forced to surface, he directed the Destroyers to retain contact and drop depth charges only in the event that the suspected submarine took aggressive action.

8. After a careful study of all attending circumstances, the Commander-in-Chief does not subscribe to the contention of the Commanding Officer, U. S. S. DALE that contact was established with a submarine. He cannot visualize any motive for a foreign submarine to be operating submerged in this particular area. The reported propeller noises, may have resulted from internal noises in the Destroyers themselves, or from the propellers of small craft [99] in the area. Attention is also invited to the statement in paragraph 3 (a) of enclosure (A), regarding the presence of fish in that area. There had been also a decided change in the direction of the wind just previous to this experience, with attending cooler weather. This may have introduced a temperature gradient in the water in this area.

9. It is the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to continue the present anti-submarine patrol. He sees no reason to expand it incident to this experience. He will continue to operate under the present directive as quoted in paragraph 4.

10. If the Department does not approve of the action taken, the Commander-in-Chief will be delighted to issue orders for offensive action whenever a contact similar to the one reported is made. In that event it seems wise to extrend the limit of the Defensive Sea Area as prescribed in General Order No. 118, and to make notification of same.

[s] H. E. Kimmel
H. E. KIMMEL.

[*100*] File A8
Serial 0187
CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES FLEET
DESTROYERS, BATTLE FORCE
U. S. S. DETROIT, Flagship
PEARL HARBOR, *T. H., Feb. 7, 1941*

From: Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.
To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Submarine Contact 3–4 February 1941—Report of.
Enclosure: (A) Report of Commanding Officer, U. S. S. DALE.

1. Enclosure (A) is the report of the subject contact submitted by the Co manding Officer, U. S. S. DALE who was designated as the officer in charge the operations by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force. This report incorpora the observations of the following destroyers which were in company with DALE—AYLWIN, HULL, LAMSON and MAHAN.

2. A separate report submitted by the Commanding Officer, U. S. S. LAMSO adds nothing to the enclosure. The MAHAN is now at sea and will be direct to submit a report immediately upon her return to Pearl Harbor.

3. Concurrently with the operations of destroyers the following air operati were conducted:

(a) The area in the vicinity of the DALE was patrolled by the DETRO planes during the forenoon and afternoon of February 3. The DETROIT aviat report that at about 1030 some porpoises were observed between the destroy and ahead of them and shortly thereafter several blackfish were observed on port bow of the DALE. They further report sighting several blackfish at ab 1400 in the same vicinity.

(b) Patrol planes patrolled the area throughout the day of 3 February.

(c) The sea area within a radius of 100 miles of Pearl Harbor was search by patrol planes during the forenoon of 4 February.

(d) No reports of sighting a strange submarine were received from any aircra

M. F. DRAEMEL

[*101*] File
A8
Serial 0189
Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET
DESTROYERS, BATTLE FORCE

U. S. S. DETROIT, Flagship,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *February 7, 1941*

From: Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.
To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Submarine Contract 3–4 February 1941—Report of.
Reference: (a) Comdesbatfor ltr. A8 Serial 0187 dated February 7, 1941.

1. Supplementing reference (a), the following additional data are submitt

2. The first report of contact by DALE was received at 0813, February 1941. DALE was immediately directed to maintain contact. The contact rep was retransmitted for information to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fle Commander Base Force, Commander Battleship Division ONE (who was proaching Pearl Harbor enroute from the mainland), and all Task Group Co manders of Task Force One then operating at sea. Patrol planes were direct to investigate and the patrol plane Task Group Commander established a pat over the area, which patrol was maintained until darkness 3 February.

3. The AYLWIN was in company with the DALE from 0736 to 0854, at whi time she proceeded on other assigned duty and was replaced by HULL ab 1015.

4. The area in the vicinity of the DALE was patrolled by DETROIT pla during the forenoon and afternoon of 4 February.

5. When the DETROIT finished her scheduled exercises about noon, 3 F ruary, she proceeded to visual contact with DALE. In reply to direct qu tions DALE stated that the contact was considered to be a submarine and t the HULL (in company) concurred.

6. Destroyer Division NINE was directed to rendezvous with Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, at 1700, at which time the LAMSON and MAHAN were directed to assist the DALE and HULL, and the DRAYTON and FLUSSER to join Battleship Division THREE as antisubmarine screen. The four destroyers engaged in the contact were directed to maintain contact and to take offensive action only if attacked. They were authorized to use navigational lights, and all other units directed to keep clear. The DETROIT then proceed to the Maui range for D. G. calibration.

[*102*] 7. During the night reports of losing and making contact were received intermittently. In response to the question as to whether or not there was good reason to believe that the contact was not a whale, the DALE advised that good contacts were checked by several ships and propeller sounds had been heard.

8. At daylight of the 4th the routine patrol plane flight covering the operating areas was initiated.

9. At 0725, February 4, the DALE reported contact lost. After a reasonable length of time in which to ascertain whether or not this was a repetition of previous experiences, it seemed established that the contact would not be regained. At 0925 the patrol planes were directed to search the sea area within a radius of 100 miles of Pearl Harbor.

10. At 1120 DALE and HULL were directed to return to Pearl Harbor, leaving the LAMSON and MAHAN to continue the search. The DRAYTON and FLUSSER were directed to join the LAMSON and MAHAN. These four destroyers continued the search until dark at which time the search was abandoned.

11. At 1800, 4 February, the destroyer offshore patrol was established for the sortie of Task Force Two the next morning. Destroyer Division NINE was directed to patrol Areas S–1 and S–2 outside of the areas of the offshore patrol.

12. After the contact was lost at 0725, February 4, no further evidence of the presence of a submarine was forthcoming from either destroyers or patrol planes.

13. Any estimate or conjecture as to whether a submarine was in this area appears of little real value. Three ships reported hearing propeller noises; two of these reported hearing propeller noises on two occasions. The Commanding Officer of the DALE has had two years experience in working with our own submarines. His sound operators are experienced. If these reports were correct the propeller noises can be explained only by the actual presence of a submarine.

M. F. DRAEMEL.

10/Fs

[*103*] In Reply Refer to File No. DD353/A9–8/S68 (57)
Confidential

U. S. S. DALE, PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
February 7, 1941.

From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander Destroyers, BATTLE FORCE.
Subject: Submarine Contact 3–4 February, 1941, report of.

1. On Monday 3 February 1941, the U. S. S. Dale was on station as Off Shore Patrol in Sector 3. Two Radiomen, graduates of the sound school and qualified operators were on Echo Ranging Watch.

2. At about 0657, a contact was reported and developed. This contact was maintained until 0638, 4 February 1941. A chronological record of events is forwarded herewith:—

Zone (Time)	*Event*
	February 3, 1941
0657	Made contact on QCA—stopped to develop. Maintained contact.
0720	Determined that submarine was on Southerly Course at very slow speed. Notified Commander Destroyer Division TWO in Aylwin of contact.
0736	Position Lat. 20°09.3′ N. long. 157°50′ W. U. S. S. Aylwin approached and made contact, verifying Dale contact.

0736–
0850 Aylwin and Dale maintained contact.
0850 Position Lat. 21°05.1′ N. Long 157°50′ W.
0854 U. S. S. Aylwin ceased tracking and proceeded to station as Inner Pat
ordering Hull as her relief.
0929 Lost contact. Submarine apparently circled. Last range 900 yar
Position Lat. 21°02.7′ N. Long. 157°50.3′ W.
1000 Regained contact. Range 4100 yards. Lat. 21°02.3′ N. Long. 157°50.8′

[*104*]

1024 U. S. S. Hull made contact. Range 2,100 yards.
1035 Position Lat. 21°02.3′ N. and Long. 157°53.4′ W.
1041 U. S. S. Hull lost contact.
1053 U. S. S. Dale lost contact. Submarine apparently circled. Last ra
1,550 yards. Position Lat. 21°03′ N. Long 157°54′ W.
1125 U. S. S. Dale regained contact. Position Lat. 21°03.8 N. Long. 157°55′
Range 3,100 yards.
1144 U. S. S. Dale lost contact. Range 1,000 yards.
1240 U. S. S. Dale and Hull regained contact. Range 2,200 yards. Subm
rine apparently circling.
1250 Lost Contact. Position Lat. 21°00.5′ N. Long. 157°55.4′ W. Range 1,
yards.
1350 Dale regained contact and heard propeller noises.
1353 Hull regained contact. Dale heard propeller noises.
1414 Hull lost contact.
1458 Maintaining contact. Position Lat. 21°02′ N. Long. 157°55.8′ W.
1536 Position Lat. 21°01.7′ N. Long. 157°55.3′ W.
1622 Lost contact. Position Lat. 21°01.8′ N. Long. 157°54.4′ W. Range 1,
yards.
1705 Dale regained contact. Position Lat. 21°00.3′ N. Long. 157°55.3′
Range 1,900 yards.

[*105*] 1747 Dale lost contact. Range 2,200 yards.

1800 Lamson and Mahan joined Task Unit formed scouting line interval 1,
yards.
1847 Dale regained contact. Range 1,500 yards.
1900 Submarine appeared to pass through formation on a southerly headi
1913 Lamson made contact. Range 2,200 yards.
1917 Dale position Lat. 21°07′ N. Long. 157°51.5′ W.
1921 Mahan reported propeller noises.
1935 Mahan lost contact.
1938 Lamson heard slow beat of propellers.
1945 Lamson and Mahan lost contact.
2000 Dale position Lat. 21°05.3′ N. Long. 157°50.9′ W.
2140 Lamson detached to envestigate shore line east of Diamond Head.
2354 Dale regained contact. Range 540 yards.

February 4, 1941

0000 Dale maintaining previous contact.
0036 Dale position Lat. 21°04′ N. Long. 157°54.3′ W.
0115 Mahan made contact.
0127 Hull made contact. Range 2,000 yards.
0130 Dale position Lat. 21°06.8′ N. Long. 157°53.3′ N.
0150 Dale and Mahan contacts show submarine in same position.

[*106*] 0152 Mahan reported hearing propeller noises.

0158 Dale position Lat. 21°07′ N. Long. 157°53′ W.
0209 Hull reported range 400 yards.
0247 Hull reported range 1,400 yards, Lamson 2,100 yards.
0250 Dale position Lat. 21°07.5′ N. Long. 157°52′ W. Dale, Lamson a
Mahan lost contact, Hull maintaining contact; range 1,350 yards.
0326 Dale regained contact. Range 2,600 yards.
0328 Mahan regained contact. Range 4,100 yards.
0345 Dale position Lat. 21°05.2′ N. Long. 157°52.7′ W. Range 1,800 yards.
0400 Dale contact, range 1,550 yards. Hull, contact 1,700 yards.
0413 Hull lost contact.

0415 Hull regained contact.
0431 Hull lost contact.
0441 All ships lost contact, last range from Dale 2,600 yards.
0555 Hull regained contact. Range 2,200 yards.
0614 Dale regained contact. Range 2,450 yards.
0638 Hull and Dale lost contact. Lat. 21°00 N. Long. 157°53′ W.
0815 Went head continuing search without results.
0921 Sighted smoke bombs on starboard beam, being dropped by planes.
[*107*] Turned right into column at 20 knots, course 103° T. to investigate.
0934 Lamson and Mahan detached to investigate smoke bombs being dropped on starboard beam.
0935 Sighted four sanpans ranging from dead ahead to broad on the starboard bow.
0946 Changed course to pass close aboard one of sanpans which was making about 15 knots and apparently attempting to evade.
0955 Sighted about ten men in sanpan.
0958 Passed close aboard sanpan Kasura Maru number FJ82.
1000 Changed course to rejoin Lamson and Mahan to continue search in area S–1.
1034 Formed scouting line course 180° T. scouting interval 1000 yards scouting speed 10 knots. Started echo ranging.
1125 Changed course to 270° T.
1132 Changed course to 000° T.
1215 Received message to return to port.

J. P. WOMBLE, Jr.

Secret

[*108*] Date: 28 Nov. 1941.
Originator: HELENA.
COMTASGR 1.5.
COMTASKFOR 1.
Action: COMTASGR 1.5; COMTASKFOR 1.
Information: CINCPAC; COMTASKFOR 2.
280835

Radar operator without knowledge CINCPAC 280355/6 positive that a submarine was in area cast 9 during HELENA firing approach about 1900.

[*109*] From: Alusna, Batavia.
Date: 5 Dec. 1941.
Addresses: OPNAV.
031030

From Thorpe for Mills War Dept. Code intercept:—Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain United States; north wind cloudy Russia; West wind clear England with attack on Thailand, Malay, and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.
Top Secret

Secret

EXHIBIT NO. 113

PACIFIC FLEET EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULES

Fall and Winter 1941

File No. UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CONFIDENTIAL

Pearl Harbor, T.H.,
August 13, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander Battle Force (Commander Task Force ONE).
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force (Commander Task Force TWO).
Commander Scouting Force (Commander Task Force THREE).
Commander Base Force.
Commanding General, Second Marine Division.

Subject: Employment Schedules; U.S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.

Reference: (a) Cincus ltr. A4-3/FF1 Serial 1773 of 15 May, 1938.
(b) U.S. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 40L-41.
(c) Cinepac Conf. ltr. A4-3/FF1-1 Serial 0750 of 8 May, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of subject schedule - Action Addressees 10 each, information addressees 3 each.
(Under separate cover)

1. Enclosure (A) has been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and is the general directive for preparation of the subject of this letter.

2. Second quarter employment schedules will be submitted for approval by 5 September, printed and distributed by 15 September, 1941, as follows:-

(a) Task Force Commanders inform Type Commanders and Commander Base Force of the times in the schedule to be devoted to inter-type tactics in their respective Task Forces, as soon as practicable.

(b) Type Commanders submit to Task Force Commanders, information Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, recommendations for type training indicating priorities in schedules. Commander Scouting Force assign submarines and patrol squadrons to Task Forces.

2

2J

0056

Cincpac File No.
A4-3/FF12/(13)
Serial 01254

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Subject: Employment Schedules, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.

(c) Task Force Commanders and Commander Base Force prepare and submit to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, for approval, the quarterly employment schedule coordinating the requirements of types in their respective Forces.

3. Fleet units in Hawaiian Area are divided for training and operations between three Task Forces, Base Force, and Naval Transportation Service as follows:

TASK FORCE ONE - Commander Battle Force.

Batdivs TWO and FOUR
SARATOGA and planes
Crudiv [illegible]
Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE
Mindiv ONE, OGLALA
1/3 available submarines
2 Patrol Squadrons

TASK FORCE TWO - Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.

Batdiv ONE
ENTERPRISE and planes
Crudivs THREE and FIVE
Desflot TWO, Desdiv FIFTY
Mindiv TWO
1/3 available submarines
2 Patrol Squadrons

TASK FORCE THREE - Commander Scouting Force.

Crudivs FOUR and SIX
LEXINGTON and planes
Desron FIVE plus Minron TWO
Transports, Base Force (when present)
Second Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment.
Submarines, Scouting Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (to include Subdiv TWENTY-ONE) less 2/3 available submarines.
Aircraft, Scouting Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, less 4 Patrol Squadrons.

[illegible], U.S. Pacific Fleet, [illegible] June 1942.

[illegible]. Pacific Fleet, less transports [illegible] present.

[illegible] - Vessels operating [illegible] Oct. 14.

[illegible] accordance with ref[illegible] have been included [illegible] training purposes.

5. Force and Type Commanders may, to suit individual [illegible] assigned, shift units from one Task Force to another [illegible] operating time.

[illegible] will be at sea at all times. [illegible] have Hilo Harbor the same day, [illegible] will clear before the entry of the other force [illegible].

6. Reference (c) remains effective, when practicable.

7. [illegible] will provide for as many [illegible] as practicable to participate in fleet [illegible] 25 November, 1941.

8. [illegible] operating and upkeep periods are [illegible] as follows:-

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

4

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A L

Employment Schedules, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.

	OPERATING	UPKEEP
THREE		20 SEP - 1 OCT
	2-10 OCT	11-22 OCT
	23 OCT - 1 NOV	2-16 NOV
	17-25 NOV	26 NOV - 4 DEC
	5-13 DEC	14-25 DEC
	26-31 DEC	

a

Periods assigned for Fleet Tactics:-

Task Forces TWO and THREE - 23-26 OCT.
Task Forces ONE and THREE - 22-25 NOV.
Task Forces ONE and TWO - 18-20 DEC.

H. E. KIMMEL

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Finished

CONFIDENTIAL

TASK FORCE ONE

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

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SECOND QUARTER
1942

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A4-3/FF1(1)/(0696)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
TASK FORCE ONE
U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship

Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
13 September 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Task Force ONE.
To : Task Force ONE.

Subject: Employment Schedule, Task Force ONE, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, 1942.

Reference: (a) Cincpac conf. ltr. A2-11/FF1-1/A3/A16/(0690) of 30 April 1941.
(b) Cincpac conf. ltr. A4-3/FF12/(13)/(01284) of 13 August, 1941.

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the appended Employment Schedule, Task Force ONE, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for the second quarter, 1942, is forwarded for information and guidance.

2. The Train services required for this schedule will be furnished by Commander Base Force.

3. Economy in fuel and mileage expenditures shall be given due consideration by all commands.

4. If unforeseen circumstances arise that make it apparent that changes in this approved schedule within a type would be advantageous, Type Commanders are responsible for making such changes without reference to higher authority; provided, these changes do not modify Fleet or Task Force directive schedules.

W. S. PYE

DISTRIBUTION:

List II, Case 1: A, B (less B4, B5).
List I, Case 2: B4, B5, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, JO, K, X1, X2, X4, X5, X6, X7, AA1, AAA1.

SPECIAL: BD10 (1); EN3 (50); EN3-6 (2); EN4 (20); EN5 (3); EN6 (5); EN7 (5); EN9 (6); EN9-24 (1); EN10 (3); EN11 (5); FPO (2); ND11 (3); ND12 (3); ND13 (3); ND14 (3); ND15 (3); NM12 (1); NM13 (1); NT1-9 (1); NT1-10 (1); NT4-4 (1); NT7-5 (1); NY8 (3); NY9 (4); NY10 (3); BatFor Mail Clerk (2); QA(1).

E. S. COVINGTON,
Flag Secretary.

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

BATTLESHIPS, TASK FORCE ONE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

SECOND QUARTER, 1942

ACTIVITY	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
	1 5 12 19 26	2 9 16 23 30	7 14 21 28
	W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W	W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W	W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	FLEET TACTICS — INTERTYPE TACTICS — GUNNERY — MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY — UPKEEP — TENDER UPKEEP — MATERIAL INSPECTIONS		
BATDIV FOUR — WEST VIRGINIA (BB48)	UPKEEP PEARL 9 | 10 Intertype Tactics 12 | 13 Tr. & Fl. LCBP 2nd AA BP-B2 AA MG H-1 Train NBP 18 | 19 UPKEEP PEARL Assist AMI-DCP MD. Shift Flag to MD. 24 26 | 27 MISC. AND ENR. NYD PUGET SOUND	23 | 24 AT NAVY YARD PUGET SOUND	
BATDIV FOUR — COLORADO (BB45)	AT NAVY YARD PUGET SOUND 12 | 13 Enr. S.F. 15 | 16 At S.F. Ld. Ammo 17 | 18 Enr. L.B. 19 | 20 At L.B. 22 | 23 Enr. Hawaiian Area 29 | 30 UPKEEP PEARL	12 | 13 Tr. SRP "A" Tr. AA & NBP.Fl.NSP (Sec. Bat.) 17 | 18 20 | 21 UPKEEP PEARL 30 | 31	
BATDIV TWO — MARYLAND (BB46)	UPKEEP PEARL 9 | 10 12 INTERTYPE TACTICS | 13 Tr. & Fl. 1st AA BP-B2 AAMG H-1, Tr. LCBP Tr.NBP 18 | 19 UPKEEP PEARL AMI-DCP 31 | a	4 Train & Fl. 2nd AABP-B2 Tr. & Fl.LCB Tr. NBP 10 | 11 UPKEEP PEARL 21 | 22 25 | 26 28 Tr. & Fl. AABP "G-1" 5"/50 Tr. & Fl. NBP-S.B. 29 UPKEEP PEARL 13 Fl. AABP "G-1" 5"/50 Fl. NBP 17 | 18 - 20 | 21 UPKEEP PEARL 30 | 31 INTERTYPE TACTICS	
BATDIV TWO — TENNESSEE (BB43)	UPKEEP PEARL | Tr. & Fl.1st AABP-B2 AAMG H-1 Tr. LCBP Tr. NBP Fl. NSP Sec. Bat. UPKEEP PEARL	INTERTYPE TACTICS | Tr. & Fl. 2nd AABP-B2 Tr. & Fl. LCBP Tr. & Fl. 1st NBP (Turrets) UPKEEP PEARL ASSIST PENN. AMI-DCP FLEET TACTICS | Train DBP Fl.DSP (Tur.) UPKEEP PEARL AMI-DCP	Tr. & Fl. DSP & DBP Fl. AABP "G-1" 3"/50 UPKEEP PEARL FLEET TACTICS
BATDIV TWO — CALIFORNIA (BB44)	UPKEEP PEARL | Tr. & Fl. LCBP 2nd AA BP-B2 AAMG H-1 Tr. NBP Fl. NSP-S.B. UPKEEP PEARL	Tr. & Fl. AABP "G-1" 5"/50 Tr. & Fl. 1st NBP (Turrets) UPKEEP PEARL Tender overhaul Medusa 11-22 Fire AABP G-2 5"/50 Tr.DBP UPKEEP PEARL ASSIST TENN. AMI-DCP	Fl. AABP "G" 5"/25 Tr. & Fl. DSP & DBP UPKEEP PEARL
BATDIV TWO — PENNSYLVANIA (BB38)	UPKEEP PEARL | Tr. & Fl. LCBP 1st AA BP-B2 AAMG H-1 Tr. NBP Fl. NSP-S.B. UPKEEP PEARL INTERIM DOCKING OCT. 28-31	Tr. & Fl. 2nd AABP-B2 Tr. & Fl. 1st NBP (Turrets) UPKEEP PEARL AMI-DCP Fire AABP "G" 5"/25 Tr.DBP UPKEEP PEARL	Tr. & Fl. DSP & DBP Fl. AABP "G-1" 3"/50 UPKEEP PEARL
VO SQUADRON — GENERAL DIRECTIVE	EMBARKED. COMPLETE MONTHLY TRAINING PRACTICES 1, 2 and 3. TRAIN FOR AND FIRE FIRST TWO MANDATORY PRACTICES. COMMUNICATION, NIGHT, INSTRUMENT AND NAVIGATION TRAINING. UTILITY SERVICE FOR PARENT SHIPS AS REQUIRED.		
VO-4	COLORADO UNIT SHORE BASED AT NAS SAN PEDRO UNTIL ABOUT 23 NOVEMBER. WEST VIRGINIA UNIT SHORE BASED AT NAS SAN PEDRO FROM ABOUT 3 NOVEMBER.		
VO-2			

SERVICES REQUIRED	13-18 Oct.	4-10 Nov.	26-28 Nov.	13-17 Dec.
Towing Vessel	4	2	2	4
Battle Raft			1	3
SHP Target				1
Helium Balloons				4
Photo Plane				
Towing Plane	2 with Mk XIV sleeve	2 with Mk XIV sleeve 2 with Mk VII sleeve	2 with Mk VII sleeve	2 with Mk XIV sleeve
Reference Vessel				1
AA Camera Vessel				2
Surface Camera Party			1	2
Sled Target	4	2 series 50		
VP Pln. for IBP (Cam. Guns).				

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

2509

CONFIDENTIAL

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

CRUISERS, TASK FORCE ONE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

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SECOND QUARTER, 1942

ACTIVITY		OCTOBER				NOVEMBER					DECEMBER				
		1 9	10 12	13 18	19 31	1	3 10	11 21	22 25	26 28	29 12	13 18	19 20	21 30	31
		W T F S S M T W T	F S S	M T W T F S	S M T W T F S S M T W T F	S S	M T W T F S S M	T W T F S S M T W T F	S S M T	W T F	S S M T W T F S S M T W T F	S S M T W T	F S	S M T W T F S S M T	W
GENERAL DIRECTIVE		UPKEEP	GUNNERY SERVICES TACTICS		UPKEEP	GUNNERY SERVICES TACTICS		UPKEEP	GUNNERY SERVICES TACTICS		UPKEEP	GUNNERY SERV. TAC. MISC. U.		UPKEEP	TAC.
CRUDIV NINE	HONOLULU (CL48)	UPKEEP PEARL	INTERTYPE TACTICS	1st AABP "B2" 1st AAMG "H" NSP	UPKEEP PEARL	INTERTYPE TACTICS	1st NBP AA Tr'g. 3" AABP"G"-3" DSP-6" DBP	UPKEEP PEARL	FLEET TACTICS	DSP-5" DMTBP AAMG Tr'g. (.50)	UPKEEP PEARL	AABP"G" (5")	FLEET TACTICS	Alongside Vestal	INTERTYPE TACTICS 31
	PHOENIX (CL46)						1st NBP DSP-6" DBP							UPKEEP PEARL	
	BOISE (CL47)			SRP* AA Tr'g. 1st AAMG "H"			1st AABP"B2" AA Tr'g-3" AABP"G"-3" DSP-6", DBP, NSP			1st NBP AABP"G" (5") AAMG Tr'g. (.50)		AABP"G" (3") DSP-5" DMTBP			
	HELENA (CL50)			SRP AA Tr'g. AAMG Tr'g (1.1) 1st AAMG "H"			1st AABP "B2" AAMG"A" (1.1)			AAMG Tr'g. (.50) DSP (6")		AABP"G" (5") DSP-5" DMTBP			
	ST. LOUIS (CL49)							ALONGSIDE VESTAL							
	RICHMOND (CL9)			SRP AAMG Tr'g. (.50) AA Tr'g.			1st AA "B2" AAMG Tr'g. (1.1) 1st AAMG "H" NSP	UPKEEP PEARL		DBP 1st NBP AAMG "A" (1.1)		DBP BTP"B" 1st AABP"G"			
GENERAL DIRECTIVE		All AvUnits when embarked underway: Services to ships, Nav. Comm., Inst., Spotting, Homing drills, message dropping, aircraft gunnery and bombing. All AvUnits when embarked at anchor: Communication, gunnery, qualification of personnel, night flying. Train for and fire first mandatory practices.													
VCS SQUADRON VCS 9		Night flying Instr. flying IBP (Guns, bombs)	TACTICS	Services to ships Nav. Hom'g Lost plane IBP Train.	Night flying Instrument flying Miscellaneous	TACTICS	Services to ships Comm. Nav. Misc. Gunnery	Night flying Instrument Gunnery	FLEET TACTICS	Services to ships Nav. Gun.	Night flying Instrument Qualification UPKEEP	IBP (depth bombs) Serv. to ships	FLEET TACTICS	Night flying Instr. Qual. Night Nav.	TACTICS

* If not previously completed.

NOTES: ——————————————

Annual Material Inspections by Forces Afloat
HONOLULU Inspection by Comcrubatfor, BOISE Assisting Ship, 1-30 Nov.
ST. LOUIS Inspection by Comcrubatfor, PHOENIX Assisting Ship, 1-30 Nov.
HELENA Inspection by Comcrubatfor, ST. LOUIS Assisting Ship, 1-31 Dec.
PHOENIX Inspection by Comcrubatfor, HONOLULU Assisting Ship, 1-31 Dec.
Full Power Trials
ST. LOUIS 22-28 Nov.

CONFIDENTIAL

DESTROYERS, TASK FORCE ONE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

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EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

SECOND QUARTER, 1942

		ACTIVITY	OCTOBER				NOVEMBER						DECEMBER			
			1 9	10 12	13 18	19 31	1 3	10	11 21	22 25	26 28	29 12	13 18	19 20	21 30	31
			W T F S S M T W T	F S S	M T W T F S	S M T W T F S S M T W T F	S S M	T W T F S S M	T W T F S S M T W T F	S S M T	W T F	S S M T W T F S S M T W T F	S S M T W T	F S	S M T W T F S S M T	W
		GENERAL DIRECTIVE	FLEET TACTICS — INTERTYPE TACTICS — GUNNERY — MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY — UPKEEP — TENDER UPKEEP — MATERIAL INSPECTIONS													
		RALEIGH (CL7)	NYPH U. K.	INTERTYPE TACTICS	GUN TR.	UPKEEP	INTERTYPE TACTICS	Gun. Tr. SRP-B	UPKEEP	FLEET TACTICS	BTP-A	UPKEEP	LCBP	FLEET TACTICS	UPKEEP	INTERTYPE TACTICS
		VSO UNIT	UPKEEP		G. & B. TR.	UPKEEP		G. & B. Tr.	UPKEEP		G. & B. Tr.	UPKEEP	G. & B. Tr.		UPKEEP	
DESRON ONE		PHELPS (360)	1-4 BUOY UPKEEP 5-9 VUL.		SRP-B	UPKEEP DOBBIN		Gun. Tr. AABP-B2 4-6 PHELPS to Subron 4 PHELPS MGBP-B	10-12, 20, 21. BUOY U. K. 13-19 VULNERABLE 17-19 1DD to LEX.		Gun. Tr. 2DD to SR2 MGBP-H	UPKEEP WHITNEY BUOY UPKEEP	Gun Tr.		UPKEEP WHITNEY	
	DESDIV 1	DEWEY (349)			Services Subron 4								13 S. & T. Ex. 1DD to SARA.		UPKEEP DOBBIN	
		MACDONOUGH (351)														
		WORDEN (352)														
		HULL (350)														
	DESDIV 2	AYLWIN (355)	8-9 BUOY U. K. 1-4 VULNERABLE 2-3 Gun. Tr. in op. area 3 BTP-A		BDCP-B (1SS from SR4)	18-20, 29-31 BUOY U. K. 21-28 VULNERABLE 21-22 1DD to ENT. 26-28 1DD to LEX. 26-28 2DD to SR2.			UPKEEP DOBBIN			28, 29, 7-12 BUOY UPKEEP 30-6 VULNERABLE	16-17 (Night) 2DD add. to SARA. AABP-H2		UPKEEP WHITNEY	
		FARRAGUT (348)														
		DALE (353)														
		MONAGHAN (354)														
DESRON THREE		CLARK (361)	BUOY U. K.			BUOY UPKEEP		Gun Tr. 7-9 CLARK to SR2 CLARK MGBP-B Desdiv 6 AABP-B2	UPKEEP WHITNEY		Gun. Tr. MGBP-H		Gun. Tr. 13 S. & T. Ex. 2DD to SR2 BDCP-B (1SS from SR2)		Same as Desdiv 6	
	DESDIV 5	CASSIN (372)	8-9 BUOY U. K. 1-4 VULNERABLE 2-3 2DD to SR4 2DD Gun. Tr. in op. area		Gun Tr. 15-17 2DD to Subron 2 13-14 (Nights) 2DD to SARA.	UPKEEP WHITNEY			BUOY UPKEEP			4 UPKEEP DOBBIN BUOY UPKEEP				
		CONYNGHAM (371)														
		REID (369)														
		DOWNES (375)														
	DESDIV 6	CASE (370)	BUOY UPKEEP			BUOY UPKEEP			UPKEEP WHITNEY			BUOY UPKEEP			20-22. 28-30 BUOY U. K. 23-27 VULNERABLE	
		CUMMINGS (365)														
		SHAW (373)														
		TUCKER (374)														
		DOBBIN	Desdiv 7 plus SELFRIDGE			Desdiv 1 plus PHELPS	Minron 2		Desdiv 2	Flt. Tac. Gun. Tr.		Desdiv 5	Desdiv 8 plus SELFRIDGE	Desdiv 1		
		WHITNEY	Desdiv 8			Desdiv 5	Desdiv 11		Desdiv 6 plus CLARK	DBP-R		Desdiv 1 plus PHELPS	Desdiv 7	Desdiv 2 plus PHELPS		

Note: Vul. — Services and Ready Duties — Upkeep as practicable.

CONFIDENTIAL

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

AIRCRAFT, TASK FORCE ONE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

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SECOND QUARTER, 1942

ACTIVITY	OCTOBER · NOVEMBER · DECEMBER
	1 · 9 10 · 12 13 · 18 19 · 31 1 · 8 · 10 11 · 21 22 · 25 26 · 28 29 · 12 13 · 18 19 20 21 · 30 31
	W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	MAINTENANCE. PREPARATION FOR TASK FORCE MISSIONS. TRAINING AND PREPARATION OF AIR GROUPS. PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON NIGHT OPERATIONS EMBARKED. A.A. LOOKOUT, IDENTIFICATION AND FIRE CONTROL TRAINING. GUNNERY — UPKEEP & A.A. — SERVICES — TACTICS — MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY.
SARATOGA (CV3)	UPKEEP PEARL 9 Intertype Tactics FBP (Torps) * 10 SERVICES Night Qual. 13-14 GUNNERY 15-18. MG Train Bom. MGAABP EB DBP & DRTBP 5" S.P. Calib. 19 UPK P.H. 22 ENROUTE NYPS VIA SAN DIEGO 2 3 INTERIM OVERHAUL — NYPS 11-14 MATERIAL INSPECTION B.I.S. 1 2 ENROUTE PEARL VIA SAN DIEGO 12 GUN 14-15 MG Train Bom. MGAABP "A". AA "Drone". Tr. NBP "C". SER. 16-17 Night Qual. FBP (Live Bombs) 17th. 18 FLT. TAC. FBP (Torps) ** 21 UPKEEP PEARL AMI-DCP ENTERPRISE ASSIST 30 Intertype Tac.
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	NIGHT TRAINING IN EXTENDED FLIGHT, SEARCH, AND ATTACK AT SEA. INSTRUMENT FLIGHT TRAINING. A.A. TRAINING EXERCISES WITH FLEET UNITS. DAY AND NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHIC AND RECONNAISSANCE TRAINING. EXERCISES IN DISPERSED ATTACK. PRE-FLEET TRAINING OF NEWLY GRADUATED PILOTS. REARMING DRILLS. FLEET TACTICAL EXERCISES. CONTINUE INDIVIDUAL QUALIFICATIONS (BOMBS AND GUNS).
SARATOGA GROUP VB-3 VF-3 VS-3 VT-3	Formation torpedo practice. VF conduct IBP (Camera Guns). Training in laying smoke screen using game board (VS-VB). Monthly training practice. Master horizontal bomber qualification practice. VF conduct IBP (Camera Guns). Instrument flight training. Bomb. man. tar. (UTAH) Master horizontal bombers' qualification practice. Monthly training practice. Complete individual qualifications (bombs and guns). Train free gunners on rifle range. Instrument flight training. Bombing of manoeuvering target (UTAH). Formation torpedo practice. Master horizontal bombers' qualification practice. FBP (Live Bombs). Instrument flight training. Bombing and strafing of a towed XX target. Monthly training practice. Bombing of manoeuvering target (UTAH).

* FBP (Torpedoes) to be fired during Intertype Tactics if practicable — otherwise on 14 October.

** (Torpedoes) to be fired during Fleet Tactics if practicable — otherwise on 16 December.

PATROL PLANES, TASK FORCE ONE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

ACTIVITY	OCTOBER · NOVEMBER · DECEMBER
VP-23	Preparation for Flight UPKEEP To San Diego To S.D. At San Diego UPKEEP Re-Equipment New Planes To PEARL UPKEEP EXPANSION TRAINING ADVANCE BASE MIDWAY UPKEEP FLEET TACTICS UPKEEP A.M.I. EXPANSION TRAINING UPKEEP FLEET TACTICS UPKEEP INTERTYPE TACTICS
VP-22	EXPANSION TRAINING UPKEEP Intertype Tactics UPKEEP A.M.I. EXPANSION TRAINING UPKEEP INTERTYPE TACTICS UPKEEP EXPANSION TRAINING ADVANCED BASE PALMYRA
VP-24	At San Diego UPKEEP Re-Equipment of New Planes To PEARL UPKEEP EXPANSION TRAINING ADVANCED BASE JOHNSTON A.M.I.

MINECRAFT, TASK FORCE ONE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

ACTIVITY	OCTOBER · NOVEMBER · DECEMBER
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	FLEET TACTICS — INTERTYPE TACTICS — GUNNERY — MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY — UPKEEP — TENDER UPKEEP — MATERIAL INSPECTIONS
OGLALA (CM4)	UPKEEP INTERTYPE TACTICS ANTI-AIRCRAFT TRAINING UPKEEP INTERTYPE TACTICS EMP "B" UPKEEP FLEET TACTICS EMP "A" UPKEEP EXP. MINING FLEET TACTICS UPKEEP
MINDIV ONE: PRUITT (DM22) TRACY (DM19) PREBLE (DM20) SICARD (DM21)	UPKEEP INTERTYPE TACTICS MGBP "C" AABP "C" INDIVIDUAL SHIP EXERCISES UPKEEP INTERTYPE TACTICS EMP "B" (night) SUB SERVICES SCREENING (day) Nov. 6-9 UPKEEP NAVY YARD OVERHAUL AT PEARL HARBOR (to January 20, 1942.)

CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

SUBMARINES, TASK FORCE ONE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

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SECOND QUARTER, 1942

ACTIVITY		OCTOBER					NOVEMBER							DECEMBER				
		1	9 10	12 13	18 19		31 1	3			10 11	21 22	25 26	28 29	12 13	18 19	20 21	30 31
		W T F S S M T W T	F S S	M T W T F S	S M T W T F S S M T	W T F	S S M	T	W T	F S S M	T W T F S S M T W T F	S S M T	W T F	S S M T W T F S S M T W T F	S S M T W T	F S	S M T W T F S S M T	W
GENERAL DIRECTIVE		FLEET & INTERTYPE TACTICS — WAR PATROL — TORPEDO & MINING — GUNNERY — UPKEEP — SERVICES																
SUBDIV 22	SNAPPER	TENDER OVERHAUL	INTERTYPE TACTICS	SRP, Spot MGH, Exp. NBP, DTPS	UPKEEP		INTERTYPE TACTICS	DTPM DTPJ			TENDER OVERHAUL	FLEET TACTICS	DTPD	UPKEEP	DTPP ETPZ-1	FLEET TACTICS	UPKEEP	INTERTYPE TACTICS
	STINGRAY	UPKEEP		SRP, Spot MGH, Exp. NBP DTPT	TENDER OVERHAUL						UPKEEP			TENDER OVERHAUL				
	STURGEON	TENDER OVERHAUL		SRP, Spot MGH, Exp. NBP, DTPS	UPKEEP			DTPQ DTPP							DTPL ETPZ-1			
	SCULPIN	UPKEEP						DTPQ DTPM			TENDER OVERHAUL			UPKEEP	DTPP ETPZ-1 DTPL		TENDER OVERHAUL	
	SAILFISH			SRP, Spot MGH, Exp. NBP, DTPT	TENDER OVERHAUL			DTPQ DTPJ			UPKEEP			TENDER OVERHAUL	DTPP ETPZ-1		UPKEEP	
	SWORDFISH							DTPM DTPP						UPKEEP	DTPL ETPZ-1		TENDER OVERHAUL	
SUBDIV 61	TAMBOR			DD/SS"Q"	BASE OVERHAUL		ENROUTE N.Y.M.I. 6			7 NAVY YARD OVERHAUL — MARE ISLAND								
	TAUTOG						Intertype Tactics	DTPT DTPD			UPKEEP	FLEET TACTICS	Z-1 RS	UPKEEP	SRP	FLEET TACTICS	BASE OVERHAUL	INTERTYPE TACTICS
	THRESHER																	
	GAR				28	29 ENROUTE P. H.		4	5			I.S.E.	ETP Z-2					
	GRAMPUS	OPERATING UNDER CINCLANT			AT PORTSMOUTH, N. H. FINAL TRIALS B. I. & S.						ENROUTE FROM EAST COAST TO PEARL HARBOR							
	GRAYBACK	OPERATING UNDER CINCLANT												AT PORTSMOUTH, N. H. FINAL TRIALS B. I. & S.			Enroute from East Coast to Pearl Harbor to arrive about Jan. 21	

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE ONE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship

1VOS

BATTLESHIPS — TASK FORCE ONE

WEST VIRGINIA (F)

Batdiv TWO
- TENNESSEE (F)
- CALIFORNIA (FF)
- PENNSYLVANIA (FF)
- VO-2 (9 VOS)

Batdiv FOUR
- WEST VIRGINIA (F)
- COLORADO
- MARYLAND
- VO-4 (9 VOS)

AIRCRAFT — TASK FORCE ONE

SARATOGA (F)

2VM Planes — Flag Unit
1 VSB (Group Com. Plane)
VB-3 (21 VSB)
VF-3 (18 VF, 2VM)
VS-3 (21 VSB)
VT-3 (12 VTB)
Utility Unit (3 VSO, 2 VJ)

CRUISERS — TASK FORCE ONE

HONOLULU (F)

Crudiv NINE
- HONOLULU (F)
- PHOENIX
- BOISE (RF)
- HELENA
- ST. LOUIS
- RICHMOND
- VCS-9 (22 VSO)

DESTROYERS — TASK FORCE ONE

RALEIGH (F)

2 VSO Planes

DOBBIN (Tender)

WHITNEY (Tender)

DESTROYER SQUADRON ONE

360 PHELPS — Squadron Flagship

DESDIV TWO		DESDIV ONE	
355	AYLWIN (F)	349	DEWEY (F)
348	FARRAGUT (RF)	351	MACDONOUGH (RF)
353	DALE	352	WORDEN
354	MONAGHAN	350	HULL

DESTROYER SQUADRON THREE

361 CLARK — Squadron Flagship

DESDIV SIX		DESDIV FIVE	
370	CASE (F)	372	CASSIN (F)
366	CUMMINGS (RF)	371	CONYNGHAM
373	SHAW	369	REID
374	TUCKER	375	DOWNES (RF)

MINECRAFT — TASK FORCE ONE

OGLALA (F)

Mindiv ONE
- PRUITT (F)
- TRACY
- PREBLE
- SICARD

PATROL PLANES — TASK FORCE ONE

(VP-23) Patrol Squadron Twenty-Three — (12 VPB)
(VP-22) Patrol Squadron Twenty-Two — (12 VPB)
(VP-24) Patrol Squadron Twenty-Four — (12 VPB)

SUBMARINES — TASK FORCE ONE

SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY-TWO

185	SNAPPER
186	STINGRAY
187	STURGEON
191	SCULPIN (F)
192	SAILFISH
193	SWORDFISH

SUBMARINE DIVISION SIXTY-ONE

196	TAMBOR
199	TAUTOG
200	THRESHER
206	GAR
207	GRAMPUS
208	GRAYBACK

CONFIDENTIAL

TASK FORCE TWO

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

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★ ★

SECOND QUARTER
1942

A4-3/12-Hc/FF2-3
(0733)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
TASK FORCE TWO
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
September 12, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Task Force TWO.
To : Task Force TWO.

Subject: Employment Schedule, Task Force TWO, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, 1942.

Reference: (a) Cincpac Conf. Serial 01254 of August 13, 1941.

1. In accordance with reference (a), the appended Employment Schedule, Task Fo TWO, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for the second quarter, 1942, is forwarded for information and g dance.

2. Type Commanders will make own arrangements for services required.

3. Economy in fuel and mileage expenditures shall be given due consideration by commands.

W. F. HALSEY

DISTRIBUTION:

Basis: List II, Case 1.

Fleet, Force and Type Commanders, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Units of Task Force TWO l DD's, DM's, and Airons.

List I, Case 2.

DD's, DM's, and Airons of Task Force TWO.

List I, Case 1.

B2-2; B3-9; B4-01; B4-1; B4-3; B4-5; B5-1; C1-01; D2-4; D2-6; E1-1; F2; G4; H2 H2-1; H2-2; H4-1; H4-3; H6-0; H6-1; I4; I6; I6-2; I6-4; I8; I9; I10.

SPECIAL:

AA-1; AB-1; AAA-1; EN-1; EN-3; EN-4; EN-6; EN-11; FATU; FPO; NA-8; NA- NA-12; NA-37; ND-11; ND-12; ND-13; ND-14; H4-0; Comdg. Gen. Haw. Dept.; Fi Post Office.

H. D. MOULTON,
Flag Secretary.

TASK FORCE TWO, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

BATTLESHIPS AND CARRIER

CONFIDENTIAL

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

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SECOND QUARTER, 1942

ACTIVITY	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
	1 8 15 22 29	1 8 15 22 29	1 8 15 22 29
	M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F	S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S	M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	FLEET TACTICS — INTERTYPE TACTICS — GUNNERY — MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY — UPKEEP — TENDER UPKEEP — MATERIAL INSPECTIONS		

		2	3 17	18 22	23 26	27 9	10 11	12 17	18 27	28 29	30 5	6 17	18 20	21 26	27
BATDIV ONE	ARIZONA (BB39)	2nd AABP "B-2" Tr. & Fl. LCBP	UPKEEP PEARL	Tr. AA 5"/25 Train NBP Fire NSP (M.B.)	FLEET TACTICS	UPKEEB PEARL	INTERTYPE TACTICS	Tr. DBP. Fl. 1st NBP (Turrets) Train & Fire AABP G-5"/25	UPKEEP PEARL	INTERTYPE TACTICS	Fire ADV AABP N-2 Tr. DBP. Fl. NSP (Sec. Bat.)	UPKEEP PEARL Tender Overhaul — VESTAL 6-16	FLEET TACTICS	Train & Fire DBP Train NBP (Sec. Bat.)	UPKEEP PEARL
	NEVADA (BB36)	SRP "A" Main & Sec. Bat.	UPKEEP PEARL	Tr. & Fl. 1st AABP "B-2" Train NBP Fire NSP (M.B.)		UPKEEP PEARL		Train & Fire LCBP (Sec. Bat.) Fire 1st NBP (Turrets)	UPKEEP PEARL		Train & Fire 2nd AABP "B-2" Tr. DBP Fl. NSP (Sec. Bat.)	UPKEEP PEARL Assist OKLAHOMA AMI - DCP		Train & Fire DBP Train NBP (Sec. Bat.)	UPKEEP PEARL
	OKLAHOMA (BB37)	SRP "A" All Batts.	UPKEEP PEARL Tender Overhaul — MEDUSA 3-16	Tr. & Fl. 1st AABP "B-2" Train NBP Fire NSP (M.B.)		UPKEEP PEARL		Train & Fire LCBP (Sec. Bat.) Fire 1st NBP (Turrets)	UPKEEP PEARL		Train & Fire 2nd AABP "B-2" Tr. DBP Fl. NSP (Sec. Bat.)	UPKEEP PEARL AMI - DCP		Train & Fire DBP Train NBP (Sec. Bat.)	UPKEEP PEARL
	GENERAL DIRECTIVE VO - 1	Embarked. Complete monthly training practices 1, 2, and 3. Train for and fire first two mandatory practices. Navigation, Communication, Night and Instrument Training. Utility services for parent ships as required.													
	GENERAL DIRECTIVE	Maintenance. Preparation for Task Force Missions, Training and Preparation of Air Groups. Particular emphasis on Night Operations Embarked. AA Lookout, Identification and Fire Control Training. Gunnery - Upkeep & AA - Services - Tactics - -Miscellaneous Underway.													
	ENTERPRISE (CV6)	Operating	UPKEEP PEARL	Gunnery 18-19. MG Training Runs MGAABP H-2 RF Calib. Services 20 - 22 Night Qual. FBP (Live Bombs) 20th	FLEET TACTICS FBP (Torpedoes)	UPKEEP PEARL	INTERTYPE TACTICS	Operating Gunnery 12-15 AA "Drone" Train for LCBP Services 16-17 Night Qualif.	UPKEEP PEARL	Intertype Tactics FBP (Torpedoes)	Operating Gunnery 30-2 Train for LCBP RF Calib. Services 3-5 Night Qualif.	UPKEEP PEARL	FLEET TACTICS	Operating Services 21-23 FBP (Torp) 23rd Night Qualif. Gunnery 24-26 LCBP. Train For NBP "A"	UPKEEP PEARL Assist SARATOGA AMI - DCP
	GENERAL DIRECTIVE	Night Training in Extended Flight, Search, and Attack at Sea. Instrument Flight Training. AA Training Exercises with Fleet Units. Day and Night Photographic Reconnaissance Training. Exercises in Dispersed Attack. Pre-Fleet Training of Newly Graduated Pilots. Rearming Drills. Fleet Tactical Exercises. Continue Individual Qualifications (Bombs and Guns.)													
	ENTERPRISE AIR GROUP	Formation Torpedo Practice. VF Conduct IBP (Camera Guns). Training in Laying Smoke Screen Using Game Board (VS-VB). Monthly Training Practice. Bombing and Straffing of Sled Target. FBP (Live Bombs) and Rearming Drill. Instrument Flight Training. Bombing of Maneuvering Target (UTAH). Train Free Gunners on Rifle Range. Master Horizontal Bombers' Qualification Practice.													

TASK FORCE TWO, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

CRUISERS

CONFIDENTIAL

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

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SECOND QUARTER, 1942

OCTOBER 1 8 15 22 29 — NOVEMBER 1 8 15 22 29 — DECEMBER 1 8 15 22 29

M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W

ACTIVITY		OCTOBER					NOVEMBER				DECEMBER				
		2	3 – 17	18 – 22	23 – 26	27 – 9	10 11	14 – 17	18 – 27	28 29	30 – 5	6 – 17	18 20	21 – 26	27
GENERAL DIRECTIVE		GUNNERY — UPKEEP — TACTICS — TENDER UPKEEP — MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY — MATERIAL INSPECTION													
CRUDIV FIVE	NORTHAMPTON (CA26)	Gunnery	(1) UPKEEP	Gunnery	FLEET TACTICS	UPKEEP (MEDUSA)	INTERTYPE TACTICS	Gunnery FPT	(1) UPKEEP	INTERTYPE TACTICS	Gunnery	UPKEEP (2)	FLEET TACTICS	Gunnery	UPKEEP
	SALT LAKE CITY (CA25)	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	FLEET TACTICS	UPKEEP	INTERTYPE TACTICS	Gunnery	(1) UPKEEP	INTERTYPE TACTICS	Gunnery 2	UPKEEP (MEDUSA)	FLEET TACTICS	Gunnery	UPKEEP
	PENSACOLA (CA24)	Gunnery	(1) UPKEEP (2)	Gunnery	FLEET TACTICS	UPKEEP (VESTAL)	INTERTYPE TACTICS	Gunnery	UPKEEP	INTERTYPE TACTICS	Gunnery	UPKEEP	FLEET TACTICS	Gunnery	UPKEEP
	CHESTER (CA27)	Gunnery	(1) UPKEEP (2)	Gunnery	FLEET TACTICS	UPKEEP	INTERTYPE TACTICS	Gunnery	UPKEEP	INTERTYPE TACTICS	Gunnery	UPKEEP (2)	FLEET TACTICS	Gunnery	UPKEEP
	GENERAL DIRECTIVE	Search and Communication Exercise - Gunnery - Aircraft Anti-Submarine Exercise - Spotting Drill - Night Training - Instrument Flying - Miscellaneous Services to Parent Vessels. Pre-Fleet and Transition Training.													
	VCS - 5	Complete Machine Gun. Qual.	Train for and Fire IBP Section Camera Guns Night Flying Cal. Compass and air Speed Meters	Aircraft Anti-Sub Exercise	FLT. TAC.	Train for and Fire IBP Dive Bombing			UPKEEP Night Flying	Tr. for and Fi. PBP Live Bombs and re-arming drill	Calibrate Compass and air Speed Meter Night Flying.		FLT TAC.	Monthly Train. Prac. Anti-sub Exercise	Night Flying UPKEEP

(1) MATERIAL INSPECTIONS:
NORTHAMPTON - November 18 - December 17 - SALT LAKE CITY Assist.
CHESTER - September 20 - October 20 - PENSACOLA Assist.
PENSACOLA - September 20 - October 20 - NORTHAMPTON Assist.

(2) AMI - DCP
PENSACOLA - October 14 - 15 - CHESTER Assist.
CHESTER - December 11 - 12 - NORTHAMPTON Assist.

TASK FORCE TWO, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

DESTROYERS AND MINE CRAFT

CONFIDENTIAL

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SECOND QUARTER, 1942

ACTIVITY		OCTOBER 1 · 8 · 15 · 22 · 29 — NOVEMBER 1 · 8 · 15 · 22 · 29 — DECEMBER 1 · 8 · 15 · 22 · 29
		MTWTFSS MTWTFSS MTWTFSS MTWTFSS MTWTFSS MTWTFSS MTWTFSS MTWTFSS MTWTFSS MTWTFSS MTWTFSS MTWTFSS MTWTFSS MTW
GENERAL DIRECTIVE		TACTICS — GUNNERY — SERVICES — MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY — UPKEEP & AA
DETROIT (CL8)		Gun. Tr. SRP-B 2 3 UPKEEP 17 18 Gun. Tr. BTP-A 22 23 FLEET TACTICS 24 27 UPKEEP 9 10 I. T. Tac. 12 Gun. Tr. AABP-B-1 17 18 UPKEEP 27 28 I. T. Tac. 30 Gun. Tr. LCBP 5 6 UPKEEP 17 18 Flt. Tac. 20 21 Gun. Tr. 26 27 UPKEEP
VSO UNIT		Gun & Bomb Tr. UPKEEP Gun & Bomb Tr. UPKEEP Gun & Bomb Tr. UPKEEP Gun. & Bomb Tr. UPKEEP Gun & Bomb Tr. UPKEEP
ESRON FOUR	SELFRIDGE (DD357)	Gun. Tr. AABP B2 UPKEEP DOBBIN Gun. Tr. 2 DD to Subron FOUR BDCP-B (1 SS from Subron FOUR) 18. S. & T. Exercise with SS 26 FLEET TACTICS 23 10 INTERTYPE TACTICS 11 Gun. Tr. 12-16, 1 DD to Subron FOUR (part time). 12-16, 1 DD to ENTERPRISE 15-16 (nights) 2 DD add to ENTERPRISE SELFRIDGE-MGBP-B MGBP-H 28 INTERTYPE TACTICS 29 Gun. Tr. AABP-N2 30-4. 1 DD to ENTERPRISE. 2-3 (Nights) 2 DD (add) to ENTERPRISE. SELFRIDGE SMCDBP UPKEEP DOBBIN 18 FLEET TACTICS 20 Gun. Tr. 20. S. & T. Exercise (2 SS from Subron TWO) 21-26. 2 DD to Subron FOUR DSP 26-27. BUOY UPKEEP 28-31. Vul.
	DESDIV SEVEN: HENLEY (DD391), BAGLEY (DD386), BLUE (DD387), HELM (DD388)	UPKEEP DOBBIN 17-19. 27. BUOY UPKEEP 20-26. Vul. 20-21. 1 DD to LEXINGTON UPKEEP WHITNEY
	DESDIV EIGHT: MUGFORD (DD389), JARVIS (DD393), PATTERSON (DD392), RALPH TALBOT (DD390)	UPKEEP WHITNEY 26-28. 8-9. Buoy Upkeep 29-7. Vul. 29-31. 1 DD to LEXINGTON 29-31. 2 DD to Subron TWO BUOY UPKEEP UPKEEP DOBBIN
DESRON SIX	BALCH (DD363)	Gun. Tr. SRP-B Same as DesDiv TWELVE Gun. Tr. 18. S & T. Exercise with SS. AABP-B2 MGBP-B (BALCH) 2 DD to ENTERPRISE (Nights) 21-22 FLEET TACTICS UPKEEP ALTAIR INTERTYPE TACTICS Gun. Tr. DDBP BTP-B UPKEEP ALTAIR INTERTYPE TACTICS Gun. Tr. BDCP-B (1 SS from Subron FOUR) 30-4. 4 DD to Subron FOUR 5-10. Buoy Upkeep 11-17. Vul. 12. 1 DD to LEXINGTON 11-12. (nights) 1 DD add to LEXINGTON FLEET TACTICS Gun. Tr. 20. S. & T. Exercise (2 SS from Subron SIX) 20-25. 1 DD to ENTERPRISE 21-22. (nights. 2 DD add to ENTERPRISE 23. 3 DD rec. ves. to ENTERPRISE AABP-N2 MGRP-H
	DESDIV ELEVEN: GRIDLEY (DD380), McCALL (DD400), CRAVEN (DD382), MAURY (DD401)	UPKEEP ALTAIR UPKEEP WHITNEY (Commence 29th) 28. BTP-A BUOY UPKEEP
	DESDIV TWELVE: DUNLAP (DD384), FANNING (DD385), BENHAM (DD397), ELLET (DD	2-7. Buoy Upkeep 8-17. Vul. 7. BTP-A. UPKEEP ALTAIR UPKEEP ALTAIR 5-6, 13-17. Buoy Upkeep 7-12. Vul. 8-12. 2 DD to Subron FOUR 8-11. 1 DD to LEXINGTON
DIXIE (AD14)		MD SIX MISCELLANEOUS EN ROUTE NAVY YARD OVERHAUL MARE ISLAND
ALTAIR (AD11)		DD ELEVEN MD ONE DD TWELVE plus BALCH 9 10 Gun. Tr. 17 18 DD TWELVE plus BALCH 27 28 DD FIVE 12 13 DD NINE plus PORTER 26 27 MD TWO
DESDIV 50	TALBOT (DD114) WATERS (DD115) DENT (DD116)	OVERHAUL - NAVY YARD MARE ISLAND SOUND SCHOOL UNDERWAY 14 SOUND SCHOOL AT ANCHOR 30 SOUND SCHOOL UNDERWAY 19 20 LEAVE LIBERTY MISCELL.
	RATHBURNE (DD113)	SOUND SCHOOL UNDERWAY 10 11 SOUND SCHOOL AT ANCHOR SD SCH 31 1 OVERHAUL - NAVY YARD MARE ISLAND 10 11
GENERAL DIRECTIVE		FLEET TACTICS — INTERTYPE TACTICS — GUNNERY — MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY — UPKEEP — TENDER UPKEEP — MATERIAL INSPECTIONS
MINDIV. 2	BREESE (DM18) GAMBLE DM15) MONTGOMERY (DM17) RAMSAY (DM16)	NAVY YARD OVERHAUL AT PEARL HARBOR 14 15 UPKEEP 27 INTERTYPE TACTICS 30 EXP. MINE BDCP "B" 5 6 UPKEEP 17 FLEET TACTICS 21 AABP "G" MGBP "G" FPT 26 27

7l
D-F

20

6M

TASK FORCE TWO, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

SUBMARINES AND PATROL PLANES

CONFIDENTIAL

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

SECOND QUARTER, 1942

ACTIVITY	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
	1 8 15 22 29	1 8 15 22 29	1 8 15 22 29
	M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W		
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	GUNNERY — UPKEEP — TACTICS — MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY		
SUBRON FORTY TWO — ARGONAUT (SM1)	DTP "J" "P" "L" · UPKEEP · MP MG "B" DTP "T" · JOINT TACTICS · UPKEEP · INTER-TYPE TACTICS · War Patrol · UPKEEP · INTER-TYPE TACTICS · DD/SS MP DTP "Q" · BASE OVERHAUL · FLEET TACTICS · DTP "T" · UPKEEP		
SUBRON FORTY TWO — NARWHAL (SS167)	DTP "J" "P" "L" · UPKEEP · MG "B" DTP "T" · JOINT TACTICS · UPKEEP · INTER-TYPE TACTICS · War Patrol · UPKEEP · INTER-TYPE TACTICS · DD/SS DTP "M" · BASE OVERHAUL · FLEET TACTICS · DTP "T" · UPKEEP		
SUBRON FORTY TWO — NAUTILUS (SS168)	NAVY YARD OVERHAUL, MARE ISLAND		
SUBRON FORTY TWO — DOLPHIN (SS169)	DTP "J" "P" "L" · UPKEEP · MG "B" DTP "T" · FLEET TACTICS · UPKEEP · INTERTYPE TACTICS · War Patrol · UPKEEP · INTERTYPE TACTICS · DD/SS · BASE OVERHAUL · FLEET TACTICS · DTP "S" · UPKEEP		
SUBRON SI... / TWO — TRITON (SS201)	DTP "J" "P" "L" · UPKEEP · MG "B" DTP "T" · UPKEEP · War Patrol · BASE OVERHAUL · DD/SS DTP "Q" · UPKEEP · DTP "S" · UPKEEP		
SUBRON SI... / TWO — TROUT (SS202)	DTP "J" Services Mission 2 · UPKEEP · Trail DR-6 MG "B" DTP "T" · UPKEEP · War Patrol · BASE OVERHAUL · DD/SS · UPKEEP · DTP "S" · UPKEEP		
SUBRON SI... / TWO — TUNA (SS203)	DTP "J" · UPKEEP · Serv. DR-4 Trail BDC "B" · UPKEEP · War Patrol · BASE OVERHAUL · DD/SS · UPKEEP · DTP "T" · UPKEEP		
SUBRON SI... / TWO — GRAYLING (SS209)	Enroute PEARL · UPKEEP · War Patrol · BASE OVERHAUL · Service DR-6 · UPKEEP · Trail Duress Bls · DTP "T" · UPKEEP		
SUBRON SI... / TWO — GRENADIER (SS210)	At Portsmouth, N. H. Final Trials B. 1 and S · Enroute from East Coast to arrive Pearl January 5, 1942		
SUBRON SI... / TWO — GUDGEON (SS211)	Enr. and at Dutch Harbor Alaska · Enroute Pearl Harbor · At Pearl Harbor · Enroute and at Lahaina · Enr. and at Hilo · Enr. and at Pearl Harbor · Enroute Mare Island · At Mare Island · Enr S. D. · At San Diego · Enroute Pearl · UPKEEP		
VP - 12	At San Diego UPKEEP Re-Equipment New Planes · To P. H. · UPKEEP · Visit Tactics · Expansion Training · UPKEEP · INTERTYPE TACTICS · UPKEEP · AMT · Expansion Training · INTERTYPE TACTICS · UP-KEEP · Advanced Base Operations - Palmyra · UPKEEP · FLEET TACTICS · UPKEEP		
VP - 14	Preparations for Flight UPKEEP to San Diego · To S. D. · At San Diego UPKEEP Re-Equipment new planes · To P. H. · UPKEEP · Expansion Training · AMT · UPKEEP · INTERTYPE TACTICS · UPKEEP · AMT · Expansion Training · INTERTYPE TACTICS · UP-KEEP · Advanced Base Operations - Johnston · UP-KEEP · FLEET TACTICS · UPKEEP		

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE TWO, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(CV6) U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

BATTLESHIPS - TASK FORCE TWO

BatDiv ONE
(BB39) ARIZONA (F)
(BB36) NEVADA
(BB37) OKLAHOMA

CARRIER - TASK FORCE TWO

CarDiv TWO
(CV6) ENTERPRISE (F)

CRUISERS - TASK FORCE TWO

CruDiv FIVE
(CA26) NORTHAMPTON (F)
(CA25) SALT LAKE CITY
(CA24) PENSACOLA
(CA27) CHESTER

DESTROYERS - TASK FORCE TWO

(CL8) DETROIT (F)
(AD11) ALTAIR
(AD14) DIXIE

DESTROYER SQUADRON FOUR
(DD857) SELFRIDGE (F)

DesDiv EIGHT
(DD689) MUGFORD (F)
(DD692) JARVIS (RF)
(DD692) PATTERSON
(DD690) RALPH TALBOT

DesDiv SEVEN
(DD891) HENLEY (F)
(DD886) BAGLEY
(DD888) HELM
(DD887) BLUE (RF)

DESTROYER SQUADRON SIX
(DD668) BALCH (F)

DesDiv TWELVE
(DD884) DUNLAP (F)
(DD898) ELLET
(DD885) FANNING (RF)
(DD897) BENHAM

DesDiv ELEVEN
(DD880) GRIDLEY (F)
(DD401) MAURY (RF)
(DD882) CRAVEN
(DD400) MC CALL

(1) DESTROYER DIVISION FIFTY

(DD113) RATHBURNE (F)
(DD114) TALBOT
(DD115) WATERS
(DD116) DENT (RF)

MINECRAFT - TASK FORCE TWO

MinDiv TWO
(DM15) GAMBLE (F)
(DM18) BREESE
(DM16) RAMSAY
(DM17) MONTGOMERY

PATROL SQUADRONS - TASK FORCE TWO

(VP12) Patrol Squadron TWELVE
(VP14) Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN

SUBMARINES - TASK FORCE TWO

SubDiv FORTY-TWO
(SS167) NARWHAL (F)
(SS168) NAUTILUS
(SS169) DOLPHIN
(SM 1) ARGONAUT (FF)

SubDiv SIXTY-TWO
(SS201) TRITON (F)
(SS202) TROUT
(SS203) TUNA
(2) (SS209) GRAYLING
(2) (SS210) GRENADIER
(2) (SS211) GUDGEON

(1) In reduced commission. Operates with underwater sound training school.

(2) On reporting.

MEMORANDUM

The attached document was introduced as an exhibit before the examination to record and preserve testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T.H., on 7 December 1941, ordered by Secretary of the Navy's confidential precept dated 12 February 1944, addressed to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U.S. Navy, Retired.

It is highly important that attached document be retained on file indefinitely where it will be certainly available for future call.

Thos. C. Hart

Thos. C. Hart

CONFIDENTIAL

TASK FORCE THREE

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

Destroyed
48-28-31-32-35-3-4-47-12-1-2
[redacted]-23-25-36-29-30-49-26

1 October - 31 December 1941

C.S.F. File No.
A4-3/FF3/(90)
Serial 0670

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
TASK FORCE THREE
U.S.S. LOUISVILLE, Flagship

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
September 11, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL.

From: Commander Task Force THREE.
To : Task Force THREE.

Subject: Schedule of Employment, Task Force THREE for the period 1 October - 31 December, 1941.

1. Appended is the Employment Schedule for Task Force THREE for the period 1 October - 31 December, 1941.

2. This schedule has the effect of orders. Attention is invited to United States Pacific Fleet Regulations, paragraph 146.

3. Commander Base Force is requested to provide the necessary Train services required by this schedule.

4. Fuel and mileage allowances impose the necessity for planning ahead. Type Commanders and Commanding Officers will reduce expenditures and mileage to a minimum consistent with efficient operations and training.

WILSON BROWN

DISTRIBUTION:
List I (Case2): B (less B4-5),C, I(less I6-2), X, A1 (Atlantic). A1 (Asiatic), JO.
List II (Case 1): A-1 (Pacific), E1-6, H (less H2-1, H4-1, H4-3), M.
List III (Case 1): B4-5, D-2 E1-1, F, G, H2-1, H4-1, H4-3, I6-2, K.

SPECIAL
EN3(50), EN4(20), EN5(3), EN6(5), EN7(5), EN9(5), EN10(5), EN11(5), EN24(1), EN25(1), KS3(3), KS4(3), NA11(2), NA12(2), NA26(2), ND1-10(2),ND11-13(3), ND14(10), ND15(3), NM5-12-13(1ea), NP1, 3,7,11, (3ea), NT1-9 to 11 (1ea), NY1 to 10(3). Des Base, San Diego (2), CO NITRO, SIRIUS, WM W. BURROWS. REGULUS, KAULA, HENDERSON, WHARTON, VEGA, LASSEN, (2ea), Bd I&S, Long Beach (6), Nav. War College, Newport (3), 2nd Asst. Postmaster General, Washington (3), Postmaster, New York, CO USCG Hdqts. Los Angeles, Director and Instructor Naval Reserves, 11th Naval District Navy Civil Liaison Officer, Room 900Law Bldg. 129 N. Brdy., Los Angeles, Fleet Per. Off., Fed. Bldg., San Francisco, Branch Intelligence Off., Rm 402 Fed. Bldg. Los Angeles, (1ea), Comdg. Gen. Hawaiian Dept. G2, Ft. Shafter (1), Lexington (20).

T.J. Casey,
Flag Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

CRUISERS, TASK FORCE THREE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET



GENERAL DIRECTIVE Search and Communication Exercises - Gunnery - Aircraft Anti - Submarine Exercise - Spotting Drill - Night Training - Instrument Flying - Miscellaneous Services to Parent Vessels and other types - Prefleet and Transition Training - Shore Bombardment Observation and Spotting - Visual Reconnaissance of Shore Objectives.

CRUISER WING

Gunnery Services To Ships Miscellaneous | 8 Inter Type Tactics | 11 Train For and Fire IBP Section Camera Guns Night Flying | 23 Fleet Tactics | 27 Services Aircraft Anti-Sub Exercises | 2 TRAIN AND FIRE IBP DIVE BOMBING / NIGHT FLYING / Services | 22 Fleet Tactics | 26 Calibrate Compass and Air Speed Meters. UPKEEP | 5 Inter Type Tactics | 8 Train Fire FBP Live Bombs and Rearming | 14 NIGHT FLYING UPKEEP | 26 Monthly TrngPrac A.S. Exercise | 2 Inter Type Tactics

EXCEPTIONS CRUISER WING

NEW ORLEANS UNIT SHORE BASED NAS SAN PEDRO UNTIL ABOUT 31 OCTOBER - INSTRUMENT AND NIGHT FLYING - COMPLY WITH WING DIRECTIVE
SAN FRANCISCO UNIT SHORE BASED NAS PEARL HARBOR COMMENCING 11 OCTOBER - COMPLY WITH WING DIRECTIVE.

CARRIER AND AIRCRAFT GROUPS, TASK FORCE THREE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

CONFIDENTIAL

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
	1 5 6 12 13 19 20 26 27	31 1 2 9 10 16 17 23 24	30 1 7 7 8 14 15 21 22 28 29 31
	M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S	M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S	M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	MAINTENANCE - PREPARATION FOR TASK FORCE MISSIONS - TRAINING AND PREPARATION OF AIR GROUPS - NIGHT OPERATIONS EMBARKED - GUNNERY - SERVICES - TACTICS - UPKEEP AA LOOKOUT, IDENTIFICATION AND FIRE CONTROL TRAINING - MISCELLANEOUS.		
LEXINGTON	ENROUTE PEARL VIA SAN DIEGO COMPLY CINCPAC OP.ORD. 27-41	11 UPKEEP 23 Fleet Tactics 27-29 Gunnery DSP DSP 5" MGAA BP. A 30-31 Services 30 FBP (Torps.) Night Qual.	2 UPKEEP 17-18 Gunnery MGAA BP H2 Train DMTBP Services 19-21 Night Qual. 22 Fleet Tactics FBP (Torps) (1) 26 UPKEEP 5 Inter Type Tactics 8-11 DSP 5" DMTBP Train NBPC 12-13 Services Night Qual. 12-FBP (Live Bombs) 14 UPKEEP 26-27 FB. Calibration Train NBPC 28-29 Services Night Qual. Inter T Tactics (Torps) (2)
	NOTES (1) FBP (TORPEDOES) TO BE FIRED DURING FLEET TACTICS IF PRACTICABLE - OTHERWISE ON 20 NOVEMBER (2) FBP (TORPEDOES) TO BE FIRED DURING INTERTYPE TACTICS IF PRACTICABLE - OTHERWISE ON 29 NOVEMBER		
	AIRCRAFT GROUPS		
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	NIGHT TRAINING IN EXTENDED FLIGHT, SEARCH, AND ATTACK AT SEA - INSTRUMENT FLIGHT TRAINING - AA TRAINING EXERCISES WITH FLEET UNITS - DAY AND NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISANCE TRAINING - EXERCISES IN SUPPORT OF LANDINGS - EXERCISES IN DISPERSED ATTACK - REARMING DRILLS - FLEET TACTICAL EXERCISES - INDIVIDUAL QUALIFICATIONS (BOMBS AND GUNS) - SERVICES - FORMATION BOMBING AND TORPEDO TRAINING - DAY QUALIFICATIONS AND REFRESHERS.		
LEXINGTON AIRCRAFT GROUP	FORMATION TORPEDO PRACTICE - VF CONDUCT IBP CAMERA GUNS) - MONTHLY TRAINING PRACTICE - BOMBING AND STRAFING SLED TARGETS - GAME BOARD EXERCISES IN SMOKE LAYING (VS - VB) - INSTRUMENT FLIGHT TRAINING - BOMBING MANEUVERING TARGET (UTAH) - MASTER HORIZONTAL BOMBERS QUALIFICATION PRACTICE - RIFLE RANGE TRAINING FOR FREE GUNNERS - FORMATION BOMBING PRACTICE (LIVE BOMBS) - SERVICES - NIGHT QUALIFICATIONS.		
MARINE AIR GROUP TWENTY ONE	MONTHLY TRAINING PRACTICE - IBP (CAMERA GUNS AND BOMBS) - INSTRUMENT FLIGHT TRAINING - BOMBING AND STRAFING EXERCISES - EXERCISES IN SUPPORT OF LANDINGS BOMBING OF MANEUVERING TARGET (UTAH) - NIGHT FLYING - SERVICES - DAY QUALIFICATIONS AND REFRESHERS.		
	SECOND MARINE DIVISION, TASK FORCE THREE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET		
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	COMBAT TRAINING - TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL TRAINING - COMBINED TRAINING - COMMAND POST EXERCISES - GAS PROTECTIVE MEASURES - LANDING OPERATIONS - CAMOUFLAGE - NIGHT OPERATIONS - FIELD TRAINING AND FIRING AT CAMP ELLIOTT - BOAT FORMATIONS - TACTICAL DEBARKATIONS AND LANDING - TROOP LEADING - TRANSPORT LOADING AND UNLOADING AS TRANSPORTS BECOME AVAILABLE.		
	TRANSPORTS, TASK FORCE THREE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET		
	EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE WILL BE PROMULGATED WHEN TRANSPORTS BECOME AVAILABLE		

CONFIDENTIAL

DESTROYERS, TASK FORCE THREE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

2527

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SUBMARINES, TASK FORCE THREE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

	ACTIVITY	OCTOBER						NOVEMBER				DECEMBER				
		1	5 6		12 13 19 20		26 27 31 1 2	9 10	16 17	23 24	30 1	7 8		14 15 21 22	28 29	31
	GENERAL DIRECTIVE	Upkeep	Gunnery	Inter Type Tactics	UPKEEP	Fleet Tactics	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	Fleet Tactics	UPKEEP	Inter Type Tactics	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	Inter Type Tactics
SUB DIV TWENTY-ONE	SALMON	NYMI	4 RFSP		11 ENR Puget Sound 14 Services 17 ENROUTE San Diego	21 UPKEEP	28 ENROUTE PEARL	3	BMPE SRPA Spotting Practice MGAABP H				DTPT DTPS DD-SS Practice	TENDER OVERHAUL	DTPJ DTPL	
	SEAL		DTPQ DTPD				DTPL DTPP	TENDER OVERHAUL	14 Enroute San Diego	22 UPKEEP	29 EN NY OVERHAUL - NAVY YARD MARE ISLAND					
	SKIPJACK		DTPT DTPJ				DTPD ETPF	TENDER-OVERHAUL	SRPA Spotting Practice				DD-SS Practice	TENDER OVERHAUL	DPTJ DTPL DTPP	
	SARGO		DTPQ DTPD		TENDER OVERHAUL		ETPF DTPL				Tender Overhaul		DTPM DD-SS Practice		BMPE DTPP DTPL	
	SAURY		BMPE DTPT		TENDER OVERHAUL		DTPD ETPF		MGAABP H		Tender Overhaul		DTPM DD-SS Practice		DTPP DTPL	
	SPEARFISH		DTPJ DTPQ				BMPE DTPD DTPP	TENDER OVERHAUL					DD-SS Prac DTPM DTPS		DTPJ ETPZ-1	
SUB DIV FORTY-THREE	CACHALOT	Overhaul SubBase	7 OVERHAUL — NAVY YARD — PEARL HARBOR										13 MISC. AT ANCHOR	22 RFSP	RWT	
	CUTTLEFISH	R S MGAABP "B"					E. T. P. Z-1	OVERHAUL SUBMARINE BASE	Services Minron 2				DTPM			
	PLUNGER								ETPD						29-BTP G	
	POLLACK								ETPD							
	POMPANO								ETPD ETPP				DTPM DTPL		Trail Desdiv 10	
SUB DIV FORTY-ONE	S-18	NAVY YARD MARE ISLAND								21 SERVICES TO SOUND SCHOOL, WEST COAST UPKEEP AND GUNNERY						
	S-23															
	S-27	SERVICES TO SOUND SCHOOL, WEST COAST — UPKEEP — GUNNERY								21 NAVY YARD MARE ISLAND						
	S-28															
	S-34	SERVICES TO SOUND SCHOOL, WEST COAST — UPKEEP — GUNNERY														
	S-35															
	LITCHFIELD	Services Subdiv 43		8 Inter Type Tactics	11 UPKEEP	23 Fleet Tactics	27 Services Subdiv 43	2 OVERHAUL SUBMARINE BASE	17 SERVICES SUBDIV 43	22 Fleet Tactics	26 Services Subdiv 41 29 UPKEEP	5 Inter Type Tactics	8 Services Subdiv 43	14 SRP 16 OVERHAUL SUBMARINE BASE	SER. S. Div. 43	Inter Type Tactics
	PELIAS	IF PELIAS JOINS PRIOR TO END OF QUARTER, SCHEDULE FOR REMAINING PERIOD WILL BE PREPARED														
	HOLLAND	TENDER SERVICES								22 Fleet Tactics	TENDER SERVICES					
	ORTOLAN	UPKEEP			13 TRAIN DIVERS - RESCUE VESSEL EXERCISES SERVICES			10 UPKEEP		24 TRAIN DIVERS - RESCUE VESSEL EXERCISES SERVICES				22 UPKEEP		
	SEAGULL	UPKEEP	6 SERVICES					3 UPKEEP	17 SERVICES					15 BASE OVERHAUL	29 SER.	
	WIDGEON	TRAIN DIVERS-SERVICES	6 BASE OVERHAUL		20 TRAIN DIVERS — SERVICES				17 UPKEEP		1 TRAIN DIVERS — SERVICES				29 Base Overhaul	

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PATROL WINGS TASK FORCE THREE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

	ACTIVITY	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
PATROL WING ONE	VP-13	TEMPORARY DUTY TRANSITION TRAINING SQUADRON, PACIFIC, AT SAN DIEGO. PREFLEET TRAINING PILOTS AND FLIGHT CREWS		
	WRIGHT	ENROUTE SAN DIEGO 16 AT SAN DIEGO 20 ENROUTE HAWAII 31 (3)	2 ENR Midway 6 MIDWAY ADVANCE BASE 20 ENR Pearl (4) 25 UPKEEP	(1) 7 SERVICES UPKEEP
	HULBERT	UPKEEP (1) SERVICES (3) 28 ENR Johnston 31 JOHNSTON ADVANCED BASE	10 ENR Pearl (4) 14 UPKEEP	2 GUNNERY MGAABPR SERVICES 13 SERVICES
	BALLARD	UPKEEP Prepare F.P.T. 7 ENR Plane Guard STA. 10 P.G. Sta. RDF 12 Enr San Diego FPT 16 SERVICES SAN DIEGO 23 Enr PL. G. Sta. P. G. 27 ENR Hawaiian Area 31 HAWAIIAN AREA - TACTICS - SERVICES - CALIBRATE D. G. GEAR	17 UPKEEP - PREPARE FOR NAVY YARD OVERHAUL	1 ENROUTE N.Y. M.I. 8 NAVY YARD — MARE ISLAND
	AVOCET	UPKEEP AND SERVICES Enr PL. GD Sta. 22 Plane Guard STATION 30 ENR Pearl	3 Up keep 5 ENR PALMYRA 10 PALMYRA ADVANCE BASE 20 ENR PEARL (4) 26 UPKEEP	11 GUNNERY AABP R SERVICES
PATROL WING TWO	VP-11	1 Upkeep (5) FLIGHTS TO TRAINING CENTERS and RETURN SAN DIEGO 22 (6) 23 UPKEEP 31 Johnston Advance Base Operations	10 EXPANSION TRAINING 20 Upkeep 22 Fleet Tactics 26 Upkeep 28 Expansion Training	3 Upkeep 6 Inter Type Tactics 8 Upkeep 10 EXPANSION TRAINING 20 UPKEEP 30 Inter type Tactics
	VP-21	1 Upkeep (1) Upkeep 8 Inter Type Tactics EXPANSION TRAINING 20 Upkeep Fleet Tactics Upkeep Midway		
	VP-24 (Old VP-12)	AT SAN DIEGO - TRAINING and INDOCTRINATION 22 (6) EXPANSION TRAINING Palmyra		
	CURTISS	Upkeep Enr Plane Guard Sta. Plane Guard Sta. F. P. T. 16 ENR Pearl (1) UPKEEP (3) 28 ENR Mid-way 31 MIDWAY ADV. BASE	7 Enr Pearl 10 Interim Docking 13 SERVICES 24 UPKEEP	8 GUNNERY - SERVICES MGAABPR UPKEEP
	THORNTON	Upkeep Enr Plane Guard Sta. Plane Guard Sta. 16 ENR Pearl UPKEEP	(3) ENR John-ston 10 JOHNSTON ADVANCED BASE 20 ENR Pearl 25 (2) SERVICES	4 UPKEEP SERVICES
	MCFARLAND	UPKEEP 15 GUNNERY MGAABP R (3) 28 ENR Palmyra 31 PALMYRA ADVANCED BASE	10 ENR PEARL (4) 15 UPKEEP (3) 30 Enr John-ston	3 JOHNSTON ADVANCED BASE 13 Enr Pearl (4) 17 (1) UPKEEP
	SWAN	Gunnery DBP R 6 (1) UPKEEP 18 ENR Plane Gd Station 22 PLANE GUARD STATION 30 ENR Pearl	SERVICES 10 Interim Docking UPKEEP (3) 28 Enroute Palmyra	3 PALMYRA ADVANCED BASE ENR PEARL (4) 19 UPKEEP
	TANGIER	SCHEDULE TO BE SUBMITTED ON REPORTING		

NOTES: (1) ANNUAL MILITARY INSPECTION. (2) ANNUAL MATERIAL IN SPECTION. (3) LOAD. (4) UNLOAD. (5) FERRY TO SAN DIEGO (6) FERRY TO HAWAII

	ACTIVITY	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
PATROL WING FOUR	VP-41	GUNNERY - TACTICS - EXPANSION TRAINING VP41AMI 16 (1) 17 (3) GUNNERY — TACTICS — EXPANSION TRAINING — KODIAK	24 Advance Base Dutch Harbor 30 GUNNERY — TACTICS EXPANSION TRAINING AT KODIAK	22 LEAVE LIBERTY RECREATION
	VP-42	GUNNERY - TACTICS - EXPANSION TRAINING VP41AMI 15 (1) 16 (3) 17 GUNNERY - TACTICS - EXPANSION TRAINING SEATTLE	5 Advance Base Tongue Point 11 GUNNERY — TACTICS — EXPANSION TRAINING	
	VP-43 VP-44	TEMPORARY DUTY TRANSITION TRAINING SQUADRON, PACIFIC, AT SAN DIEGO PRE-FLEET TRAINING PILOTS AND FLIGHT CREWS		
	CASCO	IF CASCO JOINS PRIOR TO END OF QUARTER, SCHEDULE FOR REMAINING PERIOD WILL BE PREPARED		
	WILLIAMSON	SERVICES KODIAK 10 Enroute Seattle 15 Services Seattle 18 NAVY YARD — PUGET SOUND		23 LEAVE LIBERTY RECREATION
	GILLIS	SERVICES SEATTLE AMI 10 Enroute Kodiak 15 UPKEEP 31 TRAIN AND FIRE AAMGBP R SERVICES - MISCELLANEOUS	21 ENR Dutch Harbor 24 Services Dutch Harbor 29 Enr Kodiak	3 UPKEEP 16 Services LEAVE LIBERTY RECREATION
	TEAL	SERVICES 20 UPKEEP	3 Enr Tongue Point FPT 5 Services Tongue Point 10 Enr Seattle 12 TRAIN AND FIRE NBP R AND AABP R — SERVICES — MISCELLANEOUS SEATTLE	5 AMI 8 UPKEEP AT SEATTLE LEAVE LIBERTY RECREATION
	PELICAN	TEMPORARY DUTY TRANSITION TRAINING SQUADRON, PACIFIC, AT SAN DIEGO.		

NOTES: (1) Enroute Sitka. (2) Enroute Seattle. (3) Enroute Kodiak.

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ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE THREE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

CRUISERS

(CA35) INDIANAPOLIS - - - Flagship
Ship Unit - - 4VSO (Attached to VCS-4)
1 VSO - Flag Unit

CRUDIV FOUR		CRUDIV SIX	
(CA29)	CHICAGO (F)	(CA36)	MINNEAPOLIS (F)
(CA28)	LOUISVILLE	(CA34)	ASTORIA
(CA33)	PORTLAND	(CA32)	NEW ORLEANS
(CA35)	INDIANAPOLIS (FF)	(CA38)	SAN FRANCISCO
VCS-4	SCOUTING SQUADRON FOUR-16 VSO	VCS-6	SCOUTING SQUADRON SIX - 16 VSO

CARRIER AND MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY ONE

		MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY-ONE	
(CV2)	LEXINGTON	VMSB-231	(18 VSB)
1VSB	(Group Com. Plane)	VMSB-232	(18 VSB)
VB-2	(21VSB)	VMF-211	(18 VF, 2VM)
VS-2	(21VSB)	VMJ-252	(3VJ, 3VJR, 6VR)
VF-2	(18 VF, 2VM)		
VT-2	(12 VTB)		
Utility Unit (3VSO,2VJ)			

DESTROYERS

DESRON FIVE
(DD356) PORTER - Flagship

DESDIV NINE		DESDIV TEN	
DD366	DRAYTON (F)	DD376	CUSHING (F)
DD368	FLUSSER	DD378	SMITH
DD367	LAMSON (RF)	DD379	PRESTON (RF)
DD364	MAHAN	DD377	PERKINS

MINRON TWO
(DMS18) HOPKINS - Flagship

MINDIV FOUR		MINDIV FIVE		MINDIV SIX	
DMS17	PERRY (F)	DMS10	SOUTHARD (F)	DMS1	DORSEY (F)
DMS16	TREVER	DMS12	LONG	DMS4	ELLIOT
DMS15	WASMUTH	DMS9	CHANDLER	DMS2	LAMBERTON (RF)
DMS14	ZANE (RF)	DMS11	HOVEY (RF)	DMS3	BOGGS

TRANSPORTS, BASE, FORCE (When Present)

SECOND MARINE DIVISION
(Less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment)

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE THREE, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

SUBMARINES

SUBDIV TWENTY ONE	SUBDIV FORTY THREE	SUBDIV FORTY ONE (On West Coast)
(SS182) SALMON (F)	(SS170) CACHALOT	(SS123) S-18 (F)
(SS183) SEAL	(SS171) CUTTLEFISH	(SS128) S-23
(SS184) SKIPJACK	(SS179) PLUNGER (F)	(SS132) S-27
(SS188) SARGO (FF)	(SS180) POLLACK	(SS133) S-28
(SS189) SAURY	(SS181) POMPANO	(SS139) S-34
(SS190) SPEARFISH		(SS140) S-35

(DD836) LITCHFIELD	(AS14) PELIAS
(ASR3) HOLLAND	(AM30) SEAGULL
(ASR5) ORTOLAN	(ASR1) WIDGEON

PATROL WINGS

PATROL WING ONE		PATROL WING TWO	
(VP-13)	Patrol Squadron Thirteen (5PB2Y2)	(Less Patrons Assigned Task Forces ONE and TWO)	
(AV1)	WRIGHT (Flagship Comairscofor)		
(AVD6)	HULBERT (F)	(VP-11)	Patrol Squadron ELEVEN (12 PBY5)
(AVD10)	BALLARD		
(AVP4)	AVOCET	(VP-21)	Patrol Squadron TWENTY ONE (12PBY3)
		(VP-24 (OLD VP-12)	Patrol Squadron TWENTY FOUR (6 PBY5)
		(AV4)	CURTISS (F)
		(AV8)	TANGIER
		(AVD11)	THORNTON
		(AVD14)	McFARLAND
		(AVP7)	SWAN

PATROL WING FOUR

(VP41) Patrol Squadron FORTY ONE (6PBY5)
(VP42) Patrol Squadron FORTY TWO (6PBY5)
(VP43) Patrol Squadron FORTY THREE (6PBY5)
(VP44) Patrol Squadron FORTY FOUR (6PBY5)
(AVP12) CASCO (F)
(AVD2) WILLIAMSON (F)
(AVD12) GILLIS
(AVP5) TEAL
(AVP6) PELICAN

Cincpac File No.
A16 P16-3 (0300)
Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *21 February 19*

EXHIBIT NO. 113-A

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander Battle Force.
Commander Scouting Force.
Commander Base Force.
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force.
Commander Battleships, Battle Force.
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force.
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force.
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.
Subject: Battle Organization and Condition Watches.

1. The problem of battle organization and Condition of Readiness for A for all types in the fleet is an acute one, requiring immediate and realistic solu The fleet at any moment may find itself faced with actual war conditions re ing a state of alertness and readiness, at sea and in port, not experienced World War I and incompletely anticipated in the intervening years.

2. That our ships are properly organized for battle itself and personne signed to essential stations, especially in view of what has been revealed b Fleet Personnel Board, is not questioned. However, the various Conditio Readiness for Action based on these Battle Organizations need to be exan in the light of modern needs, and they are, in the opinion of the Command Chief, susceptible of great improvement.

3. It is not desired to require rigid and detailed standardization of battl condition watch bills for all types. But there is need of agreement in basi fundamental principles, so that Fleet and Task Force Commanders may what they are getting in the way of security, and in the way of rest fo crews of their ships, when they order any Condition of Readiness for Actio

4. Since under modern war conditions it is impossible to man continuous battle stations without relief, except when battle is imminent or actually jo since men without adequate rest are soon rendered unfit for battle; and however, each ship must at all times be prepared to meet a surprise attac three Conditions of Readiness for Action have been devised. One fundam consideration is stressed—these conditions were devised as much to give adequate rest as to keep all possible stations manned. If the sole require is to keep every station manned—to provide maximum security—there be only one condition, Condition One.

The object of the other conditions is to give the crews adequate rest, th bringing them fresh into battle, and at the same time to provide reaso security. If in any Condition of Readiness, security becomes no longer reaso and adequate, the next higher condition must be set. Operating, as we soon have to operate, in a large theatre of war this delicate balance bet security and rest must be carefully kept or we shall be worn out on the one or caught unaware on the other.

5. The part that sound organization plays in this is to assign all men to various stations under all three conditions, so that each man may know w he goes and when, in shifting from one of these conditions to another; to p these shifts to be made without confusion; and to insure that the maxi number of essential stations is manned in each condition. What is desir a division of labor to avoid exhaustion. If we considered Condition Wa as primarily involving men we shall get extra dividends in security by efficient use.

6. An examination of the Type reports of the Fleet Personnel Board re that the complements recommended by that board permit the setting of a dition Two Watch, except in destroyers and certain auxiliaries, meeting

maximum requirements; also that even with complements less than those recommended, but equal to those provided for in the latest Fleet Operating Plan, a fully manned A. A. battery can be provided in that Condition. This arrangement is already in effect in the heavy and light cruisers. *The Commander-in-Chief has therefore recommended a change in the War Instructions requiring all, instead of half, the A. A. battery being manned in Condition Two.*

7. *It follows that; if in Condition Two all of the A. A. battery can be manned, in Condition Three at least one half of this battery can be manned.* This should be the *minimum requirement for Condition Three. However*, the *number* of *men available in all large ships permits the manning of much more than half, and in some ships practically all, of the A. A. battery in this Condition on a basis of a watch in four.* When this can be done a measure of security is obtained approaching that of Condition Two, insofar as the A. A. battery is concerned, without the undesirable watch and watch feature of that Condition. Over long periods such an augmented Condition Three Watch may not only be desirable but essential to prevent exhaustion of our men.

8. That the above cannot be accomplished without the use of main battery personnel is obvious. To man all A.A. guns in Condition Three without calling on all personnel already available will require more than a ship can carry. Not to man these guns to the fullest extent is to fail in providing every possible defense and to neglect a reservoir of men, who in that Condition, have no other duties to perform. It is not proposed to use main battery personnel when they are needed in the main battery, nor is it intended to place too much stress on A.A. protection to the detriment of main battery fire. But, when the situation at sea permits the setting of Condition Three of the situation in port requires the manning of A.A. guns only over long periods of time, to require the A.A. battery personnel to continue a watch in two on the one hand or to man a lesser number of guns on the other (while at the same time large numbers of main battery personnel are idle) is to fail in making efficient use of the men and material available. That this question is highly controversial is recognized. But the Commander-in-Chief fails to see how we can come to any other conclusion than to make full use of our men.

9. To insure the smooth functioning of condition watches requires strict adherence, in those ships carrying sufficient personnel, to the time honored quadrilateral organization of two watches and four sections. This is essential, and in no other way can the shift from one condition to another be accomplished without confusion and without the imposition of seccessive double watches on part of the personnel. In this connection the use of the terms "Watch One" and "Watch Two", in lieu of Starboard and Port Watches, is not only confusing, since the sections are already numbered "one" to "four" inclusive, but it disguises the fact that these watches must actually be the starboard and port watches throughout the ship to make a watch in four work. This confusion already exists in some ships for sea watches; and will be further accentuated in all ships, using this system, when Base Conditions of Readiness are established in port.

10. To permit the use of the basic four section arrangement, and the employment of the main battery personnel in Condition Three, requires the longitudinal division of main battery into starboard and port watches in Condition Two. This may be accomplished by having all turrets half manned, instead of half the turrets fully manned, in Condition Two; or it may be accomplished by having half the turrets fully manned in four turret ships; or in three or five turret ships by having one or two turrets fully manned and the odd turret half manned. Turrets fully manned should have the entire turret crew in the starboard or port watch and subdivided into only two sections. Turrets half manned should have the turret crew equally divided between the starboard and port watch. Of these systems the one should be adopted which will give the maximum return considering the material installations in the individual ships and the difficulty of getting men into the turret while the turret is being fired. The past practice in heavy cruisers of manning only one turret complete in Condition Two, thereby falling far short of the requirement of having one half the battery manned, is not approved.

11. The system of half manning all the turrets in Condition Two has been in effect in some heavy cruisers and all 10,000 ton light cruisers and has proved feasible. Indications are, since many of the installations in a triple turret are in duplicate rather than triplicate that fire can be opened with all and continued with two-thirds, rather than one half, the battery until the off watch responds

to general quarters. A firing test, shortly to be conducted in Light Cruis should settle this question conclusively for that type.

12. Certain types such as destroyers and some auxiliaries, and some activit in heavy ships, such as the M. E. and Radio Divisions, do not lend themsel to a four section arrangement. They have been organized on a three secti basis, partly from long established custom and partly because enough qualif personnel cannot be carried to permit of a normal watch in four. When t latter is truely the case this situation should be recognized and accepted. Wh the A.A. battery is also the main battery, as in most destroyers, it is frequen impossible to man all this battery in Condition Two on a basis of a watch in t If all the battery is required; Condition One must be set for its efficient servi However, it appears feasible to man half the battery efficiently on a basis o watch in three. The logical solution in such cases is to make Conditions T and Three identical—a straight watch in three.

13. The Commander-in-Chief desires that for all Types:

(a) Ships be organized on a strictly quadrilateral basis of two watches a four sections (straight three section basis for such destroyers and auxiliaries cannot meet this requirement).

(b) In Condition Three one-fourth (or one-third where applicable) of ship's company, less certain men such as cooks, bakers, mess attendants, e for essential services, be placed on watch.

(c) It be determined what essential stations can be manned by full and e cient use of one-fourth (or one-third) of the ship's company and report ma to the Commander-in-Chief, so that the requirements for Condition Three c be changed in basic directives.

14. The Commander-in-Chief desires to impress upon Force and Type Co manders, in complying with paragraph 13, that the above sets forth princip which are to be followed and that departures in detail will be necessary. T end in view is a division of labor in order to avoid exhaustion.

H. E. KIMMEL

Copy to:
CinClant
CinCaf
Compatwing TWO

P. C. CROSLEY,
Flag Secretary

EXHIBIT NO. 113-B

Cincpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A3/(12)
Serial 01772
Confidential

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *October 31, 1941*

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER 14CL-41

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet
To: PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject: Task Forces—Organization and Missions
Reference:
(a) Pacific Fleet Conf. Letter No. 4CL-41.
(b) Cincpac Conf. Ltr. A4-3/FF12/(13) Serial 01254 of 13 Aug. 1941 (F nished only to Type, Force and Task Force Comdrs. and CG, Sec Marine Div.).

1. Reference (a) is cancelled and superseded by this letter, effective 15 Nov ber 1941.

2. To provide for all phases of type, inter-type, and Fleet training, concurrently with performance of certain required patrol and escort duties, the following Task Force organizations are prescribed:

Task Force One (Commander Battle Force)

Batdivs TWO, FOUR	6 BB
Cardiv ONE less LEXINGTON	1 CV
Crudiv NINE	5 CL
Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE	1 OCL, 2DL, 16 DD
OGLALA, Mindiv ONE	1 CM, 4 DM

Primary Mission:

To organize, train, and continue development of doctrine and tactics for operations of, and in the vicinity of, the Main Body; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and current plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force *in order to* provide an efficient *Covering Force* available for supporting operations of other forces; or for engagement, with or without support, in fleet action.

Task Force Two (Commander Aircraft, Battle Force)

Batdiv ONE	3 BB
Cardiv TWO	1 CV
Crudiv FIVE	4 CA
Desflot TWO	1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD
Mindiv TWO	4 DM

Primary Mission:

To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for reconnoitering and raiding, with air or surface units, enemy objectives, particularly those on land; [2] to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force *in order to* provide an efficient *Reconnoitering and Raiding Force* for testing the strength of enemy communication lines and positions and for making forays against the enemy, and for operations in conjunction with other forces.

Task Force Three (Commander Scouting Force)

Crudivs FOUR, SIX	8 CA
LEXINGTON plus Marine Air-Group 21	1 CV
Desron FIVE	1 DL, 8 DD
Minron TWO	13 DMS
Trainron FOUR	6 AP
2nd Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment	

Primary Mission:

To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for capturing enemy land objectives, particularly fortified atolls; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force *in order to* provide an efficient *Amphibious Force* for attack, with or without support of other forces, on outlying positions of the enemy.

Task Force Four (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District)

That part of Fourteenth Naval District Activities which involve the Island Bases.

Primary Mission:

To organize, train, and develop the Island Bases *in order to* insure their own defense and provide efficient services to Fleet units engaged in advanced operations.

Task Force Seven (Commander Submarines, Scouting Force)

Subron FOUR less Subdiv FORTY-ONE	1 SM, 8 SS, 1 AM, 1 ASR, 1
Subron SIX	12 SS, 1 AS
Subron EIGHT*	6 SS, 1 AS
Subron TEN*	4 SS, 1 AS

*Upon reporting.

Primary Missions:

(1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expan program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics *in order to* provid efficient *Submarine Observation and Attack Force* for independent operat or operations coordinated with other forces.

[5] (2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the C mander-in-Chief, United States Fleet *in order to* improve security of Fleet u and bases.

Task Force Nine (Commander Patrol Wing Two)

Patwing ONE	36 VPB (A), 1 AV, 2 AVD, 1
Patwing TWO	42 VPB (A), 2 AV, 2 AVD, 1

Primary Missions:

(1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion gram, to continue development of doctrine and tactics *in order to* provide an cient long range *Air Scouting and Air Striking Force* for independent operat or operations coordinated with other forces.

(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commande Chief, United States Pacific Fleet *in order to* improve security of Fleet units bases.

Task Force Fifteen (Commander Base Force)

Units assigned ---------- 4 CA or

Primary Mission:

To escort trans-pacific shipping *in order to* protect trans-pacific shipping aga possible attack.

3. Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO, and THREE, established by order, will perform the duties incident to the organization, training and op tions of their respective Task Forces. In addition, they will control the all tion of time for Task Force and Type exercises, in the at sea exercise period the employment schedules of their respective Task Forces. The relation of Type Commanders to the Task Force Commanders, in matters relating to above will be the same as now exist between Type Commanders and F Commanders.

4. Commander Task Force FOUR, established by this order, will perform duties incident to organization, training, and development of the Island Base

5. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE, established by this or will perform the duties incident to organization, training, expansion and op tions of their respective Task Forces. They will issue orders for and super the conduct of prescribed patrols. In addition, they will control the alloca of time within their respective Task Forces to operations (including type inter-type training) and upkeep, with due regard to sufficiency of upkeep maintaining material conditions of readiness for war service.

6. Commander Task Force FIFTEEN, established by this order, will perf the duties incident to organization and operations of his Task Force. For present, cruisers will be assigned to this Task Force in rotation and in the pro tion of one each from Cruiser Divisions FOUR, FIVE, SIX and NINE, ins as overhaul schedules and other circumstances permit. Trans-pacific westbo convoys will be formed on the West Coast by the Commandant Twelfth Na District or in the Hawaiian Area by the Commandant Fourteenth Naval Distr depending on circumstances. Eastbound convoys will be formed in the Ma Area by the Commandant Sixteenth [4] Naval District. Command Fourteenth Naval District will provide liaison between the three District C

mandants and Commander Task Force FIFTEEN, furnishing information as to makeup, schedules, and routing of convoys. Commander Task Force FIFTEEN will issue the orders for and supervise the conduct of escort duties. Cruisers assigned to the Escort Force but not actually engaged in escort duty will be available to their respective Type Commanders for routine training and upkeep.

7. Force and Type Commanders will continue to exercise other functions as now assigned, and as required by U. S. Navy Regulations and basic instructions.

8. Unless already covered by appropriate publications, Task Force Doctrines and Current Tactical Orders for Task Forces shall be prepared and issued in tentative form. As soon as they have been sufficiently tested they shall be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for final approval.

9. Units of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, not specifically detailed to the Task Forces appearing herein, will remain under the Force Commanders as at present.

10. *Communications.* Effective with the organization set forth in this letter:

(a) Units in Task Organizations, while at sea or away from Pearl Harbor, shall use the effective Task Force frequency plans, except,

(1) Island Base shore radio stations guard 4285 series.

(2) Units of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE ordered to patrol in vicinity of Island Bases guard 4265 series.

(3) In Task Forces FOUR, SEVEN, and NINE, certain *Task Group* designations are assigned additional geographical area significance, as follows:

1. Midway
2. Wake
3. Johnston
4. Palmyra

in order that other components of the Fleet and Fourteenth Naval District forces may know automatically how to communicate with the forces present in those areas.

Example:

Task Group 4.1—District Activities at Midway.
7.1—Submarine Patrol at Midway.
9.1—Patrol Planes operating from Midway.

(b) Units of each task organization, when in port, will guard and use harbor circuit (2562 kcs. currently in use in Pearl Harbor) and such other circuits as may be prescribed. Senior Officer Present Afloat will also guard the harbor circuit, and establish communication, preferably by visual or landline, with the nearest shore command activity.

11. *Schedules.* Current employment schedules for Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE, and units not assigned to Task Forces, remain in effect except for units transferred to Task Forces SEVEN and NINE by this letter. Assignments to Task Force FIFTEEN will be indicated in the Task Force ONE, TWO and THREE schedules. Commanders Task Force SEVEN and NINE submit revised schedules for the period 15 November to 31 December 1941, at the earliest practicable date. For the present, required inter-type training of submarines and patrol planes with surface types will be limited to the Fleet Tactical periods listed in reference (b). Commanders Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will, if practicable, have at least two divisions of [5] submarines and two squadrons of patrol planes available for each of these Fleet Tactical periods. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will include in their schedules joint arrangements for exercises between patrol planes and submarines in recognition signals, visual and radio communications, and coordinated tactics. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will also arrange for inter-type training in addition to that required during Fleet Tactical periods by mutual agreement with Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO, and THREE during the regular at sea operating period of the surface Task Forces.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution: (5CM–41)
List II, Case 1: A, X, EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC, ND11–12–13–14, NY8–10, (A1–Asiatic, A1–Atlantic).

P. C. CROSLEY,
Flag Secretary.

EXHIBIT NO. 113C

I. Revised Employment Schedule of Task Force Nine, for Remainder of 2nd Quarter of Fiscal Year 1942.

II. Watch and Duty Schedules for December, 1941 for Patrol Wing Two.

Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force Nine, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, together with documents - which approve same.

NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERV
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

OUTGOING

Date 22 NOVEMBER 1941.

From CINCPAC PAC

Info to:

COMPATWING 2

Classification	Originator	C
PLAIN	12	
Precedence	Release	
ROUTINE	#1	
System	Show to	
LL	13 95	

HEADING

Z F5L 22#13# M9U GR3

URSER #78# AFFIRMATIVE

REF :- CLASSIFIED.

SENT AT #131/TT

CONFIDENTIAL

Taken up by PWW Date 19 Nov 1941 CINCUS Routing No. 1[illegible]4

Office of Origin PW2 (ComTaskFor 9) Date 19 Nov 1941

File No. PW2/A4-3/(0780)

Cross File No. [redacted]

CINCUS FILE NO. A4-3/FF12-7

No. copies received Orig & 3 List of Enclosures received A-2

Subject: Revised Schedule for remainder of second quarter fiscal year, 1942.

Routing No.	Title	Order	Act. Sym.	Date Rec.	Initial
00	Admiral				
01	Chief of Staff		○		
05	Flag Secretary				
11	Op. Officer	5	A	24 NOV	
15	Flag Lieut.				
16	War Plans	4	R	24 NOV	
20	Comm. Officer				
30	Asst. Comm. Off.				
35	Security Off.				
38	Radio Officer				
50	Intell. Off.				
60	Maint. Off.	3	R	24 NOV	
70	Medical Off.				
80	Gunnery Off.	2	R	24 NOV	
85	Aviation Off.	1	R	1119	
90	Aerologist				
	Out. Mail Yeo.				
	File Yeoman				

SYMBOLS
A — Action
I — Information
C — Copy distributed
R — Recommendation

FILE TRACER

REMARKS

Copy sent to [illegible]

Office sent by messenger

action taken file

MEMORANDUM

From: 12/3.

To : 11

Note

1) Tangier sailing
indefinite –
depends on
Gov decision
to reinforce.
2) [illegible] 21
relieves 22 at
Midway 5/6 Dec

A4-3/FF12-9
A4-3/V2
FW2/A4-3/ 0780

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

CONFIDENTIAL 19 NOV 1941

From: The Commander Task Force NINE.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Revised Schedule for Remainder of Second Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.

Enclosure: (A) Two copies of proposed revised schedule.

1. Changed conditions have necessitated a revision of the schedule for units of Task Force NINE for the remainder of the second quarter.

2. Approval of enclosure (A) is requested.

P. N. L. BELLINGER.


CONFIDENTIAL
OPERATING SCHEDULE
FORCE NINE
SERIAL No.
DATE NOV. 1941
2 ND QUARTER FISCAL YEAR
MONTH
DAY
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
GENERAL DIRECTIVE
EXPANSION TRAINING, TACTICS, PATROLS, INDOCTRINATION, ADVANCED BASE OPERATIONS.
PATROL WING ONE
VP 11
EXPANSION TRAINING
VP 12
EXPANSION TRAINING
FLEET TACTICS
EXPANSION TRAINING
VP 14
RE-EQUIPMENT SAN DIEGO
EXPANSION TRAINING
WING TACTICS
EXPANSION TRAINING
AND PATROL PLANE-SUBMARINE INTER-TYPE TACTICS
WING TACTICS
FLEET TACTICS OR WING TACTICS
EXPANSION
TRAINING
PATROL WING TWO
VP 21
EXPANSION TRAINING
VP 22
ADVANCED BASE OPERATIONS
TASK GROUP 9.1
VP 23
RE-EQUIPMENT SAN DIEGO
EXPANSION TRAINING
VP 24
ADVANCED BASE OPERATIONS
EXPANSION TRAINING
ADVANCE BASE OPERATIONS
TASK GROUP 9.1
NOTE EXPANSION TRAINING WILL BE CONDUCTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER MISSIONS WHENEVER PRACTICABLE
EXPANSION TRAINING INCLUDES TYPE TACTICS, GUNNERY, COMMUNICATIONS, ADVANCED FLIGHT INSTRUCTIONS, PILOT QUALIFICATIONS, FLIGHT CREW INDOCTRINATION, RECOGNITION FOREIGN SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT, ETC.



CONFIDENTIAL [illegible] 2 ND [illegible] FISCAL YEAR DATE [illegible] NOV 1941

NOVEMBER 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 DECEMBER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

GENERAL DIRECTIVE: EXPANSION TRAINING, GUNNERY, ADVANCED BASE OPERATIONS, TACTICS, UPKEEP.

CURTISS	UPKEEP | SERVICES (WING TACTICS) (WING TACTICS) | INTERM DOCKING | UPKEEP
TANGIER	UPKEEP | FLEET TACTICS | UPKEEP | SERVICES | ENROUTE | TASK GROUP 9.2 | ENROUTE | TASK GROUP 9.1 | ENROUTE PEARL
WRIGHT	UP-KEEP | ENROUTE | TASK GROUP 9.2 | ENROUTE | TASK GROUP 9.1 | ENROUTE PEARL | UPKEEP | SERVICES
MCFARLAND	SERVICES | [illegible] | UPKEEP | SERVICES (WING TACTICS) (WING TACTICS) | UPKEEP
THORNTON	[illegible] | PLANE GUARD | SERVICES (WING TACTICS) | UPKEEP | SERVICES
HULBERT	[illegible] | UPKEEP | SERVICES | [illegible] | UPKEEP | SERVICES
SWAN	PLANE GUARD | UPKEEP | INTERM DOCKING | UPKEEP | SERVICES (WING TACTICS)
AVOCET	UPKEEP (SUBMARINE BASE) | SERVICES (WING TACTICS) (WING TACTICS) | UPKEEP

NOTE:
1 SERVICES INCLUDES SHIP GUNNERY.
2 TANGIER DATES FOR DUTY WITH TASK GROUPS 9.2 AND 9.1 INDEFINITE.

Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing Two.

December 1941

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P12/A4-4/.
(3298)

25 NOV 1941

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
To : The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO.
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-THREE.
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-FOUR.
The Commander Patrol Squadron ELEVEN.
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWELVE.
The Commander Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN.

Subject: Watch and Duty Schedule for December 1, 1941, to January 1, 1942.

Enclosure: (A) Watch and Duty Schedule.

1. Enclosure (A) will be followed as the Watch and Duty Schedule for the period December 1, 1941, to January 1, 1942.

L. C. DAMSEY,
By direction.

Copy to:
Compatwing ONE.
Compatron 21.

ENCLOSURE "A"

	M 1	T 2	W 3	T 4	F 5	S 6	S 7	M 8	T 9	W 10	T 11	F 12	S 13	S 14	M 15	T 16	W 17	T 18	F 19	S 20	S 21
								SST													
PaTRON 22(1)	W	W	W	W	W	S	S	P	W	W	W	W	P	DP	T	T	T	P	T	S	S
									SST												
PaTRON 22(2)	W	W	W	W	W	S	S	W	P	DP	W	W	S	P	T	T	T	T	P	DP	S
		WT			WT					SST											
PaTRON 23(1)	DP	P	WT	WT	P	DP	S	W	W	P	W	W	S	S	P	DP	T	T	T	P	S
						SST					SST										
PaTRON 23(2)	BLD	WT	P	DP	WT	P	S	W	W	W	P	DP	S	S	T	P	T	T	T	T	P
	BLD						SST														
PaTRON 24	P	DP	WT	P	WT	S	P	DP	W	W	W	P	S	S	T	T	P	DP	T	T	S
	BLD						SST			SST											
PaTRON 11	K	WT	WT	K	DP	S	K	W	W	K	DP	W	K	S	T	K	DP	T	K	T	S
		WT			WT			SST			SST										
PaTRON 12	BLD	K	DP	WT	K	S	S	K	DP	W	K	W	S	K	DP	T	K	T	T	K	DP
						SST			SST												
PaTRON 14	BLD	WT	K	WT	WT	K	DP	W	K	W	W	K	DP	S	K	T	T	K	DP	T	K

	M 22	T 23	W 24	T 25	F 26	S 27	S 28	M 29	T 30	W 31	Jan 1
PaTRON 22(1)	W	P	DP	S	W	S	P	W	W	W	S
PaTRON 22(2)	W	W	P	S	W	S	S	P	DP	W	S
PaTRON 23(1)	W	W	W	P	DP	S	S	W	P	W	S
PaTRON 23(2)	DP	W	W	S	P	S	S	W	W	P	DP
PaTRON 24	P	W	W	S	W	P	DP	W	W	W	P
PaTRON 11	K	DP	W	S	W	S	K	DP	W	S	S
PaTRON 12	W	K	W	S	K	DP	S	K	W	W	K

T - Fleet or Wing tactics.
BLD - Bomb loading drill.
P - Pearl Harbor ready duty division.
K - Kaneohe ready duty division (other division of squadron secured).
DP - Dawn Patrol; division making dawn patrol secures upon completion, other division normal duty 0700 - 1300 except Saturday and Sunday.
S - Secured.
SST - Tactics with submarines.
WT - Wing Tactics.
W - Regular Working Hours.

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

A8-3(4)/
(3236)

RESTRICTED

November 25, 1941.

OPERATION SCHEDULE NO. 45-41 (Week of Nov. 25 - Dec. 2, 1941)

	25	27	28	29	30	Dec. 1	2
	MON	THURS	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUES
CURTISS	S-1	S-1	S-1	S-1	S-1	T1	T1
TANGIER	U1	U1	U1	U1	U1	U1	U1
WRIGHT	AB2	AB2	AB2	AB2	AB2	AB2	AB2
MCFARLAND	U1	U1	U1	U1	U1	S-1	S-1
HULBERT	S-1	S-1	S-1	S-1	S-1	S-1	S-1
SMAU	PG	PG	S-1	S-1	S-1	S-1	S-1
AVOCET	S-1	S-1 RD	S-1 DP	S-1	S-1	S-1	S-1
PATROL 11	G4 V8 RD	G4 V8 DP	G4 V8	S-1	S-1	P1 V8	P1 V8
PATROL 12	G2 P1 L2	G2 L1	G2 L1	U1	S-1	P1 V7	P1 V7
PATROL 14	U1 DP G2 P1	G2 P1	U1 RD G2 P1	RD	DP	P1 G2 P1	P1 G2 P1
PATROL 21	V4 VC9	L2 VC9	L2 VC9	DP	S-1	L1 VC9	L1 VC9
PATROL 22	AB2	AB2	AB2	AB2	AB2	AB2	AB2
PATROL 23	P1 G3	P1 G3	P1	S-1	RD	P1 G3	P1 G3
PATROL 24	P1 VC9	VC10	G1 V4	P1	S-1	V4	V4

P1 Familiarization.
P1 Proc or Fixed Machine Guns.
AB2 Advance Base Operations.
G2 High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.
G1 Master Horizontal Bombers, Qualification Practice.
G3 Anti-Submarine Bombing.
G4 Bombing Maneuvering Target.
PG Plane Guard.
P1 Inspection.
RD Ready Duty.
S-1 Holiday Routine.
SPH Services Pearl Harbor.
T1 Tactics.
U1 Upkeep.
V1 Night Flying.
DP Dawn Patrol.

REAR LUTY T / DER

HULBERT

L. C. RAMEY,
Commander, U.S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

DISTRIBUTION

Squadrons (each)	10
Tenders (each)	10
NAS PH T1	20
NAS Kaneohe Bay	20
NAS Maui	20
FAD OOD	3
Patwing TWO Photo. Unit	2

41

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

PW2/A4-3/VZ/
(3287)
CONFIDENTIAL

November 25, 1941.

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT NIGHT FLYING SCHEDULE (Week Nov. 26--Dec. 2,

Wednesday, Nov. 26 — Patron 24 landings and air tactics. For tact operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet.
VJ-1 (3 landplanes) practice landings 1800-190
2 (JRS planes) will operate without lights in areas C-7 and C-11 altitude 10,000 feet towlin 7000 feet.
Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 lan ings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and V31 above 2000 feet.

Thursday, Nov. 27 — Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 lan ings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and V31 above 2000 feet.
VO-2 and VO-4 (9 planes) will return to Pearl Harbor from operating areas at sea.

Friday, Nov. 28 — Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 lan ings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and V31 above 2000 feet.
2 VO-V8 planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230.

Saturday, Nov. 29 — VJ-1 (1 PBY) takeoff 1800. Will operate with- out lights in areas C8, C9, C10 altitude 10,00 feet towline 7000 feet.

Sunday, Nov. 30 — NONE.

Monday, Dec. 1 — VCS-7 (8 planes) landings and air tactics. tactics operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet.
2 VO-V8 planes exercise AA-4 2130 - 2230.
Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 lan ings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and V31 above 2000 feet.

Tuesday, Dec. 2 — Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 lan ings and air tactics. Navigation flights to Maui and return. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and V31 above 2000 feet.

Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).

y r

L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

PW2/A4-3(2)/ Wm

RESTRICTED

AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL AREA ASSIGNMENT DISTRIBUTION:

CinCPac	6
Comairbatfor	3
Comscofor	4
Combatships	4
Combatdiv ONE	3
Combatdiv FOUR	4
Comcrubatfor	4
Comcruscofor	3
Comcrudiv THREE	X5
Comcrudiv FOUR	4
Comcrudiv FIVE	4
Comcrudiv SIX	4
Comcrudiv NINE	4
PatWing ONE Units (each)	6
PatWing TWO Units (each)	6
Lexington Air Group	11
Enterprise Air Group	11
Saratoga Air Group	X11
Marine Air Group 21	20
C.O., U.S.S. LEXINGTON	10
C.O., U.S.S. ENTERPRISE	10
C.O., U.S.S. SARATOGA	X10
C.O., N.A.S., Pearl Harbor	20
C.O., N.A.S., Kaneohe Bay	20
Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp. Unit	9
C.O., 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field	22
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field	22
Commander Hawaiian Air Force	4
Combatfor	4
Comsubscofor	4
Comdt. 14 N.D.	4
Combasefor	2
Cominbatfor	4
Comutwing, Basefor	4
Squadron FOUR	4
CO, KSC, 3, Fort DeRussy	4
Comdesbatfor	4
C.O., Harbor Defense, Pearl Harbor	4
C.O., Harbor Defense, Fort Ruger	4
C.O., U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA	4
[illegible]	4

13

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

PW2/A4-3/FZ

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVAL AIR DETACHMENT NIGHT FLYING SCHEDULE DISTRIBUTION:

~~CinCPac~~	1
~~ComAirBatFor~~	1
~~ComScoFor~~	1
~~ComBatDivs~~	1
~~ComBatDiv ONE~~	1
~~ComBatDiv FOUR~~	1
~~ComScrubatFor~~	1
~~ComAirScoFor~~	1
~~ComScrDiv THREE~~	1
~~ComScrDiv FOUR~~	1
~~ComScrDiv FIVE~~	1
~~ComScrDiv SIX~~	1
~~ComScrDiv NINE~~	1
ComPatWing ONE	5
~~Patrol Wing ONE~~ (All units - each)	1
Patrol Wing TWO (All units - each)	1
~~Lexington Air Group~~	1
~~Enterprise Air Group~~	1
~~Saratoga Air Group~~	1
~~Marine Air Group 21~~	1
~~C.O., USS LEXINGTON~~	1
~~C.O., USS ENTERPRISE~~	1
~~C.O., USS SARATOGA~~	1
~~C.O., NAS Pearl Harbor~~	1
~~C.O., NAS Kaneohe Bay~~	1
~~Kingfisher-Marine Av. Pp. Unit~~	1
~~CO, 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field~~	1
~~Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field.~~	1
~~CO, Hawaiian Air Force.~~	1
~~ComBatFor~~	1
~~PAT COD FH TH~~	1
~~VP-1~~	1
~~VP-2~~	1

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P2/A4-3/VC/ (3231) Un

RESTRICTED November 18, 1941.

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT NIGHT FLYING SCHEDULE (Week of Nov. 19 - 25, 1941)

Wednesday, Nov. 19 #Patron 21 night bombing 2030-2200 area V82. Carrier Air Groups landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V1, V2, V3, V4, V31 above 2000 feet.

Thursday, Nov. 20 NONE.

Friday, Nov. 21 Carrier Air Groups landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V1, V2, V3, V4, V31 above 2000 feet.
2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230.

Saturday, Nov. 22 NONE.

Sunday, Nov. 23 NONE.

Monday, Nov. 24 Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V1, V2, V3, V4, and V31 above 2000 feet.
2 VO-V3 planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230.

Tuesday, Nov. 25 Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. Navigation flights to Lanai and return. For tactics operate in areas V1, V2, V3, V4, and V31 above 2000 feet.

#Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).

NOTE: Drydock channel will be closed to seaplane traffic during this period except on permission of the Tower Duty Officer.

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P22/A4-3(4)/
(3230)

Wn

RESTRICTED

November 18, 1941.

OPERATION SCHEDULE NO. 44-41 (Week of November 19 - 25, 1941)

	19 WED	20 THURS	21 FRI	22 SAT	23 SUN	24 MON	25 TUES
CURTISS	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	SPH	SPH
TANGIER	UK	UK	UK	T1	T1	T1	T1
WRIGHT	ABK	ABK	ABK	ABK	ABK	ABK	ABK
McFARLAND	SPH	SPH	SPH	UK	UK	UK	UK
THORNTON	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG
HULBERT	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
SWAN	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG
AVOCET	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
PATRON 11	DP	SBW	RD F1	DP	SBW	RD G4, V4	DP G4, V4
PATRON 12	RD F1 V5 V6	DP F1 V5 V6	F1	UK	T1	T1	T1
PATRON 14	ABK G2 F1 Y1	RD G2 F1	DP G 2 F1	ABK	ABK RD G2 F1	UK DP G2 F1	UK RD G2
PATRON 21	L1 VC10	L1 VC10	L1 VC10	SBW	L1 V4	L1 VC10	L1 VC
PATRON 22	ABK	ABK	ABK	ABK	ABK	ABK	ABK
PATRON 23	ABK	ABK	ABK	ABK	ABK	UK	UK
PATRON 24	F1	SBW	F1	RD	DP	F1	F1

F1 Familiarization.
F1 Free or Fixed Machine Guns.
ABK Advance Base Operations.
G2 High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.
G4 Bombing Maneuvering Target.
PG Plane Guard.
F1 Inspection.
RD Ready Duty.
SBW Holiday Routine.
SPH Services Pearl Harbor.
T1 Tactics.
UK Upkeep.
Y1 Night Flying.
DP Dawn Patrol.

Z 2

L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

DISTRIBUTION
Squadrons (each) 10
Tenders (each) 10
NAS PH TH 20
NAS Kaneohe Bay 20
NAS Maui 20
PAD OOD Pearl Harbor 1

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

F12/A4-3(2)/ (3229) Wn

RESTRICTED

November 18, 1941.

AIRCRAFT GUNNERY AREA ASSIGNMENT (Week of November 19 - 25, 1941).

PATROL WING TWO	VP4, VC10, L1, L2.
Carrier Air Groups Marine Air Group 21	VF1, VF2, VF3, VS1, L3. Illio Point target, Kahuku Point Target (except 25 & 26 Nov.)
VO Wing	VP7, VP8.
CA Wing	VU3.
CL Wing	VA9, VC9.
VCS-5	Kahuku Point Target 25 and 26 November.

L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

FW2/A4-3(2)/

RESTRICTED

AIRCRAFT OCCUPY AREA ASSIGNMENT DISTRIBUTION:

CinCPac	5
Comairbatfor	5
Comscofor	5
Combatships	5
Combatdiv ONE	5
Combatdiv FOUR	5
Comcrubatfor	5
Comcruscofor	5
Comcrudiv THREE	5
Comcrudiv FOUR	5
Comcrudiv FIVE	5
Comcrudiv SIX	5
Comcrudiv NINE	5
PatWing ONE Units (each)	5
PatWing TWO Units (each)	5
Lexington Air Group	11
Enterprise Air Group	11
Saratoga Air Group	11
Marine Air Group 21	20
C.O., U.S.S. LEXINGTON	10
C.O., U.S.S. ENTERPRISE	10
C.O., U.S.S. SARATOGA	10
C.O., N.A.S., Pearl Harbor	20
C.O., N.A.S., Kaneohe Bay	20
Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp. Unit	5
C.O., 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field	27
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field	27
Commander Hawaiian Air Force	5
Combatfor	4
Comsubscofor	4
Comdt. 14 N.D.	8
Combasefor	2
Cominbatfor	2
Comutwing, Basefor	5
Subron FOUR	5
CG; KSC, 3, Fort DeRussy	5
Comdesbatfor	5
C.O., Harbor Defense, Pearl Harbor	2
C.O., Harbor Defense, Fort Ruger	2
C.O., U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA	5
PAD OOD PH TH	3

PATROL WING TWO
PW2/A4-3/VZ U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION Wa
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

RESTRICTED

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT NIGHT FLYING SCHEDULE DISTRIBUTION:

CinCPac	5
Comairbatfor	5
Comscofor	5
Combatships	5
Combatdiv ONE	5
Combatdiv FOUR	5
Comcrubatfor	5
Comcruscofor	5
Comcrudiv THREE	5
Comcrudiv FOUR	5
Comcrudiv FIVE	5
Comcrudiv SIX	5
Comcrudiv NINE	5
Compatwing ONE	5
Patrol Wing ONE (All units - each)	5
Patrol Wing TWO (All units - each)	5
Lexington Air Group	2
Enterprise Air Group	2
Saratoga Air Group	2
Marine Air Group 21	4
C.O., USS LEXINGTON	2
C.O., USS ENTERPRISE	2
C.O., USS SARATOGA	2
C.O., NAS Pearl Harbor	6
C.O., NAS Kaneohe Bay	6
Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp. Unit	4
CG, 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field	27
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field.	27
CG, Hawaiian Air Force.	5
Combatfor	3
F.D COD PH TH	3
VJ-1	5
VJ-2	5

PW2/AA-3(4),
(3176)

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

RESTRICTED

November 11, 1941.

OPERATION SCHEDULE NO. 43-41 (Week of November 12 - 18, 1941)

	WED 12	THURS 13	FRI 14	SAT 15	SUN 16	MON 17	TUE 18
CURTISS	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
TANGIER	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
WRIGHT	UK	UK	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
McFARLAND	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
THORNTON	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
HULBERT	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
SWAN	SPH	SPH	SPH	UK	UK	UK	UK
AVOCET	UK	UK DP G2	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
PATRON 11	RD V1	L1	G2 L1	RD	DP	Z1	G2 L1
PATRON 12	Z1	RD	DP	UK	RD	Z1	Z1
PATRON 14	ABE DP G1	ABE V1 V1	ABE RD V1	ABE	ABE	ABE G1	ABE
PATRON 21	L1 L2	VC10	VC10	DP	SHM	L1 L2	G2 L2
PATRON 22	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
PATRON 23	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
PATRON 24	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	SHM	UK	UK

V1 Free or Fixed Machine Guns.
Z1 Familiarization.
ABE Advance Base Operations.
G1 Master Horizontal Bombers, Qualification Practice.
G2 High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.
RD Ready Duty.
SHM Holiday Routine.
SPH Services Pearl Harbor.
UK Upkeep.
V1 Night Flying.
DP Dawn Patrol.

READY DUTY TENDER

THORNTON

L. C. [illegible],
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

DISTRIBUTION:

Squadrons (each)	10
Tenders (each)	10
NAS PH TH	20
NAS Kaneohe Bay	20
NAS Maui	20
FAD OOD	3

V1

PATROL WING TWO
U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T.H.

FW2/A4-3(2)
(3178)

RESTRICTED

November 11, 1941.

ALERT FOR ENEMY AIR ASSISTANT (Week of November 12-18, 1941).

Patrol Wing Two	V4, VC10, L1, L2.
Carrier Air Groups Marine Air Group 21	V6, V8, V9, V10, VS1, L3, L5, L6, Kahuku Point and Fillio Point targets.
VO Wing	V1, V2, V3.
VP Wing	A7, A8, A11.
VL Wing	VU3, VA3.

L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

PATROL WING TWO
P-2/A4-3/VZ/(3174) U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

RESTRICTED November 10, 1941.

FLEET AIR DEFENSE FIGHT FLYING SCHEDULE (Week of Nov. 12 - 18, 19

Wednesday, Nov. 12	Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, V31 above 2000 feet. Patron ELEVEN (Kaneohe) night bombing 1830-2000 in area VS2.
Thursday, Nov. 13	#Patron TWENTY-ONE night bombing 1830-2000. Area VS2. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, V31 above 2000 feet.
Friday, Nov. 14	VJ-2 (6 landplanes) practice landings 1830-2100. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4.
Saturday, Nov. 15	NONE.
Sunday, Nov. 16	NONE.
Monday, Nov. 17	#VCS-9 (10 planes) landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, V31 above 2000 feet.
Tuesday, Nov. 18	Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, V31 above 2000 feet.

#Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).

NOTE: Drydock channel will be closed to seaplane traffic during this period except on permission of the Tower Duty Officer.

V 3

L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

PATROL WING TWO
FW2/A4-3/VZ/ U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION Wa
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

RESTRICTED

FLEET AIR DEVELOPMENT NIGHT FLYING SCHEDULE DISTRIBUTION

CinCPac	5
Comairbatfor	5
Comscofor	5
Combatships	5
Combatdiv ONE	5
Combatdiv FOUR	5
Comcrubatfor	5
Comcruscofor	5
Comcrudiv THREE	5
Comcrudiv FOUR	5
Comcrudiv FIVE	5
Comcrudiv SIX	5
Comcrudiv NINE	5
Compatwing ONE	5
Patrol Wing ONE (all units - each)	5
Patrol Wing TWO (all units - each)	5
Lexington Air Group	2
Enterprise Air Group	2
Saratoga Air Group	2
Marine Air Group 21	4
C.O., U.S.S. LEXINGTON	2
C.O., U.S.S. ENTERPRISE	2
C.O., U.S.S. SARATOGA	2
C.O., N.A.S., Pearl Harbor	6
C.O., N.A.S., Kaneohe Bay	6
Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp. Unit	4
C.G., 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field	27
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field	27
C.G., Hawaiian Air Force	5
Combatfor	3
F.A.D., C.O.D., N.H., T.H.	3

PATROL WING TWO
FW2/A4-3(2)/ U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

RESTRICTED

AIRCRAFT CURRENCY AREA ASSIGNMENT DISTRIBUTION:

CinCPac
Comairbatfor
Comaircofor
Combatships
Combatdiv ONE
Combatdiv FOUR
Comcrubatfor
Comcruscofor
Comcrudiv THREE
Comcrudiv FOUR
Comcrudiv FIVE
Comcrudiv SIX
Comcrudiv NINE
PatWing ONE Units (each)
PatWing TWO Units (each)
Lexington Air Group
Enterprise Air Group
Saratoga Air Group
Marine Air Group 21
C.O., U.S.S. LEXINGTON
C.O., U.S.S. ENTERPRISE
C.O., U.S.S. SARATOGA
C.O., N.A.S., Pearl Harbor
C.O., N.A.S., Kaneohe Bay
Kingfisher-Kedusa Av. Rp. Unit
C.O., 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field
Commander Hawaiian Air Force
Combatfor
Comsubscofor
Comdt. 14 N.D.
Combasefor
Comsubfor
Comdtwing, Basefor
Subron FOUR
CO, KSC, 3, Fort DeRussy
Comdesbatfor
C.O., Harbor Defense, Pearl Harbor
C.O., Harbor Defense, Fort Ruger
C.O., U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA
FAD OOD PH TH

V5

PATROL WING TWO
FW2/A4-3(4)/ U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
(3110) Pearl Harbor, T. H.

RESTRICTED November 4, 1941.

OPERATION SCHEDULE NO. 42-41 (Week of November 5 - 11, 1941)

	5 WED	6 THURS	7 FRI	8 SAT	9 SUN	10 MON	11 TUES
CURTISS	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	SPE	SPE
TANGIER	SPE	SPE	SPE	SPE	SPE	SPE	SPE
WRIGHT	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
McFARLAND	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
THORNTON	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG
HULBERT	SPE	SPE	SPE	SPE	SPE	ABE	ABE
SWAN	SPE	SPE	SPE	SPE	SPE	SPE	SPE
AVOCET	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG
PATROL 11	RD G3 Y1 V4	DP G3 Y1 V4	G3 V4	RD UK	DP	RD G2 L2	DP G2 L2
PATROL 14	UK	UK	UK	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
PATROL 21	F1 VC10	F1 VC10	RD F1 VC10	DP	RD	DP G1 L1	RD G2 G3 L1 VC10
PATROL 22	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
PATROL 23	UK	UK	UK	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
PATROL 24	DP	RD	DP	UK	SUN	ABE	ABE

E1 Familiarization.
F1 Prac or Fixed Machine Guns.
ABE Advance Base Operations.
G1 Master Horizontal Bombers, Qualification Practice.
G2 High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.
G3 Anti-Submarine Bombing.
PG Plane Guard.
RD Ready Duty.
SUN Holiday Routine.
SPE Services Pearl Harbor.
UK Upkeep.
Y1 Night Flying.
DP Dawn Patrol.

U1

READY DUTY TENDER

HULBERT 5 - 8 Nov.
SWAN 9 -11 Nov.

L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

DISTRIBUTION

Squadrons (each)	10
Tenders (each)	10
NAS Pearl Harbor	20
NAS Kaneohe Bay	20
NAS Maui	20
FAD OOD	3

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P2W2/A4-3/VZ
(3109)

RESTRICTED

November 4, 1941.

FLIGHT ALL DETACHMENT WING T FLYING SCHEDULE (Week November 5 - 11

Wednesday, Nov. 5	*Patron 11 landings (Kaneohe) and air tactics For tactics operate in area V4 above 2000 fe Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 la ings and air tactics. For tactics operate i areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.
Thursday, Nov. 6	*Patron 11 landings (Kaneohe) and air tactics For tactics operate in area V4 above 2000 fe Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operat areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.
Friday, Nov. 7	*VO-1 (9 planes) landings and air tactics. tactics operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet. VO-2 and VO-4 (12 planes total) will return Pearl Harbor from operations about 2130. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 la ings and air tactics. For tactics operate i areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.
Saturday, Nov. 8	NONE.
Sunday, Nov. 9	NONE.
Monday, Nov. 10	Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 la ings and air tactics. For tactics operate i areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise A/S.
Tuesday, Nov. 11	Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 la ings and air tactics. For tactics operate i areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.

*Units so designated furnish night flying details as requir by Section VI of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).

NOTE: Drydock channel will be closed to seaplane traffic during this period except on permission of the Tower Duty Officer.

U 2

L. C. RUMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Na
Operations Officer
Patrol Wing TWO.

PATROL WING TWO
PW2/A4-3(2) U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION Wa
(3108) Pearl Harbor, T. H.

RESTRICTED November 4, 1941.

AIRCRAFT GUNNERY AREA ASSIGNMENT (Week of November 5 - 11, 1941).

Patrol Wing TWO	V4, VC10, L1, L2.
Carrier Air Groups Marine Air Group 21	V6, V8, V9, V10, L3, L5, L6. Kahuku Point and Illio Point targets.
VO Wing	V1, V2, V3.
CA Wing	VU3, VA3.
CL Wing	A7, A8, A11.

E. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

FW2/A4-3(2)/

RESTRICTED

AIRCRAFT SQUADRON AREA ASSIGNMENT DISTRIBUTION:

CinCPac
Comairbatfor
Compsofor
Combatships
Combatdiv ONE
Combatdiv FOUR
Comcrubatfor
Comcruscofor
Comcrudiv THREE
Comcrudiv FOUR
Comcrudiv FIVE
Comcrudiv SIX
Comcrudiv NINE
PatWing ONE Units (each)
PatWing TWO Units (each)
Lexington Air Group
Enterprise Air Group
Saratoga Air Group
Marine Air Group 21
C.O., U.S.S. LEXINGTON
C.O., U.S.S. ENTERPRISE
C.O., U.S.S. SARATOGA
C.O., N.A.S., Pearl Harbor
C.O., N.A.S., Kaneohe Bay
Fisher-Kedusa Av. Rp. Unit
C.O., 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field
Commander Hawaiian Air Force
Combatfor
Comsubscofor
Comdt. 14 N.D.
Combasefor
Comminbatfor
Commatwing, Basefor
Subron FOUR
CO, NSC, 3, Fort DeRussy
Comdesbatfor
C.O., Harbor Defense, Pearl Harbor
C.O., Harbor Defense, Fort Ruger
C.O., U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA
PRU OOD PH TH

5 10 5

U4

PW2/A4-3/VZ

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Wa

RESTRICTED

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT FIGHT PLANE SCHEDULE DISTRIBUTION

CinCPac	1
Comairbatlor	1
Comsubfor	1
Combatships	1
Combatdiv ONE	1
Combatdiv FOUR	1
Comcrubatfor	1
Comcruscofor	1
Comcrudiv THREE	1
Comcrudiv FOUR	1
Comcrudiv FIVE	1
Comcrudiv SIX	1
Comcrudiv NINE	1
Patrol Wing ONE (all units 4 each)	4
Patrol Wing TWO (all units 4 each)	4
Lexington Air Group	1
Enterprise Air Group	1
Saratoga Air Group	1
Marine Air Group 21	1
C.O., U.S.S. LEXINGTON	1
C.O., U.S.S. ENTERPRISE	1
C.O., U.S.S. SARATOGA	1
C.O., N.A.S., Pearl Harbor	1
C.O., N.A.S., Kaneohe Bay	1
Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp. Unit	1
Comdg.Gen. 10th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field	1
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field	1
Comd.Gen. Hawaiian Air Force	1
Combatfor	1
PRO OOD FILE	1
Comfrtwing ONE	1

EXHIBIT NO. 114

SECRET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac file no.
A16/WPPac–46(16)
Serial 063W

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *July 25, 1*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Distribution List for WPPac–46.
Subject: WPPac–46.

1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has n been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in prior to the receipt of such approval.

2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 Plan concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Comma At the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting pla approval by the Commander-in-Chief:

Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Comm Task Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan Senior Officer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.)

The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provi the accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this O–1 Pl including suitable measures in their O–4 or other plans, rather than to p separate supporting plans for this O–1 Plan. The Commander Southeast Force (Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the pl operations of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Operations for approval.

3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they w incorporated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Comm in-Chief.

4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover oper to be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when com and approved.

5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received b command.

H. E. Kim
H. E. KIMM

[1]

SECRET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinCpac File
A16/WPPac–46(16)
Serial 056W.

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *July 21, 1*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
To: Distribution List for WPPac–46.
Subject: WPPac–46, promulgation of.
Enclosures:
(A) Pages for WPPac–46; Reg. No. 5 including list of effective pages.
(B) Receipt form in duplicate.

1. U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Navy Plan Rainbow Five) (WPPac–46) is promulgated herewith. Holders of Comm in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Secret letter A16(R–5)O40W of May 27, 194 the tentative Operation Plan promulgated thereby, will destroy them by b and make report of destruction to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific

2. A receipt form is enclosed to be accomplished and forwarded to the of Naval Operations (Registered Publications Section).

3. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance wi instructions contained in the Navy Regulations, the System of War Plannir the Registered Publication Manual.

4. This volume shall not be carried in aircraft, and when not in use, shall be kept in Class "A" storage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual.

5. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION MANUAL.

6. SPECIAL WARNING—the contents of this publication shall be given the minimum dissemination compatible with thorough preparation of the subordinate plans.

P. C. Crosley, H. E. KIMMEL.
P. C. CROSLEY,
Flag Secretary.

[ii] *U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five)*

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES—WPPac–46

Subject Matter	Page Number[1]	Change in Effect
Promulgating letter: CincPac file A16/WPPac–46(16) Serial 056W of July 21, 1941.	i	Original
List of Effective Pages, WPPac–46	ii	"
Table of Corrections	iii	"
Distribution List	iv	"
Title Page	1	"
Table of Contents	2, 2a, 2b	"
Parts I to V (incl.)	3–52 incl	"
	52a–52h incl	"
	53–56 incl	"
	56a–56d incl	"
	57–74 incl	"
Annex I	I–1 to I–11 incl	"
Annex II	II–1 to II–9 incl	"
Annex III	III–1 to III–5 incl	"
Annex IV	IV–1 to IV–3 incl	"

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[iii] TABLE OF CORRECTIONS

Change No.	Date of entry	Signature and rank of officer entering change

[iv] DISTRIBUTION LIST

Official to Whom Issued	*Registered Nos.*
Chief of Naval Operations	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet	7, 8
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet	9
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet	10, 11
Commander, Task Force One (Combatfor)	12, 13
Commander, Task Force Two (Comairbatfor)	14, 15
Commander, Task Force Three (Comscofor)	16, 17
Commander, Battleships Battle Force	18
Commander, Battleship Division One	19
Commander, Battleship Division Two	20
Commander, Cruisers Battle Force	22
Commander, Cruiser Division Three	23
Commander, Carrier Division One	25
Commander, Destroyers Battle Force	26
Commander, Destroyer Flotilla One	27
Commander, Minecraft Battle Force	28
Commander, Cruisers Scouting Force	29
Commander, Cruiser Division Five	30
Commander, Cruiser Division Six	31
Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force	32
Commander, Patrol Wing Two	33
Commander, Submarines Scouting Force	34
Commander, Base Force	35, 36
Commanding General, Second Marine Division	37

[iv] DISTRIBUTION LIST—Continued

Official to Whom Issued
Commandant, Naval Station, Samoa
Commandant, Eleventh Naval District
Commandant, Twelfth Naval District
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is holding registered numbers 21, 24, and 44 to 60 in reserve.

(SECRET

[1] U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE (NAVY PLAN O–1, RAINBOW FIVE)

WPPac–46

[2] TABLE OF CONTENTS

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent p of original exhibit.

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[3] SECRET

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN RAINBOW FIVE (NAVY PLAN O–1, RAINBOW FIVE)

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I. NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN (RAINBOW FIVE)

0101. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) is the directive which this U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) is designed to implement in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET are concerned. As the Basic Plan is in the possession of most of the recipients of this Fleet Plan, only particularly pertinent parts of it will be repeated herein. These parts have to do chiefly with assumptions, concepts of enemy action, and tasks.

[4] CHAPTER II. FORMAT OF FLEET PLANS

0201. This Plan follows the standard War Plan form of WPL–8 except for small variations made for the purpose of facilitating ready reference and quick dissemination on the outbreak of war. These, in brief, are as follows:

a. In Part I the order of presentation is:
Chapter I—Task Organization.
Chapter II—Assumptions.
Chapter III—Information.

b. In Part II are incorporated:
Chapter I —Task assigned by Basic Plan.
Chapter II—Phases; and specific tasks, arranged by phases, for accomplishing the assigned mission together with (in a few instances) decisions as to how they will be initially carried out.

c. In Part III the first three chapters each cover one phase. Within each of those chapters the tasks assigned to each task force are grouped in a separate section, except the naval coastal frontiers, which are grouped together. Pertinent special information and logistic instructions are placed with the tasks given therein or they are placed in an appropriate annex of this O–1 Plan. Where a task requires coordinated action with other task forces, reference is simply made to the annex which comprises the plan for such coordinated action.

d. Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV, Part V are tentative fleet operation plans which, when completed by the assignment of forces actually available at the time, and modified to meet any change in the conditions which have been visualized in this Fleet War Plan (U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five), are considered suitable, together with the annexes, for placing into effect the measures of Phase I and Phase IA of this Plan. In other words Chapter IV, Part V could be omitted as the material therein is completely covered in the text that precedes [5] them. They are included, however, for the sake of clarity and in order to have immediately available tentative fleet operation plans in the conventional form with which all concerned are familiar.

e. Annexes I, II, etc., are plans, special plans issued by the Commander-in-Chief for a particular purpose. They may be made effective separately if occasion requires. The forces affected are indicated in the annex itself. Some of the annexes may ultimately be only guides for promulgation of an operation order by despatch or letter.

f. Supporting plans of subordinate commanders, which are prescribed in the next chapter, are to be appended as lettered annexes.

[6] CHAPTER III. SUBORDINATE PLANS

0301. Subordinate plans to support this Fleet Operating Plan will be prepared as follows:

a. The Commanders of the forces designated in the Task Organization in Chapter I, Part I of this Plan, will prepare supporting plans for each assigned task, the accomplishment of which would be facilitated by further planning.

b. These supporting plans will be, as closely as practicable, in the sta
form of operation plans, and will be incorporated as annexes to this Fleet O
ing Plan. Where the nature of the tasks lends itself to such procedure, th
for their accomplishment may be in the form of a single annex. Where s
not the case, as where tasks are assigned in one or more of the Commanc
Chief's annexes, several plans may be required.

c. Letter designations for annexes are assigned to each commander as
below. The first annex to be prepared will be designated as "Letter–1
second as "Letter–2", etc. It should be noted that if the nature of a ta
signed at present does not require the preparation of a subordinate plan
commander, the annex assigned him below will be vacant.

Task Force One	A–1
Task Force Two	B–1
Task Force Three	C–1
Aircraft Scouting Force	D–
Submarines Scouting Force	E–1
Minecraft Battle Force	F–1
Base Force	G–1
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier	H–
Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier	J–1
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier	K–

d. In the subordinate plans, forces should, in general, be listed in the
organization by organizations and approximate numbers of types rather
by name, unless it is known that specific units will be available.

e. If a commander considers it desirable to disseminate the considera
which have governed his decision and task assignments, he should appe
brief and sum- [7] marized estimate of the situation as an addendu
his plan. Auxiliary directives such as communication plans should also b
pended as addenda to the task force commander's plan.

f. If the execution of the subordinate plans would be facilitated by still fu
preliminary planning, task force commanders should require their group
manders to submit plans for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned th
the task force commander's plans. These will be designated as addenda
will not be incorporated with this Fleet Plan. They need be submitted on
the task force commander for acceptance.

g. If appropriate, each subsidiary plan will include in an addendum, the lo
requirements for carrying out the plan in so far as they can be foreseen.
addenda may or may not be incorporated in the Fleet Plan, but, in every
copies will be supplied to Commander Base Force.

h. The plans must be predicated upon realities and must provide for max
possible utilization of forces presently available. Unless absolutely nece
plans should not be based upon either conceptions or material not reaso
attainable. When material, equipment or personnel, not immediately ava
is necessary for the successful execution of the measures to be undertaker
shall be made the subject of an addendum. The commander concerned shal
immediate action to remedy the deficiencies, forwarding necessary correspon
through the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Thereafter the Comma
in-Chief shall be informed of corrections of these deficiencies as they occur.

i. Task force commanders will employ, in subdividing their forces, the de
system of numbering subdivisions.

j. In numbering the pages of the plans which form annexes of this Fleet
lower case letters to correspond to the letters assigned in subparagraph c
will be used. Thus the first page of the plan of Commander Task Force
will be "a–1".

[8]

CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION

0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virt
mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the
Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Flee
be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobiliz
To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on
hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throu
the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be desig
J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day.

[9] PART I. TASK ORGANIZATION, ASSUMPTIONS, INFORMATION

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1101. The forces available to the Pacific Fleet are listed in the current Appendix II of the Basic Plan. In addition, the Commanders of the Pacific Southern, Pacific Northern, and Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the Commandants of the Naval Stations Guam and Samoa are considered to be officers of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and, through them, the local defense and coastal forces are subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

1102. For planning purposes, tasks are assigned to the commanders of the current task forces in the Fleet and to certain other commanders who are to become task force commanders as indicated in paragraph 1107 below.

1103. As of July 1, 1941, the major task forces, their commanders, and their broad tasks for which they are training, are as follows:

Task Force One.—for covering operations—Commander Battle Force in command.

Task Force Two.—for reconnaissance in force and raiding operations—Commander Aircraft Battle Force in command.

Task Force Three.—for landing attack operations—Commander Scouting Force in command.

1104. The subdivision of the Fleet which is made in paragraph 1107 below is designed to provide a flexible overall task organization from which may be drawn the task forces to accomplish the operations which can be visualized at this time. It must be realized that, for most operations, certain units must be transferred between task forces, some will be absent in the navy yard or for other reasons, and, in some cases, two or more task forces will be merged under the command of the senior officer concerned. Also many of the tasks assigned to a task force in this plan do not require the employment of the whole task force. In such cases the task force commander will utilize such units of his force as are required to accomplish the assigned task.

[10] CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1105. It is not expected that the Task Organization as shown below will be effective throughout the campaign. Rather it will be the basis for making up particular task organizations for the various operations that may be required. It will be the specific plans and orders in effect at any given time which will show the task organizations at that time.

1106. Units assigned to a task force or to a task group in the normal organization that are subsequently assigned to another task force or task group will thereafter continue as an integral part of the last organization to which assigned until released by the commander thereof. The commanders mentioned will release such units as promptly as the situation at the time permits when the period of assignment to their commands has terminated or when further reassignment is made by competent authority.

[11] 1107. The Normal Task Organization for this Plan is as follows:

1. *TASK FORCE ONE* Commander Battle Force

Batdivs 2, 4	6 BB
SARATOGA	1 CV
Crudivs 3, 9	5 CL
Desflot 1 less Desrons 5, 9	4 OCL#
	2 DL
	16 DD#
	2 AD

(#Includes Southeast Pacific Force of 2 OCL and 4 DD.)

2. *TASK FORCE TWO* Commander Aircraft Battle Force

Batdiv 1	3 BB
Cardiv 2 less YORKTOWN	1 CV
Crudiv 5	4 CA#
Desflot 2 less Desrons 4, 8 and Desdiv 50	1 OCL
	8 DD
	2 AD

(#Includes Atlantic Reenforcement of 4 CA.)

3. *TASK FORCE THREE* Commander Scouting Force

Crudivs 4, 6	8	CA
Cardiv 1 less SARATOGA	1	CV
Desrons 4, 5	2	DI
	16	DI
Minron 3, less Mindivs 5, 6	5	DI
Available Transports Base Force	—	AP
	—	AP

2d Marine Div less Defense Batt.
2d Marine Air Group.

[12] 4. *TASK FORCE NINE* (*Patrol Plane Force*) Commander Air Scouting Force

All units of Aircraft Scouting Force	107	VP
	2	AV
	2	AV
	4	AV
Utility Squadron from Base Force	10	VJ

5. *TASK FORCE SEVEN* (*Undersea Force*) Commander Submarines Scou Force

All units of Submarines Scouting Force except Sound School	30	SS
	2	OS
	1	SM
	1	OI
	3	AS
	2	AS
	1	AM

6. *TASK FORCE EIGHT* (*Mining Force*) Commander Minecraft Ba Force

All units of Minecraft Battle Force	1	CM
	8	DI

7. *TASK FORCE SIX* (*Logistic & Control Force*) Commander Base Force

All units of Base Force except AP, APD and Minron 3 less Divs 5 and 6 and 10 VJ.	8	DI
	4	AP
	6	AT
	1	AP
	13	AC
	2	AP
	1	AP
	2	AP
	2	AP
	1	AP
	10	AM
	4	AC
		Ut
		V

[13] 8. *TASK FORCE FOUR* (*Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier*) C mandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Local defense forces.
9. *TASK FORCE FIVE* (*Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier*) C mandant, Twelfth Naval District.
Coastal and local defense forces.
10. *TASK FORCE TEN* (*Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier*) C mandant, Thirteenth Naval District.
Local defense forces.

[14] 1108. The Southeast Pacific Force and the Atlantic Reenforcem composed as indicated above, will operate under the Commander-in-Chief, U Pacific Fleet until specifically detached by the Chief of Naval Operations. T will not, however, be sent to such distances from Pearl Harbor as would pre their arrival in the Canal Zone twenty-one days after their transfer is ordered

[15] CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS

Section 1. General Assumptions

1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:
a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, British Commonwealth, (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Gov

ments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

Note.—As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan.

b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

c. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subject to direct attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.

d. That the principal military effort of the Associated Powers will be in the Atlantic and European Areas, and that operations in other areas will be so conducted as to facilitate that effort. Therefore, transfer of units from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet is provided for in the Navy Basic Plan, and additional transfers may become necessary.

e. That the Asiatic Fleet will not be reinforced by the Pacific Fleet, but that eventually, if Japan enters the war, heavy British reenforcements will be made in the Far East.

[*16*] *Section 2. Special Assumption*

1221. That the Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl Harbor, but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce forces immediately available by about one-fifth.

[*17*] CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

Section 1. General Information

1311. a. The Pacific Area, which is under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is that part of the area of the Pacific Ocean:

1. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.
2. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.
3. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American Coast and Longitude 74° West.
4. Less waters in which Canada may assume strategic direction of military forces.

b. In addition, the United States will afford support to British Naval Forces in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

c. The Southeast Pacific Sub-Area, when established, will be that part of the Pacific Area south of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier and between the West Coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.

d. The Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone extending from the northern boundary of California to the southern boundary of Mexico.

e. The Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone of the Northwestern United States north of the northern boundary of California, and, in addition, Alaska.

f. The Pacific sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone defined to be within a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala boundary to a point in Latitude 5° South, Longitude 95° West and thence to the Peru-Ecuador border, and to include the sea routes near the southern and western borders of that zone.

[*18*] g. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu, and all the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.

h. The Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

i. In the Far East Area, responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the

defense of the Philippines will be assumed by the British Naval Command Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, w responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defe the Philippines.

j. The Australia and New Zealand Area comprises the Australian and Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the eq The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the str direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in this Area

1312. The foregoing delineation of principal areas and the agreements cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth ar tained in the Report of United States–British Staff Conversations (AB Joint United States–Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22) is now in the proc preparation. Similar agreements with the Netherlands East Indies are made.

[19] 1313. The following principles of command will obtain:

a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the U Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of res bility of their own Power.

b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restr the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate oper into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the str direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to type, be employed as task forces charged with the execution of specific str tasks. These task forces will operate under their own commanders and not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other P Only exceptional military circumstances will justify the temporary suspe of the normal strategic tasks.

d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exe by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal ra time in grade.

e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will op under United States Naval command, and will remain an integral part of U States Naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.

1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC–1 is as fol

Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defen- [20 sive. The United States does not intend to add to its present mil strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic p and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Jap strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augme forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Com wealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far Ea

Section 2. Enemy Information

1321. Information of the enemy will be disseminated prior to and on the cution of this Plan, by means of intelligence reports.

1322. Information which is of special interest with respect to a specific is included with that task in Part III or in the Annexes.

[21] *Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action*

1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific w limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occa pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Ma (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of Am and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian O and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

d. The principal defensive efforts to be:

1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.

2. Holding positions for their own use and denving positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.

3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

a. Capture of Guam.

b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, bv the establishment of advanced bases, and bv the [22] destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.

c. Capture of Northern Borneo.

d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, bv the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.

e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.

f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairlv strong defenses in the Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.

b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the Mandates.

c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main base in Halmahera).

d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.

e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.

f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian Area.

[23] g. Obsolete and weaker units on patrol of coastal areas and focal areas of lines of communication.

h. Merchant ships in neutral ports or proceeding home via detours wide of usual routes.

[24]

PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN—MISSION

2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:

a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;

b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;

c. Destroy axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far west as longitude 155° east;

e. Defend Samoa in category "D";

f. Defend Guam in category "F";

g. Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces;

h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;

i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces;

j. Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as circumstances require;

k. Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.

[25] CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIO

2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and divid tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

a. PHASE I—Initial tasks—Japan not in the war.

b. PHASE IA—Initial tasks—Japan in the war.

c. PHASE II, etc.—Succeeding tasks.

2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter tain all types in constant readiness for distant service.

b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.

c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.

d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.

e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day.

f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific No Naval Coastal Frontier on M-day.

g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powe prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisph patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking as necessary. In so doing support the British Naval Forces south of the e as far west as Longitude 155° East.

h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.

[26] 2202. i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limi possible raider bases in the Japanese mandates, if authorized at the time Navy Department.

j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Mi Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorize

k. Continue training operations as practicable.

1. Move the maximum practicable portion of second Marine Division to H for training in landing operations.

m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

Phase IA

2203. Phase IA tasks are as follows:

a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.

b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not beer pleted.

c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raide tenders in the northern Pacific.

d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the ciated powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering tions.

e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.

2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser against Japanese shipping in waters between Hansei Shoto and Nanpo Sh

f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols a Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.

g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oah outlying bases.

[27] 2203. h. Escort important shipping, including troop movemen tween the Hawaiian Area and the West Coast.

i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.

j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Fr as necessary.

k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment Second Marine Division.

l. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island Are

Phase II and subsequent phases

2204. Tasks of Phase II and Subsequent Phases which can be formula this time are:

a. Capture and establish a protected fleet anchorage in the Marshall Area.

b. Capture or deny other positions in the Marshall Island Area as necessary for further advance to the westward.
c. Raid other Japanese land objectives and sea communications.
d. Capture and establish an advanced fleet base at Truk.
e. Continue uncompleted tasks of Phase IA.

[28] PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3111. *Task Force One* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.
3112. When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the navy basic plan.
3113. Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[29] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3121. *Task Force Two* will:
Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[30] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3131. *Task Force Three* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.
3132. Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
3133. a. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.
b. Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan for capture of Eniwetok.
c. 1. *Special Information.*
As of July 1, 1941, the Marine defenses in Hawaii and the outlying islands are as follows:

MIDWAY —34 officers
750 men
6 5''/51 caliber guns
12 3''/50 caliber AA guns
30 0.50 caliber machine guns
30 0.30 caliber machine guns
4 searchlights.

JOHNSTON—18 men
2 5''/51 caliber guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns

PALMYRA —4 officers
101 men
4 5''/51 caliber guns
4 3''/50 caliber AA guns
4 0.50 caliber machine guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns

[31] OAHU —32 officers
620 men
4 5''/51 caliber guns
8 3''/50 caliber AA guns
20 0.50 caliber machine guns
16 0.30 caliber machine guns
NOTE: The above personnel are defense battalion personnel only and are in addition to personnel employed in guard duty, barracks duty, etc.

WAKE —None.

2. *Task*
Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

[32] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3141. *Task Force Nine* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each o
Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue ac
istration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.
3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I)

[33] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3151. *Task Force Seven* will perform tasks as required by the following
graphs of this section.
3152. a. *Special Information.*
1. There are indications that Axis raiders have been basing in the Ma
area.
2. The imminence of the entry of Japan into the war requires a de
ment suitable for this eventuality.
3. NARWHAL and NAUTILUS are fitted to carry 13,500 gallo
aviation gasoline each for fueling patrol planes.
b. *Task.*
Maintain patrols required by the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
c. *Special Logistics.*
Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor and to a limited degree at Midway
3153. Assign one submarine division to Task Force Three as required for la
attack training.
3154. On W-day transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue ves
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Al
sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discret

[34] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3161. *Task Force Eight* will:
Continue operations and training under commanders *Task Forces One* an

[35] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORC*

3171. *Task Force Six* will perform tasks as required by the following parag
3172. Provide logistic service to the fleet and cooperate with Comm
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying
3173. Perform tasks required by The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex
3174. Maintain in the office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Front
officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the fle
loading of base force and NTS vessels, and the routing and protection of
and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.
3175. Transfer ten VJR to Commander *Task Force Nine.*

36] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)

3181. *Special Information.*
The *Basic Plan* assigns the following tasks to the Commander, Ha
Naval Coastal Frontier:
a. Defend the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in Category "D". (Ca
"D"—May be subject to major attack). (N. B. The Commander-in
U. S. Pacific Fleet, does not consider Category "D" will apply during Phas
b. Protect and route shipping within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Front
c. Support the U. S. Pacific Fleet.
d. Support the Army and Associated Forces within the Hawaiian Naval
Frontier.
3182. By this *Fleet Plan, Task Force Four* is assigned the tasks below.
a. Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Ha
Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units con
(As of the date of issue of this plan, the security plan of the Commander, Ha
Naval Coastal Frontier (as Commander, Base Defense) is already in effec
b. Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Jo
Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. Assist as practicable
development of Samoa and Guam.
c. Make the facilities of outlying bases available for Fleet units opera
the vicinity; and directly and through own task group commanders co
with other task force and task group commanders in coordinating the
activities at these bases. (See Annex IV.)

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE (NAVY PLAN 0–1, RAINBOW FIVE)

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

[37] 3182. d. Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton.

Task Force Five (Pacific Southern) and Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)

3183. Commanders *Task Forces Five* and *Ten* perform tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[38] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3191. Until detached from the Fleet, all forces less those of Naval Coastal Frontiers will perform the following tasks:

a. Units in the Hawaiian Area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor by the end of four W-day; units designated for early operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.

b. Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

c. Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating with commanders of naval coastal frontiers while within the limits of those frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese forces.

d. Continue such training activities of the fleet as the commander-in-chief may direct.

e. Reinforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.

f. Protect the territory and communications of the associated powers, the operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other operations as directed by the commander-in-chief.

39]

CHAPTER II. PHASE IA

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3211. *Task Force One* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3212. Perform task assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

3213. Reenforce and support operations of Task Force two as required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

[40] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3221. *Task Force Two* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.

3222. Conduct reconnaissance and raid in force against the Marshalls as required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

[41] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3231. *Task Force Three* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3232. Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3233. Reenforce Task Force Two as required by the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II).

3234. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.

3235. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.

[42] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3241. *Task Force Nine* will perform tasks as required in the following paragraphs of this section.

3242. a. *Special Information.*

1. Patrol plane operations from Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyr Canton are feasible, the extent of such operations being dependent up defenses, facilities and supplies available at the time operations com Those defenses, facilities and supplies are being augmented. As of July tenders cannot base at Wake or Canton, but Pan-American Airways' fa may be used by special arrangement or by commandeering. A project improvement of Wake as a base is underway. No such project for Cant been approved.

2. No aircraft are assigned at present to the Commander, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

3. Our submarines will assist in the defense of Midway and Wake, a habitually operate offensively in enemy waters.

4. Land defenses exist on outlying islands, as described in paragraph 1. Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), is c with the defense of these outlying islands and will make them available for plane operations.

5. It is believed that enemy action in the area subject to our patrol plane will comprise:

(a) Submarine raids and observation off Oahu and outlying islands and our lines of communication.

[43] (b) Surface raids on our lines of communications.

(c) Surface and air raids against Wake and possibly against Midway, Jol Palmyra and Canton.

(d) Possibly carrier raid against Oahu.

b. *Tasks.*

1. Perform patrols required by patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

2. Subject to the specific tasks prescribed elsewhere in this plan, operate planes in the Hawaiian Area including outlying islands so as to gain the possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensivel when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting dam the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may

3. Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other fo

4. Perform tasks assigned in the Marshall reconnaissance and raidin (Annex II).

5. Coordinate operations of patrol planes with submarines operating i general area.

6. Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to av proportionate losses.

[44] 3242. b. 7. Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may Squadron from base force) based on Oahu at all times. During the abs major portions of the fleet from the vicinity of Oahu, such squadrons, cretion, may be temporarily transferred to commander *Task Force Four*-(ian Naval Coastal Frontier).

c. *Special Logistics.*

Logistic support at outlying bases will be supplied by own tenders, Hs Naval Coastal Frontier, Base Force, and, if necessary, by Pan-American A facilities.

[45] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3251. *Task Force Seven* will perform tasks as required by the following par

3252. a. *Special Information.*

1. Surface units of the Fleet will initially conduct the operations requ the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) and the Marshall Reconnaissa Raiding Plan (Annex II). Thereafter operations will be conducted for t ture of the Marshalls and Carolines, with occasional sweeps toward the M and the Japanese Homeland.

2. Our patrol planes will be operating from Midway, and possibly Wa Johnston Islands.

3. Japan is developing extensively the defenses of the Mandated Land planes are known to be based at Saipan, Truk and Jaluit and ha reported at Marcus Island. Air fields are believed to exist at Wotje and lap. Port Lloyd in the Bonins is a minor operating base and some

usually base there and at Hachijo Jima. Aircraft may be present on Amami Oshima.

4. Considerable air strength is based on the Japanese Homeland but it is believed that, with many commitments elsewhere and a general lack of patrol planes, the air patrol surrounding the Homeland will not be particularly intensive.

5. The main units of the Japanese Fleet will probably be operating from the Inland Sea.

6. All important harbors will probably be mined and netted against submarines and are well fortified. A considerable number of small patrol craft must be expected.

[46] 3252. a. 7. The southwestern and western lines of communications from Japan may be considered vital needs and those toward the Mandates are very important.

8. It is expected that all Japanese Merchantmen will be armed or will be operating under naval control, and will therefore be subject to submarine attack. Specific instructions on this subject will be issued later.

9. Arrangements will be made with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to extend the Pacific Area sufficiently for submarines to pass through the Nansei Shoto as far south as Latitude 28°–30′ N.

10. Mining Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. The specific authority for such mining will be issued later.

b. *Tasks*

1. Continue patrol of two submarines each at Wake and Midway.

2. Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese homeland and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating conditions, giving Stations the following priority.

YOKOHAMA
BUNGO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU

3. Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces including shipping, utilizing torpedoes and mines, and, if appropriate, gunfire.

[47] 3252. b. 4. Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.

c. *Special Logistics.*

Utilize facilities at Midway as necessary to increase endurance on patrol.

[48] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3261. *Task Force Eight* will:

Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the local defense forces during this phase.

[49] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)*

3271. *Task Force Six* will:

Continue tasks assigned for Phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I) and the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (annex II).

[50] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

3281. *Task Force Five* (Pacific Northern) and *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) will:

Continue tasks assigned for phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

3282. *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) will:

Continue tasks assigned for phase I.

[51] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3291. *All task forces concerned:*

a. Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3191.

b. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

[52] CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE IA

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3311. *Task Force One* will:
Cover operations of other forces as prescribed in the Eniwetok plan (annex and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

[52a] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3321. *Task Force Two* will:
Reenforce Task Forces One and Three as required in Eniwetok and other p and perform such reconnaissance and raiding as is directed.

[52b] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3331. *Task Force Three* will:
a. Continue training for landing attacks.
b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other opera involving landing attacks.
c. Patrol as directed in subsequent plans.
d. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.

[52c] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3341. *Task Force Nine* will:
a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3242 b, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7.
b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other plan the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

[52d] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3351. *Task Force Seven* will:
a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3252 b, 1, 2, 3, and 4.
b. Carry out tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other plan the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

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PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE IA

[52e] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3361. *Task Force Eight* will:
Perform such mining tasks as may be assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex and other operations and continue to augment local patrols as directed.

[52f] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC AND CONTROL FORCE)*

3371. *Task Force Six* will:
a. Continue tasks prescribed in paragraphs 3172 to 3174.
b. Prepare plans for the establishment of a fleet anchorage at Eniwetok a fleet base at Truk after the positions have been captured.

[52g] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

3381. *Task Forces Four, Five, and Ten* will:
Continue the tasks assigned in paragraphs 3182 and 3183.

[52h] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3391. *All task forces concerned:*
Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3291.

[53] CHAPTER IV. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN

3401. The execution of this Plan may be in one or two steps dependin whether Japan does or does not become a belligerent on the first day of execu
a. If action against European Axis Powers only is to be taken the despatch be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW F PHASE ONE".

b. When action against JAPAN is to be taken the despatch for execution will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE AFIRM".

3402. In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power against the United States prior to the existence of a state of war, it is the duty of the senior commander on the spot to take such action in the defense of his command and the national interests as the situation may require, and report the action taken to superior authority at once.

[54]

CHAPTER V. INITIAL TRANSFER OF UNITS

3501. The table below gives, for ready reference, a summary of the transfers to be made in going from the current peace time organization to the task organization as of W-Day and as of J-Day. Those transfers for W-Day will be made upon the placing into effect of Phase I of this Plan. Those for J-Day will be made when the execution of Phase IA is ordered. Units concerned will report by despatch to the commanders of the task forces to which they are transferring.

From	To	Unit transferred	Transfer effected	Remarks
Taskfor 1	Southeastern Pacific For.	2 OCL 1 Desdiv	When directed	
	Taskfor 3	1 CL	W-Day	For rotation on patrol until J-Day.
Taskfor 2	Taskfor 3	1 CA	W-Day	For rotation on patrol until J-Day.
	Atlantic Reen	4 CA	When directed	If Atlantic Reen. is detached.
Taskfor 3	Taskfor 2	2 CA	When directed	If Atlantic Reen. is detached.
	PSNCF	12 VPB 1 AVD 1 AVP	W-Day	Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
Taskfor 9 (Patrol Plane Force).	PNNCF	12 VPB 1 AVD 1 AVP	W-Day	Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
Taskfor 7 (Undersea Force).	PNNCF	2 SS 1 ASR	W-Day	Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
	Taskfor 3	NARWHAL or NAUTILUS.	W-Day	Base Samoa. Released on J-Day.
[55]				
Taskfor 8 (Minfor)	Hawaiian NCF	1 CM 8 DM	J-Day	Until further orders.
Taskfor 6 (Logistic and Control For).	Taskfor 3	1 AO	W-Day	Base Samoa, released on J-Day.
		1 AO	J-Day	For fueling at sea ships in initial sweep. To revert when released.
	Taskfor 2	2 AO	J-Day	For fueling at sea ships in initial reconnaissance of MARSHALLS. To revert when released.
	Taskfor 9	10 VJR	J-Day	Until further orders.
All Forces	Hawaiian NCF	As directed	When directed	
	Taskfor 6 (Logistic and Control Force).	Any ship passing between West Coast and Hawaii.	Prior to scheduled date of departure.	For escort duty. To revert on completion.

[56]

PART IV. LOGISTICS

CHAPTER I. GENERAL

4101. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force) is charged with the logistic supply of the Fleet and, in cooperation with Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), with supplying the present outlying bases in the Mid Pacific. He will make requests for replacements as required by paragraph 4322 g of the Navy Basic Plan. He will maintain a liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) and, through him, will control the quantities and times of delivery of material and personnel requirements to the Fleet. In so far as practicable, a reserve of consumable supplies will be established and maintained at Pearl Harbor. After capture of bases in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES a reserve of supplies will be maintained at these places, as permitted by storage and transportation facilities available.

4102. The supply of units of the Second Marine Division after they ha the West Coast will be included with that of the Fleet.

4103. Special logistic instructions affecting particular tasks have been in in the task assignments in Part III and the Annexes of this Plan.

4104. For the benefit of Commander Task Force Six, Commanders of task forces will include, in the plans which they prepare, their logistic re ments as far as they can be foreseen.

4105. The requirements of the U. S. Pacific Fleet are placed in the second h priority classification by paragraph 4261 of the Navy Basic Plan.

[56a] CHAPTER II. TRANSPORTATION

4201. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force), throu liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific So Naval Coastal Frontier), will coordinate the transportation of material an sonnel by Fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Serv

4202. The Naval Transportation Service vessels assigned to assist in th ply of the Hawaiian and Alaskan areas will be shown in a revised Chapte Appendix II, of the Navy Basic Plan. If practicable, they will not be emp for transportation farther westward than Hawaii.

4203. The employment of commercial vessels to assist in transportation the West Coast to Hawaii is most desirable and is acceptable to the Comma in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[56b] CHAPTER III. HOSPITALIZATION AND EVACUATION

4301. The facilities of the Fleet including those of hospital ships, adv base hospitals and mobile medical units will, as far as practicable, provide talization for sick and wounded personnel.

4302. As necessary, such personnel will, under the coordinated supervis the task force commanders responsible for the personnel and for the transpor facilities employed, be evacuated to the nearest shore establishment having tal space available.

4303. The ships concerned will furnish hospitalization to embarked forces until ineffectives can be transferred ashore.

[56c] CHAPTER IV. PRIZE CREWS

4401. The Navy Department will furnish prize crews as follows: U. S. F Fleet—8; Southeast Pacific Force—8. If those for the Pacific Fleet are ava they will be placed aboard ships assigned to make the search for enemy mer ships in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[56d] CHAPTER V. SALVAGE

4501. All units, particularly of Task Force Six (Logistic and Control F and suitable units of Task Force Seven (Underseas Force) will render sa service, as practicable, to naval and other vessels in the Pacific Area outs a zone lying 500 miles from the continental United States, Alaska, and Pa Within the above mentioned zone, salvage service will be rendered by the establishment.

[57] PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER I. TIME TO BE USED

5101. GREENWICH Civil Time will be used in carrying out this Plan.

[58] CHAPTER II. COMMUNICATIONS

5201. Communications will be in accordance with USF–70 as modifie Annex III to this Plan.

[59] CHAPTER III. LOCATION OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

5301. The Fleet will be kept informed of the location of the Command Chief.

[60] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

5401. Tentative Operation Plans Nos. 1–R5 and 1A–R5 as formulated below are designed to facilitate the promulgation and execution of the tasks assigned for Phases I and IA of this U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five). It is expected that they will be modified and executed by despatch when the corresponding Phase of this O–1 Plan is placed in effect as prescribed in paragraph 3401.

[61] *Section 1. Phase I*

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Operation Plan No. 1–R5

Initial Task Organization

(See paragraph 1107 of this Plan for normal organization)

(a) *Task Force One*—Commander Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus ½ minecraft less 1 cruiser in rotation to *Task Force Three* patrol pool.

(b) *Task Force Two*—Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus ½ minecraft less one cruiser in rotation to *Task Force Three* patrol pool.

(c) *Task Force Three*—Commander Scouting Force.—Normal units this task force plus 1 cruiser each from *Task Forces One* and *Two* for cruiser patrol pool plus 1 SS from *Task Force Seven*, 1 AO from Task Force Six, and (on request) 1 patron and tender from Task Force Seven for South Pacific operations.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) (S. O. P. Airscofor Hawaiian Area).—Normal units this task force less 24 VP and tenders transferred to Naval Coastal Frontiers, and (if requested by *Commander Task Force Three*) 1 patron and tender to Task Force Three.

[62] (e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force)—Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.—Normal units this task force less 2 SS and 1 ASR to *Task Force Ten* and 1 SS to *Task Force Three.*

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force).—Non-operative as such; normal units thereof being divided between *Task Forces One and Two.*

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force)—Commander Base Force.—Normal units this task force plus any units transferred from other forces for escort duty West Coast-Hawaii less 1 AO to *Task Force Three.*

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus units from other fleet forces when and if the Commander-in-Chief directs transfer.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from *Task Force Nine.*

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from *Task Force Nine* plus 2 SS and 1 ASR from *Task Force Seven.*

[63] 1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III of Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five.

2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan.

3. (a) *Task Force One.*—(1) When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the Navy Basic Plan.

(2) Perform the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(b) *Task Force Two.*—(1) Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(c) *Task Force Three.*—(1) Maintain the patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(2) Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.

(3) Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan for capture of Eniwetok.

[64] (4) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requ
by Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the
mander-in-Chief.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).—(1) Transfer twelve patrol
and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern
Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate de
discretion.

(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).—(1) Maintain patrols required
Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(2) Assign one submarine division to *Task Force Three* as required for la
attack training.

(3) Transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to
Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaska sector.
tinue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.

(f) *Task Force Eight.* (Mining Force).—(1) Continue training under Comm
Task Force One.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).—(1) Provide logistic se
to the Fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Fr
in providing logistic services to outlying bases.

[65] (2) Perform tasks required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Anr

(3) Maintain in the Office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Front
officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the Flee
loading of Base Force and Naval Transportation Service vessels, and the r
and protection of United States and Allied shipping. Maintain close
with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Assist i
viding external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval C
Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned.

(2) Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Joh
Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton is authorized. Assist as practicable
development of Samoa and Guam.

(3) Make the facilities of the outlying bases available for Fleet units ope
in the vicinity and cooperate with Commanders of Mobile Forces in coordi
the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV).

(4) Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the pu
to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wak
Canton.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Pe
tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[66] (j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Fronti
(1) Perform tasks assigned by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(x) (1) Units in the Hawaiian area complete mobilization at Pearl H
within four days of date of execution of this Plan units designated for
operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their oper
to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as r
as possible.

(2) Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service

(3) Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, coope
with the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers while within the limits of
frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese Forces.

(4) Continue such training activities of the Fleet as the Commander-in-
may direct.

(5) Reenforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.

(6) Protect the territory and communications of the Associated Power
operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other
tions as directed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor, on the West Coast, and as spe
provided for in the Annexes.

5. (a) Communications in accordance with U. S. F. Seventy, as modifi
Annex III.

(b) Use Greenwich Civil Time.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fl

[68] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

Section 2. Phase IA

Tentative

United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Place
Date.

Operation Plan No. 1A–R5.

Initial task organization

(See Basic Fleet Plan for normal organization.)

(a) *Task Force One.* Commander Battle Force.—Normal units this task force less any cruiser absent on patrol with *Task Force Three* less 1 CV and all other large CL's to *Task Force Two* for reconnaissance of MARSHALLS.

(b) *Task Force Two.* Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus 1 CV and available CL's (approximately 4) from *Task Force One* plus 1 CV from *Task Force Three* less any cruiser absent on patrol with *Task Force Three.*

(c) *Task Force Three.* Commander Scouting Force.—Same as for Operation Plan 1–R5 less 1 CV to *Task Force Two* less 1 SS and 1 AO from SAMOA returned to their respective normal task forces plus 1 AO from *Task Force Six* for fueling at sea.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) Senior Officer Present, Aircraft, Scouting Force, HAWAIIAN AREA).—Same as for Operation PlanR5 1–.

[69] PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATIONS PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

Section 2. Phase IA

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

Same as for Operation Plan 1–R5
plus 1 SS returned from *Task Force Three.*

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force)

Non-operative as such, normal units thereof being detached from *Task Forces One and Two* at end of Phase I and on commencement of Phase IA being transferred to *Task Force Four.*

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force) Commander Base Force.

Same as for Operation Plan 1–R5,
plus 1 AO returned from *Task Force Three*
less 2 AO transferred to *Task Force Two*
less 1 AO transferred to *Task Force Three.*

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Normal units this task force
plus all units of Minecraft, Battle Force.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

Same as for Operation Plan 1–R5.

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

Same as for Operation Plan 1–R5.

1. Information, Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five.

[70] 2. This Fleet, while protecting the sea communications and territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area, and supporting the operations of the British Navy south of the equator as far west as Longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East, will:

(a) Conduct an initial sweep with light forces and aircraft against enemy merchant ships and raiders.

(b) Raid Japanese communications to westward of NANPO SHOTO with cruisers.

(c) Patrol Japanese homeland with submarines.

(d) Conduct a reconnaissance and raid against the MARSHALLS, in or
divert Japanese forces away from MALAYSIA, and to prepare for the cap
the MARSHALL-CAROLINE area.

3. (a) *Task Force One.*

(1) Perform task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to
Plan O–1, Rainbow Five).

(2) Reenforce and support operations of *Task Force Two* as required
MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Pla
Rainbow Five).

(b) *Task Force Two.*

(1) Conduct Reconnaissance and Raid in force against the MARSHAL
required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex
Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five).

[71] (c) *Task Force Three.*

(1) Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as requi
the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five

(2) Reenforce *Task Force Two* as required by the MARSHALL Reconnai
and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five).

(3) Move from SAN DIEGO to HAWAII the remaining units and equi
of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.

(4) Continue preparations and training for landing attacks on Japanese
in the MARSHALLS with particular emphasis on plan for capture of
WETOK.

(5) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be request
Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), and ap
by the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Subject to the specific tasks prescribed below, operate patrol planes
HAWAIIAN Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest p
information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when
types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage
planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the obj
appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

[72] (2) Perform patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (A
to Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five).

(3) Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other for

(4) Perform tasks assigned in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and R
Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five).

(5) Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to
disproportionate losses.

(6) Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ squadron from
Force) based on OAHU at all times. During the absence of major porti
the Fleet from the vicinity of OAHU, such squadrons may, at discretio
temporarily transferred to Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier).

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).

(1) Continue patrol of two submarines each at WAKE and MIDWAY.

(2) Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese Hom
and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by ope
conditions, giving stations the following priority:

YOKOHAMA
BUNGO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU

[73] (The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements for submari
pass through that part of the Far Eastern Area in the NANSEI SHOTO
south as Latitude twenty-eight degrees, thirty minutes North).

(3) Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces, including shipping, ut
mines and torpedoes and, if appropriate, gunfire. Mining of Japanese
outside the three mile limit may be planned. Specific authority for such m
will be issued later.

(4) Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack m
is not thereby jeopardized.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force).
(1) Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the local defense forces during this Phase.
(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force).
(1) Continue general logistic support of Fleet and assistance to outlying bases.
(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five), and the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five).
(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1–R5, with regard for the probable increase in enemy activities.
[74] (i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).
(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).
(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1–R5 with regard for the probable increase in enemy activities.
(2) Perform the tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five).
4. Logistic replenishment at PEARL HARBOR, on the West Coast, and as specially provided for in the Annexes.
5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five.
(b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.
(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.

———— ————,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[*I–1*] ANNEX I

United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Patrol and Sweeping Plan
No.

INITIAL TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) Task Force One.
(b) Task Force Two.
(c) Task Force Three.
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force).
(f) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force).
(g) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
(h) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).
(i) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).
(Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1–R5.)

1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.

2. *Phase I*

This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:
[*I–2*] (a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.
(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.
(c) Covering.
(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
(e) Routing shipping.

Phase IA

This Fleet will: (a) continue the operations of Phase I, except as to p which will be modified or discontinued as necessary in order to carry ou scribed offensive operations;

(b) attack enemy communications by making initial sweep for enemy chant ships and raiders, and by raiding Japanese sea communications wes of Nanpo Shoto;

(c) reconnoiter and raid the Marshall Islands.

Subsequent Phases

This Fleet will: (a) continue operations of Phase I except as to patrols, for further directives will be issued later.

3. (a) *Task Force One.*

(1) Cover territory, forces and shipping of the Associated Powers as dire

[*I–3*] (2) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to *Task Three* for cruiser patrol pool; and be prepared to furnish, on order, other patr a striking force, or both.

(3) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and R Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O–1) conduct such sweep as information and ci stances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.

(b) *Task Force Two.*

(1) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to *Task Force Thr* cruiser patrol pool. (In case of detachment of Atlantic reenforcement thi paragraph is applicable).

(2) Be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or

(3) Develop contacts made by patrol planes from Oahu if vessels of *Task Three* are not within supporting distance of such contacts.

(4) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and R Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O–1) conduct such sweep as information an cumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task

(c) *Task Force Three*, reenforced with one cruiser each from *Task Force and Two* (for cruiser patrol pool), *NARWHAL or NAUTILUS* from *Task Seven* (Undersea Force), and one oiler from *Task Force Six* (Logistic and C Force), also further reenforced by one squadron of patrol planes and tenders *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) (by request on Commander Task Nine) when the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilities there p

(1) Patrol against enemy units that may attack own and allied communic lines, operating in general as follows:

[*I–4*] (a) Maintain two cruisers (one, if Atlantic Reenforcement is deta on patrol between Hawaii and the Pacific Coast in areas more than five hu miles from land. Reservice such ships either in Hawaii or on Pacific Coast

(b) (i) Maintain two cruisers, two destroyers, one submarine and one in the South Pacific based on Samoa, normally keeping one cruiser on p within one thousand miles of Samoa along routes to New Zealand.

(ii) When the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilitates there p request from Commander *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) assignmen patrol squadron and tenders; and advance it into that area for operations.

(iii) Coordinate activities of unit operating in the South Pacific with B naval forces as far west as longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East a situation at the time makes expedient; and in accordance with such dire as may from time to time be issued.

(c) Maintain one cruiser, based on Midway, on patrol to the northward Midway-Marianas line, in the vicinity of trans-Pacific trade routes.

(2) Upon commencement of Phase IA, dispatch two heavy cruisers in com to raid Japanese communications westward of the Nanpo Shoto, and retu base when fuel situation or other circumstances require. Arrange directly Commander *Task Force Six* for fueling such cruisers at or near Midway on ward passage and on return as may be feasible. The Commander-in-Chie make arrangements with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, concernin utilization of the portion of the Far Eastern Area involved.

[*I–5*] (3) Upon commencement of Phase IA, discontinue patrols req by paragraph 3 (c) (1) and sweep for enemy merchant ships, operating alon following general lines:

(a) Samoa based cruisers and destroyers sweep northward to latitude tw thence to rendezvous designated by Task Force Commander for operatio

conjunction with the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O–1). Other Samoa based units rejoin their normal commands.

(b) Cruisers on patrol between West Coast and Hawaii sweep or search for specific enemy merchantmen, as Task Force Commander may require enroute to rendezvous designated by him for operations in conjunction with Marshall Raid.

(c) Other available units conduct maximum practicable sweep in general area bounded by Hawaiian Island chain, latitude forty-six North, and longitudes one hundred sixty-seven West and one hundred eighty; such sweep to occupy about six days, and to begin on or as soon after J-day as possible.

(d) Units operating in the foregoing northerly area originate radio traffic to indicate an advance toward Japan via a northern route.

(4) (a) Upon completion of sweep directed in subparagraph (3) (c) above, rendezvous with oiler supplied by *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force) in latitude twenty-seven North, and one hundred seventy-eight West, or other rendezvous you may have designated. Fuel and proceed to join *Task Force Two* (Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan, Annex II to Navy Plan O–1) on twelve J-day at rendezvous Tare in latitude sixteen North, longitude one hundred seventy-seven East or other designated time and rendezvous.

(b) If any units will be delayed in joining *Task Force Two*, advise the commander thereof as to the extent of the delay.

[*I–6*] (c) If conflict of tasks exists, operations against inferior enemy forces within striking distance take precedence over joining *Task Force Two*.

(5) If Atlantic Reenforcement is detached, assign two heavy cruisers to *Task Force Two*. (In such event the assignment of one cruiser from *Task Force Two* to *Task Force Three*, hitherto mentioned will, of course, not be made).

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander *Task Force Three*, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

[*I–7*] (8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O–1).

(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible with assigned tasks, with other forces thereat. Be guided by principles of command relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan O–1.

(e) *Task Force Seven* (undersea Force).

(1) Maintain two submarines on patrol at Wake and two at Midway for gaining information and for attack on enemy units approaching those places.

(2) Be prepared, if Commander-in-Chief directs, during Phase I to conduct observations, by submerged submarines from outside the three-mile zone, of probable radar bases in the Japanese Mandates.

(3) At commencement of Phase IA, or earlier if so directed, establish patrols off the Japanese homeland as prescribed in the basic Fleet Plan.

(4) Route submarines advancing to westward for patrols so as to cover wide front. Coordinate such routing with other patrol and sweeping operations, including that prescribed for cruisers in the area westward of Nanpo Shoto, so as to avoid contact of submarines with own forces.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief and task force commanders concerned advised as to location and routes of own submarines.

(6) Transfer NAUTILUS or NARWHAL to *Task Force Three* for operations in South Pacific during Phase I.

(f) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).

(1) Through liaison with Commanders of *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern) and *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian [*I–8*] Naval Coastal Frontiers) ensure that routing of shipping is in accordance with general directives of the Com-

mander-in-Chief and is coordinated with the protection offered by Fleet
and with the routing and protective measures of the British in the South
(2) Escort important ships or convoys by using combatant vessels en
or from the West Coast and Hawaii, which vessels are made available f
purpose. If escort is found necessary and suitable vessels will be not a
by modifying schedules of escorts or convoys, make suitable representat
the Commander-in-Chief as far in advance as possible.
(3) During Phase I maintain one oiler at Samoa to operate under Com
Task Force Three.
(4) Provide oiler to fuel at sea units of *Task Force Three* on eight J-
latitude twenty-seven North, Longitude one hundred seventy-eight Wes
time and place designated by commander of that Task Force.
(5) See also oiler requirements under Marshall Reconnaissance and
Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O–1).
(g) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
(1) Coordinate, as practicable, patrol in coastal zone with patrols by oth
forces.
(2) Through liaison with Commander *Task Force Six* (Logistics and
Force) and Commander *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Fr
coordinate routing and escort of shipping in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal F
with that in the Fleet Control Zone, when and if established, and in the
Pacific Area.
[*I–9*] (h) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)
(1) Coordinate routing of shipping with the protection afforded by Flee
and by British forces in accordance with current situation, and with
directives that may be issued by the Commander-in-Chief.
(2) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as prac
with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of in
tion gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such infor
direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.
(3) In the initial stages of Phase IA, particularly, cooperate with an
forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range
West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is prac
(i) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).
(1) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as prac
with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of infor
gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such infor
direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.
(2) In initial stages of Phase IA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet
in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of th
Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicab
is especially desired to cover until eight J-Day UNIMAK PASS and the ma
area to the southward of Dutch Harbor that daily flights and available pla
permit.
(x) (1) This plan effective simultaneously with Navy Plan O–1, Rainbo
[*I–10*] (2) All task forces make available to Commander *Task Fo*
(Logistics and Control Force) for escort duty, all ships enroute between
and West Coast.
(3) Destroy enemy combatant ships encountered.
(4) Capture or destroy enemy merchant ships encountered.
(5) Investigate neutral merchant ships encountered; send them to p
adjudication if investigation warrants; or if necessary and permissible
international law, destroy them. (See "Instructions for the Navy of the
States Governing Maritime Warfare").
(6) Seize any opportunity to inflict disproportionate damage on the
modifying or discontinuing plans in operations if necessary in order to do
(7) Disseminate pertinent information to other Task Force Comman
conditions of radio silence and other circumstances permit.
(8) Aircraft attempt, without taking undue risk, to force merchant s
the vicinity of supporting surface vessels or to United States' ports.
(9) This plan effective with Navy Plan O–1.
(10) Be prepared to transfer units of Southeast Pacific Force and A
Reenforcement on short notice. So employ such units that if transferre

can reach Canal Zone within twenty-one days. If transferred, such units proceed along routes and conduct such sweeps as the Commander-in-Chief may prescribe.

(11) Continue such training as these and other prescribed operations permit.

[*I–11*] 4. Logistics as in Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five.

5. Provisions of Part V Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five apply.

———— ————,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[*II–1*] ANNEX II

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan No. ————

Initial Task Organization.

(a). *Task Force One.*
(b). *Task Force Two.*
(c). *Task Force Three.*
(d). *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).
(e). *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).
(f). *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).

Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1A–R5.

1. (a) *Information.*—(1) This plan covers the initial operations in the MARSHALLS for carrying out the basic task of diverting Japanese strength away from the MALAY BARRIER through the denial and capture of positions in the MARSHALLS.

2. This force will:

(a) Reconnoiter the MARSHALLS, particularly ENIWETOK, preparatory to a raid in force and to eventual capture, in order to develop the mobile and land defenses and material installations therein.

(b) Raid the MARSHALLS with ships and aircraft and small landing groups in order to destroy enemy mobile forces, fixed defenses and facilities.

[*II–2*] 3. (a) *Task Force One.*—(1) Transfer available large light cruisers and carrier to *Task Force Two* on J-Day.

(2) About Five J-Day, depart PEARL HARBOR with remainder of force and proceed to rendezvous with *Task Force Two* at Point Tare on Eleven J-Day. If delay in arriving at rendezvous is in prospect, advise Commander, *Task Force Two*, of the probable time of arrival. Transmit any such message prior to departing from the PEARL HARBOR area, if possible. Sweep as practicable along the route as required by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five.

(3) If the Commander-in-Chief is not present upon making the rendezvous, Commander *Task Force One* assume general charge of all further operations in connection with this reconnaissance and raid, and direct Commander *Task Force Two* to commence the raid at a suitable time after he has reported ready.

(4) Upon making rendezvous, assume command of battleships of *Task Force Two.*

(5) Cover operations of *Task Force Two*, as reenforced, from the area to the northward of the MARSHALLS, furnishing such support to that force as developments require, and keeping its commander informed as to the location of *Task Force One.* Detail escorts for any damaged ships of *Task Force Two* which it may be necessary to return to base.

(6) Utilize security offered by operations of patrol planes at WAKE.

[*II–3*] (7) After *Task Force Two* has completed raids and rejoined, if the Commander-in-Chief is not present, Commander *Task Force One* carry out further operations of a similar nature or conduct the combined forces to PEARL HARBOR at discretion.

(b) *Task Force Two*, reenforced as provided in this plan, reconnoiter and raid the MARSHALLS, carrying out the following approximate procedure:

(1) On One J-Day, unless otherwise directed, depart PEARL HARBOR with reenforcements provided by this Plan and proceed toward TAONGI; battleships and destroyer screen at fifteen knots, remainder of force at twenty knots. Sweep

along the route in accordance with Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I t
Plan O–1, Rainbow Five) and furnish security as practicable to *Task Fo*
Furnish destroyer escort to oilers as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) (1).

(2) Five J-Day, fuel the advance group from oilers at Rendezvous
other designated rendezvous.

(3) Six J-Day to Nine J-Day reconnoiter the MARSHALLS as follows

(i) Reconnoiter by air such atolls as weather conditions, forces, time an
opments permit, giving particular attention to ENIWETOK, BIKINI, R
LAP, WOTJE, JALUIT, KWAJALEIN, MALOELAP and ARNO.
noiter ENIWETOK particularly with a view to an early attack for its se

[*II–4*] (ii) So conduct reconnaissance as to leave the enemy in doul
what further reconnaissance is about to be undertaken, or as to what pa
places may be attacked.

(iii) Supplement air reconnaissance by reconnaissance from surface un
by landing patrols, and raid with forces immediately available if the si
and developments at the time indicate that such supplementary action is d
and feasible.

(iv) Utilize both photographic and visual observations to determine a
rately as practicable the opposition that may be expected to raids and
parties; and the targets suitable for air and surface bombardment. Of pa
interest are:

ships and aircraft;
storage tanks;
power plants and radio installations;
docks;
air fields;
storehouses and other buildings;
guns and observation posts;
mines;
channel and beach obstructions;
other defense installations;
beaches suitable for landing operations;
extent of anchorage area;
hydrographic, topographic, and
meteorological features.

(v) Retire on own battleships or *Task Force One* for assistance should
stances require.

(vi) Operate battleship group to furnish support as necessary.

(vii) Unless persistent bad weather or other unforeseen developments p
adjust operations to complete reconnaissance in four days or less after
initial flights over enemy territory.

[*II–5*] (viii) Upon the completion of reconnaissance, withdraw
Task Forces One and *Three*. Transfer battleships to *Task Force One*.
Force Three will merge into *Task Force Two* at this time.

(ix) Study and analyze information gained in reconnaissance; determin
the atolls to be raided and the specific objectives for attack. Complet
plans therefor, with due regard for subparagraph (4) below, and issue t
concerned. Via destroyer, furnish the Commander, *Task Force One* a
Commander-in-Chief, if present, with information and aerial photograp
tained, and copy of raiding plan.

(x) Report by visual (or by destroyer if out of signal distance) to the
mander-in-Chief, if he is within the general area, otherwise to the Comm
Task Force One, the time it is desired to place the raiding plan into effect.

(4) Beginning about Thirteen J–Day, when directed, carry out the
plan. In preparing and carrying out the raiding plan, be guided by the foll

(i) Make such additional air reconnaissance immediately prior to attack
meets the existing situation.

(ii) Attack the selected objectives with air and surface forces, the sch
attack being at the discretion of the Task Force Commander and desig
provide the best economy of force. Avoid directing enemy attention in a
to the objectives of attack.

[*II–6*] (iii) The priority of objectives is as follows:

combatant ships, tenders, and aircraft;
other ships;
fuel tanks;
power and radio installations;

troop concentrations;
storehouses;
other installations.

(iv) Except in unusual circumstances, no vessel expend more than twenty-five per cent of bombs or ammunition on *fixed* objectives.

(v) Where conditions appear favorable, land personnel to demolish installations and eliminate enemy personnel.

(vi) Do not enter lagoons with ships.

(vii) Make suitable arrangements for the protection of and withdrawal of damaged ships, requesting escorts from *Task Force One.*

(viii) If sufficient weakly held positions are developed to warrant further raids, carry them out, otherwise discontinue raids at discretion and join *Task Force One.*

(c) *Task Force Three.*—(1) If Atlantic Reenforcement has been detached, transfer two heavy cruisers at PEARL HARBOR to *Task Force Two.*

(2) If carrier is available, assign it to *Task Force Two* for this operation beginning J-Day.

[*II–7*] (3) While in the Northern Pacific carrying out the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five) employ radio to deceive enemy as to intentions in the MARSHALLS.

(4) If available, assign combat unit of about one hundred fifty marines to each cruiser which will eventually join *Task Force Two.*

(5) Upon completion of the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan on about Ten J-Day, join *Task Force Two* with cruisers and destroyers at Point Tare or other designated rendezvous. Thereafter operate as part of *Task Force Two* until released upon completion of the raiding operation of this plan.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) coordinate operations of patrol planes with those of other forces as follows:

(1) Prior to Five J-Day advance maximum practicable patrol plane strength to WAKE, MIDWAY, and JOHNSTON, leaving not less than two operating squadrons at OAHU.

(2) JOHNSTON-based planes, during passage of units of other forces to the westward, search along the route of advance from the vicinity of JOHNSTON to longitude one hundred seventy-eight degrees west.

(3) MIDWAY-based planes search sectors to the southwestward of MIDWAY to prevent surprise attack across that sector on units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

[*II–8*] (4) WAKE-based planes make preliminary air reconnaissance of TAONGI and BIKAR on Five J-Day, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and acquaint Commander *Task Force Two* with the results. Thereafter, conduct search, to the extent that available planes and supplies will permit, to prevent surprise attack from the westward by enemy surface forces on own units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

(5) On completion of the raiding operations of *Task Force Two* resume normal operations as required by paragraph 3242b. of the Fleet Operating Plan.

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).—No primary tasks in connection with this plan are assigned but:

(1) Submarines which may have been in the MARSHALLS in carrying out the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow Five) report enemy information obtained.

(2) While en route to patrol stations to the westward:

(i) Seize opportunities to damage important enemy units.

(ii) Avoid contacts with own forces.

(iii) Force Commander keep other forces advised of location and movements of submarines.

(f) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force). Despatch two oilers to carry out the following:

(1) Proceed on J-Day with destroyer escort provided by Commander *Task Force Two,* to rendezvous with the advance group of *Task Force Two* on Five J-Day at Point Tare, or as directed by Commander *Task Force Two.*

[*II–9*] (2) Thereafter conduct fueling and proceed as directed by Commander *Task Force Two.*

(x) (1) Seize every opportunity to damage the enemy, but avoid engaging at a disadvantage.

(2) Be alert to detect and destroy enemy mobile forces, particularly raids or expeditions which may be directed at our outlying islands.

(3) Restrict the use of radio to a minimum.

(4) This plan effective simultaneously with the execution of Phase IA of U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).

4. (a) Fuel from oiler as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) above.
(b) Fuel destroyers from large ships at discretion of force and group comm
(c) Logistic support for submarines and patrol planes as in U. S. Pacif
Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).
5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Pla
Rainbow Five.
(b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.
(c) Rendezvous Tare: Latitude sixteen degrees North; Longitude one h
seventy-seven degrees East.
(d) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised as to his loc

———— ————,
Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific

[*III–1*] ANNEX III

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, F
Place
Date

Communication Plan No. 1, Rainbow Five

USF–70 effective as modified herein. The numbered parts, section
paragraphs of USF–70 listed are effective in toto, or as indicated. C
numbered parts, sections, or paragraphs are not effective unless spec
made so by Task Force Commanders by supplementary communication p
1110. Effective.
1120. Effective. Unless otherwise directed this communication plan i
tive coincident with the placing in effect of Navy Plan O–1 Rainbow Five
1170 to *1178.* Effective.
1179. Effective. The above procedure shall be used for Radar contact
No receiver not supplied by Bureau of Ships shall be used for this or an
purpose until it has been thoroughly tested to assure that it does not tra
carrier from its oscillating circuit.
1180. Effective.
1190. Effective.
1212. Effective.
1220. Effective.
1330. Allied communications in Pacific Area are governed by SP 02376
Eastern Theater by current Andus publications.
[*III–2*] *2120.* Condition 19 effective.
2131. Effective.
2200. The radio frequency plans are as set forth in Appendix B, USF–70,
that Naval Coastal Frontier Defense Communication Plans will be gover
Article 4005, 1(a) of WPDNC–46.
No transmission shall be made on 500 kcs. frequency without the auth
the O. T. C. of a Task Force.
When the O. T. C. of a Task Force or component at sea considers that
is justified by the importance of the traffic concerned he may transmit t
the nearest shore radio station that guards the Naval Calling Frequency
or to Radio Washington or Honolulu on the 4235 kc series. He shall not,
in extreme emergency and when he is sure that the situation justifies t
answer calls or receive traffic on 355 kc, except by interception.
The various circuit guards required shall be so disposed as to permit th
mum number of ships to set watches on the radio direction finder, und
listening equipment and other intelligence equipment as directed by Tas
Commanders.
The Senior Commander of Units from different task organizations op
in the same area shall arrange for rapid means of inter-communications, pre
by available shore stations. Task Organization Commander in a port or
ing area shall establish an area radio frequency for use under circumstanc
visual systems will not serve. In port radio shall not be used [*III–3*]
inter-communication or communication with shore when a visual link or
exists or may be established.

Guard NPM Primary Fox regardless of geographical position.

2300. Effective.

2400. Effective.

2510. CSP–1161 effective with this communication plan and shall be used in lieu of CSP–776 for Task Organization command traffic.

2520. Use effective Confidential Radio Call Sign lists and ciphers for administrative traffic.

2540. Effective.

2720. Effective.

2740. Effective.

3000. Effective.

4120. Effective.

5000. Effective.

5230. Until receipt of satisfactory radio recognition device for aircraft the following approach and recognition procedure shall govern the approach of Naval aircraft to either units of the Fleet or Naval outlying island bases. Separate special procedure will be prescribed for major bases and areas.

Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising formation (if more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. [*III–4*] on odd days (GCT), and 135° T. or 315° T. on even days (GCT), from center of formation or station at 1000 feet or under. (These bearings may be changed if necessary by local authorities.) They shall never approach from the bearing on the sun when the sun is low.

If station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by making "Zs" on searchlight, or by training searchlight with red filter on plane if available; otherwise at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red rocket at night.

On seeing challenge plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, replies as follows:

(a) *Daytime.*—On odd day of the month (GCT), leave formation, circle to the right and, when back on the approach course, dip right wing twice, on even days (GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, when back on approach course, dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, dipping the wing about 30 degrees to the prescribed side and returning to horizontal after each dip.

(b) *Nighttime.*—Turn on running lights and proceed as for daytime replies to challenge, except circling may be omitted; or make emergency identification pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective CSP.

When approaching aircraft are recognized as friendly, the recognition station shall [*III–5*] train on the approaching aircraft a powerful searchlight, make "Fs" or show *green* colored light. Those signals indicate to planes that they are recognized as friendly and will not be fired on.

In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will be, unless otherwise designated, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. and 225° T. or 135° T. and 315° T. (depending on the day) from Fleet center.

0131. Effective.

6200. Effective.

6400. Effective.

6500. Effective.

6610. Effective.

7000 (less *7100*). Effective.

[*IV–1*]

ANNEX IV

Command relationships and coordination of activities at outlying bases

1. Forces operating from outlying stations or bases, under this Plan, may consist, broadly, of the following:

(a) Local Defense Forces, consisting of the local garrison and the local defense forces (which may include submarines and aircraft especially designated for this purpose), operating under the direct control of the base or station commander, and with the primary mission of defending the base or station against hostile attack.

(b) Fleet forces consisting of submarines, airplanes and possibly surface ships or detachments, operating under a fleet task force commander or commanders, whose missions, while contributing indirectly to local defense, are primarily dictated by broader strategical and tactical considerations in connection with other operations.

2. Command relationships, under these conditions, will be governed by following:

(a) The base or station commander will, normally, command and direct operations of local defense forces, in accordance with the directive of the C mander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (Commandant, Fourteenth Na District). This base commander, a task group commander under the Comman Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, who is himself a task force commander un the Commander-in-Chief, may, on occasion, also have functions of comman connection with Fleet units in the vicinity.

(b) Fleet forces will, normally, be operated in accordance with directive their respective Fleet task organization commanders. In entrance and egr use of facilities, arrangements for berthing and services, etc., they will conf to and be guided by the local regulations.

(c) In the event of contact with enemy forces which may threaten the b or the forces operating [*IV–2*] therefrom or in connection therewith, senior officer present in the base area will assume command of all forces and ac ities in the vicinity as necessary to take appropriate action against the threate enemy. As it is entirely possible that such procedure may temporarily di Fleet forces from some broader task contemplated by their task force comman of the Commander-in-Chief, local commanders must bear this in mind and red such diversion to a minimum. They must also, within the limits of the infor tion available to them, and as permitted by the urgent local situation, so di any action taken by Fleet units under their temporary command, as to furt the broad operating plan in effect.

(d) To obviate to a maximum the difficulties which are inherent in the c mand and communication relationships at such bases, it will be necessary insure that all interested commanders, including the commanders of bases c cerned, are made information addressees of all appropriate plans, orders, reports of enemy forces. Commanders of all forces within the area will ens that the base or station commander, as well as the Senior Officer Present familiar with the general nature of their orders and with their general operat (unless specifically directed otherwise).

(e) In general, the question of command in such circumstances is covered articles 801 and 1486, U. S. Navy Regulations.

(f) The shifting of vessels, squadrons, or other units within an area may re in consequent changes in seniority among those actually present.

3. (a) A Base Defense Plan and a supporting Communication Plan will prepared under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Front They must provide for the Fleet units present participating in the defense, for adequate communications among the various fixed and mobile forces, b local and Fleet. Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier will furn copies of such plans to appropriate fleet force commanders. [*IV–2*] latter will, whenever practicable, supply copies to units of their command p to departure for operations at the outlying base. A unit commander arriv in the area without receiving the plans in advance, however, will obtain them soon as possible after arrival.

(b) The Base Defense Plan should be analogous to the one currently in ef for the Pearl Harbor area. The Senior Officer Present, in exercising his funct of command (paragraph 2 (c) of this Annex) should normally conform to Base plans.

(c) The Communication Plan should include provisions for:

(1) Inter-communication between units of the local defense forces, and betw such forces and the local defense commander.

(2) Communication between local defense commanders and fleet task organi tion commanders.

(3) An area radio frequency which may be used within that area for both and (2) above and for inter-communication between the fleet task organizat commanders present.

EXHIBIT NO. 115

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES CONCERNING LOCATIONS OF JAPANESE FLEET UNITS

CONTENTS

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND
NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
1 NOVEMBER 1 9 4 1.

GENERAL- Traffic volume a little less than normal, receiving conditions fair but traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not very great. Fleet calls only changed, shore station calls and shore addresses not changed. It is believed that tactical calls also remain unchanged but not enough intercepted traffic to so state definitely. The same garble table for calls is employed so the change amounts to a reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have appeared but it is thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units or were in reserve. All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small amount of individual calls were recovered today. Because the new calls are not yet lined up save for the major Fleet Commanders and all time today was spent in call recovery, this summary will deal only with general impressions.

COMBINED FLEET- The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio traffic. The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of traffic to addresses placed in submarine and carrier category. No indications of movement of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were heard but little tactical traffic copied due to interference by NPM.

CARRIERS- The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in despatches from Tokyo and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast.

SUBMARINES- Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well lined up yet.

THIRD FLEET- This Fleet very active as before. The SECOND and FIRST BASE FORCEs are still marshalling their MARUs and the CINC is very busy with Tokyo.

CHINA- The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several messages from Saigon.

Sheet 1 of 1.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

2 November, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were fair but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution of new call system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new system not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individual calls. The number of alternate calls for major commands is increased over last system. So far there are seven alternate calls for the Combined Fleet.

Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air Force traffic is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air Force originating many dispatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SAMA and BAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelligence bureaus are originating periodic despatches, those from Tokyo being prefixed WIWI. There were several high precedence dispatches from Tokyo with the major fleet commanders as addressees.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
3 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday. Receiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages continue to eminate from TOKYO communications. Such an amount is unprecedented and the import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for activites of this nature. The impression is strong that these messages are periodic reports to the Major Commander of a certain nature. Dummy traffic is again being sent on the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval Intelligence TOKYO addressed two WIWI messages to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and to KUMI 8 (unidentified).

COMBINED FLEET - Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message to SUMIL information all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval Intelligence Tokyo, the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of Personnel. Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet also was associated in traffic with offices in the mandates, principally RNO PALAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined continues to be associated with the Carriers and Submarines.

THIRD FLEET - Third Fleet traffic continues at a high level. A movement report by RATI66(unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief Third Fleet for information.

AIR - A WE address today broke down as "ITIKOUKUU KANTAI". The literal reading of this as "1st Air Fleet" is correct it indicates an entirely new organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicate that this may be the case. An old call (YOME7) while never identified seemed to be in a high position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Corps. Upon movement of air units to TAIWAN the association of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3 with units of the Combined Air Force was apparent. Their assocation in a command sense between shore based air and fleet air had never occured before but under the concept of an AIR FLEET can easily be accepted. Traffic in the Air Force continues at a high level.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
4 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal with all circuits easily readable. More tactical traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and Carriers heard on tactical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four messages to Major Commanders. One of these was for information Chief of Staff China Fleet and one other for information of Chief of Staff Second Fleet.

AIR - High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of the air despatches were some in which various air corps w addressed and BAKO included for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addressed to SANCHOW Island Radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also noted as an addressee in several messages from SASEBO and originated two messages to SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two unident fied calls for information of Commander Combined Air Force, Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDivs Collective, BAKO and others. The Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message to Commander in Chief Third Fleet.

MANDATES - The RNO PALAO was active today, being addressed by Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKOSUKA. The PALAU weather station sent a long code message addressed to nearly all the islands of the Mandates. MARCUS Island appears as an originator. No Change in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted.

SUBMARINES - No activity noted.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
5 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving conditions were fair to good. TOKYO very active as an originator, sending out many messages of general address. Two WIWI messages in Kana Code sent by NGS to Chief of Staff CarDivs and TIYA44 (unidentified) respectively. The Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue active with many despatches passing between the two.

THIRD FLEET - Two units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKAO area. Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RISI4 and YOA2) it is not known how much of this fleet they represent. It is fairly certain that the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area although it is expected that he will before long. One message which may be a movement report from him was received late on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the Third Fleet does not permit of an estimate of the movement involved.

A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CARDIV 4 appeared today at BAKO. This Carrier Division was addressed as "less FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd Section ?) Whether or not there are other units at BAKO is not known. The Commander CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several dispatches today. The following were also associated, SANCHOW ISLAND, TAKAO AIRCORPS, CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO TAIHOKU originated many despatches to TOKYO and the French Indo China Forces. A TAIWAN originator sent one to Lieut. Comdr. SHIBA at the Embassy THAILAND for information to HANOI and the Commander French Indo China Forces.

BAKO originated numerous despatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet Commanders.

The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many despatches from TOKYO.

Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there is now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which will comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and will be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an unknown extent.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

6 November, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interferred somewhat. Today the specific call-up on the Tokyo broadcast was eliminated. Formerly Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the dispatch was addressed to a member of that unit. Beginning yesterday afternoon all broadcast messages are addressed to a single call without regard to the addressee of the message. The recovery of the radio organization will be hampered by this new advance in Communication Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this broadcast from which the address and originator were missing. This may be the start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo addressed a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and Submarine Force.

TAKAO-BAKO AREA - It is now certain that there is a very heavy air concentration on Taiwan. This comprises practically the entire Combined Air Force including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division and an unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the Third Fleet were located there today but it is believed that CinC Third Fleet is now enroute BAKO from SASEBO. From traffic association it is believed that some Second Fleet units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The South China Fleet Command has been active in dispatches to Taiwan addresses.

COMBINED FLEET - A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now appearing with secret (tactical) calls in use.

MANDATES - The Mandates traffic has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth Defense Force at Truk and the RNO PALOA continue to be the most active units.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

7 November, 1941

GENERAL - Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use of the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to all Combined Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which attached is very difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet forces, many of which have not yet been definitely identified or associated with known calls, renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of the prefix "JITSU" (authenticator for bonafide traffic) in several messages indicates that a communication drill is being held but without indication as to what units are participating and therefore much of the traffic is suspected of being "drill". Jaluit Radio is handling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to congestion of Mandate circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy concentrations in that area.

AIR - Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities, mainly centered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in the Mandates included in headings of messages. Despatches originated by Fourth Fleet Command included Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of Mandate activities in long headings.

FLEET - Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but identifications are not sufficiently certain to confirm this.

Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling fleet traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

8 November 1941

GENERAL -
Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies" appearin on the UTU. All UTU traffic was broadcast to the general call only. The Staff Communication Officer of the French Indo-China Force (So. Exp. For.) sent a despatch action to S.C.O. Combined INFO. S.C.O. Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, unidentified fle unit, Radio stations at Tokyo, Palao and Takao. This may indicate a contemplated coordination of communications between the Indo-China-South China areas and the Palao Island-Taiwan area. Secret calls were used very little as compared to the past few days and only three circuits were heard using them, including t Combined Fleet Commanders circuit and Air Station Net. North Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. All mandate circuits were active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all classes of Mandate addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis the Palao area at one end and the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other. Chichijima Air Station was included in much of the traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan Air with Jaluit Base Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijima usuall presages an air movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units involved are unidentified. Commander of unidentified sho activity (NEO 66) previously associated with the Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air which tentatively identifies hi as an air activity. Previous association of the Fifth Fleet traffic with Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief that Fifth Fleet operations are, or will be, in the area adjacent to Chichijima-Marcus, supplementing the Fourth Fleet i the lower island areas.

FLEET -
Chief of staff First Fleet originated a despatch through Kure Radio. Batdiv Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating separately from the main force, possibly in connection with Car divs Three and Four in the Taiwan-Naha area. An apparent movement report from Cardiv Four was addressed to CinC Combined Fleet, First Fleet, CarDiv Commander, Combined Air Force Commander and to movement offices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, Maizur and Sasebo. Traffic from the Commander Indo-China Force is han from the Japanese radio station at Saigon rather than from the KASHII, indicating that the staff is based ashore at present. identifiable submarine activity was noted.

AIR - Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The area between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to be particularly concerned with movement of air force and auxiliaries, while the formation of a force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-Bako area appears to be nearly completed as indicated by reports addressed to CinC. Combined, Naval Minister, Commanders of Cardivs, Combined Air Force, Firs

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COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

6 November, 1941

AIR - (Continued)
Fleet and shore addresses generally associated with movements or organization changes. This force is belived to include CarDiv Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with a number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly some units from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the force highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior to change of calls, much traffic was exchanged between China, South China and Indo-China while at present most traffic includes Palao.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

9 November 1941

GENERAL -

Traffic volume heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but heavy static caused numerous garbles and fragmentary messages. Navy Minister sent several messages of general address including one to all First and Second class Naval stations. Practically all of the general messages carried SAMA as an information address. Carrier Division Three arrived at Takao and there are indications that Carrier Division Four will return to Sasebo from Takao. The Flagship of Carrier Divisions is AKAGI and is in Sasebo area. Some tactical traffic today shows units of Combined Fleet still operating. The association of Batdiv Three and Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may indicate operations of that unit in the Marianas. The JINGEI was communicating with SAMA, HAINAN today. The Chief of Staff of the French-Indo China Force is in Tokyo.

One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to MAIZURU for delivery but this is believed a communication error. The Third Fleet appears to be still in Sasebo area but it was noted that considerable traffic passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The Fifth Fleet is still being organized with no indications yet that it has assembled. The Eighteenth Air Corps at Saipan originated much traffic to Yokosuka Air Corps.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

10 November, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were fewer general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo Intelligence still active and addressing dispatches to all Major Commanders. The Mandates construction traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is progressing but has been slowed down by the general call-up used on Fleet broadcast.

COMBINED FLEET - Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A staff officer of BatDiv Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this whole division is there also. The CinC, Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well as two cruiser divisions.

THIRD FLEET - The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area. Several movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none have been noted other than individual ships. At least two units of this fleet still at Takao. CinC Three originated one movement report for information of CinC Fourth Fleet.

FOURTH FLEET - Little activity. CinC. Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk with major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of Submarine Force sent a message to the CinC. Fourth for information of Jaluit.

FIFTH FLEET - One unit of this fleet located at Chishijima.

AIR - The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of Carrier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. CinC. Combined Air Force is still in Takao.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
12 November 1941.

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving condition about average. The general character of the traffic has been administrative with most of it being between shore logistic and technical activities. The D. F. net was active today with very little activity shown yesterday Intercept operators have commented adversely on the major shore network which comprises all of the major naval activities in the Empire. Traffic has been moving slowly over this circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the operators and the definite lack of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. TOKYO Intelligence is still sending messages to the major commands but the remainder of TOKYO traffic has been mostly from the technical bureaus.

COMBINED FLEET - The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area. The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates stations is born out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3 which places him about halfway between CHICHIJIMA and MARCUS Island. Their position was obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet identified. No subsequent bearings have been obtained. Also associated with this BATDIV are a Submarine Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the association of this CARDIV (Lately returned from TAKAO) is not positive. The Third Fleet remains at SASEBO with the only activity exhibited in the Base Forces.

AIR - CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE. Most of air activity confined to dispatches between carrier and shore establishments.

FIFTH FLEET - Nothing to report.

FOURTH FLEET - The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The volume of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Commander Submarine Force is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addressed a message there. AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the direction. Communication exercises were held by JALUIT and several stations in that area. YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO.

CHINA - The previous activity of SAMA and the French Indo China forces and bases continues.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
13 November 1941.

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several messages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are:

1. UNIWIWI despatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval Station.

2. WIWI from N.G.S. to MAIZURU INFO Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.

3. NIKAWIWI from N.G.S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet and SAMA, HAINAN.

4. UNIWIWI from N.G.S. to Secretary First Fleet.

5. (2 messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above.

6. A 3 part NIKAWIWI from N.G.S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet.

7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA, INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet.

This is the only occurence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO intelligence activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China Fleet Intelligence Bureau were active all day with despatches to the Major Commanders.

The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7 (near CHINKAI), JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports.

COMBINED FLEET - The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is operating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communication Officer is communicating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in this division remain unlocated but it is assumed, lacking evidence to the contrary, that they are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet seem inactive. One Cruiser Division of Second Fleet is associated in traffic with PALAO and may be in that area.

THIRD FLEET - Still located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been active in the traffic, being addressed by both TOKYO and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several messages but no indication of change of location.

FOURTH FLEET - The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is in communication with the Sixth BASEFORCE JALUIT. Several messages were exchanged. He appears to be preparing for a move from TRUK but no movement has yet occurred. SUBRON 2 is again in communication with JALUIT and today originated a movement report, but no indication of direction.

AIR - Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still with them and a few may be engaged in target practice near KURE. The Combined AIRFORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high traffic level between its component Air Corps still exists.

CHINA - The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one by the RNO TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is still in SHANGHAI.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

14 November. 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor to fair receiving conditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated several AlNav dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated today.

1. UNIWIWI from N.G.S. and HUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet, Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA.
2. WIWI from N.G.S. and HUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO.
3. UNIWIWI from N.G.S. to ANI758 (Chief of Staff of an unidentified unit), Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in addition to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair amount of activity.

COMBINED FLEET - Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is still operating but no further information on this division. Two Combined Fleet units appear active in the traffic. They are DesRon Three (normally in First Fleet but has been operating with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second Fleet. Both of these units have been associated in traffic with the South China Fleet and the French Indo China Force. They may proceed to the South China area in near future.

THIRD FLEET - Still in Sasebo area. The CinC. has been addressed by Tokyo to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in traffic. It has been noted that the association between the Third Fleet and units of the Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps. Will air units be embarked in ships of the Base Force?

FOURTH FLEET - No movement yet from the TRUK area. It appears that the Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the staff were addressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations.

SUBMARINES - No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO and Submarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by Tokyo and Yokosuka originators.

AIR - One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HAINAN. The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good representation of his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with most of them in port.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

15 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address messages originated by Communication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers, Ominato, U K 9 (D.F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Takao and Sama Radios, Staff Communication Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Communication Officer South Expeditionary Force and two apparent collective shore addressees. Traffic from all stations mentioned except Sama and Calmato to D. F. Control and Plotting Room Tokyo information to Staff Communication Officer Combined Fleet was encrypted. No messages of the D. F. type were detected so it is presumed that the interchange had to do with arrangements for drill or organization of the net. The Minister of the Navy originated one Kinav and one to all Major Commands and collective shore. Tokyo personnel and Tokyo Communication Division originated several to collective fleet and shore. Significance is not determined though it is believed possible that a further partial change of shore and air calls may be in prospect. The Empire air station net was normally active using tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet originated one Urgent Code to unidentified (NINI 55), Staff Communication Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and Commanding Officer of Batdiv Three flagship.

COMBINED FLEET - Same as yesterday, same units (Batdiv Three, Desrons One and Three) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force. CinC Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging operations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units.

THIRD FLEET - Inactive.

FOURTH FLEET - Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or underway, with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CinC. Fourth traffic still being handled from the Truk area, with Air-ron Twenty-four (Kamoi) and associated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some movement, direction undetermined. All Marshall Island activities, including unidentified Army Forces, exchanging traffic freely.

SUBMARINE FORCE - Little activity detected. It is believed that some submarine activity is operating or preparing to operate in the Marshall area, from communication arrangements underway between Staff Communication Officer Submarine Force and some Fourth Fleet, Information to Jaluit. Jaluit has been heard working on various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure associated with submarine operations, but no identifications of calls have been made.

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COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

15 November 1941

AIR - Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified Airron (formerly YOKE 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama addressees in traffic. Composition of this force and purpose still speculative but believed to be preparing to move southward to work with the South Expeditionary Force.

The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis of traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries of alternates are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes available for research.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

16 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A new form of despatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcasted on the regular UTSU series. Only the originator or the address of the dispatch appeared; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or address may be buried in the text. These dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text) all in the nine-Kana period separator system and the single call in the heading fitted in each case Line seven of the call garble table.

A dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major Fleets and general addresses to this effect:

"Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of a decision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows:

1. Resolution of House of Peers - (Expressed deepest thanks and emotion to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period to the Empire and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in battle.

2. Resolution of House of Representatives - Expressed thanks, etc., to all officers and men of Army, Navy and Air Force for their 4½ years service (in China affair) and for their contribution to the establishment of a permanent world peace. Gave prayers for well being of all hands, etc.."

FIRST AND SECOND FLEETS - Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain in the general Kure area. The units of these two fleets that have been most active from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear to be:

Airon Seven (3 Chitose class)
Carrier Division Four
Destroyer Squadron Seven
Destroyer Squadron Three
Battleship Division Three
Cruiser Division Seven.

It is rather singular that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed an important role in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet units recently. In some of these dispatches the call identified as Southern Expeditionary Force (Indo-China Force) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches have thrown the Second and Third Fleets with the Combined Air Force and in other dispatches, there appears to be an association between First Fleet, Carrier Divisions and the Mandates.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

16 November 1941

FIRST AND SECOND FLEETS - (Continued)
It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron One has been or is operating with the Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division Three while Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three have been operating together. Iwakuin Air sent short priority dispatch to the ATAGO, Second Fleet cruiser and submarine units indicating some joint minor exercises in that area.

THIRD FLEET - Believed inactive in Sasebo - Kure area.

FOURTH FLEET - KUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an unidentified fleet unit (NEN 33), information to CinC. Combined Fleet, Communication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Saipan Base Force, Kure Movement Officer, CinC, Fifth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NEO 66, believed to be a shore based air activity in Chichijima-Marcus area.

FIFTH FLEET - Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition of the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite but appeared to contain several naval auxiliary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been recovered of the composition of this mythical fleet but it is definite that some units are operating in the general Yokosuka Chichijima-Marcus.

SUBMARINES - Little activity. Communication Officer, Submarine Force originated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to Combined Fleet Communication Officer. Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet commands continues.

SECRET

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

17 November, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. More traffic with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit. These dispatches numbered serially and each call different but all fitting the same line in the call garble table. Since these messages are transmitted each hour on the hour and are of approximately the same length it appears that they are drill messages. It is feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a heading. Since none of this traffic has been found going in to Tokyo it is probably originated in the Navy Ministry. Very few messages of general address were noted. Tactical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day with radio Saipan controlling.

COMBINED FLEET - No movement from the Kure area of any major portion of the First or Second Fleets. The CinC. Second Fleet very active as an originator today. He continues to address units which are [redacted] normally under his command. He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Palau Forces, and the Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.

THIRD FLEET - Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of Third Fleet was addressed by the R.N.O. Palau.

FOURTH FLEET - The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area centered about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit. Both these activities originated traffic.

AIR - The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed by the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostlyin the Kure-Sasebo area with the exception of a few which are operating in the Kyushu area.

CHINA - Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R.N.O. Taihoku addressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island, Sama, Bako, CinC. South China, and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

18 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions fair to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general address emanating from the Communication Section. The double originator BUMIL and N.G.S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet for information to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also addressed an urgent dispatch to SAKA, information to R.N.O. TAINOKU, Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator, believed to be N.G.S., sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. MAIZURU Naval Station also sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, French Indo Chine Force and for information to N.G.S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent three long dispatches to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active today with many bearings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff sent one to Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French Indo China Force.

COMBINED FLEET - CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an originator and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the address of every important message, he will no longer be mentioned as an addressee unless he is the only addressee. The association between the CinC Second Fleet and the French Indo China Forces and Combined Air Force is very plain. He was addressed by CinC. French Indo China Force today in an urgent NIKA dispatch. Several units of the Combined Air Force also addressed several dispatches to him. Battleship Division Three, the Carrier Divisions and two destroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic. Several dispatches occured today, being addressed by N.G.S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in several instances. The CinC. Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches to him. These form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be in command of a large Task Force comprising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some carrier divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home waters has been noted.

THIRD FLEET - The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears to be a movement report. He also sent one to R.N.C. TAIHOKU, information to CinC. Third Fleet. There were other units tentatively placed in Third Fleet who sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was an addressee. It is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the Sasebo area in the near future. This Second Base Force was having quite a bit of traffic with several Air Corps a while ago and may be transporting air units or equipment.

FOURTH FLEET - Not much activity in this fleet. The amount of traffic between this fleet and Palao is noticeable with the submarines still interested in Jaluit.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

19 November, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates was noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also very light. Some tactical traffic received from Combined Fleet units. There has been a noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the normal amount usually seen. Fleet units seem to have a great deal of business with other Fleet units both within and outside of their own organization. Staff Officers are frequently addressed at other than their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has subsided somewhat in that there were fewer general messages than for the past few days. Tokyo Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Second Fleet, Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAIA for information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet. The Navy Minister sent out two AlNavs. The Direction Finder net is still active with all stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making reports to major commanders.

COMBINED FLEET - The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today at Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed. Destroyer Squadron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet continues his activity, being still associated with Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three. Carrier Division Three was in Takao and returned to the Empire a week ago and has been associated with Third Fleet since. A Bako activity addressed the Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The Chief of Staff Second Fleet addressed an urgent dispatch to CinC. French Indo China Fleet information to Third Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five.

THIRD FLEET - Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and of the Base Forces originated movement reports but no indication of direction. CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo.

FOURTH FLEET - Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base Defense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second Fleet was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appears at Jaluit today. This call has been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message is correct it appears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the Jaluit area. This in not confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence at Jaluit is doubted, attributing the message to be a communication error.

FIFTH FLEET - Flagship located at Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet appeared in a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

20 - 21 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal. Tokyo originators active with messages addressed to all major commanders. N.G.S. sent a UNI WIWI to Commandant BAKO for information to Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at Tokyo become very active on the 21st sending out a series of long personnel messages. The activity at Tokyo identified as R.D.F. plotting stations increased his recent high volume of messages with a long four part message addressed to all major commanders. He also addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder net, indicating the employment and results being obtained by this activity. The traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy that the circuit was in duplex operation most of the mid-watch.

COMBINED FLEET - Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area and most of both fleets remain in Kure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division Three still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet continues obnormally high. A list of units addressed by him or who sent traffic to him and CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows:

HIRA 9	(Carrier Division Three)	ENO 7	(Unidentified)
TAE 1	(Airron 7)	AKU 8	(Air Unit)
KAME 5	(Airron 6)	KUSU 7	(Unidentified)
YAWI 1	(Crudiv 5)	SATU 88	(Unidentified)
KEMU 3	(Crudiv 7)	KUNI 88	(Unidentified)
RESE 4	(Desron 3)	OYU 9	(Unidentified)
AKI Ø	(Desron 4)	KONA Ø	(Unidentified)
TIYA 7	(Comdr. 1st Base For)	NOTU 6	(Unidentified)
SASE 3	(Comdr. 2nd Base For)	NETE 5	(Unidentified)
YOMO 9	(Desron 5)	NSI 3	(Unidentified)
REA 2	(Shiogama Air Corps)	SUTE 1	(Unidentified)
KUNO 9	(Erimo)	YAYU 1	(Unidentified)
HIMO 3	(Air Unit?)	MARE 5	(Unidentified)
TUI 7	(Unidentified)	Plus 11 Marus.	

This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him but only the ones occurring in the past two days. Each one appeared not only with the CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one of the units now in South China or a Taiwan-South China Address. A complete list is being made up but was not finished at this writing. Assuming that the entire Second Fleet will be included in this organization and that each unit addressed will either participate or contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that it will comprise a good portion of the navy. One item stands out - so far there has been practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or Third Fleets in connection with South China activities. Commander Submarine Force has not been included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Fleet and Mandates traffic.

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COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

20 - 21 November 1941

MANDATES AND FOURTH FLEET - The R.N.O. Palao and Palao radio stations have remained active with the Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka for days. This is taken to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active with the R.N.O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so great it may be that he will assign some non-Second Fleet units to that area but just which ones is not yet known. From information from radio sources there is no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base Force which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units routed there and the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to that area. With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as either a carrier unit or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron of the Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is far greater than that existing at Palao.

JAMMIT

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

22 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises are now completed. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs and sent two other messages, one to CinC Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and Commander Submarine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual long messages to CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. BuMil addressed Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering Section at Peleliu and Yokosuka. Another unidentified Tokyo originator sent a priority message to all major flags and China Fleet, information to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao. Sasebo addressed one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Bako, Sama, Chief of Staff South China, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, Commander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander Destroyer Squadron Three. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three to South China Area soon? While the Direction Finder Net is still active, the station at Palao sent in more bearings than usual for that station.

COMBINED FLEET - CinC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two unidentified calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged between these three commanders was very great. One message addressed many units as follows:

CinC. Second Fleet. To: METE 5 (Crudiv ?), KOO 2 (Subron 5) TIYU 66 (CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force), MIRA 9 (CarDiv 3), RESE 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collective), less Crudiv 8 and unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3)(at Kure and Sasebo), Airron 7 (at Kure), SUTI 1 (?) (at Kure), SATU 8 (?)(at Kure), META Ø (AKASHI)(at Kure) META 2 (ASAHI MARU), TUFU 2 (?), NARI 33 (CinC. China Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), MISI 66 (CinC. Comb. Fleet).

THIRD FLEET - CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN SANBOUTEU MAEDATI SEUZEU (at Tainoku). This is translated as "Army Chief of Staff General MAEDATI and indicates the linking of the Taiwan Army Forces with Third Fleet. The CinC Third Fleet continues his association with Combined Air Forces.

FOURTH FLEET - CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. The Third Base Force at Palao and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and Yokosuka. He also received one from Commander Submarine Force.

CHINA - The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC. Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to Secretary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier Divisions, Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet.

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COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

23 November, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has increased. Some of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed:

1. MAYURU (Tokyo address) to HORONO MUSEKU (Collective Shore Information Chiefs of Staff Combined, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and Southern Expeditionary Force.

   Precedence
   NIKA-NIWI

2. Third Fleet Chief of Staff to Second Fleet Chief of Staff Information Combined and Southern Expeditionary Force Chief of Staff.

   NIKA

3. KESANA EONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force. Information "SAMKUYUTI" at Sama Hainan.

   NIWI

4. SUTE 1 (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Radio Takao, Hainan, Flagship NKA 2, information Radio Tokyo and Second Fleet flagship.

   NIKA

5. Imakuni Air to Iwakuni Air Detachment at NAF Information Kure, Ba.o, and MINO 3 in Takao.

   KIU

Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First Fleet, Third Fleet, and others. The following AE address was followed by Sasebo Radio in the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch "SAHOTI.RENGO.RI.SI".

An unidentified fleet unit (SUTE 1) listed recently in Kure appeared on radio circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this circuit were the following:

KENU 3 - CruDiv 7 Flagship?
HOWI 2 - Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
HIE 8 - Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
KUSE 5 - Naval Auxiliary associated with Second Fleet.

The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated by CinC Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to outline the forces expected to operate in the Indo-China general area.

COMBINED FLEET - CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange of fleet commander traffic, but no important messages originated by him were intercepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned in summaries of 22nd were still being circulated but Third Fleet appeared as the most active unit in today's traffic. Indications are that Third Fleet units are underway in

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COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

23 November, 1941

a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air Force and French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force (So. Exp. For) was included in all important traffic from Second, Third and Combined Air Commanders, Hainan addressees were included in nearly all high precedence messages concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous of forces in that area. Palao appeared as an information addressee on a portion of the traffic. Fourth Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and Marshalls on the other. With no means of substantiating the impression, it is believed that more submarines are operating in, or from, the Marshalls than it has been possible to definitely place from radio interceptions. It is recalled that there was an exchange between Staff Communication Officers of the Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet with Jaluit included as either action or information around November 1st and that Jaluit opened a direct circuit to Yokosuka early this month, apparently to relieve traffic congestion from that area. Jaluit Radio Has been heard on various frequencies using, and working with units using tactical or secret type calls, while the main submarine frequency of 6385/12770 has been relatively inactive.

AIR - Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area, while the Mandate Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole Mandate area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier Division Three definitely associated with Second Fleet operations.

CHINA - CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third, Air Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic and were quiet. Bearings from Cavite and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan, but this is believed questionable.

Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few days and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent or actually underway, at least in part, to the southward, with covering forces operating from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled or gathering in the Palao area.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

24 November, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal. Traffic analysis impressions are unchanged from yesterday's report. The difficulties of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and fleets to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area. If the poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and the assumption made that Radio Heeia intercepted their "share" of the total traffic, the following impressions are worth something:

(a) The falling off of traffic to China addresses.
(b) The increased activity among third fleet addresses with a high percentage of what appears to be movement reports.
(c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat addresses.

The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in despatch traffic, the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force Commander with the latter.

FIRST AND SECOND FLEETS - Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet, Commander Southern Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The CinC. Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a large number of units from First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three and Combined Air Force units.

THIRD FLEET - Large number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC. Third Fleet appears as information addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with CinC. Third Fleet.

FOURTH FLEET AND MANDATES - Fourth Fleet appears to be concentrated in Truk area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have come from Truk. Air Squadron Twenty-four and perhaps a large number of submarines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area.

SUBMARINES - Comparatively little activity.

CHINA - Comparatively quiet.

CARRIERS -No definite indications of location.

COMBINED AIR FORCE - Commander Kanoya Air [illegible] Tokyo. Otherwise no change.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

25 November, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal. Receiving conditions much improved over last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various units. Tokyo originated one UNI WIWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet, CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet and CinC. French, Indo China Force plus Yokosuka, Kure and Maizuru. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs. A Direction Finder Net, controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret calls being sent by the five stations. The entire fleet traffic level is still high which leads to the conclusion that organizational arrangements or other preparations are not yet complete.

COMBINED FLEET - Little activity by CinC. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet remains highly active as an originator, addressing Third Fleet, Air Forces and South China units. A Second Fleet unit and a submarine division or squadron arrived in Takao communication zone today. Crudivision Seven which previously arrived there has been associated with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicates the presence of that unit in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still exchanging messages. Two new units to be associated with CinC Second Fleet and the Task Force now forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One.

AIR - Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps has been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of the Combined Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China Area although this is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates.

FOURTH FLEET - CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander Carriers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth Base Forces.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

26 November, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal. All circuits heard well except for Tokyo-Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic picture about the same as for the past week. Intra-fleet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo Bureaus still dispatching AlNavs. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC. Second and Third Fleets in particular. The only MAN schedule was NR15 which was first broadcast on the twenty-fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic today than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC. Second Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working the ISUZU (flagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations directly. Takao is also working ITSUBA (Spratleys).

COMBINED FLEET - Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via SAMA, indicating the arrival of that unit in Hainan waters. While no indications were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is probable that this unit is still in company with Cruiser Division Seven and is also present at Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet became active in the traffic today being associated with the Second and Third Fleets. The tanker HAYATOMO appeared in several of CinC. Second Fleet's dispatches today as well as the SOYO MARU. No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of the newly formed force. The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the Combined Air Force still continues at it's high level.

FOURTH FLEET - No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive communication with Saipan forces as well as Palao forces. The KATORI and CinC. Submarine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima.

FIFTH FLEET - The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dispatches of the Second Fleet and is associated with the new Task Force.

SUBMARINES - As noted above Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima area. The Submarine Squadron NETE5's location is somewhat uncertain today due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this dispatch is doubted because of the indication of her arrival at Takao yesterday and her previsous association with Cruiser Division Seven.

CHINA - Two Marus of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today.

THIRD FLEET - Active as above but no indication of large scale movement from the Sasebo area.

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COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

27 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the frequencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Takao circuit unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama, and Saigon active as originators, addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Staff of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed the Chief of Staff Third Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence activity who sent five despatches to the major commanders. The Direction Finder activity was very high with all stations sending in bearings including the Marshall Islands Station which has been silent for the past four days.

COMBINED FLEET - No further information as to whether or not Destroyer Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to be still with Cruiser Division Seven in that area. There is still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator lately. CinC. Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and Bako.

THIRD FLEET - Still holding extensive communication with Baka, Sama, South China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of KE addresses is increasing, those occurring today were:
"DAIHATIFUTAI"TAISANBOTSU" (in Taihoku)
"KOROKUKITISIKI"
"KIZUKIYAMASITA"TAI" (in care of RYUJO)
"ISIZUKITAIGUNDAIGOHRSUSEU"
These is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet.

FOURTH FLEET - CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the Commander Submarine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air Corps held communication with Jaluit and CinC. Fourth Fleet. The Civil Engineering Units at [illegible] were heard from after being silent for weeks. Chitose Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron Twenty-four is still operating in the Marshalls. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates.

AIR - An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the HORYU and SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of further movement of any Combined Air Force units to Hainan.

SUBMARINES - Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area.

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COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

November 28, 1941.

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal. Communications to and from South China and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As has been previously reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is very active and is becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity addressed more messages to the Radio net than previously and most of these sent for information to the Major Commanders. Much traffic also was directed to NRE (the TOKYO D.F. Command) from all eight stations in the Mandates and OMINATO. This Command also originated messages of high precedence to the Major Fleet Commanders. This activity is interpreted to indicate that the R.I. net is operating at full strength upon U.S. Naval Communications and IS GETTING RESULTS.

TOKYO originators were active with messages of high precedence to the Commander in Chief's of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. The Navy Minister sent to Alnavs. The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent one to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third Fleet, French Indo - China Force, Second Fleet and RNO PALAO. The BUAERO sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info IJN SI and 11th Air Corps at SAIPAN.

COMBINED FLEET - No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units. Commander in Chief Second Fleet originated his usual number of despatches to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid particular attention to by the Commander in Chief Second Fleet were CRUDIVS Five and Seven and DESRONS Two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO (CA).

THIRD FLEET - Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present with the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not yet located elsewhere. The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding communications with the Commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO.

FOURTH FLEET - Bulk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief Fourth addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the Fourth Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at RUOTTO and WOTJE and held communications with AIRRON Twenty-Four and KAMOI.

SOUTH CHINA - SAMA sent several messages to shore addresses in the Empire. SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages which went for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed the Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, the French Indo China Force and Combined Air Force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed SUKUGAWA Air Corps and YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN office now at SAIGON originated several messages to the Naval Bases at SASEBO and KURE. The Commander in Chief China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief Second and Commander in Chief Third Fleets.

SUBMARINES - Except for the mention of SUBRONS Five and Six in two despatches there was no submarine activity today.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

29 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume above normal. The traffic to South China still very high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Tokyo-Takao circuit but was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today's traffic is made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to Major Commanders both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the Major Commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, radio Yokosuka sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The Direction Finder Net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. One message for Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station included Commander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated his usual two AlNavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force and the South China Units. The unit which has been addressed as the "103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch today whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls. It is apparent that he has no Navy call list. One address was "JUITIKOUKUUKANTAI" "11th AIR FLEET". Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use of KANTAI is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is unknown.

COMBINED FLEET - The arrival of Air Squadron Seven in Takao area is confirmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confirmed nor denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the immediate command of CinC. Second Fleet:

CARDIV THREE	[illegible]	DESRON TWO	[illegible]
SURRON FIVE	[illegible]	DESRON FOUR	[illegible]
SURRON SIX	[illegible]	THIRD FLEET	
CRUDIV FIVE	[illegible]	FRENCH INDO CHINA FORCE	
CRUDIV SEVEN	[illegible]		

Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships but their assignment is not yet definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff; Commander in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above. Only one message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This was addressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Force, CRUDIV Four and BUNILAFF. The HUKKI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fleet

THIRD FLEET - Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to Comdesron Five, Number Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One and Comdesron Two and Four. He held extensive communications with the Commander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKA. Two more units of Third Fleet made movement reports.

FOURTH FLEET - Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander in Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. He is still in TRUK area.

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SUBMARINES - Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed through SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday.

SOUTH CHINA - CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander addressed several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The Commander in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China Naval Bases and the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
November 30, 1941.

GENERAL - Traffic volume less than for past few days. Todays traffic consisted largely of despatches bearing old dates, some as far back as 26 November. No reason can be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for past few days has prevented the repetition of despatches. The number of despatches originated on the 30th is very small. The only tactical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARUs. The TOKYO Intelligence activity originated two WIWI despatches to Major Fleet Commanders. One urgent despatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff, Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force; Submarine Force and China Fleets.

COMBINED FLEET - The Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet are in KURE. In the same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet was not at any location. Other traffic indications are that he is at sea. Commander in Chief Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force but also included KOMOO and HIYEI, which places them as members of his Task Force. The Commander in Chief Second Fleet is no longer adding PALAO activities and has not for past two days. The RNO PALAO today addressed two messages to TAIWAN GUNSIREIBU (TAIWAN Army Headquarters).

THIRD FLEET - Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to COMDESRON Two, Four and Five; COMCRUDIV Five; First and Second Base Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway.

FOURTH FLEET - Believed to be still in TRUK area. D.F. activity in Marshalls a little greater today than normal. JALUIT addressed Commander Submarine Force and AIRRON 24 in one despatch. The continued association of JALUIT and Commander Submarine Force plus his known progress from the Empire to CHICHIJIMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the Marshalls. Since one of his large units (SITI 4) arrived in the Marshalls some time ago this unit cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a submarine concentration in that area. Every evidence points to a concentrationof not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA AIR CORPS presence in that area points to intended air-submarine operations from the Marshalls. Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed.

SOUTH CHINA - BAKO active with despatches to Second and Third Fleets, Combined Air Force and SAMA. Commander in Chief China Fleet becoming more and more active as an originator with despatches to the Task Force. He made a movement report with the South China Fleet as an information addressee. The Staff Communication Officer of the South China Fleet was addressed at Shanghai today.

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SECRET

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1 December 1941

GENERAL - All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November, 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December indicates that an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls, there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromises. Either that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending.

FIRST FLEET - Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters. [redacted]

SECOND FLEET - This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is made that this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force are definitely in the Indo-China area (Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three most prominent).

THIRD FLEET - Nothing to report except that the same association of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces continues.

FOURTH FLEET - No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area.

FIFTH FLEET - Nothing to report.

SUBMARINES - Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan. Flagship somewhere in this general area.

CARRIERS - No change

COMBINED AIR FORCE - No change.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

2 December 1941

GENERAL - The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao Radio received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao Radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao. The change of calls on December first has prevented this office from making definite statements at this date of the units now in the Southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai Radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues to appear in Shanghai. ComSixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south by Camranh Bay. This group is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons five and six, which units normally operate with the First Fleet but have been included repeatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern operations.

There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo. Hainan continues as a prominent address. Palao and Third Base Force is holding the same relative importance.

FIRST FLEET - Dispite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appears relatively quiet. From inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing indicates one Combined Fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets and apparently in company while another Combined Fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets.

SECOND FLEET - No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company . Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated and unobserved since change of calls.

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SECRET

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

2 December 1941

THIRD FLEET - Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way in some of the Third Fleet traffic.

MANDATES - Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues. Some traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through Truk.

CARRIERS - Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.

COMBINED AIR FORCE - This force continues to be associated closely with Second, Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have undoubtedly left the Takao area.

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SECRET

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND
NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY - 3 DECEMBER 1941

GENERAL- Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present state of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identification of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long despatches to the CINC COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence originated nine despatches to the same addresses.

The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is indicated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is indicated for delivery by that station. It is the impression that both SECOND and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence means.

There are some FOURTH FLEET Units in the Marshall Islands area including some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not known. The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to CINC FOURTH.

Some Swatow Units were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many despatches to the KUO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander.

No information on submarines or Carriers.

Sheet 1 of 1.

SECRET

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

4 December 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far only a few messages have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages today, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Among others Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven part message to Chiefs of Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force and Sama. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders.

COMBINED FLEET - The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the CinC. Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which CinC. Second Fleet is still copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force Palao, CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet.

FOURTH FLEET - The CinC. Fourth Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air Corps, Chitose Air, Air Squadron Twenty-four, Third Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No further check could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's traffic being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and MUSI 88 (which is believed to be an oil tanker).

SOUTH CHINA - Bako continues as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China Commanders, all units in that area quiet.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

December 5, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broadcast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operation. There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO radio working SAMA and BAKO sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic to Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic for these units also. It is noted that some traffic being broadcast is several days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization.

There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused by the jammed condition of all circuits.

A plain language message was sent by the Captain, [redacted] from Tokyo to Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau saying that " in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said is considered important at this end but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon".

COMBINED FLEET - Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either.

THIRD FLEET - In one WE address a "Chief of Staff" sent a message to "Commander Fourteenth Army aboard RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet. HITOYONGUN.SATI (IRO 1 REUZEU MARU). A number of MARUS have been addressing the CinC. Third Fleet.

FOURTH FLEET - The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication Officer of the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening the impression that the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The Commander of the South China Fleet has been addressing Palao radio [redacted], the RMO PALAO and the Commander Second Fleet.

SOUTH CHINA - SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO continues as an active originator with many dispatches to Second and Third Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force appears to be busy with the movement of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA Air and at least two unidentified corps are moving, probably to Indo-China.

Wheller Saturday P.M. 6 December 1944.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
December 6, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic. This is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level but is the result of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now holding broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts), SAIPAN, OMINATO and TAKAO.

Yesterday's high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained with the Intelligence activity still sending periodic messages. Practically all of TOKYO's messages carry prefixes of high priority.

COMBINED FLEET - Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers, Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders.

FOURTH FLEET - The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK area. It is doubtfull that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain that some members of his staff were there over the past few days. There is a definite close association between the Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces in South China. This unit is constantly sending messages to the Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It is being almost entirely neglected by Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet under whose command it normally operates. RONGELAB radio addressed the PALAO weather observer.

FIFTH FLEET - This fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN Sea with OMINATO broadcasting traffic for this unit.

SUBMARINES - The Commander Submarine Force originated two messages to his command. These are the first two originated since 1 December He is definitely in the MARSHALLS.

SOUTH CHINA - Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAO still sending many messages to the Task Force.

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

by

PACIFIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

27 October 1941 - 6 December 1941

SECRET INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating ___ Serial No. ___ Date 27 October 1941

Latest information of locations of units of Orange Fleet is:

Takao Area: CVs AVs

[illegible]O NOTORO
[illegible]IJU KENJO MARU
Unidentified Maru Type
Maru Type
DD (Plane Guards)
DD " "

Takao: Commander Combined Air Force

Inland Sea & Ariake Bay Area: FIRST & SECOND FLEET plus SUBFORCE except:

Yokosuka: [illegible] IRO

Maizuru: KONGO

Kanoya - Eastern Kyushu Area: CVs: AKAGI HIRYU
[illegible] HOSHO
Unidentified
Unidentified
Unidentified

Sasebo Area: THIRD FLEET

(continued)

00 01 02 12 13 16 17 18 19 20 21 25 26

SECRET INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 44 Date 4 November, 1941.

The following information is from a source which has been thoroughly reliable in the past:

From 1 Nov. the navigation through [illegible] is restricted as follows. Seven flag buoys are in the channel.

(1) Lighted buoy: From [illegible] lighted buoy 17[illegible] degrees, 6500 meters (3.97 miles). Lighted painted black.

(2) Lighted buoy: From [illegible] lighted buoy 104 degrees, 6500 meters (3.95 miles). Painted black.

(3) Lighted buoy: From [illegible] lighted buoy 104 degrees, 8700 meters(5.08 miles). Painted red.

(4) Flag buoy: From [illegible] lighted buoy 87 degrees, 8600 meters(5.[illegible] miles).

(5) Flag buoy: From buoy (4) 190(170?) degrees, 500 meters (.27 miles).

(6) Flag buoy: From [illegible]AMI LIGHT 88degrees, 4900 meters (2.67 miles).

(7) Flag buoy: From buoy (6) 170 degrees, 500 meters(.27 miles)

NAVIGATION

Sail to the west of [illegible] buoy (1) and between lighted buoys (2) and (3). Sail to the west of the northern four buoys because the area to west of them is dangerous. Do not enter (this area).

When meeting (another ship) going to the entrance between buoys (2) and (3), the ship leaving port is to wait.

There will probably be maintenance by naval patrol vessels and by the lookout station on the northwest point of MOKOHIRI YAMA.

Take care!

(NC



70

SECRET INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating a-1 Serial No. 3 Date 19 November 1941

Reliable information indicates the ZUIKAKU, NOTORO and two Maru tenders have returned to the Sasebo - Kure Area. RYUJO is still in Taiwan. The HEIJO MARU is in the Saigon - Camranh Bay Area.



A-20

SECRET INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 56 Date 12 November 1941

It is reliably reported that the RYUJO has returned to Kure.



4-19

SECRET INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating ? Serial No. 67 Date 22 Nov 1941

Dutch Authorities in the NEI have received information that a Japanese Expeditionary Force which is strong enough to constitute a threat against the NEI or Portugese Timor has arrived in the vicinity of Palau. If this force moves past a line through Davao - Waigea - Equator the Governor General of the NEI will regard it as an act of hostility and will consider war to have begun.



4-18

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 87 Date 23 Nov 1941

CinC Fourth Fleet is now reported to have returned to Truk after a trip to Saipan in the Kashima. There has been increased activity of the cruiser division and other units of the Fourth Fleet in the Truk - Saipan area. The following increases in Base Forces are estimated: Third (Palao), one (1) division marus; Fourth (Truk), two divisions marus, two maru air tenders, special landing force (?); Fifth (Saipan), two divisions marus; Sixth (Jaluit), three divisions marus, three unidentified shore commands, two maru air tenders.

The acitivity of the Combined Air Force is increasing. The Eleventh Air Corps is believed to be at Palao and Airon Twenty four is concentrated in the Marshalls. The Fifth Fleet is apparently at Chichijima with portions possibly at Marcus. There have been approximately seventy arrivals or departures of marus since one November, mostly in the Truk and Jaluit areas.

A-17

SECRET [illegible] INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. [illegible] Date 23 Nov 1941

CinCAF has [illegible] the Dutch report of a Japanese Expe[illegible] Force [illegible] Palao. His information does not indicate [illegible] a case of with other than the Fourth Fleet in the ma[illegible] initial concentration of that force. [illegible] possible [illegible] increase in the number of aircraft and [illegible] concentration of 30 - 40 Kates in the [illegible] the middle of October. CinC Fourth [illegible] that Kiron 24 [illegible] that Kiron 24 may also be pre[illegible] that one battleship division and two [illegible] to proceed to the mandates but so far there [illegible] that the movement has begun.



A-16

SECRET INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating _____ Serial No. 10 Date 5 November 1941

The U.S. [illegible] advises in a [illegible] report that the [illegible] the Japanese Expedition in Timor have [illegible] from the Dutch Army in Timor. Portuguese Timor is [illegible] the objective of the Expedition. The [illegible] further [illegible].

00	01	11	12	13	16	17	18	86	20	21	25	26		
X	X													

A-15

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating _____ Serial No. 71 Date 25 Nov 1941

The British report that Germany is obtaining rubber from Saigon in the following shipments. All routing is from Saigon to Bordeaux around Cape Horn. Six thousand tons was shipped in two Japanese ships on 15 October and 14 November repectfully. Five thousand tons is to be shipped in a German ship on about one December. The Jap ships may be German vessels under Japanese charter. The ships have not yet been identified.

00 01 11 12 13 16 17 18 20 21 25 26 90 95 96

A-14

P. 4-65

SECRET INTELLIGENCE REPORT Top Secret

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 12 Date 25 November 1941

Opnav reports that the chances of any favorable result coming out of the present negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. It is his opinion that this, coupled with the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements of their military and naval forces, indicates that they may make a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam. The Chief of Staff of the Army concurs in this opinion. Senior Army Officers in the Far East, Pacific and West Coast areas (including Panama) have been informed. Utmost secrecy is enjoined regarding this opinion in order to not further complicate the present tense situation or to precipitate Japanese action.



Top Secret

[redacted] INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 13 Date 25 Nov 1941

For the past month the Commander Second Fleet has been organizing a Force composed of the following:

Second Fleet - Third Fleet (including 1st and 2nd Base Forces and 1st Defense Division) - Combined Air Force - Desron Three - Airron 7 - Subron 5 - possibly units of Batdiv 3 (from First Fleet)

These units are linked with the South China Fleet and French Indo-China Force as well as the Naval Stations at Sama, Takao and Bako. The Commander Second Fleet has intensely been interested in operations at Palao and the Third Base Force which is at Palao.

The Combined Air Force has assembled at Takao with some indications that certain units have moved on to Hainan.

The Third Fleet is believed moving in the direction of Takao and Bako.

The Second Base Force appears to transporting the equipment of air forces to Taiwan.

An unidentified Second Fleet unit and a submarine unit appears to be in the vicinity of Takao. Crudiv 7 and Desron 3 appear to be an advance unit and may beenroute South China. A strong concentration of submarines and aircraft is believed in the Marshalls comprising Airron 24, at least one crudiv and one third of the submarine force.

Com 14 believes the above indicates a strong force is preparing to operate in SouthEastern Asia while certain units operate from Palao and the Marshalls.

00	01	11	12	13	16	17	18	20	21	25	26	90	95				

A-12

[redacted] INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Top Secret

Reliability Rating _____ Serial No. 44 Date _____

page 3 (cont)

8. He believes that

[redacted] Combined Fit is in [redacted]
" 1st " " " [redacted]
" 2nd " " " [redacted] (In KU[redacted] area)
" 3rd " " " [redacted] (In SA[redacted] area)
" 4th " " " [redacted] area
" 5th " " " [redacted] (In YO[redacted] area but this is unreliable)

7. [redacted] 3rd Fit and 2nd [redacted] Southern Expeditionary Force [redacted] have the same roles.

8. Units from North or Central appear to have joined the South China Fleet(probably torpedo boats).

9. One Base Force unit apparently being used to strengthen Southern Expeditionary Force.

SECRET INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Top Secret

Reliability Rating _____ Serial No. 74 Date _____

page 2. (cont)

Desron 2 (From 2nd Flt) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs(12 DD's))

Desron 4 (From 2nd Flt) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs(12 DD's))

Subron 5 (From 6th Flt) (1 CL, 3 Subdivs(6 or 7 SS'

Desdiv 23 (From Carrier Flt) (4 DD's)

1st Base Force (From 3rd Flt)

3rd Base Force (At PALAO)

5th Base Force (At SAIPAN)

Other lesser units (Names not known)

It is possible but not known for sure that Batdi may be included herein. (From 1st Flt) (4 BB's--HIYEI, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA)(HARUNA may be undergoing major repairs

3. Disposition of remainder of 3rd Flt in doubt but it is they will be stationed around the BAKO-TAKAO area or fu south.

4. Indications are that today(Nov. 26th) Desron 3 (1st Flt Crudiv 7 (2nd Flt) and Subron 6 (6th Flt) are in the TA Units of Combined Air Force from the Empire are at TAKA PAKHOI, SAIGON and other bases along the CHINA COAST an TAIWAN.

5. He cannot confirm report there being large force of SS in the MANDATES. Thinks all known carriers of 1st and Flts are still in the KURE-SASEBO area. (cont)

Pg. 4

-261B-

A-10

SECRET INTELLIGENCE REPORT Top Secret

Reliability Rating A Serial No. 94 Date November 26, 1941.

A reliable source of information evaluates the situation during the past few days as follows. He considers it reliable:

1. He believes that various units of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th Fleets are being directed by CinC 2nd Flt in a loosely-knit organization. He further states that the organization appears to be subdivided into two sections. And expects:
   Section I to operate in South China Area.
   Section II to operate in the Mandates.

2. Forces which appear to be under CinC 2nd Flt.

Section I

Crudiv 7 (From 2nd Flt) (4 CA's--KUMANO, KOMAKI, MIKUMA, SUZUYA)

Airon 6 (From Combined Air Force) (3 AV's--KAMIKAWA MARU, FUJIKAWA MARU, KUNJO MARU)

1st Defense Division (From 3rd Flt)

Subron 6 (From 6th Flt) (1 CL, 2 Subdivs(4 DD)) (and 4 SM)

It is possible but not known for sure that Crudiv 6 may be included herein. (From 1st Flt) (4 CA's--KAKO, FURUTAKA, AOBA, KINUGASA)

Section II

Crudiv 5 (From 2nd Flt) (3 CA's(maybe 4)--MYOKO, HACHI, HAGURO)

Cardiv 3 (From Carrier Flt) (2 CV's--RYUJO?, TOSHO)

RYUJO and 1 AV

1 CV

(cont)

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SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A Serial No. 95 Date November 27, 1941.

A reliable agent states that there appears to be CHANGE Army activity in the air that envolves Imperial Headquarters, Combined Army Forces and Commander CHITOSE KING AFIRE. Command CHITOSE KING AFIRE and Combine Army Taiwan and Combined Army Forces Sana.



P. #59

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating B-3 Serial No. 96 Date 27 November 1941.

Information from British Intelligence (Far East) sources states:

Japan will commence Military Operations on 1 December against the Kra Isthmus, Thailand, with the objective of interposing between Bangkok and Singapore.

Main landing and center of effort at SINGORA (SONGKHLA).

Japanese Assault Forces to proceed direct from TAIWAN (FORMOSA) and HAINAN Is.



Pg #58

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Top Secret

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 97 Date 28 Nov 41

Absolutely reliable reports from Singapore are that the following procedure will be carried out on Japanese news broadcasts in the event that diplomatic relations are on the verge of severance:

On ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts, the following words repeated five times beginning and the end will have this significance:

HIGASHI HIGASHI : Japanese - American

KITA KITA : Russia

NISHI NISHI : England (including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and NEI)

On Japanese language foreign broadcasts, the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end will be used:

"[redacted] HIGASHI NO KAZE AME" (America)

"KITA NO KAZE KUMORI" (Russia)

"NISHI NO KAZE HARE" (England)

The British and Com 16 are monitoring the above broadcasts.

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Pg 55

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 91 Date 28 Nov 1941

Com 16 reports location of following units:

ISUZU
SubTender
4 Subs (probably Subron 6)
NAGOYA MARU
} In Formosa Straits

NITTA MARU sailing Yokosuka to Takao on 29th with military supplies.

Two senior construction officers and 4000 men (status unknown) order to the Mandates.

Unidentified CL (?) has apparently relieved KASHII as flagship of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and is now in the Camranh Bay Saigon Area.



SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 99 Date 29 Nov 1941

Com 16 reports recent developments noted:

"COMDR FIRST PATROL FORCE" has headquarters apparently in Palao or Yokosuka along with other forces of this nature.

"FIFTH AIR BATTALION" is at Takao.

"COMDR AIR BORNE TROOPS" (location unknown)

"FRENCH INDO-CHINA BILLETING DETACHMENT" in Saigon area.

"THIRD FLEET HEADQUARTERS" probably at Yokosuka.

CinC Third has shifted flag from ASHIGARA to NAGARA.

CinC Southern Expeditionary Force shifted flag from KASHII to CH

New additions to the First Section (Ser, #94):

DESRON 4
SUBRON (?)
AIRRON 7 (CHITOSE type)

The HIYEI and KONGO now appear to be definitely in the First Section but no movement has been noted.

Completely reliable information indicates that CinC Combined wil leave Kure Zone at 0400 today, leave Sasebo Zone at midnight on the 1st and enter Bako Zone at midnight on the 2nd.

SECRET INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 104 Date 1 Dec 41

There have arrived in the Takao Area in the past two days: ComDesRon 5 in the NATORI: [redacted] to join DesRon 4; Units of Number Two Base Force; CHOGEI (believed to be tender for two subdivs). All of these units are under command of CinC Third. CinC Second has shifted from Kure to Sasebo Area in the ATAGO apparently enroute South China Waters.

00 01 02 12 13 16 17 18 86 20 21 25 26

P₂ #54

A-3

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 101 Date 1 Dec 1941

Absolutely reliable agent in Bangkok reports tha on the 29th cnferences were in progress considering plans to force the British to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora as counter move to Japanese landing at Kota Bharu. Thai, at present, intends to consider the first invader as her enemy therefore Japan believes this landing in Malay would force the British to invade Thai at Padang Bessa. Thai would then declare war against the British and call on Japan for help. This plan appears to have the approval of the Thai Chief of Staff Bijitto. Up until 25 November Thai government circles have been sharply divided between pro-British and pro-Japanese but now those favoring Japan seem to have silenced the anti-Japan group and intend to force Premier Pibul to make a decision. They expect early and favorable developments.

00 01 13 16 17 18 86 20 21 25 26

Pg #

A-2

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 102 Date 2 December 1941.

CinC Second Fleet, and the Cinc Third Fleet have put in their appearance in the TAGO area. The Commander Southern Expeditionary Force in the CHOKAI has arrived at SAIGON, HAINAN.

The U. S. Ambassador at Bangkok on the 30th requested permission to destroy all but a limited number of Codes.

Three I-class submarines were sighted bearing 070 distant 180 miles from SAIGON, course 180 speed 15.

Nine (9) ORANGE Submarines sighted at 0230 GCT 2nd Latitude 13-10, longitude 110-00 East course 180 speed 10.

Reported at CAMRANH Bay 21 ORANGE transports with a six plane patrol overhead.



Pg #52

A-1

PACIFIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

of

1 December 1941

LOCATION OF JAPANESE FLEET UNITS

Cincpac File No

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Pearl Harbor, T.H.,
December 1, 1941.

From: Fleet Intelligence Officer.
To : Admiral.

Subject: ORANGE FLEET - Location of.

1. From best available information units of the ORANGE fleet are thought to be located as listed below:-

Yokosuka Area

TAKAO (CA)	1 CA
3rd Fleet ~~HQ~~	?
4 Patrol Force	?
AIR GROUP of 5th Fleet (Chichijima?)	36 planes ?
Total - 1 CA plus ? 36 planes	

Kure - Sasebo area

CinC Combined Fleet
CinC First Fleet

BatDiv 1 & 2	6 BB ?
Crudiv 6 - may head for Mandates (?)	4 CA ?
Desron 1	1 CL
	12 DD
~~CinC 3rd Fleet in NAGARA~~	~~1 CL~~ (1 Takao)
~~1 CL~~	~~1 CL~~
~~Desdiv 12 (?)~~	~~1 CL~~
	~~4 DD~~
Cruiser Division EIGHT	2 CA
Total - 6 BB - ~~10~~ 6 CA - ~~2~~ 1 CL - 16 DD 4 CV	

Shanghai Area

CinC China Fleets in IZUMO	1 - CCA
Shanghai Base Force	1 - PG
	3 - CDD

Pg. 6

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: ORANGE FLEET - Location of.

Shanghai Area (Continued)

#10 Air Group	plus miscellaneous craft 36 planes (?)

Total - 1 CA - 1 PG - 3 DD - 36 planes, et

Bako - Takao Area

THIRD Fleet Submarine Squadrons	1 AS 6 SS (I)
Subron-5	1 CL 6 SS
Subron-6	1 CL 4 SS
Desron-5 less Desdiv-22	1 CL 8 DD
#2 Base Force	3 CM 5 XPG or XPC 17 AP or AK
Desron-4	1 CL 12 DD

Comdr. Combined Air Force

5th Air Battalion (Army ?)	
11th Air Group	36 planes
Air Squadron 6	3 XAV 30 planes
Air Squadron 7	3 AV 48 planes
23rd Air Group	36 planes
? Air Group	36 planes
? Air Group	36 planes
? Air Group	36 planes
Genzan Air Group	36 planes
Shiogama Air Group	36 planes
Kanoya Air Group	36 planes
Kasuga Maru	1 XCV 36 planes

CinC 2nd Fleet with units ~~enroute~~ to TAKAO

plus Crudiv-5	4 CA possibly 5 CA
Desron-2	1 CL 16 DD

- 2 -

Pg. 7

CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: ORANGE FLEET - Location of.

Sako - Takao Area (Continued)

Cardiv-4	2 CV & 4 DD
Cardiv-3	2 CV & 3 DD
Batdiv-3 less HARUNA	3 BB (maybe 2 BB)

Total — 3 BB - 4 CV - 3 CL - 4? DD - 4 SM - 3 AV - 4 XAV - 4 CA - 3 CM - 17 AAP - 5 XPG - 450 planes.

Hainan - Canton Area

CinC South China (in ISUZU)	1 CL
	1 CA
	4 CA
Crudiv-7	1 CL
Desron-3	15 DD
	3 CM
1st Base Force (?) (part of this may be in Formosan waters)	12 AM's
	6 XPG
	12 PC
	27 AP

Total — 5 CA - 2 CL - 15 DD - 3 CM - 12 AM's - 6 XPG 12 PC - 27 AP

French Indo China

CinC S. Sea Fleet in CHOKAI	1 CA
	1 CL
	1 CM
	9 Torpedo Boats
	? XPG

Some of 1st & 2nd Base Force may be here (?) — Total — [illegible] - 1 CL - [illegible] (?) - [illegible] 1 CM - 9 Torp. Boats & Miscellaneous

OMURA AIR GROUP		36 planes
12 Air Group	Some may be on Hainan	36 planes (?)
13 Air Group		36 planes (?)
14 Air Group		36 planes (?)

Mandate Area

PALAU
15th Air Group — 36 planes

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: ORANGE FLEET - Location of.

Mandate Area (Continued)

2nd Base Force	10 XPG 4 SS (Ro)
Total -- 36 planes - 10 XPG - 4 SS	
Truk	
CinC 4th. Fleet	1 CL 2 OCL 2 - OCL 1 CL 8 DD
4th Base Force	4 XPG 4 XAP 4 XAL's
17th Air Group	36 planes
Total -- 36 planes - 2 CL - 2 OCL - 8 DD - 4 XPG - 4 XAP - 4 XAL	
Saipan	
CinC Submarine Force plus subs (?) 1 Subron (?)	1 CL 1 AS 7 SS
Chitose Air Group	36 planes
18th Air Group	36 planes
5th Base Force	2 CM 8 XPG 5 XAP
Total -- 72 planes - 1 CL - 1 AS - 7 SS - 2 CM - 8 XPG - 5 XAP	
Marshall Area	
19th Air Group	36 planes
Yokohama Air Group	36 planes
Wotje Air Group	24 planes
Kwajalein Air Group	24 planes

Cincpac File No. UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

C-O-i-F-1-D-p-n-1-1-a-1

Subject: [illegible] FLEET - Location of.

Marshall Area (Continued)

Air Squadron 24	2 AAV
KAKYU (?) plus plane guards	30 planes 1 CV 4 DD
Submarine Squadron 7	1 AS 7 SS (RO)
Subdiv (?)	4 SS (I)
Submarine Squadron 3	9 SS (I)
6th Base Force	4 YaG's 8 APG 3 PC
KATSURAGI	1 AG (survey)

Total — 140 planes - 2 AAV - 1 CV - 4 DD - 1 AS - 22 SS
4 AA[illegible] - 8 APG - 3 PG - 3 PC - 1 AG.

Respectfully,

E. T. LAYTON,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N.,
Fleet Intelligence Officer.

EXHIBIT NO. 115A

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES

of

9 & 10 December 1941

showing

ASSUMED COMPOSITION OF JAPANESE STRIKING FORCE

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

9 December 1941

COMBINED FLEET - The Combined Fleet Commander-in-Chief and Staff are believed to be in Empire waters. There appeared to be a split in this command in Mid-November which led to the belief that the operations as mitiated by Second Fleet Commander in South East Asia occasioned a supreme Commander in Empire waters with a secondary Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet in South East Asia or elsewhere.

FIRST FLEET - First Fleet is believed to be temporarily in the background as some first fleet units should be operating with the Second and Third Fleets and the majority of the remainder is operating with the Carrier Divisions. Battle Ship Division One and Two have disappeared as far as our identifications are concerned. Battleship Division Three is believed to be operating with Carrier Divisions which outfit is in turn divided so that HIYE I and KIRISHIMA are operating with Striking Force #1 in the Blue Pacific and HARUNA and KONGO are probably with the or a #2 Striking Force. Destroyer Squadron One and ABUKUMA are believed also in the #1 Striking Force. From one dispatch in plain text and associations, it appears likely that Striking Force #1 is still in the Oahu-Midway area (Lat. 32 N Long. 164 W).

SECOND FLEET - Cruiser Division Eight of this Fleet may be operating with Striking Force #1. Other units are probably with the Commander-in-Chief, Second in Southeast Asia. One indication is that the bulk of the Second Fleet is operating against Malay and Singapore while the Third Fleet took care of Luzon. The indications continue that Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force are under one command; also that Indo-China Force and South China Force seem to have lost some of the close association with this combination, probably because South China and Indo-China Force are holding the South China Coast and Indo-China.

THIRD FLEET - Together with some units of the Combined Air Force is probably operating against the Philippines and also in Malay. The close connection of Palao with Third Fleet addresses and Palao prior to war is the basis for this assumption.

FOURTH FLEET - Operating in the Mandates. No recent indications of operations of this fleet outside of the Mandates. On one hand there is a close connection between Fourth Fleet and Fifth Fleet in the north; on the other hand Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet must be working together in the defense of the southern flank. Air Squadron Twenty-four figures prominently in the traffic and is still in the Marshall area. Saipan Radio initiated a broadcast similar to Takao. Jaluit appears to have taken over some of the promary duties of a radio intelligence unit and is assumed to be headquarters in the "Field".

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COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

9 December 1941

FIFTH FLEET - Definite information that this fleet is in the northern area continues. Ominato Radio handles traffic to and from t Fifth Fleet units. This fleet appeared to shift from Yokosu north to Ominato area shortly before war opened. The compos of this fleet is still somewhat obscure but is believed to h very few so called fleet vessels. Probably as large percent of fleet auxiliaries and converted air tenders?

CARRIERS - #1 Striking Force operating in Blue Pacific. Believed t comprise Carrier Division One - AKAGI (Flagship Cardivs)
KAGA
Carrier Division Two - HIRYU
SORYU
Carrier Division
Four (or Five) - SHOKAKU
ZUIKAKU
Cruiser Division Eight
Destroyer Squadron One
KIRISHIMA - - First Section BatDiv Three.
HIYEI.
By deduction #2 Striking Force, if such an organization exis comprises Carrier Division Three - RYUJO
HOSHO
Carrier Division
Five (or four) - KORYU
and probably other combatant units. Carrier Division Three RYUJO were definitely associated with Second and Third Fleet prior to war.

SUBMARINES - A strong force of submarines believed to be operating with Fourth Fleet and another force operating with Carrier Divisions.

CHINA - China Fleet Commanders in normal bases or locations.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

10 December 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume continues very high with proportionate amount of high precedence traffic. The actual amount of traffic intercepted at Heeia has not increased materially since the Eighth but this is due to the concentration of efforts on obtaining all transmissions of Japanese vessels in the Hawaiian area somewhat at the expense of obtaining the maximum traffic on all known circuits. There were very few signals identified as emanating from the immediate Hawaiian area. A great many bearings have been obtained the last two days in the sector 295 - 300 true from Oahu; since most calls involved have been tentatively identified as vessels in the North China and Takao areas, increased activity in that region may be the reason therefor. The Navy Minister originated the following dispatch to the Secretary of the Combined Fleet which was broadcasted from Takao Radio:

"164. From the Cabinet, Prime Minister and Admiral Arihama Takaza Igo received a request for a congratulatory telegram as follows addressed to all hands (?).
"Congratulations (upon) there having been attained manifold results (war results) (at) the outset of the naval war. We pray for the success of the fortunes of war for all ranks of officers and enlisted men".

COMBINED FLEET - No change.

FIRST FLEET - No indications of any change. The calls identified as First Fleet have practically disappeared from the traffic lately. This is submitted as a partial strengthening of the opinion that the First Fleet has lost its identity as such and has been split between Carrier Divisions and the large task force operating in the Malay area. The report of United States bomber action on a HARUNA type Battleship in the Philippine area, if true, substantiates this.

SECOND AND THIRD FLEETS - Appear to be "intact" in the South eastern Asia area.

FOURTH FLEETS - Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Fleet and some of the Fourth Fleet vessels definitely show in the Mandates. It is believed that Air Squadron Twenty-four is still in the Marshall area and that the Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Fleet is in the Truk area. While complete coverage at Heeia is not possible under present conditions, the available traffic does not indicate the previous association between Palao and Second-Third Fleet combination.

A/S

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

FIFTH FLEET - No apparent change in the available information on this fleet. Considerable activity has been noted in the High North and Ominato area shore stations.

SUBMARINES - Commander Submarine Force continues to show in the routing of traffic to and from Mandate stations, particularly the Marshall Island area. From all the reports of submarine activity in the Hawaiian area and the well established fact that Submarine Squadrons Five and Six went south to Malay prior to declarations of war, it appears that practically all submarines are away from Empire waters or that our estimates of Japanese submarine strength were lower than actual numbers.

CARRIERS - Very little radio activity the past twenty-four hours. One possible significant clue to Carrier Divisions future operations was contained in a despatch from Tokyo Radio to the Commander of First Air Fleet flagship, AKAGI, listing a long string of Tokyo Broadcast messages which it is assumed provided a reminder or check on those dispatches which should have been received for the First Air Fleet during the period 7 - 10 December. To this office, the inference is that for the past three days (during radio silence in Hawaiian waters), a check up was not practicable but now may be done without breaking radio silence. While this may be far-fetched, it still remains a possibility.

EXHIBIT NO. 115B

PACIFIC FLEET

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

#45-41

27 NOVEMBER 1941

Cincpac File No. A8/FF1/(25)
Serial 01954

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

HRK

Pearl Harbor, T.H.
November 27, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Bulletin.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information.

2. BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF BOTH THE SOURCE AND INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, IT IS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE THAT THE C O N F I D E N T I A L CHARACTER OF THIS BE CAREFULLY PRESERVED.

3. This information obtained from Naval Intelligence sources has been reproduced by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Any request for additional copies of this document will be made to the Commander-in-Chief, and not to the Division of Naval Intelligence.

4. Additional copies shall not be made. This bulletin should be retained for study and reference (plus subsequent additions or corrections) during the present National Emergency.

P. C. CROSLEY,
By direction.

DISTRIBUTION: (70X-41)
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FRTU; NTS, NC4, ND11-ND14,
NB49, Rdo. & Snd. Lab.

CONFIDENTIAL Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.

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(A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS. October 30, 1941. (10574)

The following revision of Op-16-F-2, O.N.I. Serial #27-41 supersedes and replaces the former report on this subject.

The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown below.

MAJOR FLEET COMMANDS

I.	Combined Fleet		
	1. First Fleet	(Battle Force)	3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2 Desrons
	2. Second Fleet	(Scouting Force)	4 Crudivs, 2 desrons, etc.
	3. Third Fleet	(Blockade & Transport Force)	Small craft.
	4. Fourth Fleet	(Mandate Defense Force)	1 Desron, 1 Subron and many small units.
	5. Fifth Fleet	?	?
	6. Sixth Fleet	(Submarine Fleet)	6 Subrons
	7. Carrier Fleet	(Aircraft Carriers)	5 Cardivs
	8. Combined Air Force	(Seaplane tenders, etc.)	4 Airrons, & shore based planes.
II.	Japanese Naval Forces in China.	(Staff Headquarters)	1 PG and 3 DD's
	1. First China Exped. Fleet.	(Central China)	Gunboats
	2. Second China Exped. Fleet.	(South China)	1 CA, 1 CL and small craft.
	3. Third China Exped. Fleet.	(North China)	Torpedo Boats, etc.
	4. Southern Exped. Fleet.	(Saigon)	1 CL, transports and mine craft.

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The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-war-time footing.

COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET

YAMAMOTO Isoroku, CinC (Admiral)

NAGATO, Flagship

FIRST FLEET

Batdiv One
- NAGATO (F)
- MUTSU
- YAMASHIRO

Batdiv Two
- FUSO (F)
- ISE
- HYUGA

Batdiv Three
- HIYEI (F)
- KONGO
- KIRISHIMA
- * HARUNA

Crudiv Six
- KAKO (F)
- FURUTAKA
- AOBA
- KINUGASA

Desron One
- ABUKUMA (F)

Desdiv 6
- IKAZUCHI (F)
- INAZUMA
- SAZANAMI
- HIBIKI

Desdiv 21
- HENOHI (F)
- HATSUHARU
- HATSUSHIMO
- WAKABA

Desdiv 27
- SHIRATSUYU (F)
- ARIAKE
- YUGURE
- SHIGURE

Desron Three

SENDAI (F)

Desdiv 11
- FUBUKI (F)
- SHIRAYUKI
- HATSUYUKI

Desdiv 12
- SHIRAKUMO (F)
- SHINONOME
- USUGUMO
- MURAKUMO

Desdiv 19
- ISONAMI (F)
- SHIKINAMI
- AYANAMI
- URANAMI

Desdiv 20
- ARAGIRI (F)
- ASAGIRI
- YUGIRI
- SAGIRI

TOTAL	
10	BB
4	CA
2	CL
27	DD

* NOTE: The HARUNA has been inactive during 1941, and is probably undergoing major repairs.

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COMBINED FLEET

SECOND FLEET

TAKAO, Flagship

Crudiv Four
TAKAO (F)
ATAGO
CHOKAI
MAYA

Crudiv Five *
MYOKO (F)
NACHI
HAGURO

Crudiv Seven
KUMANO (F)
MOGAMI
MIKUMA
SUZUYA

Crudiv Eight
TONE (F)
CHIKUMA

Desron Two
JINTSU (F)

Desdiv 8
ASASHIO (F)
ARASHIO
OSHIO
MICHISHIO

Desdiv 15
KUROSHIO
OYASHIO
NATSUSHIO
HAYASHIO

Desron Two (Cont'd)

Desdiv 16
HATSUKAZE
YUKIKAZE
AKATSUKAZE
TOKITSUKAZE

Desdiv 18
KASUMI
ARARE
KAGERO
SHIRANUHI

Desron Four
NAKA (F)

Desdiv 2
YUDACHI (F)
MURASAME
HARUSAME
SAMIDARE

Desdiv 9
ASAGUMO
YAMAGUMO
MINEGUMO
NATSUGUMO

Desdiv 24
KAWAKAZE (F)
YAMAKAZE
SUZUKAZE
UMIKAZE

* NOTE: There is a possibility that a new cruiser has been added to Crudiv 5.

TOTAL

15	CA
2	CL
28	DD

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THIRD FLEET

TAKAHASHI Ibo - Vice Admiral
NAGARA, Flagship

NORTHERN BLOCKADE FORCE

CHOGEI (F)

Subdiv _____
_____
_____
_____

Subdiv _____
_____
_____
_____

2nd BLOCKADE FORCE

Desron Five

NATORI (F)

Desdiv 5
ASAKAZE
HARUKAZE
MATSUKAZE
HATAKAZE

Desdiv 12
SATSUKI
FUMITSUKI
MINATSUKI
NAGATSUKI

Desdiv 34
HAKAZE
AKIKAZE
YUKAZE
TACHIKAZE

TOTAL

1	CL	12	AM
12	DD	6	XPG
1	AS	12	PC
6	SS	46	AP
6	CM		

1st BASE FORCE

_____ Maru (F)

Minelayer Division
ITSUKUSHIMA (F)
AOTAKA
HATSUTAKA

Mine Sweeper Division 1 and 21

AM-1	AM-7
AM-2	AM-8
AM-3	AM-9
AM-4	AM-10
AM-5	AM-11
AM-6	AM-12

Gunboat Division 1
6 Gunboats
(Converted Fishing Vessels)

SUBCHASER SQUADRON

_____ (F)

Subchaser Division 1 and 11

PC-1	PC-7
PC-2	PC-8
PC-3	PC-9

Subchaser Division 21 and 31

PC-4	PC-10
PC-5	PC-11
PC-6	PC-12

27 AP - Names Unknown

2nd BASE FORCE

_____ Maru, (F)

Minelayer Division 17
SHIRATAKA
YAEYAMA
KUNAJIRI

At least 5 other men of war, and 17 merchant ships.

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FOURTH FLEET

HIRATA - Vice Admiral

KASHIMA, Flagship

Crudiv Eighteen
TENRYU (F)
TATSUTA
KASHIMA

Desron Six
YUBARI (F)

Desdiv 29
OITE
HAYATE
ASANAGI
YUNAGI

Desdiv 30
MUTSUKI (F)
KISARAGI
YAYOI
MOCHITSUKI

Subron Seven

JINGEI

Subdiv 26
RO-60
RO-61
RO-62

Subdiv 27
RO-65
RO-66
RO-67

Subdiv 33
RO-63
RO-64
RO-68

Subdiv ___
———
———
———

8 XPG

Survey and Patrol Division
KOSHU
KATSURIKI (CM)
KOMABASHI (AS)

Repair and Salvage Division
MATSUEI MARU
NAGAURA (MARU)

3rd BASE FORCE

Palao, Headquarters
_____ Maru (F)

Guard Division 3
_____ Maru
_____
_____
_____
_____

Subdiv 6
RO-56
RO-57
RO-58
RO-59

Subchaser Division 55
_____ Maru (F)

XPG 551 (?)
XPG 552 (?)
XPG 553 (?)
XPG 554 (?)

9 AP or AK

THIRD DEFENCE FORCE (HQ PALAO)
Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including Air Group #16 and TOBI detachment of 4th Defence Force
_____ Detach. 4th Def. Force
_____ " " " "
_____ " " " "
_____ " " " "
_____

(Estimate these unknown locations to be SOROL, HELEN REEF, ULITHI, YAP and ANGUAR).

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FOURTH FLEET (Cont'd.)

4th BASE FORCE

Truk, Headquarters
_____ Maru (F)

Guard Division 4

_____ Maru (F)
_____
_____

4 AP or AK

FOURTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-TRUK
Miscellaneous Forces ashore, including Air Group #17 and Ponape Detachment of 4th Def. Force
Kusaie Detachment " " " "
Olol Detachment " " " "
Greenwich Detachment " " "
Mortlock Detachment " " "
Pingelap Detachment " " "
Puluwat Detachment " " "
Lamotrek Detachment " " "
.....(Hall ?) " " " "

5th BASE FORCE

Saipan, Headquarters
SHOEI MARU (F)

Guard Division 5
Composition unknown

Minelayer Division 19
OKINOSHIMA (F)
TOKIWA

Subchaser Division 20
KASHI (F)
XPG 561 (?)
XPG 562 (?)
XPG 563 (?)

Gunboat Division 8
Composition unknown

9 AP or AK

FIFTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ - SAIPAN)
Miscellaneous Forces ashore, including
Air Group #16
Tenian Detachment, 5th Defence Force
PAGAN " " " "

6th BASE FORCE

Jaluit, Headquarters
TAZUHIN MARU (F)

Mine Sweeper Division 16
NAGATA MARU (F)
CHOKAI MARU
DAIDO MARU
IKUTA MARU

? ? (This may
_____ Maru be the SALVAGE
_____ Maru Unit known to
_____ Maru be in 6th Base Force)

Subchaser Division 5
PC-51
PC-52
PC-53

SIXTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-JALUIT)
KAIKEI Maru
#5 FUKU Maru
_____ Maru
Miscellaneous Forces ashore including AIR GROUP #19 at ENIEJI, Jaluit Atoll and probable Air Groups at WOTJE and KWAJALEIN and RUOTTO Is. (Kwajalein Atoll)
Detachment 6th Defence Force
KWAJALEIN Is. (Kwajalein Atoll)
TAROA Is. (Maloelap Atoll)
ENIWETOK Is. (Eniwetok Atoll)
UJELANG Atoll
ENYBOR Is. (Jaluit Atoll)
ENIEJI Is. (" ")
WOTJE Atoll - Detach. of 6th Def.Force
UTIRIK Atoll- " " " " "

TOTAL

4	CL	16	SS	15	XPG
9	DD	1	Survey Ship	3	PC
2	AS	3	CM	4	XAM
				41	AP or AK

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FIFTH FLEET

CL _____ (F)

The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown.
The Flagship has been reported at Maizuru.

SIXTH FLEET

(Submarine Fleet)

KATORI, Flagship

Subron One

TAIGEI (F)

Subdiv 1
I-9
I-15
I-16
I-17

Subdiv 2
I-18
I-19
I-20

Subron Two

KITAGAMI (F)

Subdiv 7
I-1
I-2
I-3
I-7

Subdiv 8
I-4
I-5
I-6

Subron Three

NAGOYA MARU (F)

Subdiv 11
I-74
I-75

Subdiv 12
I-8
I-68
I-69
I-70

Subdiv 20
I-71
I-72
I-73

Subron Five

YURA (F)

Subdiv 28
I-59
I-60

Subdiv 29
I-61 (Sank 10-2-41)
I-62
I-64

Subdiv 30
I-65
I-66

Subron Six

KINU (F)

Subdiv 9
I-123
I-124

Subdiv 13
I-121
I-122

Subron Ten

KIRASAKI (F) *

Subdiv 18
I-53
I-54
I-55

Subdiv 19
I-56
I-57
I-58

Subdiv 21
RO-33
RO-34

* NOTE: The old sub-tender KIRASAKI appears to have been recommissioned.

TOTAL

3 CL
2 AS
1 AP
42 SS

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CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs)

CV KAGA Flagship

Cardiv 1

AKAGI
KAGA (F)

Desdiv 7
ODORO (F)
USHIO
AKEBONO
AKATSUKI

Cardiv 2

SORYU (F)
HIRYU

Desdiv 23
UZUKI
KIKUTSUKI
MIKATSUKI
YUZUKI

Cardiv 3

RYUJO (F)
HOSHO

Desdiv 17
ISOKAZE
URAKAZE
HAMAKAZE

Cardiv 4

ZUIKAKU
SHOKAKU

Desdiv 3
HOKAZE
SHIOKAZE
NATSUKAZE
NUMAKAZE

Cardiv

CV KORYU
CV KASUGA (MARU)

TOTAL

10 · CV
16 · DD

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COMBINED AIR FORCE

Kanoya Naval Air Station, Hdqtrs.

Shore-based land planes and seaplanes. The organization provides for great mobility. Air units are ordered to work with other forces, and return to the Combined Air Force pool when their mission is fulfilled. The named Air Groups (e.g. the Takao Air Group) are not tied down to their stations, but are sent freely wherever they are needed. Furthermore, the various air squadrons and air groups frequently split into smaller units, and are scattered over wide areas.

Because of this extreme mobility, the picture is constantly changing. Accordingly, the following list makes no attempt to indicate all the temporary groupings into which the various units may be combined.

SHIP-BASED SQUADRONS

Air Ron 6

KAMIKAWA MARU (F)
FUJIKAWA MARU
KENJO MARU

(Has been working with the 3rd Fleet)

Air Ron 7

CHITOSE (F)
CHIYODA
MIZUHO

(Has been working with the 1st Fleet)

Air Ron 24

KAMOI (F)
1 AV
Yokohama Air Group
Chitose Air Group

(Has been working with the 4th Fleet)

Patrol Squadron 2

NOTORO

(Formerly with Air Ron 6)

SHORE-BASED AIR GROUPS

8th Air Group
10th Air Group
11th Air Group
12th Air Group
14th Air Group
16th Air Group
17th Air Group
18th Air Group
19th Air Group
23rd Air Group

Chichijima
Chinkai
Genzan
Hyakurihara (or Koribara)
Iwakuni
Kanoya (Hdqtrs.)
Kashima
Kasumigaura
Kisarazu
Kure
Maizuru
Oita
Ominato
Omura
Saeki
Sasebo
Suzuka
Takao
Tateyama
Tsukuba
Usa
Yatabe
Yokosuka

TOTAL

5 AV
3 XAV
35 Air Groups

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TRAIN FOR COMBINED FLEET

SHIRETOKO
SATA
TSURUMI
SHIRIYA
IRO
ONDO
HAYATOMO
NARUTO
NAHIYA
ASAHI
ASASHI
MUROTO
OTONASHU
SETTSU

Total:

8 AC
1 AF
2 AR
1 AC
1 Ice Breaker
1 Target Ship

79716 O—46—pt. 17——17

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JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA

KOGA, Mineichi - Vice Admiral

IZUMO, Flagship

SHANGHAI BASE FORCE

ASUGA
TSUGA
KURI
HASU

Shanghai Harbor Affairs Section

Special Naval Landing Force, Shanghai

NAnking Base Force

Special Naval Landing Force, Nanking

TOTAL
1 OCA
1 PG
3 DD

CENTRAL CHINA FLEET, or
FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

KOMATSU, Teruhisa - Vice Admiral
UJI, Flagship

Petrol Division 11

ATAKA
SETA
KATADA
HIRA
HOZU
TOBA
ATAMI
FUTAMI
FUSHIMI
SUMIDA
HASHIDATE

Air Group 10

Hankow Base Force

Kiukiang Base Force

Gunboat Division ? ?

SHINFUKU MARU (F)
HITONOSE
CHIKUBU

TOTAL
4 PG
10 PR
1 AP

SOUTH CHINA FLEET, or
SECOND EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

NIIMI, Masaichi, Vice Admiral
ISUZU, Flagship

Cruiser 15

ISUZU (F)
ASHIGARA

Patrol Division 14

SAGA
AM-17
AM-18

Torpedo Boat Division 1

OTORI
HAYABUSA
HIYODORI
KASASAGI

Guard Division 15

Guard Division 16

Canton Base Force

Amoy Base Force

Hainan Is. Base Force

13 Special Service Ships

TOTAL
1 CA
1 CL
4 TB
1 PG
2 AM
13 Misc.

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JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA (Cont'd)

NORTH CHINA FLEET, or
THIRD EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

SUGIYAMA, Rokozo, Vice Admiral
IWATE, Flagship

Patrol Division 12

IWATE (F)
KUNIRI MARU

Torpedo Boat Division 11

HATO
SAGI
KARI
KIJI

Torpedo Boat Division 21

CHIDORI
MANAZURU
TOMOZURU
HATSUKARI
KARUKAYA

Gunboat Division 1

Gunboat Division 2

Gunboat Division 13

Gunboat Division 14

Tsingtao Base Force

SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

KASHII (F) (CL)
SHIMUSHU (CM)

AP

TOTAL
1 CGA
1 DD
8 TB
1 AP

CONFIDENTIAL Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.

(B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS.

1. FOURTH FLEET, which may be termed the MANDATE FLEET, apparently administers the Naval activities, afloat and ashore and also the Army Garrisons units in the Mandated Islands. While the forces afloat exercise administrative jurisdiction over the Mandate area, the Yokosuka Naval District is directly responsible for the supply of stores, material and provisions. Truk is the headquarters for supply and munitions and has been principle Fourth Fleet operating base.

2. Up to the present the entire Mandated Islands have been lightly garrisoned, the majority of the garrison units being Naval Defence Forces ("special Landing Forces" corresponding to our Marine Corps) but some Army troops are believed to be on SAIPAN, PALAO, PONAPE, TRUK and JALUIT. The total garrison force has been estimated at fifteen thousand. In addition, there are Civil Engineering Units engaged in development work on various islands. Working in conjunction with these are naval engineering units, naval ordnance specialists, navy yard units with civilian navy yard workers and technicians. The network of naval radio stations has been greatly expanded, meteorological stations and high frequency direction finders installed at strategic locations, aviation facilities increased both in scope and number, and shore-batteries emplaced on strategic islands of key Atolls.

3. It is apparent that a decision to expedite the fortification, expansion of facilities and militarization of the Mandated Islands, was made late in 1940, probably concurrently with the signing of the Tripartite Pact. The movement of naval auxiliaries, small and medium cargo, freight-passenger vessels (ex-merchant marine) to the Mandates began in December, 1940, and has increased in scope and number until some seventy odd vessels are engaged in this traffic, the average number present in the Mandate area at any one time being some forty odd vessels.

4. The function of supply of munitions, supplies, material and provisions to the Mandates is under the YOKOSUKA Naval District with a Headquarters for Civil Engineering, Munitions, Military Stores and Supplies for the Mandates centered at Truk, although this function is normally under the jurisdiction of Yokosuka as the Mandates are in the First (HQ - YOKOSUKA) Naval District.

5. The Commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Base Forces are subordinate commanders under Commander-in-Chief, 4th Fleet; they have a designated Flagship and a Headquarters or Administrative Section, the latter remaining ashore at the home base regardless of the movements of the command or the Flagship. Each Base Force contains a DEFENCE FORCE, detachments of which are stationed on outlying islands of that general area. Four Ro Class submarines have been reported to be attached to the PALAO BASE FORCE.

CONFIDENTIAL Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.

6. Considerable air activity has been in evidence in the SAIPAN, PALAO-PELELIU, TRUK, PONAPE and JALUIT-KWAJALEIN areas. Close cooperation has been noted between the Defence Forces and the Aircraft activities at their home bases. Foreign steamers nearing the SAIPAN area have been subject to aircraft observation and close scrutiny by Patrol planes, Bombers and Fighters. Heavy land plane bombers and patrol planes, undoubtedly ORANGE, have made reconnaissance flights over the Gilbert Islands (TARAWA, BUTARITARI, and BERU).

7. The distribution of material, personnel, and installations in the Mandated Islands is indicated in table "A". While this is admittedly incomplete and may be subject to inaccuracies, it represents the latest and best intelligence on this subject. In addition to those listed in Table A, there are a number of potential bases, principally in the lagoons of the naturally protected atolls, which may be used as emergency bases or may be earmarked for "priority two" development.

8. The latest information (up to 25 November 1941) indicates that the present distribution of the Air forces (believed to be a temporary strategical disposition rather than a permanent assignment) in the Mandates is:

Identification	Location	Includes
Airron 24	Marshall Area	(AV) KAMOI (AV?) ..... Maru ex-CHITOSE Air Group ex-YOKOHAMA Air Group
11th Air Group	PALAO Area	
16th Air Group	PALAO Area	
17th Air Group	TRUK	
18th Air Group	SAIPAN	
19th Air Group	IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit Atoll)	
Air Station (and Air Group?)	WOTJE	
Air Station (and Air Group?)	KWAJALEIN	
1 AIR GROUP	TRUK	

The exact composition of these Air Groups is unknown and the estimates of total/strength in the Mandates vary widely: 62 - 268 planes.
plane

Last Page of Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.

TABLE A (PAGE ONE)

TABLE A (PAGE TWO)

GROUP W. CAROLINES – PALAU Headquarters	MARIANNAS HQ – SAIPAN	IRON-NAMIATE
ATOLL	PALAU (PELEW)	BONIN
ISLAND OR ATOLL	ULITHI	FAIS	SOROL	YAP	KOROR	ARAKABESAN	BABELTHUAP	PELELIU	HELEN REEF	TOGI (LORY NORTH)	PAGAN	SAIPAN	TINIAN	ROTA	MARCUS	CHICHIJIMA	HAHAJIMA	PARACE VELA
ADMINS. OFFICE / HQ=O	X		X	X	⊗		X	⊗	X	X	X	⊗	X	X	X	X		X
NAVAL RADIO / HS/OP=O	X	JPF	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	⊗	⊗	⊗	X	⊗	X	X
NAVAL DEFENCE FORCE HQ = Headquarters 4th Def. Force.		?	?	ⓡ	NW/3	?	?	P/3	?	P/3	P/5	HQ P/5	P/5		B/			
LANDING FIELD				ⓡ		ⓡ	ⓡ	X	ⓡ			X			ⓡ	ⓡ		
SEAPLANE FACILITIES			ⓡ	X		X	X	X	X			X					X	
AIR BASE = B AIR TECH SEC. #2 = S/2						S/4	B	B	B	B	B	S/2			B			
AIR GROUP OR AIR CORPS						11th						18th						
PUBLIC WORKS DEPT.				X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X			X		
CIVIL ENG. UNITS				X			X				X	X	X					
NAVY YARD UNITS								X			X	X						
ORDNANCE SPECIALISTS				X		X	X	X					X					
SHORE BATTERIES = S AA BATTERIES = A LOOKOUT TOWERS & CONTROL STATIONS				S/A		S/A (R)	S/A, S/A					S/A	S/A		S/A			
METEOROLOGICAL STATIONS OR FACILITIES									X			X			X	X		
MUNITIONS DEPT.				X		X		X	X			X						
SUPPLY DEPT.				X		X		X				X						
BRANCH # ___ MILITARY POST OFFICES						#2						#1						
ARMY TROOPS ESTIMATED NO.				5000			5000					5000				3000		
FLEET ANCHORAGE						X			X									
SUBMARINE BAS. ___				(R)			(R)						(R)		(R)			

PASTE THIS END TO PAGE ONE (TABLE A) TO FORM ONE SHEET.


Reef
CONFIDENTIAL
PALAO ISLANDS
(PELEW)
KAYANGEL Is.
Rumored Seaplane Base under construction.
KOSSOL PASSAGE
Fleet Anchorage
Observation tower (or Battery Control Station) and Shore Battery Emplacements under construction. Dismantled guns recently unloaded from Transports were "Ten-foot" barrels six-inch bore".
Babelthuap I. (Babeldaop)
Rumored Fleet Anchorage
Barracks.
(Ngaraboseng) Arakabesan
NOTE: All Lighthouses are now undoubtedly being used for observation posts or Battery Control Stations. Informant believes batteries are emplaced near each light-house. All are "PROHIBITED AREAS".
PELELIU Is.
Village
Village
Barracks
Barracks
Shore Batteries
Angaur I.


CONFIDENTIAL
MALAKAL HARBOR AND APPROACHES
URUKTHAPEL I.
KOMEBAIL LAGOON
Two Inter-Island Causeways
Large Landing Craft Seaplanes anchor off shore in middle of Canal Seaplane Basin
Storage Tanks
MALAKAL HARBOR
Radio
Barracks
Pier
Ferry
(BABELDAOB) BABELTHUAP I.
New Road
Airplane Detaching Service
Storage
ARAKUBEL CHANNEL
Aimai Village
REEF
CHANNEL

CONFIDENTIAL Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.

NOTES TO ACCOMPANY SKETCH OF JALUIT

1. Aviation Facilities - Two landing fields, each with a hangar capable of housing twenty medium sized planes. Engineering Shop (camouflaged) situated between the two fields. Adjacent storehouses (galv. iron) camouflaged. Diesel fuel and gasoline storage in camouflaged, above-ground tanks adjacent to air fields. Diesel power plant (June-1940). Eighty planes reported based here (November, 1940).

On beach opposite southern air field is Naval Air Station having small ramp and one hangar for seaplanes (June 1940). This may be an auxiliary as present indications point to naval air Base on Imieji (EMIDJ) Is.

2. Headquarters - Two story concrete building. Large building to SE of Headquarters is Post Office and Telephone central. Flagstaff adjacent to Post Office is also used as signal tower. In town are many one story concrete stores. Good bitumen and powdered coral roads.

3. Radio towers - Two steel combination radio and lookout towers 400 feet high. Diesel engine power plant near southern tower (1940).

4. Shore Batteries - Bases and trunnions along the three quarter mile waterfront street called the Marine Parade (1940) (guns not mounted in June, 1940 but are now). Also three 6" guns and a battery of four 4.7" field pieces. Barracks for regular garrison of 500 soldiers (1940) (probably enlarged now).

Mobile Batteries - Machine guns and AA guns mounted on Diesel-tractor towed trailers. 10" searchlights on pneumatic tired truck assemblies (1940).

5. Government Pier - 600 feet long, 75 feet wide (18'-25' alongside) equipped with two railroad tracks and three 10 ton mobile cranes. Storehouse on end of pier (1940).

6. Mole - 150' concrete mole constructed parallel to shore line along NW corner of JABOR (1933).

7. Conspicuous red building (may be red-roofed building)(1936).

8. South Seas Trading Co. PIER (N.B.K. or "NABO") also called "SYDNEY Pier". Two water tanks and warehouses. Coal and briquette storage (1938).

9. Two buildings (resembling hangars) with tracks leading down to water from one of them (beaching gear? — small marine railway?). A gasoline storage located near the two buildings. (1936).


ENYBOR Is
KABBENBENBOCK Is
S.E. PASSAGE
JABOR Is
JALUIT
G

EXHIBIT NO. 116

Op-30C-MD
(SC)N20-12
Serial 07830
Confidential

FEBRUARY 11, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To. The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.
Subject: Experimental and Development Work on Nets and Booms.
Reference: ALUSNA London Dispatch 041625 of February 5, 1941.

1. Reference (a) requested information concerning all promising experimental and development work on nets and booms done by the U. S. Navy since March 1940.

2. As far as this Office is aware, no such work has been done oher than the making of minor modifications to the Admiralty designs. It is considered that experimental and development work should be undertaken. If necessary, additional personnel for this purpose should be secured.

3. There appears an urgent need for an anti-torpedo net which can be laid and removed in certain harbors in a short time for temporary use, and which will give good if not perfect protection from topedoes fired from planes. The present Admiralty type net is designed to withstand torpedoes armed with cutters, and its appurtenances are very heavy. A lighter net which will stop a torpedo not armed with cutters would furnish some protection, especially against torpedoes which would explode on contact with a metal net.

4. Effort should be made to reduce the weights of the present Admiralty nets and booms and their appurtenances without reducing their efficiency in order that they may be more readily handled. As a beginning, it is also suggested that plans be made to test sections of the old A/S net and of the new, as well as indicator nets, by attacking submarines. While such tests may duplicate British experiments, valuable lessons may be learned. It is requested that this office be kept informed of development work and all tests and experiments conducted with nets and booms.

H. R. STARK.

Op-30C1-AJ
(SC)N20-12
Serial 09330
Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Washington, Feb. 15, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of the congestion.

3. As a matter of interest the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very low launching heights at reported ranges by the individual aviators of 400 to 1300 yards from the battleships, but the *depths of water* in which the torpedoes were launched were *between 14 and 15 fathoms*. The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic anti-aircraft fire. The eastern shore line of the anchorage and moorings were protected by numerous balloon barrages, but there was no trawler borne balloon barrage to the west. The torpedoes were apparently dropped inside of the nets, probably A/T nets.

4. It is considered that certain large bays and harbors, where a fleet or large force of heavy ships may be anchored and exposed with a large body of water on an entire flank, should have that flank protected by a series of baffles if the water is deep enough for launching torpedoes. The main fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow, for instance, has an A/T net extending slightly to the north of a line between Calf of Flotta and Cava Island protecting the main fleet anchorage. The depth of water where this net is laid is approximately 17 fathoms. On the other hand constricted harbors, in which practically all available space is taken up by anchorages, and which is relatively deep probably must depend upon other defense measures. It might be possible and practicable to provide in some places, which are not protected by relatively shallow water, anti-torpedo baffles practically surrounding a limited [2] number of berths for large ships, such as battleships or carriers. An extreme example of this is furnished at the present time by the French at Dakar, where double nets surround the Richelieu; she is placed similarly as in a dry dock, and evidently would have to open a section of the net to be hauled clear. The depth of water at Dakar, however, is very shallow.

5. The present A/T nets are very expensive, extremely heavy, their heavy anchors and moorings take up about 200 yards of space perpendicular to the line of the net, take a long time to lay, and are designed to stand up under heavy weather conditions. There is apparently a great need for the development of a light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protected harbors and which can be readily removed. It is hoped that some such net can be developed in the near future.

6. Recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief are especially desired.

[s] H. R. STARK.

Copy to: CinC Atlantic Fleet.
CinC Asiatic Fleet.

[1] Op-30C1-AJ
(SC)N20-12
Ser. 010230
Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
February 17, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commandant, First Naval District
The Commandant, Third Naval District
The Commandant, Fourth Naval District
The Commandant, Fifth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixth Naval District
The Commandant, Seventh Naval District
The Commandant, Eighth Naval District
The Commandant, Tenth Naval District
The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District
The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District
The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Naval Station, Guantanamo.

Subj: Anti-Torpedo Baffle for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks.

1. In previous correspondence, the Commandants and local joint planning committees have been requested, where considered necessary, to submit recommendations concerning the employment of nets and booms in their defenses. In nearly all cases the recommendations received were limited to harbor entrances. One of the reasons for this was that the Department, after previously making a study of many harbors, submitted certain proposals for consideration by the districts, but did not specifically propose any protection against torpedo plane attacks.

2. The Commandants and local joint planning committees are requested, if they have not already done so, to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles, especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the Fleet in their respective harbors, and especially at the large fleet bases.

3. In considering the use of A/T baffles, the following limitations, among others, may be borne in mind:

[2] (a) A minimum depth of water of 75' may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffle for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes upon striking baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well-protected anchorages within the harbor from torpedo plane attack on a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a Fleet is based, the establishment of certain baffles would be difficult because of congestion.

R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

cc: CinCPac
CinC Atlantic
CinC Asiatic
Co, NavNetDep, Tiburon BuOrd
Co, NavNetDep, Newport Op-12

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinC File No.
S81-5/0398
Confidential

AT SEA, HAWAIIAN AREA, Mar. 12, 1941.

From: Comander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.
Reference: (a) CNO Conf. ltr. file Op-30C1-AJ (SC) N20-12 Serial 09330 of 15 Feb. 1941.

1. In view of the contents of reference (a), the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommends that until a light efficient net, that can be laid temporarily and quickly is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area.

H. E. KIMMEL.

C-N20-12/ND14
(0250)
Confidential

20 MARCH 1941.

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.
Reference: (a) CNO Classified ltr serial 010230 of February 17, 1941.

1. In reply to reference (a) the following comment and recommendation on anti-torpedo baffles for vessels moored in Pearl Harbor is submitted.

(a) The depth of water in and alongside available berths in Pearl Harbor does not exceed forty-five (45) feet.

(b) There is limited maneuvering area in Pearl Harbor for vessels approaching and leaving berths which prevents the departure of a large group of vessels on short notice.

(c) Most of the available berths are located close aboard the main ship channels, which are crossed by cable and pipe lines as well as ferry routes. The installation of baffles for the fleet moorings would have to be so extensive that most of the entire channel area would be restricted.

2. Other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District have a water depth limitation similar to Pearl Harbor.

3. In view of the foregoing the Commandant does not recommend the installation of baffles for moorings in Pearl Harbor or other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District.

C. C. BLOCH.

cc: to
CINCPACIFIC
BUORD

Op-30C1-LH
(SC)N20-12
Serial 027830

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Washington, Apr. 9, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Chief of Bureau of Ordnance
Subject: Anti-Torpedo Nets
Reference:
(a) Op-30C Serial 07830 of 11 Feb. 1941
(b) O. N. I. Serial 24-41, Monograph Index Guide 603-600

1. In reference (a) the Chief of Naval Operations brought forth the necessity for experimental and development work in connection with nets and booms, and especially the need for a light anti-torpedo net. The attention of the Bureau is directed to reference (b) which gives certain details of an apparently much lighter net now used by the Germans.

/s/ R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

Op-30C1-AJ-5/19
(SC) N20-12/ND14
Serial 046230
Confidential

MAY 20, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Subject: Net Defenses, Fourteenth Naval District.
Reference:
(a) CNO ltr. OP-30C Serial 367330 of Dec. 7, 1940.
(b) CNO ltr. OP-30C Serial 375930 of Dec. 23, 1940.
(c) CNO ltr. OP-30C Serial 18530 of Jan. 21, 1941.

1. The Commandant is directed to lay the net defenses in the Fourteenth Naval District, when the procurement of material permits, if this meets with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The Bureau of Ordnance has been requested to expedite the procurement of the necessary material.

2. The laying of the above defenses will necessitate certain protective measures to shipping and to the nets, and will necessarily place the harbors to some extent in a situation similar to that existing under war conditions. In reference (a) the Commandant was directed to take preliminary steps to be prepared to lay the nets and to properly tend them after laying. In reference (b) an estimate of personnel necessary at the beginning of a war was submitted for information. In reference (c) the Commandants were authorized to confer with Local Coast Guard authorities concerning necessary additional navigational aids. Local regulations and instructions considered necessary for the information and control of shipping should be taken up with the District Engineer, U. S. Army, and the District Commander, U. S. Coast Guard.

3. The present standard A/T net is 30 feet in depth, which when suspended protects to a depth of 35 feet when not affected by currents. Hence, it is possible that magnetically fired torpedoes may be fired under the nets and exploded below ships berthed inside of the nets. It is suggested, therefore, that the inner of the double A/T nets be suspended as much as 15 feet in order to give necessary vertical protection where the depth of water permits torpedoes being fired under the nets and under ships berthed inside. The suspension of the inner net decreased partially the protection furnished by two nets for shallow running torpedoes. Later it may be advisable to order aprons to be secured to the present type of net.

R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

Copy to:
BuOrd
Op-12
CinCpac

Op-30C1-AJ
(SC) N20-12
Serial 055730
Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Washington, June 13, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Commandant, First Naval District
The Commandant, Third Naval District
The Commandant, Fourth Naval District
The Commandant, Fifth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixth Naval District
The Commandant, Seventh Naval District
The Commandant, Eighth Naval District
The Commandant, Tenth Naval District
The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District
The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District
The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District
Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.
Reference: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op-30C1 Serial 010230 of Feb. 17, 1941.

1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially

for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives [2] of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it can not be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.

R. E. INGERSOLL.

Copy to:
CinCpac
CinClant
CinCaf
C. O. Naval Net Depot, Tiburon
C. O. Naval Net Depot, Newport
Comdt. NavSta, Guantanamo
Comdt. NavSta, Samoa
BuOrd
Op-12

Op-30C1-FM
S81-3 (410916)
Serial 470330

SEPTEMBER 16, 1941.

Restricted
From: The Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.
Subject: Experimental and Development Work on Nets and Booms.
Reference:
(a) Op-30C Serial 07830 of 11 February 1941.
(b) Op-30C1 Serial 027730 of 9 April 1941.
(c) Alusna London ONI Report Serial 1674, Mono. Index Guide No. 910-4000 of 24 July 1941.
(d) ONI Serial 1745 Guide No. 910-4000 of 1 August 1941.

1. It is suggested that in order that progress may be made in solving some of the problems which confront us, that a small group of officers, engineers and draftsmen be assigned exclusively to planning improvements in net and boom designs and to development and experimental work. The group, it is suggested, may be aided by using the facilities of the Net Depots at Tiburon and Newport. It is suggested that these two depots appear suitable as centers for experimental and development work.

2. In references (a) and (b) the Chief of Naval Operations indicated the desirability of undertaking some research and development work. Among other suggestions, the need for a lighter anti-torpedo net was stressed, which can be laid and removed in harbors in a short time for temporary use, and which will give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes.

3. Designs are requested to be prepared giving A/T net protection to one or more large ships moored in harbors against torpedo plane attack in which the

A/T net may be placed completely around one or more large ships, similar to placing the ship (or ships) in a "dry-dock" of A/T net. It may be assumed that the currents inside of most harbors are not as great as at the entrances, and the moorings of such nets may be of less weight and less extensive than for the present A/T nets which are designed principally for harbor entrances. As such nets may desired for advance bases, as little weight and volume of material as possible is desirable. As little space as possible should be taken up by the nets in order not to take up too much anchorage space.

4. Designs of A/T nets which might be attached to booms on ships or floating off of ships at anchor are requested to be prepared in conjunction with the Bureau of Ships. In a design of this type it may be possible to do away with mooring the nets. A net which deflects rather than stops the torpedo may possibly be designed.

5. Reference (c) is a preliminary Admiralty report on the development of a torpedo net defense for merchant ships at sea. It is requested that the Bureau of Ordnance in conjunction with the Bureau of Ships undertake a similar development work for the protection of ships underway at sea.

6. It is possible that in our Navy the assumption has been reached that anchorages protected by nets are secure. Nets are defensive measures and, in general, are without destructive means. Patrol vessels are required in conjunction with net defenses, and of the two measures of defense, the vessels, capable of offensive action, are probably the more important. It is not believed that the tests with nets conducted by the British should be accepted as conclusive. While one test of torpedo firing against an A/T net has been conducted by the Bureau, the torpedo was not equipped with cutters. No other tests have as yet been held. It may be well to repeat and to extend the British tests. It may be worthwhile to know the exact damage which will be done to an anti-torpedo net from a torpedo fired in the net.

7. Until the present in great measure reliance in this mode of defense has been placed on British designs, experiments and tests. It is considered that now we should be in a position to take more progressive action. In this letter it is realized that the requests made are not concrete and definite, but serve only to indicate several of the problems toward the solution of which action may be directed.

R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

Copy to: BuShips

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP

Cincpac File No.
A16/ND14/(16)
Serial 086W

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *Sep 20, 1941.*

Secret
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Subject: Blocking Pearl Harbor Channel.
Reference: (a) Com-14 Conf. ltr. C-A16/H3/ND14 (0800) of August 16, 1941.

1. In view of anti-submarine defenses approved for and now in process of installation at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor, the Commander-in-Chief does not desire to reopen the question of anti-submarine nets thereat.

2. With reference to laying defensive mine fields off those harbors, it is believed there is insufficient prospect of commensurate return for the restricted maneuverability and risks involved to our own ships.

3. The Commander-in-Chief has noted with approval the action initiated toward obtaining suitable radar for protection of channel entrance. He would like to see this matter vigorously prosecuted. Please keep him informed as to progress.

4. WPL-46 assigns salvage in these waters as a task for the forces afloat, assisted by such facilities as the shore establishment may be able to provide. Organization and assembly of equipment is now in process under Commander Base Force. It is requested that the results of the study and inventory referred to in paragraph (3) of the reference (a) be made available to Commander Base Force and that, if and when necessity arises, appropriate local facilities and technical facilities be furnished him.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Op-30C1-HF
(SC)N20-12/ND12
Doc. 35904
Serial 0101130

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 3 October 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Chief of Bureau of Ordnance
Subject: A/T Net Defenses, San Francisco Bay.
Reference: (a) Proceedings of meeting of Local Joint Planning Committee, Northern California Sector, Pacific Coastal Frontier, of September 17, 1941.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.

2. Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of the enclosure. The Chief of Naval Operations considers it urgent to develop an anti-torpedo net which can be made up, towed to a desired location, and quickly laid. The use of pontoons, as suggested, does not appear to solve this question; a reduction in the number of moorings, at present necessary for the standard net, would seem to be required.

[S] R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

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[1] PW2/A16-3/022 Sr.
Confidential

EXHIBIT NO. 117

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A., 16 Jan. 1941.

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: (1) The Commander Scouting Force.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.
Reference: (a) OpNav Conf. serial 095323 to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet—"Protection of Fleet Aircraft."

1. I arrived here on October 30, 1940, with the point of view that the International situation was critical, especially in the Pacific, and I was impressed with the need of being ready today rather than tomorrow for any eventuality that might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing TWO and looking over the situation, I was surprised to find that here in the Hawaiian Islands, an important naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the more I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be.

2. (a) War Readiness of Patrol Plane Squadrons is dependent not only on the planes and equipment that comprise these squadrons, but also on many operating needs and requirements at Air Stations and outlying bases over which the Patrol Wing Commander has no direct control. Needs and requirements for War Readiness include: spare planes, spare engines, hangar and beach equipment, squadron equipment, spare parts, stores, material, bombs, ammunition, base operating facilities, overhaul and repair facilities, qualified personnel to man all base facilities and shops, all in sufficient adequacy to insure continuous operating readiness. These cannot be provided overnight. The isolation of this locality from the source of supply, the distance, and time involved, make careful and comprehensive long distance planning mandatory. I am informed that in the past, the average interval between the normal request and receipt of material has been nine months.

(b) Reference (a) reads, in part, as follows: "In about one year practically all fleet aircraft except Patrol Wing TWO will have armor and fuel protection". As there are no plans to modernize the present patrol planes comprising Patrol Wing TWO, this [2] evidently means that there is no intention to replace the present obsolescent type of patrol planes in Patrol Wing TWO prior to one year and that Patrol Wing TWO will be practically the last Wing to be furnished new planes. This, together with the many existing deficiencies, indicates to me

that the Navy Department as a whole does not view the situation in the Pacific with alarm or else is not taking steps in keeping with their view.

3. (a) Presumably, the offices and bureaus concerned are familiar with the situation in the Hawaiian Area over which they have particular cognizance; certainly enough correspondence has already been written concerning patrol plane needs to enable bureaus and offices to take the necessary steps to provide and to anticipate such needs.

(b) If war should break in the Pacific, there is much work cut out for patrol planes and undoubtedly much will be expected of them. Considerably more attention will have to be paid to anticipating their needs and action taken to provide deficiencies by all the bureaus and offices concerned if patrol planes are to perform according to expectations.

4. It is therefore urgently recommended that those concerned with War Plans and those in the Planning and Procurement Divisions of all bureaus and offices view the patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian Area in the light of the International situation in the Pacific; that each bureau and office check and recheck their planning and procurement lists for present requirements and future needs and that immediate steps be taken to furnish the personnel, material, facilities and equipment required and under their cognizance, to meet the present emergency and probable eventualities. The tremendous and all consuming work of those in the Navy Department is fully appreciated and there is no intent to criticize or to shift responsibility. This letter is written merely in an effort to insure that we may not be "too late".

5. The following are some of the deficiencies and requirements referred to above:

[3] (a) For Patrol Wing TWO:

1. Replace present obsolescent type patrol planes with high performance modern types having latest approved armor and armament features and in such numbers as the readiness of base operating facilities will permit.

2. Provide squadron spares and squadron equipment in excess so as to have available a sufficiency to provide for shift of operations to outlying bases.

3. Provide bomb handling equipment of latest design in sufficient amounts as to reduce to minimum the time element involved in rearming both at normal base and outlying bases.

4. Provide ordnance material to fill and maintain full squadron allowances.

5. Provide increased number of aircraft torpedoes when additional storage is available. Twenty-four aircraft torpedoes are now stored at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

6. Expedite completion and assignment of patrol plane tenders. At present, the tenders for Patrol Wing TWO consists of the U. S. S. WRIGHT and the U. S. S. SWAN. The WRIGHT now is not available due to Navy Yard overhaul until March 17, 1941.

(b) For Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.:

1. Increase capacity for overhaul and repair of patrol planes, engines, instruments, radio and ordnance material, and provide manufacture and stowage of breathing oxygen, to anticipate [4] operating needs both now and as estimated for the future, through addition of shop space, additional shops, additional personnel, additional equipment, additional supply of spare parts and stock.

2. Increase and improve bomb storage and ammunition storage through enlargement and preparation of present storage and installation of bomb handling equipment.

3. Construction of squadron's ready ammunition storage.

4. Additional bombs in Hawaiian Area.

5. Additional ferries or other suitable means for transporting bombs from Ammunition Depot across water surrounding Ford Island to Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

6. Increase supply facilities through additional stowage, additional supply personnel (officer and enlisted), additional facilities for handling supplies, assistance in obtaining and increasing the amount of spares and supplies on hand, and simplification of requisitioning spare parts and supplies.

7. Increase machine gun and rifle range facilities in Pearl Harbor Area to provide for more effective ground training for personnel of patrol squadrons based on Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

8. Provide for torpedo waf head stowage at some suitable location readily accessible to the [5] Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

9. Increase barrack space to provide for increased personnel at Naval Air Station and for personnel of additional patrol squadrons as may be assigned.

(c) For Naval Air Station, Kaneohe:

1. Expedite completion; providing the operating facilities necessary to permit basing and efficiently operating the number of patrol squadrons intended to base thereon, including dredging the patrol plane operating area to the extent recommended, dredging ship channel, housing of the necessary personnel, supplying equipment for the various buildings, supplying necessary boats and supplying adequate station personnel. Anticipate engine and plane overhaul facilities to meet War requirements.

(d) For Keehi Lagoon:

1. Take necessary steps to expedite the development of Keehi Lagoon for a patrol plane base.

(e) Outlying Bases: Wake, Johnston, Palmyra:

1. Expedite completion of operating facilities with particular regard to dredging ship channels; dredging landing and take-off areas; providing gasoline and oil reserves and issue facilities; bomb and ammunition supply and stowage; concrete ramps and parking area.

(f) For Midway:

1. Expedite completion and establishment of Midway as an outlying operating base with the assignment of necessary personnel and with facilities and equipment to provide for the basing thereon of two patrol plane squadrons.

(g) General:

1 Stop the normal shifting and rotating between sea and shore and between other activities of personnel, officer and enlisted, in Patrol Wing TWO, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, and Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, until all personnel complements have been brought up to the requirements necessary for war-time operations.

2. Provide two sets additional beaching gear and two boats fitted with gasoline bowser tanks for use at each of the following outlying bases: Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Guam and Canton.

/s/ P. N. L. Bellinger.

Copy to:
Comairscofor.
Com. 14.
N. A. S., P. H., T. H.
Prosp. C. O., N. A. S., Kaneohe.

C. S. F. File No. A16-3/(035)
Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET

SCOUTING FORCE

U. S. S. INDIANOPOLIS, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *Jan 21, 1941.*

First endorsement to CPW2 conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of 1/16/41.

From: Commander Scouting Force.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Commander Scouting Force appreciates that the efforts of the Department toward the completion of adequate defense measures must necessarily be based upon the development of the entire Naval Establishment rather than concentration upon one point. He believes, however, that the importance of Pearl Harbor as the spear-head of our defenses in the Pacific, and the essential role of Patrol Wing TWO not only in the defense of Pearl Harbor but also in any operations to the westward, warrant early and full attention to the needs cited by the Commander of that Wing.

3. Commander Scouting Force has, since his arrival in this area as Commander Hawaiian Detachment, been much concerned at the lack of adequate material and facilities for proper and efficient operation of Patron Wing TWO in war. He has effected such remedial measures as lay within his power, and has urged upon the Department such matters as the enlargement of the originally-planned installation at Kaneohe Bay and the provision of gasoline

and lubricating oil reserve supplies at outlying-island bases so that these bases might be utilized temporarily without awaiting the arrival of tenders.

4. In view of the location of Pearl Harbor and the island bases, and the functions of Patrol Wing TWO in war in the Pacific, the Commander Scouting Force therefore recommends strongly that measures toward fulfilling the needs cited by Commander Patrol Wing TWO be given the highest priority in the Department's program and accomplished at the earliest practicable moment.

/s/ ADOLPHUS ANDREWS.

Copy to:
Comairscofor Compatwing Two
Com FOURTEEN
NAS, Pearl Harbor
Prosp. CO, NAS, Kaneohe

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[1] CinC File No. A16-1/A4-1/VZ/(0178)
Confidential.

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *Jan 31, 1941.*

Second endorsement to CPW2 conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of 1/16/41.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.

1. Forwarded, concurring with the basic recommendation and with the first endorsement by Commander Scouting Force.

2. The Commander-in-Chief appreciates the spirit in which the basic letter, urging action toward effective readiness for missions that may be demanded of Patrol Wing TWO, has been written. He also appreciates the fact that action has already been initiated or, in some cases, is not readily practicable at this time with respect to a number of the basic recommendations; and that separate correspondence with respect to much of this material is already in circulation.

3. It is the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, however, that the basic letter, summarizing as it does the entire patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian area, presents a very valuable picture of the overall requirements that are urgently needed if the potentialities expected of patrol planes are to be even approximately realized. Therefore, full review of the subject, accompanied by appropriate action toward expediting or initiating needed developments, is urged.

4. Attention is particularly invited to:

(a) The desirability of better priority in the delivery of improved patrol planes to Patrol Wing TWO.

(b) The great importance of increased bomb and torpedo supply, including not only bulk storage, but also ready storage at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, together with suitable handling and loading equipment at the Air Station, and improved transportation from bulk storage. In this connection, provision at the Naval Air Station should include two "fills" for five patrol plane squadrons and *one aircraft carrier group,*

(c) The vital necessity of expediting the readiness at outlying island developments of the basic essentials: gasoline and oil storage, bomb and ammunition storage, parking area, ramps and dredged approaches thereto. This latter subject has been discussed informally with representatives of the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and is understood to be receiving full consideration. Departmental support, if and as needed, is urged.

/s/ J. O. RICHARDSON.

Copy to:
Comscofor
Comairscofor
Compatwing-2
Com-14
NAS P. H.
NAS KANEOHE

Confidential
Op-23-H-KB 2/19
(SC)A16-1/PW2
Serial 015823 FEB. 27, 1941.
From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics.
Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.
Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks.
Chief of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.
Subject: Patrol Wing Two—Readiness of.
Reference: (a) Compatwing Two Confid. Ltr. PW2/A16-3/022 of 16 January 1941.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.

2. In separate correspondence the Chief of Naval Operations has already indicated his desires on the following items of paragraph 5 of reference (a)

(a) 1.	(a) 3.	(b) 2.	(b) 4.
(a) 2.	(a) 4.	(b) 3.	(b) 5.

3. In regard to the remaining items and to the general situation the Chief of Naval Operations desires the addressees to be guided by the following policy:

In case of hostilities practically all the aircraft of the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets may be dependent upon the Hawaiian Area for logistics. The Area should be prepared expeditiously to handle this contingency. Needs that can be foreseen should be supplied by the Bureaus in advance of requisition.

R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

Copy to:
Cincpac, Comscofor,
Comairscofor, Compatwing 2,
Com. 14, NAS Pearl.

---

[1] Confidential
G-A16-1/A7-3(2)/
ND14(0135)
Headquarters
Hawaiian Department
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Headquarters
14th Naval District
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

14 FEBRUARY 1941.

Subject: Army and Navy Aircraft in Hawaiian Area.
To: Officers named in par. 2, herein.

1. Reference is directed to the following:

A. Letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on the above subject, dated 4 February 1941, (CinC serial (0195).

B. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Navy short title, 14ND-JCD-13; Army short title, HCF-39) Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Headquarters Fourteenth Naval District, dated 14 April, 1939.

2. In order to study and make recommendations to the Planning Representatives, (Paragraph 4, Reference B), for measures relating to increasing the combat efficiency of Army and Navy aircraft stationed in Hawaiian waters and to improve the effectiveness of the defenses against hostile air attacks, the following joint committees (Paragraph 5, Reference B) are appointed:

a. Air Operations Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraphs 5 *a*, *c*, and *d*, Reference A, and to prepare plans for the conduct of joint exercises, on a weekly or more frequent basis, to insure the readiness of joint defensive measures in Oahu against surprise aircraft raids.

Army Members: Haw. Air Force: Lt. Col. W. S. Streett, AC.; H. S. C. A. B.: Major R. T. Frederick, 64th CA.

Navy Members: 14ND NAS Operations Officer, Lt. Comwr. H. F. Carlson; Staff, Com. AirBatFor., Comdr. M. R. Browning; Patrol Wing 2 C. O. Patron 22, Lt. Comdr. G. Van Deurs.

Enc. (A) Com 14 serial (0410) 1 May 1941

[2] b. Communications Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects, listed in subparagraph 5 *b.*, Reference A.

Army Members: Hq. Haw. Dept.: Lt. Col. W. H. Murphy, SC; Haw. Air Force: Lt. Col. C. I. Hoppough, SC; H. S. C. A. B.: Major I. H. Ritchie, CAC.

Navy Members: PatWingTwo C. O. Patron 22; Lt. Comdr. W. P. Cogswell; 14ND Communication Officer: Comdr. H. L. Thompson; Staff ComAirBatFor Communication Officer: Lt. L. J. Dow.

c. Air-Antiaircraft Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraphs 5 *e*, *f*, and *h* of Reference A, to prepare plans for the effective coordination of ship and shore antiaircraft artillery gun fire against surprise aircraft raids, and to consider the desirability of using balloon barrages in the defense of the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field Area.

Army Members: Haw. Air Force: Lt. Col. Hegenberger, AC; H. S. C. A. B.: Major R. T. Frederick, 64th CA; Capt. M. G. Weber, CAC.

Navy Members: 14ND District Marine Officer: Col. H. K. Pickett; BatFor Gunnery Officer, USS Mississippi: Lt. Comdr. W. W. Juvenal; Asst. Air Officer, USS Yorktown: Lt. Comdr. H. F. Macomsey.

d. *Armament Committee:* To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraph 5 *g* of Reference A:

Army Members: Hq Haw. Dept.: Lt. Col. M. W. Marsh, Inf.; Major R. McK. Smith,OD; Haw. Air Force: Lt. Col. A. B. Custis, OD.

Navy Members: 14ND 10C NAD Oahu: Comdr. W. W. Meek; Staff ComAirBatFor, Gunnery: Lt. Comdr. S. E. Burroughs, Jr.; Staff, ComPatWing-Two, Gunnery: Lt. H. P. Cooper.

[3] *e. Chemical Warfare Committee:* To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to measures to screen the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field Area from air attack by the use of smoke or by other devices;

Army Members: Hq. Haw. Dept.: Col. J. W. Lyon, CWS; Haw. Air Force: Major M. E. Jennings, CWS; H. S. C. A. B.: Major F. T. Ostenberg, 64th CA.

Navy Members: 14ND CO Barracks Detachment: Major J. M. Smith, USMC; PatWingTwo CO Patron 21: Lt. Comdr. J. W. Harris.

3. The studies and recommendations of the Committees will be based upon existing conditions and steps which may be taken in the near future to improve these conditions. The senior officer of each committee will act as its chairman. Direct consultation by committee members with any units under the control of the Department Commander or of the District Commandant is authorized and encouraged. Reports containing the recommendations of the committees will be submitted to the Planning Representatives (Paragraph 4 Reference B) not later than 1 March, 1941, with a view to the immediate preparation of joint operation plans for defense against air attacks.

4. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, has detailed the fleet members for the committees as indicated in paragraph 2 above.

5. All members of all committees who are not temporarily absent from Oahu on other duty will assemble at 0930 seventeen February in Office of Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter.

C. C. BLOCH
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.
COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

WALTER C. SHORT
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
COMMANDING HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Copies to:
C. G., H. A. F.
Fort Shafter, T. H.
C. G., H. S. C. A. B.
Fort DeRussy, T. H.
C. G., Schofield Barracks
CinCus
ComBatFor
ComScoFor
ComAirBatFor
ComPatWingTwo

EXHIBIT NO. 117A

SECRET

Initials: C. G.
Date: 17 Feb. 1941

[1] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 17, 1941.

In reply refer to: AG 354.2/JAX
Subject: Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Division,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

1. In a recent confidential letter of instructions to commanders of the six major echelons of the United States Fleet, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, expressed the pressing necessity for maximum readiness in the Hawaiian area, particularly for Pearl Harbor defense, of all available aviation components. I am in agreement with Admiral Kimmel in his belief that much remains to be done for adequate future effectiveness in this respect, but that much can now be done with means now available, to make arrangements for local employment of aviation more effective than they now are.

2. With above in mind and under provisions contained in Joint Control Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and 14th Naval District, 14 April 1939, joint planning representatives have been selected from echelons concerned in order that detailed plans and recommendations may be undertaken. Upon completion, plans and recommendations will have been formulated to implement the following;

a. Joint Air Exercises. Desirability of intensified attention to this subject. Frequency and scope. Degree of coordination. Improvement along practical lines.

b. Communications. Fully satisfactory communications between all Army and Navy air activities, both in the air and on the ground. Direct and instantaneous communication, in particular, between all Army and Navy air fields. Continuation of and renewed stress upon Joint communication exercises.

c. Air Command. Determination of responsibility and degree under various conditions. Arrangements between the two services for such direct exercise of air control as may be necessary.

d. Landing Fields, Mutual Use. "Scattering" plans, including dispersion of patrol planes. Familiarization of Navy and Army aircraft personnel with one another's landing fields and facilities, including actual practice in mutual use and servicing.

[2] *e. Aircraft Recognition and Familiarization.* Recognition signals between air and ground. Familiarization of all personnel—air, ground, and ship—with all local Navy and Army types.

f. Alert Watches. Determination of suitable alert watch conditions. Requirements for all naval aircraft types. Size and composition of watches. Watches with and without ship-based planes present. Conservation of personnel and material.

g. Armament and Re-armament. Plans for adequate accomplishment with means now available. Ready storage. Speed. Replenishment.

h. Alarm and Detection. Effective and instantaneous air alarm arrangements. Detection by RADAR (and otherwise) and tracking of enemy planes. Possible restriction of own planes to specific operating areas for this purpose. Similarly, control of air traffic approaches.

i. Employment of balloon barrages, smoke and other special devices for improving defenses of Pearl Harbor.

j. High priority to increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and establishment of air warning net.

k. Effective coordination of Naval and Military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

l. Joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

m. Joint exercises, at least once weekly, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces on Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids.

3. In the joint plannig enumerated herein it is directed that all echelons or individuals concerned render every possible aid and cooperative assistance to the end that maximum needs for Army-Navy joint action may be met.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

EXHIBIT NO. 118

[*1*] Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
1200, 30 November, 1941.

Memorandum for the Commander in Chief.

STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF AMERICAN-JAPANESE WAR WITHIN THE NEXT TWENTY-FOUR HOURS

1. Despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.
2. Despatch to Task Force Commanders:
(a) WPL 46 effective.
(b) Sweeping plan cancelled.
(c) Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Task Force 8) carry out present mission. Upon completion cover WAKE against enemy operations until joined by Task Force Three. Remainder of Task Force Two (now at sea in operating areas, return to PEARL HARBOR.
(d) Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows: Cancel cruiser operations west of NANPO SHOTO; delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Task Force Three with units of Task Force Two present in PEARL HARBOR depart ---------- and rendezvous with Comairbatfor at Point "A" at ----------; Commander Base Force send two tankers to Point "A" with utmost dispatch, report expected time of their arrival.
(e) Send one Marine Bombing Squadron to MIDWAY.
[*2*] 3. (a) I would not modify the movements of the WRIGHT now enroute WAKE to MIDWAY, nor REGULUS, enroute PEARL to MIDWAY, nor ships bound to CHRISTMAS and CANTON.
(b) I would continue WILLIAM WARD BURROWS to WAKE, directing Comairbatfor (Com Task Force 8) to have two destroyers join her as escort.
(c) I would not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.
(d) I would provide two destroyers to escort SARATOGA from longitude 150° west to PEARL HARBOR. (Under present set-up, Commander Task Force Three has been directed to furnish this escort from his force which would be at sea on arrival of SARATOGA. Under the plan of paragraph 2, above, this order should be transferred to Com Task Force One. This note added by Good).
(e) I would not direct any change in passage of shipping to and from MANILA, nor would I send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward CALIFORNIA or SAMOA until further developments occur.

[*1*] Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.
1200, December 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the Commander in Chief.

RECOMMENDED STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF AMERICAN-JAPANESE WAR WITHIN THE NEXT FORTY-EIGHT HOURS

1. Send despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.
2. Send despatch to Task Force Commanders:
(a) WPL 46 effective. (Execute O–1A R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below. (The SS and VP plans will become effective without special reference to them).
(b) Commence sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Nanpo Shoto, cancelled.

(c) Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows: Delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three ar joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One. Commander Base Force send two tankers with utmost despatch to rendezvous with Task Force Three to eastward of Wake at rendezvous to be designated.

(d) Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Task for 8) return to Pearl at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of Taskfor Two, less BBs, to join Task Force Three.

(e) LEXINGTON land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p. m. 7 Dec) and proceed with ships now in company (Taskfor 12) to vicinity of Wake.

(f) Comtaskfor Three proceed to join LEXINGTON group. Return DMS to Pearl.

[2] 3. (a) Do not modify the movements of REGULUS at MIDWAY (departing 9th), nor ships bound to CHRISTMAS and CANTON.

(b) Direct that WILLIAM WARD BURROWS continue to WAKE but delay arrival until 10th. Direct that LEXINGTON group send two destroyers to join BURROWS prior to her arrival at WAKE.

(c) Do not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.

(d) Provide two destroyers to escort SARATOGA from longitude 150° west to PEARL HARBOR.

(e) Do not change passage of shipping to and from MANILA nor send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward CALIFORNIA or SAMOA until further developments occur.

(s) C. H. McMorris.

EXHIBIT NO. 119

RADIO LOG

of

BISHOP'S POINT RADIO STATION

7 December 1941

RADIO LOG

SECTION BASE
BISHOP'S POINT, OAHU, T.H.

WATCH
C.E. GIBSON SUPERVISOR
R.B. MOYLE OPERATOR

RECEIVER & CONTROLS O.K.
FREQ. 2670 KCS. 1941 4.2 M.C.
DATE 7 DECEMBER 1941

1445	DZ5Y	DB1L V DN3L	AR
	DN3L	V DZ5Y	K
	DZ5Y	DB1L V DN3L	AS ONE MOMENT PLEASE STAND BY
	DB1L	DZ5Y V DN3L	AR
	DN3L	V DZ5Y	COME IN
	DN3L	V DB1L	K
	DZ5Y	V DN3L	WHAT IS THE DISTANCE OF THE SUBMARINE K
	DZ5Y	V DN3L	WHAT WAS THE APPROXIMATE DISTANCE AND COURSE OF THE SUBMARINE THAT YOU SIGHTED K
1450	DN3L	V DZ5Y	THE COURSE WAS ABOUT WHAT WE WERE STEERING AT THE TIME 020 MAGNETIC AND ABOUT 1000 YARDS FROM THE ENTRANCE APPARENTLY HEADING FOR THE ENTRANCE K
1451	DZ5Y	V DN3L	R
1456	DZ5Y	V DN3L	BT DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE SUB K
	DN3L	V DZ5Y	NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION K
	DZ5Y	V DN3L	WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME APPROXIMATELY THAT YOU SAW THE SUBMARINE K
	DN3L	V DZ5Y	APPROXIMATE TIME 0350 AND HE WAS APPARENTLY HEADING FOR THE ENTRANCE K
1458	V DN3L		R
1505	DZ5Y	V DN3L	AR PLEASE
	DN3L	V DZ5Y	K
	DZ5Y	V DN3L	BT THANK YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION NOTIFY US IF YOU HAVE ANY MORE INFORMATION WE WILL CONTINUE SEARCH K
1508	V DZ5Y		R
1524	DB1L	V DZ5Y	AR
	DZ5Y	V DB1L	K
	V DZ5Y		WE ARE FINISHED K
1525	V DB1L		R
1535	DR7Y	V DJ8A	PM DRBR EARLY 0450 K
1538	V DJ8A		R
1539	DW2X	V DB1L	AR
	DB1L	V DW2X	K
	DW2X	V DB1L	CLEAR K
	V DW2X		R
1555	DJ8A	V DR7Y	AR
	DR6Y	V DJ8A	K
	DJ8A	V DR7Y	815 FEMALE 0525 YOU GOT THAT MESSAGE BEFORE DID YOU
	DR7Y	V DJ8A	R BOTH MESSAGES R LAST TWO MESSAGES K
1557	DJ8A	V DR7Y	R
1630	DE2A	V DW2X	AR
	DW2X	V DR9Q	K
	DW2X	V DN3L	K
	V DZ5I		K
	DE2A	V DW2X	Z RIME WING 071614 (SEE FILE) K
1641	V DN3L		R
	V DZ5I		R
	DW2X	V DN3L	AR
	DN3L	V DW2X	K
1642	DW2X	V DN3L	ZCD DZ5I R AR
1643	DN3L	V DW2X	R
1647	DW2X	V DZ5I	AR
1650	DW2X	V DR9Q	ZCE DZ5I K
	DR9Q	V DZ5I	Z8F K
	DZ5I	V DR9Q	S3 K
	DW2X	V DN3L	ZCE DZ5I AR
	DZ5I	V DW2X	K
	DW2X	V DZ5I	Z8F K
	V DW2X		S5 K5 K
1652	V DZ5I		R
1714	DR7Y	V DJ8A	HAVE YOU ANYTHING FOR ME
	DJ8A	V DR7Y	YES 2307 COUNTER 0640 VA
1715	DR7Y	V DJ8A	R

Pg 1

6 June 1945.

I hereby certify that this is the radio log or the exact copy of the log that was made by the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, T.H., on 7 December 1941.

Richard Wilmot Humphrey

Richard Wilmot Humphrey
438-06-63, RM3c, V-3, U.S.N.R.

This copy was certified in my presence.

Walter H. Kozacko

Walter H. Kozacko
Lt.Comdr., USNR.

RADIO LOG

SECTION BASE
BISHOP'S POINT, OAHU, T.H.

WATCH
G.E. GIBSON SUPERVISOR
RJB. MOYLE OPERATOR

RECEIVER & CONTROLS O.K.
FREQ. 2670 KCS. 1941 KWN
DATE 7 DECEMBER ~~1942~~

1715			TIME OF LAST ENTRY
~~1721~~	DW2X	V DR3L	AR
	DN3L	V DW2X	K
	DW2X	V DN3L	P BT WE HAVE DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES UPON SUBS OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREA AR
	DW2X	V DN3L	STAND BY FOR MORE MESSAGES
	DN3L	V DW2X	IMI YOUR LAST PRIORITY K
1723	DW2X	V DN3L	WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DRIPPED DEPTH CHARGES UPON SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREA AR
	DW2X	V DN3L	DID YOU GET THAT LAST MESSAGE K
	V DW2X		R
	V DN3L		STAND BY FOR FUTHER MESSAGES
1727	V DW2X		R
1749	DW2X	V DN3L	AR
	DN3L	V DW2X	K
	DW2X	V DN3L	ZMA Ø BUT STAND BY AR
	V DW2X		R
1755	DW2X	V DN3L	AR
	V DW2X		K
	DW2X	V DN3L	ZMA Ø BUT STAND BY FOR MESSAGE AT ANY TIME AR
1756	V DW2X		R
1803	DJ8A	V DN3L	P P AR PLEASE
	DR9Q	V DN3L	ZCG DJ8A AR
	AJ8A	V DR9Q	AR
	DW2X	V DN3L	P AR
	V DW2X		K
	V DN3L		BT WE HAVE INTERCEPTED A SAMPAN INTO HONOLULU PLEASE HAVE COAST GUARD SEND CUTTER TO RELIEVE US OF SAMPAN AR
1805	V DW2X		R P K
	V DN3L		AS 1 MINUTE
	V DJ8A		K
	V DN3L		BT WE HAVE INTERCEPTED SAMPAN AND ESCORTING SAMPAN INTO HONOLULU PLEASE HAVE CUTTER RELIEVE US OF SAMPAN AR
	DN3L	V DW2X	Z DW2X Ø71807 DN3L P GR 11 BT HELID ARUQS QLUAN
1810			SVDER LBVQY WEXKQ TPHQX BMMQH LBPBV ARUQS HELID K
	DR7Y	V DJ8A	IMI GR 1
1813	DJ8A	V DR7Y	GR 1 402
	DR7Y	V DJ8A	R
	MOYLE AND GIBSON OFF TO BANKS AND HUMPHREY - - - - - - - - - -		
1817	DE1T	V DW2X	AR
1821	DN3L	V DW2X	AR
	DW2X	V DN3L	K
	V DW2X		Z DW2X Ø71820 DE1T Q DN3L P GR 5 BT PROCEED IMMEDIATELY AND CONTACT WARD AR
1826	DW2X	V DN3L	R
	DR7Y	V DJ8A	AR
	DJ8A	V DR7Y	K
	DR7Y	V DJ8A	HERE IS A MESSAGE Z DK3K Ø71801 DR7Y GR 4 BT PROCEED CONTACT HARBOR PATROL
	DJ8A	V DN3L	IMI THAT PAST MESSAGE
1830	DW2X	V DR6K	ZMC ZGD DR6K DR9Q DU1P
	DJ8A	V DN3L	
1834	RECEIVER AND TRANSMITTER HAVE GONE OUT--POWER OFF		
1838	AIR RAID BY JAPANESE PLANES		

6 June 1945.

I hereby certify that this is the radio log or the exact copy of the log that was made by the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, T.H., on 7 December 1941.

Richard Wilmot Humphrey
Richard Wilmot Humphrey
438-06-63, USNR, V-5, U.S.N.R.

This copy was certified in my presence.

Walter M. Kozacko
Walter M. Kozacko
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

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EXHIBIT NO. 120

[1] KIMMEL EXHIBIT 5 TO REPORT OF ACTION

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 19, 1941.

Memorandum for Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: In accordance with our conversation of yesterday, I am forwarding to you the following information:

1. Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of 7 December, 1941:

Squadron	In commission	Total available for flight	Location	Under repair	Ready at base	In air
VP-11	12 PBY-5	12	Kaneohe	0	12	0
VP-12	12 PBY-5	11	Kaneohe	1	11	0
VP-14	12 PBY-5	[1] 10	Kaneohe	2	7	[1] 3
VP-21	12 PBY-3	[2] 11	Midway	1	4	[2] 7
VP-21	1 PBY-3 (spare)	1	Pearl Harbor	1	0	0
VP-21	1 PBY-3	12	Pearl Harbor	2	12	0
VP-22	14 PBY-3	12	Pearl Harbor	1	11	0
VP-24	6 PBY-5	5	Pearl Harbor	1	1	[3] 4

RECAPITULATION

Squadron	In commission	Total available for flight	Under repair	Ready at base	In air
At Kaneohe	36	[1] 33	3	30	[1] 3
At Pearl	33	[3] 28	5	24	[3] 4
At Midway	12	[2] 11	1	4	[2] 7
Total	81	72	9	58	14

[2] NOTES

[1] 3 planes armed with two depth charges each conducting search of assigned fleet operating areas in accordance with U. S. Pacific Fleet Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised) (Task Force NINE Operating Plan (9-1). 3 planes in condition 2 (30 minutes notice).

[2] 5 planes conducting search of sector 120°-170° radius 450 miles; departed Midway at 1820 GCT. 2 planes departed Midway at same time to rendezvous with U. S. S. LEXINGTON at a point 400 miles bearing 130° from Midway to serve as escorts for Marine Scouting planes. Four planes, additional plants, armed with 2-500 pound bombs each were on the alert at Midway as a ready striking force. These four planes took off at about 2230 GCT upon receipt of information on the attack on Pearl Harbor, and searched sector 060° to 100° radius 400 miles. One plane was under repair in the hangar at Midway. A spare plane was under overhaul at Pearl Harbor.

[3] Four planes conducting inter-type tactics in area C-5 with U. S. Submarine.

[4] All planes, except those under repair, were armed with machine guns and a full allowance of machine gun ammunition.

[3] 2. Material condition:

(a) Of the 81 available patrol planes 54 were new PBY-5's; 27 were PBY-3's having over three years service. The PBY-5's were recently ferried to Hawaii, arriving on the following dates:

Squadron	Number planes	Arrival date	Squadron	Number planes	Arrival date
VP-11	12	28 Oct. 1941	VP-23	12	23 Nov. 1941.
VP-24	6	28 Oct 1941	VP-14	12	23 Nov. 1941.
VP-12	12	8 Nov. 1941.			

(b) The PBY-5 airplanes were experiencing the usual shake-down difficulties and were hampered in maintenance by an almost complete absence of spare parts. In addition, a program for installation of leakproof tanks, armor, and modified

engine nose sections was in progress. They were not fully ready for war until these installations were completed, nor were extensive continuous operations practicable until adequate spare parts were on hand.

(c) The 12 PBY–3 airplanes at Pearl Harbor (VP–22) had returned from Midway on 5 December after an arduous tour of duty at Midway and Wake since 17 October. This squadron was in relatively poor material condition because of its extended operations at advance bases with inadequate facilities for normal repair and upkeep. In addition 10 of its planes were [4] approaching 18 months service and were due for overhaul.

(d) It should be noted that the material situation of the patrol squadrons made the maintenance of continuous extensive daily searches impracticable. Under such conditions the PBY–5's were to be expected to experience numerous material failures which would place airplanes out of commission until spare parts arrived. The PBY–3's of Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO at Pearl were scheduled for a week of upkeep for repair and maintenance.

(e) Under the circumstances, it seemed advisable to continue intensive expansion training operations and improvement of the material military effectiveness, at the same time preserving the maximum practicable availability of aircraft for an emergency. Under the existing material and spare parts situation, continuous and extensive patrol plane operations by the PBY–5's was certain to result in rapid automatic attrition of the already limited number of patrol planes immediately available by the exhaustion of small but vital spare parts for which there were no replacements.

(f) In this connection it should be noted that there were insufficient patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area effectively to do the job required. For the commander of a search group to be able to state with [5] some assurance that no hostile carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away and launch an attack without prior detection would require an effective daily search through 360° to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming a 15-mile radius of visibility this would require a daily 16 hour flight of 84 planes. A force of not less than 200 patrol planes, adequate spare parts and ample well trained personnel would be required for such operations.

(Signed) P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

PW2/A16–3/
016
Confidential

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 1 Jan. 1942.

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO
To: Senior Member, Board Investigating Activities of December 7, 1941.
Subject: Data Requested by Board.

1. In accordance with your request I am sending herewith six (6) copies of Report of Army-Navy Board of 31 October, 1941.

2. The dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid Drills were held are as follows:

24 April, 1941,
12 May, 1941,
13 May, 1941,
19 June, 1941,
10 July, 1941,
26 July, 1941,
1 August, 1941,
20 August, 1941,
5 September, 1941,
27 September, 1941,
13 October, 1941
27 October, 1941,
12 November, 1941.

P. N. L. BELLINGER

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF ARMY-NAVY BOARD 31 OCTOBER 1941

[1] In compliance with radiogram to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated 2 October 1941 and a similar radiogram to the Commandant, 14th Naval District, a Joint Army-Navy Board was convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas for all purposes

for the entire Hawaiian Area with particular recommendations on the jurisdiction of the Kahuku Point Area. The board met at 0900 October 7, 1941 and frequently thereafter until final recommendations were submitted. Present were:

Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. A.
Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. N.
Brigadier General H. C. Davidson, U. S. A.
Lieutenant Commander S. E. Burroughs, U. S. N.

1. A general discussion was held concerning the various Army-Navy aviation activities, the available training areas, the present congestion of aircraft areas, the expected expansion of aircraft of both services in the near future with the attending operational difficulties which such expansion would produce.

2. In order that the board could intelligently approach the problem which confronted it, it was necessary to have such information as was available as to the total number of airplanes of both services for which operating facilities should be made available. The following lists show the number of airplanes which were considered.

Navy

14th Naval District Aircraft: 84 Patrol planes, 48 VSO seaplanes.
Fleet Aircraft: 750 airplanes (10 Aircraft Carrier Groups).
Cruiser and Battleship Seaplanes: 75 seaplanes (approximately).
Patrol Wings One and Two: 98 Patrol planes.
[2] *Marine Aircraft Groups:* 162 airplanes
Utility Aircraft: 88 Airplanes (various types)
Total, 1305.

Army

54 Group program:

Combat Airplanes

B–17	170
A–20–A	27
P–40	163
P–38	163
C–47	20

Present Assignment:

Combat Airplanes

B–17	12
P–40	104
A–20–A	12
O–47	13

Obsolescent Airplanes

B–18	30
P–36	50
P–26	17
Total	781

Air Fields Available:

Oahu

Army: Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field.
Navy: Ford Island, Ewa, Kaneohe.
Air Fields Proposed: Kahuku, John Rodgers, (Commercial), Barbers Point, Keehi Lagoon (commercial—under construction).

[3] *Outlying Islands—Hawaiian Archipelago*

Army: Barking Sands, Kauai; Burns Field, Kauai (Commercial—too small for bombardment airplanes); Morse Field, Hawaii; Hilo, Hawaii (Municipal Airport); Lanai (Under construction); Homestead Field, Molokai (Used jointly Army-Navy and commercial).

Navy: Maui (Navy and Commercial; Hilo (Temporary facilities patrol planes).

3. The problem confronting the board as it pertains to Naval aviation was summed up by the Naval representatives as follows:

a. The Navy requires shore air bases for the use of carrier aircraft in order to maintain them in a proper state of training for war readiness. With the imminent increase in numbers of Army and Navy aircraft operating from Oahu, the congestion of air space for training and the shortage of suitable sites for air bases on Oahu must be recognized as becoming serious problems. Lack of suitable harbor and dock facilities in islands of the Hawaiian group other than Oahu precludes the development of these islands as bases for carrier-based aircraft, since it is essential that carrier planes be readily accessible to their parent vessels. For this reason Oahu is the only logical island for the development of additional facilities for shore basing of carrier air groups. Carrier aircraft, when based on shore, must, on account of the nature of their functions, be considered in a mobile state of readiness and not definitely fixed or attached to any shore base. Nevertheless, there must be provided on shore suitable and adequate facilities for the basing and operating of such aircraft just as definitely and specifically as if they were intended to be shore based permanently. It is estimated that approximately ten carrier air groups will be shore based in the Hawaiian Area at any one time. It is essential that shore bases be available for these air groups in order that a proper state of training may be maintained. These shore bases must necessarily be located on the island of Oahu where transportation facilities are available between bases and berths of parent vessels both for transferring personnel and equipment, and for reasons of readiness. In addition, in order to provide air space and fields for the conduct of daily training of these air groups, adequate aviation facilities must be available not only on Oahu but on other islands of the Hawaiian Group.

b. The Navy has under lease approximately 70 acres of land on Kahuku Point. There is a landing strip and a dive bombing target on this area that is continually in use by shore-based carrier aircraft in connection with training operations. If this area is given over to the Army for construction of an air base, its loss will be strongly felt even now, when congestion on Oahu is but a portion of [4] that of the future, and adjustments must be made not only for loss of the existing landing strip and target area, but also for the reduction of the Navy air space involved. With the arrival of each additional carrier group in Oahu, further adjustments will be required to permit the necessary training to proceed.

c. The principal joint task assigned to Army and Navy forces permanently based in the Hawaiian Islands is "to hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval base." The importance of Oahu in the Hawaiian Group is due entirely to the existence of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and its attending activities. The existence of Army Forces and Navy District Forces in great numbers in the Hawaiian Islands is solely for the purpose of maintaining the usefulness of Pearl Harbor as a base for the various units of the Fleet. The value of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the Fleet is in providing means for Fleet units to be maintained and continued in effecting operating readiness at a point well advanced to the westward. It therefore appears that any military or Naval air units on Oahu which unnecessarily interfere with the maintenance of proper readiness of Fleet units and which are not required on Oahu for the security of Oahu, but are required in the Hawaiian Area, should be based on other islands of the Hawaiian Group.

d. It appears necessary, to develop to maximum practicable capacity all sites on Oahu considered suitable for air bases; to construct auxiliary fields where practicable; and, at the same time, to avoid creating an undesirable degree of air congestion in the vicinity of Oahu that will defeat operating effectiveness. In planning the above developments, due consideration should be given to providing adequate dispersion.

e. To provide for future requirements of Army and Navy air forces in the Hawaiian Islands, it appears necessary to develop all suitable air base sites on islands of the Hawaiian Group, other than Oahu, to their maximum practicable capacities. In order to carry out estimated requirements, these developments should precede or at least proceed with any further developments on Oahu. This may not be entirely practicable of accomplishment, but every effort should be made to do so. A far-sighted policy in which currently foreseen needs are subordinated to and coordinated with a general plan of ultimate development should be adopted now. Otherwise, inevitable future expansion will cause a more difficult problem to arise at a later date.

f. There is every desire of the Navy to cooperate with the Army to the fullest extent, but in the case under consideration there is insufficient space on the island of Oahu for the numbers of aircraft involved, even in current plans, to base thereon at the same time. As both services are basing their requirements on the part they are expected to play in national defense, it follows that final decision as to the action to be taken should be based on the effect of the various alternatives on over-all national defense.

[5] 4. The problem confronting the board as it pertains to Army aviation was summed up by the Army representatives as follows:

a. The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out this mission is:

(1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by bombardment aviation.

(2) To detect, intercept and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit aviation.

b. Due to the limited range of pursuit aviation and the uncertainty of ascertaining the direction of approach of enemy aircraft making an attack on the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, it is mandatory that the air fields from which pursuit aviation operates, in the performance of this mission, be situated on the Island of Oahu. Under no other condition could there be assurance that enemy aircraft could be intercepted before they reached their bomb release line. The minimum requirements of pursuit aviation for its mission is two groups. The number of airplanes at present allocated to a pursuit group, which is 163, necessitates two air fields be available on this island. One of these groups is now permanently located at Wheeler Field where atmospheric conditions at times offer an obstacle to their continuous operation. To insure that at least one group of pursuit aviation may operate without being hampered by weather conditions, it should be located at approximately sea level elevation. The Kahuku Point area has been selected as having the necessary level ground and weather prevailing to satisfy these conditions. Furthermore, by having all Army pursuit aviation located at Wheeler Field and Kahuku Point, it makes it possible to carry out the pursuit mission and training therefor on the north side of Oahu, removing all pursuit aircraft from the air congestion which pervails over the Pearl Harbor area. The Kahuku Point area also lends itself to the establishment of grounds targets, in its immediate vicinity, which are so essential to proper progress in pursuit training. This still leaves one group at Wheeler Field without proper ground gunnery facilities which cannot be obtained on the Island of Oahu. The nearest point where these facilities can be made available is on the Island of Molokai where one gunnery range has been established.

c. There is allocated to the Hawaiian Air Force 39 A–20–A airplanes which form the support command to assist the ground forces of the Hawaiian Department in their mission of defending the Pearl Harbor Naval Base. These airplanes must, of necessity, be closely associated with the ground troops which they serve, both for training and to facilitate their employment in time of war. The home for the support command is established at Bellows Field.

[6] d. The bombardment command of the Hawaiian Air Force consists of 182 heavy bombers. To relieve congestion, all of the training for heavy bombardment is conducted over water or land areas removed from the Island of Oahu. This number of heavy bombers over-taxes the capacity of Hickam Field, their home station, to such an extent that provisions must be made for the training of approximately one-half of this force from outlying fields on other islands of the Hawaiian Archipelago.

e. To establish permanent stations for air organizations on other islands in this group entails changing the defense plans for these islands that security for these bases may be established. This would require a decided increase in the number of ground troops or such a dispersion of available forces as to destroy their effectiveness. This cannot be done except at enormous expense of time and money. For this reason the home base for bombardment aviation and the large quantities of bombs and other supplies necessary for continued operations must be placed under the protection of the ground defense installations on Oahu. Operations may be conducted from outlying fields in the Hawaiian group in the beginning of the attack but as the attack is pressed home these bombers will be forced to fall back upon their protected home bases. While the training of bombardment units is normally conducted in areas distant from the Pearl Harbor area, it would be practically impossible to control this force in

time of actual hostilities if they were stationed on outlying islands. Radio is the sole means of communication and is too susceptible to interference to furnish a positive medium of control. A positive means of communication is a prime requisite for successful air operations. It must be in being and constantly used prior to the beginning of hostilities. Further, it must be pointed out that bombardment aviation must be protected by every available means of ground and anti-aircraft defense, i. e., pursuit aviation antiaircraft artillery and aircraft warning service. Duplication of these defenses on outlying islands is manifestly prohibitive. Therefore, as pursuit concentrations for the defense of Oahu must be located on Oahu, it is imperative that bombardment aviation must be based on Oahu under the protection of the Interceptor Command.

f. The 20 transports must of necessity operate from Hickam Field as that is the base at which technical supplies are concentrated for which the transports furnish transportation to outlying fields where training is being conducted. Supply and maintenance facilities also require the same protection from the ground and air as is required for grounded bombardment aviation.

g. In the case of actual war, the majority of the Fleet units, with their carriers attached, would be at sea, leaving ample air field facilities for such naval aviation as might be left behind and for all Army aviation participating in the defense of these islands. Therefore, the problem which confronts this board is to find a solution which will permit the maximum use of existing air fields for aviation training for both the Army and the Navy and to suggest such sites as might be developed to increase these facilities.

[7] h. A careful survey has been made of the entire Island of Oahu for sites on which landing fields can be constructed. On this island, with the exception of the Kipapa Gulch area, all level ground that might be available for air fields is either so occupied, projects are underway for preparation of air fields, or the turbulence in the air created by the close proximity of mountain ranges precludes such development. The site commonly referred to as the Kipapa Gulch area will accommodate two 5,000-foot runways free from obstructions. The greatest handicap to the use of this area is that it is about two-thirds of the distance between Pearl Harbor and Wheeler Field which would further increase the congestion of the air over this part of the island. It would also remove from cultivation a highly productive tract of land. The Kipapa Gulch area is the only site remaining where an air field could be constructed. The principal objection to the use of this site, which is congestion of the air over the Pearl Harbor area, is much less of a handicap should this site be used for the training of carrier groups than it would be as a station for Army pursuit aviation. The use of this site by the Navy would permit the concentration of carrier-group training for Naval aviation on the south side of the island of Oahu, at Barber's Point, Kipapa Gulch, and Ford Island. As the training from these stations would be entirely under Naval control it lends itself to aerial traffic regulations which would be difficult to attain if large numbers of airplanes of the two services were intermingled. The Kipapa Gulch area is advantageously located for occupancy of carrier-group aviation in that the site is readily accessible to the parent vessels of the carrier groups. It would permit facility in the transfer of personnel and supplies to and from the parent vessel in Pearl Harbor. It would be advantageous in making for ease of supervision of the training of all carrier-based Naval aviation.

i. The Army is cognizant of the fact that with the increase in carrier-based aircraft contemplated for this area, serious problems arise as to sufficient air and ground space on Oahu. It is also cognizant of the fact that air units in Hawaii will, within the next few months, be reinforced with pursuit and bombardment aircraft for which bases must be available now, while the additional carriers anticipated for this area will not be available for an elapsed time of from one to three years.

j. That far-sighted and long-range planning must be done there can be no doubt. But, provisions for aircraft which may be available within three years should not be allowed to disrupt the plans, training and employment of the Army Air Force units in this area at a time when they may be required for immediate use against a hostile threat.

k. This problem can be solved by restricting the number of carrier groups to that which can be adequately accommodated on existing Navy facilities and those Navy projects which are now under development.

[8] 5. *Conclusions:*

That the board concludes that it has been presented with a problem for which a satisfactory solution to all concerned cannot be obtained due to the fact that—

a. The Army estimates its requirements from directives emanating from the War Department.

b. The Navy estimates its requirements from directives emanating from the Navy Department.

c. There is insufficient space on the Island of Oahu to provide for the estimated future requirements of both the Army and the Navy.

6. *Joint recommendations:*

a. That it be agreed that in order not to delay starting the development of an important strategical base, the board recommends:

(1) That the Kahuku Point area be developed immediately by the Army as an air base.

(2) That as the Army representatives hold that the Kahuku Point air base should be available for Army air units solely and the Navy representatives hold that the Kahuku Point air base should be available for temporary use by the Navy when circumstances so require, the extent of availability of this base to the Navy as well as the extent of the availability to the Navy of all other Army air bases on the Island of Oahu, be left to the determination of higher authority as the solution of this problem transcends the perogatives of this board.

b. That progress be continued on the development of air bases on islands of the Hawaiian Group, other than Oahu, which are now under construction.

c. That in order to reduce air congestion on Oahu, all existing and new sites of strategical importance on islands of the Hawaiian Group other than Oahu, suitable for air bases and auxiliary operating fields be expanded or developed to maximum practicable capacities and that such developments have the same high priority as any development proposed for the Island of Oahu.

d. That all sites on the island of Oahu suitable for air bases and auxiliary operating fields be developed to maximum practicable capacities at the same time avoiding the creation of an undesirable degree of air congestion in the vicinity of Oahu.

e. That the existing revised Joint Army-Navy agreement relating to operating areas be placed in force—adjustments which may become necessary, from time to time, to be accomplished by conference between local representatives.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.,
Senior Naval Member.

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Senior Army Member.

Confidential

17 WAR

WASHN, D. C., 210P Oct. 2, 1941

COMMANDING GENERAL
Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H.

One eight six second September twenty-three reurad Navy Department instructed Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in radio September twenty six to confer with you and submit joint recommendations covering allocation aircraft operating areas for all purposes for entire Hawaiian area stop This has War Department approval stop Navy radio stated further joint recommendations on Kahuku Point desired stop You are authorized to confer on this latter matter but will be guided by instructions to you in General Marshall's letter of August nineteen.

ADAMS.
156P/2

EXHIBIT NO. 121

FACTS AND CORRESPONDENCE ABOUT ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S RETIREMENT

FACTS ABOUT ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S RETIREMENT

On 25 January 1942 I was informed by Rear Admiral Greenslade, U.S.N., Commander 12th Naval District, San Francisco, California, that Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs, U.S.N., Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department,

Washington, D. C., had telephoned an official message to be delivered to me which stated that Admiral Jacobs had been directed by the Acting Secretary of the Navy to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement. I took this as a suggestion that I submit a similar request and on 26 January I submitted a request for retirement. Until I received this message from the Navy Department I had not even thought of submitting a request for retirement.

On 28 January I was informed by Rear Admiral Greenslade that Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations, had telephoned a message for me to the effect that my notification of General Short's request for retirement was not meant to influence me.

I thereupon submitted my letter of 28 January in which I stated, "I desire my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determination by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and the good of the service."

Subsequently I learned from Admiral Jacobs that the Official directing him to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement was not the Acting Secretary, but the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox.

On 22 February 1942 in a letter to Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, I stated in part: "I submitted this request solely to permit the Department to take whatever action they deemed best for the interest of the country. I did not submit it in order to escape censure or punishment."

The approval of my request for retirement included the statement: "This approval of your request for retirement is without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action."

I was notified through the public press on or about 1 March 1942 that the Secretary of the Navy had directed that charges and specifications be prepared to bring me to trial by General Court Martial at some future time.

Nav-3-HC

APRIL 24, 1942.

From: The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.
To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N., Retired, *280 Bronxville Road, Bronxville, N. Y.*
Subject: Duty.
Reference: (a) Your letter of April 21, 1942.

1. The receipt is acknowledged of reference (a) in which you express your readiness to perform any duty which may be assigned you.

[s] RANDALL JACOBS.

Certified a true copy.

[s] H. E. KIMMEL.

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280 BRONXVILLE ROAD, BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK.
21 April 1942.

Rear Admiral RANDALL JACOBS, U. S. Navy,
Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR JACOBS: Enclosed herewith is my request for any duty to which the Navy Department may see fit to assign me. I know that you and Admiral King understand my desire to do anything to help, but I believe the enclosed request should be on file to keep the record straight.

My kindest regards,
Sincerely,

[s] H. E. KIMMEL.

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280 BRONXVILLE ROAD, BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK,
21 April 1942.

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.
To: Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Subject: Duty.

1. Supplementing the statement in my request for retirement dated 26 January 1942, I wish to again state that I stand ready to perform any duty to which the Navy Department may assign me.

[s] H. E. Kimmel,
H. E. KIMMEL.

Letter from Admiral Stark

FEBRUARY 23, 1942.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: I tried to get you by phone last night at the St. Francis where Jacobs told me you were staying, only to find out you are not registered there. I then called Johnny Greenslade, and I trust he got over to you what I wanted to say, which was particularly to clear any doubts in your mind so far as I could regarding the situation here.

Also, I should have so liked just to talk to you for a couple of minutes and, incidentally, to send you some birthday wishes, which are almost due.

It might not have just fitted to have said "Happy Birthday", but I do wish it and I also know that it will be just as happy as you will to make it, and that the measure of that happiness will be commensurate with your innermost strength.

We all have a tough year head amid the present clouds of uncertainty, and we all need courage that will enable us to think bravely, act wisely, and endure. I do not have to tell you that my faith in one Husband Kimmel and in the fine fiber in his innermost makeup is such that I know it will carry him through, regardless of how rough the going.

I told Kit I was going to drop you a line this morning when I had failed to reach you last night, and she said to be sure to join all her good wishes with mine to you and to Dot.

Sincerely,

Rear Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.
c/o Rear Admiral J. W. Greenslade, U. S. N.
Twelfth Naval District, San Francisco, California.

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22 FEBRUARY 1942.

DEAR BETTY: I started writing this letter a few minutes after Pye gave me your letter of 21 February. I thank you for the letter and for the information contained therein. I also thank you for your other letters which I have not answered.

I understand from your letter that I will not be retired for the present, that I will be in a leave status until some further action is taken.

I submitted my request for retirement because I was notified that Short had done so and took that notification as a suggestion for me to do likewise. I submitted this request solely to permit the department to take whatever action they deemed best for the interests of the country. I did not submit it in order to escape censure or punishment.

When I was notified that the notification in regard to Short was not meant to put pressure on me, I submitted my second letter on the subject.

When the fact that Short and I had submitted requests for retirement was published to the country, I was astounded that the department would put Short and me in such light before the public.

On February 19, I received notification by the Secretary that I would be placed on the Retired list on March 1, 1942. Paragraph 2 of this letter states, "This approval of your request for retirement is without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action."

I do not understand this paragraph unless it is to be published to the country as a promise that I will be disciplined at some future time.

I stand ready at any time to accept the consequences of my acts. I do not wish to embarrass the government in the conduct of the war. I do feel, however, that my crucifixion before the public has about reached the limit. I am in daily receipt of letters from irresponsible people over the country taking me to task and even threatening to kill me. I am not particularly concerned except as it shows the effect on the public of articles published about me.

I feel that the publication of paragraph two of the Secretary's letter of February 16 will further inflame the public and do me a great injustice.

I have kept my mouth shut and propose to continue to do so as long as it is humanly possible.

I regret the losses at Pearl Harbor just as keenly, or perhaps more keenly than any other American citizen. I wish that I had been smarter than I was and able to foresee what happened on December 7. I devoted all my energies to the job and made the dispositions which appeared to me to be called for. I cannot now reproach myself for any lack of effort.

I will not comment on the Report of the Commission, but you probably know what I think of it. I will say in passing that I was not made an interested party or a defendant.

All this I have been willing to accept for the good of the country out of my loyalty to the Nation, and to await the judgment of history when all the factors can be published.

But I do think that in all justice the department should do nothing further to inflame the public against me. I am entitled to some consideration even though you may consider I erred greviously.

You must appreciate that the beating I have taken leaves very little that can be added to my burden.

I appreciate your efforts on my behalf and will always value your friendship, which is a precious thing to me.

My kindest regards always.

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL.

To: Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations.
(Written in San Francisco, California.)

KIMMEL, HUSBAND E.
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.
(2218-11-Kn)

FEBRUARY 21, 1942.

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy
To: The Secretary of the Navy
Subject: Transfer to the Retired List after forty (40) years' service.
Reference: (a) The Secretary of the Navy's letter of February 16, 1942 informing me that I will be transferred to the retired list of officers of the United States Navy.

1. I hereby acknowledge the receipt of reference (a).

/s/ H. E. Kimmel.
H. E. KIMMEL.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL STARK

Op10-KR

FEBRUARY 21, 1942.

DEAR KIMMEL: A few days ago I thought that you would have something definite before long. I am inclined to think now that this is not the case, and that for the time being at least you will just be continued on leave. I know that from your standpoint this is terribly indefinite, but I believe that if you knew all the cross-currents you would concur with this decision and that it is made with much thought regarding your own interest.

Pending something definite, there is no reason why you should not settle yourself in a quiet nook somewhere and let Old Father Time help this entire situation, which I feel he will—if for no other reason than that he always has.

I would like you to know the remark the Secretary made a day or two ago and that was:

"As for Kimmel, he has conducted himself in an exemplary fashion since this thing happened." And to which I believe the entire Navy would give a hearty "Aye, Aye!"

We realize how tough it is, but again I am counting on you to rise above it and be master of yourself in the future just as you always have been in the past.

Every good wish.

Sincerely,

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL,
Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, California.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL STARK

21 FEBRUARY 1942.

DEAR KIMMEL: Unless I am mistaken, you have another landmark in the near offing. May I send you some thoughts which I recall from something I once read and which is in substance:

On this occasion, instead of a wish for a happy birthday, knowing as I do that it will be just as happy as you choose to make it, and instead of wishing you the happiest year just ahead, knowing as I do that the measure of happiness will be exactly commensurate with what you, in your innermost strength, choose to make it; I wish for you, amid the clouds of uncertainty, *COURAGE*—courage that will enable you to think bravely, act wisely, and endure; courage to defend all the virtues and therefore itself, the greatest of them; courage that will steel the arm without clouding the brain; courage that can and will lift both body and mind above their present levels and capacity. Make over your own world. Let your courage be its architect. May God give you strength, wisdom, balance, courage, and hope.

Affectionately,

Rear Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, *USN*,
c/o Rear Admiral J. W. Greenslade.

[First endorsement]

FEBRUARY 17, 1942.

From: The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.
To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Twelfth Naval District.
Via: The Commandant.
Subject: Transfer to the Retired List after forty (40) years' service.

1. Forwarded.

/s/ RANDALL JACOBS

[Second endorsement]

ON LETTER FROM SECNAV. DATED FEB. 16, 1942, TO REAR ADM. H. E. KIMMEL

From: Commandant, Twelfth Naval District and Naval Operating Base, San Francisco.
To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy
Subject: Transfer to the Retired List after forty (40) years' service.

1. Delivered, February 19, 1942 at 11:05 A. M.

/s/ J. W. Greenslade.
J. W. GREENSLADE.

Certified a true copy:
/s/ H. E. KIMMEL

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
WASHINGTON, *February 16, 1942.*

From: The Secretary of the Navy:
To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.
Subject: Transfer to the Retired List after forty (40) years' service.

Reference: (a) Your request for retirement, dated January 26, 1942.

1. Your request to be transferred to the retired list after the completion of forty (40) years' service in accordance with the provisions of U. S. Code, Title 34, Section 381 is, by direction of the President, approved. You will be transferred to the retired list of officers of the United States Navy as of March 1, 1942.

2. This approval of your request for retirement is without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action.

3. Acknowledgment of receipt is requested.

/s/ FRANK KNOX.

Certified a true copy:
/s/ H. E. KIMMEL.

KIMMEL, HUSBAND E.
Rear Admiral, USN
(2208-11-Kn)

JANUARY 28, 1942.

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: My Request for Retirement.
Reference: (A) My ltr. to the Secretary of the Navy of 26 January 1942 requesting retirement under the provisions of Article 1443 Revised Statutes.

1. Reference (A) was submitted after I had been officially informed by the Navy Department that General Short had requested retirement.
2. I was officially informed today by the Navy Department that my notification of General Short's request was not intended to influence my decision to submit a similar request.
3. I desire my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determination by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and the good of the service.

/s/ H. E. Kimmel.
HUSBAND E. KIMMEL.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL STARK

Op-10 Hu

27 JANUARY 1942.

DEAR KIMMEL: Yesterday Jacobs called up directing Greenslade to continue you on leave.

Our feeling here is that until definite action is taken regarding your future orders, it is better for you not to return to any temporary duty. We also think that it would be well for the two Secretaries to confer before any final action is taken and at the moment Colonel Knox is out of the City and will not be back until Thursday.

I showed the Secretary and the President your splendid letter stating that you were not to be considered and that only the country should be considered.

Marshall informed me yesterday while we were talking over the situation, that Short had submitted a request for retirement. We all thought this information would be of interest to you and Jacobs sent it on to Greenslade. I do not want you in any sense to consider the transmission of this information as request on you by the Department to follow suit. We do not desire to influence your initiative in any way. If and when we have any definite recommendations—suggestions—we will definitely say so.

I do want you to know that we will try and solve the problem on the basis of your letter—"whatever is best for the country"; that is about all I can say.

That you are sitting on a question mark hoping for something definite at the earliest possible moment, we realize and I can assure you you are very much in our thoughts.

Every good wish as always.
Sincerely,

Rear Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, *USN*,
c/o Rear Admiral John W. Greenslade,
12th Naval District.

P. S. The information about Short is confidential. I do not know what action will be taken on his request.
Copy to Adm. Jacobs.

KIMMEL, HUSBAND E.
Rear Admiral, USN
(2207-00-Kn)

JANUARY 26, 1942.

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N.
To: The Secretary of the Navy
Subject: Request for Retirement under the Provisions of Section 1443 Revised Statutes.

1. After forty one years and eight months service in the Untied States Navy, I hereby request that I be placed upon the retired list in accordance with the provisions of Section 1443 Revised Statutes.

2. I hold myself in readiness to perform any duty to which I may be assigned.

/s/ H. E. Kimmel
HUSBAND E. KIMMEL.

[First Endorsement]

JANUARY 27, 1942.

From: Commandant, Twelfth Naval District and Naval Operating Base, San Francisco, California.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Request for Retirement under the Provisions of Section 1443 Revised Statutes.

1. Forwarded.

J. W. GREENSLADE.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL STARK

HRS/hu 29 DECEMBER 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Just received your note of 24 December 1941.

You certainly are entitled to a short leave and shall have it.

Don't worry about our finding duty for you. I value your services just as much as I ever did and more and I say this straight from the heart as well as the head.

If there is any way in which I can help you when you arrive here, call on Kit and me at once.

We had a great and wonderful surprise yesterday when Kewpie called up from San Francisco. The head of the concern her husband works for had informed me they were going to close their business out in Honolulu so it was a joy that transportation was made available for them and I have just dropped Admiral Bloch a line telling him of our appreciation.

Every good wish in the wide world as always and with the admonition of the old Irishman who said "if you can't be cheerful, be as cheerful as you can."

Sincerely,

Rear Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, *USN*,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL STARK

HRS/hu
Ser. #9

17 DECEMBER 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: I want you to know how deeply I feel for you.

I am not going to tell you the developments here. Nimitz can.

Tell the Gang for me that it is almost superfluous for me to say that regardless of their personal feelings, I know in a time like this, they will give Nimitz all the support they have in every ounce and fiber of their makeup.

Suffice it to say that what is happening had never even occurred to Nimitz, but like a good soldier he is obeying orders.

I wish there were something I could do for you, both officially and personally, but I know you will keep your chin up regardless.

My best to all hands and good luck.

Sincerely,

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS Pennsylvania, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

P. S. King is here and echoes what I have to say.
Copy to Adm. Nimitz.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL STARK

HRS/hu
#8

11 DECEMBER 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: I am enclosing a page from the Congressional Record covering the remarks of Congressman Jimmie Van Zandt. Thought it might be of interest to you.

Keep cheerful.
Good luck.
We'll fight it out.

BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS Pennsylvania, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL STARK

In reply refer to Initials and No. #7.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, December 8, 1941.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
USS Pennsylvania, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

DEAR ADMIRAL KIMMEL: We are feeling for you just as hard as we can in just what you have been through and are biding our time until you can send us some details which are eagerly awaited. We did not want to bother you while you were applying first aid but will welcome news as soon as you can get some for us.

Hundreds of telegrams and messages are being received from the families of ships and we know that as soon as you can you will start sending us a list so that we may acquaint them with the facts.

I dropped Admiral Bloch a line and will just repeat what I told him that I am not going to bother you now knowing that you will give us reports as soon as you can.

Very good wishes from all.

Sincerely,

HAROLD R. STARK,
Admiral, U. S. N.

P. S. Send us your needs and we will do everything we can to assist in any way we can.

EXHIBIT NO. 122

CinCPac File No.
A16-3/AD/(11)
Serial 1836

(Es)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Aug. 16, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Subject: Aircraft Warning Facilities for the Hawaiian Department.
Reference: (a) CG, Hawaiian Dept. ltr. File SIG. 676.3 AWS of 5 August 1941.

1. In reply to the suggestion that an officer of the Fleet serve as liaison officer with your Headquarters, I am pleased to advise you that Commander Maurice E. Curts, U. S. Navy, the Communication Officer of my Staff, has been assigned to that duty.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to: Com FOURTEEN (with copy of ref.)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 August 1941.

SIG.676.3 AWS
Subject: Aircraft Warning Facilities for the Hawaiian Department.
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Pearl Harbor, T. H.

1. The Army's Aircraft Warning Facilities for the Hawaiian Department are rapidly approaching completion. Small scale operations is expected in the immediate future. Subsequent to the original setup the AWS has been greatly augmented. The results of this augmentation, however, are not expected to materialize for some months.

2. The Department Air Warning Service Board, consisting of officers from all instrumentalities associated with the Air Defense, has been reactivated and is now constituted as a liaison and advisory council on AWS affairs. Inasmuch as the Navy has shown considerable interest in the AWS and has initiated plans for a similar system of their own, it seems greatly to the interest of both services to have a Naval officer as contact or liaison officer between Army and Navy AWS activities. I believe that in this manner our efforts along these lines will be highly comulative and that the prospects for future joint Army-Navy cooperation greatly enhanced.

3. Accordingly, your assistance would be appreciated in effecting arrangements whereby an officer from your Headquarters be detailed to serve as liaison officer between your Headquarters and mine.

(S) WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

S-S67/RADAR
ND14(0576)
Secret

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
19 June 1941.

From: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.
To: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Combined Communication Training.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of letter from Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U. S. A. to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (SECRET) dated 12 June 1941.

1. There is forwarded herewith enclosure (A) for such action as you may care to take.

(S) C. C. BLOCH.

Secret

12 JUNE 1941.

Rear Admiral C. C. BLOCH, USN,
Commandant 14th Naval District,
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL BLOCH: As you are doubtless aware, fifteen key enlisted men and one officer of the Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, have recently gone to sea on cruises on board the CALIFORNIA, CHICAGO, CHESTER, and PENSACOLA. While at sea, these men received valuable instruction and experience in the operation of RADAR equipment, preparing them for the operation of similar Army equipment. Upon their return, the personnel receiving instructions were unanimous in expressing their gratitude for the consideration accorded them on these cruises and for the opportunity to become associated with the fleet personnel.

It is anticipated that the Army Aircraft Warning Service will be placed in operation in the near future. Due to the interest expressed by the Navy radio operators in the Army equipment, I will cause arrangements to be effected to afford such naval personnel as you may desire to inspect the Army equipment shortly after it has been placed in operation.

Will you transmit to Admiral Kimmel and to the other Naval Commanders concerned my appreciation for the instructions afforded these men. Both services should reap great benefit in the near future from the security which will be afforded them from the increased efficiency of the Aircraft Warning Service Personnel.

Very sincerely yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

EXHIBIT NO. 123

Naval Message
Drafter ND14/N3-1 (Y&D)
From OPNAV
Released by H. R. STARK
Date 15 OCT. 1941
Navy Department
COMFOURTEEN
CINPAC

152227 OCT. 1941 NCR 425

URDIS 14~~9499~~ to BUDOCKS X Request consideration be given to construction of combined operating center sufficient in size and facilities to accommodate in time of emergency staffs of all essential operating activities of both Army and Navy in Hawaii such as CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN COMTRAIN COMSUBFOR COMPATWING and parallel activties of Army X CNO considers concentration of Army and Navy activities in one building of proper construction constitutes great advantage for emergency operations X Comment with recommendations including location and estimates of cost requested

(This is a copy made from microfilm records) 10/ July 45
Confidential

[1] C-A16/A&N/ND14
(01171)

Confidential

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

Fourteenth Naval District
and
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A.

3 NOVEMBER 1941.

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Combined Operating Center, Army and Navy.
References:
(a) CNO Confidential dispatch 152227 of October 1941.
(b) Letter of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated 29 October 1941.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (b).

1. It is recommended that no steps be taken at the present time to concentrate the Army and Navy in a common building as proposed in reference (a).

2. Since the visit of Captain Mountbatten, R.N., who gave his views on this subject and the experiences of the British along parallel lines, this and allied matters have been under consideration by: (a) Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet; (b) Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; (c) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

3. On receipt of reference (a), a paraphrased copy of this dispatch was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; his comments in connection therewith are given in reference (b), enclosure (A).

4. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, accompanied by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, has visited the underground chambers at Aliamanu Crater and had their functions explained in a brief way by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. If one or more of these chambers were to be assigned to the Navy, it is not apparent that any real benefit would be derived therefrom.

5. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, has offices ashore, as has Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. It appears certain that at the outbreak of hostilities, even though the Commander-in-Chief may return to his flagship, Commander Base Force will have to have offices ashore. Accordingly, the Commander-in-Chief has requested that suitable offices be constructed for the Commander-in-Chief, Commander Base Force, and Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. I do not believe that the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet operations would be benefitted by being in a common office building with the Commanding General and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. As a matter of fact, I am inclined to believe that his best interests would be served by being in a building with only agencies of the Fleet therein.

[2] 6. There has been established in this district a joint harbor control post; this is located at District Headquarters. Here there are provisions for officers of the Coast Artillery, the Army Air Corps, the Fleet Air Detachment, and the Submarine Force, all in addition to the district officers who work in connection with the local defense forces. So far as can be ascertained without actual experience in war, this post fulfills the requirements of the area.

7. In addition to the above, funds are available for and construction will soon be undertaken on a bomb-proof communication center adjacent to District Headquarters. Provision will have to be made in case of air raids for certain features of the harbor control post to occupy this bomb-proof shelter.

8. The Commandant feels that no delay is acceptable in providing for the present needs of the Commander-in-Chief. His needs are real and immediate. What should be done later in connection with a combind operating center can best be determined by actual experience.

(Signed) C. C. BLOCH.

Advance copy to:
Chief of Naval Operations (by clipper mail).

[1] Confidential

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 October, 1941.

Admiral C. C. BLOCH,
Commandant, 14th Naval District,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

DEAR ADMIRAL BLOCH: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of October 21, 1941, file No. C-A16-1/A&N/ND14 (01101), with reference to a combined operating center and command post for Army and Navy functions in this Department.

While I am strongly in favor of combined operating centers for equivalent units of Army and Navy forces, I do not believe that all of the operating centers should be combined into one single building. There are strong strategic and tactical reasons why the various Army functions cannot be located together in the same structure. The Different elements have distinct missions, and while it is necessary to establish close liaison and communications between these various Army headquarters, it is equally necessary that they be located in separate command posts for efficiency of individual operation. Also if the various Army headquarters were to be combined in one location, we would be confronted with technical problems involving communications to subordinate elements which would be extremely difficult to solve. From a security standpoint, I do not believe that this combination of Army activities would be advisable; a lucky hit effecting either the structure or communication would have a far greater adverse effect than a similar hit on one of the separate command posts.

The Army already has its command posts under construction and these will be completed in the near future. The Department command post is in the Aliamanu Crater, the 18th Bombardment Wing is on the southwest outer slopes of Aliamanu, and the Interceptor command post consisting of fighter planes, antiaircraft artillery and the aircraft warning service, is at Fort Shafter. The command post of the Hawaiian Air Force is also to be located at Fort Shafter. Communications facilities are now available to all these locations, and arrangements can easily be made to expand each into a combined operating center for the equivalent Army and Navy units. All of these structures are being built underground by tunneling methods; this requires a minimum of material. A combined operating center located in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor would probably have to be a cut and cover type of structure and to afford the same protection that we now have in the tunnels, it would have to be very massive. Under present conditions securing the necessary materials would be difficult.

[2] It is therefore suggested that instead of a single operating center, consideration be given to the construction of additional space for Navy units adjacent to the existing command posts of equivalent Army units. This suggestion would mean that the Navy structure for the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, the Commandant 14th Naval District, and various fleet echelons would be located in the Aliamanu Crater, that the command post for Patwing two would be located adjacent to the Army command post for the 18th Wing, and that the Navy fighters could be located adjacent to the Army's interceptor command post, and that space for the Navy Air Headquarters could be made available either adjacent to the headquarters of the Army Air Force, or with Patwing two.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. ARMY,
Commanding.

[1] CinC File No. A1/A&N/ (18).
Serial 01810
Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

My
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

1st Endorsement on Com-14 C-A16-1 A&N/ND14 (01171) dated Nov. 3, 1941

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.

1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet has given careful consideration to the question of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Hawaii. On its face, the proposition sounds attractive, but unless it can be shown that the advantages of such an establishment outweigh the disadvantages, its creation is not only unjustified, but may be undesirable.

2. The conditions likely to exist on Oahu, in the event of war, are definitely different from those prevailing in Europe and which dictated the establishment of the combined headquarters and operating centers in Great Britain. Sustained attack of any kind is unlikely. The mission of the Army and the Fleet are considerably different—the operation of one being defensive and local while the operations of the other are offensive and far flung. Strategic, rather than tactical cooperation, is indicated and therefore the necessity for rapid receipt and exchange of information and arrival at quick decisions is of less importance.

3. On the other hand, there are manifest disadvantages, among which are the following:

(a) A combined operating center would not relieve the necessity for local centers for individual forces and its communication system would be very complex. This complexity might well complicate, rather than simplify, the flow of orders and information.

(b) It might well result in over centralization for large scale operations and thus tend to deprive subordinates of necessary initiative.

(c) It would result in loss of contact, by virtue of physical separation from subordinate commanders, with those commanders and their activities. A location suitable for the Army is not suitable for the Navy and vice versa.

(d) There would be serious consequences if such a center or its communication system were damaged or destroyed.

(e) It would tie the respective commanders to an immobile post—with the post necessarily in an inactive area.

(f) It would have at least a psychological tendency to divert Fleet units to defensive tasks.

4. The above considerations primarily apply to a combined operating center for the Army and the Fleet. They are applicable, also, but in less degree, to the Army and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. Undoubtedly, there is need for close cooperation and liaison between those commanders, much of which is now provided for in current plans. The Harbor Command Post provides for liaison and joint control of shipping, identification of vessels, fire of coast artillery and related questions. Offensive air operates under unity of command by the Navy. Defensive air operates under unity of command by the Army. Command posts are in existence for the control of these operations and, as pointed out by General Short, it is very doubtful that a central command, superimposed on these separate and local command posts, would add much to cooperation. Nor would the disadvantages enumerated above be much reduced.

5. In view of the above, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, is of the opinion that the establishment of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Hawaii is not only unnecessary, but definitely undesirable. The recommendation of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in paragraph (1) is concurred in and it is further recommended that the construction of the building for the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Commander Submarines Scouting Force, and Commander Base Force be proceeded with without further delay.

(Signed) H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to: Com-14.

In reply refer to Initials and No.
Op-12B-7-My
(SC)A16-3(9)
Serial 0134212
Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, November 18, 1941.

FIRST MEMORANDUM ENDORSEMENT

From: The Director, War Plants Division.
To: The Director, Naval Districts Division.
Via: The Director, Radio Liaison Division.
Subject: Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.

1. Forwarded for information, and for such recommendations and comment as desired.

2. An informal joint working committee has been formed to endeavor to improve cooperation of Army and Navy shore defense activities by the formation of joint command centers. As the records of the conferences held by this committee are being maintained in this Division, it is requested that all papers, comment, and recommendations be returned.

(Signed) R. K. TURNER.

In reply refer to Initials and No.
Op-14/LJH
(SC)A16-3(9)
Serial 01114
Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, December 6, 1941.

SECOND MEMORANDUM ENDORSEMENT

From: The Director, Radio Liaison Division.
To: The Director, Naval Districts Division.
Subject: Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.

1. Forwarded.

2. Due to the many and complex facilities under the organization responsible for defense in any given land area bordering the ocean, the most perfect set-up for command is one in which the supreme comand is exercised by one officer best equipped of any for the task, in direct and immediate touch with his staff, comprising intelligence, plans, operations, and communications.

3. Because our defense is under two officers, Army and Navy, we must try and arrange matters so that where component parts of the commands are interwoven these two can function as nearly as possible as one. If the duties of the Commanders beyond command and operation duties, i. e., training duties, materiel duties, and comand of local units of their respective over-all commands, will interfere with the most efficient exercise of their primary duty, which is their higher duty in command of the over-all command, then the higher command should be relieved of detail duties (except for inspection for over-all efficiency) of the lower commands under him, and additional subordinate officers should be ordered to assume these duties. The two higher commands of the two services will then be free to choose together the joint operating center, with their respective staffs, without regard to the lower command duties.

4. Without opportunity for consultation and evaluation of the same information, it is not possible for two widely separated staffs to prepare efficiently decisions on complex matters of immediate urgency for the two opposite service commanders as well as if they have immediate access to one another. This is indisputable. Therefore, it should be accepted, and everything within reason subordinated to that principle, as the most efficient high command possible is necessary.

5. In other words, if the duties of the Commandant at Pearl Harbor and the Commanding General at Fort Shafter, in Hawaii, are such that their local duties make it essential that they remain at the Navy Yard and with the troops, respectively, my answer is that there should be additional officers assigned specifically for the supreme command in Hawaii, and staff officers for Plans, Operations, Intelligence, and Communications transferred to these officers, and that a protected location for their offices be provided. Certainly the importance of the broader duties is such that their efficiency should not be confused due to the local duties and routine.

(Signed) S. L. HOOPER.

Op-12B-7-Br
2669
CNO
Commanders all
Naval Coastal
Frontiers less
Philippine

CinCpac
CinClant

DECEMBER 18, 1941.

It is essential that joint operations centers be established in all coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors in which joint operations are being or likely to be carried on X Request funds by despatch if required X Immediate action directed X A similar directive is being issued by the Chief of Staff US Army X Consult Army authorities.

Copy to:
BuAero
BuNav
BuShips
BuDocks
Army WP Division
Confidential Top Secret

Com 14 13545
OPNAV RRRRRRR
29 December 1941
1731/29
Greenman
V Tucker
291535 CR0190

Propose to temporarily set up joint center in Army tunnels Aliamanu Comgen and Com 14 agree this unsatisfactory and recommend bombproof building to be placed in deep gulch near Salt Lake in which center Army Navy Cincpac can be properly accomodated. Estimate for building utilities and for lease of land later. Your 18291 Cincpac concurs and has this.

Distribution
12
10/11 BUAER BUNAV BUSHIPS BUDOCKS ARMY 38N 13 38
20OP FILE FILE
Confidential Top Secret 29:585

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13 KCS
COM 14 OPNAY RRRR
30 December 1941
CINPAC
Slade
Slade RRRR
292120 CR 0348

Mydis 291535 Salt Lake center primarily for Army and COM 14. CINPAC to be provided for at new SITE near Makalapa as substituted for subbase site.
Action
10/11 13 38 38W BUNAV BUSHIPS BUDOCKS FILE FILE: 20-OP
COS Army
Confidential Top Secret 29212o

In reply refer to Initials and No.
Op-30C-DG
(SC) A16-3 (9)
Doc. 37746

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, December 31, 1941.

MEMO FOR CAPTAIN READ

Subject: Combined Operating Senter for Army and Navy (Ltr. from Com-14 to CNO via Cincpac C-A16-1/A&N/ND14 01171 of 11-3-41)

1. Rather than make the basic document appear more ridiculous than it now does, I am returning this informally.
2. The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, have entirely "missed the boat".

(Signed) R. W. CARY,
Room 1066.

In reply refer to Initials and No. (Du-Et)
Op-12B-6
(SC) A16-3 (9)
Doc. 37746
Serial 01212
Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
7 January 1942, Washington.

Fourth Memorandum Endorsement

From: The Director, War Plans Division.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Combined operating center for Army and Navy.
References:
(a) CNO conf. despatch 182010 of December 1941.
(b) Com-14 dispatches 291535 (CR0190) and 292120 (CR0346) of December 1941.
(c) Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff's Joint letter on Joint Operations Centers, dated December 31, 1941.

1. In view of the orders issued by Chief of Naval Operations in reference (a), and the resulting action to establish a joint operations center in Hawaii as indicated by reference (b), it is recommended that the basic letter be filed without further action.
2. Reference (c) is expected to implement the establishment of joint operations centers in all coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors.
3. The remarks of the Director, Radio Liaison, in the 2nd Memorandum Endorsement, have been noted as applicable to the problem of joint operational command in general, as well as to the specific problem at hand in this correspondence.

(Signed) R. K. TURNER.

Copy to:
Op-12B
Op-14
Op-30

EXHIBIT NO. 123A

JAN. 10, 1942.

Confidential Memorandum

From: The Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans).

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Joint Operations Centers.

Enclosure: (A) Letter on above subject to be signed by the Commander in Chief.

1. As a result of negotiations with the Army through the War Plans Division, a joint letter on Joint Operations Centers for Coastal Frontiers was agreed on, and the joint letter had been signed on December 6 by the Chief of Naval Operations but was awaiting signature of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, on December 7.

2. The letter was revised to conform to current directives and conditions and was signed by both Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, on December 31, 1941.

3. It is recommended that the joint letter be promulgated by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, by means of the attached letter, enclosure (A), herewith submitted for signature.

R. K. TURNER.

Copy to:
CNO
F12Z-6

Received S-C Files, Room 2055, Jan. 10, 1942, Route to 30. Op File No. (SC) A16-3 (9), Doc. No. 41197.

Cominch File FF1/A16-3 (9)
Serial 014
Confidential

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES FLEET, NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., January 10, 1942.

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
To: Commanders all Naval Coastal Frontiers, less Philippine.
Subject: Joint Operations Centers.
Reference: (a) Joint letter of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, of December 31, 1941, on Joint Operations Centers.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of Reference (a).

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information and guidance.

(S) E. J. King
(T) E. J. KING.
(S) C. B. Lanman
(T) C. B. LANMAN,
Acting Flag Secretary.

Copy to:
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
Chief of Naval Operations (10 copies)
CinCpac
CinClant
Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department

Received S-C Files, Room 2055, Jan. 14, 1942. Route to: 10-11. Op. File No. (SC) A-16-3 (9). Copy No. 1 of 10.

[1] Confidential Dec. 31, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations and
The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

To: The Chief of Staff, General Headquarters.
Chief of the Army Air Forces.
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Commander; North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander; Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander; Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander; Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander; Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander; Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander; Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

Subject: Cooperation in Joint Defense; formation of Joint Operations Centers in Coastal Frontiers.

References:
(a) Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935 (FTP-155).
(b) Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5.
(c) CNO and Chief of Staff's joint letter quoted in CNO confidential file Op-22-A2 (SC) A16-3 (9), Serial 0115422 of October 23, 1941, subject: "Joint Army and Navy Training" and in AG 354.2 (10-3-41) dated October 17, 1941, subject: "Joint Army and Navy Training".
(d) CNO despatch 182010 of December 1941.
(e) Adjutant General's message AG 370.26 of December 19, 1941.

1. Operations during the present war have demonstrated the value of close personal contact of the commanders of Army, Navy, and Air Forces engaged in a given theater of war. In nearly all cases the combatant forces which have had such close personal contact or complete unity of command have been successful.

2. Present instructions for Joint Action of the Army and Navy, reference (a), provide for Joint Action of the Army and Navy, reference (a), provide for mutual cooperation of the Army and Navy at all times, and for unity of command in certain contingencies by joint agreement or when directed by the President. Instructions regarding joint planning are contained in references (a), (b), and (c).

[2] 3. The ideal method of obtaining close personal contact between Army, Navy, and Air Force commanders on shore is through the use of a joint operations center for each Frontier and subdivision of the Frontier. Commendable progress in approaching this ideal has been made in the North Atlantic Coastal Frontier, where a "Joint Operations Office" has been established, and in various Coastal Frontiers where joint Harbor Entrance Control Posts have been placed in operation. A layout plan showing one of these centers is enclosed for your information.

4. The recent joint directive of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff, reference (c), provided for a joint training program in the Coastal Frontiers. Actual joint operations, as required by this directive, were expected to indicate existing deficiencies of joint organization and planning and to point the way towards improvement in joint military efficiency.

5. The establishment of Joint Operations Centers in Coastal Frontiers, sectors, and sub-sectors where joint operations are being carried on or are likely to be carried on has been directed by references (d) and (c). Early completion of these operations centers is desired.

(S) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

(S) H. R. STARK,
Chief of Naval Operations.

Inclosure: Copy of Comdr. North Atlantic N. C. F. serial 539 of December 13, 1941, with enclosures thereto.

[1] Op-22-A2
(SC)A16-3(9)
Serial 0115422
Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT, (hw)
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, October 23, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.
The Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
The Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier.
The Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.
The Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
The Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.
The Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
The Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier.
Subject: Joint Army and Navy Training.

1. The Following is quoted from J. B. No. 350 (serial 704), subject: Joint Army and Navy Training, for necessary action:

"From: The Chief of Naval Operations, and
The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
"To: The Chief of Staff, General Headquarters.
Chief of the Army Air Forces.
Commanding General, Northeastern Defense Command.
Commanding General, Southern Defense Command.
Commanding General, Western Defense Command.
Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.
Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East.
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier.
"Subject: Joint Army and Navy Training

[2] Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935 (FTP-155).

"1. There is need for frequent and closely coordinated joint training of army field forces and naval operating forces, to the greatest extent compatible with other urgent preparations for war.

"2. Due to the employment of the U. S. FLEET and the training program of the major portion of Army forces, the scheduling of Grand Joint Exercises is not practicable at this time.

"3. Consideration is now being given to joint training for overseas expeditions employing elements of the Third Division, U. S. Army, and the Second Division, U. S. Marine Corps; and employing elements of the First Division, U. S. Army, and First Division, U. S. Marine Corps, in Puerto Rico. Similar joint training for other units of the Army will be initiated by the War and the Navy Departments, as the situation permits. In general, such training will be accomplished by the assembly of a Task Force.

"4. A large field for joint training exists in the coordinate operations required between the Army and the Navy in Coastal Frontiers. Such operations might involve:

"(a) Joint air defense operations, both for attack and defense, including operations of antiaircraft, barrage balloon, and aircraft warning units.

"(b) Joint signal communications, between Army and Navy forces, including ground, sea, and air.

"(c) The operation of harbor entrance control posts and inshore patrol, and the coordinated functioning of personnel in defense of the harbor. The cooperation of the Coast Guard and other government agencies may be obtained.

"(d) The operation of internal security measures in Army and Navy posts and stations; exercises in passive defense measures for the prevention of damage by hostile action or sabotage to Army and Navy defense installations; [3] and liaison with Civilian Defense agencies.

"5. The preparation of Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans (and their subsidiary plans) is a necessary preliminary to coordinated operations of ground, sea and air forces required in defense of the Coastal Frontiers. Based upon these plans, and closely paralleling actual operations which are likely to occur and in anticipation of which the plans are drawn, joint training exercises shall be held at frequent intervals with special emphasis on joint communications. To provide for the use of mobile air forces, and other defensive measures provided by the Army Air Forces, situations should be assumed in the training exercises, where necessary, which place them in a higher category of defense than that prescribed in the joint color plan. Provisions shall be made to alternate command in the exercise of unity of command, and also for the conduct of the exercises under the principle of mutual cooperation.

"6. Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders, Army Air Force Commanders in the continental United States, and Army Defense or Department Commanders shall undertake coordinated operations monthly, if practicable, and at least bi-monthly. It is recommended that staff problems requiring coordinated action be conducted at least weekly and that continuous training of joint signal communication personnel be conducted. Where the use of mobile air forces and other defensive measures are required, joint training shall be undertaken to the greatest extent compatible with other urgent preparations for war.

"7. It is desired that:

"(a) Commanders concerned prepare promptly Joint Coastal Frontier, Joint Sector, and Joint Subsector Defense Plans, based on the directives contained in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5, and in accordance with Army and Navy Operations Plans as issued.

"(b) In accordance with the conditions in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this letter, the Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, Commanding Generals of the Army Air Forces in the continental United States, and Commanding Generals of [4] the Defense Commands and Departments initiate a program of minor joint exercises.

"(c) Copies of these programs be furnished the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, as soon as prepared.

"(d) Reports of exercises be submitted in accordance with paragraph 119.b., Chapter VII, Section II of reference (a).

/S/ G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

/S/ H. R. STARK,
Chief of Naval Operations.

/S/ R. M. Griffin
/T/ R. M. GRIFFIN,
By direction.

Copy to:
CinCPac
CinCLant
CinCAF
Op-12
Op-20
Op-30
Op-38

Confidential
AG 354.21 (10-3-41) MC-E-M

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, October 17, 1941.

Subject: J. B. No. 350 (Serial 704)—Joint Army and Navy Training.
To: The Chief of Staff, GHQ;
The Chief of the Army Air Forces;
The Commanding Generals, Northeast, Southern, Western and Caribbean Defense Commands; U. S. Army Forces in the Far East; and Hawaiian Department.

Received S-C Files, Room 2055, Oct. 20, 1941. Route to: 12 Op File No. (SC) P-11-1 (A&N). Doc. No. 36793. Copy No. 1 of 1.

The following is quoted from J. B. No. 350 (Serial 704), subject: Joint Army and Navy Training, for necessary action:

"The following joint letter is furnished you for necessary action:

"From: The Chief of Naval Operations, and
The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
"To: The Chief of Staff, General Headquarters.
Chief of the Army Air Forces.
Commanding General, Northeastern Defense Command.
Commanding General, Southern Defense Command.
Commanding General, Western Defense Command.
Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.
Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East.
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier.

"Subject: Joint Army and Navy Training.
"Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935 (FTP-155).

[2] "1. There is need for frequent and closely coordinated joint training of army field forces and naval operating forces, to the greatest extent compatible with other urgent preparations for war.

"2. Due to the employment of the U. S. FLEET and the training program of the major portion of Army forces, the scheduling of Grand Joint Exercises is not practicable at this time.

"3. Consideration is now being given to joint training for overseas expeditions employing elements of the Third Division, U. S. Army, and the Second Division, U. S. Marine Corps; and employing elements of the First Division, U. S. Army, and First Division, U. S. Marine Corps, in Puerto Rico. Similar joint training for other units of the Army will be initiated by the War and Navy Departments, as the situation permits. In general, such training will be accomplished by the assembly of a Task Force.

"4. A large field for joint training exists in the coordinate operations required between the Army and the Navy in Coastal Frontiers. Such operations might involve:

"(a) Joint air defense operations, both for attack and defense, including operations of antiaircraft, barrage balloon, and aircraft warning units.

"(b) Joint signal communications, between Army and Navy forces, including ground, sea, and air.

"(c) The operation of harbor entrance control posts and inshore patrol, and the coordinated functioning of personnel in defense of the harbor. The cooperation of the Coast Guard and other government agencies may be obtained.

"(d) The operation of internal security measures in Army and Navy posts and stations; exercises in passive defense measures for the prevention of damage by hostile action or sabotage to Army and Navy defense installations; and liaison with Civilian Defense agencies.

"5. The preparation of Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans (and their subsidiary plans) is a necessary preliminary to coordinated operations of ground, sea and air forces required in defense of the Coastal Frontiers. Based upon these plans, and closely paralleling actual operations which are [3] likely to occur and in anticipation of which the plans are drawn, joint training exercises shall be held at frequent intervals with special emphasis on joint communications. To provide for the use of mobile air forces, and other defensive measures provided by the Army Air Forces, situations should be assumed in the training exercises, where necessary, which place them in a higher category of defense than that prescribed in the joint color plan. Provisions shall be made to alternate command in the exercise of unity of command, and also for the conduct of the exercises under the principle of mutual cooperation.

"6. Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders, Army Air Force Commanders in the continental United States, and Army Defense or Department Commanders shall undertake coordinated operations monthly, if practicable, and at least bi-monthly. It is recommended that staff problems requiring coordinated action be conducted at least weekly and that continuous training of joint signal communication personnel be conducted. Where the use of mobile air forces and other defensive measures are required, joint training shall be undertaken to the greatest extent compatible with other urgent preparations for war.

"7. It is desired that:

"(a) Commanders concerned prepare promptly Joint Coastal Frontier, Joint Sector, and Joint Subsector Defense Plans, based on the directives contained in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5*, and in accordance with Army and Navy Operations Plans as issued.

"(b) In accordance with the conditions in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this letter, the Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, Commanding Generals of the Army Air Forces in the continental United States, and Commanding Generals of the Defense Commands and Departments initiate a program of minor joint exercises.

"(c) Copies of these programs be furnished the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, as soon as prepared.

"(d) Reports of exercises be submitted in accordance with paragraph 119.b., Chief VII, Section II of reference (a).

/S/ H. R. STARK,
Chief of Naval Operations.

/S/ G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff."

[4] * Sufficient information to carry out this directive is contained in WPD WDOP-R5-41 and WPD WDCP-R5-41. However, Joint Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5 is undergoing revision and a copy will be sent to you in the near future.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/S/ E. S. ADAMS,
Major General
The Adjutant General.

Copies furnished:
The Chief of Coast Artillery;
The Chief Signal Officer;
The Divisions of the War Department General Staff;
The Chief of Naval Operations.

EXHIBIT NO. 124

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 18, 1941
Purple (CA)

#900 (Part 1 of 5)

At half past four the afternoon of the 18th, I had a private and secret interview with the President (the Secretary of State was present). The President, opening his remarks by saying that he had spent some few days enjoying life at sea, remarked that sailing was fine, and little fog had been encountered to mar the pleasure of the voyage. He went on to say that he sailed on his yacht, transferred to a warship, and then kept a rendezvous at a point off the Maine coast. Then, speaking as though there were many advocates of war, he took up the business of the interview and, holding notes in his hand, he said, "The Secretary of State, you, and I are continuing our efforts to bring about peace in the Pacific, but no one else is." I said, "There are many among the third powers who desire war in the Pacific." He affirmed this, and continued by saying, "The United States, Britain, and probably the Soviet too, hope for peace in the Pacific. But there are not many others who desire it."

21230

ARMY SECRET Trans. 8/20/41 (1)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 18, 1941.
Purple (CA)

#709.

(Part 2 of 5)

After joking about "our German friend" who maintains no warships in the Pacific, the President said, "Neither you, the Secretary of State, nor I, have come up through the diplomatic ranks and, therefore, do not observe diplomatic conventions. What we have here is not in the form of a diplomatic document, nor is it in the form of an aide memoire but is merely what we want to say." Having said this, he read in a clear-cut, spirited manner the material which I incorporated into my #707[a] and then said, "I have no desire to put these things in writing." Yet he seemed to be of the opinion that it should be expressed in writing.

Bearing in mind your instructions

a - Not available.

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 18, 1941
Purple (TO)

#708 (Part 3 of 5[a])

I expressed myself on the following points:

ITEM - The Japanese Government is sincere in its desire to bring about an adjustment of Japan-American diplomatic relations.

ITEM - The Japanese Government would like to be advised as to the possibility of arranging an interview with Prince KONOE.

ITEM - The Japanese Government would like to be advised as to the possibility of informal conversations being realized in the near future along lines of conversations of the past few months.

ITEM - The Japanese Government, having already expressed its various opinions with regard to the French Indo-China question to the Secretary of State, feels that no additional explanations are necessary.

ITEM - The Japanese Government wishes to advise that Prince KONOE is willing for an exchange of opinions along general lines from the viewpoint of world peace.

ITEM - The Japanese Government has every expectation that the finest statesmanship will be exercised by the United States Government. The Japanese Government will reciprocate in like manner.

I went on to say: "We have every confidence in your exemplary statesmanship and your ability to settle matters." The President listened closely to my remarks. Holding the Memoire outlined in my #708[b] in his hand, he said: "Geographically speaking, it is impossible for me to go to

ARMY SECRET

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Honolulu. I am not permitted to travel in an airplane."

a - For part 4 see S.I.S. #21178

B - Not available.

21232

ARMY

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Trans. 8/20/41 (1)

SECRET

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
August 18, 1941.
Purple. (CA) Urgent.

#709. (Part 4 of 5)[a]

The President said: "The Japanese Prime Minister has (never?) been either to (this city?) nor to Seattle. How about Juneau? (It seems to me that he was once in Alaska (visiting?) Sitka[b], though I am not sure.) How many days would it take from Japan?"

I replied: "About ten days. I believe."

"How about the middle of (?)?"

I replied: "I think it would be all right up until about that time."

Then he continued by saying: "For these reasons I have made a few changes in this paper." He then explained that it is merely for geographical reasons that he had stricken out the word "President" from the original text in which it was stated that the President himself would be present, and he read the paper to me. He added the remark: "It is not that I welcome the 'closed door' such as we have today, but, since we have been forced to it by Japan's actions, there is only one country that can open the door. This time it's Japan's turn." He changed his subject to that of French Indo China, stating that an official representing the Secretary of State was ———.

a - Parts 1, 2, 3, and 5 of 5 are not available.

b - District, Alaska, W. Coast of Baronof Island.

ARMY 21178 SECRET Trans. 8-19-41 (3)

SECRET

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
August 18, 1941
Purple (CA)

#708 (Part 5 of 5)

The President from beginning to end maintained an extremely tactful attitude and received me with kindness. (I got the impression that he was undoubtedly thrilled at the reception given by the British people to the joint British-American peace terms which he had succeeded in getting from CHURCHILL in his conversations with him during the past few days. (Unlike the independent declaration by the American Government in Wilson's Fourteen Points, this time, because of the insistence of the United States, joint peace terms by England and America were achieved.) In addition, some 14 or 15 days of life at sea, which he likes so well, have left him in the best of spirits.) Furthermore, the Secretary of State when we parted asked me to call any time that I so desired. The China question, being a separate problem, was not referred to at all in our conversations today.

During the course of our conversations, the President casually mentioned by name Postmaster General WALKER as being ardently endeavoring to bring about Japanese-American good will and, with regard to the early realization of the suggested interview, it seems that he had spoken in its favor.

With regard to our conversations of this day, I shall make a full report of my humble opinions separately.

21222

ARMY SECRET Trans. 8/20/41 (1)

From: Washington (Nomura).
To : Tokyo.
19 August 1941
(Purple)

#719 (in 2 parts, complete).

The fact that upon his return to the capital on Sunday, the President wished to see me before any other person, with the exception of the Secretary of State with whom he talked for several hours, clearly indicates the graveness with which he views Japanese-U.S. relations. It is apparent that the note contained in my message #707* was prepared in advance of the President's return. I have already reported that while reading the note, the President interrupted himself on several occasions to make minor and major comments thereon.

The note with I relayed to you as my message #708**, on the other hand, seemed to contain much that was the President's own attitude and opinion. From that, it seems as if the President was inclined to be in favor of our proposal on certain conditions.

However, when I said that the matter depended entirely on the President's statesmanship, he replied that the United States was not in favor of the "closed door" and that it was Japan's turn to figure out ways and means of opening it.

The impression I got throughout my talks with him was that he harbored other desires. There is no room for doubt, however, that the President hopes that matters will take a turn for the better.

According to recent comments in the newspapers, the President is fearful of the dangers of the United States being drawn into a war in the Far East. Apparently, he believes that there is a 50-50 chance that Japan will attempt further aggression.

It is true that by our proposing that talks be held between the leaders of the two countries, the attitude of the U.S. Government has been considerably eased. However, it is of the utmost importance that this matter be kept strictly secret for if it should once leak out, attempts will be made from every direction to destroy the project. I feel above all else that it is essential that a strict secrecy be maintained in Japan, also.

We, too, are giving this matter our careful attention and study, and should we stumble on to some good

JD-1: /z (continued) (c) Navy Trans. 8-22-41 (2)

ideas, we shall report them to you for whatever value they may have.

*JD-1: 4672.

**JD-1: 4696 and 4713.

21342

JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 8-22-41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941.
Purple. (A)

#722.

(Part 1 of 2)

During my conversation with a member of the Cabinet, he remarked, "The President has a broad-minded view of the world and is not anti-Japanese. In his past speeches and in his recent statement he has never referred to Japan. As soon as he returned to Washington he had the Secretary of State take up the question of the proposed Japanese-American conference and replied to you. This is an unprecedented thing and it seems that Japan should reciprocate in a like manner." So I replied by saying that it was with a strong resolution that the Japanese Government had come thus far in dealing with this question; whereupon the Cabinet member replied, "It is equally true in the case of the President. Above all, even if there is no real justification for it, the country is replete with anti-Japanese sentiment."

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (CA)

#722 (Part 2 of 2)

"And when the atmosphere in Congress is just as bad, if this fact leaks out there is no doubt that a strong opposition will be made, but if the conference succeeds and as a result peace is maintained in the Pacific, the people will for the first time ----- -----. Since I myself had endeavored in the same direction, the success would make me feel that life is worth living. Inasmuch as there is no way of telling whether the President will continue to take such an open-hearted attitude in the future, I earnestly wish that a way could be found to successfully settle this question."

21274

ARMY SECRET Trans. 8/21/41 (7)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#723. Part 1 of 2.

It seems that the President believes that he could meet with Premier KONOYE depending on circumstances (my #722[8]). It is not hard to imagine that he is also of the opinion that he would like to take this matter out of the hands of the authorities and settle it himself because of the general situation. It may be said that the President had made this proposal so that he could make his last political stroke at this moment when Japanese-American feelings are at their worst. It is well for Japan to respond in a like generous spirit to this move on the part of the President. It would be well also to leave the decisions of the concrete points until some future date - - - - - - - - - and show that there is nothing that would conflict with - - - - - and I think it is imperative that we thus bring about the resumption of the informal negotiations which have been disrupted.

From this standpoint, I am submitting a proposal we have drawn up (- - - #724[8]). There may be points in it that need to be dealt with more in detail. Should I think of any points that should be added I will wire them later. This

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proposal gives due respect to the policy proposed by the United States Government.

a - See S.I.S. #21273 and #21274.

b - See S.I.S. #21350 to #21356 inclusive - text of Nomura's proposal.

Trans. 8/25/41 (X)

ARMY SECRET

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (OA) (Urgent)

#729. Part 2 of 2.

It explains the immutable policy of our government based on the important statements by Prime Minister KONOYE and Ministers HIRANUMA, ARITA and MATSUOKA and attempts to correct misunderstandings regarding this policy. I believe that since it is limited to those points included in the American proposal, it would be accepted as a sufficient statement and is within the possibility of the United States giving it careful consideration. Of course, it is not wise to refer to those points which the President had not taken up. This is only a convenient method for opening Japanese-American negotiations and is not of a nature that could be proclaimed to the world as Japan's national policy.

I would like to have this proposal considered by the Foreign Office bearing in mind the points I have mentioned above. If the Japanese Government is determined to adjust Japanese-American relations, this is the time. Losing this opportunity, there will be no other that we can take. If the meeting is to take place about the middle of September, as the President has suggested, there is left for preliminary negotiations less than two months, in fact a little more than a month. Besides, if the meeting is really to take place, it would be necessary to

ARMY 7419

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have a ship ready and to select those who will accompany the part,. For these reasons I urge that you decide on this matter quickly.

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941.
Purple. (English text)

0724. (Part 1 of 7)

To be handled in Government code.

Strictly confidential.

Reference is made to the communication conveyed, on August 17th, 1941, to the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State and the President of the United States.

The Government of the United States mentioned certain circumstances and measures considered as typical to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. In an atmosphere of world crisis and international confusion, it is difficult to ascertain whether an event is a cause or a consequence.

Accordingly, not unlike the press in Japan, such news and editorial comment in the United States has forecasted the [illegible] as to the outcome of American-British policy in the Far East. Various speculations have been made by the press to indicate how, with the assistance of Russia, Japan would be deprived of natural resources [illegible] in the East Asia region. Meanwhile, the United States had to answer [illegible] could be interpreted in Japan as indicative of a continuing friendly [illegible] at variance with our then current amicable conversations.

ARMY SECRET Trans. 8-22-41

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941.
Purple. (English text)

#724. (Part 2 of 7)

The Government of the United States considers that certain of its actions vis-a-vis Japan have been only counter-measures to policies and procedures prejudicial to American interests and principles. On the other hand, the Government of Japan considers that its own actions have been dictated by considerations responsive to hazards, circumstantial and political, affecting the national sufficiency and protection of Japan.

It is quite conceivable that both Governments are right.

With admirable modesty of mind, the Government of the United States has seemed, frequently, unaware that the words of policy are weighted with the immense power of America's natural endowment and potential might. The President of the United States, and the Secretary of State, in their own unquestioning adherence to the way of peaceful procedures, might find it difficult to believe that other nationals, anywhere, could consider themselves threatened by the United States.

Yet, so long as they lack that assuagement of possible threat (so convincingly eliminated from South America by the good neighbor policy) there will be some, geographically less well endowed and, by nature, poor in essential resources, who will feel compelled to consider defensively their relations with the United States.

Trans. 8-22-41 (2)

ARMY

SECRET

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (English Plain Text)

#724

(Part 3 of 7)

It is not, therefore, surprising that temporary measures taken by the Government of Japan for the protection of its own equitable and necessary supply of living commodities, should be interpreted, though never so intended nor operated, prejudicial to the procurement by the United States of essential raw materials.

Equally, it is not surprising that, lacking such guarantees as are mentioned in the communication of August 17th, and in default of a consummated understanding with the United States, the Government of Japan felt compelled by current conditions to take certain measures of precautionary defense.

Accordingly, the Government of Japan appreciates that, having indicated difficulties, the Government of the United States now encourages an exchange of basic policies and attitudes as the foundation of an understanding that will condition lasting and extensive peace in the Pacific area.

For such peace, the Government of Japan is ready for such a united effort toward a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation the Government of Japan would be proud to make sacrifices.

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (English Text)

724 (To be handled in government code.) Part 4 of 7.

The government of Japan, with lively appreciation, endorses as its own, without qualification, the cogent "program attainable by peaceful methods". As outlined in the communication of August 17, 1941, the program is such as has long been desired and sought by Japan.

The government of Japan desires, for itself and all others, the application in the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. The government of Japan desires to make possible for itself and all countries, access to raw materials and to all of her essential commodities. The government of Japan desires cooperation by all nations of the Pacific, on a voluntary and peaceful basis, for the utilization of available resources of capital, technical skillfull, and progressive economic leadership for the purpose of building up not only their own but also the economy of regions where the productive and distributive capacities can be improved, in such manner that for the nations and peoples concerned, purchasing power will be increased, living standards raised and conditions conducive to peace will be created.

SECRET

From: Washington (Kamura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (English text)

#734 (Part 5 of 7)

(To be handled in Government Code)

If such a program, based upon peaceful and constructive principles, is adopted for the Pacific and if, thereafter, any of the countries or areas in the Pacific were menaced, the Government of Japan would cooperate with the other nations in extending assistance to any nation so threatened. The Government of Japan believes that such a program if faithfully carried out, with the consideration for the relative conditions of the various nations, would preclude the extension, by any one country, of political or military control to attain economic right of a definitely monopolistic or preferential character. In those cases where the production and distribution of essential commodities are vested in monopolies, it is expected that the Government of the United States will use its great influence to see that all countries are given fair and guaranteed share of the distribution of the products of such monopolies, and at a fair price.

Moreover, the Government of Japan rejects any intention of territorial aggrandizement or exploitation of other peoples. It desires the orderly establishment of effective, responsible, independent sovereignty in a united China. It desires the political inviolability of all Pacific nations.

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941.
Purple.

#724. To be handled in Government Code.

(Part 6 of 7)

The Government of Japan does not desire, unless forced thereto by political or economic aggression, that the East Asian region should be cut away from a world economy of equitable and peaceful processes, but it does desire that the principle of non-discrimination should be operative and exercised by other nations, no less than by Japan, for both citizenry and commerce. The Government of Japan has sought to express, in its international procedures, the cultural and ethical ideals of peace and harmony which are part of Japanese national culture. Japan participated in the League of Nations and cooperated in various disarmament conferences. But multiple events of world turmoil — of discrimination — of boycott and barriers — of personal indignities and attack, motivated the Governments, responsible for the welfare of the Japanese people, to take certain counter measures which they would have preferred to avoid. Some of these measures, whether faction or alliance, were interpreted as aggressive.

The Government of Japan has no intention and no alliance and no policy of aggression. The Government of Japan conceives its people as members of the family of nations, each of whom ought to live, and let live, under the common bond of brotherhood and just tolerance.

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (English Plain Text) Urgent

#724 (Part 7 of 7)

We consider that the natural position and circumstances of Japan and her people is not incomparable to that of Britain; and the deprivation of economic opportunity by boycott and discrimination are measures against which, not less than against military attack, the prescripts of national security and honor require resistance. It is this policy of resistance, extended to armed conflict, that has been interpreted by some as aggressive.

But, the Government of Japan prefers a policy of cooperation and desires to sincerely respond to the cordial, penetrating proposals of the President of the United States and the Secretar of State by the rapid conclusion of our informally negotiated, and almost completed, understanding. The meeting of the responsible head of our respective Governments would confirm and give such sanction to our purposes that peace in the Pacific would be insisted with the date of that meeting.

It is with great good will that the Government of Japan antisipates the complete resumption of the historic friendship with the United States.

ARMY SECRET Trans. 8/22/41 (2)

From: Tokyo.
To : Washington.
21 August 1941
(Purple-CA)

7

- - - -(Preamble and first couple of lines missed).

- - - -in view of this request (the said Ambassador notified me, also, on the 15th), I had the various circles concerned make investigations, I said. I went on to say that we are trying to dispose of the matter in accordance with the desires expressed by the United States and that I was certain that I would be able to submit a reply to him at an early opportunity.

Then, on condition that he keep it strictly confidential and "off the record" I talked to him for over two hours concerning the matter contained in my message #452*. I pointed out to him, in accordance with the lines contained in my previous messages, the absolute necessity of displaying some real statesmanship if we are to surmount the crisis which now confronts us.

So saying, I strongly urged that the proposed talks take place. I added that since he had worked so tirelessly during the past nine years in behalf of Japanese-U.S. friendship, I was counting on his services in the promotion of these talks.

The above is for your information.

*JD-1: 4380. Amb. Nomura is directed to feel out the attitude of U.S. officials on arranging a meeting between Pres. Roosevelt and Premier Prince Konoe for a friendly discussion of steps that may be taken for conclusion of an "understanding" to guarantee peace in the Pacific.

JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 8-22-41 (J-TT)

From: Washington.
To : Tokyo.
21 August 1941
(Purple-CA)

#725

According to reports along the lines of those contained in my #722*, there are indications that the President himself is becoming seriously interested in participating in the resumption of the negotiations to revise Japanese-U.S. relations. It is even said that the latter half of the note which I sent to you as my message #708**, was composed by the President himself. I have also heard that he expects to have me hand our reply to that note directly to him. For these reasons, I believe that it would be well if we omitted all of the involved and complicated points in the composition of our reply and instead have it in the most simple and direct phraseology as possible. In my opinion, I think it would be to our interest if we omitted expressions like "continuance of encirclement" as it appears in section three of my message #724***. Other corrections which I would make would include the changing of the phrase "of discrimination, of boycott, and barriers, of personal interorities and attack" as it appears in section 18, to, simply, "circumstances in the recent past". I also feel that it is essential that we point out the fact that we place much emphasis on the point concerning the guaranteeing of the safety of the Far East.

*JD-1: 4695. Nomura reports the gist of a conversation with a Cabinet member in which he is told of President Roosevelt's interest in the proposed conference (with Konoye) and of his (the Cabinet member's) hope for its success.

**JD-1: 4696. Text of a memorandum handed to Mr. Nomura by the President.

***JD-1: 4735. Text of Mr. Nomura's (proposed) reply to the President's note.

JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 8-25-41 (2)

From: Tokyo.
To : Washington.
23 August 1941
(Purple-CA)

#495

(Strictly Confidential)

According to newspaper reports, it is alleged that a British-U.S.-Soviet conference will be held early in September. This comes at the same time as the reports that the United States is shipping goods to aid the Soviet Union, which in many respects confirms the already existing rumors of "encirclement". Under these circumstances, if the proposed talks between the leaders of Japan and the United States comes subsequent to the above referred to tripartite conference, the general impression would be that Japan had given in in the face of the threat of "encirclement".

We are, therefore, doing everything in our power to rush our reply to the United States and at the same time to bring about the "leaders conference" at an earlier date. Under these circumstances, will you please exert as much effort as possible to accomplish this. At the same time will you please draw the United States' attention again to the matter contained in the last part of my message #487.*

*JD-1: 4694. Tokyo's intentions regarding her northern policy are outlined to Amb. Nomura for his information, with the request that should the U.S. question the increase of Jap troops in the North, it should be explained as a precautionary measure taken to offset dangers that might arise from a Soviet defeat and subsequent political confusion in Eastern Russia. Also, that should the U.S. ship vital materials to Russia via Japanese coastal waters, it would provoke the feelings of the Japanese people and have an unfavorable effect on the question of readjusting U.S.-Japanese relations.

21455

JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 8-25-41 (S-TT)

From: Washington.
To : Tokyo.
23 August 1941
(Purple-CA)

#739

I called on Secretary Hull again at 5 o'clock this (Saturday) afternoon, and in accordance with the contents of your message #495 (?)", reported that Japan was prepared to make an early reply and at the same time to hold the "leader's conference" at an earlier date than previously proposed. As you instructed, I requested that the Moscow conference be delayed and the proposed material aid to the Soviet Union be withheld for the time being.

The Secretary made no comment with regard to the first part. With regard to the second portion of my statement, he again - as he did this morning - pointed to the Japanese-U.S.S.R. Neutrality Pact.

He did assure me, however, that my statement would be relayed to the President. According to reports - - - - - - - - - - - - -the President has made inquiries as to whether Japan's reply had arrived or not. In my opinion, the President is the one who shows the most interest in the "leader's conference".

"JD-1: 4769. Tokyo wires Washington that every effort is being made to rush a reply to the President's note, etc., etc.

21465

JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 8-26-41 (2)

From: Washington.
To : Tokyo.
25 August 1941
(Purple)

Unnumbered

To Chief of Telegraph Section, from Iguchi*.

We are expecting your reply concerning revisions in U.S.-Japanese relations within a very few days. Will you please insert the one word "[illegible]" in plain language at the beginning of that message when it is dispatched so that we may decode it without loss of time.

*Sadao Iguchi - Counselor.

2156.

JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 8-28-41 (1)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 26, 1941
Purple CA (Very Urgent)

#501

Re your #707[a] and 708[a].

This is a matter of great gravity and the Premier is eager concerning these conversations. Therefore, I am wiring you under this date, message #502 containing a message from the Premier to the President and in #503 the reply of the Imperial Government, (in which connection see also #504.)

Will you please go and report them immediately to both the President and the Secretary of State.

a - For 707 see J.I.S. #21226 and for #708 see J.I.S. #21334 & #21339 which are the texts of the notes handed Ambassador Nomura by President Roosevelt.

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 28, 1941
Purple (Very Urgent)

#502 (Part 1 of 2) (To be handled in Government Code)

I am very much pleased to learn from the document which you handed to Ambassador NOMURA on August 17 that you are in agreement with the idea contained in our proposal regarding holding a meeting between you and me.

Today, when the whole world is in confusion, for the two countries of Japan and the United States, who hold the key to world peace, to drift as we are drifting toward the worst of relations, not only is an unfortunate thing in itself but also means the downfall of world civilization. The reason for Japan being so concerned over the question of peace in the Pacific lies in no other than her desire not only to improve the relations between Japan and the United States, but also to contribute to the realization of world peace through the opportunity which such improved relations would afford.

It seems to me the reason that Japanese-American relations have come to be so bad as they are today is to be found largely in the fact that the governments of the two countries have been lacking in mutual understanding and have repeatedly doubted and misconstrued each other's intentions. It seems also to have been due to machinations on the part of third-power countries. Unless we begin with the elimination of such causes, we cannot by any means hope that the relations between the two countries could be adjusted. Herein lies the reason for my proposing that I meet you face to face for the purpose of frankly exchanging our views.

ARMY SECRET Trans. 8/26/41 (S)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 26, 1941
Purple (Very Urgent)

#502 (Part 2 of 2)

however, the method upon which we have hitherto been replying; namely, the method of informal negotiations, which was disrupted in July—though it may have been, on the whole, appropriate in consideration of the attitude then taken and of the matters discussed—even if continued from now on with a view of having the leaders of the two governments later giving recognition to the matters discussed, is not a suitable method under the present circumstances in which rapid changes are taking place and the possibility of an unfortunate condition arising is unforeseeable. I believe the need of the moment is for the leaders of the two countries to meet face to face and to discuss whether there is any possibility of saving the present situation by studying together with a proper perspective the important questions which affect the whole area of the Pacific Ocean lying between the two countries, and to do this without being bound by the customary method of negotiations. It would be all right to have the details settled by those officials specialising in such matters according as the necessity arises after the leaders have conferred on them.

This is the idea underlying my proposal. It is my earnest wish that you would accept this proposal in an understanding spirit and reciprocate. The situation being such as explained above, I am eagerly

ARMY SECRET

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waiting for the day of our meeting. As to the place of the meeting, I believe that, in view of various circumstances, it would be best if it were somewhere in the vicinity of Hawaii.



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21474

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

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 31, 1941
Purple

(Part 2 of 2) (To be handled in Government code.)

The Government of Japan cannot help but feel deeply regrettable that despite Japan's good pledges and her repeated explanations concerning her activities and measures toward other countries, the United States Government is still harboring misunderstanding and fear. The Government of the United States refers to certain situations and measures which it considers harmful to the peaceful settlement of problems affecting the Pacific area and does so on the basic policy of the fundamental principles to which it has pledged itself. However, in such a world crisis as we face today and in such an atmosphere of international confusion, it is exceedingly difficult to judge whether a certain incident is the cause or the result. It is, furthermore, dangerous to base that judgment essentially upon certain political facts only. The Government of Japan cannot but point out how harmful such a judgment is to lasting peace.

When a country's natural and peaceful progress is interfered with or when the right of existence is threatened from without, for that country to take measures to cope with the threat or to resort to methods for the defense not only is unavoidable, but also must be said to be a most natural thing from the standpoint of maintaining peace. Therefore, before criticizing such countermeasures or defensive measures, to ascertain the cause and to correct the situation must be regarded as the greatest factor for a speedy establishment of peace.

ARMY 021475 SECRET Trans. 9/24/41 (S)



SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 28, 1941
Purple

#[illegible] (Part 2 of 7)

We shall not consider at this time those things which have happened in the far past. However, if the matter is regarded in the light of recent incidents, we find that many newspaper articles and editorials in the United States have predicted that a British-American joint policy in the Far East would result in a threat to Japan and have hinted the formation of an anti-Japanese front by Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands Indies. In the meantime, in conflict with the friendly conversations that were taking place at the time between Japan and the United States, the United States Government has expressed the intention of applying a continuous and unfriendly policy of pressure and has taken measures which might deprive Japan of the opportunity of obtaining the natural resources necessary to Japan. Although the United States considered some measures as having been taken in opposition to Japan's policy and activities which the United States considered as harmful to her rights and to the principles she upholds, on the other hand, the Japanese Government believed that her nation was pressed by certain measures which she had taken to cope with circumstantial and political obstacles which affected her national requirements of self-sufficiency and defense.

It should not be forgotten that, as pointed out, what the government of one country considers as just proves to be exactly the opposite when regarded by another country, and that it often proves to be a cause for suspicion as well. Looking back upon past instances, we find quite a few subjects which the United States Government has







SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 6, 1941
Purple

#906 (Part 6 of 7)

The steps which Japan has taken for the joint defense of French Indo-China, as stated repeatedly in the past, had for their purpose hastening of the settlement of the China incident which originated from the threat against Japan's right of existence. They constituted also a policy which became, for reason of self-existence, inevitable for the purpose of maintaining peace in the Pacific by coping with various threats which tended to disrupt that peace, and thereby to achieve an equitable supply of materials vital to [illegible] to the country. It was not in the nature of unduly making a threat. Therefore, should the China incident be settled or should a just peace be established in the Far East, the Government of Japan, as you already know, is willing to withdraw its troops immediately from French Indo-China. In order that every bit of prejudice there may be wiped out, the Government of Japan reiterates here the principle it has repeated in the past--that her steps with regard to the joint defense of French Indo-China were not taken with the intention of using that area a base from which to advance by force into the neighboring areas. From the [illegible] made above, we believe that Japan's attitude toward Thailand is self-evident. Also, as regards Japanese-[illegible] relations, the Japanese Government is to state clearly here that as long as the Soviet Government respects the terms of the Russo-Japanese neutrality agreement and refrains from taking actions which are a threat to Japan [illegible] Manchukuo or acts in contravention to the spirit of this agreement, Japan will not resort to

ARMY 21478 Page 2-A SECRET


SECRET

military action against that country. It is, therefore, an essential decision on the part of the Japanese Government that the United States Government refrain from any action that would instill fear in the Japanese, or any nation of the people in those countries which might later be occupied by the United States and Soviet Russia acting jointly.

SECRET



SECRET



SECRET

enjoying favorable conditions or having advantages over other countries economically, politically, militarily, from the point of view of natural resources or geographically shall assume an attitude of strict impartiality with regard to cooperation and to the distribution of such advantages. It is natural and essential that, first of all satisfying the requirements essential to the existence of a country, in a spirit of reciprocity adjustments should be made in relation to the areas adjacent to it. It is further more important in hastening the establishment of peace.

21479

ARMY M.I. SECRET



SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 24, 1941
Purple

#920 (Part 7 of 7)

To be handled in government code.

I believe that the opinions of the Imperial Government as set forth above are clear and concise. We believe that it is paramount for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific that the governments of Japan and the United States confer dispassionately and constructively together on problems great and small.

From this point of view it is my fervent belief that it would be highly significant for the leaders of both countries to meet together for an immediate conference. However, in order that such a conference can be conducted in the most friendly manner, I believe that it is essential to immediately quash the impression that this step is due to pressure put upon the Japanese Government by the Government of the United States. The Japanese Government is convinced that the Government of the United States is in the main interested in the establishment of world peace and Japan has decided to reciprocate and in the light of the present international situation has decided to endorse the early invocation of this conference.

21480

ARMY SECRET Trans. 8/26/41 (S)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 28, 1941
Purple (CA)

#608 (Part 1 of 5)

Re my #803.

(A) For convenience's sake, in exchanging messages in the future on this question, please insert the paragraph numbers in the order used in the caption telegram.

1. (The section beginning "The Government of the United States" and repeating the content of recently received documents)

2. (The section beginning "The Government of Japan cannot help but feel deeply regrettable that despite Japan's past pledges, etc.")

3. (The section beginning "The steps which Japan has taken for the joint defense of French Indo-China, etc.")

4. (The section beginning "The Government of the United States has gone on record as having said that, etc.")

5. (The section beginning "The Imperial Japanese Government believes that the Government of the United States considers, etc.")

6. (The section beginning "I believe that the opinions of the Imperial Government as set forth above, etc.")

(B) The following are explanations of the points in the caption telegram which need special attention:

(1) Our opinions regarding this question were set forth briefly in response to those views which the United States Government freely submitted with the request that we do likewise.

ARMY

SECRET

We made our views clear, believing that by so doing we might find in due time points upon which the two parties can agree in a friendly spirit and that because of this the meeting of the leaders of the two countries would prove to be effective.

a - S.I.S. Nos. 21474-80 which give Japan's viewpoints with regard to American-Japanese negotiations.

21536

ARMY SECRET Trans. 8/28/41 (S)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 28, 1941
Purple (CA)

509 (Part 2 of 3)

(2) With regard to Part 3 [a], "should a just peace be established in the Far East." This means, for example, when the CHIANG regime has become merely a local regime as a result of the closing of routes used to aid that regime; when Japanese-Chinese relations have, on the whole, actually returned to normalcy; and when it is possible to secure efficiently and justly materials from French Indo-China, Japan will be willing to consider withdrawing her troops even if a complete settlement of the China incident has not been achieved. In other words, it was a statement made because of the desire to allow as much flexibility as possible when the conversations are to be begun.

(3) With regard to Part 5. (A) [a]. "... which will be applicable to the whole world, etc." was inserted out of consideration of the fact that if the principles and desires expressed by the other side are applied merely within the Pacific area, we would suffer various restrictions within the East Asia sphere of co-prosperity in which we hope to establish a new order, while the United States, on the other hand, would not be bound by any pledge with regard to her relations with her adjacent areas. Since this would result in an arrangement which would be one-sided insofar as it affects Japan, I thought that the principle should be such as may be applied to the entire world.

a - The parts referred to do not correspond to parts in the translated message; Part 3 mentioned above corresponds to Part 5 in the translated message, and Part 5 to Part 6.

ARMY 2158 SECRET Trans. 8/26/41 (S)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 28, 1941
Purple (GA)

#909 (Part 3 of 3.)

(3) With regard to that section in which it is stated that countries enjoying favorable conditions or having advantages over other countries should assume an attitude of strict impartiality with regard to cooperation and to the distribution of such advantages, we wish to point out the logical reasons for cooperation in the application of leadership to the end of bringing about steps for an equitable distribution of resources by those countries who are advantageously situated, and the passage has to do with the proposal by the United States with reference to equality of economic opportunity and treatment. In other words, it hints the idea that it is natural that Japan should assume peaceful economic leadership within the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity.

(4) As to the words to the effect that it is natural and essential that adjustments should be made in a spirit of reciprocity in relation to the areas adjacent, etc., the passage clarifies the fact that Japan is inevitably, as well as naturally, endeavoring to bring about peace on the basis of the principle of equality in her relation with Manchukuo and China; that is to say, on the basis of the principle of good neighborliness to the end of establishing the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity. It also goes to show that the

ARMY SECRET

SECRET

policy of adjacent countries each respecting the conditions peculiar to the other, is not a policy, as the United States alleges it to be, of securing a position superior to the others. This has many points in common with the American Monroe policy.

The passage in which appear the words "first of all satisfying the requirements essential to the existence of a country" came from the idea of so-called (joint defense ?) which the United States Government referred to. This passage was given with the idea also of a joint defense in China in our mind.

In other words, (A), (B) and (C) were brought out as a precaution against the possibility of our being too narrowly restricted when the discussion takes place concerning the method by which the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity should be established.

ARMY SECRET Trans. 8/28/41 (E)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 28, 1941
Purple CA (Very Urgent)

#752 (Part 1 of 2)

Re my #748[a].

Today, the 28th, at 11:00 a.m. in accordance with your instructions, I had an interview with the President (the Secretary of State was present.) I gave him at that time your message as well as the English text of your #503[b]. While the President was reading the message he flatteringly commended it. Having read it thoroughly, in discussing the point having to do with discrimination he smilingly and cynically said, "Though I am looking forward to conversations with Prince KONOYE, I wonder whether invasion of Thailand can be expected during those conversations just as an invasion of French-Indo China occurred during Secretary HULL'S conversations with your Excellency." However, I could see that he was well pleased. He continued by saying, "I am looking forward to having approximately three days talk with Prince KONOYE. The main thing that I am interested in is the saving of time. Hawaii is out of the question for according to the constitution the President must sign bills passed through the Houses of Congress within ten days and I cannot have the Vice-president do it for me."

a - Not available.

b - S.I.S.#21474-80 inclusive, English text message containing statement to be made to Roosevelt.

Trans. 8/30/41 (2)

ARMY SECRET

SECRET

From: ashington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 28, 1941
Purple (CA)

#752 (Part 2 of 2)[a]

He explained that in this respect it is different with the Japanese Government in that the Japanese Government could appoint an acting minister and added that if it is going to be in Juneau, it would take three days to Seattle, and the round trip from that point on being ten days, if we had fourteen days in all, we would be able to do it, but it would be impossible if it is going to be in Hawaii, since it would take three weeks. I, therefore, told him that insofar as the Japanese Government is concerned, their chief object is to hold a conference, and question of the place of the conference is secondary. I promised that I would communicate the details to the government. I then said that we would like to have the earliest possible date set, whereupon the President replied that he did not object to having an early date set, but he did not give the immediate reply as to when.

The President added also that the recent meeting with CHURCHILL was to have taken place in ----- this year but had been postponed on account of the Balkan War and that the meeting was held after the Congress had approved of it. The conversation between the President and me was as given above. These conversations will be continued.

a - Part 1 of 2 not available.

ARMY SECRET

Trans. 8/29/41 (?)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 28, 1941
Purple (CA)

#753

a

Re my #752 .

Since the time for the interview was announced by the White House, the Secretary of State immediately made public briefly the fact that I had delivered to him after the conference Premier KONOYE's message to the President, which was discussed by us. It was agreed that no reference should be made to the content of the message.

a - Part 2 of 2 available, being translated.

ARMY SECRET Trans. 8/29/41 (7)

From: Tokyo.
To : Washington.
29 August 1941
(Purple-CA)

#510

As you have been advised by other messages concerning this matter, no information of the "leaders' conference" should be allowed to leak out until it is definitely settled upon. You should be perfectly well aware that such leaks may make it impossible to get some things done which otherwise would be well within the realm of possibility.

On the 28th, however, the Domei and other press dispatches, report that in an interview to the press you made references to Premier Konoye's message. (We suppressed those dispatches here). Hereafter will you please refrain from making any mention of this until you have communicated with this office.

Although we were able to suppress the above mentioned dispatches, in view of the channel through which they arrived, we are of the opinion that a fairly large group of people are now aware of the news. We are at present figuring out ways and means of making the best of the situation. In the meantime, will you take every precaution against any leakage of the contents of the message.

JD-1: 4868

(D) Navy Trans. 8-30-41 (3-TT)

From: Tokyo.
To : Washington.
29 August 1941
(Purple-CA)

#511

Regarding my message #510*

In view of our domestic situation and the delicate international situation, we had intended to keep this matter a strict secret for the time being. However, now that the matter has been made public in your area, we fear that there will be further misunderstanding if we should attempt to suppress or censor the news here. Being of the opinion that it would be best to publicly announce the contents of section 2 of paragraph 5 of the separate message, we did so at 2:30 p.m. on the 29th.

It should be superfluous to mention that because we must take into consideration our relations with Germany and Italy, and in view of the exceedingly complex domestic situation, there is much danger that the project will fail if information is allowed to leak out before a settlement is reached. Bear this in mind and take every precaution to guard against leaks. You should conduct your negotiations, as they were being conducted during your unofficial talks, in such a manner so as to avoid attracting any attention. (We do not feel that the contents of the discussion on the 28th should be made public at this time). Hereafter, will you please get in touch before you make any public statements. We realize, of course, that you may let an opportunity slip by by this delay, but please look upon such an occurrence as being unavoidable under the present circumstances.

With regard to the location at which the "leaders' conference" should take place, we mentioned Hawaii after giving consideration to our dignity and also because early in the discussions the United States suggested Hawaii.

We do not insist upon Hawaii, but if it is not to take place there, we feel that we should avoid selecting a place which is a part of either nation, but select a spot on the high seas. Will you discuss this matter along those lines.

With regard to maintenance of security, in view of the matter contained in your message #754**, will you please request the Americans to cooperate fully. (You are aware that our relations with Germany and Italy may be unfavorably affected by occurrences made in the United States. It is quite possible that the United States proposed that the announcement be made to estrange Japan from Germany and Italy. I expect to have

JD-1: (continued) (c) Navy Trans. 8-30-41 (S-TT)

1462

~~Xxxxx~~

at least this much cooperation from them).

With regard to the announcement made by us which was mentioned early in this message, we felt that time was of the utmost importance; we could not consult the U.S. first. Please explain this to them.

*JD-1: 4868.

**Not available.

21647

JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 8-30-41 (S-TT)

From : Washington.
To : Tokyo.
29 August 1941
(Purple-GA)

#756 (Part 4 of 4 - Parts 1, 2, 3 translated 9-3-41)

4. I assume that Prince Konoye will travel by warship and that about ten days will be required en route.

5. The public statement will be made jointly at a time agreed upon by both. I believe that the best time would be shortly after Prince Konoye's departure.

The Secretary of State agreed to discuss these points with the President. In general, it may be said that the Secretary of State is an exceedingly cautious person. There are indications that he is considering this matter from many angles. I feel that unless we are in fairly close agreement the "leaders' conference" will not materialize.

2173u

JD-1: 4899 (D) Navy Trans. 9-4-41 (1)

EXHIBIT NO. 125



N. Nav. 48
(Mar., 1920)

Page 330

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP WRIGHT. (Name) AV-1. (Identification Number)

AT PASSAGE Pearl Harbor, T.H. TO adv...ce Base, ... Tuesday (Day) 25 November (Date) (Month) 1941.

ZONE DESCRIPTION Minus 12. C...ir..., Comdr., U.S. Navy Commanding.

Hour	Air Temp. Wet Bulb Reading	By Revs. Number Miles	By Revs. Number Turns	By Log Number Miles	By Log Number Turns	Course (P. C.) Gyro Mag. (Indicate which)	Wind Direction	Wind Force	Barometer Inches	Barometer Reading at Noon	Temperature Air	Temperature Sea Intake	Temperature Water Closet	Weather by Symbols	Clouds Form	Clouds Moving From—	Clouds Amount	Visibility	Sea Condition	Sea Swell Force
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M.																				
200	1	87.5	12.4			282	NW	15	29.74	77	77	75	80	bc	cu		3	10	1	
200	2	87.5	12.4			284	NW	12	29.70	77	77	75	81	bc	cu			10	1	
200	3	87.	12.4			282	NW	12	29.70	76	76	75	81	bc	cu		3	10	1	
200	4	[illegible]	12.4			281	[illegible]	16	29.69	76	76	75	80	bc	cu		3	10	1	
200	5	87.	12.4			282	NW	16	29.70	76	76	75	80	bc	st cu		4	10	1	
200	6	87.	12.4			282	NW	16	29.73	76	76	75	81	b	st cu		5	10	1	
200	7	87.5	12.4			283	NW	16	29.73	76	76	75	81	bc	st cu		4	10	1	
200	8	86	12.4			282	NW	15	29.74	76	76	75	81	bc	cu	cu	3	20	1	
200	9	87.5	12.4			282	NW	15	29.74	76	76	75	81	bc	cu	cu	4	30	1	
200	10	86	12.4			283	NW	14	29.73	77	77	75	81	bc	st	cu	4	30	1	
200	11	87.5	12.4			284	NW	16	29.74	77	77	75	81	bc	st	cu	4	30	1	
200	12	86	12.4			282	NW	17	29.70	77	77	76	81	bc	st	cu	4	30	1	
P.M.																				
200	13	87.5	12.4			284	NW	16	29.6[illegible]	77	77	76	81	bc	st		4	1	1	
200	14	87	12.3			284	NW	14	29.6[illegible]	77	77	76						1	1	
200	15	87.5	12.4			284	NW	16	29.6[illegible]	77	77	76						1	1	
200	16	87	12.3			284	NW	16	29.6[illegible]	76	76	76						1	1	
200	17	87	12.3			284	NW	16	29.6[illegible]	76	76	76						1	1	
200	18	87	12.3			284	NW	14	29.6[illegible]	76	76	76						1	1	
200	19	87.5	12.4			284	NW	16	29.6[illegible]	76	76	76						1	1	
200	20	87	12.3			284	NW	16	29.71	76	76	76						1	1	
200	21	87	12.3			284	NW	14	29.71	76	76	76						1	1	
200	22	86.5	12.4			284	NW	14	29.71	76	76	76						1	1	
200	23	86.5	12.4			284	NW	14	29.7[illegible]	76	76	76						1	1	
200	24	87	12.3			284	NW	16	29.71	76	76	76		bc	st			20	1	

Latitude 19°50'00"N
Longitude 171°38'00"E

Latitude 19°43'00"N
Longitude 170°43'00"E

Latitude 19°26'00"N
Longitude 168°54'

Current: Set 182, Drift 0.0 kt.

Gyrocompass in Use
Error 0°

Standard Mag. Compass
Compass No. 10019
S. H. 282
Error 9°30'E
Variation 6.30'E
Deviation 1°

Fuel: Received ..., Expended 20911, On hand [illegible]

Distilled: Received 17410, Expended 881.0, On hand 106500

Before Leaving Port: Draft for'd ..., Draft aft ...

After Entering Port: Draft for'd ..., Draft aft ...

Magazine Temperatures: Maximum 85°, Minimum 72°, Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1		
2	General quarters. Sunday drills.	
3	Sunday drills.	
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

Page 330

UNITED STATES SHIP [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] November 19 [illegible]

REMARKS

[illegible] darkened, [illegible]° [illegible], [illegible], boilers [illegible]1,2,3,5, and [illegible] [illegible] lbs., average [illegible]

[illegible], [illegible], [illegible].

[illegible]. Average steam, 200 lbs.,

[illegible], Chief Boatswain, [illegible].

[illegible] Quarters. [illegible] Secured [illegible] Drills. [illegible] Secured from Gun- [illegible]. [illegible]: [illegible] [illegible] normal.

[illegible], [illegible], [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible]°, 254° [illegible]. [illegible] Secured from Gunnery Drills.

[illegible], [illegible], [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible], [illegible], Second [illegible] lower left [illegible] [illegible]. Average [illegible]

[illegible], [illegible], [illegible].

[illegible] Description [illegible]

[illegible], [illegible], [illegible].

[illegible], [illegible] true, [illegible]. Average [illegible]

[illegible], [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible], Navigator

(Original ribbon copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

Page 331

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP [illegible] (Name) aY-1. (Identification Number)

AT PASSAGE Pearl Harbor, T.H. TO Advance Base. Friday 28 November, 1941. (Day) (Date) (Month)

ZONE DESCRIPTION Minus 11. C. H. Miller, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hours	"All Ships" Expenditure Fuel	By Revs. Distance Run Nautical Miles	By Revs. Distance Run Tenths	By Log Nautical Miles	By Log Tenths	Courses (P. C.) Gyro / Mag. (Indicate which)	Wind Direction	Wind Force	Barometer Inches of Mercury	Barometer Reduced to Sea Level	Temperature Air, Dry Bulb	Temperature Air, Wet Bulb	Temperature Water at Surface	Weather, by Symbols	Clouds Form	Clouds Moving From	Clouds Amount	Visibility	Sea Direction	Sea Height in Feet
	1	2	3	4	5	6								14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M.																				
200 1	87	12	3			084													1	
200 2	87	12	3			234													1	
200 3	87.5	12	4			84													1	
200 4	87.5	12	4			264													1	
200 5	87.5	12	4			264													1	
200 6	87.5	12	4			305													1	
200 7	87	12	3			036													1	
200 8	13	1	8			100													1	
200 9	3	0	0			045													1	
200 10	0	0	0			110													1	
200 11	12.5	0	0			024													1	
200 12	0	0	0			097													1	

P.M.																				
200 13	2.5	0	0			069														
200 14	12.5	1	7			012														
200 15	0	0	0			097														
200 16	.3	0	0			075														
200 17	9.1	0	0			125														
200 18	0	0	0			273														
200 19	0	0	0			271														
200 20	0	0	0			271														
200 21	0	0	0			244														
200 22	0	0	0			244														
200 23	0	0	0			244														
200 24	0	0	0			279														

Position at Noon
- Latitude 19°18'40"N
- Longitude 166°34'15"E

Position at 4 P.M.
- Latitude 19°18'30"N
- Longitude 166°34'30"E

Position at Midnight
- Latitude 19°15'00N
- Longitude 166°34'00-E

Current: Set / Drift

Gyrocompass in Use: Error C

Standard Mag Compass
- Compass No. 10 89
- S. H. 264
- Error 8½ E
- Variation 9° E
- Deviation 1° E

Fuel: Received / Expended 61978 / On hand 904340

Water: Distilled 17890 / Received / Expended 29791 / On hand 150051

Before Leaving Port: Draft for'd / Draft aft

After Entering Port: Draft for'd 32'6" / Draft aft 33'6"

Magazine Temperatures: Maximum 85° / Minimum 79°

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation [illegible])

N. Nav. 48
(Mar 1926)

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UNITED STATES SHIP [illegible] 19 [illegible]

ZONE DESCRIPTION [illegible]

REMARKS

00-04 [illegible]

04-8 [illegible]

8-12 [illegible] Operations normal.

12-1 [illegible]

Approved [illegible] Executive

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

31

ADDITIONAL SHEET.

[illegible]


LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

332

ADDITIONAL SHEET.

[illegible]

to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets.

Page --332

REMARKS

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

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

AT
PASSAGE

TO

19

ZONE DESCRIPTION

UNITED STATES SHIP

19 41

REMARKS

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333

ADDITIONAL SHEET.

LOG BOOK

OF THE

U. S. S. [illegible]

[illegible] Rate,

COMMANDED BY

[illegible], U. S. Navy,

[illegible] Division,

Attached to [illegible] Squadron,

[illegible] Fleet,

Commencing [illegible], 1941.,

at [illegible]

and ending [illegible], 1941.,

at [illegible]

19[illegible]

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets.)

LIST OF OFFICERS

Attached to and on board of the U. S. S. ENTERPRISE. , commanded by C. W. WIEBER, Commander, , U. S. N., during the period covered by this Log Book, with date of reporting for duty, detachment, transfer, or death, from December 1, , 19 41, to December 31, , 19 41

NAME	RANK	DATE OF REPORT FOR DUTY	DETACHED DATE	DUTIES
WIEBER, Carlos W.	Commander, USN	6/30/41		Commanding Officer.
KIEFER, Dixie	Commander, USN	8/7/41	11/20/41 Temp. Duty	Executive Office.
KRANE, Campbell	Commander, USN D-V, USN.	8/16/41	Cdr. Task Group 9.2 Wake Island.	Air Officer.
PRISCO, Leonard	Lieut. Comdr. DE-V(S) USNR	11/1/41		Navigator.
SANFORD, John R.	Lieut. Comdr.	4/6/40		Gunnery Officer.
LUCAS, Percy S.	Lieutenant C-V(S) USNR	8/11/41		Communication Off.
WEBER, Robert L.	Lieutenant D-V, USNR.	1/21/41		First Lieut.
HAGEN, Edwin C.	Lieutenant (jg) D-V(G), USNR	6/3/41		First Div. Off.
HOWE, Scott	Lieutenant (jg) D-V, USNR.	6/23/41		Second Div. Off.
PICKETT, James H.	Ensign D-V(G)USNR	4/20/41		Signal Officer.
PINZ, Robert J.	Ensign D-V(G)USNR	4/20/41	Undergoing treatment Navy [illegible] P.M. 12/19/41	Asst. Gunnery Off.
PERE, John	Ensign E-V(G)USNR	6/30/41		"B" Div. Officer.
PRESCOTT, Paul H.	Ensign E-V(G)USNR	6/30/41		"A" Div. Officer.
GREEN, Maurice F.	Ensign E-V(G) USNR	6/30/41		"C" Div. Officer.
HAROLDSON, John C.	Ensign E-V(G) USNR	10/10/41		"D" Div. Officer.
WAGNER, Hugo G.G.	Lieut. Comdr. (MC) USN	6/16/41		Senior Med. Off.
KELLY, Robert E.	Lieutenant (jg) (MC-V(G), USNR	6/13/41		Junior Med. Off.
PRASZ, Edward R.	Lieutenant (jg) (DC-V(G), USNR.	6/13/41		Dental Officer.
HARRIS, Charles L.	Lt.(jg)(SC)USN.	6/3/41		Supply Officer.
MUIR, Frederick W.	Lt.(jg)(SC)USN.	3/25/41		Disbursing Off.
HALDEN, Ervin L.	Ensign (SC)V(G), USNR.	10/17/41		Asst. Supply Off.
PARK, Charles B.	C.B.M., USN.	3/31/41		Chief's Mess.
ERNST, Alphonse M.	Gunner, USN.	10/12/37		Torpedo Officer.
SMITH, Julius S.	Gunner, USN.	1/6/41		Asst. to Gun. Off.
McKELVEY, Carlton A.	C.R.M., USN.	12/3/3[illegible]		Radio Officer.
ACHUFF, John N.	Machinist, USN.	12/13/39		A. E. Officer.
MERRITT, Carl N.	Machinist, USN	11/26/40		Engr. Officer.
BERAN, Adolph H.	Carpenter, USN.	12/27/37		Ship's Carpenter.
HARMS, Orvil S.	C.P.O., USN.	4/16/41		Asst. to Sup. Off.
HOLTSLANDER, Herman, S.	S.A.P.C., USN.	10/5/40		Asst. to Sup. Off.

Examined and found to be correct

Leonard Prisco
[illegible] USNR,
Lieut. Comdr.,
U.S. Navy.
Navigator.

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

N. Nav. 43

Page

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP [illegible] (Name) AV-1. (Identification Number)

AT / PASSAGE [illegible] TO [illegible] Island. [illegible]day (Day) 1 (Date) December (Month) 19[illegible]1.

ZONE DESCRIPTION [illegible] [illegible], Comdr., U. S. Navy, Commanding.

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UNITED STATES SHIP

REMARKS

Examined:


LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

N. Nav. 69 (Mar 1920)

Page 33

UNITED STATES SHIP [illegible] Tuesday (Day) 2 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION minus 12.

REMARKS

00-04 Steaming singly with ship darkened on course 059° true and gyro, 051° p.s.c., and 050° p.stg.c. Boilers #1,2,3,5, and 6 in use for steaming purposes. S/S 84 R.P.M., (12 knots). 0000 Advanced clocks one (1) hour to Zone Description minus twelve. Average steam, 195 lbs., average R.P.M., 84.

R. J. [illegible], Ensign, USNR.

04-08 Steaming as before. 0626 Lightened ship. Average steam, 195 lbs., average R.P.M., 84.

C. B. [illegible], Chief Boatswain, USN.

08-12 Steaming as before. Note: Made daily inspection of all magazines and S.P. samples; conditions normal. 0855 Held Quarters for Muster followed by physical drill; no absentees. 0930 Set Material Condition "X". 0935 Ship in Material Condition "X". 0935 Set Material Condition "Y". 0947 Ship in Material Condition "Y". 0948 Sounded General Quarters. Set Material Condition "Z". 0955 All General Quarters stations manned. 1000 Material Condition "Z" Set. 1009 Secured from General Quarters and continued with gunnery drills. 1015 Retreat from gunnery drills. 1040 Sighted two (2) PBY planes bearing 030° true, on a parallel opposite course, distance twelve (12) miles, height two thousand (2000) feet. Average steam, 195 lbs., average R.P.M., 84.

A. [illegible], Gunner, USN.

12-16 Steaming as before. 1427 c/c to 60° true and gyro, 051° p.stg.c and 050° p.s.c. 1300 Gunnery Drills. 1325 Secured from Gunnery Drills. 1400 The Captain held mast at this date and awarded the following punishment: [illegible], Roberson F., R.M.C., (344-09-09) USN; offense: Treating a superior officer with contempt. Disrespect; punishment, ten (10) days deprivation of liberty ashore upon arrival in the next liberty port. Average steam, 195 lbs., average R.P.M., 84.

J. S. [illegible], Gunner, USN.

16-16 Steaming as before. 1725 Darkened ship. Average steam, 195 lbs., average R.P.M., 84.

[illegible] S. [illegible], Lieut., USNR.

16-20 Steaming as before. Average steam, 195 lbs., average R.P.M., 84.

R. L. [illegible], Lieut., USNR.

20-24 Steaming as before. 2000 c/c to 061° true and gyro, 051° p.s.c., and p.stg.c. 038°. Average steam, 195 lbs., average R.P.M., 84.

E. C. [illegible], Lieut. (jg) USNR.

Approved: C. [illegible], Commander, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

Examined: [illegible], Lieut. Comdr., U.S.N., U.S.N. Navigator

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
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP
DRILLS AND EXERCISES
Morning
Afternoon
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Page

UNITED STATES SHIP [illegible] T. [illegible] December 19 [illegible]

ZONE DESCRIPTION Minus 12.

REMARKS

00-04 [illegible] Standard Speed [illegible].

[illegible]

04-08 Steaming as before. 0600 [illegible] Average [illegible], average [illegible], 94.

J. [illegible], Ensign, [illegible]

08-12 Steaming as before. [illegible] Muster [illegible]. 0920 Exercised at Gunnery Drills. [illegible] 1120 Crossed International Date Line [illegible] Latitude [illegible] North. Average Steam, [illegible] 11 [illegible] normal

[illegible], Ens, [illegible]

12-16 Steaming as before. 1600 [illegible], average [illegible]. Average Steam, 195 lbs., average [illegible].

C. [illegible], Chief [illegible]

16-18 Steaming as before. 1700 [illegible]. Average [illegible], average [illegible], 94.

A. [illegible], [illegible]

18-20 Steaming as before. [illegible] 0500 [illegible]. Changed [illegible]. Average Steam, 195 lbs., average [illegible].

J. [illegible]

20-24 Steaming as before. [illegible] Secured [illegible], 195 lbs., average [illegible], 90.

[illegible]

Approved: Examined:

C. [illegible] ZIMER,
Commander, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

[illegible], Navigator

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
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Page 3

ADDITIONAL SHEET.

U.S.S. [illegible] T. [illegible], 19[illegible]

Con't.

18-20 Honolulu before. 1300 Completed unloading cargo. 1945 Completed unloading ammunition.

C. B. [illegible], Chief Boatswain, USN.

20-24 Secured before. 0800 A. F. [illegible], employed at Commercial Pacific Cable Company, reported aboard for transportation to Honolulu, T.H.

A. E. [illegible], Master, USA.

Approved:

C. W. [illegible],
Commander, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Accepted:

[illegible] Field,
Lieut., Coast Art.,

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Page

UNITED STATES SHIP 19 41

REMARKS

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ADDITIONAL SHEET.



N. Nav. 43

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UNITED STATES SHIP [illegible] [illegible] 1 December, 19[illegible]

ZONE DESCRIPTION [illegible]

REMARKS

00-04 Moored starboard side to dock at Midway Island, [illegible] six (6) manila lines. #2 boiler in use for auxiliary purposes. Receiving [illegible] service from shore. [illegible] present, [illegible], C.C. [illegible]

J. C. Smith, Gunner, USN

04-08 Moored as before. 0500 Lighted fires under #3 boiler. 0530 Cut #3 boiler in on auxiliary line. 0600 Lighted fires under #4, 5, and 6 boilers. 0635 Lifted safety valves by hand on #4, 5, and 6 boilers with 150 lbs. pressure. 0700 The following named, contractors' personnel, reported aboard for passage to Pearl Harbor, T.H.: [illegible] 0700 Pursuant to Group [illegible] Order [illegible] 1941, [illegible] Aircraft [illegible], Fleet Marine Force, [illegible] of November [illegible], 1941, the following listed Marines were returned to Midway Island [illegible] for Special Temporary Duty: [illegible] 0705 Tested [illegible] system. 0710 Cut in [illegible] 4, 5, and 6 boilers on main and auxiliary lines. [illegible] Tested main engines.

[illegible], Lieut. USN

08-12 0807 Underway from N.A.S. Dock, Midway Island to Pearl Harbor, T.H. in accordance with Operation Order [illegible] various [illegible] Captain, Executive Officer, [illegible] Standard speed, [illegible] (15.5 knots), [illegible] turning [illegible] left ship. [illegible] departure from Midway Island, course 135° [illegible] gyro, [illegible] p.s.c., and 12[illegible]° p.s.c., s/c [illegible], (15.5 knots). [illegible] Sighted [illegible]

Approved: [illegible]
Commander, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
[illegible]
Lieut. Comdr., U.S.N. Navigator.
U.S. [illegible]

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

N. Nav. 45 (Mar., 1939)

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LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP ______ (Name) ______ (Identification Number)

AT / PASSAGE [illegible] TO ______ (Day) (Date) (Month) 19__

ZONE DESCRIPTION [illegible] ______ U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hour	"All Stop" Average Revolutions	By Revs. Nautical Miles	By Revs. Tenths	By Log Nautical Miles	By Log Tenths	Course (P. C.) Gyro / Mag. (Indicate which)	Wind Direction	Wind Force	Barometer Height in Inches
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A. M.									
1	[illegible]	12	5			135	SE	[illegible]	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	12	[illegible]			135	SE	[illegible]	[illegible]
3	[illegible]	12	6			103	[illegible]	11	[illegible]
4	[illegible]	12	[illegible]			102	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
5	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			108	[illegible]	12	30.12
6	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			108	[illegible]	12	30.12
7	[illegible]	12	[illegible]			108	S	[illegible]	30.10
8	[illegible]	13	5			108	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
9	[illegible]	12	6			[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
10	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			108	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
11	[illegible]	12	6			[illegible]	[illegible]	12	30.11
12	[illegible]	12	5			108	[illegible]	[illegible]	30.10
P. M.									
13	96	12	[illegible]			109	[illegible]	10	[illegible]
14	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			109	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
15	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			102	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
16	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			109	[illegible]	10	30.09
17	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
18	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			111	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
19	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			111	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
20	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
21	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			11	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
22	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			11	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
23	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
24	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			11	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Barometer: Reading at Ther. (10) — Temperature: Air, Dry Bulb (11); Air, Wet Bulb (12); Water at Surface (13) — Weather, by Symbols (14) — Clouds: Form (15); Moving From— (16); Amount (17) — Visibility (18) — Sea: Condition (19); Swells From— (20)

8 A. M. [illegible]
Latitude [illegible]
Longitude [illegible]

Noon
Latitude [illegible]
Longitude [illegible]

8 P. M. [illegible]
Latitude [illegible]
Longitude [illegible]

Current: Set ______ Drift ______

Gyrocompass in Use
Error 0

Standard Mag. Compass
Compass No. [illegible]
S. H. 135
Error [illegible]
Variation [illegible]
Deviation [illegible]

Fuel: Received ______ Expended ______ On hand ______

Water: Distilled ______ Received ______ Expended ______ On hand ______

Before Leaving Port
Draft for'd ______
Draft aft ______

After Entering Port
Draft for'd ______
Draft aft ______

Magazine Temperatures:
Maximum ______
Minimum ______

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Morning | Afternoon

Divisions
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

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UNITED STATES SHIP _____ 19__

ZONE DESCRIPTION

REMARKS

Approved:

Examined:

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Nav. 626

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LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP _____ (Name) _____ (Identification Number)

AT _____ TO _____ 7 Saturday 6 Dec. 1941.
PASSAGE (Day) (Date) (Month)

ZONE DESCRIPTION _____ _____, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

				WIND		BAROMETER		TEMPERATURE				CLOUDS				SEA	
				Direction	Force	Height in Inches	Reduced to 32° F.	Air, Dry Bulb	Air, Wet Bulb	Water at Surface	Weather, by Symbols	Form	Movement	Amount	Visibility	Condition	Height
				7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
						30.									85	2	
														4	85	1	
														3	85	1	
														4	85	1	
														1	80	1	
														2	80	1	
														4	80	1	
															80	1	
														3	80	1	
						.0								8	80	1	
														7	80	1	
														7	80	2	

Fuel
- Received
- Expended
- On hand

Water
- Distilled
- Received
- Expended
- On hand

Before Leaving Port
- Draft for'd
- Draft aft

After Entering Port
- Draft for'd
- Draft aft

Gyro Compass in Use

Standard Mag. Compass

Magazine Temperatures:
- Maximum
- Minimum

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

															65		
															65		
															75		
															80		
															85		
															85		
															85		
															85		
															85		
															85		
															85		

Submerged Run Data—Submarines

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Log No. (Serial)						
Time to set mercury						
Greatest depth						

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Page

UNITED STATES SHIP WRIGHT. Saturday (Day) 6 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 11.

REMARKS

0 to 4 Steaming singly with ship darkened, under [redacted] are #1,2,3,4, and 5, s/s 88 R.P.M., (12.5 knots), on course 111° true and gyro. 101° p.s.c., and 100° p.stg.c. 0000 Set ship's clocks ahead one (1) hour to Zone Description Plus (+) Eleven. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R.P.M., 87.

J. W. FICKETT, Ensign, USNR.

0 to 8 Steaming as before. 0300 Lighted ship. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R.P.M., 87.4.

R. J. [illegible], Ensign, USNR.

0 to 12 Steaming as before. 0800 c/c to 102° true and gyro, 093° p.s.c., and 093° p.stg.c. 0815 Held quarters for muster and Captain's inspection; no absentees. Made daily inspection of all engineering and S.P. samples; conditions normal. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R.P.M., 87.1.

C. B. [illegible], Chief Boatswain, USN.

12 to 16 Steaming as before. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R.P.M., 86.25.

A. M. [illegible], Gunner, USN.

16 to 18 Steaming as before. 1721 Darkened ship. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R.P.M., 86.7.

[illegible], Gunner, USN.

18 to 20 Steaming as before. 1915 Lighted fires under #3 boiler. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R.P.M., 86.5.

[illegible], Lieut., USNR.

20 to 24 Steaming as before. 2000 c/c to 109° true and gyro, 099°30' p.s.c., and 099°30' p.stg.c. 2055 Lifted safety valve by hand on #3 boiler at 100 lbs. pressure. 2120 Cut in #3 boiler in on main and auxiliary lines. 2155 Secured #1 boiler. 2345 Sighted vessel bearing one point abaft port beam running without lights on course as nearly as 300°, true, distance four (4) miles. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R.P.M., 86.1.

R. L. [illegible], Lieut., USNR.

Approved: C. W. NIMITZ, Commander, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

Examined: LEONARD FRISCO, Lieut. Comdr., U.S.N., Navigator, U.S.S. [illegible]

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)


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LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

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UNITED STATES SHIP . 19

ZONE DESCRIPTION

REMARKS

Leonard Fuisz

Approved

Examined

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(The remaining portion of Exhibit 125 is a map reflecting the Disposition of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, 7 Dec. 1941 and particularly the location of the USS *Wright* on 27 November and 7 December, 1941. This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 33 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to proceedings of the Joint Committee.)

EXHIBIT NO. 126

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., February 3, 1941.

General Order No. 143

ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

1. General Orders Nos. 68 and 102 are hereby canceled.
2. Effective February 1, 1941, the Naval Forces of the United States are by this order organized into:

The United States Fleet, comprising:
(a) The United States Atlantic Fleet,
(b) The United States Pacific Fleet,
(c) The United States Asiatic Fleet;
The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces,
Special Task Forces,
Special Duty Ships,
The Naval Transportation Service,
Naval District Craft.

The assignment and administrative organization of units pertaining to the foregoing will be as prescribed by the Chief of Naval Operations either in special orders or in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy," and the "Assignment of Units to Naval Districts and Naval Stations."

3. The United States Atlantic Fleet, the United States Pacific Fleet, and the United States Asiatic Fleet are administrative and task organizations, and normally operate under the instructions or orders of the Navy Department. Each is under the command of a flag officer having the title "Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic (or Pacific, or Asiatic) Fleet." The geographical limits of command of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, shall include the Western Pacific and the Indian Oceans and tributary waters. The eastern limit shall be the 180th meridian south of latitude 50° north and the 160th meridian east of Greenwich, north of latitude 50° north. The western limit shall be Asia, Africa, and, south of Africa, the 20th meridian east of Greenwich.

4. The United States Atlantic Fleet, the United States Pacific Fleet, and the United States Asiatic Fleet together comprise the Untied States Fleet, whose commander-in-chief is appointed from among the commanders-in-chief of the component fleets. The United States Fleet is an administrative organization for training purposes only, and is a task organization only when two or more fleets are concentrated, or are operating in conjunction with each other.

5. Under the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet will, through Type Commanders, prescribe standards and methods of training for all of the seagoing forces and aircraft of the Navy. Type Commanders will be designated in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy", and customarily, so far as possible, the type commander will be in the same fleet as the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

[2] 6. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, is senior to the other Commanders-in-Chief. When two or more fleets are concentrated, or are operating in conjunction with each other, the senior Commander-in-Chief is responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations for joint operations.

7. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, when formed, are administrative and task organizations, and operate under the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders. Where Naval Coastal Frontiers have more than one Naval District in them, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are subdivided into "Naval Coastal Forces" and "Naval Local Defense Forces", operating under the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders and the Naval District Commandants, respectively. Where Naval Coastal Fron-

tiers include but one Naval District, the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces consist only of Naval Local Defense Forces. Commandants of Naval Districts and Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers have administrative responsibility direct to the Navy Department for Naval Local Defense Forces and Naval Coastal Forces, respectively. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers have task responsibility to the Chief of Naval Operations for Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

8. Special Task Forces may be formed from time to time under the Chief of Naval Operations for the accomplishment of particular tasks.

9. Special Duty Ships are those assigned to outlying naval stations, to survey duty, and to such other special details as may be designated. They operate under orders of the commandants of the stations to which they are assigned or under the Chief of Naval Operations, depending on the type of duty they are performing.

10. The Naval Transportation Service is composed of such units as may be assigned to it by the Chief of Naval Operations. This service operates directly under the Chief of Naval Operations.

11. Naval District Craft are under the command of the commandant of the naval district or station to which assigned. They consist of such naval craft and floating equipment of the district as are not in the "Naval Local Defense Force."

FRANK KNOX,
Secretary of the Navy.

NAVY REGULATIONS SETTING FORTH THE GENERAL DUTIES OF A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

"(1) The commander in chief shall take all practicable steps to keep the ships of his command ready for battle. (Navy Regs. Article 687.)

"(2) He is responsible for the indoctrination, drill, training, and efficient administration and operation of the fleet and the coordination of its varous units in strategic and tactical employment.

"(3) He shall make recommendations to the Navy Department as to the composition and organization of the fleet and as to all matters pertaining to its military efficiency and control. He shall submit schedules of employment and cruising itineraries to the department in accordance with its instructions."

"The commander in chief shall carry out all drills and exercises in accordance with the customs of the service, the instructions of the department, and the drill books and other publications of a similar nature. This shall be done in such manner as will most conduce to maintaining the fleet in constant readiness for war in all its phases." (Navy Regs. Article 692.)

"(3) He shall also be governed by the following rules:

"(a) He has the sole right to correspond directly with the Navy Department concerning any official matter connected with the fleet.

"(b) He shall keep the Secretary of the Navy fully informed of the movements of the fleet. These general reports shall not be considered as taking the place of separate letters on separate subjects." (Navy Regs. Art. 699.)

"The use of force against a foreign and friendly state or against anyone within the territories thereof is illegal.

"The right to self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and forebearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation as above defined." (Navy Regs. Article 723.)

"The Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet is vested with authority to exercise control of the operations of fleet aircraft units from naval air stations, to allocate among units of the fleet the services, facilities, equipment, and spaces made available to the fleet, and to establish priorities with respect to repair and overhaul of aircraft of the fleet." (Navy Regs. Article 1554.)

RESTRICTED

STAFF INSTRUCTIONS—STAFF OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET—1941

A2-12(05)
Serial 1525

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *July 14, 1941.*

The following Staff Instructions are published for the guidance of all persons attached to or serving with the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, and also the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, while both commands are administered jointly.

The 1938 edition of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff Instructions are hereby superseded and all copies should be destroyed.

W. W. SMITH,
Captain U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff.

Approved:
H. E. KIMMEL,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET STAFF INSTRUCTIONS, 1941

STAFF INSTRUCTIONS 1941—DISTRIBUTION LIST

Command	*No. Copies*
Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet	40
Opnav	10
Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet	5
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Commander Battle Force, Pacific Fleet	5
Commander Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet	5
Commander Base Force, Pacific Fleet (including Subordinate Command) (3 each)	6
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Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet	2
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet	2
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet	2
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Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet	2
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Commander Mine Squadron THREE	1
Commander Transports, Base Force, Pacific Fleet	2
Commanding General, Second Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force	5
Commandants 11th, 12th & 14th Naval Districts (each 2)	2
Fleet Flagship	5
Fleet Personnel Officer	1
Total	107
Spares	40
Grand total	147

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[1]

STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

SECTION 1—COMPOSITION, ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL COGNIZANCE OF DUTY

111. The composition of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet is as indicated in the following paragraphs.

112. The Commander-in-Chief is available to the entire Staff for consultation, but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of Staff whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay.

113. The below tables indicate in general the assignment of duties to the members of the Staff. Primary functions are indicated at the top of each column; the officer whose number appears first after each of the subheads under (a), (b), (c), or (d) is the leader in the duty specified:

Commander-in-Chief—00

Chief of Staff—01.
Assistant Chief of Staff—02.
Personal Aides—01, 05, 15.
Staff Duty Officer—14.
(a) *Operations*
11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 90, 95.
Estimates, Plans, Orders, Instructions. 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 90, 95.
Communications. 20, 05, 15, 18, 21, 22, 30.
Schedules, Training, Exercises, Reports of Exercises. 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 50, 90, 95.
Tactics. 11, 12, 13, 15.
Anchorages, Anchoring, Getting Underway, Operating Areas. 11, 12, 13, 15.
Joint Army and Navy Operations. 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 86.
Ship and Airplane Movements, 11, 12, 13, 95, 15, 20, 50, 90.
Navigation. 12.
Logistics. 50, 12, 90, 95.
Intelligence. 11, 25.
[2] Censorship. 25, 05.
Aerological. 96, 95.
Navy Relief Force. 11, 12, 13, 86.
Security. 21.
Propoganda. 05, 25, 26.
Damage Control. 50, 11, 90, 75.
Chemical Warfare and Mines. 90.
Base Hospital. 11, 75.
(b) *Administration*
01, 05, 20, 21, 25, 75, 90, 95, 96.
Correspondence Files, Records, Legal Matters, Flag Allotment and Office, Print Shop, Flag Personnel. 05.
Communications. 20, 05, 15, 18, 21, 22, 30.
Secret and Confidential Registered Publications. 20, 21, 33.
Guard Duty, Uniforms, Calls, Celebrations, Ceremonies, Band, Boats, Official Cars. 15.
Characteristic Cards. 50, 18, 90, 95.
Athletics and Recreation. 15, 96.
Requisitions, Surveys, Ship's Service. 50.
Landing Force and Parades. 86, 15, 90.
Annual Report. 05.
(Assisted by each member of the Staff.)
Intelligence. 25, 26, 20, 05.
Censorship. 25, 26, 05, 20.
Navy Relief Force. 11, 12, 13, 86.
Aerological and Personnel. 96.
Security. 21.
Medical (Sanitation, etc.) and Religious Activities. 75.
Public Relations. 27, 25, 26, 05.
Damage Control. 50, 90, 75.
Base Hospitals. 75.
Customs and Agricultural Inspection Liaison. 75, 96.
(c) *War Plans*
16, 17, 18, 19, 86.
Estimates, Plans Orders. 16, 17, 18, 19.
Marine Corps matters. 86.
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Radio and Sound (Signal Equipment). 18, 20, 50, 22, 15.
Navy Relief Force. 11, 12, 13, 86.
(d) *Maintenance*
50, 90, 95.
Overhauls, Docking. 50.
Repairs, Altherations. 50, 90, 95.
Technical Services. 50, 18, 20, 90, 95.
Bureau of Ships Activities. 50.
Navigation. 50, 12.
Bureau of Ordnance. 90, 95.
Aviation. 95
Aerological. 96.
Mines, Chemical Equipment. 90.
Base Hospitals. 75.

NOTE: Detailed assignments of duties are contained in section II.

Cognizance and Duty

114. The following numbers are employed to identify the duties of the officers attached to the Staff:

01—Chief of Staff.
02—Assistant Chief of Staff.
05—Flag Secretary.
11—Operations Officer.
12—1st. Assistant Operations Officer.
13—2nd. Assistant Operations Officer.
14—Staff Duty Officer.
15—Flag Lieutenant.
16—War Plans Officer.
17—1st. Assistant War Plans Officer.
18—2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.
19—3rd. Assistant War Plans Officer.
20—Communications Officer.
21—Communications Security Officer.
22—Radio Officer.
23—Assistant Communication Officer.
24—Assistant Communication Officer.
25—Intelligence Officer.
26—Assistant Intelligence Officer.
27—Public Relations.
30—Assistant Communication Officer.
31 to 48—Communication Duty and Coding Officers.
50—Maintenance Officer.
75—Medical Officer.
86—Marine Officer, (Assistant War Plans Officer).
90—Gunnery Officer.
95—Aviation Officer.
96—Aerological and Personnel Officer.

[3] 115. The following table shows the reliefs for members of the Staff who may be absent for any reason:

Primary Duty	*Relief*	*Remarks*
01—Chief of Staff.	02—Assistant Chief of Staff.	(02 is same as 11.)
05—Flag Secretary.	25—Intelligence Officer.	
11—Operations Officer.	16—War Plans Officer.	
12—1st. Assistant Operations Officer.	13—2nd Assistant Operations Officer.	
13—2nd Assistant Operations Officer.	12—1st. Assistant Operations Officer.	
15—Flag Lieutenant and Athletic Officer.	26—Assistant Intelligence Officer.	16—Relieves if available, otherwise 12 relieves 11.
16—War Plans Officer.	17—1st. Assistant War Plans Officer.	
17—1st. Assistant War Plans Officer.	18—2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	
18—2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	19—3rd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	
19—3rd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	18—2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	
20—Communication Officer.	22—Radio Officer.	20—Relieves for visual communications.
21—Communication Security Officer.	30—Assistant Communication Officer.	
22—Radio Officer.	20—Communication Officer.	
23—Assistant Communication Officer.	24—Assistant Communication Officer.	
24—Assistant Communication Officer.	23—Assistant Communication Officer.	
25—Intelligence Officer.	26—Assistant Intelligence Officer.	
26—Assistant Intelligence Officer.	25—Intelligence Officer.	
27—Public Relations Officer.	05—Flag Secretary.	
30—Assistant Communication Officer.	31—Assistant Communication Officer.	Senior CWO.
31 to 43, inclusive—Communication Watch Officers and Coding Board.		
50—Maintenance Officer.	13—Assistant Operations Officer.	
75—Medical Officer.	05—Flag Secretary.	
86—Marine Officer.	05—Flag Secretary; (and Gunnery Officer for Landing Force etc.)	War Plans Section by 16, 17, 18, 19.
90—Gunnery Officer.	95—Aviation Officer.	Assisted by 12.
95—Aviation Officer.	90—Gunnery Officer.	Assisted by 96.
96—Aerological and Personnel Officer.	35—Aviation Officer.	Assisted by 05 for personnel.

SECTION II—INDIVIDUAL COGNIZANCE OF DUTIES

200. *CHIEF OF STAFF—01—Personal Aide.*
(See Navy Regulations Articles 785–786.)
(a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.
(b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members of the Staff.
(c) Advises the Commander-in-Chief on all matters concerning the war readiness and battle efficiency of the Fleet.
(d) Supervises the preparation of campaign orders and plans, as well as strategical and tactical problems of the Fleet.
(e) Signs correspondence as follows:
(1) Routine Matters.
[4] (2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on same, to material Bureaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which a policy has been established.
(3) Orders to and requests from officers not in Command.
(4) Matters concerning which the policy is of long standing.
(5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance, information, or guidance.
(6) The Commander-in-Chief personally will sign correspondence regarding questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or disapproval of previous recommendations; action on legal papers.
201. *ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF—02*—See Operations Officer (11).
202. *FLAG SECRETARY—05—Personal Aide.*
(a) Responsible for the receipt, dispatch, recording, routing, and filing of all official written correspondence. He shall be assisted by an officer (Assistant Communication Officer) designated to handle the SECRET mail.
(b) Authenticates and checks the distribution of operation plans, orders, movement orders and multiple address correspondence requiring authentication.
(c) In charge of the Flag Office organization and personnel connected therewith.
(d) Ascertains that outgoing correspondence is in agreement with current instructions and properly distributed.
(e) Brings to the attention of the officers concerned all conflicting, inconsistent or overdue communications.
(f) Responsible for the general dissemination of administrative information.
(g) Supervises the handling of U. S. and Guard Mail within the Fleet.
(h) Printing.
(i) Legal and disciplinary matters.
(j) Signs correspondence "by direction" for:
(1) Papers forwarded or returned without comment.
(2) Correspondence consisting of information or appropriate minor action only.
(3) Receipts and tracers.
(4) Transmission of registered mail, or publications.
(5) Transfers and orders for enlisted personnel.
(k) Controls Flag Office Allotment.
(l) War Diary.
203. *Operations officer—11*—(Assistant Chief of Staff 02).
(a) Assists the Chief of Staff as required, signing correspondence in his absence as "Assistant Chief of Staff".
(b) As head of Operations Section coordinates operations and employment activities.
(c) Develops Fleet tactics and doctrine, and originates recommendations for revision of same.
(d) Prepares problems and exercises.
(e) Assignments of vessels to special duties.
[5] (f) Prepares estimates of the situation, campaign orders, operations orders, and plans and movement orders.
(g) Assisted by other members of Staff reviews and analyzes Fleet exercises.
(h) Acts as head of the Schedule Board for preparing the Fleet operation plans.
(i) Navy Relief Force.
(j) Fleet anchorages, bases, and operating areas.

204. *First assistant operations officer—12.*

(a) Acts as Fleet Navigator with corresponding cognizance of navigational equipment, charts, etc.

(b) Assists in all the duties under the cognizance of the Operations Officer.

(c) Coordinates the duties of Operations Officer with those of the War Plans Section.

(d) Acts as member of the Schedule Board.

(e) Commander-in-Chief's Night Order Book.

205. *Second assistant operations officer—13.*

(a) Assists the Operations Officer in all the duties of that office.

(b) Responsible for maintaining location plot and movement report system for vessels of the Fleet.

(c) Edits Quarterly Fleet Organization information.

205A. *Staff duty officer—14.*

(See paragraph 226).

206. *Flag Lieutenant—15—Personal Aide.*

(a) Acts as Fleet Signal Officer; supervises the dissemination of tactical signals, under the Fleet Communication Officer; is responsible for the efficiency of Fleet signalling operations and material.

(b) Fleet Athletic Officer; liaison officer with Fleet Recreation and Morale Officer based ashore.

(c) Boarding officer.

(d) Has cognizance of:

(1) Matters relating to ceremonies, salutes, honors, and official calls.

(2) Entertainments.

(3) Club privileges, invitations, etc.

(4) Uniform.

(5) Boats, boat crews, and official cars.

(6) Military and Medical Guard Duties.

(7) Band or orchestra.

(e) When on board during working hours, attends the side.

(f) Maintains flag combat bill.

(g) Acts on requests for bands, parades, visits to ships, etc.

(h) In charge of Admiral's mess attendants.

207. *War Plans Officer—16.*

(a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of Staff, for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters pertaining thereto.

(b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto.

(c) Member of Schedule Board.

(d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Commanders.

[6] (e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters,—via District Commandant if appropriate.

(f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships—general features—and on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics.

(g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material, particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and their distribution.

(h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans matters.

(i) Is responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate commanders and of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as these Plans may affect the Fleet.

208. *Assistant War Plans—17.*

(a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:

(1) Fleet estimates and plans.

(2) Collaboration with Naval Coastal Frontiers and Commandants of Naval Districts.

(3) Liaison with Army on War Plans matters.

(4) Duties of 18 when that assignment is vacant.

209 *Assistant War Plans—18.*

(a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:

(1) Review of subordinate plans, including those of Naval Coastal Frontiers and Naval Districts.

(2) Prosecution of current War Plans tasks and projects.

(3) Action on administrative matters and correspondence in which War Plans has an interest.

(4) Logistic studies and data.

210. *Assistant War Plans—19.*

(a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:

(1) Office administration and correspondence.

(2) Compilation and assembly of data.

(3) Specific custody of War Plans publications and files.

Fleet Marine Officer—86. (See paragraph 222.)

211. *Fleet Communication Officer—20.*

(a) Responsible for the efficiency of Fleet communications.

(b) Supervises training in Fleet communications.

(c) Assists Operations Officers and War Plans Officers with strategic operations and with war plans.

(d) Prepares Fleet communication plans.

(e) Directs activities of flag radio and sound schools and assignments of communication personnel.

(f) Collaborates with "96" concerning radio and sound schools and assignments of communication personnel.

(g) Supervises activities ashore of communications stations when manned by Fleet personnel.

(h) Supervises the assignment and utilization of Fleet radio frequencies.

(i) Coordinates with "50" on matters of communication material.

[7] (j) Responsible for registered publications.

(k) Supervises communication watch officers.

(l) Crytographic and radio security, with "21".

212. *Communication Security Officer—21.*

(a) Assist Fleet Communication Officer.

(b) Is responsible for security of Fleet Communications and directly those of Fleet flagship:

(1) Inspection of radio traffic handled by Fleet flagship.

(2) Inspection of communication plans and orders of subordinate commanders.

(3) Supervision and control of monitor watch.

(4) Preparation of Fleet Letters and orders on communication security.

(5) Recommendations for improvement of crytographic aids.

(6) Recommendations for distribution and allowances of crytographic aids.

(7) By personal contact and instruction improve security of communications.

(c) Is in immediate charge of Radio Intelligence Unit.

(d) Is in charge of Commander-in-Chief's registered publications library. Signs all routine transfer and destruction reports and inventories "By direction".

(e) Is responsible for production and security of U. S. F. publications and other classified publications and printed matter issued by the Commander-in-Chief.

(f) Advises concerning and ensures security of handling of secret and confidential correspondence.

(g) Is responsible for the organization and training of the Fleet Coding Board.

213. *Fleet Radio Officer—22.*

(a) Assists Fleet Communication Officer.

(b) Assists "50" in regard to technical aspects of Degaussing.

(c) Recommends assignment of Radio frequencies to 20.

(d) Supervises radio, sound and landwire communications and material installations of the Fleet.

(e) Initiation and conduct of radio training operations in the Fleet.

(f) Instruction and training of radio and sound personnel.

(g) Liaison with commercial radio and cable companies.

(h) Material inspection reports of radio and sound installations in the Fleet.

(i) Recognition and identification installations in the Fleet.

214. *Intelligence Officer—25.*

(a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, disseminating to various members of staff, indicating where action is required.

(b) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential for current estimates (monograph material).

(c) Maintains Section II (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces). Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.

(d) Directs counter espionage and counter information.

(e) Maintains Intelligence Records (See Naval Intelligence Manual).

(f) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins.

[8] (g) Evaluates Intelligence Information received of procedures or practices of other navies and prepares definite recommendation as to any action to be taken within own Fleet.

(h) In charge of censorship.

(i) Internal Security of ships.

(j) Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.

215. *Assistant Intelligence Officer—26.*

In addition to assisting "25" in all duties of the Intelligence section, performs the following additional assignments:

(a) Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis.

(b) Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination to Fleet.

(c) Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Enemy information.

(d) Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces) and location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.

216. *Public Relations Officer—27.*

(a) Liaison officer with the Press.

(b) Releases all Fleet publicity requiring the Commander-in-Chief's review.

(c) Maintains file of clippings from current periodicals.

(d) Maintains photographic file.

(e) Maintains biographical file of flag and commanding officers.

(f) Cognizance of Staff library.

(g) Motion Picture Officer.

(h) Assists in recruiting activities in collaboration with the Bureau of Navigation.

(i) In charge of Staff photographer.

(j) Assists 15 (Flag Lieutenant) in connection with press release for visitors, visits, social activities, athletics; and other recreational subjects.

(k) Publicity liaison with other U. S. government activities.

(l) Propaganda in time of war.

(m) When directed assists "25", and "26" with censorship and collaborates in intelligence matters as necessary.

(n) Reviews ship's papers in the fleet.

(o) Reviews congressional records, bills, etc.

217. *Assistant Communication officer—30.*

(a) In addition to the following, assists the Fleet Communication Officer as directed.

(b) Is in charge of internal distribution and conduct of Flag rapid communications within the Flagship.

(c) Is in charge of the Flag Communications Office, including personnel, routine operations, files, forms, and publications.

(d) Coordinates the duties of the Communication Watch Officers and Coding Watch Officers.

[9] (e) Under Flag Secretary, has duty as officer responsible for receipt, routing, custody, and dispatch of secret mail.

(f) Responsible for cleanliness and upkeep of the Flag Communication Office and communication spaces.

218. *Communication Watch Officers—31, 32, 33, 34.*

(a) Communication Watch Officers stand communication desk watches, being governed in the performance of these duties by the provisions of the Communication Instructions and such orders and instructions as may be issued by the Fleet Communication Officer, Fleet Radio Officer, or Assistant Communication Officer.

(b) A Communication Watch Officer is the Flag Division Officer. He is assisted in this assignment by the communication watch officers who are designated as Junior Division Officers for the Flag Division.

(c) Communication Watch Officers must become proficient in the use of codes and ciphers and be familiar with Fleet Operations, routine, and staff procedure. In addition to performing routine code and cipher duties they may be assigned coding board duties at a battle station.

(d) One Communication Watch Officer is detailed as custodian of non-registered communication publications which he shall keep corrected.

(e) One Communication Watch Officer is detailed as custodian of the Registered Publications which he shall keep corrected.

219. *Coding Board Officers—35, 36, 37, 38, (39, 40).*

(a) Coding Board Officers stand Coding Board watches, being governed in the performance of these duties by the instructions issued by the Assistant Communication Officer.

(b) They shall familiarize themselves with all cryptographic systems in use and become proficient in their proper use.

(c) They shall assist the Fleet Security Officer in matters of Fleet Cryptographic Security.

(d) They shall familiarize themselves with the duties of Communication Watch Officers to the end that they may stand Communication Watch Officer watches when required.

(e) All Coding Board Officers shall assist Fleet Security Officer in the correction, custody, preparation, and care of registered and classified matter.

(f) The Coding Board of the Fleet Flagship is required to perform Flag Coding Board functions, as directed.

220. *Fleet Engineer And Maintenance Officer—50.*

(a) Docking and overhaul schedules.

(b) Engineering performances.

(c) Repairs, preservation and alterations of ships of the Fleet.

(d) Fleet repair and docking facilities.

(e) Tests and upkeep of material.

(f) Design, construction, and operation of machinery and governing instructions.

(g) Orders for and reports of military and material inspections.

(h) Damage Control.

(i) Allowance lists (Bureau of Ships), requisitions and surveys.

[*10*] (j) Ship's Service store activities.

(k) Training of engineering personnel.

(l) Member of Schedule Board.

(m) Fuel and provisioning schedules.

(n) Ship's characteristics cards and logistics.

(o) Supply Department matters.

(p) Assists War Plans Officer in preparation of War Plans.

(q) Makes recommendations on design of new ships (Bureau of Ships cognizance).

(r) Degaussing.

221. *Fleet Medical Officer—75.*

(a) Keeps himself informed by inspections, and advises Commander-in-Chief of the sanitary conditions of ships of the Fleet.

(b) Prepares a periodic Fleet Medical News Letter.

(c) Acts as liaison officer with civilian medical activities.

(d) Interests himself in making such provisions for medical services at bases as may not be otherwise provided for.

(e) Customs and agricultural inspections.

(f) Shall obtain for, or advise Units of the Fleet in the obtaining of Bills of Health and the securing of pratique in accordance with local and foreign health regulations.

(g) Holds periodic conferences with medical officers of the Fleet for the purpose of standardizing practices not specially provided for by regulations and for other purposes in the interest of increased efficiency of the medical department.

(h) Has cognizance of religious activities.

(i) Has cognizance of and advises upon Damage Control Activities within the purview of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

222. *Fleet Marine Officer—86.*

(a) General cognizance of matters concerning Marine Corps and Fleet Marine Force.

(b) Data on organization, strength, equipment, etc., of Marine Divisions, Defense Battalions, and Detachments.

(c) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with the following:

(1) Plans for amphibious operations.

(2) Seizure, establishment, and defense of advance bases.

(3) Demolition and related operations.

(4) Logistic data (Marines and Army.)

(5) Review of Marine Corps subordinate plans.

223. *Fleet Gunnery Officer—90.*

(a) Supervises gunnery, training, gunnery exercises, and the care and upkeep of the armament of the Fleet.

(b) Keeps informed of the efficiency in gunnery and the condition of the armament of the Fleet.

(c) Advises in regard to tactical maneuvers for obtaining advantageous range bands, greatest fire effect, and dispositions for the best use of the armament.

[11] (d) Prepares outlines of schedules of gunnery exercises for the Fleet and advises concerning detailed schedules prepared by Force Commanders.

(e) Supervises small arms training and exercises of the Fleet.

(f) Consults with Aviation Officer in connection with aircraft and antiaircraft gunnery.

(g) In charge of the following matters, consulting with Operations Officer regarding tactical aspects:

(1) Mining and sweeping exercises and material.

(2) Torpedoes and torpedo practices.

(3) Smoke screens, both offensive and defensive.

(4) Chemical warfare service—Material and training of personnel. (In collaboration with Fleet Maintenance Officer).

(h) Supervises courses of study in Ordnance and Gunnery technical schools of the Fleet.

(i) Assists War Plans Officer in preparation of War Plans and in matters of liaison with Army.

(j) Reviews military and material inspection reports.

(k) Consults with Fleet Maintenance Officer on Damage Control.

(l) Exercises particular supervision over recommendations for changes to "Orders for Gunnery Exercises," "Gunnery Instructions" and other ordnance, gunnery and fire control publications.

(m) Makes recommendations on designs of news ships (Bureau of Ordnance cognizance).

(n) Member of Schedule Board.

(o) Advises on gunnery features of tactical plans and publications.

(p) With 86 has cognizance of matters involving landing forces.

(q) Handles matters affecting training, assignments, rating, and qualifications of gunnery personnel (consults with 96).

224. *Fleet Aviation Officer—95.*

(a) Advises with reference to:

(1) All aircraft operations and aviation matters including those pertaining to policy with respect to:

(A) Material.

(B) Personnel.

(C) Gunnery and Bombing.

(D) Radio.

(2) Aircraft Operations, and aviation shore facilities.

(3) Coordination of aviation activities of the Fleet.

(4) Employment of aircraft in tactical exercises, analysis and reports thereon.

(5) The development of aircraft tactics, gunnery and doctrine.

(6) Naval air operating policy.

(b) Assists War Plans Officer in the preparation of War Plans.

(c) Keeps informed as to the effectiveness of aircraft units of the Fleet.

(d) Assists Operation Officer in the preparation of Fleet Schedules dealing with aircraft and aircraft services.

(e) Consults with Gunnery Officer in connection with aircraft and anti-aircraft gunnery. Handles Aircraft Gunnery Reports.

(f) Member of Schedule Board.

(g) Has cognizance of, keeps informed of aircraft material matters.

[12] 225. *Fleet Aerological and Personnel Officer—96.*

(a) In charge of the aerological office and keeps the Commander-in-Chief and members of his staff advised of weather conditions as concerns the planning and executions of Fleet Operations. Assists War Plans Officer.

(b) Advises with reference to the establishment of new aerological units in matters concerning:

(1) Equipment.

(2) Personnel.

(3) Weather information required.

(c) Coordinates aerological activities in the Fleet, including:

(1) Collection and dissemination of weather reports.

(2) Weather forecasts and advisory storm warnings.

(3) Aerological research.

(d) Exercises supervision over the training and instruction of aerological personnel.

(e) Prepares such weather summaries as are required in connection with orders for for Fleet Problems and Tactics.

(f) Consults with Gunnery Officer in connection with atmospheric ballistic information pertaining to gunnery.

(g) Advises with reference to exchange of weather information between the Fleet and the U. S. Weather Bureau or other activities maintaining meteorological facilities.

(h) In charge of all matters relating to:

(1) Orders for officers and enlisted personnel.

(2) Naval Reserve Officers on active duty.

(3) Transportation in ships of the Fleet.

(4) Congressional mail regarding personnel matters.

(5) Action on leave requests for all officers and preparation of endorsements for signature of Admiral, Chief of Staff and Flag Secretary, depending upon the rank of officer requesting leave.

(6) Examinations and promotions.

(7) Navy Relief and Red Cross.

(i) In charge of entertainment and welfare of enlisted personnel.

(j) Shore Patrol.

(k) Liberty for the Fleet.

226. *Staff Duty Officer—14.*

(a) Such Officers as may be designated by the Chief of Staff shall stand a day's duty in port and a watch on the Flag Bridge at sea when a watch is established.

(b) The officer having the day's duty shall:

(1) Receive routine reports.

(2) Act on routine matters.

(3) Act as necessary on matters when the officer having cognizance and his relief are absent, informing officers concerned of action taken as soon as possible.

(4) Attend the side when the Flag Lieutenant is not available. The procedure for tending the side is laid down in Section X of these Staff instructions.

(5) Regulate movements of Admiral's Barge, Chief of Staff's Gig, and Staff boats in absence of Flag Lieutenant or outside of working hours. The Officer-of-the-Deck will keep the Staff Duty Officer and Flag Lieutenant informed of the movements of the Admiral's Barge, Chief of Staff's Gig, and Staff Duty boats.

[13] (6) Keep informed as to Staff Officers on board or absent from the ship.

(7) In the absence of the Flag Lieutenant see that boarding calls on visiting men of war are made by an officer from Fleet flagship.

(8) Receive aerological forecasts from the Aerologist and when bad weather is forecast transmit the necessary information to the ships present.

(9) Initial all dispatches, taking action if necessary when action officer is not on board.

(10) See that the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff are kept informed of all important matters, and particularly that they are informed proptly upon their return to the ship of all important matters that occur during their absence; and similarly keep the Operations Officer informed of all ship movements observed by the signal watch.

(11) Examine all mail received during the absence of the Flag Secretary or his regularly designated relief, and decide what action if any shall be taken.

(c) Day's duty will begin at 0900, except Sundays and holidays when it will begin at 1100. The sequence will be uninterrupted by the fact that the ship may be at sea when regular watches are set.

(d) The duties of the Staff Duty Officer assume particular importance when, in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, or other members of the staff, he is called upon to make decisions in cases of emergency, or on matters which cannot be delayed for reference to higher authority or to the officers having cognizance. This fact makes it imperative that all officers standing duty keep themselves informed as to existing situations, the policies of the Commander-in-Chief and the usual and proper manner of taking action on all matters which may arise.

(e) In important emergency cases the Staff Duty Officer will take such action as may be necessary. Instructions should be obtained by the most expeditious manner of communication with the Chief of Staff and, failing to locate him, with the Commander-in-Chief. The Operations Officer should, if practicable, be fully informed of the situation.

(f) When civilians or officials, other than personal friends of the Commander-in-Chief or officials whose status is a matter of doubt, come on board the flagship to confer with the Commander-in-Chief, he shall first present them to the Chief of Staff, Flag Lieutenant, or in their absence, to the Operations Officer.

(g) Should an emergency arise necessitating action involving the Fleet Relief Force, the Staff Duty Officer will carry out the following:

(1) Notify the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff and Operations Officer.

(2) Send staff boats to landing, keeping one at ship as may be advisable.

(3) Land field radio and signalmen if BASRAD is out of commission.

(h) Assignment of Berths.

Requests for berths are received occasionally by the Staff Duty Officer for immediate action during the absence of the Operations Officers. To assist the Staff Duty Officer in assigning berths, an anchorage chart is kept in the Operations Office, together with a copy of current instructions. See also the Commander-in-Chief's current letter in regard to anchorage assignments.

(i) In the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, or Chief of Staff, he shall take steps to correct any defects in external Fleet routine which would constitute an adverse reflection on the Fleet.

(j) Leave—Relief for Day's Duty.

(1) The Day's Duty list for Staff Duty Officers is prepared on the basis that the sequence will not be interrupted by the fact that the ship may be at sea. Nor is it to be interrupted by absence on duty, illness or leave.

(2) Staff Duty Officers are "Relief Officers" in inverse order of seniority. A Relief Duty List is posted in the Staff Duty Book. When an officer stands a relief duty watch, he will inform the senior watch officer. The next officer on the list then becomes the "Relief Duty Officer."

(3) For extended periods of leave, greater than 10 days the Relief Duty Officer will take the duty for the officer scheduled for the Day's Duty. For shorter periods of leave, officers are expected to arrange for their own reliefs by agreeable shifts with other Staff Duty Officers. In every case, inform the Senior Staff Duty Officer of the arrangements made.

Sea Watches

(k) An officer of the Staff shall be on the bridge at all times when the Fleet flagship is underway in company with vessels of the Fleet acting as a unit.

(l) He is the representative of the Commander-in-Chief on the bridge and bears the same relation to him that the Officer-of-the-Deck bears to the Captain of the ship. He shall keep himself informed of the location of all units and ships in whatever disposition or formation the Fleet is at the time; whatever land or lights are in sight; whether either are likely to be seen; and of all other particulars which may be of use to the Commander-in-Chief in keeping the ships of the formation out of danger.

(1) In case of emergency, when neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the Chief of Staff is on the bridge, he shall make such signals as are required by the circumstances, reporting his action immediately to the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff and the Operations Officer. ACT FIRST. REPORT AFTERWARDS. Under all other conditions the formation shall not be maneuvered without the authority of the Commander-in-Chief or the Chief of Staff. Furthermore, under these latter conditions, the Staff Duty Officer shall report the circumstances to the Operations Officer. Also, he shall call the Flag Lieutenant and Operations Officer to the bridge at once if immediate action is required—otherwise those officers shall be informed of the time when their presence on the flag bridge will be required and the reasons therefore.

(m) He shall promptly report to the Commander-in-Chief, through the Chief of Staff, all land, shoals, rocks, lighthouses, beacons, buoys, discolored water, vessels, or wrecks sighted; all changes of weather or shifts of wind; all signals made; all changes in speed, formation, disposition, or course; in general, all occurrences worthy of notice.

(n) He shall handle all dispatches which in port are routed to the Officer having the day's Staff duty.

(o) When the Flag Lieutenant is on the Bridge he will handle all tactical signals, relieving the Staff Duty Officer of this function of his usual duties.

(p) RECORD OF EVENTS: A Record of Events during the watch will be kept by the Staff Officer on watch assisted by a duty yeoman. This record will include items of importance, movements, major and minor contacts with the enemy, aerial and submarine activity, weather information, etc. THE RECORD OF EVENTS will be typed in quadruplicate, signed by the Officer on watch and handled as follows: Original to be placed in a file folder in Flag Plot. (This folder will be kept in Flag Plot, until the completion of the exercise, when it shall be turned over to the file yeoman by the yeoman securing the watch.) At 0800 each day the three copies of the RECORD OF EVENTS covering the watches of the preceding 24 hours shall be turned over to the Flag Office for the following distribution: one copy to the Admiral, one copy to the Chief of Staff, and one copy to the Operations Officer.)

(q) When necessary to make a signal to change course or speed to avoid a vessel or unit having the right of way, make such changes great enough, and execute the signal soon enough to leave no doubt in the minds of the other officers of the deck as to your intentions. Avoid crossing ahead of vessels or units having the right of way.

[15] (r) When fog closes in:

(1) Order bridge radios manned if not already in effect.

(2) Order fog buoys streamed.

(3) Order fog searchlights manned.

(4) Comply with Fleet Communication letter—2RL–41 summarized briefly as follows:

(*a*) Take soundings at short intervals to ensure safety of the formation.

(*b*) Designate a ship to: At least half-hourly or oftener; obtain bearings from shore radio direction finder stations, and radio bearings of ships in company.

(*c*) Plot all bearings and soundings on a chart. This ensures safety.

(*d*) Establish a transmitting and receiving watch, (on distress frequency).

(*e*) Provided Radio restrictions so permit broadcast in plain language followed by International Code: visibility conditions, names of ships in company, position, and time of origin GCT. If other ships reply to this safety transmission shift to 422 kcs. and exchange information.

227. The night order book is written by the Commander-in-Chief for guidance of officers having night watches. Each officer having a night watch shall initial the book after reading the orders, and before relieving the watch. The night order book is prepared by the Fleet Navigator (12).

228. Nothing herein is intended to contravene existing regulations or to preclude taking such additional precautions as may seem desirable.

[16] SECTION III—BATTLE STATIONS

300. The Combat Organization of the Staff is covered in a separate confidential issue of this section. It is distributed to the flagship and flag personnel only.

[17] SECTION IV—FLAG OFFICE PERSONNEL AND GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

401. The authorized Flag Allowance of yeomen is:

Chief Yeoman	3
Yeoman 1st class	4
Yeoman 2nd class	5
Yeoman 3rd class	6
Total	18

Yeoman on board are assigned in general as follows:

1 Yeoman—In general charge.
1 Yeoman—Admiral, Chief of Staff and Flag Lieutenant.
1 Yeoman—Flag Secretary and Division Officer.
3 Yeomen—Operations and Assistant Operations Officers.
2 Yeomen—War Plans Officers.
2 Yeomen—Communication, Radio, and Comm. Security Officers.
1 Yeoman—Intelligence Officer.
1 Yeoman—Aviation Officer.

1 Yeoman—Gunnery Officer.
1 Yeoman—Engineer and Maintenance Officer.
1 Yeoman—Aerological Officer.
1 Yeoman—Files and Correspondence Classification.
1 Yeoman—Outgoing Mail Desk.
1 Yeoman—Communication Office.

These assignments will be augmented by yeoman strikers. Yeoman strikers will also be assigned to other Flag Office details, such as incoming mail, File Section, Tracer desk, etc.

402. Assignment of yeomen will necessarily depend largely on their individual aptitude for certain duties, and their availability. One Pharmacist's Mate is included in the Flag Allowance and is assigned to the Fleet Medical Officer. One Marine Sergeant Major is assigned to the Marine Officer.

403. Whenever an officer finds that he requires additional clerical assistance, he will apply to the Flag Secretary. Additional clerical assistance can in this way be secured with a minimum of delay and without interfering with the routine of the office.

404. The Chief Yeoman in charge has general supervision of the Flag Office and personnel under the Flag Secretary, who is in direct charge of the offices of the Commander-in-Chief. The Chief Yeoman in Charge is responsible for the cleanliness of the offices and storerooms, for the carrying out of the office instructions, for the conduct and proper performance of duty by the enlisted personnel and for regulating watch lists, liberty and leave in accordance with existing instructions and orders. He will supervise the drawing of office supplies against the flag allotment, issuing of stationery, etc., and exercise care that expenditures are kept within requirements.

405. *Routine Duty.*

(a) Routine hours of duty in flag offices and print shop are as follows:

Daily	0800 to 1600
Half Holidays	0800 to 1130

(b) *Handling of work outside regular office hours.*—Routine work outside of regular office hours will be handled by the yeoman of the officer desiring such work done, when that yeoman is on board, otherwise by the duty section. There is always a duty printer on board who sleeps in the print shop.

(c) No uncompleted work shall be stowed away in office desk drawers, but shall be kept above the desks in labeled baskets or envelopes, and available to the staff officers concerned, or to the duty section, if required.

[18] 406 *Handling of mail upon arrival in port.* The taking up and distribution of mail upon arrival in port will, without exception, be an "all hands" job. All yeomen will prepare routing sheets and assist in clearing up all mail received. No liberty will be granted on arrival in port until such mail has been received, routed and distributed to the cabinets of the officers concerned.

407. *Liberty and Leave.*

(a) Liberty and leave for the flag office personnel will be regulated to conform, as closely as work will permit, to that of the flagship. Subject to the approval of the officers for whom the yeomen work, after routine working hours, or Saturdays after 1130, Wednesday afternoons, Sundays and holidays, will be considered routine liberty periods. Liberty cards are issued under the supervision of the Division Officer for all flag personnel.

(b) All requests for other than regular liberty shall first be referred to the officer for whom the yeoman works, the Flag Division Officer and to the Chief Yeoman in Charge for designation of relief if required, then to the Flag Secretary for approval or disapproval. If the request is one for leave and is approved by the Flag Secretary as Head of Department, it will then be sent to the Executive Officer for issuance of formal leave papers.

408. *Cleanliness of Offices.*

(a) The cleanliness of flag offices and storerooms will be under the supervision of the Chief Yeoman in Charge. Each yeoman will be required to keep his own desk neat and clean, as well as the desk of the officer for whom he works. Offices will be cleaned daily, prior to 0800, and a field day shall be held between 1200 and 1300 each Friday.

(b) Flag offices, shops, storerooms and other spaces will be included in the commanding officer's inspection of adjacent ship spaces. Personnel in charge of offices, shops, storerooms and other flag spaces shall have their spaces open and ready and shall stand by for inspection at the times designated in the

daily schedule issued by the flagship. Yeomen shall have the drawers of their desks neatly stowed and ready for removal should they be directed to do so by the inspecting officers.

409. *Flag Office Duty Section.*

(a) The Flag Office personnel will be divided into duty sections of not less than three men, one of whom shall be a competent stenographer. Duty changes at 0900 daily, Sundays excepted. The Duty Section will function in the Flag Office during the following hours:.

Daily	0730 to 0815
	1130 to 1300
	1600 to 2200
Half Holidays	0730 to 0815
	1130 to 2200
Whole Holidays	0730 to 2200

(b) The duty section will handle all emergency work outside of regular working hours and if the Outgoing Mail Yeoman is not on board, will mail all signed outgoing correspondence. The entire duty section will remain in the flag offices during the hours specified in subparagraph (a) except:

(1) Only one rated man need remain in the flag office during mealtimes.

(2) When the press of work permits and when in the discretion of the senior duty yeoman their services are not immediately required, members of the duty section may be allowed to attend the evening movies on deck, subject to call; however, one rated member of the duty section shall remain in the flag office during the authorized absence of the rest to attend the movies. From time to time, if the Staff Duty Officer grants permission to do so, the offices may be locked and keys turned over to him, during movies, smokers, etc.

[*19*] (3) When the Flag is based temporarily ashore, the Duty Section will maintain a continuous one-man security watch in the Flag Office during the following hours:

Daily	1600 to 0800
Half-holidays	1200 to 0800
Holidays	0800 to 0800

This watch will be armed, the primary duty of which is to prevent unauthorized persons from entering the Fleet War Plans Offices and all other Flag Offices of the Commander-in-Chief. This Security Watch will normally be sufficient to remain in the Flag Office after working hours. The entire Duty Section is available for call by the Staff Duty Officer at any time.

(c) *Handling of mail and correspondence.* Before going on liberty the incoming and outgoing mail yoemen will inform the senior duty yoeman of any special instructions, who in turn will inform his section. Special instructions may be:—To watch for special correspondence expected in the incoming mail—to see that certain U. S. or guard mail is dispatched. File numbers will not be entered on incoming mail by the duty section unless the correspondence is of an urgent nature, in which case a file number will be entered on the routing sheet and file yoeman notified when he returns from liberty. Incoming correspondence shall be made ready for the examination of the Staff Duty Officer with minimum delay and report shall be made to him that it is ready for his examination. On board ship, immediately after the end of working hours, the duty section shall gather up all confidential and other important correspondence from the Staff Officers' rooms and retain such correspondence in the Flag Office overnight, distributing it immediately after 0800 the following working day. In offices ashore, immediately after the end of working hours, the duty section shall gather up all confidential correspondence from the desks of the Staff officers and deposit it in the locked cabinet provided for this purpose. Just prior to 0800 the next working day, the correspondence shall be returned to the respective officers desks.

(d) *Security of Flag Offices.* The duty section will stand watch in the main flag office. The offices will be secured promptly at 2200 and keys turned over to the Flag Secretary, if on board, otherwise to the Staff Duty Officer. If, for any urgent reason it is desired to keep offices open after 2200, permission should be requested from the Staff Duty Officer. Flag offices shall never be left unguarded. Outside regular working hours a constant check should be kept on the Staff offices, operations office, and file room to see that it is either occupied by staff personnel, or locked. If it is necessary for everyone to leave flag offices on duty, the last person to leave will lock offices and take keys with him, posting

a note on main flag office door as to who has keys. Offices should be reopened as soon as possible.

(e) *Visitors to flag offices.* No general visitors will be permitted. Other than flag personnel admitted by senior duty yoeman, only officers and men on duty, or persons accompanied by staff duty officer, will be permitted in the flag offices outside of working hours.

(f) *Waste paper baskets in Cabins and Staterooms.* Waste paper baskets in Admiral's Cabin, Chief of Staff's Cabin and Staff officers' staterooms will be emptied and the contents burned, or stowed in flag office pending burning, at the following times:

Regular working days	1500
Half and Whole Holidays	1115

[20] 410. *Security of Classified Matter.* All personnel of the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, whose duties require handling of classified matter, shall acquaint themselves with the Navy Regulations and other instructions pertaining to the security of classified matter.

(a) *Offices, Print Shop, Multilith Shop, Flag Plot, Officers' Staterooms.* Flag personnel are responsible that classified matter under staff routing, or in spaces in which flag activities are paramount, is constantly attended. *Attended, as employed herein, signifies that the matter is receiving care while being used, or that it is under surveillance with respect to possible pilferage or perusal by unauthorized persons, or that it is under lock.*

(b) *Trash and waste.* Will be removed from flag activities and burned at times specified in subparagraph 409 (f). Should the incinerator be secured, or out of commission, such rubbish will be returned to flag offices, flag plot, print or multilith shops for retention awaiting suitable opportunity for its burning. The Senior Duty Yeoman will personally supervise collection and burning as set out in 409 (f). However, during routine hours of duty (see Article 405), this may be done by a rated yeoman designated by the Chief Yeoman in Charge.

(c) *Keys.* The key to the flag storerooms, the keys to the flag offices and mimeograph shop, and duplicate keys to the print shop and multilith shop are in the custody of the Flag Secretary. The Chief Printer and the Duty Printer will each retain a key to the print shop, and the Multilith Printer will retain a key to the multilith shop. Keys to the Flag Office files will be in the custody of the Flag Secretary, Gunnery Yeoman, File Yeoman, or Duty Yeoman. At the end of working hours, whenever classified matter is being produced in the print shop or multilith shop, the keys to the print shop galley racks and stowage locker will be placed in the main flag office key locker. During office hours the key to the flag offices will be in the main flag office. When offices are secured for the night, the keys to confidential files will be placed in the main flag office key locker and the keys to the flag offices turned over to the Flag Secretary, if on board, otherwise to the Staff Duty Officer. Except as herein specified, personnel are forbidden to have duplicate keys to flag offices and print shop spaces in their possession.

(d) *Files, Lockers, Storerooms.* Access to the flag storeroom by other than regularly authorized personnel may be had upon application to the Flag Secretary. In all cases when a confidential file jacket is to be removed from the flag offices, a receipt will be required from the recipient.

(e) Nonconfidential file jackets should be obtained from the File Yeoman or in his absence from the duty yeoman. If the file jacket is to be removed from the flag office, a receipt will be signed by the recipient.

(f) Classified matter may be removed from the Print Shop only at the instance of the officer for whom the work is being done, or an officer of the Staff. Classified matter will not be allowed to remain in the multilith shop overnight, but will be stowed under lock in the print shop stowage locker.

[21] SECTION V—HANDLING OF CORRESPONDENCE

501. (a) *Incoming Mail,* is delivered to the Incoming Mail Desk.

(b) Upon receipt of Registered U. S. Mail in the Main Flag Office, it shall be taken immediately to the Secret Mail Officer or the Chief Yeoman designated as Secret Mail Yeoman. In their absence the mail shall be taken to the Duty Communication Watch Officer who shall open it and extract the envelopes marked "SECRET". A receipt for the envelopes so retained shall, in all cases, be obtained on the "Incoming Registered Guard Mail Log". The envelopes marked "CONFIDENTIAL" shall be returned to the Flag Duty Yeoman. All "SECRET"

mail received by the C. W. O. shall be logged in the book provided for that purpose, and then taken to the Staff Duty Officer who shall open it in order to determine its urgency. If the Staff Duty Officer retains any of the Secret Mail his receipt therefor shall be obtained. All Secret Mail shall be delivered to the Secret Mail Officer at the first opportunity.

(c) Incoming personal mail for the Commander-in-Chief will be delivered to his orderly and placed on his desk. If Admiral is not on board, it will be placed in the routing cabinet in the Flag Office and will be delivered upon the Admiral's return to the ship.

(d) Incoming personal mail for other staff officers will be delivered by a Flag Office messenger immediately upon its receipt in the Flag Office. In the absence of any Staff Officer his personal mail will be placed in the routing cabinet in the Flag Office and delivered to him upon his return to the ship.

502. *Urgent Correspondence.* When URGENT correspondence is received on board, routing sheets shall be prepared immediately, an URGENT tag securely attached to and visible on the routing sheet, and correspondence delivered by hand to the Flag Secretary, or in his absence, to the Staff Duty Officer. Such correspondence shall be shown to Action Officer and a copy delivered to him if desired, prior to routing to other officers. If a copy is delivered to Action Officer, a notation of this fact will be made on routing sheet. If file yeoman are not on duty or in the office when URGENT mail is received, such mail shall be assigned a file number by the Duty Yeoman and handled as indicated above. No correspondence, or other papers, shall be kept visible as the top paper on the correspondence. If correspondence or other papers are of an urgent nature and no URGENT tag accompanies it, the officer concerned shall indicate to this yeoman that the matter is urgent and the latter shall then attach an URGENT tag.

503. *Routine Correspondence.*

(a) *Incoming Mail Yeoman.* Opens all incoming mail immediately upon its receipt, except U. S. registered mail, which is handled in accordance with subparagraph 501 (b), above. (See Section VI for method of handling registered U. S. mail by receiving officers.)

Logs the envelope number and descriptive data of all correspondence received via registered guard mail and U. S. Mail.

Carefully checks all incoming mail to insure that it is complete and the listed enclosures are attached, or in case enclosures have been forwarded under separate cover keeps a memorandum check-off record of such enclosures so that they can be readily identified and properly distributed upon receipt.

Passes correspondence to File Yeoman and then, after File Yeoman has assigned office file numbers, prepares routing slips for all matter received except certain routine reports designated by the Flag Secretary, and MAILGRAMS. MAILGRAMS received by registered mail are logged and then sent to the Flag Communication office without being taken up on routing slips.

After routing slips have been typed, detaches memorandum routing slip and delivers mail to Chief Yeoman in Charge. From data shown on the retained memorandum routing slips, maintains the Incoming Mail Log in loose-leaf form. This log shall be a permanent record of all correspondence received and will show:

[22] Date of receipt.
Office of origin.
File and serial number of office of origin.
Date of correspondence.
Subject.
Cincus file number of jacket in which permanently filed.
Serial number of routing slip on which correspondence has been taken up.

(b) *File Yeoman.* Assigns file numbers. (See Article 505).

(c) *Chief Yeoman in Charge.* Routes correspondence.

(d) *Flag Secretary.* Confirms routing of correspondence. or changes routing where required.

(e) *Tracer Yeoman.* Removes routed correspondence from the outgoing basket of the Flag Secreary, detaches duplicate routing sheet, stamps date of delivery to first officer indicated in order of routing and delivers the correspondence (except URGENT—see Article 502), through routing cabinet to officers concerned in accordance with the assigned order of routing.

Files duplicate routing sheet as a tracer against outstanding correspondence in the office.

(f) *Yeoman Concerned.* Takes cognizance of and removes all correspondence from routing boxes of officers for whom he works and delivers to officers as directed.

When the officer for whom he works is absent, he will return the correspondence checked to that officer for Information, to the Tracer Yeoman, to be checked to the next officer in the order of routing, and deliver Action correspondence to the assigned relief officer.

(g) *Officer concerned.* In general, papers will pass from one officer to another via Tracer Yeoman as indicated on the routing sheet.

Correspondence requiring action will be routed first, if the Flag Secretary deems it necessary, to the Action Officer, the latter being responsible that other interested officers are consulted before letter or endorsement is prepared.

Correspondence routed for information should not be placed in the routing cabinet for an officer temporarily absent until it has been noted by all other officers checked for information.

Ordinarily, when necessary data is available, action should be completed on correspondence within forty-eight hours after receipt.

Any officer desiring to hold correspondence, in order to compile data, reports, etc., should return the correspondence to the files and draw it from the files when needed.

A list will be furnished each officer on Tuesday showing all correspondence which the records of the Flag Office indicate has been in his possession since the preceding Tuesday. Officers indicated as being charged with the correspondence should check this list and mark in the column provided the items which they have in their possession.

(h) *Yeoman Concerned.* Prepares outgoing letter or endorsement as directed (See Article 504).

[23] Keeps outgoing basket of officer for whom he works empty—delivering routed correspondence on which action is required or taken to Tracer Yeoman.

Insures that officer concerned has initialed in the space provided on the routing sheet and that notation is made when action is taken by a method other than a letter or endorsement.

(i) *Tracer Yeoman.* Delivers through the routing cabinet, correspondence on which routing is incomplete.

Scrutinizes all correspondence on which routing is complete to see that no correspondence requiring action goes to file and that officers concerned have initialed in the space provided on the routing sheet.

The correspondence to be finally cleared by the Tracer Yeoman falls into three classes:

(1) Incoming letters on which no action is required, or on which dispatch action was taken and so noted on the original routing slip.

(2) Incoming letters which were endorsed or are the basis for additional correspondence.

(3) Letters originated by the Commander-in-Chief with no incoming correspondence attached.

When correspondence described by (1) above has completed its routing the Tracer Yeoman will destroy his duplicate routing slip, initial in the space provided on the original routing slip under "Tracer," and pass this correspondence to the File Yeoman. However, if there is a cross file, the duplicate routing slip shall not be destroyed but will be attached to the correspondence for filing.

When correspondence described by (2) above has completed its routing the Tracer Yeoman will destroy his duplicate routing slip (unless it has a cross file number) initial in the upper right-hand corner of the file copy of the Commander-in-Chief's action, and on the original routing slip, and pass this correspondence to the File Yeoman.

504. *Outgoing Mail.*

(a) *General:* Dates and serial numbers will be stamped by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman after the letter is actually signed. The original sheet of correspondence of a personal nature shall not bear a file or serial number. The originator's yeoman shall address envelopes for this class of correspondence.

The use of staples in fastening correspondence should be limited to printed or mimeographed letters of two or more pages. Staples shall then be used in the upper left hand corner.

Letterhead paper shall be used for the original sheet and all copies of correspondence.

(b) Correspondence for signature shall be prepared and assembled as follows:

(1) Sheets shall be arranged in numerical order from bottom to top, i. e., page one on the bottom, last page or endorsement on top. Enclosures to the entire correspondence shall be in alphabetical sequence, fastened directly behind the letter or endorsement to which it is an enclosure and securely fastened by brass fasteners, with ends turned over the face of the sheet. When enclosures are too bulky to be attached, then a separate slip with notation should indicate that the enclosures have been temporarily retained by the originator.

(2) In preparing endorsements, reference should be made to the basic correspondence as prescribed by Fleet Regulations.

(3) In preparing a letter, the originator shall:

Indicate the distribution, acknowledgement (if desired), signature, and obtain file number from file yeoman or, in the case of a reply, assign same file number as has been placed on the routing sheet of the incoming letter plus the originator's symbol number.

[24] Ascertain that there is a:

(A) Green file copy (pinned on top of a complete copy of the incoming correspondence with the routing sheet on the bottom.)

(B) Yellow information copy. The day following the mailing of correspondence, information copies shall be bound and routed to all officers. After completion of routing, these copies shall be destroyed.

(C) Pink Copy. This is retained by the tracer yeoman until the correspondence is signed, after which it is sent to the outgoing mail desk and subsequently returned to the originator bearing the date and serial number.

(4) The original and all copies shall show in the upper right-hand corner the initials of the yeoman typing the letter and the originator's symbol number immediately following the file number.

(5) Correspondence shall be clipped together with paper clips in the following order: Original and copies for information addresses; file copy (green); information copy (yellow); pink copy. The green copy shall extend at least an inch to the right side of the correspondence to permit the initials of the originator (indicated by red diagonal mark) as well as other interested officers (indicated by pencil diagonal mark).

(c) *Correspondence to be printed.* Four copies shall be typed, original on green paper, copy on white bond for the printer, one yellow information copy and one pink copy. The word "PRINT" shall be typed on the left side of the last page, opposite the signature, and immediately over the word "DISTRIBUTION." When the green copy (original) has been signed, it will pass through the outgoing mail desk to be numbered and dated, and for the preparation of a printing order.

(d) *Correspondence to be mimeographed.* In order to reduce the amount of typing required for letters that will be mimeographed, the yeoman doing the typing will insert a green sheet provided for this purpose under the stencil when cutting the latter. When this impression copy has been signed by the Admiral or Chief of Staff, the Flag Secretary affixes his authentication, using a stencil stylus, and the stencil and impression copy are then delivered to the Outgoing Mail Yeoman for entry of date and serial number, mimeographing, (done by the Mimeograph Yeoman), and ultimate mailing. (Article 504 (j) (10).)

(e) *Multiple Address Letters.* Multiple address letters are those addressed to more than one office. The original of the multiple address letter shall be made on green paper, and one onion copy shall be made for each addressee. These onion skin copies shall be checked off by the yeoman preparing the correspondence, an arrow check being placed immediately after the office addressed. All action copies of multiple address letters shall be authenticated by the Flag Secretary. The original (green), arranged in the manner prescribed in Art. 504 (b) (5), will be signed by the Commander-in-Chief or Chief of Staff and is kept as the file copy.

(f) *When a letter is required to be rewritten,* the pink copy shall be removed from the file on the tracer desk and all copies of the letter as originally prepared shall be immediately destroyed except the one copy on which corrections have been indicated. This copy shall be attached to the pink copy of the letter as rewritten and will be returned with the pink copy to the yeoman of the officer taking action. With the exception of recommendations on a subject made by various staff officers, these instructions shall also apply to rough drafts of letters or endorsements. Copies of letters on which corrections have been made and

rough drafts of letters or endorsements shall not be filed in the correspondence files unless retention in the files is indicated.

(g) Letters that have not been signed should be returned to the tracer yeoman in order that the latter may inform the originator accordingly, meanwhile returning to him the pink copy.

[25] (h) When correspondence is signed by other than the Commander-in-Chief, the following words shall be typed immediately below the name of the officer signing:

Signed by		*Signature Typewritten*
Chief of Staff	—	NAME Chief of Staff
Operations Officer when Chief of Staff is absent	—	NAME Acting Chief of Staff
Flag Secretary or Flag Lieutenant (Authentication of multiple address letters).	—	NAME Flag Secretary (or Acting Flag Secretary) NAME Flag Lieutenant
Flag Secretary or Flag Lieutenant (for single address letters).	—	NAME by direction

(i) When information addressees are directed to take action by copy of letters or endorsements, such copy shall be authenticated by the Flag Secretary.

(j) When correspondence is ready for signature the following procedure shall be followed:

(1) Deliver to Tracer Yeoman.

(2) *Tracer Yeoman.* Uses the pink copy for tracing correspondence circulating through the staff for initialing. When correspondence is initialed by all officers except Flag Secretary and Chief of Staff, delivers to Chief Yeoman in Charge.

(3) *Chief Yeoman in Charge.* Checks correspondence to see that it is complete and in agreement with regulations, policies and current instructions.

(4) *Flag Secretary.* Checks correspondence to see that it is complete and that it is in agreement with regulations, policies and current instructions.

Brings to the attention of officers concerned any conflicting or inconsistent orders or instructions.

Authenticates all multiple address letters, and copies of letters or endorsements directing action. Signs single address letters.

Releases printed and mimeographed letters for mailing.

(5) *Tracer Yeoman.* Removes correspondence from the outgoing basket of Flag Secretary.

Delivers correspondence signed "By direction" to the Outgoing Mail Yeoman, attaching pink.

Places unsigned correspondence in the Chief of Staff's box in the routing cabinet and indicates by notation on pink copy date and time that it has been placed in Chief of Staff's box in the routing cabinet for signature or initialing.

(6) *Chief of Staff's Orderly or Yeoman.* Removes correspondence from Chief of Staff's box in the routing cabinet, and delivers to Chief of Staff for initials or signature.

Removes correspondence from outgoing basket of Chief of Staff and delivers to Tracer Desk.

(7) *Tracer Yeoman.* When correspondence is initialed by Chief of Staff, places it in Commander-in-Chief's box in the routing cabinet, indicating by notation on pink copy date and time that it has been placed in Commander-in-Chief's box for signature. Delivers mail signed by the Chief of Staff to the Outgoing Mail Yeoman, attaching pinks.

(8) *Flag Secretary.* Removes correspondence from the Commander-in-Chief's box in the routing cabinet. Sees that all correspondence is initialed by Chief of Staff and delivers to the Commander-in-Chief for signature.

[26] *Tracer Yeoman.* When correspondence has been signed by the Commander-in-Chief removes pink copies from tracer file, and attaches same to the letters to which they belong; delivers them to Outgoing Mail Yeoman.

Makes daily check on pink copies where letters are outstanding.

(10) *Outgoing Mail Yeoman.* Insures that correspondence is complete; enclosures, if any, attached; properly arranged (See Art. 504 (b); initialed by Flag Secretary; signed; that there are sufficient copies for all action and information addressees; that each copy of CONFIDENTIAL correspondence is so marked; that information and pink copies have been prepared where necessary.

Returns correspondence which is found to be delinquent in any of the above respects to the Chief Yeoman in Charge for corrective action.

Stamps serial number (except on personal letters) and date on original and all copies; stamps date of mailing on file information and pink copies, and initials file copy.

Provides for the registry of all records of proceedings of Naval Courts and Boards, all SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL correspondence and other correspondence as directed. Maintains a record of all registry numbers and records the serial file number or other description of the correspondence for which each register number is used.

Is responsible for the correct addressing of envelopes for all mail passing over the Outgoing Mail Desk and for its being placed in the mail properly protected to insure its delivery free from damage by normal handling. In connection with the former, he shall keep himself informed of the location and prospective movements of all ships and transfers of all Flags.

Requests instructions from Flag Secretary regarding mailing of multiple addressed letters, operation orders, plans, etc., to Commanders who are absent when several of the vessels under their command are present with the Commander-in-Chief.

Under the direction of Flag Secretary determines the distribution and number of copies necessary to be printed or mimeographed using "U. S. Fleet Mail Distribution Lists" or such other distribution as may be assigned. Prepares Distribution Memorandum on Printing Orders.

Prepares Printing Order and forwards with White copy of the letter to be printed to print shop. The print shop shall send the Printing Order with each proof to the yeoman designated to proof-read it. This yeoman shall initial in the space provided for each proof and when correct in all respects and considered ready for printing the yeoman shall refer the final proof and the printing order to the originating officer, who shall, if he approves for printing, initial on the Printing Order in the space "Read and found correct". The Flag Secretary will release all letters for printing and distribution. The green (file copy) is held by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman until the letter is printed and mailed, when it is given to the Tracer Yeoman for necessary action. Yellow and pink copies, are handled in the same manner as for other outgoing correspondence. The date sent to the print shop, instead of the date of mailing will appear on the file copy. When distribution is made and entered in the outgoing mail log, a printed copy with original "Printing Order" securely attached thereto, shall be sent to file.

NOTE: The Mimeograph Yeoman will mimeograph the required number of copies shown on the Distribution Memorandum.

A copy of each mimeographed letter originating in the office of the Commander-in-Chief will be marked "INFORMATION COPY", and will be handled in the same manner as other "Information" copies.

[27] When the Distribution Memorandum is released for mailing by the Flag Secretary, the Outgoing Mail Yeoman mails the printed or mimeographed letter and furnishes the Tracer Yeoman with the necessary copies for a Staff Distribution; stamps date of mailing and initials on the Distribution Memorandum; sends file copy to the Tracer Yeoman with the Distribution Memorandum securely attached thereto.

Assigns and maintains a record of serial numbers, in their proper numerical sequence, of Operation Plans, Operation Orders, U. S. and Pacific Fleet Letters, Memoranda, Notices, etc.

Insures that when required, URGENT tags are securely attached to the correspondence, and to the outside envelope. (See Article 502).

Removes any SPECIAL NOTICE tags before mailing.

Handles all guard mail, incoming and outgoing, and will promptly inform Flag Secretary of any variation from the scheduled trips called for by Fleet Regulations. Logs registered number, originator and addressee of all incoming registered guard mail. Delivers incoming mail to Incoming mail Yeoman, and has outgoing mail ready for Guard Mail Petty Officers at the designated times. When the ship is at the Navy Yard, is responsible that necessary guard mail trips are made to the Commandant's Office.

At the end of each day, checks numerical sequence and enters in the outgoing mail log, loose leaf form, all correspondence mailed that day. This log shall be a permanent record of correspondence mailed and will show:

(1) Serial number of letter.
(2) Cincpac file number of jacket in which filed.

(3) To whom sent.
(4) Date of letter.
(5) Subject.

The above date shall also be entered for all mimeographed and printed letters dated and serialled that day, even though they are not mailed on that day. A note "Mailed on ----------" shall be made in "Subject" column of log and the date of mailing inserted on the date the mimeographed or printed letter is mailed.

Confidential and Secret correspondence will be so designated in the log and, in the case of secret correspondence, the subject will not be entered.

When correspondence has been entered in the log, gives file copies to Tracer Yeoman, pink copies to the yeoman of the officer taking action as indicated by the officer's number (not the initials of the yeoman).

Arranges yellow information copies in numerical sequence and prepares routing sheets next morning and delivers to Chief Yeoman in Charge.

(11) *Tracer Yeoman.* Takes appropriate action being governed by the preceding provisions of this Article.

(12) *File Yeoman.* Handles correspondence as directed in Article 506–1.

505. *FILE NUMBERS.* The file yeoman will assign file numbers to all correspondence. If the File Yeoman is not on duty or in the office when URGENT mail is received, such mail shall be handled as directed in Article 502. In assigning file numbers to correspondence, the File Yeoman shall use the U. S. Navy Filing Manual as the basis for filing arrangement. Correct file numbers are essential in order to locate correspondence readily. A new jacket shall be prepared for each new number so assigned.

506. In addition to the standard file numbers assigned to outgoing correspondence, the originator's symbol number and a serial number will be used. The originator's symbol number shall be placed after the file number and enclosed in parenthesis. The serial number will appear after the word "Serial" and will not be in parenthesis. New serial numbers will be started on each [28] January 1st, and will run throughout the calendar year. The first figure of all CONFIDENTIAL serial numbers shall be a "0".

506.1 The File Yeoman shall:

Scrutinize correspondence to see that none goes to file unless complete action has been taken; that routing sheet has been initialed by all officers and the Tracer Yeoman and that original routing sheet is attached to correspondence.

Prepare correspondence for file, retained spare copies in the spare copy file when action is so indicated on routing sheet.

File correspondence. CONFIDENTIAL correspondence must actually be placed in the jackets by the File Yeoman himself. He may utilize his assistants for filing correspondence of a lower classification.

Check off, in colored pencil, all entries in the incoming and outgoing mail logs to see that all mail received and originated has been checked to file. Undue delays shall be reported after check has been made with the Tracer Yeoman.

Keep an up-to-date Index of the files.

Cooperate with the Tracer Yeoman in preparing the Weekly List of Outstanding Correspondence.

507. Where correspondence treats of more than one subject, it shall be filed under the principal subject, and cross-index tracers prepared and filed under the other subjects treated or referred to. Cross-index tracers shall be printed on white paper.

508. Yeomen preparing correspondence shall type the file number appearing on the routing sheet, the symbol number of the originator in parenthesis and the word "Serial" below the file number after which the serial number will be entered by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman.

509. *FILING OF PRINTED MATTER.* Fleet Letters, Memoranda, Notices, etc., must be kept in an unbroken serial titled file for ready reference in addition to being placed in the subject file jacket. Care must be taken to make cross-index files complete and to make sure that signed copy is filed.

None of the above matter will be removed from the files merely because it has been cancelled or superseded, but a notation to this effect shall be made on the file copy showing reference numbers of the dispatch or letter cancelling and superseding it. Extra copies held for issue will, however be destroyed. Whenever the number of spare copies of a particular publication is low, or a request for spare copies is large, the requests will be referred to the Flag Secretary. Normally requests from ships should be handled by Type commanders.

510. *WEEKLY CHECK OF OUTSTANDING CORRESPONDENCE.* On Tuesdays of each week a sight check will be made by the Tracer Yeoman of all outstanding correspondence that records indicate has been in the possession of an officer since the preceding Tuesday, and a list prepared for each such officer showing correspondence thus outstanding. The duplicate routing sheet will be used as a "tickler" tracer for checking outstanding letters in the office. A notation will be made on the outstanding correspondence sheet showing the date the check was made and the officer who acknowledges having each piece of correspondence in his possession on that date.

511. If, after making a thorough canvass of the offices, no trace can be found of a letter that has not moved in its routing from one officer to another within the past week, the outstanding correspondence sheet will be delivered to the Flag Secretary with a report of the search.

512. Lists of outstanding correspondence checked to the Admiral and Chief of Staff will be delivered to the Flag Secretary.

[29] SECTION VI—CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET CORRESPONDENCE

601. Confidential mail shall be handled in accordance with Article 410 and the following:

(a) All correspondence classified as CONFIDENTIAL will have the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped and typed, or printed in the upper left-hand corner, under file number, of each sheet.

(b) All routing sheets for confidential correspondence shall be printed on blue paper and are plainly marked "CONFIDENTIAL".

(c) All confidential correspondence will be filed in separate filing cases known as "the CONFIDENTIAL files".

(d) All confidential correspondence placed in U. S. or Guard Mail will be placed in double envelopes with the inner envelope stamped "CONFIDENTIAL". Confidential correspondence forwarded by U. S. Mail or Guard Mail must be registered.

602. SECRET correspondence shall be handled in accordance with the following instructions:

(a) *Stowage and Handling.*

(1) SECRET correspondence files shall be kept in a safe under the immediate supervision of the Secret Mail Officer: except correspondence regarding War Plans which may be retained by the War Plans Officer, and that concerning Communication Intelligence which may be retained by the Fleet Security Officer.

(2) The yeomen assigned to the War Plans Officer and the Secret Mail Yeoman are authorized to handle secret correspondence. Secret correspondence shall not be typed or handled by any enlisted personnel other than the yeoman who have been so authorized. Secret correspondence must not be permitted to pass out of the personal custody of staff officers at any time.

(b) *Incoming Mail.*

(1) The Secret Mail Officer, or in his absence, his authorized relief, the duty communication officer, will receive all incoming Officer Messenger Mail, and show same to the Flag Secretary or in the latter's absence to the Staff Duty Officer.

(2) Incoming mail marked SECRET will be handled by the Secret Mail Officer subject to instructions by the Flag Secretary.

(3) The Secret Mail Yeoman, under the supervision of the Secret Mail Officer, shall log all incoming SECRET correspondence, attach secret routing slips, and deliver to the Flag Secretary for routing.

(4) The Secret Mail Officer or the Secret Mail Yeoman shall deliver the SECRET correspondence to the staff officers concerned. Receipts shall be obtained for all SECRET correspondence left in the custody of officers. Officers not having authorized secret stowage shall not retain correspondence overnight.

(c) *Outgoing Mail.*

(1) An officer desiring to originate a SECRET letter shall prepare a rough draft in long hand or dictate the letter to a yeoman authorized to handle secret correspondence. The letter shall be typed and delivered by personnel authorized to handle secret documents to staff officers concerned for initialling and signature.

(2) The file copy of outgoing secret correspondence prepared by the War Plans Officer may be retained in his files. In such cases a copy of the letter shall be delivered to the Secret Mail Officer for filing in the secret correspondence files.

[30] (3) SECRET correspondence will be forwarded in accordance with Article 76 (4), U. S. Navy Regulations.

(4) Outgoing SECRET mail will be marked with an identification number of five figures preceded by CINCPAC or CINCUS as appropriate. Franked cards bearing a return receipt shall be enclosed with each letter and will indicate the identity of the letter by both the serial and shipment numbers.

[31] SECTION VII—LIBRARIES

701. Every effort will be made to maintain an office library of official publications required for reference by members of the Staff. Officers are requested to advise the Flag Secretary of publications they desire to have ordered.

The office library consists of various books and pamphlets, such as:—Annual Reports, Regulations, Bureau Manuals, Registers, Directories and miscellaneous publications. The library will be added to as publications are received from time to time. Any publications carried in the library which have become obsolete will be submitted to the Flag Secretary, who will issue the necessary instructions as to their disposition.

Each publication is listed and assigned a serial number, and filed according to that number.

The File Yeoman will be responsible for the proper classification and filing of the library.

702. The Commander-in-Chief's Library is maintained under the supervision of the Fleet Public Relations Officer. It consists principally of non-fiction although some works of fiction may be included. The books are kept in bookcases in the Admiral's and guest cabins and elsewhere as necessary. The Fleet Public Relations Officer will publish to the staff a list of books on hand and lists of additions as received. All members of the staff are invited to make use of the facilities afforded by this library. It is desired to augment and improve the Commander-in-Chief's library. To this end suggestions as to books which should be obtained are requested from all members of the Staff. Keys to the bookcase of the Commander-in-Chief's Library will be kept in the key locker in the flag office.

[32] SECTION VIII—RAPID COMMUNICATIONS OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

Part A—General

801. *Drafting of Despatches.*

(a) In order that the Commander-in-Chief may set an example of propriety in drafting of despatches, all officers of the Staff will familiarize themselves with the provisions of Communication Instructions relative to that subject. Communication watch and coding board officers should bring to the attention of originating officers all violations of these instructions and recommend necessary corrections. In no case will a change in a despatch be made without the consent of the originating officer.

(b) An officer originating a non-classified or restricted despatch will have the message typed by his own yeoman, or duty yeoman. After it has been initialed by the originating officer it will be delivered to the communication watch officer who will obtain the initials of the information and releasing officers and supervise the transmission of the despatch.

(c) An officer originating a classified despatch will write or type the message on an outgoing classified despatch blank. After initialing by the originating officer it will be delivered to the communication watch officer who will obtain initials of the information and releasing officers, have the despatch encrypted and supervise its transmission.

(d) All despatches will normally be released only by the Admiral or Chief of Staff. In case of emergencies or special circumstances, despatches may be released by other members of the Staff.

(e) An officer desiring to have a message passed to supplementary addresses for action or information will inform the communication watch officer who will prepare the necessary despatch or procedure signal and obtain initials of originating, information and releasing officers.

802. *Security of Communications.*

(a) Visual methods or landline will be used for transmission of despatches whenever practicable. *The use of radio for transmission of administrative despatches shall be kept at a minimum.*

(b) If a delay in the delivery of a despatch is acceptable, such message should be sent by despatch mail (mailgram). Mailgrams should be used particularly

for transmission of despatches to information addressees when it is desirable that their radio calls do not appear in the heading of the radio despatch.

803. *Distribution of Despatches.*

(a) Copies of all outgoing and incoming non-classified and restricted administrative despatches are provided for the Admiral, Chief of Staff, Operations Officer, Staff Duty Officer, Flag Secretary and Communication Officer. Outgoing despatch books also contain a copy for the originating officer. Incoming despatch books also contain an action copy and two information copies which are available to any member of the Staff who may request such copies from the communication orderly. The Communication Officer's copies of despatches will be placed on a file in the Staff Office where they will be available for perusal by all members of the Staff.

(b) Only one copy of outgoing and incoming classified administrative despatches (other than restricted despatches) will be made. Paraphrases of secret and confidential despatches shall be kept at a minimum and will be furnished only at the specific request of officers, and must be returned to the coding room for burning when no longer needed. Paraphrases of secret messages will be furnished only to the action or originating officer, and shall be receipted for in the same manner as registered publications.

[33] (c) Only four copies of the translations of tactical despatches will be made for distribution to appropriate boards.

804. *Routing and Delivery of Despatches. (Internal)*

(a) Correct and complete routing of despatches is a function of the communication watch officer.

(b) The Staff Duty Officer should see all despatches when the action officer is not on board. In such cases instructions will be requested by the orderly from the Staff Duty Officer as to whether the latter will accept responsibility for the message or whether it should be held for the action officer.

(c) Whoever initials the message for the action officer and accepts the action copy assumes full responsibility for taking the required action and for informing the designated action officer of the action taken.

805. *Movement Reports.*

(a) The movement report sheets and cards will be corrected and maintained by communication personnel under the supervision of the communication watch officer designated as Movement Report Officer.

(b) Movement reports of the flag plane will be originated by the pilot making the flight and will be prepared and released by the flagship.

806. *Fleet Coding Board.*

(a) The fleet coding board will consist of four officers of the Staff and five officers detailed by the Commanding Officer of the Fleet Flagship.

(b) The fleet coding board will be charged with encrypting and decrypting messages sent or received by the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet flagship, as directed by the Fleet Communication Officer.

(c) The Communication Security Officer will be responsible for the organization and training of the fleet coding board.

807. *Shutting Down Transmitters.*

Except in case of emergency, permission for securing transmitters must be obtained from the Fleet Communication Officer.

[34] *Part B—Instructions for Communication Personnel*

806. *Administrative Communication Organization.*

(a) The following stations will normally be manned:

(1) Main radio room;
(2) Signal bridge;
(3) Main communication station;
(4) Flag communication office;
(5) Coding room.

(b) The communication watch will normally consist of:

(1) Communication Watch Officer
(2) Coding Board Officer
(3) Communication Supervisor
(4) Communication Yeoman
(5) Communication Orderly
(6) Radio Supervisor
(7) Signal Supervisor
(8) Radio Operators
(9) Signalmen

(c) The communication watch officer will stand a day's duty, relieving the watch at 0800. He will inform his relief regarding unfinished business, effective organization, frequency plan in effect, circuits up, visual signalling conditions, and all pertinent information necessary for the proper conduct of his duties.

(d) The coding board officer will stand a day's duty, relieving the watch at 0800. He will inform his relief regarding unfinished business and all pertinent information necessary for the proper conduct of his duties.

(e) Relief Communication Watch Officers. The first and second relief communication watch officers will maintain a continuous watch in the Flag Communication Office during working hours. The second relief communication watch officer will stand watch from 0800 until after lunch. The first relief communication officer will stand watch from after lunch until 1530, at which time he will be relieved by the communication watch officer with the day's duty. Other relief communication watch officers are available for duty when the traffic situation requires.

(f) The first and second relief coding board officers will maintain a continuous watch in the Coding Room during working hours. The watches will correspond to those stood by relief communication watch officers. Other relief coding board officers are available for duty when the traffic situation requires.

(g) Communication Supervisor. The communication supervisor will stand a day's duty under the administrative organization in the Main Communication Station. He will act as an assistant to the communication watch officer. The time of relieving and hours on watch will be the same as those prescribed for the communication watch officer. The watches for the communication supervisors will be arranged by the Senior Chief Radioman and will be approved by the Assistant Communication Officer.

(h) The radio and signal supervisors shall maintain continuous watches in the Main Radio Room and Signal Bridge respectively. The watches for supervisors will be arranged by the leading radio and signal chief petty officers and will be approved by the flagship's Radio and Signal Officers, respectively.

(i) Communication Yeoman. Communication yeomen will maintain a continuous watch in the Flag Communication Office. The watches will be arranged by the Senior Communication Yeoman and approved by the Assistant Communication Officer.

[35] (j) The flagship will provide sufficient communication orderlies to permit a continuous watch in the Flag Communication Office. When the flagship is underway a continuous watch will also be maintained on the Flag Bridge. Orders for the communication orderlies will be promulgated by the Assistant Communication Officer.

(k) Watches prescribed in the preceding articles will not be exchanged without permission of the officers concerned.

809. *Tactical Communication Organization.*

(a) The following Stations will normally be manned:

(1) Main Radio Room;
(2) Signal Bridge
(3) Main Communication Station;
(4) Flag Communication Office
(5) Flag Bridge Radio Station;
(6) Flag Bridge Communication Office;
(7) Coding Room.

(b) The communication watch normally consists of:

(1) Communication watch officer;
(2) Coding board officer;
(3) Two communication yeomen;
(4) Two communication orderlies;
(5) Communication Supervisor;
(6) Radio Supervisor;
(7) Signal Supervisor;
(8) Radio Operators;
(9) Signalmen;
(10) Additional members of coding board as necessary.

(c) Communication watch officers shall maintain a continuous watch in the Flag Bridge Communication Office. Off-watch communication watch officers are available for handling administrative traffic and coding duties as the situation requires.

(d) Coding Board Officers shall maintain a continuous watch in the Coding Room. Off-watch coding board officers are available for coding duties as the situation requires.

(e) The Chief Radioman assigned to the Flag Allowance shall maintain a day's duty watch in the Main Communication Station, and a continuous watch as radio supervisor in the Flag Bridge Radio Station. This watch list may be augmented by qualified first class radiomen as required.

(f) The radio and signal supervisors shall maintain a continuous watch in the Main Radio Room and Signal Bridge.

(g) Communication yeomen shall maintain continuous watches in the Flag Bridge Communication Office and the Flag Communication Office.

(h) The flagship will provide sufficient communication orderlies to permit continuous watches in the Flag Communication Office and on the Flag Bridge.

810. *Duties of Communication Watch Officer.*

(a) The communication watch officer is in direct charge of the communications of the Commander-in-Chief.

(b) The communication watch officer is responsible for the efficiency of the communication watch and will require an alert and military watch of all communication personnel.

[36] (c) The communication watch officer is responsible for complete and rapid internal distribution of despatches and for the expeditious handling of outgoing traffic.

(d) The communication watch officer is responsible for the handling of encrypted despatches and the efficiency of the coding watch.

(e) The communication watch officer must be fully cognizant of the effective organization of the Fleet and is responsible for setting up and maintaining the communication channels required by the organization.

811. *Duties of Coding Board Officers.*

(a) The coding board officer is in charge of the operation of the Commander-in-Chief's coding room.

(b) The coding board officer is responsible for expeditious, accurate and efficient encryption and decryption of despatches.

(c) The coding board officer must be fully cognizant of the rules for cryptographic security and will ensure strict observance of these rules in the handling of the encrypted traffic of the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) The coding board officer is responsible for the custody of the cryptographic aids, publications and devices in the coding room.

812. *Qualification of Communication Watch Officers and Coding Board Officers.* Upon reporting for duty communication watch officers and coding board officers must undergo sufficient instruction to qualify taking over a watch. To be considered qualified a communication watch officer or coding board officer must:

(a) have a working knowledge of Communication Instructions, Basic Communication Plan, Frequency Plans and Tactical Instructions;

(b) have a working knowledge of the call systems, the General Signal Book and Signal Vocabulary;

(c) have a thorough knowledge of the U. S. Fleet Staff Instructions and Staff Organization;

(d) have a thorough knowledge of the operation of the communication plant of the Fleet Flagship;

(e) be proficient in the use of all cryptographic systems held by the Commander-in-Chief.

(f) have a thorough knowledge of the principles and rules of communication and cryptographic security and their application.

813. *Routing of Despatches.*

(a) Full and complete routing of despatches is a function of the communication watch officer. A despatch must be seen by every officer having a possible interest in it. Intelligent and complete routing requires a thorough knowledge of the Staff organization and a careful application of this knowledge to each despatch.

(b) Copies of dispatches concerning routine reports and requests should not be delivered to the Admiral. Such despatches will be marked "NN" and the Admiral's copy will be delivered to the Assistant Communication Officer for disposition.

(c) Classified despatches, other than restricted, shall be routed to the Chief of Staff, Operations Officer, Communication Officer and Communication Security Officer in addition to action or information officers. The Chief of Staff shall be the first to see classified despatches and shall approve the routing prior to further

delivery. When the Chief of Staff is not available despatches may be shown to the action officer prior to final approval of the routing.

(d) The flag is responsible for delivery of messages addressed to the flagship. Copies of such messages and copies of messages which are not addressed to, but which are of interet to the flagship, shall be delivered to the flagship communication office for internal distribution.

[37] 814. *Delivery of despatches.*

(a) The communication watch officer will be responsible for requiring orderlies to deliver all messages promptly between 0800 and 2230 unless otherwise directed. Between 2230 and 0700 messages will be delivered to action and information officers when so directed by the communication watch officer. In case of doubt, messages will be delivered regardless of the hour. Priority despatches will always be delivered to the action officer immediately.

(b) Delivery of all traffic accumulated during the night will be completed by 0900 daily.

(c) Speed in delivery of despatches, especially those of priority precedence, is essential and the system must not be allowed to delay action. However, it is also essential that despatches be accurately written up. It is the responsibility of the communication watch officer to insure that a complete and accurate copy of all despatches is delivered to the proper officers as soon as possible.

815. *Emergencies.*

(a) The communication watch officer should bear in mind that speed in the delivery of a message indicating an emergency is the primary consideration.

(b) Make use of the telephone as well as messengers. Above all, do not let the system delay action.

(c) Call relief watches as necessary to assist in handling the situation and retain them on watch as long as required.

(d) Be prepared to handle any emergency at night. Before turning in leave clear and definite instructions to be notified immediately in the case of any unusual occurrence.

816. *Encrypted Despatches.*

(a) If time permits, the encryption of each outgoing encrypted despatch will be checked prior to transmission by an officer other than the one who encrypted the despatch. If time does not permit the encryption to be checked prior to transmission it will be checked as soon as possible thereafter.

(b) All intercepted encrypted despatches will be delivered to the coding room where they will be decrypted for information if traffic conditions permit.

817. *Intercepted Traffic.*

Intercepted traffic of possible interest to the Commander-in-Chief will be written up and distributed for information. Each copy will be marked "Written up for Cincpac information."

818. *Radio Logs.*

Radio logs shall be kept in accordance with Articles 1413–1417, Communication Instructions, 1937. The communication watch officer will examine radio logs carefully during his watch for despatches addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, for violations of communication instructions, for intercepted despatches of possible interest to the Commander-in-Chief, and to ascertain that circuit discipline is being maintained.

819. *Transmitting and Receiving Data.*

Transmitting and receiving data will be recorded by the radio operator or signalman as indicated below:

Radio

(1) Time of Delivery or Receipt
(2) Frequency
(3) Operator's sign.

Visual

(1) Time of Delivery or Receipt
(2) System
(3) Signalman's sign.

[38] *Communication Files.*

(a) General File. The general file includes one copy of each message transmitted or received. Service messages (except despatches) shall be stapled to the message to which they refer. Procedure signals not classified as service messages and messages not bearing time groups shall be filed according to time of receipt or delivery. Classified, mailgrams (other than restricted) shall be filed in the classified files and a tickler filed in the general file.

(b) Shore station Schedule Files. A copy of each message received by I or F method shall be filed in these files. A separate file shall be maintained for each shore station. Messages shall be filed by shore station serial numbers.

(c) Movement Report File. A copy of each notice or modification to the Ship Movement Report Sheets shall be placed in this file.

(d) Flag Files. The flag file includes one copy of each message originated by the Commander-in-Chief, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, or written up for information of the Commander-in-Chief. These messages shall be filed in chronological order of time groups under the headings incoming and outgoing.

(e) Alnav File. A copy of each alnav message shall be placed in this file in order of alnav number.

(f) Fleet File. A copy of each fleet message shall be placed in this file in order of fleet number.

(g) Classified Files. Translations of classified despatches shall be placed in these files in order of coding room serial number. Secret despatches shall be placed in a file separate from the regular classified files.

(h) Tactical Translation Files. The tactical translation files contain one copy of the exact translation of each encrypted tactical despatch and one copy of each plain language tactical despatch. Messages will be filed in chronological order of date time groups.

821. *Composition and Standard Distribution of Message Books:*

(a) Outgoing Circuit

Front cover	General File
First copy	Station File
Second copy	Flag File
Third copy	Originator
Back copy	Ship

(b) Outgoing Administrative

Front cover	General File
First copy	Flag File
Second copy	Originator
Third copy	Admiral
Fourth copy	Chief of Staff
Fifth copy	Operations Officer
Sixth copy	Flag Secretary
Seventh copy	Staff Duty Officer
Eighth copy	Communication Officer
Ninth copy	Station File
Back cover	Ship

(c) Outgoing Tactical

Front cover	Translation File
First copy	Flag Plot
Second copy	Flag Plot
Back cover	Coding Board

(d) Outgoing Umpire

Front cover	Translation File
First copy	Umpire
Back cover	Coding Board

[39] (e) Incoming Circuit

Front cover	General File
First copy	Spare copy
Second copy	Advance action
Back copy	Check copy

(f) Incoming Administrative

Front cover	Flag File
First copy	Action
Second copy	Admiral
Third copy	Chief of Staff
Fourth copy	Operations Officer
Fifth copy	Flag Secretary
Sixth copy	Staff Duty Officer
Seventh copy	Information
Eighth copy	Information
Back cover	Communication Officer

(g) Incoming Tactical

Front cover	Translation File
First copy	Flag Plot
Second copy	Flag Plot
Back copy	Coding Board

(h) Incoming Contact Report

Front cover	Translation File
First copy	Flag Plot
Second copy	Flag Plot
Back cover	Ship

(i) Incoming Umpire

Front cover	Translation File
First copy	Umpire
Back cover	Coding Board

[40] SECTION IX—REGISTERED AND OTHER SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL PUBLICATIONS

901. The Communications Security Officer is responsible to the Commander-in-Chief and to the Department for the custody of all registered publications.

902. A Communication Watch Officer, designated as Registered Publications Officer, is the custodian of registered and other secret and confidential publications. He shall receipt to the Fleet Communication Security Officer for all registered publications and for other important confidential, secret or restricted documents which must be accounted for by the Commander-in-Chief.

903. All registered and other important publications shall be catalogued to show their receipt and the safes in which they are stowed. No registered publication shall be issued except on written receipt of an authorized individual, which receipt shall be obtained at the time of issue. Other confidential or secret publications and important documents shall be handled in a similar manner.

904. In accounting for registered publications when preparing quarterly returns, each publication actually must be sighted by the officers taking the inventory.

905. Confidential and secret publications shall be kept only in authorized stowages.

906. The Coding Board Officer on watch shall be responsible for the publications in the communication office safes. The Registered Publications Officer shall make a weekly inventory of the contents of the communication office safes.

907. The Registered Publications Officer shall be the only person regularly in possession of the combinations of safes containing un-issued registered publications, except for: (a) communication office safes; (b) War Plans safe; (c) Security Officer's safe. In order that access to any safe may be had in the absence of the regular custodian, the Registered Publications Officer shall maintain in sealed envelopes the combinations of all safes assigned to the Staff. These sealed envelopes shall be kept in the communication office secret safe. Prompt report shall be made to the regular custodian of a safe whenever the envelope containing the combination thereto is opened for any purpose.

908. The Registered Publications Officer shall change the combinations of all safes when he first receipts for the registered publications, and from time to time thereafter; particularly subsequent to the opening of a safe by another officer.

909. The Registered Publications Officer shall keep a record of all "shipment memoranda" to insure receipt of all new matter. He is responsible that all publications in his custody are corrected to date. It is desirable that members of the staff correct their own publications; but even though they do so, their work shall be checked by the Registered Publications Officer, who is responsible for their being corrected.

910. When not actually in use, war plans shall be stowed in the safes especially provided for them. Corrections to the war plans shall be made under the direction of the War Plans Officer. War plans shall not remain out of the above safes overnight. The War Plans Officer shall have custody of all War Plans in use by the War Plans Section, receipting for them to the Registered Publication Officer.

[41] SECTION X—RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FLAG AND SHIP

A—Station keeping and maneuvering of flagship

1001. When in formation, the flagship will normally maneuver in obedience to signal in the same manner as other vessels of the formation.

1002. The Commander-in-Chief will, however, as circumstances warrant, verbally direct the flagship to make changes in course, speed, or position.

1003. When, for any reason, the movements of the flagship are no longer to be directed by the flag, the Captain of the flagship will be so informed. He will be further informed as may be practicable, of the interval during which he is expected to act independently.

1004. When in position, the commanding officer is responsible for the station keeping, course, and speed of the flagship as circumstances dictate.

B—Honors

1005. Responsibility for rendering proper honors lies with the flagship except that no gun salutes shall be fired without the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. Advance information as to honors shall be furnished by the Flag Lieutenant or Staff Duty Officer.

C—Personnel

1006. Officers of the Staff shall be careful to preserve the unity of command of the flagship. To this end they shall give no orders to the officer-of-the-deck except in an emergency. Personal requests may be made to subordinate officers of the flagship but official requests to the ship shall always be made direct to the Captain or Executive Officer. Such requests should be headed, "The Admiral desires you_____Etc."

1007. The Flag Division Officer and the Junior Division Officers will be the Communication Watch Officers or Coding Board Officers so designated.

1008. Leave and liberty for all men assigned special duty with the flag will be regulated by the Flag Secretary who will regulate it to conform as closely to that of the flagship, as flag work will permit. (See Article 407 (a)). The flagship will regulate, control, and administer the following functions pertaining to flag personnel:

(a) Reports, inspections, records and accounts, and advancements in ratings.

(b) Personal requests (via Flag Secretary).

(c) Disciplinary matters.

(d) The division parade is assigned by the flagship. The Flag Division Officer is in charge at division parade. He reports to the Executive Officer at quarters, the number of unauthorized absentees.

1009. The following instructions govern the routine muster of flag personnel:

(a) All flag personnel except the marines will muster at quarters with the flagship.

(b) The marines assigned as flag allowance, will muster with the ship's marine detachment.

1010. Flag Division personnel will be stationed for abandon ship drill and will report at quarters for this drill unless excused. At fire and collision drills and general quarters, Flag division personnel will, when men detailed by the ship have failed to do so, secure ports, etc., in offices and other places devoted strictly to Flag activities. The Flag division, will not go to quarters for these drills except that radio and visual communications will actually be manned.

[42] 1011. The Flag division officer and the junior Flag division officers will conduct bag and bedding inspections of the Flag Division. The ship will provide berthing and messing for all personnel of the Flag Division. Flag Division personnel under the direction and supervision of the Flag Division Officer will clean all compartments dedicated exclusively to Flag use. Boat crews, under the direction of the Flag Lieutenant, will clean the barges and staff boats; the signal force, under the direction of the Flag Lieutenant, will clean the Flag Bridge and Flag Conning Tower.

1012. All members of the Staff shall be assigned battle stations which will be manned when "General Quarters" is sounded. Enlisted men of the Flag not required for Staff Battle Stations will be assigned to ship battle stations. Enlisted men of the Flag will stand Flag condition and cruising watches, but will not stand ship cruising watches.

1013. The Flag Lieutenant is in direct charge of the boat crews, chauffeur, signal force, Admiral's mess attendants, boats, and automobiles (Band and Orchestra if assigned), and is directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for their appearance, training and performance. The ship is responsible for maintenance and upkeep. The Flag Lieutenant, and, in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, regulates the employment of the Staff motor boats and the Chief of Staff's barge when it is used as the Staff duty boat. He will prepare the schedules for all staff motor boats, prescribing the routine hours for securing and the places of securing away from the ship and will furnish information as to liberty of boat crews, after securing, to the Flag Secretary. The Officer-of-the-Deck will keep the Flag Lieutenant, and in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, informed of the movements of the barges and the staff motor boats.

1014. The Commanding Officer of the Flagship shall be responsible that all safety precautions of the barge and staff gig be made as are required by existing regulations and instructions.

D—Routine Reports

1015. In order that the routine reports to the Commander-in-Chief may be complete and uniform, the Commanding Officer of the flagship is requested to promulgate the following instructions:

(a) *At Anchor*

(1) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall make reports to Commander-in-Chief as follows:

(a) The hours of 0800, 1200 and 2000.
(b) Ship's Movements.
(c) All marked changes in the weather.
(d) Display of storm signals.
(e) All occurrences worthy of notice.

(2) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall report salutes fired, exchanges of official calls, shifting of personal flags and movements of ships to the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, and to the Flag Lieutenant, or in the absence of the Flag Lineutenant to the Staff Duty Officer.

(3) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall announce requirements for Staff attendance at the accommodation ladder by loud speaker: "Staff Gangway". Boat gongs shall also be sounded in number equal to the number of side boys required in attendance; e. g., for Admiral and Vice Admiral, eight (8) gongs; for Rear Admiral, six (6) gongs; and for Captain, four (4) gongs. The above procedure shall be carried out by the Officer-of-the-Deck in sufficient time for the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, and the Flag Lieutenant, or, in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, to reach the Quarter Deck and properly meet visiting officers. When the Commander-in-Chief is leaving the ship, the Officer-of-the-Deck will notify the Flag Lieutenant, or in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, and the Chief of Staff, when the barge or automobile is alongside.

(4) The signal Bridge supervisor shall report all movements of ships getting underway, or coming to anchor, shifting of personal flags, exchange of salutes, and any occurrences worthy of notice to the Officer-of-the-Deck.

[43] (5) When the Admiral has retired, the Officer-of-the-Deck shall make necessary reports to the Staff Duty Officer who will indicate what action is to be taken.

(6) During the night the Officer-of-the-Deck shall report to the Staff Duty Officer only such movements of ships as he deems necessary. The Signal Bridge supervisor will report to the Flag Lieutenant or to the Staff Duty Officer, prior to 0800, any movements of ships occurring during the preceding night.

(b) *Underway* (1) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall report to the Commander-in-Chief via the Staff Duty Officer on watch on the Flag Bridge:

(a) The sighting of land, rocks, shoals, lighthouses, beacons, buoys, and discolored water.
(b) All vessels or wrecks discovered.
(c) All marked changes in the weather.
(d) All occurrences worthy of notice.

If the ship is operating independently, the Officer-of-the-Deck shall make the above listed reports direct to the Chief of Staff and officer with the day's Staff Duty.

(2) If the Commander-in-Chief should be on the Navigating Bridge, the Officer-of-the-Deck will make reports direct to him, reporting thereafter to the Staff Duty Officer on watch.

(3) When underway making passage or outside the usual operating areas the Navigator shall report the ship's position at 0800, 1200 and 2000.

EXHIBIT NO. 127

Confidential.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,
NAVAL AIR STATION, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA,
Dec. 18, 1941.

From: Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: The Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.
Subject: Procurement of Long Range Bombing Landplanes for Patrol Wing Two.

1. Commander Patrol Wing Two has expressed an urgent need for long range landplane bombers, for use initially as patrolling aircraft covering the approaches to Oahu. Further uses of these planes in long range photographic reconnaissance and in offense are many. He has stated further that he has temporarily under his command from the Army a squadron of B–17 airplanes for such operations in conjunction with his VPB's and that for purposes of liaison, indoctrination and familiarization, he is assigning Naval Aviators to those aircraft as second pilots on their joint patrol missions.

2. Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force concurs in the request of Commander Patrol Wing Two and strongly recommends the immediate transfer from Lend Lease or other source of 15 B–17 (Boeing) or B–24 (Consolidated) bombers for this purpose and that an increase in that number in the future, as circumstances and experience may dictate, be considered. With the high speed of these aircraft, the additional area covered during daylight hours on a search adds immeasurably to security. Particularly is this true during the shorter days in winter.

3. Germane to this recommendation is the highly desirable possibility of the early establishment of patrol plane operating facilities at Magdalena Bay, Baja California, from which could be covered effectively the southwest approaches to the United States in conjunction with the patrol being conducted from San Diego. Provision of a squadron of subject landplane bombers in the Hawaiian area might serve to release for operation at Magdalena Bay, one of the three Patrol Squadrons to be equipped presently at Alameda.

4. In view of the current situation, this is being forwarded direct. The approval or comment of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is requested.

J. S. MCCAIN.

Copy to: CinCpac, Comscofor, Compatwing 2.

Secret—No. 18

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,
OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER,
Hickam Field, T. H., 22 December, 1941.

In reply refer to:
Memorandum to Roberts Commission:

1. Since my arrival I have issued orders or instructions for security and employment of the Hawaiian Air Force as follows:

a. Ordered immediate wider dispersal of airplanes, supplies and personnel.

b. Directed surveys to be made of additional fields for operation of aircraft on the Island of Oahu.

c. Required the movement of pursuit into Hickam Field area for more positive protection in the event of adverse weather at the former base at Wheeler Field.

d. Mover obsolescent B–18 and A–20s to Bellows Field to eliminate the airplane conjestion at Hickam Field. A–20s were later moved to Wheeler Field.

e. Moved one squadron B–17s to Wheeler Field to further relieve conjection at Hickam Field.

f. Directed that all planes be camouflaged. Those arriving from the mainland to be painted immediately upon arrival.

g. Directed plans be completed for air transport of aircraft ammunition to Maui and Molokai, capable of dispatch on two hours notice.

h. Have issued orders on alerts as follows:

"1. 30 before sunrise to 0800, and one (1) hour before sunset to 30 after sunset 1/8 Army Pursuit and Navy fighters in air.

"All other Army and Navy planes including pursuit excepting searching planes warmed up, manned and ready to take off.

"2. Between 0800 and one (L) hour before sunset:

1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit in air.

1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit warmed up, manned and ready to take off.

"All other Army and Navy planes including fighters excepting searching planes on one hours notice.

"3. One (1) hour after sunset, 30 minutes before sunrise ¼ planes on one (1) hours notice, ¾ on four (4) hours notice."

e. I have visited all operating airdromes, made ground reconnaissance of areas where additional airdromes are to be located, have discussed tactical operations, administrative problems, morale and rewards with all major commanders.

j. I have conferred with Com. Pat. Wing Two and expect to submit to the Department Commander within twenty four hours revised plans for the employment of the Air Force in the Hawaiian area.

k. I have directed that plans be made and they are well underway for the use of certain elements of the Air Force in offensive operations.

l. Commanding General, 18th Bombardment Wing, directed to have striking force of minimum of 18 b–17's available at all times.

m. Directed that a positive system of aircraft and surface ship identification be arranged.

(S) C. L. Tinker
C. L. TINKER,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

[*1*] F1
Confidential

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,
NAVAL AIR STATION,
San Diego, California, Dec. 24, 1941.

From: Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.
Subject: Procurement of Four-Engine Land Planes—Request for.

1. Contract 78903 dated 19 November 1940, is for the delivery of 200 PB2Y–3 airplanes. A supplementary contract 78903 dated 30 June 1941, is for the delivery of 54 airplanes, presumably PB2Y–4's. The progress report on this contract submitted by the Inspector of Naval Aircraft, San Diego, for the period ending 30 November 1941, estimates the delivery of the airplanes in quantity in October 1942. These estimated delivery dates are extremely disappointing as four-engine airplanes are urgently required. Experiences with Consolidated Aircraft, would indicate that this October 1942 delivery date will not be anticipated.

2. Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force believes that a part of our patrol aircraft should be long range land plane types. So long as there are prepared fields from which these planes may operate, the advantages to be derived from their operation are numerous. Among them are:

(a) Greater ease and celerity in handling and servicing after flight (a big item when number and fatigue of beach crews is considered).
(b) Quicker to get off on a mission.

(c) Cover larger area in daylight search.

(d) Higher speed and ceiling permits of long range photographic reconnaissance of enemy defended positions with infinitely less hazard.

(e) Greater striking power, particularly in a torpedo attack.

[2] Need for this type has been keenly felt in the last two weeks. The seaplane, however, still must be used from advanced bases in areas where no landing field exists.

3. A comparison of the performance of the B-24-D, and the PB2Y-3 airplane, which information has been obtained from the specifications, is tabulated below as a matter of interest:

B-24-D	*PB2Y-3*
Performance @ 41,000# V max @ 25,000 ft. with military power—316 MPH.	Performance @ 66,000# V max @ 20,000 ft..—236 MPH.
Operating speed @ 25,000 ft.—220 MPH.	
Service ceiling—34,000 ft.	Service ceiling—22,300 ft.
Service ceiling any two engines—19,000 feet.	
Range at operational speed carrying 8 1,000# bombs—2,000 miles.	Range at combat load carrying 4 1,000# bombs—2,370 miles.
Bomb Load: 4—2,000 lb. or 8—1,000 lb. or 8—500 lb. or 12—300 lb. or 20—100 lb.	Bomb Load: 8—1,000 lb. or 8—500 lb. In addition 4 1,000 lb. bombs can be carried on external tanks.
Armament: 1 .50 cal. Nose gun and 500 rounds 2 .50 cal. top guns (twin mount) and 800 rounds. 2 .50 cal. bottom guns (twin mount) and 600 rounds. 2 .50 cal. tail guns (twin mount) and 1,000 rounds. Total—7 .50 caliber—2,900 rounds ammuntion.	Armament: 1 .50 cal. bow gun and 400 rounds. 2 .50 cal. side waist and 800 rounds. 1 .50 cal. tunnel and 400 rounds. 1 .50 cal. upper waist and 400 rounds. 2 .50 cal. tail (twin mount) and 800 rounds. Total—7 .50 caliber—2,800 rounds ammunition.

[3] 4. This command has been informed by Consolidated Aircraft officials that the B-24-D is now in production, and will be produced in increasing number. Further the B-24-D is a less expensive plane and lends itself to production better than the PB2Y type.

5. Accordingly, Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force recommends that negotiations be undertaken with the Army Air Corps to obtain a total of sixty B-24-D airplanes at the earliest opportunity. Whether or not the PB2Y-3 contract could be reduced by that number would depend on the course of events.

/s/ J. S. McCain

Copy to:
CinCus
Comscofor

From: CINCPAC
Date: 4 January 1942.
For: Coderoom 1210
Decoded by: Graydon
Paraphrased by: Graydon

5385 K/C
COMINCH
PPPPP
OPNAV
COMAIRSCOFOR
COMPATWING 13

041001 CR0442

Your 011145. Comairscofor 312013. Fully agree. However the necessary detachment patron 22 and nonavailability additional patrol planes from mainland for at least several months makes situation here very critical. Total patrol planes 68, Army heavy bombers 44. Impossible satisfactorily meet simultaneous requirements for effective daily research reasonable air striking force material maintenance and personnel fitness. Best possible results being obtained but

searches far from positive and air striking force too small. Replacement 17 PBY–3 planes here by Army B–24 planes would make vital improvement in situation for both search and striking. Attention this connection invited comairsco for serial 0755 of December 18 with which CINCPAC heartily concurs. Subject fully covered in separate correspondence being forwarded airmail. Crews can be spared from here for taking over and ferrying B–24's. With background patrol plane qualification this can be quickly accomplished. Urgently recommend favorable consideration and immediate initiation action.

Distribution Action COMINCH WAROP 20CP
Record 11 OPD 12 38 NAVAIDE 16 Personal
Top Secret

From: CINCPAC
Date: 5 January 1942.
Decoded by: Canning
Paraphrased by: Reiss

COMINCH
PPPPPPPP
OPNAV

050547 CR0804

Withdrawals of Army bombers and Navy patrol planes from this theatre even though temporary for other projects leave us dangerously weak against aircraft carrier and other forms of attack. Retention of Oahu is by no means assured with present available forces. Navy patrol wings should be increased to 144 planes composed of both seaplane and landplane types for maintenance effective search. Carrier squadrons should be filled and kept filled to full allowance of spares to insure maximum effective seaborne striking force. To maintain even present daily search imposes greater load on material and personnel than can be much longer continued. See my 041001. See Commanding General Hawaiian Departments despatch of even date to War Department with which CINCPAC strongly concurs. ComdGen Haw Detp informed by mail.

Distribution
COMINCH. Action
Record Copy—11 12 38 OPDO NAVAIDE 16 Personal
CINCPAC WAROP File 20OF File
WAROPS Secret
Top Secret

EXHIBIT NO. 128

JUNE 4th, 1941.

Air Mail
The Honorable The ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.
(Attention: Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney General.)

SIR: Reference is made to your letter dated May 22, 1941 in which you asked my opinion concerning the prosecution of the several Japanese Sub-Consular Agents in Hawaii and also my radiogram of May 31, 1941 relative to the same matter.

Immediately after receiving your letter, I contacted Mr. R. L. Shivers, Special Agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Agent F. G. Tillman, who has been assigned to Japanese matters exclusively. Although I have been aware of this general situation for some time, no reports concerning these matters have been submitted to this office. Mr. Shivers brought with him, at my request, a copy of the investigative report of Special Agent F. G. Tillman, dated at Honolulu, March 10, 1941, in reference to ITSUO HAMADA, concerning a violation of the Registration Act. From my conversation with Mr. Shivers and Mr. Tillman and from the information set out in the report, I think that a successful prosecution could be had against this individual and other Japanese Sub-Consular Agents in the Territory if the facts are substantially the same in all of these cases. Mr. Shivers advises me that about forty of these cases have been investigated completely and would be ready for immediate prosecution, and that the facts in the remaining two hundred or so are approximately the same and they could be brought up to date with very little notice.

In a conference with representatives of the Army and Navy in which Captain I. M. Mayfield represented the Admiral of the 14th Naval District and Colonel M. W. Marsden represented the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Captain Mayfield stated that it was the opinion of the Admiral that prosecution should be instituted immediately against these Japanese Sub-Consular Agents and that it should be handled in a routine manner so as to cause as little disturbance as possible. Colonel Marsden stated that it was the opinion of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department who is charged with the internal security of the Islands, that prosecution at this time would be detrimental to the general plans of the Army and would probably have a bad effect on work already done. It is also the Commanding General's opinion that the majority of the American citizens of Japanese ancestry will be loyal to the United States and that prosecution at this time of the Sub-Consular Agents would only tend to aggravate the situation and probably materially effect the loyalty of these individuals. The Army has conveyed the opinion to the Japanese population as a whole that they will be taken care of and given full protection of the law if they are loyal to the United States.

It is my opinion that these prosecutions should be instituted at the earliest possible time if they do not conflict with any policy of the State Department or other Departments of the Government. I think it has been clearly developed from investigation that these Sub-Consular Agents exercise an enormous influence on the Japanese population in the Terrritory and all evidence indicates the fact that they are the sources of information for the Consul and the Agents through whom he delivers his instructions to the Japanese in the Territory.

I think that if we ever hope to divorce the influence of the Consul and Tokyo from the Japanese people in the Territory of Hawaii, it should be begun immediately and that this would be one of the best steps in that direction.

During the conference with the Army and Navy and other conferences that I have had with individuals in Honolulu in reference to this situation, it is impossible to predict just what reaction the Japanese population as a whole in the Territory would have to such a step, but it is my opinion that the good that would be done would far outweigh any evil that might result.

No further action will be taken on this matter until advice is received from you.

Respectfully,
AMT: JB

ANGUS M. TAYLOR, Jr.,
United States Attorney,
District of Hawaii.

A true copy. Attest:
/S/ THOMAS C. HART,
Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired,
Examining Officer.

Exhibit 32 (2).

WENDELL BERGE
Assistant Attorney General

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, June 13, 1941.

Re: Co 800.01B11 Registration—Koike, Yoshio

The Honorable The SECRETARY of STATE.

SIR: This will acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated June 11, 1941, in the above-entitled matter, in reply to our letter of April 10, 1941. It is understood that you have also received a number of investigative reports from the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning Japanese consular officers in Hawaii.

The Criminal Division has concluded from the investigative reports that these individuals have acted as agents of the Japanese Government. It appears that the Japanese Government requires detailed reports concerning the lives and activities of all persons in Hawaii whom it considers as Japanese citizens. However, the Japanese Government seems unwilling to employ the necessary consular staff to carry out this program. To accomplish its purpose, it appoints numerous Japanese citizens in Hawaii as agents to aid in this work. While these agents receive no compensation from the Japanese Government, they are commissioned to act, and apparently can only act, with the consent of the Japanese

Government; their activities are for the benefit of the Japanese Government; and their work is in furtherance of matters required by the Japanese Government.

Apparently none of these agents have been notified to the Secretary of State, but there remains the question of whether or not they are "diplomatic or consular officers or attaches". It is the view of the Criminal Division that they cannot be so considered and that they have, therefore, violated Section 233 of Title 22 of the United States Code.

It is noted that you have inquired of the Japanese Embassy to ascertain whether forms have been forwarded by the Embassy to the Department of State with regard to all Japanese Government officials on whose behalf exemption is claimed from the provisions of the Act approved June 15, 1917, and certain other acts, and that you will advise us further in this matter when an answer is received from the Japanese Embassy.

The United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii has recommended that prosecutions should be instituted at the earliest possible date against these agents for violation of said Section 233, if said prosecutions do not conflict with any policy of the Department of State or other Department. He states that the good that would be done in restricting the enormous Japanese influence in Hawaii would far outweigh any evil that might result.

It will be greatly appreciated if you will advise us as soon as possible whether or not the Department of State considers these agents as "diplomatic or consular officers or attaches" and of any statement the Department of State may be pleased to make with reference to the contemplated prosecutions.

Respectfully,
For the Attorney General,

WENDELL BERGE,
Assistant Attorney General.

JUNE 26, 1941.

In reply refer to
Co 800.01B11 Registration—Koike, Yoshio

The Honorable ROBERT H. JACKSON,
Attorney General.

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Berge's letter of June 13, 1941 in regard to the matter entitled "Yoshio Koike—Registration Act".

With reference to the inquiry concerning the status of Koike and other individuals whose names have been set forth in reports received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation who are said to be performing certain services on behalf of the Japanese Government in Hawaii, I may say that while this Department has no information concerning the personal status of these individuals with reference to the Japanese Government, they are not considered to have the status of diplomatic or consular officers or attachés who are accredited to this Government and, accordingly, the Department perceives no objection to the contemplated prosecution of these individuals for violation of the provisions of Title VIII of the Act of June 15, 1917 (Title 22, United States Code, section 238).

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON,
Assistant Secretary.

CR Co:EDK:MJY PR LE FE PA/H A-B

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
August 13, 1941.

JWB
PA/H
MMH

In reference to the attached file, 800.01B11 Registration Koike, Yoshio/8, you may note that:

Under date June 26, 1941, the Department wrote to the Attorney General, in reference to reports received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning the performing of certain services in Hawaii on behalf of the Japanese

Government, stated that the Department perceives no objection to prosecution of the persons concerned for violation of the provisions of the Act of 1917 requiring the notification to the Department of agents of foreign governments.

The Secretary of War, in a letter of July 25, 1941, to the Attorney General on the same subject, expressed opposition to the proposed prosecutions and strongly recommended that a warning be issued to any unregistered Japanese Consular agents.

A copy of the July 25 letter of the Secretary of War was supplied to this Department by the Department of Justice under cover of a letter of August 4, 1941, which states that the enclosure is being transmitted to this Department for its "information". The Department of Justice does not indicate what is to be its decision in the matter of the proposed prosecutions; but the fact that the objections of the Secretary of War are communicated to the Department gives rise to the inference that the Department of Justice is not at present contemplating proceeding with the prosecutions.

800.01Z11 Registration Koike, Yoshio/8
FE: Coville: MBW

WENDELL BERGE
Assistant Attorney General

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, August 4, 1941.

Re: Japanese Consular Agents in Hawaii, Your File Co. 800.01B11—Registration, Koike, Yoshio

The Honorable, the SECRETARY OF STATE:

SIR: Reference is made to your letter dated June 26, 1941, concerning the prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii under Section 233 of Title 22, United States Code.

There is inclosed herewith for your information a photostatic copy of a letter dated July 25, 1941, from the Secretary of War, concerning this matter.

Respectfully,

/s/ WENDELL BERGE.
Assistant Attorney General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 25, 1941.

The Honorable The ATTORNEY GENERAL.

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: Upon receipt of your letter of July 14, 1941 on the subject of the prosecution of certain unregistered Japanese consular agents in the Territory of Hawaii I dispatched a secret radiogram to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, directing him to radio his recommendations stating clearly his reasons and objections if any to the proposed prosecutions.

A paraphrased copy of his reply is attached hereto.

I concur in the statements and objections set forth by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and strongly recommend that a warning be issued to these unregistered Japanese consular agents, through their accredited Consul General in Honolulu, to register by a certain date, say within a period of thirty days after promulgation of the warning, under penalty of prosecution for violation of our laws.

I believe that such a warning will effect the desired registration and contribute materially toward the Commanding General's campaign to secure the loyalty of the Japanese population of the Territory.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

1 Inclosure: Paraphrase of Radiogram.

PARAPHRASE OF CODE RADIOGRAM RECEIVED AT THE WAR DEPARTMENT AT 9:58, JULY 22, 1941

Hawaii, filed July 21, 1941.

We are at present engaged in a counter propaganda campaign whose object is to encourage loyalty of the Japanese population of Hawaii on promise of fair treatment. The present outlook of results of this campaign on entire population is very favorable. Success of the campaign would promote unity and greatly reduce proportions of our defense problem. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 referred to in your radio of July 19, 1941 has been in effect here since August 1939 with no attempt at local enforcement. As result of careful survey of situation, considering available facts and opinions FBI and other Federal agencies I believe not over ten per cent of the unregistered consular agents in Hawaii are aware they have violated our laws. I believe further that prosecution at this time would unduly alarm entire population and jeopardize success our current campaign to secure loyalty Japanese population.

In my opinion fair play demands that warnings be given to consular agents to register by a certain date on penalty of prosecution. I believe development of loyalty among Japanese population more important than punishment of a few individuals. It is impracticable to place total Japanese population of one hundred sixty thousand in concentration camps.

SHORT.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING THERETO

PART 18

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 129 THROUGH 156

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79716 WASHINGTON : 1946

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1– 399	1– 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401– 982	1059– 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983–1583	2587– 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585–2063	4195– 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065–2492	5461– 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493–2920	6647– 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921–3378	7889– 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379–3927	9108–10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929–4599	10518–12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601–5151	12278–13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153–5560	13709–14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements.

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
1	23 11–15–45	1	Selection of intercepted diplomatic messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941.
2	24 11–15–45	254	Selection of intercepted messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between Dec. 2, 1940, and Dec. 8, 1941, concerning military installations, ships movements, espionage reports, etc.
3	87 11–16–45	317	Navy Department dispatch No. 252203 dated Nov. 25, 1941, directing the routing of trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits.
4	142 11–16–45	318	Chart showing plotting record of early plane flights Dec. 7, 1941, obtained by Opana Radar Detector Station.
5	153 11–16–45	318	Army compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Colonel Thielen as illustrating his narrative statement.
6	153 11–16–45	337	Navy compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Admiral Inglis as illustrating his narrative statement.
7	172 11–17–45	391	Photostatic copy of Opana Radar Detector Station plot, submitted by Senator Ferguson, identified by Admiral Inglis, previously marked "Exhibit 3–B in evidence" in proceedings before Army Pearl Harbor Board.
8	233 11–19–45	391	Material obtained by Army and Navy primarily from Japanese sources, relating to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
8–A	1792 12–18–45	413	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8–B	1792 12–18–45	415	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8–C	1792 12–18–45	424	Report dated Dec. 4, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
8–D	2480 1–5–46	425	Report dated Dec. 13, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
9	256 11–19–45	923	Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
10	279 11–20–45	1000	Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.
11	319 11–21–45	1006	Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.
12	363 11–21–45	1013	Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.
13	387 11–21–45	1019	Study of the air situation in Hawaii dated Aug. 20, 1941, by Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
14	397 11–21–45	1040	Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, entitled "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor" in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject (see exhibit No. 10), enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security).
15	401 11–23–45	1042	Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941, Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941, which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United States.

16	401 11-23-45	1061	(a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (b) Minutes of The Joint Board for Nov. 3, 1941; (c) Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Gerow.
16-A	3839 2-6-46	1077	Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
16-B	4341 2-13-46	1081	Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through the Department of State.
17	402 11-23-45	1083	Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.
18	402 11-23-45	1084	Documents relating to proposed "*Modus Vivendi*," including Secretary Hull's recommendation dated Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit).
19	402 11-23-45	1201	Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan.
20	402 11-23-45	1226	Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents, including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941.
21	402 11-23-45	1246	Two dispatches dated Dec 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memorandum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21, 1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941. All documents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the Far East.
22	458 11-23-45	1252	(*a*) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government; (*b*) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 160115; (*c*) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President and British Prime Minister.
22-A	1694 12-15-45 2065 12-31-45	1262	Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 ((*c*) above), of proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Sumner Welles. (See p. 556, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931–1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of statement made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
22–B	1783 12–18–45	1269	Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells of his conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning proposed parallel action with reference to Japan.
22–C	1783 12–18–45	1275	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Welles, of conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, attended by Welles, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry Hopkins concerning "British-American Cooperation".
22–D	1783 12–18–45	1292	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of conversation between Sumner Welles and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning "British-American Cooperation" at the Atlantic Conference, and Welles' subsequent conversation with the President.
23	476 11–24–45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
24	476 11–24–45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
25	574 11–26–45	1301	Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, reporting reaction in Japan to the Secretary's proposal of Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note). See pp. 766 to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931–1941, for proposal dated Nov. 26, 1941, to the Japanese Government.
26	634 11–27–45	1303	Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State concerning general policy toward Japan (so-called "green light" dispatch).
27	670 11–27–45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941", Introduction (pamphlet edition, 1942), Department of State Publication 1853.
28	670 11–27–45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941", Introduction and Documents (cloth edition, 1943), Department of State Publication 1983.
29	670 11–27–45	1315	"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941", vols. I and II (1943). Department of State Publication 2008.
30	670 11–27–45	1315	"Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew, Simon and Schuster (1944).

31	787 11-28-45	1316	Six dispatches bearing various dates from April 4 to Dec. 2, 1941, from United States diplomatic officials in foreign countries reporting to the Department of State inquiries and comments of Japanese representatives in those countries concerning possible break in United States-Japanese relations.
32	778 11-29-45	1326	Selection of messages between War Department and Hawaiian Department from July 8 to Dec. 7, 1941. Included are certain messages sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur in the Philippines, and to Commanding General, Panama, as well as their replies. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33	778 11-29-45	1334	Selection of Military Intelligence Estimates prepared by G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., covering period July 7 to Dec. 6, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33-A	2092 12-31-45	1385	Secretary of War's copy of memorandum, dated Oct. 2, 1941, from Col. Hayes A. Kroner to the Chief of Staff, concerning "Japanese-American Relations", bearing note in handwriting of Secretary Stimson.
34	825 11-30-45	1389	Memorandum, dated Oct. 18, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for Chief of Staff, concerning "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet" and proposed message to Army outpost commanders.
35	828 11-30-45	1390	Memorandum, dated Jan. 31, 1942, prepared by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, concerning "Warnings Sent to Hawaii Prior to Dec. 7, 1941", with enclosures.
36	830 11-30-45	1393	Photostatic copy of draft of General Marshall's message of Nov. 27, 1941, to General Short, containing phrase "hostile action possible at any moment", which draft contains a sentence that did not appear in the message as transmitted to General Short. (See Exhibit No. 32 for message sent.)
37	839 11-30-45	1395	Selection of dispatches sent and received by the Navy Department entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
38	841 11-30-45	1409	Paraphrase of message, dated Dec. 3, 1941, from General Miles to Military Attaché, Tokyo, concerning the handling of his codes and secret documents.
39	928 12-4-45	1409	Memoranda for the record on events of Dec. 7, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff; Col. W. B. Smith, Secretary, General Staff; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Col. J. R. Deane, Secretary, General Staff.
40	954 12-4-45	1412	Dispatch, dated Dec. 7, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV (070645) concerning report of promised armed support to British under certain conditions.
41	988 12-5-45	1413	Information from documentary evidence on interception, decoding, and translating of Japanese messages Nos. 901, 902, 907, 910 (so-called pilot message, 14 part message, 1 o'clock delivery message, and code destruction message).

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
42	990 12–5–45	1416	Copy of Army Regulation No. 10–15, dated Aug. 18, 1936, with amendments up to Dec. 7, 1941, entitled "General Staff—Organization and Duties".
43	997 12–5–45	1422	Instructions dated Jan. 27, 1941, of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff concerning staff conversations to be held with representatives of British Commonwealth.
44	1001 12–5–45	1423	Compilation entitled "Copies of Defense Plans", which contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans, to illustrate defensive measures contemplated against air attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
45	1019 12–5–45	1471	Memorandum, dated Nov. 27, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Far Eastern Situation" and warning messages to outpost commanders.
46	1027 12–5–45	1472	Photostatic copies of replies by General MacArthur and General Short to warning messages of Nov. 27, 1941, with routing slip.
47	1041 12–5–45	1476	Supplementary documents concerning the Nov. 5, 1941 Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President (see Exhibit No. 16), including dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from Ambassador Gauss to State Department; message dated Nov. 2, 1941, from Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt; memorandum for Director of Naval Intelligence concerning "Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 3ØØ85Ø"; dispatch 3ØØ85Ø from Alusna, Chungking, to OPNAV dated Oct. 30, 1941, and another same date, same correspondents; message dated Oct. 28, 1941, from General Magruder, Chungking, to War Department.
48	1044 12–5–45	1481	Two memoranda dated Nov. 17, 1941, by Brig. General Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers", and letter dated Dec. 20, 1941, to Gen. Delos C. Emmons, from General Marshall, concerning unity of command in Hawaii.
48–A	2093 12–31–45	1484	Memorandum, dated Dec. 5, 1941, from General Marshall for General Gerow, concerning coordination of command.
49	1053 12–6–45	1485	Report dated Mar. 27, 1941, of United States-British Staff conversations (ABC–1).
50	1053 12–6–45	1551	Report of American-Dutch-British Staff conversations at Singapore, dated Apr. 27, 1941 (A. D. B.).

51	1053 12-6-45	1585	Report entitled "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2" (ABC-22).
52	1053 12-6-45	1593	Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, concerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
53	1063 12-6-45	1600	Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
54	1067 12-6-45	1627	"Notes on General Council Meeting", Feb. 19, 1941, concerning "Defense Objectives" (revised Feb. 13, 1941).
55	1067 12-6-45	1628	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff", on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of Pearl Harbor was discussed.
56	1076 12-6-45	1630	Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department" by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff.
57	1077 12-6-45	1631	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941", concerning use of planes in proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B-17 bombers that were not dispatched to Hawaii.
58	1088 12-6-45	1632	List of President's appointments with military representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6, 1941; list of President's appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
59	1092 12-6-45	1635	General Marshall's aide memoire to the President concerning "Defense of Hawaii".
60	1094 12-6-45	1636	General Marshall's memorandum for the President concerning "Ground Forces".
61	1112 12-7-45	1640	Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders.
62	1284 12-10-45	1641	Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed
63	1345 12-11-45	1644	Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General in connection therewith.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
64	1544 12–13–45	1645	Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941.
65	1541 12–13–45	1677	Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated.
66	1642 12–15–45	1680	Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (Ø61255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, by R. E. Schuirmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters.
67	1642 12–15–45	1682	Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President's return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called "parallel action message").
68	1675 12–15–45	1689	Log of U. S. S. *Boise* for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship on certain dates.
69	1677 12–15–45	1715	Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941.
70	1695 12–15–45	1716	Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the President's statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941.
71	1696 12–15–45	1719	Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract from radio address of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese policies.
72	1696 12–15–45	1721	Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassador's reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand; digest of Secretary of State's news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand.
73	1700 12–15–45	1727	Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of State Department on the matter. No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the Konoye cabinet in Japan).

74	1703 12–15–45	1735	Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern offices, advising American citizens to leave the Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 19, 1941.
74–A	2768 1–19–46	1741	Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hostilities.
75	1705 12–15–45	1744	Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining the delivery of the so-called "Ten Point Note" on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note.
76	1709 11–15–45	1754	Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State Minister Meissner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945.
77	1712 12–15–45	1757	Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy, Peiping, China, to State Department presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12, 1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called "green light" dispatch.
78	1724 12–17–45	1768	Navy dispatches concerning "Kra Peninsula Alert (1941)". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
79	1724 12–17–45	1770	Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
80	1724 12–17–45	1774	Office of Naval Intelligence "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations" dated Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, 1941.
81	1724 12–17–45	1837	Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6, 1941.
82	1728 12–17–45	1864	Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP–16).
83	1754 12–17–45	1866	Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (Ø31850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPAC, COM 14, and COM 16, advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts to destroy most of their codes and secret documents.
84	1775 12–17–45	1867	Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo (so-called "Mori telephone call").

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
85	1799 12-18-45	1870	Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through Dec. 3, 1941.
86	1825 12-18-45	1901	Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas.
87	1889 12-19-45	1907	Memorandum, dated Dec. 15, 1945, prepared by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, concerning "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940", with attached documents referred to therein.
88	1912 12-19-45	1937	Sections of document "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, Oct. 23, 1940", concerning duties of "War Plans Division (OP-12)".
89	1938 12-20-45	1937	Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy "For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii".
90	2066 12-31-45	1941	Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories, and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies.
91	2067 12-31-45	1950	Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers and records after outbreak of hostilities.
92	2068 12-31-45	1960	Photostatic copy of pp. 591 to 618, vol. 377, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, containing statement by Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on Jan. 27, 1942.
93	2075 12-31-45	1974	Photostatic copy of p. 2, G-2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941.
94	2078 12-31-45	1975	3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, transmitting the so-called "Ten Point Note" which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull on that date.
95	2091 12-31-45	1987	Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark.

96	2091 12-31-45	1989	Memorandum dated July 16, 1940, and study "Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and certain problems of United States Far Eastern Policy, July 4, 1940", attributed to Stanley K. Hornbeck.
97	2091 12-31-45	2007	Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, concerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda.
98	2093 12-31-45	2014	Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stimson for the President concerning "Japanese Convoy Movement Toward Indo-China".
99	2094 12-31-45	2015	Memorandum dated Sept. 26, 1944, prepared by J. W. Ballantine and M. M. Hamilton, relating their recollection of the delivery of intercepted Japanese messages to Secretary Hull's office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941.
100	2095 12-31-45	2016	Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning "Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay".
101	2095 12-31-45	2023	Log of U. S. S. *Enterprise* from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive.
102	2095 12-31-45	2107	Log of U. S. S. *Lexington* from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
103	2095 12-31-45	2118	"Report of Action With Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941", by Commander, *Enterprise* Air Group to his Commanding Officer, dated Dec. 15, 1941.
104	2095 12-31-45	2122	"U. S. S. *Lexington* War Diary" for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive.
105	2096 12-31-45	2140	Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941.
106	2096 12-31-45	2144	Compilation of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral H. E. Kimmel from Jan. 13 to Dec. 12, 1941.
107	2349 1-4-46	2258	"Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Pearl Harbor Investigations", prepared by Navy Department. It contains endorsements by Secretary James Forrestal, Judge Advocate General, Admiral T. L. Gatch, and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, to the Hewitt Report, and endorsements by the same officials to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry's Findings of Fact.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
107–A	2479 1–5–46	2393	"The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy", including the Fourth Endorsement by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel.
108	2364 1–4–46	2432	Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28, 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", described by him as "a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation".
109	2476 1–5–46	2444	Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941.
110	2477 1–5–46	2444	Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8, 1941.
111	2495 1–15–46	2457	Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence and memoranda.
112	2496 1–15–46	2458	Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
113	2558 1–16–46	2502	Letter, dated Aug. 13, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders, concerning Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, and attached Employment Schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3.
113–A	2807 1–19–46	2532	Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning "Battle Organization and Condition Watches".
113–B	2807 1–19–46	2534	Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL–41, dated Oct. 31, 1941, concerning "Task Forces—Organization and Missions".
113–C	3449 1–31–46	2538	(*a*) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL–41, together with documents which approve same; (*b*) Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing 2 (December 1941).

114	2558 1-16-46	2568	WPPac-46, and letters from Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 25, 1941, promulgating WPPac-46, which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow 5).
115	2558 1-16-46	2601	Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (*a*) Fourteenth Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941; (*b*) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (*c*) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
115-A	3449 1-31-46	2672	Fourteenth Naval District "Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force".
115-B	3450 1-31-46	2677	Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, dated Nov. 27, 1941.
116	2558 1-16-46	2700	Selection of correspondence of Admiral H. R. Stark, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, and others from Feb. 11, 1941, to Oct. 3, 1941, concerning anti-torpedo baffles for protection of ships in harbor against torpedo plane attacks.
117	2559 1-16-46	2707	Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.
117-A	5015 2-20-46	2713	Letter dated Feb. 17, 1941, concerning "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," from Gen. W. C. Short to his Commanders.
118	2559 1-16-46	2714	Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled "Steps to be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours".
119	2559 1-16-46	2716	Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
120	2559 1-16-46	2721	(*a*) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning "Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941"; (*b*) Compilation of dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (*c*) Report of Army-Navy Board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas, Hawaiian area.
121	2561 1-16-46	2727	Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters.
122	2588 1-16-46	2735	Selected correspondence in June and August 1941 of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and Gen. W. C. Short concerning aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
123	2588 1-16-46	2736	Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942.
123-A	5015 2-20-46	2743	Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.)
124	2674 1-17-46	2749	Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29, 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1.
125	2678 1-17-46	2801	Log of the *U. S. S. Wright* from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941.
126	2767 1-19-46	2832	(*a*) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (*b*) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (*c*) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.
127	2768 1-19-46	2867	Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7, 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same subject.)
128	2768 1-19-46	2870	Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii, recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941.
129	2842 1-19-46	2875	Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R. Stark promulgating the plan.
130	2879 1-21-46	2941	Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese and United States air reconnaissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government protesting reported flight of United States planes over Tiawan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's reply to Ambassador Grew.
131	2892 1-21-46	2943	Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army Pearl Harbor Board.

132	2917 1-21-46	2943	Selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 7874–7877, Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Memorandum "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (b) Memorandum "Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941."
132–A	5137 2-20-46	2946	Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 13662–13665 Joint Committee Transcript): (*a*) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881, 941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (*b*) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug. 19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and Vice-Minister Aman; (*c*) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a peace settlement between Japan and China; (*d*) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the progress of Japanese-American negotiations.
133	2965 1-23-46	2953	Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request. Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Commission and Army Pearl Harbor Board.
134	2965 1-23-46	3124	Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population characteristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee.
135	2965 1-23-46	3171	Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning messages of Nov. 27–28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages.
136	2966 1-23-46	3187	Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War.
137	2966 1-23-46	3187	Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material.
138	2976 1-23-46	3195	Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen. F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii". (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 13.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
139	3006 1-23-46	3196	Two reports dated Oct. 17 and 25, 1941, entitled "G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation" by Lt. Col. G. W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department.
140	3188 1-26-46	3203	Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate General, and related material.
141	3311 1-28-46	3254	File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It".
142	3324 1-29-46	3302	Compilation of Material Relating to so-called "Winds" code. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
142-A	3324 1-29-46	3318	(*a*) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese Weather Broadcast; (*b*) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
142-B	3674 2-4-46	3321	Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.
142-C	3741 2-5-46	3322	Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three messages, two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called "winds" messages, indicating no interception by the British or Dutch Governments of a "winds execute" message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.
142-D	3780 2-5-46	3323	Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called "winds" code.
143	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22 through 25.)
144	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. 26.)
145	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 27 through 31.)

146	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.)
147	3929 2-7-47	3332	Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U. S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.)
148	3929 2-7-46	3332	Report of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, A. U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.)
149	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)
150	4063 2-8-46	3333	Letter dated Mar. 18, 1944, from Admiral H. E. Kimmel, retired, to Admiral W. E. Halsey, suggesting questions for Comdr. A. D. Kramer concerning the so-called "winds" message.
151	4421 2-13-46	3335	Six memoranda prepared by Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in connection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese messages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
152	4794 2-18-46	3351	Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, "General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941", prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.
153	5009 2-19-46	3353	Prepared statement dated Dec. 1, 1945 entitled "The War Record of Civilian and Industrial Hawaii", with attached Exhibits, submitted to the Joint Committee by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.
154	5013 2-20-46	3430	Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. L. Martin from Aug. 15 to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
155	5068 2-20-46	3435	Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941.
156	5122 2-20-46	3436	Memorandum dated June 21, 1941 prepared by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning "Final Recommendations Far Eastern Intelligence Organization".
157	5201 4-11-46	3441	Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
158	5201 4–11–46	3441	Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
159	5201 4–11–46	3488	Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
160	5240 4–11–46	3502	Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.
161	5241 4–11–46	3508	Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)
161–A	5464 5–23–46	3520	Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.
162	5269 4–11–46	3534	Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.
162–A	5464 5–23–46	3543	Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.
163	5292 4–11–46	3557	Log of the U. S. S. *Helena* from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.
164	5292 4–11–46	3593	Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
165	5292 4–11–46	3643	Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.
166	5468 5–23–46	3648	State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)

167	5468 5–23–46	3652	(*a*) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (*b*) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 26, 1941, relating to the delivery of (*a*); (*c*) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery and text of (*a*); and (*d*) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (*a*) and general Far East matters.
168	5468 5–23–46	3666	Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed *modus vivendi*, which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
169	5469 5–23–46	3696	Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
170	5469 5–23–46	3789	Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.
171	5469 5–23–46	3942	Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
172	5469 5–23–46	3978	Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and antiaircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.
173	5469 5–23–46	3985	Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.
174	5469 5–23–46	4030	Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
175	5470 5–23–46	4115	Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President.
176	5470 5–23–46	4121	Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
177	5470 5–23–46	4132	Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
178	5470 5–23–46	4209	Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
179	5470 5–23–46	4241	Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.
180	5471 5–23–46	4551	Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
181	5520 5–23–46	4565	The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.
182	5537 5–23–46	4702	Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G–2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.
183	5468 5–23–46	4766	Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the *Utah* by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940–45 production of B–17 4-engine bombers.

EXHIBIT NO. 129

[i]

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, May 26, 1941.

Op–12B–5–McC
(SC) A16(R–5)
Serial 060512

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Distribution List for WPL–46.

Subject: Promulgation of Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL–46).

Enclosures:

(A) Pages for WPL–46, Registered No. 92, including List of Effective Pages.
(B) Receipt form in duplicate.

1. Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL–46) is promulgated herewith.
2. Report receipt, and check of contents, on the form provided as enclosure (B).
3. The highest priority in the preparation of war plans is assigned to plans required by WPL–46.
4. It is desired that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accomplished with the least possible delay. To this end, all planning based upon the directives of WPL–13, WPL–14, WPL–42, and WPL–44 will be discontinued until plans based upon WPL–46 are completed.
5. Appendix II, Chapter IX, prescribing the composition of the Naval Transportation Service will be issued as a change to this plan. If this plan is executed prior to the issue of Chapter IX, specific directives will be issued to provide for the initial sea transportation requirements of the plan.
6. The extreme importance of the security of this Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, cannot be over-emphasized. In this respect, attention is invited to the instructions contained in "The System of War Planning", and in the "Registered Publication Manual".
7. Plans and estimates of requirements for the preparation for war service of vessels to be taken over from private sources, as indicated in the tables of Appendix II, will be classified as confidential. Attention is invited to paragraph 1105 of WPL–8.

[ii] 8. This plan shall not be carried in aircraft except by authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, and when not in use shall be kept in Class "A" stowage as prescribed in the "Registered Publication Manual".

9. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT IN SUBORDINATE PLANS BASED UPON THIS PUBLICATION.

H. R. STARK.

[iii]

Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Subject Matter	Page or Sheet No. [1]	Change in Effect
Letter of Promulgation, CNO Secret Serial 060512, (SC) A16(R–5) of May 26, 1941.	i, ii	Original
List of Effective Pages	iii	Original
Table of Corrections	iv	Original
Distribution List	v, vi	Original
Title Page	1	Original
Table of Contents	2 to 4 inc	Original
Introduction	5 to 8 inc	Original
Part I	9, 10	Original
Chart	11	Original
Part I (Cont'd)	12	Original
Part II	13, 14	Original
Part III	15 to 60 inc	Original
Part IV	61 to 80 inc	Original
Part V	81, 82	Original
Appendix I	1 to 51 inc	Original

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5—Continued

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES—Continued

Subject Matter	Page or Sheet No. [1]	Change in Effect
Appendix II:		
Title Page	1	Original
Chapter I	2, 3	Original
Chapter II	4, 5	Original
Table ATF-1	1 to 3 inc.	Original
Chapter III	6	Original
Table PAF-1	1 to 3 inc.	Original
Table PAF-2	1	Original
Chapter IV:		
Table SEP-1	1	Original
Chapter V:		
Table ASF-1	1, 2	Original
Chapter VI	7	Original
Table NE-1	1	Original
Table NE-2	1	Original
Chapter VII:		
Table CNO-1	1	Original
Chapter VIII	8 to 10 inc.	Original
Table NACF	1 to 5 inc.	Original
Table SCF	1 to 4 inc.	Original
Table CACF	1	Original
Table PACF	1	Original
Table PSCF	1 to 3 inc.	Original
Table PNCF	1	Original
Table HCF	1	Original
Table PhCF	1	Original
Chapter IX	11	Original

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[iv] TABLE OF CORRECTIONS

R. P. M. or Change No.	Date of entry	Signature and rank of officer entering change.
1	26-7-44	Marion L. Monsen Ens. U. S. N. R.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 3, 1941.

Op-12B-5-McC
(SC)A16(R-5)
Serial 064112

Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Distribution List for WPL-46.
Subject: Change No. 1, WPL-46.

1. Make the following pen and ink corrections to WPL-46:
(a) *On Page 45*
Paragraph 3511.a.2.(f), first line—Change 13,400 to 6,400.
Paragraph 3511.a.2(g), first line—Change 23,600 to 12,600.
Paragraph 3511.a.2.(i), first line—Change 44,000 to 23,000.
(b) *On Page 80*
Paragraph 4601, first line,—after "will be" insert "prepared as".
(c) *On Page 30 of Appendix I*
Paragraph 51.*a.*(13), first line—Change 13,400 to 6,400.
Paragraph 51.*a.*(14), first line—Change 23,600 to 12,600.
(d) *On Page 31 of Appendix I*
Paragraph 51.*a.*(16), first line—Change 44,000 to 23,000.
2. Insert this letter in the front of WPL-46.
3. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

R. E. INGERSOLL, *Acting.*

[V]

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Official to whom issued	*Registered Nos*
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet	1
Commander, Battle Force	2
Commander, Battleships, Battle Force	3
Commander, Battleship Division One (issue withheld)	4
Commander, Battleship Division Two (issue withheld)	5
Commander, Battleship Division Three	6
Commander, Battleship Division Five	7
Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force	8
Commander, Cruiser Division Three, Battle Force	9
Commander, Destroyers, Battle Force	10
Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force	11
Commander, Minecraft, Battle Force	12
Commander, Scouting Force	13
Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force	14
Commander, Aircraft, Scouting Force	15
Commander, Submarines, Scouting Force	16
Commander, Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet	17
Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet	18
Commander, Cruisers, Atlantic Fleet	19
Commander, Cruiser Division Two, Atlantic Fleet	20
Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet	21
Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet	22
Commander, Submarines, Atlantic Fleet	23
Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet	24
Commander, Train, Atlantic Fleet	25
Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet	26
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Division	27
Commanding General, Second Marine Division	28
Operations—Director, War Plans Division	29, 30, 31
—Director, Naval Intelligence Division	32
—Director, Naval Communications Division	33
—Director, Fleet Maintenance Division	34
—Director, Ship Movements Division	35
—Director, Naval Districts Division	36
—Director, Naval Transportation Service (Issued to Director, Ship Movements Division)	37
Chief of Bureau of Navigation	38, 39
Chief of Bureau of Ordnance	40
Chief of Bureau of Ships	41
Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks	42
Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics	43
Chief of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts	44, 45
Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery	46
[VI] Judge Advocate General, U. S. Navy	47
Major General Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps	48
Director, Shore Establishment Division (Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy)	49
War Plans Division, General Staff, War Department	50
President, Naval War College	51
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Op–12B–McC
(SC)A16(R–5)
Serial 071912

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICER OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, July 1, 1941.

Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Distribution List for WPL–46.
Subject: The establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers.
Reference:

(a) GO No. 142.
(b) GO No. 143.
(c) WPL–46.

1. The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232 and 3312 of WPL–46 are hereby established.

2. The boundaries of the Naval Coastal Frontiers are as prescribed in Annex I, Appendix I, WPL–46.

3. The command relations prescribed in Part III, Chapter I, Section 3, and Part III, Chapter II, Section 4, of WPL–46, are hereby made effective and, in accordance with the provisions of these sections, the conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended.

4. For the present, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces as prescribed in General Order No. 143 will not be formed. Vessels assigned to Naval Districts and Naval Stations will continue in these assignments, and, until further orders, new assignments of vessels will be made to Naval Districts or Naval Stations, rather than to Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, Naval Coastal Forces, or Naval Local Defense Forces.

5. The Bureau of Navigation will issue orders assigning officers to additional duties as Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers as indicated:

Commandant, 3rd Naval District—Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier;
Commandant, 6th Naval District—Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier;
Commandant, 10th Naval District—Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier;
Commandant, 15th Naval District—Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier;
Commandant, 12th Naval District—Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Frontier;
Commandant, 13th Naval District—Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Frontier;
Commandant, 14th Naval District—Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier;
Commandant, 16th Naval District—Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier.

6. The establishment of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the orders to the commanders thereof, is assigned a *RESTRICTED* classification. The limits of the Naval Coastal Frontiers remains in a *SECRET* classification. Correspondence relating to Naval Coastal Frontiers will be classified according to its nature.

7. Transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.

/s/ H. R. STARK.

[1] W. P. L.—46

NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW NO. 5, UNITED STATES NAVY

[2] TABLE OF CONTENTS

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[5] INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I. ORIGIN, BASIS, AND SCOPE OF THIS PLAN

0101. This Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was prepared under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

0102. It is based upon the Report of the United States-British Staff Conversations (Short Title ABC–1), the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (Short Title ABC–22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5.

0103. The United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC–1) and the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (ABC–22) will be given only a limited distribution to holders of this plan. These documents are referred to in this plan by their short titles. Their essential features, so far as concerns war operations, are incorporated in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, which is included in this plan as Appendix I.

0104. This plan provides for the initial organization, composition of forces and tasks for the Naval Establishment in a Rainbow No. 5 War.

0105. After the execution of this plan has been directed, no attempt will be made to maintain the tables of Appendix II corrected up to date. Changes in the composition of forces will be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations and shown subsequently in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy," and in the "Assignment of Units to Naval Districts and Naval Stations."

[6] CHAPTER II. EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN

Section 1. EXECUTION OF THE ENTIRE PLAN

0211. a. Upon the receipt of the following ALNAV despatch, the Naval Establishment will proceed with the execution of this plan in its entirety, including acts of war: "EXECUTE NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN RAINBOW No. 5".

b. The date of the above despatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise designated.

[7] *Section 2. EXECUTION OF A PART OF THIS PLAN*

0221. A preliminary period of strained relations of uncertain duration is anticipated, during which time certain preliminary steps provided for in this plan may be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

0222. Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan or any part thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war.

0223. This plan may be executed in part by a despatch indicating the nations to be considered enemy, the tasks to be executed, or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan or additional tasks thereof.

[8] CHAPTER III. AGREEMENTS WITH ASSOCIATED POWERS OTHER THAN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

0301. The substance of agreements reached with Associated Powers other than those with the British Commonwealth, including Canada, insofar as they relate to the operation of naval forces, will be made available to the holders of this plan, as soon as made, by revision of this Chapter III of the Introduction.

0302. Brazil, for the purposes of defense of the Western Hemisphere, has agreed to permit United States naval forces to use the ports of RECIFE and BAHIA.

a. There is at present no time limit on the duration of stay in these ports.

b. They are available for refreshment and upkeep, and for the purchase and delivery of fuel, consumable supplies and fresh provisions within the limited capacities of the ports.

c. A United States Naval Observer is stationed at each port.

d. On first entry, two days confidential advance notice of arrival should be given to the United States Naval Observer at the port via the United States Naval Attache, Rio de Janeiro. This notice should include information in regard to communicable diseases and last port visited. Pratique and customs clearance are not required.

e. For repeated entry, incident to extended operations in the vicinity, local arrangements as to notice may be made with the Brazilian Captain of the Port, through the United States Naval Observer.

[9] PART I. TASK ORGANIZATION. INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1101. The task organization, by which this Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 will be executed, under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, is prescribed below:

a. *THE OPERATING FORCES*, under command of the Chief of Naval Operations.

1. *THE UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET*, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
2. *THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET*, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
3. *THE UNITED STATES SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE*, under command of the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE.
4. *THE UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET*, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.
5. *THE UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE*, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE.
6. *THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES*, under the command of the Commanders, NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, consisting of:

(a) *THE NAVAL COASTAL FORCES;*
(b) *THE NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES.*

b. *THE SERVICES*, under command of the Chief of Naval Operations.

1. *THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE.*
2. *THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE.*
3. *THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.*

c. *THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT*, under the direction of the appropriate Chiefs of Bureaus, and Heads of Offices of the Navy Department.

[10] 1102. Major areas of command and instructions concerning responsibility for the strategic direction of military forces therein are set forth in Appendix I, "Section V". In paragraph 3222 of this plan is defined an additional subarea, designated as the "SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA." In Annex I, of Appendix I, are the sub-areas which are included in the Naval Coastal Frontiers.

1103. Command over naval forces in the areas and sub-areas for which the United States has accepted responsibility for the strategic direction of operations will be exercised by the appropriate United States naval commanders listed in paragraph 1101 a. of this plan, subject to the special conditions set forth in Appendix I, "Section V."



[12] CHAPTER II. INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

1201. Assumptions are as stated in Appendix I, "Section III."

[13] PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. CONCEPT OF THE WAR

2101. The Concept of the War is as stated in Appendix I, "Section IV."

[14] CHAPTER II. THE GENERAL TASK

2201. The Joint Army and Navy General Task is set forth in paragraph 24 of Appendix I.

2202. The Navy General Task is as follows:

a. The Naval Establishment, in cooperation with the Army and the forces of the other Associated Powers, will:

1. Destroy Axis sea communications in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, in the PACIFIC AREA east of 180°, and through the MALAY BARRIER in the FAR EAST AREA;

2. Raid Axis forces and sea communications in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST AREAS, and in the EASTERN ATLANTIC and the WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN;

3. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers in United States Areas, and support the defense of sea communications in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, in the FAR EAST AREA, and to the eastward of AUSTRALIA;

4. Prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic military power, and support the defense of the territory of the Associated Powers in the FAR EAST AREA; and

5. Prepare to capture the AZORES, CAPE VERDE, MARSHALL, and CAROLINE ISLANDS.

[15] PART III. ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. FORCES IN THE WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA

Section 1. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET

3111. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (Chapter II, Appendix II) will initially be organized into task forces as follows:

a. *OCEAN ESCORT;*
b. *STRIKING FORCE;*
c. *SOUTHERN PATROL FORCE;*
d. *SUBMARINE FORCE ONE;*
e. *SUBMARINE FORCE TWO;*
f. *SUBMARINE FORCE THREE;*
g. *NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE;*
h. *U. S. NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA;*
i. *ADDITIONAL TASK FORCES AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.*

3112. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA:

a. *TASK*

PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES (see Part III, Chapter V, Section 1);

b. *TASK*

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;

[16] c. *TASK*

PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND

AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE;

d. *TASK*

IN COOPERATION WITH BRITISH FORCES AND THE U. S. ARMY, DEFEND BERMUDA IN CATEGORY "C";

e. *TASK*

COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE U. S. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES;

f. *TASK*

PREPARE TO OCCUPY THE AZORES AND THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS.

3113. a. So far as practicable, the naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA will be covered and supported against attack by superior enemy surface forces, by the naval forces of the Associated Powers which are operating from bases in the UNITED KINGDOM and the EASTERN ATLANTIC.

b. Forces operating normally in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, and the SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA, which move temporarily into the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA in pursuance of their assigned tasks, will remain under the strategic direction of the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff. They will be supported by the naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA as necessary and practicable.

3114. a. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until its arrival in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.

[17] b. This force will be assigned the following task by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET:

1. *TASK*

PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO GIBRALTAR, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

c. After arrival of SUBMARINE FORCE TWO in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA this force will execute the following task:

1. *TASK*

RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN, ACTING THROUGH THE BRITISH (OR UNITED STATES) FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING NORTH ATLANTIC.

d. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will remain a part of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for administrative purposes.

3115. a. *THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE* and *SUBMARINE FORCE THREE* will operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.

b. These forces will each be assigned the following task by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET:

1. *TASK*

PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

[18] c. Upon arrival in UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE will be detached from the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and be assigned to U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE. Their tasks thereafter are to be found in Part III, Chapter IV, Section 1.

3116. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will arrange for the logistic support for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (see Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2) operating in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA from sources designated by the Shore Establishment in the continental United States and outlying possessions and bases in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and from United States and foreign (outside the British Isles) commercial sources. For

this purpose he will employ the transportation facilities of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, which will be supplemented, as required, by those of the Naval Transportation Service.

b. Logistic support for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, and other United States forces operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, will be arranged as indicated herein. Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service.

1. Fuel and subsistence stores from United States naval auxiliaries, supplemented as may be practicable from British sources available in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.

2. Personnel, technical supplies, and ammunition from United States sources.

3. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels, and temporary shore facilities erected by the United States, supplemented by use of available British facilities.

4. Replacement of British fuel and subsistence stores from United States sources.

[19] c. In emergency circumstances where the transportation facilities of the Naval Transportation Service are inadequate for the logistic support of SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, or of other U. S. Naval forces operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, the Senior U. S. Naval Officer of forces based in that area is authorized to charter, on a time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available.

d. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will establish in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations an officer of the staff of the Commander, TRAIN, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect to the quantities and the transportation of logistic requirements, including personnel, for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.

e. Logistic support for the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE, after transfer to the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be provided as directed in Part III, Chapter IV, Section 1.

3117. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will require the preparation of the following plans:

1. *U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Navy Plan 0–3, RAINBOW No. 5);

2. *NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE MOVEMENT PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Navy Plan 0–3–A, RAINBOW No. 5), covering the movement of this force and the first movement of Army troops to ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, and NORTH IRELAND (See paragraph 3511 a. 2. (b));

3. *SUBMARINE FORCE THREE MOVEMENT PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Navy Plan 0–3–B, RAINBOW No. 5) covering the movement of this force to the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA;

4. Such other subordinate task force operating [20] plans as the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may direct, including the movement plan for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO. No operating plan for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, for operations after arrival in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, need be prepared.

b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1, 2, 3, and 4, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.'

[21] *Section 2. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES*

3121. a. The organization of NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES is prescribed in General Order No. 143.

b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers, Coastal Zones, Sectors, and Subsectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935", as modified by Annex I of Appendix I.

3122. The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA are:

a. THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
b. THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
c. THE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
d. THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

1. All tasks assigned to the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER are contained in this Section, including those for the PACIFIC SECTOR.

3123. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Appendix II) in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA are assigned the following tasks:

a. *TASK*

DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER IN CATEGORIES INDICATED BELOW:

CATEGORY B—THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

—THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

CATEGORY D—THE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

—THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

[*22*] b. *TASK*

PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VII, SECTION 3;

c. *TASK*

SUPPORT THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET;

d. *TASK*

SUPPORT ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN THE COASTAL FRONTIER.

e. In addition, the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES of the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER are assigned the following task:

1. *TASK*

SUPPORT THE U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE.

3124. a. The following plans will be prepared:

1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix I, paragraph 48, of this plan;

2. By the Commanders, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER:

(a) *Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans—RAINBOW No. 5*, including an annex covering the operating plans of the Naval Coastal Force. (Naval Coastal Frontier Plans 0–4, RAINBOW No. 5);

3. By Commanders, CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and by Commandants, FIRST, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICTS:

[*23*] (a) *Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans—RAINBOW No. 5* (Naval District Plans 0–5, RAINBOW No. 5);

(b) *Joint Embarkation Plans* as required in Appendix I, paragraph 48;

4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval Districts.

b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans, and other plans prepared by the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Operating Plans prepared by the Commandants of Naval Districts will be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.

3. Subordinate Task Force Operating Plans will be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, or Commandants of Naval Districts.

4. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Force Operating Plans for the NORTH ATLANTIC and SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, and Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans for the CARIBBEAN and PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS will be forwarded to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for comment, prior to their review by the Chief of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination with the Operating Plans of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.

(b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans and Naval District Contributory Plans, as relate to the protection of fleet anchorages and to services to the U. S. [*24*] ATLANTIC FLEET, will be referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for comment, if he so requests.

5. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[*25*] *Section 3. COMMAND RELATIONS*

3131. In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, in

the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, the following provisions shall apply:

a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER so far as regards operations in the ATLANTIC SECTOR, are assigned a dual status as follows:

1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations;

2. As officers of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, operating under the orders of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, in command of task groups of that fleet, when and as directed by the Commander in Chief thereof.

b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may thereafter require the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, temporarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will, when taking temporary command of such task forces, have due regard to the tasks assigned in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.

1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will not require task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the limits of their respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

[*26*] c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while the provisions of this paragraph are in effect.

3132. The NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA, by this plan is assigned as a unit of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, both for administrative and task purposes.

3133. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval Local Defense Forces, the Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and the Commander, SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER have authority to coordinate the activities of the Commandants of the Naval Districts within their respective Naval Coastal Frontiers, in matters that concern the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence Service, and the Naval Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given to the requirements of the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3134. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign temporarily to the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force.

b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

3135. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, Appendix I, after ABC–22 has been approved.

[*27*] CHAPTER II. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AREA

Section 1. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

3211. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET (Chapter III, Appendix II) will be organized into task forces as follows:

a. Task forces as directed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET;

b. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA;

c. NAVAL STATION, GUAM.

3212. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the PACIFIC AREA:

a. *TASK*

SUPPORT THE FORCES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE FAR EAST BY DIVERTING ENEMY STRENGTH AWAY FROM THE MALAY BARRIER, THROUGH THE DENIAL AND CAPTURE OF POSITIONS IN THE MARSHALLS, AND THROUGH RAIDS ON ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND POSITIONS;

b. *TASK*
PREPARE TO CAPTURE AND ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE CAROLINE AND MARSHALL ISLAND AREA, AND TO ESTABLISH AN ADVANCED FLEET BASE IN TRUK;
c. *TASK*
DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;
d. *TASK*
SUPPORT BRITISH NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA SOUTH OF THE EQUATOR AS FAR WEST AS LONGITUDE 155° EAST;
[28] e. *TASK*
DEFEND SAMOA IN CATAGORY "D";
f. *TASK*
DEFEND GUAM IN CATAGORY "F";
g. *TASK*
PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES (See Part III, Chapter V, Section 1);
h. *TASK*
PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE PACIFIC AREA AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONS AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE;
i. *TASK*
COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES;
j. *TASK*
ESTABLISH FLEET CONTROL ZONES, DEFINING THEIR LIMITS FROM TIME TO TIME AS CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE;
k. *TASK*
ROUTE SHIPPING OF ASSOCIATED POWERS WITHIN THE FLEET CONTROL ZONES.

[29] 3213. a. Units assigned to the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT in Chapter III, Appendix II, will be transferred from the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, when directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

b. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II), will be established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations, when so directed by that officer.

c. Until detached, the units assigned to the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT and the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE will be under the command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and may be employed as desired by him, so long as they remain in the PACIFIC AREA. They shall not be sent to such distances from PEARL HARBOR as would prevent their arrival in the CANAL ZONE twenty-one days after the Chief of Naval Operations directs their transfer from the PACIFIC AREA.

3214. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will arrange for the logistic support of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET from sources in continental United States and in the FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT designated by the Shore Establishment, and from United States and foreign commercial sources. (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.) For this purpose he will employ the transportation facilities of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, which will be supplemented as required by those of the Naval Transportation Service.

b. To the extent practicable, the services of the Naval Transportation Service will be restricted to supplementing the movement of logistic supplies, including personnel, between the continental United States and OAHU.

c. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, an officer of the staff of the Commander, BASE FORCE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect to the quantities and transportation of logistic requirements, including personnel, to be delivered into the Fleet Control Zones. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may,

at his discretion, establish similar liaison officers in the offices of the Commanders of other Naval Coastal Frontiers.

[30] 3215. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will require the following plans to be prepared:

1. *THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Navy Plan O–1, RAINBOW No. 5);

2. A plan for the execution of TASK b. of paragraph 3212, assuming the availability of approximately 30,000 Army troops in addition to forces of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and assuming that the task will be executed on 180M;

3. *NAVAL STATION, SAMOA, NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Naval Station Samoa Plan O–5, RAINBOW No. 5);

4. Such other subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may direct.

b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1. and 2, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. The NAVAL STATION GUAM Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plan—RAINBOW No. 3 will be applicable, and no additional plan need be prepared.

NOTE: The Commandant, Naval Station, GUAM, is not included in the distribution of this Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5.

[31] *Section 2. THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE*

3221. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II) will be established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations upon its arrival in the CANAL ZONE.

3222. This force will base on the Naval Operating Base, BALBOA, or in SOUTH AMERICAN ports as may later be directed, and will operate in the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA, delimited as that part of the PACIFIC AREA south of the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and between the west coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.

3223. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE is assigned the following tasks:

a. *TASK*
DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;

b. *TASK*
PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, OR PATROLLING AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES;

c. *TASK*
SUPPORT THE OPERATIONS OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES IN THE PACIFIC SECTOR;

d. *TASK*
PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE NATIONS ON THE WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA.

[32] 3224. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, will arrange for the logistic support of the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE from Shore Establishment sources in the FIFTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and from foreign commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2). Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service.

b. In circumstances where transportation facilities provided by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him, for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available.

3225. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, will require the preparation of the following plans:

1. *U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Navy Plan O–3–C, RAINBOW No. 5);

2. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, may direct.

b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1. will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[33] *Section 3. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES*

3231. a. The organization of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES is prescribed in General Order No. 143.

b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers, Coastal Zones, Sectors, and Subsectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935," as modified by Annex I of Appendix I.

3232. The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the PACIFIC AREA are:

a. PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;

b. PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;

c. HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

3233. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Appendix II) in the PACIFIC AREA are assigned the following tasks:

a. *TASK*

DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS IN CATEGORIES INDICATED BELOW:

CATEGORY B—THE PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

—THE PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, EXCEPT THE ALASKAN SECTOR.

CATEGORY C—THE ALASKAN SECTOR OF THE PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, EXCEPT UNALASKA.

CATEGORY D—UNALASKA.—THE HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;

[34] b. *TASK*

PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VII, SECTION 3;

c. *TASK*

SUPPORT THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET;

d. *TASK*

SUPPORT THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN THE COASTAL FRONTIERS.

3234. a. The following plans will be prepared:

1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix I, paragraph 48;

2. By the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER:

(a) *Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plan—RAINBOW No. 5*, including an annex covering the operating plan of the Naval Coastal Force (Naval Coastal Frontier Plan 0-4, RAINBOW No. 5);

3. By Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and by the Commandant, ELEVENTH and TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICTS:

(a) *Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans—RAINBOW No. 5* (Naval District Plans 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5);

(b) Joint Embarkation Plans as required in Appendix I, paragraph 48;

[35] 4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval Districts.

b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans and other plans prepared by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Operating plans prepared by Commandants of Naval Districts will be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.

3. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans for the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans for the HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will be forwarded to the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for comment, prior to their review by the Chief of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination with the Operating Plans of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

(b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans and Naval District Contributory Plans as relate to the protection of fleet anchorages and to services to the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will be referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for comment, if he so requests.

4. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[36] *Section 4. COMMAND RELATIONS*

3241. In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET and of the PACIFIC NORTHERN and PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, in the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, the following provisions shall apply (see paragraph 3242):

a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will be assigned a dual status as follows:

1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. As officers of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET operating under the orders of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, in command of task groups of that fleet when and as directed by the Commander in Chief thereof.

b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may thereafter require the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, temporarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, when taking temporary command of such task forces, will have due regard for the tasks assigned in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers by the Chief of Naval Operations.

1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will not require task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the limits of their respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while the provisions of this paragraph are in effect.

[37] 3242. The provisions of paragraph 3241 above, apply to the command relations of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and the Commander, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, except that the circumstances under which its provisions are applicable are not restricted to the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, but apply in all circumstances.

3243. The Chief of Naval Operations will direct the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, to operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if coordinated action of that force and the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET becomes necessary. The Chief of Naval Operations will be informed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if this situation arises.

3244. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval Local Defense Forces, the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, has authority to coordinate the activities of the Commandants of the Naval Districts within his respective Naval Coastal Frontier in matters that concern the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence Service, and the Naval Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given to the requirements of the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3245. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign, *temporarily*, to the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force.

b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

3246. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, Appendix I, after ABC–22 has been approved.

[38] CHAPTER III. FORCES IN THE FAR EAST AREA

Section 1. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET AND THE PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

3311. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 16.b.:

"Far East Area

"Coordination in the planning and execution of operations by Military forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East Indies, in the FAR EAST AREA will, subject to the approval of the Dutch authorities, be effected as follows:

"(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers will collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in that area.

"(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may be practicable and appropriate.

"(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the PHILIPPINES, will be assumed by the British Naval Commander in Chief, CHINA. The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the PHILIPPINES."

3312. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is the immediate superior in command of the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, who is also designated as the Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER (see Chapter V, Appendix II).

b. The organization of Naval Coastal Frontiers is prescribed in General Order No. 143.

[39] c. The boundaries of the PHILIPPINE COASTAL FRONTIER, and the extent of the PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935", as modified by Annex I of Appendix I.

d. The Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will employ the Naval Local Defense Force in the execution of tasks assigned by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army, under the direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

3313. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks:

a. *TASK*
RAID JAPANESE SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND DESTROY AXIS FORCES;

b. *TASK*
SUPPORT THE LAND AND AIR FORCES IN THE DEFENSE OF THE TERRITORIES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS. (THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET, FOR SUPPORTING THE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES REMAINS SO LONG AS THAT DEFENSE CONTINUES.);

c. *TASK*
DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;

d. *TASK*

PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES;

[40] e. *TASK*

IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY DEFEND THE PHILIPPINE COASTAL FRONTIER—CATEGORY OF DEFENSE "E";

f. *TASK*

ROUTE UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH THE OTHER ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE FAR EAST AREA.

3314. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will shift base to BRITISH or DUTCH ports at discretion.

3315. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will arrange for the logistic support of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET from sources in the SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in continental United States; from commercial sources in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; and from British and Dutch governmental and commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.).

b. Logistic requirements other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, will be obtained from sources in the FAR EAST AREA or from sources in the adjacent BRITISH AREAS.

c. Personnel, ammunition, and technical materials will be obtained from sources in the United States.

d. Transportation facilities available to the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET will be employed so far as practicable for the movement of logistic supplies. The Naval Transportation Service will provide transportation for shipments from the United States. The first two of these vessels to arrive in the FAR EAST AREA may be retained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, for use in that Area.

[41] e. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, may acquire through the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in accordance with the provisions of existing law, any vessels of United States' or Philippine registry by requisition, time charter, or bare boat charter, to supplement the transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

f. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, supplemented as provided for in paragraphs d. and e., are inadequate, the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed if available.

3316. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will require the following plans to be prepared:

1. *THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Navy Plan O–2, RAINBOW No. 5);

2. Local Joint Plans required by Appendix I, Paragraph 48;

3. *SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5.* (Sixteenth Naval District Plan O–5, RAINBOW No. 5);

4. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, may direct.

b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[42] CHAPTER IV. FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA

Section 1. THE U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE

3411. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, is also the naval member of the United States Military Mission in London.

b. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will come under the administrative command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, upon the arrival of these forces in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.

3412. a. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE (Chapter VI, Appendix II) will be organized into task forces as follows:

1. *THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE;*
2. *SUBMARINE FORCE THREE.*

b. These task forces will operate under the command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.

3413. After their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, the task forces of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, are assigned the following tasks:

a. *THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE*

1. *TASK*

ESCORT CONVOYS IN THE NORTHWEST APPROACHES, ACTING UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE WESTERN APPROACHES;

b. *SUBMARINE FORCE THREE*

1. *TASK*

RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN AN AREA TO BE DESIGNATED, UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH VICE ADMIRAL, SUBMARINES.

[43] 3414. Logistic support for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be arranged as indicated herein (see Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2). Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service, or from vessels assigned to the task forces.

a. Fuel from United States and British sources.

b. Personnel, technical supplies, ammunition, and subsistence supplies from United States sources.

c. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels and shore facilities assigned to this force, supplemented by a limited use of British facilities.

d. Replacement of fuel to British storage from United States sources.

e. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and those provided by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, or a bare boat basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available.

3415. a. Outline operating plans for the employment of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be prepared by the prospective Commander of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, and submitted to the prospective Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, for review by the British Commander in Chief, WESTERN APPROACHES. After review and acceptance, copies of this plan will be furnished the Chief of Naval Operations.

[44] CHAPTER V. THE SERVICES

Section 1. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

3511. The NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE (Chapter IX, Appendix II) is assigned the following task:

a. *TASK*

PROVIDE SEA TRANSPORTATION FOR THE INITIAL MOVEMENT AND THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF ARMY AND NAVY FORCES OVERSEAS, OTHER THAN THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE TRANSPORTED BY THE OPERATING FORCES. MAN AND OPERATE THE ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE.

1. Deliveries may be made by commercial transportation or by vessels of the Naval Transportation Service as circumstances require.

2. The initial movements of U. S. Army troops under this task are as indicated in this paragraph. Larger movements may be made eventually, as indicated in Appendix I, paragraph 51, but the Navy will make no plans for these later movements until so directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(a) *NEW YORK to ICELAND*, 26,500 troops, 73 aircraft. First contingent—10,500 troops embark on 24M. Second contingent—16,000 troops embark on 57M. These two movements will be made by British transports if arrangements can be effected. If not, this plan contemplates use of United States transports.

(b) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 7,000 troops embark on 10M.
NEW YORK to IRELAND, 8,000 troops embark on 10M.

(1) These two forces will move in one convoy.

(c) *NEW YORK to BERMUDA*, 3,700 troops, 38 aircraft, embark on 18M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 30 aircraft will be [45] transported. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

(d) *GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA*, 6,000 troops, embark on 15M.

(e) *GALVESTON to TRINIDAD*, 12,500 troops embark on 15M.

(f) *GALVESTON to PANAMA*, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark on 20M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

(g) *GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO*, 12,600 troops, of 4,000 embark 20M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

(h) *SEATTLE to ALASKA*, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark on 10M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before M-day.

(i) *SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII*, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000 embark on 10M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of these troops may be moved before M-day.

3. The supply levels for the support of overseas forces which are to be transported by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, are indicated in Appendix I, paragraph 57.

3512. Shipping will be routed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders of the Operating Forces in accordance with instructions contained in Part III, Chapter VII, Section 3.

[46] 3513. The Director, Naval Transportation Service, will prepare the Principal Naval Transportation Service Operating Plan—Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe therein, the Naval Transportation Service Operating Plans—Rainbow No. 5, which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts.

(47) *Section 2. THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE*

3521. The NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE is assigned the following tasks:

a. *TASK*

INSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AND A SYSTEM FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT ADEQUATE TO THE NEEDS OF THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT IN THE EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN;

b. *TASK*

IN COOPERATION, WHERE NECESSARY, WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND INDEPENDENT OFFICES, AND SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PERTINENT LEGISLATION, PROCLAMATIONS, AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS, PROVIDE FOR THE OPERATION OR SUPPRESSION, CONTROL, OR SUPERVISION, AS NECESSARY, OF NON-MILITARY COMMUNICATION STATIONS IN AREAS UNDER UNITED STATES' CONTROL.

3522. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Communications) comprises the following:

a. Office of the Director, Naval Communications, Navy Department;

b. The Communication Organization under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts and Outlying Naval Stations; and under command of commanders of forces afloat, including aircraft.

3523. The Director, Naval Communication Service, will prepare the Principal Naval Communication Service Operating Plan—Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe therein, the Naval Communication Service Operating Plans—Rainbow No. 5 which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts.

[48] *Section 3. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE*

3531. The NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE is assigned the following asks:

a. *TASK*

IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED POWERS, SECURE, AND DISSEMINATE AS ADVISABLE, SUCH INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING THE ENEMY, ENEMY AGENTS AND SYMPATHIZERS, AS WILL ASSIST AND FACILITATE THE EXECUTION OF NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5 AND THE PROTECTION OF THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT;

b. *TASK*

IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, PREVENT THE TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION OF MILITARY OR ECONOMIC VALUE TO THE ENEMY.

3532. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence), comprises the following:

a. Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, including naval attaches, naval observers, and other personnel directly under the Director of Naval Intelligence;

b. The Naval Intelligence organization under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts, the Navy Yard, Washington, D. C., and Outlying Naval Stations, including the field units of the respective subordinate activities.

3533. The Director, Naval Intelligence Service, will prepare the Principal Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plan—Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe therein the Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plans—Rainbow No. 5, which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts.

[49] CHAPTER VI. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

3601. The task of the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is prescribed in Part IV

[50] CHAPTER VII. INSTRUCTIONS JOINTLY APPLICABLE TO TASK FORCES

Section 1. FORMING THE TASK FORCES

3711. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will be formed on M-day or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

a. Units of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, designated for assignment to NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, when directed by the respective Commanders in Chief of the Fleets, will report to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, to which assigned.

b. Vessels of NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT (See General Order No. 143), designated for assignment to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, when directed by the Commandants of the Naval Districts, will report to the commanders of task organizations to which assigned.

c. Vessels to be mobilized, upon completion of mobilization, and when directed by the Commandants of Naval Districts in which they mobilize, will report to the commanders of task organizations to which assigned.

3712. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue special instructions to vessels of the Naval Transportation Service and to vessels operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations as circumstances require.

3713. a. Coast Guard Districts, including vessels, aircraft and shore establishments within the Districts, upon M-day or sooner if directed by the President, will automatically come under the control of Naval Districts in the manner set forth in the "United States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940."

b. The Commandants of Naval Districts will direct the Coast Guard units coming under their command to report to the commanders of the task organizations as indicated in Appendix II of this plan.

[51] *Section 2. MOBILIZATION*

3721. a. Mobilization comprises two steps, viz:

1. Timely assembly at assigned Mobilization Districts of the forces to be mobilized preparatory to 2;

2. Preparation for war service. This is a function of the Shore Establishment assisted to the extent practicable by the forces being mobilized, and is provided for in Part IV of this plan.

b. Under this plan the term "mobilization" is applied only to the Operating Forces and the Services, including their units ashore. The Shore Establishment does not mobilize, but, as stipulated in Part IV, increases its personnel and facilities as required to perform its assigned task.

c. Mobilization is thus not a process confined exclusively to the initial days of the war but continues as long as there are additional forces to be mobilized. During and subsequent to mobilization, vessels and units are supported through the operation of the maintenance provisions of Part IV.

3722. Most of the Naval Forces listed in the current Operating Force Plan have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. Vessels so listed, even if not completely mobilized on M-day, will be considered available for immediate war service within the limits of their capabilities. They will complete their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

3723. In view of the provisions of paragraph 3722, mobilization in this plan applies principally to vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service, to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, and to Naval District Craft which are to be taken over from private sources or other government departments.

[52] 3724. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be issued by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3725. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of vessels assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II.

[53] *Section 3. THE ROUTING AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING*

3731. The following is quoted from Appendix I, "Section V";

a. "20. The British authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military Forces. United States authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces.

"21. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and protected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North Atlantic bound to and from the United Kingdom.

"22. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange for the control and protection of shipping of United States registry or charter within United States areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service Organization for protection by United States forces within United States areas will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations."

b. The term "control of shipping" as used in Appendix I, "Section V", includes all matters relating to the movement of non-combatant vessels on the high seas, except protection.

Definitions

3732. a. *ROUTING.* The term "routing of shipping" as employed in this plan relates to the sea routes to be followed; [54] the time of departure from port; whether or not ships will move singly or in convoy; the timing at meeting points (rendezvous) and along the sea route; and the delivery of instructions for routing. Instructions in regard to the assembly of vessels for convoys, the scheduling of ports of call or destination, and loading are not considered as a part of routing.

b. *INTRA-DISTRICT SHIPPING.* That shipping of the Associated Powers proceeding from one port to another within the limits of a Naval District.

c. *INTRA-FRONTIER SHIPPING.* That shipping of the Associated Powers proceeding from one Naval District to another within the same Naval Coastal Frontier.

d. *INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING.* That shipping of the Associated Powers, not overseas shipping, proceeding from a port in one Naval Coastal Frontier to, or through the waters of, another Naval Coastal Frontier.

e. *FLEET CONTROL ZONE SHIPPING.* All shipping of the Associated Powers while within the Fleet Control Zone.

f. *OVERSEAS SHIPPING* is that shipping of the Associated Powers whose route, in whole or in part, lies outside the coastal zone of a Naval Coastal Frontier; except that shipping passing between the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and the ATLANTIC COAST ports of the United States or Canada is considered INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING.

Instructions for routing shipping

3733. *INTRA-DISTRICT INTRA-FRONTIER, and INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING.*

a. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue general instructions to Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders for the routing of Intra-District, Intra-Frontier, and Inter-Frontier Shipping. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers and Commandants of Naval Districts will keep the Chief of Naval Operations and interested Commanders in Chief informed as to routing instructions issued by them.

[55] b. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will route Intra-Frontier and Inter-Frontier Shipping.

c. Intra-District shipping will be routed by the Commandant of the Naval District under the general direction of the Commander, Naval Coastal Frontier.

3734. *OVERSEAS SHIPPING.*

a. Overseas shipping is divided into two categories, referred to hereafter as Class A and Class B Overseas Shipping:

1. *CLASS A.* Overseas shipping between two points in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States;

2. *CLASS B.* Overseas shipping between one point in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States, and one point in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United Kingdom.

b. *WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA.*

1. The Chief of Naval Operations, in consultation with the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff, will arrange the routing details of Class B Overseas Shipping which passes between the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA and UNITED KINGDOM AREAS to the east or south.

2. The Chief of Naval Operations will route all Class A and Class B Overseas Shipping while it is within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA. In the case of overseas shipping moving in convoy, he will issue the routing instructions to the convoy commanders, via the Commandants of the Districts in which are the ports of assembly of the convoys, with copies to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, appropriate Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders, and Commandants of other Naval Districts affected. In the case of overseas shipping moving singly, the [56] Chief of Naval Operations will issue general routing instructions to the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders, with copies to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, and to Commandants of Naval Districts affected. Under the general supervision of the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers, Commandants of Naval Districts will issue routing instructions to commanders of vessels.

c. *PACIFIC AREA.*

1. Under the general direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander of the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will perform, in the PACIFIC AREA, all the routing duties performed by the Chief of Naval Operations in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, with the following exceptions:

(a) The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will route shipping in the PACIFIC FLEET CONTROL ZONES;

(b) The Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, will route shipping in the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA;

(c) Routing details of overseas shipping bound to or from the AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND AREA will be arranged directly between the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Chief of the Australian Naval Staff. The Chief of Naval Operations will make arrangements with the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff in case action is required by that officer.

Instructions for the protection of shipping

3735. a. Tasks providing for the protection of shipping are assigned to the Operating Forces.

[57] b. Protection of shipping may be provided by sea or air escort, by covering operations, by patrol, by dispersal, by shifting of routes, or by a combination of these methods.

c. The shipping of the Associated Powers operating in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States will be protected by the responsible Commanders in Chief, Commanders of Sub-Areas, and Naval Coastal Frontiers, and by the Commandants of Naval Districts, to the extent required by the existing situation, and as may be practicable by the use of available forces. These officers will keep each other informed, as may be appropriate, as to the strength of naval forces, and the methods being employed, in the protection of shipping.

d. The protection of embarked military personnel and valuable cargoes will be viewed as having an especial importance.

[58] *Section 4. RULES OF WARFARE*

3741. In the conduct of the war the Naval Establishment will be guided by the current "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare".

3742. Except under extraordinary circumstances (as when no prize crews are available or great distances are involved, and it is impracticable for the capturing ship to leave her station), prizes should be sent promptly to a port within the jurisdiction of the United States, or to an allied port in which a United States prize court is sitting, or to an allied port where arrangements have previously been made by the commander in the Area for prizes captured by the United States to be received into custody of local officials until an opportunity presents itself of sending them to United States prize courts. When the State Department shall have made arrangements with other Associated Powers to permit United States prize courts within their jurisdiction, the forces afloat will be promptly notified.

3743. Do not use poison gas except in retaliation for similar use by the enemy.

3744. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, within the PACIFIC AREA, are authorized to declare such "Strategical Areas" as in their opinion are *vital.* They must give wide publicity to the exact boundaries of the areas involved and, at the earliest opportunity, notify the Chief of Naval Operations of these actions. A "Strategical Area", as here used, means an area from which it is necessary to exclude merchant ships and merchant aircraft to prevent damage to such ships or aircraft, or to prevent such ships or aircraft from obtaining information, which, if transmitted to the enemy, would be detrimental to our own forces.

[59] 3745. Should the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, or the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, desire to lay mines outside the territorial waters of the enemy, or of the United States or other Associated Powers, or outside of proclaimed Strategical Areas, they should make recom-

mendations to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the areas proposed to be mined and the time when the mines are to be laid. The Chief of Naval Operations will take the necessary steps to declare the mined areas and to notify shipping and foreign governments. In an emergency, mines may be so laid, before communicating with the Chief of Naval Operations, but in such cases appropriate local notification should be made by the Commander in Chief concerned, and the Chief of Naval Operations should be informed.

[60] *Section 5. INTELLIGENCE LIAISON BETWEEN COMMANDERS OF ASSOCIATED FORCES IN THE FIELD*

3751. The commanders of the Operating Forces and their subordinate task force commanders will, on their own initiative, exchange liaison officers with task force commanders of the Associated Powers for the purpose of coordinating matters which directly affect their operations. (See Appendix I, paragraph 17. f.).

[61] PART IV. LOGISTICS

CHAPTER I. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

4101. The SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is assigned the following tasks:

a. *TASK*

PREPARE FOR WAR SERVICE, MAINTAIN, AND AUGMENT THE OPERATING FORCES AND THE SERVICES;

b. *TASK*

PROVIDE PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING ADVANCED BASES;

c. *TASK*

PROVIDE SALVAGE SERVICE IN THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS, THE GULF OF MEXICO, AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA, WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 500 MILES OF CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, ALASKA, PANAMA CANAL ZONE, AND OF OUTLYING UNITED STATES POSSESSIONS AND LEASED TERRITORY IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA.

4102. Each Chief of Bureau or Head of an Office of the Navy Department, and each Commandant of a Naval District or an Outlying Naval Station will execute such parts of the tasks assigned to the Shore Establishment as fall under his cognizance by law or regulation, unless otherwise stipulated in Part IV.

[62] CHAPTER II. GENERAL DIRECTIVES

Section 1. PERSONNEL

4211. The Shore Establishment will supply the trained personnel required for:

a. Preparing for war service, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating Forces and the Services;

b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities;

c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases;

d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service.

4212. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 54.

"The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel will be met by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940".

4213. a. Personnel will be supplied in accordance with the Basic Priorities established in Section 6 (paragraph 4261).

b. Where the requirements for personnel for the Operating Forces and the Services cannot be supplied from other sources, naval personnel assigned to Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) will be replaced with civilian personnel for such period of time as found to be necessary.

[63] *Section 2. MATERIAL*

4221. The Shore Establishment will supply material required for:

a. Preparing for war service, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating Forces and the Services;

b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities;

c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases;

d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service.

4222. The material to support this Plan will come from existing reserves of the Navy and from production sources developed under the approved Industrial Mobilization Plan, and Navy Procurement Plans. The procurement of material will be regulated and controlled by existing laws and regulations, Executive Orders, and in accordance with the instructions contained in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 (Appendix I, paragraphs 56 and 58).

4223. Bureaus having technical cognizance of material being procured for the Navy will take appropriate measures to insure that contractors safeguard such material from exposure to sabotage and from damage by sabotage or other means.

4224. Material will be supplied in accordance with the Basic Priorities established in Section 6 (paragraph 4261).

[64] *Section 3. TRANSPORTATION*

4231. a. Sea transportation will be provided by:

1. THE OPERATING FORCES;
2. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE.

b. The Naval Transportation Service will arrange for delivery of personnel and material by commercial transportation facilities wherever practicable.

4232. a. Bureaus will provide material at loading ports ready for loading.

b. The Shore Establishment will furnish the Chief of Naval Operations and the District Commandants concerned with the necessary information regarding material and personnel to be loaded at loading ports in order that sea transportation may be provided.

c. The Shore Establishment will load material and embark personnel in vessels designated by the Chief of Naval Operations.

4233. a. The Army will furnish to the Chief of Naval Operations, or the District Commandants, information regarding the numbers of troops and quantities of material to be transported overseas (see Appendix I, paragraphs 51 and 57).

b. The Army will move Army material and troops to ports of embarkation, and load Army material and embark Army troops in vessels designated by the Chief of Naval Operations, subject to supervision by the Navy in matters regarding the safety of vessels.

c. The Navy will furnish subsistence and medical supplies for Army personnel while embarked on transports operated by the Navy (including time-chartered vessels); the Army will provide subsistence and medical supplies for all animals embarked on such transports. Army medical and Army commissary personnel embarked will be available to perform their normal duties in relation to Army personnel.

(65) 4234. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, officers having liaison duties in regard to coordinating the transportation of material and personnel by fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Service.

[66] *Section 4. LEGAL SERVICES*

4241. The Shore Establishment (Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy) will provide the legal services, charged to it by law and regulation, necessary for the execution of this plan by the Naval Establishment.

4242. These services will include:

a. The supervision of the administration of law throughout the Naval Establishment;

b. Securing the enactment of such legislation and the promulgation of such Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders as may be required by the Naval Establishment in the execution of this plan;

c. In conjunction with the War Department, securing the enactment of legislation and the promulgation of such Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as are deemed necessary for the execution of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 (Appendix I, paragraph 59).

[67] *Section 5. AUGMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT*

4251. The Shore Establishment will augment and maintain its activities by providing personnel and material necessary for the accomplishment of its assigned tasks.

4252. Requirements for Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in excess of those provided for in the current Operating Force Plan, will be met locally by the Commandants of Naval Districts. This may be done by taking over suitable craft from private owners, or by contracting with private owners for the operation of such craft in a pool under navy control, to meet both government and private requirements.

[68] *Section 6. PRIORITIES*

4261. Priority in matters of supply, delivery, and services will be in accordance with the basic priorities stipulated below. All supporting efforts of the SERVICES and the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT will fall respectively under the priorities established by this general formula. For planning purposes, the several items listed under the same basic priority shall be considered of equal importance.

a. *PRIORITY ONE*

1. The transportation of Army troops and material in the initial movements to the UNITED KINGDOM, BERMUDA, CURACAO-ARUBA, TRINIDAD, PANAMA, PUERTO RICO, ALASKA, and HAWAII.
2. The requirements of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE.
3. The requirements of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

b. *PRIORITY TWO*

1. Initial movements to ICELAND.
2. The requirements of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
3. The requirements of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE not specified under PRIORITY ONE.

c. *PRIORITY THREE*

1. The requirements of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES.
2. The transportation of Army troops and material not specified under PRIORITIES ONE and TWO.

d. *PRIORITY FOUR*

1. New Construction.

[69] CHAPTER III. THE OPERATING FORCES AND SERVICES

Section 1. PREPARATION FOR WAR SERVICE

4311. Commencing on M-day, and before if directed, the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT will prepare for war services those vessels and units of the OPERATING FORCES and SERVICES listed in Appendix II, which are not then in condition of readiness for war service, by placing them in material condition and providing personnel to perform their war tasks.

4312. The desired condition of readiness for war service as regards personnel, repairs and alterations, and supplies, is the STANDARD CONDITION prescribed by the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department concerned and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations.

4313. *Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services listed in the current Operating Force Plan.*

a. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services appearing in the current Operating Force Plan are not assigned to Mobilization Districts, as most of those vessels have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. Vessels not completely mobilized on M-day will be considered available for immediate war service within the limitations of their capabilities. They will complete their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

4314. *Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services NOT listed in the current Operating Force Plan.*

a. Vessels not appearing in the current Operating Force Plan, assigned in Appendix II to the Operating Forces and the Services, are assigned to Mobilization Districts for preparation for war service (mobilization). Commandants are responsible for preparing for war service all vessels assigned to their districts for mobilization.

b. In cases where Appendix II indicates the day of arrival at the Mobilization District and the day required to be ready for service, the Commandant will employ the intervening period in the preparation of the vessel for war service.

[70] If essential items of conversion can not be completed by the "Day Ready" indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will inform the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander of the Operating Force concerned, as far in advance as practicable.

c. In cases where the day of arrival at the Mobilization District and the "Day Ready" are not indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will complete the mobilization as promptly as possible in accordance with the priorities established and other related instructions.

d. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces, other than those assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, will be degaussed, armed, and manned with navy personnel before being considered ready for war service.

e. Vessels assigned to Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, unless the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, direct otherwise, in which case placing them in STANDARD CONDITION will be deferred until opportunity permits.

f. Vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, except as follows:

1. Transports to be commissioned in the Navy will be considered ready for war service when degaussed, provided with fresh water, commissary, sanitary, medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled voyage;

2. Transports to be operated on a time charter basis will be considered ready for war service when provided with fresh water, commissary, sanitary, medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled voyage, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a communication group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as may be required;

[71] 3. All other classes commissioned in the Navy scheduled for voyages outside of the WESTERN HEMISPHERE will be considered ready for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service for which scheduled;

4. All other classes operated on a time charter basis will be considered ready for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service for which scheduled, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a communication group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as may be required;

5. Vessels of the Naval Transportation Service will not be delayed for the installation of batteries and magazines.

g. Time chartered merchant vessels of the Naval Transportation Service to be taken over and commissioned will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION after their initial voyage, and when opportunity permits.

h. Instructions for the mobilization of vessels assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II.

4315. a. The crews of all combat loaded transports and other vessels scheduled to unload at a destination having no stevedores available, will include competent stevedore personnel. These may be supplied from trained naval personnel, or by contract if suitable naval personnel is not available. This provision applies to vessels commissioned in the Navy and to time chartered vessels.

b. Provision will be made for furnishing prize crews consisting of a suitable number of officers and men as follows:

1. To the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.....6;
[72] 2. To the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.....8;
3. To the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE.....8;
4. To the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.....6.

[73] *Section 2. MAINTENANCE*

4321. The Shore Establishment will maintain the Operating Forces and the Services in condition of readiness for war by:

a. Replacement of personnel and material;

b. Repairs to units made available at Shore Establishment activities;

c. Hospitalization of personnel;

d. Provisions of facilities at Shore Establishment activities for recreation and welfare of personnel.

Replacements

4322. a. In order to provide for replacements of personnel and material for the Operating Forces and the Services, the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department concerned will establish standard monthly replacement rates based upon estimated expenditures, plus a small excess for building up a reserve. These rates will be used by the Shore Establishment as a basis for procuring personnel and material to meet the replacement requirements of the Operating Forces and the Services. The estimates should be based on probable operations of each type of the Task Organization in each of the Areas and Sub-Areas listed in paragraph 1102 of this plan.

b. These standard monthly replacement rates will be revised from time to time so as to accord with the requirements of the Operating Forces and the Services, as determined by war experience.

c. In procuring personnel and material at the standard monthly replacement rates, no deduction will be made for probable losses in the forces to be supplied. A 10% surplus over the standard monthly replacements will be maintained available for shipment to provide for probable losses during sea transportation to destination.

d. Should the established monthly replacement rates prove to be inadequate to supply the requirements, personnel [74] and material allotted to low priority units will be reassigned to higher priority units, as required, until deficiencies can be replaced under revised replacement rates.

e. The Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department who provide replacements of personnel and material will designate the activities of the Shore Establishment to which the Operating Forces and the Units of the Naval Transportation Service will submit their requests for replacements.

f. The rate of flow of replacements will be controlled by the timely submission of requests for replacements, stating the desired time and place of delivery.

g. Requests for replacements will be submitted as follows:

1. For the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, and SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, and U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE by the commanders thereof, or by officers designated by them;

2. For the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, by the Commandants of Naval Districts upon which the forces are based;

3. For units of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE by the commanders thereof, through the appropriate local naval authorities where delivery is desired;

4. For units ashore by the commanders thereof, through the Commandants of Naval Districts or Commanders of Outlying Naval Stations in which these units are established.

h. Where Shore Establishment facilities are not readily available, units of the Operating Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service will obtain material replacements from local sources. (See par. 3116, 3214, 3224, 3315, 3414.) Replacements obtained in this manner will not be included in requests for replacements made to Shore Establishment activities.

[75] 4323. Delivery of replacements to the Operating Forces the the Services will be effected, insofar as practicable, at the times and places requested.

Repairs

4324. a. The Shore Establishment will repair such units of the Operating Forces and Services as may be made available therefor at Shore Establishment activities.

b. The assignment of availability of such units to an activity of the Shore Establishment for overhaul and repairs will be governed by the following:

1. The geographic disposition of the various forces;

2. The facilities available at certain activities for accomplishing the work required;

3. The degree of urgency of the work required;

4. The distribution of the work load among the various activities;

5. The needs for repairs by units of the Associated Powers.

4325. The Chief of Naval Operations will designate the shore activity to which a vessel will be assigned for overhaul and repairs and will fix the availability dates.

Hospitalization and evacuation

4326. a. The Operating Forces will provide hospitalization for sick and wounded personnel within the capacity of the hospital facilities available in hospital ships, in Advanced Base Hospitals, and in Mobile Medical Units.

[76] b. The Shore Establishment will provide hospitalization for sick or wounded naval and marine corps personnel which may be evacuated to Shore Establishment activities.

4327. The sick and wounded personnel evacuated to Shore Establishment activities will be transported in evacuation transports, hospital ships, and other available vessels having adequate medical facilities.

4328. a. Army forces overseas will provide their own hospitalization, but will be evacuated to home territory in the same manner as naval personnel.

b. Army forces embarked on naval vessels will be provided hospitalization by the Navy until such time as the sick and wounded can be evacuated to Army hospitals or field medical units.

Recreation and welfare

4329. a. The Shore Establishment will provide and maintain recreation and welfare facilities at Shore Establishment activities for naval and marine corps personnel.

b. Provisions for these activities will include:

1. Augmentation and maintenance of recreational facilities at Shore Establishment activities where units of the Operating Forces and Services are concentrated, and at Training Stations;

2. Augmentation and maintenance of religious and welfare facilities at the above activities, including cooperation with national and local welfare agencies and religious groups, operating for the welfare of naval personnel.

[77] *Section 3. AUGMENTATION*

4331. The Shore Establishment will augment the Operating Forces and the Services by:

a. New construction of vessels and aircraft;

b. Acquisition from the Maritime Commission and from private owners of vessels and aircraft designated by the Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Supply and Transportation Service Section), and by their preparation for war service;

c. Preparation for war service of vessels and aircraft transferred to the Navy from other Government Departments;

d. Acquisition of material.

4332. In preparing plans for the acquisition of small vessels, Commandants of Naval Districts will provide for consultation and cooperation between local representatives of the Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission.

[78] CHAPTER IV. ADVANCED BASES

4401. The Shore Establishment will provide personnel and material required for establishing and maintaining ADVANCED BASES in accordance with instructions issued in separate directives.

[79] CHAPTER V. SALVAGE

4501. a. The Shore Establishment will provide salvage units and render salvage service to vessels, both private and public, of all nationalities, in the areas prescribed in paragraph 4101.c.

b. The Operating Forces, assisted by such facilities as can be made available by the Shore Establishment, will render salvage service to vessels of their own forces and to other vessels where practicable, in the waters of the outlying United States possessions in the Pacific Ocean, of the Philippine Islands and of Advanced Bases, and in the open sea outside of the areas mentioned in paragraph 4101.c.

4502. The Shore Establishment will cooperate with and assist the Army or other agencies responsible for clearing harbor channels of stranded vessels within the waters of the United States.

4503. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the President, the Navy will acquire the following vessels to be converted and equipped as salvage vessels:

1. *From the COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY*
   PIONEER,
   GUIDE,
   DISCOVER;
2. *From the COAST GUARD*
   REDWING.

b. These vessels will be manned and operated as directed by the Bureau of Ships, and two will be stationed on the Atlantic Coast of the United States and two on the Pacific Coast of the United States.

[80] CHAPTER VI. PLANS TO BE PREPARED BY THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

4601. Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will be prepared as prescribed in Part V, WPL–8, with particular reference to paragraphs 5126, 5127, and 5128.

4602. The Principal Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will prescribe the estimates of requirements, if any, to be made by the subordinate planning agencies.

[81] PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER I. EXERTION OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE

5101. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 60:

"The Administrator of Export Control, jointly with the War and Navy Departments, is to prepare plans and programs for the application of economic pressure such as may be obtained through control of commodities, transportation, communication, financial relationships, and all related means."

5102. The Chief of Naval Operations will cooperate in the preparation of joint plans for the Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure.

[82] CHAPTER II. JOINT PLANS COVERING INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, CENSORSHIP AND PUBLICITY, AND MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES

5201. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 61:

"Cooperation of Other Departments of the Government

"The War and Navy Departments, jointly with other departments of the Government, shall have prepared plans or programs covering the following subjects:

a. Intelligence Service;
b. Censorship and Publicity;
c. Mobilization of Resources."

5202. a. The Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will act for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for the Intelligence Service.

b. The Secretary of the Navy (Director of the Office of Public Relations) and the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will jointly act for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for Censorship and Publicity.

c. The Under Secretary of the Navy, acting through the Navy Members of the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board, will represent the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for the Mobilization of Resources.

[1] APPENDIX I. TO WPL–46, THE JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW NO. 5

[2] SECTION I. DIRECTIVE

1. The directive for Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5, contained in J. P. 325 (Serial 642–1), Section 1, paragraph 3*e*, approved October 14, 1939, and revised April 10, 1940, is superseded by the directive contained in paragraph 2 of this paper.

2. The Joint Board directs The Joint Planning Committee to submit Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 based upon the Report of

United States-British Staff Conversations, dated March 27, 1941 (ABC–1), and upon Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC–22), now in process of drafting.

[3] SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

3. The term "Associated Powers" means the United States and the British Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the Associates and Allies of either Power.

4. The term "Axis Powers" means Germany and Italy, and, if Japan and other Powers are at war against the Associated Powers, is to be understood as including all such Powers.

5. "Malaysia" includes the Philippines, the Malay States, the Straits Settlements, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies. The "Malay Barrier" includes the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the chain of islands extending in an easterly direction from Java to Bathurst Island, Australia,

6. The term "United States naval forces" as used herein will be construed as including United States naval aviation. The term "air forces" will be construed as including only the United States Army Air Corps and the Royal Air Force.

[4] SECTION III. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

7. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis Powers, comprising either:

a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or

b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

8. That the Associated Powers will conduct the war in accord with ABC–1 and ABC–22.

9. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

10. That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be able to fill logistic requirements, other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, from sources in that general region.

11. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive elements, but will remain in a nonbelligerent status unless subjected to direct attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.

[5] SECTION IV. CONCEPT OF THE WAR

12. The Concept of the War as set forth in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of ABC–1 is quoted below, except that paragraph 13 (h) is quoted as modified by the Chief of Naval Operations' and the Chief of Staff's secret letter Serial 039412 of April 5, 1941.

"10. The broad strategic objectives of the Associated Powers will be the defeat of Germany and her Allies.

"11. The principles of United States and British national strategic defense policies of which the Military forces of the Associated Powers must take account are:

(*a*) *United States*

The paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western Hemisphere. The United States must, in all eventualities, maintain such dispositions as will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political or Military power.

(*b*) *British Commonwealth*

The security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circumstances. Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must maintain dispositions which, in all eventualities, will provide for the ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A cardinal feature of British strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will ensure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort.

(*c*) *Sea Communications*

The security of the sea communications of the Associated Powers is essential to the continuance of their war effort.

[6] "12. The strategic concept includes the following as the principal offensive policies against the Axis Powers:

(a) Application of economic pressure by naval, land, and air forces and all other means, including the control of commodities at their source by diplomatic and financial measures.

(b) A sustained air offensive against German Military power, supplemented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which contribute to that power.

(c) The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis.

(d) The employment of the air, land, and naval forces of the Associated Powers, at every opportunity, in raids and minor offensives against Axis Military strength.

(e) The support of neutrals, and of Allies of the United Kingdom, Associates of the United States, and populations in Axis-occupied territory in resistance to the Axis Powers.

(f) The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against Germany.

(g) The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive.

"13. Plans for the Military operations of the Associated Powers will likewise be governed by the following:

[7] (a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.

(b) Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom, the principal task of the United States anval forces in the Atlantic will be the protection of shipping of the Associated Powers, the center of gravity of the United States effort being concentrated in the Northwestern approaches to the United Kingdom. Under this conception, the United States naval effort in the Mediterranean will initially be considered of secondary importance.

(c) It will be of great importance to maintain the present British and Allied Military position in and near the Mediterranean basings, and to prevent the spread of Axis control in North Africa.

(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

[8] (e) The details of the deployment of the forces of the Associated Powers at any one time will be decided with regard to the Military situation in all theatres.

(f) The principal defensive roles of the land forces of the Associated Powers will be to hold the British Isles against invasion; to defend the Western Hemisphere; and to protect outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack.

(g) United States land forces will support United States naval and air forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped organizations, United States land forces will, as a general rule, provide ground and anti-aircraft defenses of naval and air bases used primarily by United States forces.

(h) Subject to the requirements of the security of the United States, the British Isles and their sea communications, the air policy of the Associated Powers will require that associated effort in the air will be directed toward providing the necessary naval and land air components for the accomplishment of naval tasks, for the support of land operations, and for independent air operations against the sources of Axis military power.

(i) United States Army Air Forces will support the United States land and naval forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped organizations, they will undertake the air defense of those general areas in which naval bases used primarily by United States forces are located, and subsequently, [9] of such other areas as may be agreed upon. United States Army air bombardment units will operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against German Military power at its source.

(j) United States forces will, so far as practicable, draw their logistic support (supply and maintenance) from sources outside the British Isles. Subject to this principle, however, the military bases, repair facilities, and supplies of either nation will be at the disposal of the Military forces of the other as required for the successful prosecution of the war."

13. In addition, plans for the Military operations of United States forces will be governed by the following:

(a) Under this War Plan the scale of hostile attack to be expected within the Western Atlantic Area is limited to raids by air forces and naval surface and submarine forces.

(b) The building up of large land and air forces for major offensive operations against the Axis Powers will be the primary immediate effort of the United States Army. The initial tasks of United States land and air forces will be limited to such operations as will not materially delay this effort.

[10] SECTION V. TERMS OF AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM RELATING TO WAR OPERATIONS

14. Agreements have been reached between the United States and the United Kingdom relating to war operations.

In this Section certain of these agreements are set forth (See ABC–1 and ABC–22).

15. *Principles of Command of the Forces of the United States and the United Kingdom.* *a.* As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsibility of their own Power.

b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their type, be employed as task (organized) forces charged with the execution of specific strategic tasks. These task (organized) forces will operate under their own commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. Only exceptional Military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks.

d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of time in grade.

e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate under United States naval command, and will remain an integral part of United States naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.

f. Special command relationships pertaining to particular areas are set forth in paragraph 16.

[11] 16. *Responsibility for the Strategic Direction of Military Forces.* *a. United States Areas.* Upon entering the war, the United States will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of its own and British Military forces in the following areas:

(1) The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, north of Latitude 25° South and west of Longitude 30° West, except:

(a) The area between Latitude 20° North and Latitude 43° North which lies east of Longitude 40° West.

(b) The waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada Joint Agreements.

(2) The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, as follows:

(a) North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East;

(b) North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East;

(c) South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American coast and Longitude 74° West; except for the waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada Joint Agreements. The United States will afford support to British naval forces in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

[12] *b. The Far East Area* Coordination in the planning and execution of operations by Military forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East Indies in the Far East Area will, subject to the approval of the Dutch authorities, be effected as follows:

(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers will collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in that area.

(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may be practicable and appropriate.

(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines will be assumed by the British naval Commander-in-Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines.

(4) For the above purposes, the Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

[13] *c. Joint Land Offensives.* Responsibility for the strategic direction of the Military forces engaged in joint offensive action on land will be in accordance with joint agreements to be entered upon at the proper time. In these circumstances unity of command in the theatre of operations should be established.

d. British Commonwealth Areas. The British Commonwealth will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of associated Military forces in all other areas not described in sub-paragraphs *a*, *b*, and *c* next above. These areas as initially delimited are:

(1) *The AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AREA* comprises the Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in the Australian and New Zealand Area.

(2) *The UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA* comprises the waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the Northward of Latitude 43° North and the land areas bordering on, and the islands in, the above ocean area. Administrative command of all United States land and air forces stationed in the British Isles and Iceland will be exercised by the Commander, United States Army Forces in Great Britain. This officer will have authority to arrange details concerning the organization and location of task forces (organization of units in appropriate formation) and operational control with the War Office and the Air Ministry.

(3) *The NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.*

(a) Northern boundary, Latitude 43° North,

(b) Southern boundary, Latitude 20° North,

[14] (c) Western boundary, Longitude 40° West,

(d) Eastern boundary, the coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude 5° West, together with the islands and land areas contiguous thereto.

(e) Strategic direction of a United States naval force basing on Gibraltar will be exercised by the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff except when he specifically delegates it for a stated period as follows:

To the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for operations in the Western Mediterranean.

To the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, for operations in the Central Atlantic.

(*f*) The Commander of United States naval forces basing in Gibraltar will be responsible for administrative matters to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

(4) *The SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA* comprises:

(a) The area between Latitudes 20° North and 25° South, bounded on the west by Longitude 30° West and on the east by the African Coast.

(b) The South Atlantic Ocean, south of Latitude 25° South, between Longitudes 74° West and 33° East, together with the islands and land areas contiguous thereto.

(5) *The MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST AREAS* comprise the Mediterranean Sea east of Longitude 5° West, the Suez Canal, and the islands and countries adjoining them, including the present theatres of operations in North and East Africa. The Black Sea, Iraq, and Aden are also included in this area.

[*15*] (6) *The INDIA AND EAST INDIES AREA* comprises:

(a) India.

(b) Indian Ocean, including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, bounded on the West by the coasts of Africa and Longitude 33° East, and on the East by the western boundaries of the Far East Area and the Australian Station.

(c) The islands in the above ocean area.

17. *Collaboration in Planning.* *a.* The High Commands of the United States and United Kingdom will collaborate continuously in the formulation and execution of strategical policies and plans which shall govern the conduct of the war. They and their respective commanders in the field, as may be appropriate, will similarly collaborate in the planning and execution of such operations as may be undertaken jointly by United States and British forces. This arrangement will apply also to such plans and operations as may be undertaken separately, the extent of collaboration required in each particular plan or operation being agreed mutually when the general policy has been decided.

b. To effect the collaboration outlined in the preceding sub-paragraph, and to ensure the coordination of administrative action and command between the United States and British Military Services, the United States and United Kingdom will exchange Military Missions. These Missions will comprise one senior officer of each of the Military Services, with their appropriate staffs. The functions of these Missions will be as follows:

(1) To represent jointly, as a corporate body, their own Chiefs of Staff (the Chief of Naval Operations being considered as such), vis-a-vis the group of Chiefs of Staff of the Power to which they are accredited, for the purpose of collaboration in the [*16*] formulation of Military policies and plans governing the conduct of the war in areas in which that Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction.

(2) In their individual capacity to represent their own individual Military Services vis-a-vis the appropriate Military Services of the Power to which they are accredited, in matters of mutual concern in the areas in which that Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction.

c. The personnel of either Mission shall not become members of any regularly constituted body of the government of the Power to which they are accredited. Their staffs will, however, work in direct cooperation with the appropriate branches and committees of the staff of the Power to which they are accredited.

d. The United States, as may be necessary, will exchange Liaison officers with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand for effectuating direct cooperation between United States and Dominion forces.

e. To promote adequate collaboration and prompt decision, a military transportation service will be established between England and the United States. Ships and airplanes will be assigned to this service by the United States and the United Kingdom as may be found necessary.

f. Existing Military intelligence organizations of the two powers will operate as independent intelligence agencies, but will maintain close liaison with each other in order to ensure the full and prompt exchange of pertinent information

concerning war operations. Intelligence liaison will be established not only through the Military Missions but also between all echelons of command in the field with respect to matters which affect their operations.

[17] *Communications*

18. The United States and the United Kingdom will establish in London the "Associated Communication Committee" which is to be constituted as follows:

a. A representative of the United States Army and a representative of the United States Navy, who are members of the staff of the United States Military Mission in London.

b. Representatives of the British Combined Signals Board in the United Kingdom.

19. The Associated Communications Committee will be the supreme controlling body with relation to intercommunications by radio (W/T), wire, visual, and sound affecting the armed services and the merchant marines of the two nations.

Control and Protection of Shipping

20. The British authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces. United States authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces.

21. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and protected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North Atlantic bound to and from the United Kingdom.

22. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange for the control and protection of shipping of United [18] States registry or charter within United States Areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service Organization for protection by United States forces within United States areas will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations.

23. *Special Relationship between Canada and the United States.* Joint Agreements are being drawn up by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United States-Canada, regarding the cooperation of the Armed forces of the United States and Canada in the areas in which the United States has strategic direction. When completed, the substance of these agreements, (Short Title ABC-22), will be incorporated in this plan.

[19] SECTION VI. GENERAL TASKS

24. *Joint General Task.* In cooperation with the other Associated Powers, defeat the Axis Powers, and guard United States national interests, by:

a. Reducing Axis economic power to wage war, by blockade, raids, and a sustained air offensive;

b. Destroying Axis military power by raids and an eventual land, naval, and air offensive;

c. Protecting the sea communications of the Associated Powers;

d. Preventing the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic military power; and by

e. Protecting outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack.

[20] SECTION VII. TASKS

25. The tasks of the Army and Navy, as set forth in this section, are those listed in, or derived from, the tasks of ABC-1, Annex III.

26. These tasks as stated do not include the assistance which may be furnished by the Armed Forces of Latin-American Republics. Such assistance may reduce the total of forces required but will not change the character of the operations.

The Western Atlantic Area

27. *Definition.* The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with Islands and contiguous continental land areas north of latitude 25° South, and west of Longitude 30° West except the area between Latitudes 20° North and 43° North which lies east of Longitude 40° West.

28. *Army Tasks.* *a.* In conjunction with Naval forces, protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and Naval bases in that Hemisphere.

b. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin American Republics against invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere.

c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

d. Relieve British forces in Curacao and Aruba.

e. Provide defensive garrisons for Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, Trinidad, St. Lucia, Antigua, and British Guiana.

[*21*] *f.* In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

g. Build up forces in the United States for eventual offensive action against Germany.

h. Prepare to relieve Marine Forces in the Azores and Cape Verde Islands if such garrisons have been established.

29. *Army Forces.* *a.* 1941 Troop basis plus all augmentations, less detachments.

b. Local defense forces.

c. One reinforced Corps of three divisions, including appropriate Air forces maintained in the United States as a reserve for the support of overseas garrisons and Latin American Republics.

Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51.

30. *Navy Tasks.* *a.* Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

c. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expeditionary forces and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.

d. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

[*22*] *e.* Protect and route shipping in the Coastal Zones.

f. Prepare to occupy the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands.

31. *Navy Forces.* *a.* The Atlantic Fleet, less detachments.

b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

The Pacific Area.

32. *Definition.* The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, is as follows:

a. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.

b. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.

c. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to South American coast and Longitude 74° West.

33. *Army Tasks.* *a.* In conjunction with naval forces, protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and naval bases in that Hemisphere.

b. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin American Republics against invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere.

[23] *c.* Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

d. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

34. *Army Forces.* *a.* Local defense forces.

b. One reinforced Division, including appropriate air forces maintained in the United States as a reserve for the support of Latin American Republics on the West Coast of South America.

Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51.

35. *Navy Tasks.* *a.* Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area.

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific area, and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying [24] hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere.

f. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area.

g. Defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa and Guam.

h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

i. Route shipping in the Pacific Area.

36. *Navy Forces.* *a.* The Pacific Fleet, less detachments.

b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

The Far East Area

37. *Army Tasks.* In cooperation with the Navy defend the Philippine Coastal Frontier—Category of Defense "E".

38. *Army Forces.* Local Defense Forces, augmented only by such personnel and facilities as are available locally.

39. *Navy Tasks.* *a.* Raid Japanese sea communications and destroy Axis forces.

b. Support the land and air forces in the defense of the territories of the Associated Powers. (The responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, for supporting the defense of the Philippines remains so long as that defense continues.)

[25] *c.* Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

d. Protect sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

e. In cooperation with the Army defend the Philippine Coastal Frontier—Category of Defense "E".

40. *Navy Forces.* *a.* The Asiatic Fleet.

United Kingdom and British Home Waters

41. *Definition.* *a.* Waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the Northward of Latitude 43° North.

b. Land areas bordering on, and islands in the above ocean area.

42. *Army Tasks.* *a.* In cooperation with the Royal Air Force conduct offensive air operations primarily against objectives in Germany, and against attempted invasion or blockade as demanded by the situation.

b. Provide for the ground defense of occupied bases and air defense of those general areas in the British Isles in which bases used primarily by United States Naval forces are located, and subsequently of such other areas as may be agreed upon.

c. Provide a token force for the defense of the British Isles.

[26] *d.* Relieve, as soon as practicable, the British garrison in Iceland and in cooperation with the Navy defend that island—Category of Defense "D".

43. *Army Forces.* Subject to the availability of trained and equipped forces:

a. British Isles.

3 Heavy Bombardment Groups
2 Medium Bombardment Groups
3 Pursuit Groups
Approximately 10 Anti-aircraft Regiments
Approximately 10 Infantry Battalions (Bases)
One reinforced Regiment (Token Force)

b. Iceland.

One reinforced Division.

Note: For overseas movements see paragraphs 51.

44. *Navy Tasks and Forces. a. Northwest Escort Force.*

Task. Escort Convoys in the Northwest Approaches, acting under the strategic direction of the British Commander-in-Chief of the Western Approaches.

b. Submarine Force Three.

Task. Raid enemy shipping in an area to be designated later, acting under the strategic direction of the British Vice Admiral, Submarines.

North Atlantic Area

[27] 45. *Definition.* The North Atlantic Area is defined as follows:

a. Northern boundary, Latitude 43° North.
b. Southern boundary, Latitude 20° North.
c. Western boundary, Longitude 40° West.
d. Eastern boundary, the Coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude 5° West.

46. *Navy Tasks and Forces. a. Submarine Force Two.*

Task. Raid enemy shipping in the Mediterranean under the strategic direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, acting through the Flag Officer Commanding North Atlantic.

Note: As soon as the situation in the Pacific permits their transfer to the Atlantic, United States naval forces may be assigned the following tasks in this area, unless the strategic situation in the Atlantic at that time dictates a different decision.

b. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

d. Raid Axis sea communications, territories and forces in the Western Mediterranean.

[28] 47. *Categories of Defense.* The Categories of Defense listed in this paragraph apply to all Defense Command Areas, Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers and isolated positions.

Northeast Defense Command and North Atlantic Coastal Frontier, except United States Bases in Newfoundland	Category B
United States Bases in Newfoundland	Category C
Southern Defense Command and Southern Coastal Frontier	Category B
Caribbean Defense Command and Panama and Caribbean Coastal Frontiers	Category D
Western Defense Command and Pacific Coastal Frontier, except Alaska	Category B
Alaska, Less Unalaska	Category C
Unalaska	Category D
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier	Category D
Philippine Coastal Frontier	Category E

Note: No Army reinforcements will be sent to the Philippine Coastal Frontier.

Bermuda	Category C
Iceland	Category D
Midway, Johnston, Palmyra	Category D
Guam	Category F

48. *Joint Plans to be prepared.* The provisions of paragraph 42 *e.* "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy" in conflict with the provisions of this paragraph will be disregarded.

a. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans.

b. Joint Sector Defense Plans, except that the Sector Defense Plans for Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the British Columbia Sectors will be made as required by ABC-22.

c. Joint Subsector Defense Plans and Defensive Coastal Area Plans as directed by the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans.

d. Joint Embarkation Plans for the embarkation of the Army units, specified in paragraph 51 *a*, to be prepared by the Commanding Generals, Army Ports of Embarkation and the Commandants of the Naval Districts in which these ports are located.

[*29*] SECTION VIII. OVERSEAS MOVEMENTS

49. *Army Tasks.* Move troops to ports of embarkation as required.

50. *Navy Tasks.* Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and the continued support of Army and Navy forces overseas. Man and operate the Army Transport Service.

51. *Overseas Movements of Army Troops.* The plan in this paragraph 51 is based on the assumption that M-day will occur prior to September 1, 1941. Movements on the dates given in certain sub-paragraphs will not be made unless M-day has occurred before such date.

a. The Navy will assemble material and make specific plans for the troop movements specified in this subparagraph *a*.

(1) *NEW YORK to ICELAND*, 26,500 troops, 73 aircraft.

First contingent—10,500 troops embark on 24–M.

Second contingent—16,000 troops embark on 57–M.

These two movements will be made by British transports if arrangements can be effected. If not, this plan contemplates use of United States transports.

(2) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 7,000 troops, embark on 10–M.

(3) *NEW YORK to IRELAND*, 8,000 troops, embark on 10–M.

These two forces, sub-paragraphs (2) and (3), will move in one convoy. The Northwest Escort Force will move with this convoy.

(4) *NEW YORK to BERMUDA*, 3,700 troops, 41 aircraft, embark on 18–M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 33 aircraft will be transported. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

[*30*] (5) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 8,000 troops, 73 aircraft, embark September 1, 1941. 16 aircraft will be transported, 57 aircraft will fly to destination.

(6) *NEW YORK to IRELAND*, 7,000 troops, 105 aircraft, embark October 1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported.

(7) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 6,600 troops, 60 aircraft, embark October 1, 1941. 57 aircraft will fly to destination, three aircraft will be transported.

These two forces, sub-paragraphs (6) and (7), will move in one convoy.

(8) *NEW YORK to IRELAND*, 11,600 troops, 200 aircraft embark November 1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported.

(9) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 7,000 troops, 38 aircraft, embark January 1, 1942. 35 aircraft will fly to destination, 3 aircraft will be transported.

(10) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 13,000 troops, 76 aircraft, embark on February 1, 1942. 70 Aircraft will fly to destination, six aircraft will be transported.

(11) *GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA*, 6,000 troops, embark on 15–M.

(12) *GALVESTON to TRINIDAD*, 12,500 troops embark on 15–M.

(13) *GALVESTON to PANAMA*, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark on 20–M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

(14) *GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO*, 12,600 troops, of which 4,000 embark 20–M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

[31] (15) *SEATTLE to ALASKA*, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark on 10–M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before M-day.

(16) *SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII*, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000 embark on 10–M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of these troops may be moved before M-day.

b. The movements of the troops in this sub-paragraph *b* are contingent upon unpredictable eventualities. The Navy will not prepare material nor make specific plans for these movements in advance of M-day.

(1) *GALVESTON to WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA*, 24,000 troops, 80 aircraft will prepare to embark at Galveston on 45–M. If the Panama Canal is not open, these troops will embark at San Francisco.

(2) *NEW YORK and GALVESTON to EAST COAST of LATIN AMERICA*, 86,000 troops, 56 aircraft, will prepare to embark 90–M. The 56 aircraft may be flown to destination.

(3) *NEW YORK and GALVESTON to TRANSATLANTIC DESTINATIONS*, 83,000 troops will be prepared to embark 20–M; desired minimum rate of movement 60,000 troops per month.

(4) *EXPEDITIONARY FORCE*, One Army, two Corps, ten Divisions, will be prepared to embark at East Coast and Gulf ports beginning 180–M.

SECTION IX. SUPPORTING MEASURES

[32] 52. *Theaters of Operation.* The designation and delimitation of additional land and sea theaters of operations to meet the developments of the situation covered by this Plan will be announced when the Plan is put into effect.

53. *Time of Execution.* M-Day is the time origin for the execution of this Plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M-Day.

54. *Personnel.* The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel will be met by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.

55. *Ports of Embarkation.* The Army will establish, when required, additional ports of embarkation at:

New Orleans, La.
Galveston, Texas
Boston, Mass.
Charleston, S. C.

56. *Material.* The United States will continue to furnish material aid to the United Kingdom, but for the use of itself and its other associates, will retain material in such quantities as to provide for security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany and her Allies. Subject to the foregoing, the material to fill the requirements of the Army and Navy under this plan will come from existing reserves of the respective services and from production sources developed under Army and Navy Procurement Plans. In all cases where surveys indicate that reserves and existing production will not meet requirements, the War and Navy Departments will [33] each be responsible for providing the additional production necessary to meet deficiencies of their respective services, except in cases where one Department furnishes the other with the material involved.

57. *Supply Levels.* Supply levels will be maintained for forces operating in the areas or positions as indicated by the tentative figures given in this paragraph. Final figures pertaining to building up initial levels will be established after a detailed joint examination of the problems involved.

a. Supplies other than ammunition.

(1)	Iceland	30 days, build up to 60 days within six months.
(2)	British Isles	Except pursuit aircraft, 30 days, build up to 60 days within six months. *Pursuit Aircraft* 60 days, build up to 120 days within six months.
(3)	Panama and Caribbean Coastal Frontiers.	30 days, build up to 45 days within six months.
(4)	Newfoundland and Alaska (Less Unalaska).	30 days, build up to 60 days within six months.
(5)	Unalaska	60 days, build up to 90 days within six months.
(6)	Bermuda	Maintain at 30 days.
(7)	Hawaii	Maintain at 70 days.
[*34*] (8)	Philippines	As the situation may permit, the desirable standard being the maintenance of stocks at 90 days' supply.

b. Ammunition for places listed under 57 a:

(1) For all troops included in a project; complete the project and then maintain at that level.

(2) For ground troops not included in a project; establish and then maintain five times the mobilization allowance.

(3) For Air Corps troops not included in a project (less pursuit aviation in British Isles): Ammunition for 30 days' operation; build up to 60 days within six months.

(4) Pursuit aviation in the British Isles: Ammunition for 60 days' operations; build up to 120 days within six months.

58. *Industrial Planning.* For Industrial planning purposes, and with due regard to decisions that may be made with respect to supplies to other Associated Powers, the industrial capacity of the nation will be allocated in conformity with the following general policy:

a. The Army and the Navy shall each continue to plan for maximum industrial needs.

b. When the available capacity of the nation to produce does not meet the requirements of the Army, Navy, and Associated Powers, such priorities as necessary to support the strategic situation will be established by The Joint Board and administered by the Army and Navy Munitions Board, in keeping with national policy.

[*35*] *c.* When plans contemplate that one Service procure for and deliver material to the other Service, the manufacturing facilities needed to produce such material shall be taken into consideration when a division of capacity is made. Under this provision, all ship-building plants will be allocated to the Navy, and the Navy will furnish the Army with such overseas transportation as the Army may require, consistent with national strategic needs as a whole.

59. *Supporting Legislative Program.* The War and Navy Departments jointly shall have prepared by appropriate agencies, such drafts of legislation, Presidential Proclamations, and Executive Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as are deemed necessary for the execution of this Joint Plan.

60. *Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure.* The Administrator of Export Control, jointly with the War and Navy Departments is to prepare plans and programs for the application of economic pressure such as may be obtained through control of commodities, transportation, communication, financial relationships and all related means.

61. *Cooperation with Other Departments of the Government.* The War and Navy Departments, jointly with other departments or agencies of the Government, shall have prepared plans or programs covering the following subjects:

a. Intelligence Service.

b. Censorship and Publicity.

c. Mobilization of Resources.

SECTION X. DIPLOMATIC MEASURES

[*36*] 62. With respect to Latin American Republics, confirmation should be sought that each State will make available to the armed forces of the United

States, immediately as the necessity arises in carrying out operations for Hemisphere Defense, or in behalf of any State, the use of its available sea, air, and land bases.

63. A special agreement should be sought with Brazil to the effect that the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the protection of its sea communications may require use by the United States of Brazilian sea, air and land bases and commercial port facilities for the projection of naval, land or air operations to the African continent. The most important areas in this respect are the coastal zones and territorial waters extending from Belem to Bahia and including the Island of Ferando do Noronha.

64. Diplomatic and economic pressure should be directed towards securing the acquiescence of the powers concerned for the protective occupation when necessary of Eire, the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, and French North Africa.

65. Diplomatic and economic support should be given to Governments in exile, to China, to neutrals and to populations in occupied territory in order to encourage opposition to the Axis Powers.

66. Acquiescence of the Netherlands Government in London for protective occupation of Curacao and Aruba will be secured by the British Government.

[37] ANNEX I. COASTAL FRONTIERS

Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.

1. For purposes of this Plan, this ANNEX I to Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 temporarily amends Section IV of reference (a), as indicated herein.

2. Change paragraph 33 of reference (a) to read:

"33. Joint organization and command.

"*a.* Coastal divisions with geographical coterminous boundaries within which an Army officer and a Naval officer will exercise command over the Army forces and the Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions, have been established in order to provide a joint organization and to ensure the effective coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. These coastal divisions comprise coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors. The system of coastal frontiers includes certain outlying land, island and sea areas, as well as the coasts of continental United States. The joint organization, together with the commanders responsible for the execution of security measures on and after M–day and the necessary peacetime planning therefor, are as stated below.

NOTE: The preceding sub-paragraph, for purposes of this plan, modifies Chapter V, paragraph 26 *a*, Section I, of reference (a).

"*b.* A Defense Command is a geographical area within which an Army officer is responsible for the coordination or preparation, and for the execution of all plans for the employment of Army forces and installations lving within the command boundaries; where pertinent, a Defense Command includes one or more coastal frontiers and may include isolated localities. (See map attached showing defense commands in continental United States.)

"*c.* Normally a naval coastal frontier includes the coastal zone adjacent to the coastal frontier. In certain cases, two naval coastal frontiers may be included in a coastal frontier; in other cases the naval coastal frontier includes waters which extend beyond the limits of the coastal frontier.

[38] "*d.* The provisions of ABC–22 may prescribe the extension of the North Atlantic coastal frontier and the Pacific coastal frontier to include part of the territory and coastal waters of Canada.

"*e.* Coordination between Army and Navy forces in coastal frontier operations shall be by the method of mutual cooperation, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 *b.*"

3. Change paragraph 34 of reference (a) to read as follows:

"34. North Atlantic coastal frontier.

"*a.* Boundaries.

Northern.—Northern boundary of the United States, but including United States bases in Newfoundland. This may later be modified by ABC–22.

Southern.—Diamond Shoals Lightship, Hatteras Inlet inclusive, southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.), Albemarle Sound, Chowan River, Virginia—North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive.

"b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command, or an officer, designated by him.

Navy.—The Commandant, Third Naval District, who is designated as the Commander North Atlantic naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Naval Districts under the command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named will arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands.

[39] "c. Sectors.—The North Atlantic coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors:

(1) Newfoundland sector.

(a) Boundaries: These may later be established by ABC-22. The sector now consists of the United States bases in Newfoundland.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command.

Navy.—Commander, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland.

(2) New England sector.

(a) Boundaries.

Northern.—Northern boundary of the United States.

Southern.—Nantucket Shoals Lightship, exclusive; Block Island, inclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command.

Navy.—The Commandant, First Naval District.

(c) This sector is subdivided into the Portland, Boston, and Newport subsectors, with boundaries as follows:

[40] 1. Between the Portland and the Boston subsectors: Northern boundary of Massachusetts.

2. Between the Boston and the Newport subsectors: Pollock Rip Slue Lightship, Monomy Light, Bishop and Clerk's Light, Cotuit Bay, Bourne, Taunton, northern boundary of Rhode Island, all to Boston subsector.

(3) New York sector.

(a) Boundaries.

Northern.—Nantucket Shoals Lightship, inclusive; Block Island, exclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary.

Southern.—Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both exclusive; Trenton, inclusive.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command.

Navy.—Commandant, Third Naval District.

(c) This sector is subdivided into the Long Island and New Jersey subsectors with boundary as follows:

Between subsectors: The Sandy Hook Peninsula and lower New York Bay to the Long Island subsector.

(4) Delaware-Chesapeake sector.

(a) Boundaries.

Northern.—Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both inclusive; Trenton exclusive.

[41] Southern.—Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, inclusive; southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.), Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive. This sector will be subdivided into the Delaware and the Chesapeake subsectors, with the boundary as Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship (to Delaware subsector), southern and western boundary of Delaware.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command.

Navy.—There is no naval commander of this sector. The Commandant, Fourth Naval District, commands the naval local defense force in the Delaware subsector, and the Commandant, Fifth Naval District, commands the naval local defense force in the Chesapeake subsector. The Commandant, Fifth Naval District, coordinates operations and war planning of the naval local defense forces of the Fourth and Fifth Naval Districts."

4. Change paragraph 35 of reference (a) to read as follows:

"35. Southern coastal frontier.

"*a.* Boundaries.

Northern.—Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, exclusive; southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.); Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all exclusive.

[*42*] Southern.—The Rio Grande. The coastal zone extends southeastward and southward to the northwestern boundary of the Caribbean naval coastal frontier, so as to include the Gulf of Mexico and such parts of Bahaman waters and the Caribbean Sea as to lie to the northward of that boundary.

"*b.* Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Southern Defense Command, or an officer designated by him.

Navy.—The Commandant, Sixth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander Southern naval coastal frontier. This officer exercises command over the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Naval Districts under the immediate command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named will arrange for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army, of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands.

"*c.* Sectors.—This frontier will be subdivided into defense sectors of Carolina, Florida, and Gulf, corresponding territorially to the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Naval Districts, respectively."

5. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs:

"35A. Caribbean coastal frontier.

"*a.* Boundaries.

All United States territories and possessions, and United States military and naval reservations and activities on shore located within an area bounded as follows:

[*43*] Beginning at latitude 18°05′ North, longitude 87°32′ West thence by a line bearing 63° true to the 25th parallel of latitude, thence by the 25th parallel of latitude to the 65th meridian of longitude, thence by a line direct to latitude 2° North, longitude 49° West, thence by a line direct to the place beginning. The coastal zone includes all of the waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea lanes and focal points beyond, but near, the eastern boundary.

"*b.* Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, or an officer designated by him.

Navy.—The Commandant, Tenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Caribbean naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.

"*c.* Sectors.—The Caribbean coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors:

(1) Guantanamo sector.

(a) Boundaries.—The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying westward of a line passing through Cape Isabela and Beata Point, Hispaniola, extended to cut the northern and the southwestern coastal frontier boundaries.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

[44] Navy.—Commander, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.

(2) Puerto Rico sector.

(a) Boundaries.—The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and northward of the 15th parallel of north latitude.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

Navy.—The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.

(3) Trinidad sector.

(a) Boundaries.—The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and southward of the 15th parallel of north latitude.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

Navy.—The Commander, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad."

6. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph:

"35B. Panama coastal frontier.

[45] "*a.* Boundaries.

All United States territories and possessions, and United States military and naval reservations and activities on shore located within the following area: British Honduras, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, and Ecuador; all land areas between the southwestern boundary of the Caribbean coastal frontier and the coasts of Central and South America; and all land areas between the coasts of Central and South America and a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala border to a point in latitude 5° South, longitude 95° West, and thence to Peru-Ecuador border. The coastal zone includes all the waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea lanes beyond, but near, the western and southern boundaries.

"*b.* Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, or an officer designated by him.

Navy.—The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Panama naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.

"*c.* Sectors.

The Panama coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors:

(1) Atlantic sector.

(a) Boundaries.—The area within the Panama coastal frontier lying between the northeastern boundary and the continental divide.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by Commanding General Caribbean Defense Command.

Navy.—The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.

(2) Pacific sector.

(a) Boundaries.—The area within the Panama coastal frontier lying between the contiental divide and the western and southern boundaries.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

Navy.—The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District."

7. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph:

"35C. The Caribbean defense command includes all the land and water areas lying within the boundaries of the Caribbean coastal frontier and the Panama coastal frontier."

8. Change paragraph 36 of reference (a) to read:
"36. Pacific coastal frontier.
"*a.* Boundaries.
Northern.—Northern boundary of Washington except that Alaska is part of the Pacific coastal frontier. This frontier may later be changed as required by ABC-22.
[47] Southern.—Southern boundary of the United States. The coastal zone extends southeastward to abreast the southern boundary of Mexico.
(1) Pacific naval coastal frontiers.—The Pacific coastal frontier is divided into two naval coastal frontiers, i. e., the Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, and the Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier. The boundary between the two naval coastal frontiers is the northern boundary of California.
"*b.* Commanders.
Army.—The Commanding General, Western Defense Command, or an officer designated by him.
Navy.—
(1) The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, who is also designated as the Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier.
(2) The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, also commands the Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force under his immediate command and the naval local defense forces of the Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts under the command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned.
(3) The Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, is the Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District. This officer also commands the naval local defense force assigned to his district.
(4) The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, and the Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, will arrange for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army, of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands.
[48] "*c.* Sectors.—This frontier is subdivided into the Southern California, Northern California, Northwestern, and Alaskan sectors, as follows:
(1) Boundary between the Southern California and Northern California sectors, Santa Maria River.
(2) Boundary between the Northern California and the Northwestern sector is the northern boundary of California.
(3) Northern boundary of the Northwestern sector is the northern boundary of Washington.
(4) The boundaries of Alaska define the Alaskan sector.
"*d.* Sectors of this frontier are further subdivided into subsectors with boundaries as follows:
(1) San Diego subsector: Mexican boundary to San Mateo Point, inclusive.
(2) San Pedro subsector: San Mateo Point, exclusive, to Santa Maria River, exclusive.
(3) Monterey subsectors: Santa Maria River, inclusive, to Pigeon Point, inclusive.
(4) San Francisco subsector: Pigeon Point, exclusive, to northern boundary of California.
(5) Columbia River subsector: Northern boundary of California to Moclips, Wash., inclusive.
(6) Seattle subsector: Moclips, Wash., exclusive, to northern boundary of Washington.
[49] (7) Sitka naval subsector: Alaska east of longitude 141° West.
(8) Kodiak naval subsector: Alaska west of longitude 141° West.
9. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs:
"36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier.
"*a.* Boundaries.
The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.

"*b.* Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Navy.—The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army.

"36B. Philippine coastal frontier.

"*a.* Boundaries.

The Philippine coastal frontier consists of Luzon, and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Luzon. The coastal zone includes all of the sea approaches to the coastal frontier.

[*50*] "*b.* Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Philippine Department.

Navy.—The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Philippine naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.


SECRET
NORTHEAST COMMAND
NORTH ATLANTIC COASTAL FRONTIER
NORTHEASTERN DEFENSE COMMAND
SOUTHERN DEFENSE COMMAND
CENTRAL DEFENSE COMMAND
WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND
PACIFIC COASTAL FRONTIER
SECRET

[1] APPENDIX II TO WPL–46, COMPOSITION OF FORCES

[2] CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

2–101. APPENDIX II prescribes the initial composition of the Operating Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service.

2–102. a. Naval vessels and aircraft are listed by organization unit or number.

b. Coast Guard vessels are listed by name.

c. Units not listed in the current Operating Force Plan which are to be taken over by the Navy either temporarily or permanently are, for war planning purposes, designated in this Appendix II as "X" vessels in accordance with the system defined in WPL–10 (XAR 5, XAK 17, XPYc 20, etc.).

2–103. a. When the Coast Guard becomes a part of the Navy, Coast Guard vessels will continue to be designated by their Coast Guard names.

b. When vessels listed in the tables as "X" vessels come under Navy control, the Chief of Naval Operations (Director, Ship Movements Division) will assign to them names, symbols, and numbers in accordance with standard nomenclature (AP 60, AK 90, PY 50, etc.). The names will be recommended by the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and the symbols and numbers by the Chief of the Bureau of Ships.

2–104. Units appearing in the current Operating Force Plan are not assigned to Mobilization Districts, as most of these vessels have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan.

2–105. In the Tables of Appendix II, where capital letters appear under the heading "Sub-Group", these letters indicate the categories to which vessels and aircraft belong, as follows:

A—Navy vessels and aircraft in commission on M-day;

B—Navy vessels not in commission on M-day, including those under construction;

C—Vessels and aircraft belonging to other Departments of the Government to be commissioned in the Navy;

[3] D—Merchant vessels to be commissioned in the Navy, either Navy-owned or on a bare-boat charter basis;

E—Merchant vessels to be chartered on a time charter basis;

CG—Coast Guard vessels.

[4] CHAPTER II. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET

2–201. Table ATF–1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET as of July 1, 1941.

2–202. a. SUBMARINE FORCE ONE will be composed of submarines, submarine tenders and submarine bases, not assigned to SUBMARINE FORCE TWO. Not less than five submarines must remain based on the SUBMARINE BASE, COCO SOLO.

b. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will be composed of submarines destined for the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.

2–203. When the units included in the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, arrive in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, the Chief of Naval Operations will assign them to such existing or new task forces as may then be dictated by the existing strategic situation.

2–204. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will assign for task duty, patrol planes, and patrol plane tenders required for their support, to the Task Forces indicated herein:

1. *To the NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE.*
   18 VPB and necessary tenders;
2. *To the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE*
   12 VPB and necessary tenders;
3. *To the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE*
   12 VPB and necessary tenders.

b. The aircraft units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph will remain under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. Rotation of units may be made periodically at the discretion of the Commander in Chief.

[5] 2–205. TRANSPORT DIVISION ONE will be assigned temporarily to the Naval Transportation Service, as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, for the transportation of Army troops.

2–206. Destroyers assigned to experimental work and sound school, and submarines assigned to submarine school and sound school will normally continue in these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under exceptional circumstances.

TABLE ATF-1

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
BATTLESHIPS			
Batdiv 3	BB	3	
Batdiv 5	BB	3	
CRUISERS			
CA 31	CA	1	
Crudiv 7	CA	4	
Crudiv 8	CL	4	
Crudiv 2	CL	4	
DESTROYERS			
AD 2, 12	AD	2	
DD 141, 187, 343	ODD	3	
Desdiv 54	ODD	4	
Desdiv 22	DD	4	
Desron 2	DD	9	
Desron 8	DD	9	
Desron 9	DD	8	1,850 tons.
Desron 13	DD	8	
AIRCRAFT			
Cardiv 3	CV	2	
CV 5	CV	1	
Patwing 5			
VP 31	VPB	12	
VP 32	VPB	12	
AVD 4, 9	AVD	2	
AVP 1, 9	AVP	2	
Patwing 5			
VP 51	VPB	12	
VP 52	VPB	12	
AVD 13	AVD	1	
AVP 3, 8	AVP	2	
SUBMARINES			
PG 53	PG	1	
Subron 1			
S/M Base, New London			
ASR 2	ASR	1	
Subdiv 11	OSS	8	
Subdiv 12	OSS	7	
Exdiv 1			
AG 24	AG	1	
SS 20, 48	OSS	2	
SS 204	SS	1	
Subron 3			
S/M Base, Coco Solo			
ASR 4	ASR	1	
Subdiv 31	OSS	6	
Subdiv 32	OSS	6	
Subron 7			
AS 5, 21	AS	2	
Subdiv 71	OSS	3	
Subdiv 72	OSS	7	
Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 2			
S/M Base, St. Thomas			
TRAIN VESSELS			
AF 1, 9	AF	2	AF 1 to be assigned in August, 1941.
AG 17	AG	1	
AKS 3	AKS	1	AKS 3 to be assigned in July, 1941.
AO 9, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26	AO	8	
AT 37, 66	AT	2	
AE 2	AE	1	To be assigned in August, 1941.
MINECRAFT			
Minron 7			
Mindiv 13	DMS	4	
Mindiv 14	AM	7	
TRANSPORTS			
Transdiv 1	AP	4	
Transdiv 11	APD	2	

TABLE ATF-1—Continued

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
PATROL CRAFT			
Subchaserdiv 31	PC	5	
DUANE (CG)	XPG	1	
INGHAM (CG)	XPG	1	
CAMPBELL (CG)	XPG	1	
SPENCER (CG)	XPG	1	
HAMILTON (CG)	XPG	1	
BIBB (CG)	XPG	1	
NORTH STAR (CG)	XPG	1	
NORTHLAND (CG)	XPG	1	
AG 29	AG	1	
UNCLASSIFIED			
IX 20	IX	1	
NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA			
MOBILE BASE HOSPITAL NO. 1			
MARINE CORPS FORCES			
First Marine Division			
First Marine Aircraft Group			
Fifth Defense Battalion			

[6] CHAPTER III. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

2-301. a. Table PAF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET as of July 1, 1941.

b. Table PAF-2 shows the initial composition of the ATLANTIC REINFORCEMENT, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

2-302. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET will assign for task duty, patrol planes and submarines, and tenders required for their support, to the Task Forces indicated herein:

1. *To the PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE*

12 VPB and necessary tenders,
2 SS and necessary tenders (for ALASKAN SECTOR);

2. *To the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE*

12 VPB and necessary tenders.

b. The units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph will remain under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. Rotation of units may be made periodically at the discretion of the Commander in Chief.

2-303. Destroyers and submarines assigned to sound school will normally continue in these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under exceptional circumstances.

TABLE PAF-1

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
BATTLESHIPS			
Batdiv 1	BB	3	
Batdiv 2	BB	3	
Batdiv 4	BB	3	
CRUISERS			
Crudiv 4	CA	4	
Crudiv 6	CA	4	
Crudiv 9	CL	5	
DESTROYERS			
Desflot 1			
CL 7	CL	1	
AD 3, 4	AD	2	
Desron 1 (less one Desdiv)	DD	5	
Desron 3, 5	DD	18	
Desflot 2			
CL 8	CL	1	
AD 11, 14	AD	2	
Desron 4, 6	DD	18	
Desdiv 50	ODD	4	

TABLE PAF-1—Continued

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
MINECRAFT			
CM 4	CM	1	
Mindiv 1, 2	DM	8	
AIRCRAFT			
Cardiv 1	CV	2	
Cardiv 2 (less CV 5)	CV	1	
Patwing 1			
VP 11	VPB	12	
VP 12	VPB	6	
VP 13	VPB	5	
VP 14	VPB	12	
AV 1	AV	1	
AVD 6, 10	AVD	2	
AVP 4	AVP	1	
Patwing 2			
VP 21	VPB	12	
VP 22	VPB	12	
VP 23	VPB	12	
VP 24	VPB	12	
AV 4	AV	1	
AVD 11, 14	AVD	2	
AVP 7	AVP	1	
Patwing 4			
VP 41	VPB	6	
VP 42	VPB	6	
VP 43	VPB	6	To be formed about October 1, 1941.
VP 44	VPB	6	
AVD 2, 12	AVD	2	
AVP 5, 6	AVP	2	
SUBMARINES			
CL 9	CL	1	
Subron 2			
AS 3	AS	1	
ASR 5	ASR	1	
Subdiv 21	SS	6	
Subdiv 22	SS	6	
Subron 4			
S/M Base, Pearl Harbor			
DD 336	ODD	1	
AM 30	AM	1	
ASR 1	ASR	1	
Subdiv 41	OSS	6	
Subdiv 42	SS	4	Includes SM 1.
Subdiv 43	SS	5	
Subron 6			
Subdiv 61	SS	3	
Subdiv 62	SS	3	
BASE FORCE			
TRAIN VESSELS			
AE 1	AE	1	To be assigned in August, 1941.
AF 7, 8, 11	AF	3	
AG 16, 31	AG	2	
AH 1	AH	1	
AKS 1, 2	AKS	2	
AM 3, 13, 16, 20, 24, 25, 26, 31, 43, 52	AM	10	
AO 1, 3, 4, 5, 12, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29	AO	14	
AR 1, 4	AR	2	
ARb 1	ARb	1	EXAD 13.
ARD 1	ARD	1	
AT 12, 23, 33, 34, 64, 65	AT	6	
TRANSPORTS			
Transdiv 2	AP	2	
Transdiv 4	AP	2	
Transdiv 12	APD	4	
MINE SQUADRON 2			
DMS 13	DMS	1	
Mindiv 4	DMS	4	
Mindiv 5	DMS	4	
Mindiv 6	DMS	4	
NAVAL STATION, GUAM			
NAVAL STATION, SAMOA			
Seventh Defense Battalion			
MARINE CORPS FORCES			
Second Marine Division			
Second Marine Aircraft Group			
Second Defense Battalion			
Sixth Defense Battalion			

TABLE PAF-2. THE ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
CRUISERS			
Crudiv 5	CA	4	

CHAPTER IV. THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE

2-401. Table SEP-1 shows the initial composition of the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE as of July 1, 1941.

TABLE SEP-1

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
CRUISERS			
Crudiv 3	CL	2	
DESTROYERS			
Desdiv 1 or 2	DD	4	As assigned by CinCpac.

CHAPTER V. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET

2-501. The Table ASF-1 shows the composition of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

2-502. One stores ship (AF) and one cargo ship (AK) of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, upon arrival in the FAR EAST AREA may be retained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

TABLE ASF-1

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
CRUISERS			
CA 30	CA	1	
CL 12	CL	1	
DESTROYERS			
AD 9	AD	1	
Desron 29	ODD	13	
AIRCRAFT			
Patwing 10			
VP 101	VPB	12	
VP 102	VPB	12	
AV 3	AV	1	
AVD 1, 7	AVD	2	
AVP 2	AVP	1	
SUBMARINES			
Subron 20			
AS 9, 20	AS	2	
ASR 6	ASR	1	
Subdiv 201	OSS	6	
Subdiv 202	SS	4	
Subdiv 203	SS	7	
PATROL CRAFT			
PG 21, 22	PG	2	
PR 3, 4, 6, 7, 8	PR	5	
PY 10	PY	1	
TRAIN			
AO 6, 13	AO	2	
AT 32	AT	1	
Mindiv 3	AM	2	
Mindiv 9	AM	4	
MARINE CORPS FORCES			
Marine Detachments			
Fourth Marines (Shanghai)			
Marine Detachments (North China)			
Marine Detachments (Philippines)			

[7] CHAPTER VI. U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE

2-601. The Tables for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, show the initial composition as of July 1, 1941.

a. *THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE*—TABLE NE-1.

1. Units of this table not prepared for overseas service will be temporarily assigned to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for training and material preparation.

b. *SUBMARINE FORCE THREE*—TABLE NE-2.

TABLE NE-1. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
DESTROYERS			
AD 15	AD	1	
Desron 7	DD	9	
Desrons 30, 31	ODD	18	
DD 341, Desdiv 53	ODD	5	
Desdiv 21	DD	4	
Mobile Destoyer Repair Units 1, 2			
AIRCRAFT			
Patwing 7			
VP 71	VPB	12	
VP 72	VPB	12	
VP 73	VPB	9	
VP 74	VPB	9	
AV 5	AV	1	
AVD 3, 8	AVD	2	
Patwing 8			
VP 81	VPB	12	
VP 82	VPB	12	
VP 83	VPB	12	
VP 84	VPB	12	
AVD 5	AVD	1	
Patwing 9			
VP 91	VPB	12	This wing will be formed following completion of Patwing 8.
VP 92	VPB	12	
VP 93	VPB	12	
VP 94	VPB	12	
Mobile Aircraft Repair Units 1, 2			
AIN VESSELS			
AM 73, 74, 75, 77	AM	4	
AMc 36, 42, 43, 46, 47, 50	AMc	6	
MARINE CORPS FORCES			
Eleventh Provisional Marine Company			

TABLE NE-2. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
SUBMARINES			
Subron 5			
AS 13	AS	1	
ASR 3	ASR	1	
Subdiv 51	OSS	7	
Subdiv 52	OSS	4	
Subdiv 53	OSS	6	
Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 3			

CHAPTER VII. VESSELS OPERATING UNDER THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

2-701. The Table CNO-1 shows the vessels assigned to special duty under the Chief of Naval Operations.

TABLE CNO-1.

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
AG 1	AG	1	
AG 23	AG	1	SecNav Yacht.
AG 25, 26	AG	2	President's Yacht and tender.
AG 30, 32	AG	2	Survey vessels.
AM 40	AM	1	BuOrd duty.
PG 52	PG	1	Tender for PT's and PTC's.
MTB Squadron 1	PT	6	
MTB Squadron 2	PT	7	
Subchaser Squadron 1	PTC	4	
COMANCHE (CG)	XPY	1	Greenland Patrol.
ALGONQUIN (CG)	XPY	1	Greenland Patrol.
MODOC (CG)	XPG	1	Greenland Patrol.
RARITAN (CG)	XYT	1	Greenland Patrol.
IX 50	IX	1	Greenland Patrol.
SS 206 to 211 incl	SS	6	In commission or to be commissioned and to operate either under the CNO or CinClant for temporary duty. To be assigned to U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

[8] CHAPTER VIII. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES

2–801. The tables in this Chapter VIII show the assignments to the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES.

2–802. Units that are not listed in these tables but which have otherwise been assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Districts, outlying Naval Stations, or to activities excluded from Naval Districts, will continue in such commands. Commandants of Naval Districts and outlying Naval Stations will assign such units under their commands to Naval Local Defense Forces or to Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in accordance with the following general rules:

a. *TO THE NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES*

1. Units other than auxiliary type (see "Standard Nomenclature, Ships' Data, U. S. Naval Vessels").

2. Units of the Auxiliary Type required for execution of the tasks of Naval Local Defense Forces.

3. District Craft (see "Standard Nomenclature, Ships' Data, U. S. Naval Vessels"), as follows: YN, YNg, YMS, YP; those YT assigned for net and boom services; and other classes at the discretion of the Commandant.

b. *TO NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT*

1. Units not assigned to the Naval Local Defense Force.

c. 1. Units of the Naval Local Defense Force and of the Naval District Craft will be placed in the status "in service not in commission", or in the status "in commission" as prescribed by article 636 (1), (2), U. S. Navy Regulations, in accordance with the current Operating Force Plan in effect, or in specific cases as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Units taken over from private sources will be placed "in service not in commission", or "in commission", depending upon the status in which units of the same classification appearing in the current Operating Force Plan, are operating.

[9] 2–803. a. Units of the Coast Guard not otherwise assigned in succeeding paragraphs or in the tables of Appendix II, will be employed in the Naval Local Defense Forces of the Naval Districts in which they are based at the time the Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy, in the manner prescribed in the "United States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940." Commandants of Naval Districts will understand that, on assuming command of Coast Guard units, they also assume responsibility for the discharge of essential Coast Guard functions. Prior to M-day, Commandants of Naval Districts, in cooperation with local Coast Guard commanders, will plan the war operations of the Coast Guard.

b. Lighthouse tenders will normally be employed in their peace-time duties, as modified by war requirements of the Army and Navy.

2–804. a. The tables show the assignments to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces in tabular form.

1. Unit (vessel, aircraft, or organization unit)..... Column (1).

2. Sub-group ..... Column (2).
3. From (indicating the fleet from which the unit is to be detached, the Naval District in which a private vessel is to be taken over, or that the assignment will be made by the Chief of Naval Operations) ..... Column (3).
4. Mobilization District (indicating the Naval District in which the vessel is to be mobilized) ..... Column (4).

b. The symbol XAGs indicates a station ship.

2–805. Units to be taken over will be manned by Navy crews in the Naval Districts indicated in Column (3) of the tables, and moved under the direction of the Commandant of that Naval District to the Mobilization District indicated in Column (4), where mobilization will take place.

[10] 2–806. It is undesirable to take over for use in Naval Coastal Frontier Forces vessels that will remain idle for a long period on account of inability to convert, equip, or man them. Commandants of Naval Districts in which units are taken over (Column (3)) will, therefore, arrange to do so after consideration of the following:

a. Personnel available to take over and man the unit for movement to the Mobilization;

b. Conversion yards available and readiness to start conversion;

c. Equipment available;

d. Personnel available to man the unit upon completion of conversion;

e. The desirability of placing the unit in immediate service with little or no conversion.

2–807. Commandants charged with taking over and mobilizing Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will give the same priority to units assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces of other Districts as they give to units assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces within their own Districts.

TABLE NACF.—NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

Unit—Vessel (1)		Sub-group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
NAVAL COASTAL FORCE					
Navy Vessels					
PE 19, 27, 48, 55, 56	5 PE	A			
PY 12, 13, 15, 16	4 PY	A			
PG 17, 18, 54	3 PG	A			
VPB	18 VPB	A	USAF	.....	Administration in U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
AV or AVD or AVP	number as required	A	USAF	.....	
ZNP	6 ZNP	A	IV ND		
Coast Guard Aircraft based at:					
Air Station, Salem, Mass					
Air Station, New York, N. Y					
Air Station, Elizabeth City, N. C					
Vessels from Other Sources					
XPG 1	1 XPG	D	CNO	I	
XPG 2, 3	2 XPG	D	CNO	III	
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT					
Navy Vessels					
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.					
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.					
Coast Guard Vessels					
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.					
Vessels from Other Sources					
XYP 1 to 30 incl	30 XYP	D	I ND	I	
XAGs 1, 2	2 XAGs	D	I ND	I	
XAM 1 to 4 incl	4 XAM	D	I ND	I	
XAMb 1 to 9 incl	9 XAMb	D	I ND	I	
XAMc 1, 2	2 XAMc	D	I ND	I	
Units Ashore					
As indicated in I ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.					
Marine Corps Forces					
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.					

TABLE NACF.—NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER—Continued

Unit—Vessel (1)		Sub-group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT					
Navy Vessels					
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.					
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.					
Coast Guard Vessels					
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.					
Vessels from Other Sources					
XYP 31	1 XYP	D	III ND	III	
XAM 5 to 13 incl	9 XAM	D	I ND	I	
XAMb 10 to 14 incl	5 XAMb	D	I ND	I	
XAMc 3 to 16 incl	14 XAMc	D	I ND	I	
Units Ashore					
As indicated in III ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.					
Marine Corps Forces					
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5					
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—FOURTH NAVAL DISTRICT					
Navy Vessels					
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.					
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.					
Coast Guard Vessels					
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.					
Vessels from Other Sources					
XCMc 1	1 XCMc	D	I ND	I	
XPYc 1, 2	2 XPYc	D	III ND	III	
XPYc 3, 4	2 XPYc	D	IV ND	IV	
XAGs 3	1 XAGs	D	IV ND	IV	
XAM 14 to 21 incl	8 XAM	D	I ND	I	
XAMb 15 to 24 incl	10 XAMb	D	I ND	I	
XAMc 17 to 19 incl	3 XAMc	D	IV ND	IV	
XAMc 20	1 XAMc	D	I ND	I	
Units Ashore					
As indicated in IV ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.					
Marine Corps Forces					
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5					
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT					
Navy Vessels					
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.					
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.					
Coast Guard Vessels					
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.					
Vessels from Other Sources					
XCMc 2	1 XCMc	D	V ND	V	
XYP 32 to 38 incl	7 XYP	D	V ND	V	
XAGs 4	1 XAGs	D	V ND	V	
XAM 22, 23	2 XAM	D	I ND	I	
XAMc 21 to 31 incl	11 XAMc	D	V ND	V	
Units Ashore					
As indicated in V ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.					
Marine Corps Forces					
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.					

TABLE SCF.—SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

Unit—Vessel (1)			Sub-group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
NAVAL COASTAL FORCE						
Navy Vessels						
None						
Coast Guard Vessels						
MOJAVE, TAMPA	240′	2 XPG	CG	VI ND	VI	
TALLAPOOSA	Misc.	1 XPY	CG	VI ND	VI	
MOHAWK	165′	1 XPY	CG	IV ND	VI	
Coast Guard Aircraft based at:						
Air Station, Charleston, S. C						
Air Station, Miami, Fla						
Air Station, St. Petersburg, Fla						
Air Station, Biloxi, Miss						
Vessels from Other Sources						
XPG 4		1 XPG	D	CNO	VI	
XPY 1 to 4 incl		4 XPY	D	III ND	III	
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—SIXTH NAVAL DISTRICT						
Navy Vessels						
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.						
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.						
Coast Guard Vessels						
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.						
Vessels from Other Sources						
XCMc 3		1 XCMc	D	III ND	III	
XPYc 5, 6		2 XPYc	D	III ND	III	
XYP 39 to 44 incl		6 XYP	D	VI ND	VI	
XAGs 5, 6		2 XAGs	D	VI ND	VI	
XAM 24 to 27 incl		4 XAM	D	I ND	I	
XAMb 25 to 31 incl		7 XAMb	D	I ND	I	
XAMb 32 to 34 incl		3 XAMb	D	VI ND	VI	
Units Ashore						
As indicated in VI ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.						
Marine Corps Forces						
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.						
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—SEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT						
Navy Vessels						
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.						
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.						
Coast Guard Vessels						
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.						
Vessels from Other Sources						
XPYc 7, 8		2 XPYc	D	I ND	I	
XPYc 9, 10		2 XPYc	D	III ND	III	
XAGs 7, 8		2 XAGs	D	VII ND	VII	
XAM 28, 29		2 XAM	D	I ND	I	
XAMb 35, 36		2 XAMb	D	I ND	I	
XAMc 32 to 35 incl		4 XAMc	D	I ND	I	
Units Ashore						
As indicated in VII ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.						
Marine Corps Forces						
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.						
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT						
Navy Vessels						
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.						
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.						
Coast Guard Vessels						
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.						

TABLE SCF.—SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER—Continued

Unit—Vessel (1)		Sub-group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued					
Vessels from Other Sources					
XCMc 4	1 XCMc	D	III ND	III	
XPYc 11 to 18 incl	8 XPYc	D	IX ND	VIII	
XYP 45 to 50 incl	6 XYP	D	VIII ND	VIII	
XYP 51 to 55 incl	5 XYP	D	V ND	V	
XAGs 9 to 11 incl	3 XAGs	D	VIII ND	VIII	
XAMb 37 to 40 incl	4 XAMb	D	VIII ND	VIII	
XAMc 36 to 40 incl	5 XAMc	D	I ND	I	
XAMc 41 to 43 incl	3 XAMc	D	VI ND	VI	
Units Ashore					
As indicated in VIII ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.					
Marine Corps Forces					
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.					

TABLE CACF.—CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE					
Navy Vessels					
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.					
ODD Desron 33 less Desdiv 67	5 ODD	A			
PY 18	1 PY	A			
VPB	12 VPB	A	USAF		Administration in U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
AV or AVP or AVD	number as required	A	USAF		Administration in U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
Coast Guard Vessels					
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.					
Vessels from Other Sources					
XPG 6, 7	2 XPG	D	CNO	X	
XPC 2, 3, 4	3 XPC	D	III ND	III	
XPY 8	1 XPY	D	V ND	V	
XPY 9, 10	2 XPY	D	III ND	III	
XPYc 24 to 27 incl	4 XPYc	D	III ND	III	
XPYc 28 to 31 incl	4 XPYc	D	I ND	I	
XYP 128 to 131 incl	4 XYP	D	IV ND	IV	
XAM 42 to 47 incl	6 XAM	D	I ND	I	
XAMb 61 to 66 incl	6 XAMb	D	V ND	V	
XAMb 67 to 70 incl	4 XAMb	D	I ND	I	
XAMc 93 to 102 incl	10 XAMc	D	I ND	I	
Units Ashore					
As indicated in X ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.					
Marine Corps Forces					
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.					
Fourth Defense Battalion, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.					

TABLE PACF.—PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE					
Navy Vessels					
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.					
ODD Desdiv 67	4 ODD	A			
PG 50	1 PG	A			
VPB	12 VPB	A	USAF		Administration in U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
AV or AVP or AVD	number as required	A	USAF		Administration in U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
Coast Guard Vessels:					
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.					
Vessels from Other Sources:					
XCMc 6	1 XCMc	D	V ND	V	
XPC 5, 6	2 XPC	D	III ND	III	
XPY 11 to 14 incl	4 XPY	D	IX ND	VIII	
XPYc 32 to 43 incl	12 XPYc	D	III ND	III	
XPYc 44 to 46 incl	3 XPYc	D	V ND	V	

TABLE PACF.—PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER—Continued

Unit—Vessel (1)		Sub-group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—Continued					
Vessels from Other Sources—Continued					
XPYc 47	1 XPYc	D	VI ND	VI	
XYP 132 to 141	10 XYP	D	IV ND	IV	
XAGs 16, 17	2 XAGs	D	VIII ND	VIII	
XAM 48 to 50 incl	3 XAM	D	I ND	I	
XAMb 71, 72	2 XAMb	D	V ND	V	
XAMc 103 to 116 incl	14 XAMc	D	V ND	V	
Units Ashore					
As indicated in XV ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5.					
Marine Corps Forces					
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.					

TABLE PSCF.—PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

NAVAL COASTAL FORCE					
Navy Vessels					
ODD Desdiv 70, 83	8 ODD	A			
PE 32, 38	2 PE	A			
PY 14	1 PY	A			
VPB	12 VPB	A	USPF		Administration in U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
AV or AVD or AVP number as required		A	USPF		
Coast Guard Vessels					
TANEY	327' 1 XPG	CG	IXV ND	XI	
SHAWNEE	Misc. 1 XPY	CG	XII ND	XII	
Coast Guard Aircraft based at:					
Air Station, San Francisco, Calif					
Air Station, San Diego, Calif					
Vessels from Other Sources					
XPG 5	1 XPG	D	CNO	XII	
XPY 5, 6, 7	3 XPY	D	XI ND	XI	
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—ELEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT:					
Navy Vessels:					
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.					
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.					
Coast Guard Vessels:					
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.					
Vessels from Other Sources:					
XCMc 5	1 XCMc	D	III ND	III	
XPC 1	1 XPC	D	XI ND	XI	
XYP 93 to 97 incl	5 XYP	D	XI ND	XI	
XAGs 14	1 XAGs	D	XI ND	XI	
XAM 39 to 41 incl	3 XAM	D	XI ND	XI	
XAMb 51 to 60 incl	10 XAMb	D	XI ND	XI	
XAMc 65 to 86 incl	22 XAMc	D	XI ND	XI	
Units Ashore:					
As indicated in XI ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5.					
Marine Corps Forces:					
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.					
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT					
Navy Vessels					
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.					
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.					
Coast Guard Vessels					
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.					
Vessels from Other Sources					
XYP 98 to 127 incl	30 XYP	D	XII ND	XII	
XAGs 15	1 XAGs	D	XII ND	XII	
XAMc 87 to 92 incl	6 XAMc	D	XII ND	XII	

TABLE NACF.—NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER—Continued

Unit—Vessel (1)	Sub-group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued				
Units Ashore				
As indicated in XII ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
Marine Corps Forces				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2. RAINBOW No. 5.				

TABLE PNCF.—PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—THIRTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT				
Navy Vessels				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
ODD Desdiv 82 — 5 ODD	A			
PG 51 — 1 PG	A			
PE 57 — 1 PE	A			
SS — 2 SS	A	USPF		Administration in U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
ASR — 1 ASR	A	USPF		
VPB — 12 VPB	A	USPF		
AV or AVD or AVP number as required	A	USPF		
Coast Guard Vessels				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
AURORA — 165' B 1 XPC	CG	XI ND	XIII	
Coast Guard Aircraft based at: Air Station, Port Angeles, Wash.				
Vessels from Other Sources				
XPYc 19 to 23 incl — 5 XPYc	D	XI ND	XIII	
XYP 56 to 92 incl — 37 XYP	D	XIII ND	XIII	
XAGs 12, 13 — 2 XAGs	D	XIII ND	XIII	
XAM 30 to 38 incl — 9 XAM	D	XI ND	XIII	
XAMb 41 to 50 incl — 10 XAMb	D	XIII ND	XIII	
XAMc 44 to 64 incl — 21 XAMc	D	XIII ND	XIII	
XAOb 1, 2 — 2 XAOb	D	CNO	XIII	
Units Ashore				
As indicated in XIII ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
Marine Corps Forces				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No.				

TABLE HCF.—HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE				
Navy Vessels				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
ODD Desdiv 80 — 4 ODD	A			
PG 19 — 1 PG	A			
Coast Guard Vessels				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
DAPHNE — 165'B 1 XPC	CG	XII ND	XII	
Vessels from Other Sources				
XCMc 7 — 1 XCMc	D	V ND	V	
XYP 142 to 167 incl — 26 XYP	D	XIV ND	XIV	
XAM 51 to 55 incl — 5 XAM	D	I ND	I	
XAM 56 — 1 XAM	D	XII ND	XII	
XAMc 117 to 119 incl — 3 XAMc	D	XIV ND	XIV	
XAOb 3, 4 — 2 XAOb	D	CNO	XIV	
XYF 1 to 5 incl — 5 XYF	D	XIV ND	XIV	
Units Ashore				
As indicated in XIV ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
Marine Corps Forces				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5				
First Defense Battalion				
Third Defense Battalion				

TABLE PhCF.—PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

Unit—Vessel (1)	Sub-group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT				
Such suitable vessels as are locally available and additional vessels and aircraft as assigned by Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.				
Units Ashore				
As indicated in XVI ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
Marine Corps Forces				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				

[11] CHAPTER IX. NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

2-901. The Sections and Tables prescribing the composition of forces of the Naval Transportation Service will be issued as a change to this plan.

EXHIBIT NO. 130

Confidential

PARAPHRASE OF CODE RADIOGRAM RECEIVED AT THE WAR DEPARTMENT AT 22:55, OCTOBER 27, 1941

MANILA, October 27, 1941.

British sources report 2 Japanese aircraft carriers, one of which is the Kage, operating in Mandated islands. Following planes reported there:

Wotje—8 flying boats
Jaluit—8 flying boats, 12 fighters
Truk—6 fighters, 6 heavy bombers
Saipan—8 fighters, 6 heavy bombers
Palau—8 flying boats

General southward movement of Japanese shipping in Western Pacific reported by British.

BRINK
IB #2 10/28/41.

Distribution:
Mr. Lauchlin Currie
Assistant Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War for Air
Chief of the Army Air Forces
Chief of the Air Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD
G. H. Q.
State Department
Director of Naval Intelligence
Situation Section
Far Eastern Section

Department of State. Received Nov. 29, 1941. Division of Communications and Records.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Paraphrase

NOVEMBER 21, 1941.

The following was received from the Naval Observer at Wellington November 19, 1941:

"Source New Zealand Naval Intelligence: On November 16 and 17 planes, apparently Japanese, were sighted over Gilberts. One day twin engined monoplane next flying boat, course generally north and south with speed 125. Indi-

cates daily patrol from Jaluit over Gilberts to area south near shipping routes. Several unknown ships reported last 10 days near Gilbert and Ellice Jap liners reported carrying troops or laborers to Mandates, Truk and Saigon each recently reinforced by ½ squadron fighters and ½ squadron bombers."

Department of State. Received Nov. 30, 1941. Division of Communications and Records.
Strictly confidential

Paraphrase

NOVEMBER 24, 1941.

The following was received from the Naval Attache Singapore November 23 1941:

"DEPENDABLE REPORTS HERE OF RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER GILBERT ISLANDS ON NOVEMBER 15 BY MONOPLANE WITH TAPERED WINGS, SINGLE TAILFIN, TWIN ENGINES. NEXT DAY REPEATED BY MONOPLANE FLYING BOAT SILVER COLOR NUMBER OF ENGINES UNOBSERVED."

CC: Mr. Hamilton
Mr. Hornbeck.

Telegram received

HRL GRAY
From: Tokyo
Dated: November 29, 1941
Rec'd 8:11 p. m.
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

1868, November 29, 6 p. m.

The Embassy has received Foreign Office note no. 129 American 1 dated November 27 which is translated as follows.

"EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to state that according to a report from the Japanese Naval authorities, an American airplane flew over Garanbi on the southernmost tip of Taiwan Island at 12:30 p. m. November 20, 1941 and after circling at an altitude of 2,000 meters flew away southward at 12:45 p. m. the same day.

"It is believed that the Japanese Government cannot overlook such a violation of Japanese territory by an airplane and it is therefore requested that the matter be brought to the attention of the United States authorities concerned. Also I particularly bespeak Your Excellency's solicitude particularly the recurrence of such incidents at this time when the international situation is tense and the untoward events to which they might give rise are unpredictable. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance's of my highest consideration. Shigenori Togo, Minister for Foreign Affairs." Sent to the Department only.

GREW.

JRL

Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, December 2, 1941.

The following information has been received from the Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet.

"At a bearing from Saigon of 070 and a distance of 180 miles three type 1–61 submarines were observed on December 2nd in cruising formation headed south at a speed of 15 knots. Also at Camaranah six planes patrolled overhead while 21 transports anchored.

"In Lat. 13– 10N. Long 110–00 at 0230 Greenwich December 2nd a patrol plane observed 9 submarines headed south at a speed of 10 knots, [apparently headed for Camranh Bay.]"

/s/ R. E. SCHUIRMANN.

Strictly confidential Paraphrase

DECEMBER 4, 1941.

The following message was received from the Governor of Guam November 24, 1941:

"At 1217 local time today unidentified two-engined plane sighted, circling southern end of island. Altitude approximately 15,000 feet. At 1226 local time plane passed out of sight to southwest."

Telegram sent

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
December 6, 1941.

AMEMBASSY
Tokyo (Japan).

Your 1868, November 29, 6 p. m.

The Foreign Office note has been brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities of this Government.

In connection with this question, you may be interested to know that the Navy Department has been informed by the Governor of Guam that about noon on November 24 an unidentified two-motored airplane circled the southern extremity of Guam for about ten minutes flying at an altitude of approximtaely 15,000 feet.

/s/ HULL.
/s/ S W

FE: RLS: NHS FE

EXHIBIT NO. 131

(This exhibit was originally designed to incorporate the prior testimony of Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel before (1) the Roberts Commission, (2) the Navy Court of Inquiry and (3) the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Inasmuch as the entire transcript of testimony taken incident to each of these proceedings has been set forth as exhibits to the Joint Committee record, the prior testimony of Admiral Kimmel is not being printed at this point pursuant to direction of the Committee. For reference thereto, see index.)

EXHIBIT NO. 132

REPORT ON CONFERENCE BETWEEN FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER TOGO AND THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR 7:30 A. M. DEC 8, 1941

1. I stated, "After my conference with you last night I succeeded in obtaining an answer from the Emperor to the personal telegram from President Roosevelt to the Emperor which you presented at that conference. Thus, His Imperial Majesty orders me to convey the following message to President Roosevelt through you:

" 'We have heretofore commanded the Japanese Government to reply to the query of the President of the United States respecting the assembling of Japanese troops in French Indo China. Further, the withdrawal from French Indo China was one of the matters discussed in the Japanese-American negotiations and we have already had the Japanese Government state its opinions on the matter. Therefore, please consult these statements to understand our position. We believe the President must be fully aware of the fact that the object of our wishes is the establishment of peace in the Pacific and throughout the world, and that, in accordance with our desires, the Japanese Government has up to the present time striven to attain that goal.' "

The Ambassador listened to the Emperor's note with respectful attention and replied that he would transmit it to the President immediately. He then said that he had been instructed to request an audience of the Emperor to present

the President's telegram personally, and since the relations between our two nations were now facing a grave crisis he requested that I take special pains to arrange for an audience. I answered that if his sole object in requesting an audience was to present the President's telegram, I doubted, considering the nature of the Emperor's note, that an audience was necessary. I pointed out, however, that I had nb intention of standing in his way and if he had any further statement to make, in addition to the telegram, I would of course do everything I could to arrange for one. The Ambassador seemed very pleased and expressed his gratitude. (At his request, I have submitted a provisional translation of the English text of his application [for an audience] (as Supplement A)).

2. Next I handed the Ambassador a copy of the note to the United States and said that, as he knew, the Imperial Government had done everything in its power to bring the Japanese-American negotiations to a successful conclusion and that I myself had worked earnestly to that end.

"However,"

I continued,

"we have come to the conclusion that the attitude of the American Government unfortunately precludes any prospect of reaching an agreement even though the negotiations should be further continued, and we have therefore ordered this ntoe to be presented to the Government of the United States on the afternoon of December 7, Washington time. I am very sorry that things have worked out this way."

[2] The Ambassador said that he would return to the Embassy to read the document and would refrain from making any statement at this time, whereupon he withdrew.

3.* The conference lasted about half an hour, but at that time Ambassador Grew stated that President Roosevelt had sent a personal telegram to the Emperor and that he had been instructed to present it to the Emperor himself, and therefore he requested the Foreign Minister's help in arranging for an audience. The Foreign Minister answered that it was now late at night and steps for arranging an audience could not be taken before the next morning. He suggested that the Ambassador's chances for getting an audience would probably depend on the contents of the President's telegram. Ambassador Grew informally handed the Foreign Minister a copy of the telegram which he had with him (Supplement A), again requested that the Foreign Minister do everything possible to arrange for an audience in view of the gravity of the situation, and withdrew after arranging for another interview.

4. The Foreign Minister proceeded to the Premier's official residence with a summary translation of the President's telegram, and there, at an emergency conference with the Premier and the rest of the cabinet, determined in general the line of action to be taken on this matter. [Two lines illegible.]

5. At about 3 A. M. the Foreign Minister returned to his residence. He waited as directed, until 6 o'clock on the morning of the 8th to notify the English and American Ambassadors of the rupture of Anglo-American negotiations. At this time he handed the following statement to Ambassador Grew as the Emperor's answer to President Roosevelt's wire:

[Here follows the text of the Emperor's note as given above.]

GIST OF CONFERENCE BETWEEN FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER TOGO AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR 8:00 A. M. DEC. 8, 1941

Following my interview with the American Ambassador, I called the British Ambassador to an interview. I told him directly as I had the American Ambassador that it had become unavoidably necessary to break off Japanese-American negotiations, and handed him a copy of the note addressed to the United States. At the same time I said "Although this is only the copy of a note to the United States, please understand that the Imperial Government, realizing Great Britain's great interest in these negotiations and that the interests of Great Britain and the United States are inseparably connected, has included in the note its opinions on all problems currently pending between Japan and Great Britain." The Ambassador thereupon remarked that he regreted the rupture of negotiations as deeply as I did. He went on to say that there were reports to the effect that Japanese vessels with a large number of troops aboard were proceeding westward

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* From this point on this would seem to be a totally different document, referring to what preceded the conference of the morning of the 8th.

through the Gulf of Siam and that it would seem that possibly part of them were headed for Thailand and part for the Malay Peninsula. The invasion of these areas by the Japanese Army would produce a most serious situation. As he had stated a little while ago (here he referred to the interview with me on the 6th), Great Britain had no intention of violating Thai independence and territorial integrity provided that other nations respected them. Therefore he hoped that the Japanese Government would restrain its Military.

I answered that I was by no means certain of the situation since last evening. However, just this morning I had heard a report to the effect that the English had assembled Indian troops on the Thai border. I thought it probable that our vessels were cruising the waters adjacent to that area to be ready for anything that might come up in a situation which was plainly not normal. I had just ordered our ambassador to Thailand to report on the situation, and as soon as that report arrived, would consider this mater in a general study of the situation. Whereupon the British Ambassador advised me to be wary of reports fabricated by elements seeking to disturb the peace, and withdrew.

ON THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN
MEETING OF PRIVY COUNCIL DEC. 8, 1941

Written by Matsumoto—Head of Treaty Bureau

In the 11th item of Article 6 of the Internal Orders decided upon at the time of the Reorganization of the Privy Council in December 1938, was included a section on "The Declaration of War." It was unclear whether this gave the Privy Council the right to advise the decision to engage in war, or just the authority for advising the formal declaration of war. However, when war was declared against the United States and Great Britain, the decision to engage in war had already been made at the previous conference of Dec. 1, 1941, so the Privy Council was only to consider an address to the throne stating "We declare war against the United States and Great Britain." A draft of an Imperial Rescript declaring war was attached to the Address to the Throne for advisement. (The Address to the Throne and the draft of the Imperial Rescript were drawn up by the Cabinet.)

Meeting of Committee of Advisement
Dec. 8—7:40 A. M.
In the Imperial Palace

Tozo Room
Those Present
All members of the Advisory Council [Komonkan]
All Cabinet ministers (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Togo, was absent, because he was holding interviews with the United States and British Ambassadors).

Head of the Legal Bureau—Moriyama
Foreign Affairs Officials:
Yamamoto, Head of the American Bureau
Sakamoto, Head of the Europe-Asia Bureau
Matsumoto, Head of the Treaty Bureau
Army Officials:
Muto, Head of Military Affairs Bureau
Navy Officials:
Muto, Head of Military Affairs Bureau

First, the Navy Minister reported on the military action against American and British Troops which had been in progress since this morning in the Malayan, Hongkong, and Hawaiian areas.

1st President of the Council—I propose that a Committee of Advisement headed by the Vice-President of the Council, and constituted of all the members of the Advisory Council, meet immediately and consider this matter.

Premier Tojo—explained the reasons for declaring war.

Advisor Ishii—At what time will war be declared? It is necessary to make sure that America and Britain don't saddle us with the responsibility.

Primier—We hope for an immediate declaration.

[2] Advisor Kubota—A state of war already exists, but what is the viewpoint of the Imperial Headquarters.

Premier—At the conference of Dec. 1 they determined to commence hostilities against England, America, and the Netherlands.

Advisor Shimizu—What is the attitude of Thailand?

Premier—It is not yet clear, but negotiations are in prograss for a policy of Mutual Defense.

Advisor Shimizu—Aren't we going to declare war on Holland?

Premier—We are not declaring war against Holland because of military expediency.

Advisor Minami—What is Germany's attitude?

Premier—German entrance into the war in our support is almost certain, and negotiations to that effect are now in progress.

Advisor Nara—What is the attitude of the Soviet Union?

Premier—The attitude of the Soviet Union is one of circumspection.

Advisors Sugawara and Fukai submitted questions on the expenditure of war funds, matters of material, etc., which were answered by the Minister of Finance and the Premier.

Advisor Sutakami—Is it the question of whether or not we should declare war that you want us to consider? I mean, has an Imperial Rcesript already been issued on the beginning of the war?

Premier—Yes.

(Foreign Minister Togo enters and takes his place.)

Advisors Futakami and (?Ikeda?) pointed out that the use of the word "America," [BEIKOKU] in the suggested draft of the Imperial Rescript which had been appended for advisement, might be misunderstood to apply to all the Americas, and recommended a revision, but the Premier and the Head of the Treaty Bureau explained that no such misunderstanding was possible.

Last of all, Foreign Affairs Minister Togo reported on the diplomatic situation which had preceded the commencement of war.

[3] The documents under discussion were approved by a unanimous vote.

Full session, 10 A. M. Dec 8, Imperial Palace, Higashidame Room

His Imperial Majesty was present.

The rest of the attendance was the same as at the meeting of the Committee of Advisement.

Committee President Suzuki presented his advisement report which was unanimously approved.

EXHIBIT NO. 132A

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
30 September 1941
Msg. #881

Part 2([a])—(conclusion of the message)

Said Admiral is a man who thinks that war between Japan and America would bring about no advantageous results for either country and that it is impossible to solve economic problems by means of arms. He was cordial in his attitude toward me from beginning to end. So I told him how much I regretted that, since my arrival to take up my post, I had not been able to accomplish anything at all, to which he said, "All the people who know your Excellency deeply appreciate your efforts", and pointing out the apprehensions expressed in the Business Conditions Weekly([b]) regarding Far-Eastern problems (the gist of the article is to the effect that, while a showdown([b]) between Japan and America is imminent, war between these two countries is unnecessary and that if Japan is able to change and readjust her policy, America will be mindful of her prosperity), he urged me to read the article and said that he would put forth due efforts in the matter.

I would request that the above information be conveyed to the Navy Minister. (Finis)

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[a] Part 1 appears under SIS–22987.
[b] Expressed by the English words.

From: Tokyo
To: Germany, Brazil, Canada, England, Australia, Russia
Date: 8 November 1941
Msg No. Circular 2288

With regard to the present stage in the Japanese-American negotiations: (Office Chief's Code)

1. The government, since the formation of the cabinet, has held daily conferences with Imperial Headquarters and has given consideration to the fundamental aim in our national policy so as to meet the present grave crisis. We came to a decision on the matter at the conference held in the Emperor's presence on the 5th inst. together with a determination of fundamental plans relating to diplomatic adjustments between Japan and America.

2. With regard to Japanese-American negotiations we decided to continue negotiating for diplomatic adjustments and Ambassador NOMURA has already begun conversations in compliance with our new policy. However, although we on our part still have the same strong desire to come to an agreement in the negotiations, we are also determined to persist in our demands in so far as they pertain to the existence and authority of our Empire. However, in view of the way in which these negotiations have progressed in the past, there will be a great deal of divergency of opinion between us and them. On the other hand, since the situation indicates imminent tension, the outlook does not permit optimism. In case of a rupture in the negotiations, the situation throughout our Empire may be expected to undergo a sudden change.

3. At present the government will endeavor to save the situation by peaceful means. It expects to expedite the negotiations by urging the American government to reconsider its attitude. So exhausting every possible method to accomplish this, and because we think it appropriate, we have decided with this in view to despatch Ambassador KURUSU to America (he is scheduled to arrive in Washington about the 13th), so that he might himself inform Ambassador NOMURA of our decision, and aiding said ambassador in the final stages of the negotiations, bring about a new turn in the critical situation.

4. In this way our government, while persistently adhering to our position, is trying in every possible way to prevent a break in Japanese-American relations, and by devoting its utmost efforts, is endeavoring to bring about a rapid and new turn in the critical situation. The above is for your information alone.

This message is addressed to GERMANY, BRAZIL, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, ENGLAND and RUSSIA. Will you please relay it to ITALY from GERMANY, and to the ambassadors and ministers in South America and MEXICO from BRAZIL.

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Peking, Nanking, Manchuria, Shanghai, Hongkong, Hanoi, Batavia, Thailand, San Francisco, Manila.
Date: 12 November 1941
Circular 2313

With regard to the present stage in the Japanese-American negotiations: (Office Chief's Code. Urgent).

1. The government, since the formation of the Cabinet, has held daily conferences with Imperial Headquarters and has given consideration to the fundamental aim of our national policy so as to meet the present grave crisis. We came to a decision on this matter on the 5th inst. together with a determination of our fundamental plans relating to diplomatic adjustments between Japan and America.

2. With regard to Japanese-American negotiations we decided to continue negotiations on diplomatic adjustments on an equitable basis. And no sooner had conversations begun on the 7th than considerable divergence of opinion appeared. In view of the way in which the negotiations have moved in the past, it is doubtful whether an agreement will be reached in the negotiations, and while on our part we will try to put forth our utmost efforts to bring about an agreement, the situation is such that we shall not be able to make any further concessions, so that the outlook does not permit any optimism. In case of a rupture in the negotiations it is expected that the situation throughout our Empire will undergo a sudden change.

This message is sent to: Peking, Nanking, Manchuria, Shanghai, Hongkong, Hanoi, Batavia, Thailand, Manila and San Francisco. Will Hongkong please

relay it to Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, and will San Francisco relay it to the various Consuls in America, to Chicago, Honolulu and Vancouver.

From: Tokyo
To: Canada and Brazil
Date: 10 November 1941
Msg No. Circular 2193
(Very Urgent. Office Chief's Code).

The reason for the resignation of the entire Cabinet, as the Information Bureau * has already announced, was that recently no unanimity of opinion within the Cabinet could be found. However, no matter what kind of a Cabinet will henceforth be formed, the intention is to give very careful thought to meeting the present crisis, and to continue the negotiations between Japan and America as well. This is for your information alone.

This wire is addressed to Canada and Central and South American countries. Will Brazil please relay it to Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Colombia.

MINUTES OF AN INTERVIEW HELD ON 19 AUGUST 1941 BETWEEN VICE-MINISTER AMAU AND AMBASSADOR OTT

On the 19th August the German Ambassador Ott called upon the Vice-Minister and, after an exchange of courtesies and after a presentation of the war situation in Europe, advanced the idea (1) that it would be to the advantage of Japan also if at this time she attacked Russia from the east, and (2) stating that intelligence had been received to the effect that America was going to provide oil to Vladivostok by means of transport vessels, that the first of these ships had already sailed, and that after that they would sail in rapid succession, he remarked that this oil would doubtless be used for an attack upon Japan too, and this would have a very important bearing on Japan. Thus, he tried to find out what Japan's attitude was regarding these matters. (3) He also tried to sound out Japan's attitude on the problem of American vessels stopping at Japanese ports (the problem of the President Coolidge). And (4) referring to Japan's attitude toward Thailand, he asked whether Japan was planning merely for the economic development of that country or whether she was thinking of a political or military penetration. He asked various questions in order to obtain intelligence of this kind.

To this the Vice-Minister replied: "For Japan to do a thing like attacking Russia would be a very serious question and would require profound reflection. As for the problem of American oil we are giving the matter very careful attention. And while we do not consider such a matter as American vessels stopping at our ports to be of such importance as to cause the world to get excited, we have not yet had time to investigate the facts in the case. (At this point Ambassador Ott interjected the remark that at the interview with the news reporters held today at the Information Bureau there were many questions and answers relating to the matter). Then with regard to Thailand, Great Britain, in view of the fact that Thailand (?bears such a close relation?) to the defense of the British Empire, attaches very great importance to that country and Japan's attitude will therefore have to be decided by giving consideration also to the attitude of England and America."

In the course of the above interchange of questions and answers Ambassador Ott stated that the Russo-German war was at present making progress in the southern sectors, that southern Russia would soon fall into the hands of Germany, that Moscow would fall perhaps during the first part of September, but in that case whether or not the Stalin regime would fall or not could not be affirmed.

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[1] GIST OF A CONSULTATION HELD BETWEEN THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR OTT AND VICE-MINISTER AMAU ON 29TH AUGUST, 1941

At 6 p. m. on 29th August Ambassador Ott called and had the following interview with Vice-Minister Amau:

The AMBASSADOR: "According to a communique issued by the Japanese government this afternoon, Ambassador Nomura handed a message from Premier

* Jōhō Kyoku.

Konoye to President Roosevelt. Is that correct? In fact, I had requested an interview with the Foreign Minister about this problem, but I have now come to you because I consider it my duty to get a detailed explanation on the question as to whether there would be any objection for us to understand that today's message does not depart from the policy which was determined at a conference held in the Imperial presence on 2nd July, at which time confidential information relating to the policy of the Japanese government in regard to the Axis was given to us, as well as on the question as to whether the present Cabinet is contemplating any change with regard to this point."

The VICE-MINISTER: "I regret that the Foreign Minister could not see you because of a previous engagement, but I will reply to your questions to the limit of my knowledge. It is true that Ambassador Nomura conveyed a message from Premier Konoye to President Roosevelt. But that does not mean that there has been a change in Japan's policy, nor that we are contemplating any change in our relations with the Axis. As you know, when Matsuoka was Foreign Minister, negotiations were carried on between Japan and America with regard to various problems, and at that time we sent confidential reports regarding the negotiations to your country. However, because of the Japanese Army's advance into French Indo-China a temporary rupture in these negotiations took place. And meanwhile in China, as well as in Japan and America, various questions arose between Japan and America, causing Japanese-American relations, contrary to our wishes, to become strained, so that in fact communications between Japan and America have at present come to a standstill, and the situation is such that even economic relations have been broken off. It is natural that no country would desire such a situation to persist for any length of time. I seems that America too desires a break in the deadlock, and the same thing is true of Japan. I understand that the reason for sending the message was to clarify the atmosphere in the Pacific."

The AMBASSADOR: "Although I am aware that negotiations had previously been carried on between Japan and America, that these negotiations had been discontinued, and that since then various incidents have come up, do the proposed negotiations between Japan and America involve only matters that have fallen into abeyance, or do they concern entirely new problems?"

[2] The VICE-MINISTER: "As I have just said, the idea back of the message which was sent from Premier Konoye to President Roosevelt was merely an attempt to start conversations between the two parties. It was not concerned with any concrete problem such as to what questions would be talked about. Furthermore we have not yet received any reply to the message from the President."

The AMBASSADOR: "How you received any notification from the American authorities that they are prepared to consent to negotiations?"

The VICE-MINISTER: "We have not received any such particular notification from the American authorities, but as I have just said, we have received the impression that the American authorities are prepared to enter into negotiations in order to break the deadlock."

The AMBASSADOR: "As usual, America will try to gain time by beginning negotiations with Japan, and meanwhile will put forth still greater efforts to carry out her objectives. Therefore, I think that precautions must be taken against America's scheme to prolong these negotiations, so that this might work to her advantage."

The VICE-MINISTER: "We have given those points full consideration. And we have also given the matter careful thought so that the carrying on of negotiations by Japan with America might not have any disadvantageous consequences upon Germany and Italy. As you are aware from the Imperial edict and other proclamations issued by government authorities at the time, the original purpose of the Tripartite Alliance was the quelling of disturbances and the restoration of peace. So even if we begin negotiations between Japan and America, the objective will always be to maintain peace, and therefore this will not conflict with the spirit of Axis diplomacy.

"Moreover, if next I may express my own personal opinions, our aim at the time when Matsuoka was Foreign Minister was to keep America from participating in the war, and for this reason we took a firm attitude toward America. In order to prevent her from joining in the war, we considered it necessary to get her to reflect upon her attitude, and, judging from the situation at the time, it was no mistake at all for us to think that it was quite proper for us to take a firm attitude toward her. Nevertheless the results proved to be just the opposite, and

we can not deny that American public opinion has grown stronger and stronger, speeding up American preparations for war. Meanwhile Germany took a very mild attitude toward America. That is, America in all kinds of ways gave aid to England, instituted a system of convoy, and invaded Iceland, on the other hand freezing German funds in America and even closing German Consulates, while Germany took a very gentle [3] attitude. Even at present Japan's policy of preventing America from participating in the war remains unchanged, and our aim is to keep her from joining in the war. Even now there is no change whatever in that objective. However it will be necessary for us to consider a policy that is adequate for the attainment of said objective, depending upon the time and occasion. In the present situation, America being a country of wide expanse and plentiful raw materials, we might possibly think it preferable, just at this time when the hostile feeling of the people toward the situation is on the point of becoming violent, to appease them and bring about a domestic disintegration, rather than to excite and unify them."

The AMBASSADOR: "Negotiations between Japan and America may prove to be quite troublesome. For instance, when we think of the China problem, since the sending of aid to Chiang Kaishek is one of the fundamental policies of America, she will not readily give this up. And I think that it may be very difficult to come to an agreement with regard to various other problems. At any rate, since the contents of this message is considered to be of tremendously great importance to Germany also, even though I have not received any instructions from my government, would it not be possible for me to receive a secret report of its contents since I will have to send a report about it to the government?"

The VICE-MINISTER: "As I have just said, the message conveys a statement from Premier Konoye to the American President, and we have not received a reply from the President as yet, but I will convey the substance of your desire to the Foreign Minister."

The AMBASSADOR: "If that is the case, then will it be all right for the present for me to send a report to my government to the effect that the content of the message signifies that for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, negotiations are to be carried on between Japan and America on the basis of the Tripartite Alliance?"

The VICE-MINISTER: "As I have just said, the object of beginning parleys between Japan and America is to clarify the atmosphere in the Pacific. And while there is no objection to the use of the words 'for the maintenance of peace', we think that it would be permissible to suppose that nothing like a concrete problem, such as, for instance, the concluding of a non-aggression pact, is mentioned in the message."

The AMBASSADOR: "If so, do you have any idea of sending a special mission to America to carry on these negotiations?"

[4] The VICE-MINISTER: "As I have just said, it has not yet been settled as to whether or not negotiations will be begun, and preliminary arrangements regarding concrete problems have not yet been completed. So I understand that no decision has yet been reached as to such a problem as sending a mission."

The AMBASSADOR: "Is this problem to be worked out through Ambassador Grew?"

The VICE-MINISTER: (Hesitated to say anything for a moment).

The AMBASSADOR: "Is Ambassador Nomura to do it?"

The VICE-MINISTER: (Nodded assent).

The AMBASSADOR: "Again may I ask you to tell the Foreign Minister that I would like to have a confidential report of the contents of the message. In fact, it has also some bearing upon instructions which I recently received from my home government regarding the Russo-German war. Will you please make arrangements so that I might by all means have an interview with the Foreign Minister tomorrow."

The VICE-MINISTER: "I will tell the Minister."

THE GIST OF AN INTERVIEW HELD BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER TOYODA AND AMBASSADOR OTT ON 30TH AUGUST 1941, AT 3:00 P. M. IN THE OFFICIAL RESIDENCE (ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL YOSHIUCHI ACTING AS INTERPRETER)

After Ambassador Ott made a statement relating to the situation in the Russo-German War, the conversation proceeded as follows: (Ambassador Ott is to be designated by "O" and the Minister by "Toyo" in the following account).

"O": "In the notice sent to the German government on the 2nd July, the statement is made that Japan is making preparations for every possible eventuality in her relations with Russia and America, but are the intentions of the Japanese government still the same today? Is there any possibility that Japan may participate in the Russo-German war?

"Toyo": "Japan's preparations are now making headway, and it will take more time for their completion."

"O": "Are the intentions of Japan as given in the notice of 2nd July still the same?"

"Toyo": "There is no change in our intentions, which are, to make preparations in order to avail ourselves of any new development that may take place in the situation henceforth."

"O": "I learned of the message which Premier Konoye sent to President Roosevelt for the first time through the newspapers, and later according to Dōmi (in response to a question from the Minister Ott replied that this Dōmei dispatch was one that was "carried" by DNB on the evening of the 29th as Dōmei report). I learned that this message mentions the disposal of the China problem and the establishment of a Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere as the ultimate aims of Japan's national policy, and refers to the fact that as a result of the Russo-German War Japanese-American relations have become delicate. So far as the problems referred to in the message are concerned, from the viewpoint of the Tripartite Pact Germany has very grave apprehensions, and since a detailed report will have to be sent to my government, in disregard of propriety I must once more make inquiry about this matter. Yesterday Vice-Minister Amau gave me an explanation as to the contents of this message, but if you have anything beyond that to add, will you please state it."

[2] "Toyo": "The situation being what it is, all kinds of reports are bound to arise, but what I would like to tell you explicitly is that the report about problems concerning which I have just now heard for the first time, is absolutely false. Vice-Minister Amau gave you the right explanation of the message."

"O": "If so, then the message does not concern any concrete matters?"

"Toyo": "It is just as Vice-Minister Amau explained."

"O": "I would like to inquire what your impression is as to how the message was received by them [the Americans]. Even if it does not deal with any concrete matters, I would like to ask whether it was received in a friendly spirit, or whether their attitude was one of disapproval."

"Toyo": "I can't tell you, because I have as yet received no report whatsoever about the matter."

"O": "In Foreign Minister Matsuoka's time the Japanese government authorities thought that what America was planning to do was to get Japan to take an attitude in conflict with the Tripartie Pact, that is, to give up taking any positive action in the Pacific area no matter what occasion might arise, and Germany is very grateful that at the time the Japanese government resolutely resisted these American designs, and we hope that it will continue to take that 'line'. I would like to ask what Your Excellency's views are concerning this point."

"Toyo": "In a word I may say that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact is to prevent American participation in the war, and that this view is the same as in the past; nor will it change in the future."

Basic Conditions for a Peace Settlement Between Japan and China

(Agenda for a conference with the Army and Navy Military Affairs Bureau Chiefs held at the Foreign Minister's Official Residence at 2:00 p. m. on the 6th September, 1941).

The Chungking regime accepts the basic treaty concluded between Japan and the Nanking government together with the agreements attached thereto, as well as the fact that the joint declaration issued by Japan, Manchoukuo, and China is based upon the following principles, and will join up with the Nanking government.

1. The merging of the Chungking and Nanking regimes.
2. Neighborly friendliness.
3. Respect for sovereignty and territory.
4. Joint defense (the maintenance of public order, the protection of rights and interests, and cooperation in defence of things jeopardizing the same). The

stationing of Japanese army units particularly in prescribed areas in Mengchiang and North China as well as in Amoy and Hainan Island for this purpose.

5. Withdraway of troops. The Japanese army units which have been sent to China because of the incident are to be withdrawn attendant upon the settlement of the incident in accordance with a Sino-Japanese agreement.

6. Economic coalition. Not: economic activities of third powers in China are not to be restricted so long as they are conducted on an equitable basis.

7. Non-annexation.*

8. No indemnities.

9. Recognition of Manchoukuo.

BASIC CONDITIONS FOR A SINO-JAPANESE PEACE

Decisions reached at a liaison conference held on the 13th September, 1941.

1. Neighborly friendliness.

2. Respect for sovereignty and territory.

3. Sino-Japanese joint defense.

Sino-Japanese cooperation to preserve public order and to check communistic and other movements of a subversive nature which threaten the security of Japan and China.

The stationing of Japanese army units for a necessary period in prescribed areas in Inner Mongolia and North China for the above purpose, as well as the placing of Japanese warships and units for a necessary period in Hainan Island, Amoy, and other localities on the basis of previous agreements and practices.

4. Withdrawal of troops. The Army units which have been sent to China for the prosecution of the China Incident shall, with the exception of those mentioned in the preceding item, be withdrawn attendant upon the settlement of the incident.

5. Economic Coalition.

(a) A Sino-Japanese economic coalition shall be put in operation, the main object of which shall be the development and use of important raw materials for national defense in China.

(b) The economic activities of third powers in China shall not be restricted if conducted on an equitable basis.

6. The merging of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the Wang government.

7. Non-annexation.

8. No indeminities.

9. Recognition of Manchoukuo.

26 NOVEMBER, 1941.

The last time I gave you the details up to the 18th November, but I will now inform you of developments since then.

Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu called upon Secretary Hull on the 20th and presented our new proposal, stating that they were making this proposal with a view to bringing about a speedy settlement. But Secretary Hull without saying anything in particular about it, manifested great disapproval of that clause in the proposal which states that "America shall cease any activities that might interfere with the peace efforts between Japan and China", and replied that, unless Japan clarifies the meaning of the Tripartite Pact and positively asserts that she will pursue a peaceful policy, it will be difficult to cut off aid to Chiang Kaishek, and that the statement too to the effect that the President was to act as intermediary in a Sino-Japanese peace would necessarily be conditioned by Japan's adoption of a peaceful policy. But he did promise that after a study of the new proposal, he would have further consultations.

On the next day, the 21st, when Ambassador Kurusu had a private interview with Secretary Hull, the latter stated that he had no objection to Japan and America holding leading positions through peaceful measures in East Asia and in the Western Hemisphere respectively, and that he hoped that both countries could conclude a Pacific agreement in a friendly spirit, the Japanese authorities to

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* Doubtless refers to non-annexation of China by Japan.

see to it that the Tripartite Pact did not interfere with the execution of such a treaty.

On the 22nd Secretary Hull, before he had an interview with Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, held a conference with the Ambassadors and Ministers of England, Holland and Australia with regard to those parts of the proposal for a Japanese-American understanding which deal with matters in which these countries are concerned, and these Ambassadors and Ministers said that they would send in a request to their home governments and would be able to reply to the American government by Monday (the 24th).

On the same day at the interview held between Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu and Secretary Hull, the former asked for America's own reply to our proposal, but the Secretary avoided a definite reply to this. However, he said that what England, Holland and Australia desired was that the serious situation in the South Pacific areas might be alleviated at once, that the movement of the Japanese army units stationed in southern French Indo-China to the northern part of the country was not deemed sufficient, and further, that, while gradual progress in the restoration of trade conditions was desirable, when Japan once made clear her peaceful intentions, we could look for a sudden change within a few days. He also made the remark with regard to the cutting off of aid to Chiang Kai-shek by America, that he would like to have us acknowledge the fact that in such a matter America could not be an impartial intermediary.

[2] With regard to the cutting off of American aid to Chiang Kai-shek, we issued orders to Ambassador Nomura on the 22nd to the effect that, since our Empire simultaneously with the conclusion of a treaty, in accord with our new proposal, would like through the good offices of America to get China to express her friendship toward Japan in line with a suggestion made by America on the 12th inst., and to begin direct peace negotiations between Japan and China, he should make a representation to the American authorities to the effect that it would be natural to expect the American authorities to stop any activities that might obstruct these negotiations.

Furthermore, in Tokyo I, the Foreign Minister [a], asked the American Ambassador in Tokyo to call on the 23rd, and I made it clear to him that, while it seems that England, Holland and Australia as well as America are not satisfied with merely the movement of the Japanese forces stationed in Southern French Indo-China to the northern part of that country, neither do we consider it sufficient merely to restore conditions as they were previous to the putting into effect of the freezing order, a thing which we with reluctance dared to propose and which we anticipate, and that it will be impossible to reach a settlement so long as no understanding with America is reached also with regard to the cessation of aid to Chiang Kai-shek and with regard to the securing of raw materials from the Dutch East Indies.

[a] The word here used is Hondaijin, indicating that this message is a report sent out by Tokyo and made up in the main of information received from Washington.

EXHIBIT NO. 133

[SECRET]

[a] STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT OF EVENTS AND CONDITIONS LEADING UP TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK, DECEMBER 7, 1941

[a]

Table of Contents

Statement Major General Walter C. Short. Pp. 1-50 incl. Exhibits A-1R (incl.)

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[a] *Table of Contents*—Continued

[1] **Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.**

[1] STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT OF EVENTS AND CONDITIONS LEADING UP TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK, DECEMBER 7, 1941

The following radiogram from the Chief of Staff was received October 16, 1941—Exhibit "A":

Note for commanding general Hawaiian department:

The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which I have been directed to pass to you quote:

Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation x if a new cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic x if the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States x either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible x since Britain and the US are held responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers x view of these possibilities *you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan x.*

The following radiogram from the Chief of Staff was received 2:22 P. M., November 27th—Exhibit "B":

"Hawn Dept, Ft. Shafter, TH:

472 27th negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment stop If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act stop This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as *not* comma repeat *not* comma *to alarm civil population or disclose intent* stop Report measures taken stop Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned the Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan Stop Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

MARSHALL,
116P/27.

[2] Upon receipt of the above radiogram, I gave consideration to the type of an alert which I should order, and, after talking the matter over with the Chief of Staff, Alert #1 was ordered by telephone and put into effect at once.

Standing Operation Procedure, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 5 November 1941.—Exhibit "C":

"SECTION II—ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph *f* (8) below.

14. *ALERT NO. 1. a.* This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and Special Staff Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending further orders.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

(2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(3) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations), in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

Police District No. 1, see paragraph 14 *h* (2) below.
Command and Fire Control Cable System.
Railway and Highway Bridges.
Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA.
WAIAU Generating Plant.
Telephone Exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALEIWA), LAIE and KANEOHE.

Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU KAILUA, WAIPIO AND EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO, WAHIAWA, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAU switch station BELLOWS FIELD.

[3] Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA.
Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU.

(4) the 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND will:

(1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command.

(3) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.

(4) Provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

(1) Protect all vital installations on posts of OAHU garrisoned by air forces.

(2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders.

g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the Air Corps detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.

h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, in addition to his normal duties, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will:

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.

(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.

i. The STATION COMPLEMENTS OF HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the protection of all vital installations on their respective posts.

j. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD. Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the TERRITORIAL Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installons ation Army and Navy Reservations.

[4] 15. *ALERT NO. 2.* *a.* This alert is applicable to a more serious condition than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

(2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present strength, except those required under (3), (4) and (5) below.

(3) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(4) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

Police District No. 1.
Command and Fire Control Cable System.
Railway and Highway Bridges.
Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA.
WAIAU Generating Plant.
Telephone exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALEIWA), LAIE and KANEOHE.
Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO, WAHIAWA, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAU switch station BELLOWS FIELD.
Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA.
Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU.

(5) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the Pumping Stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

[5] (6) Place 240 mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards and, when directed, place ammunition at positions.

(7) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command.

(8) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 15 *l* below.

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Field Artillery, will:

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that railway batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced.

(2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(3) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 15 *k* (1) below.

(5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(9) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.

(10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

f. The Hawaiian Air Force will:

(1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters.

(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(4) Disperse bombers with crews.

(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces.

(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 *g* below.

(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:

[6] (a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of readiness "A". The bomber commander will report to the Commander of Patrol Wing X TWO.

(b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.

(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.

(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.

(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.

(6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 15 *k* (1).

i. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will:

Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

k. STATION COMPLEMENTS:

(1) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, undert the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

(2) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

l. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD. Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 15 *d* (4) and *g* above.

16. *ALERT NO. 3. a.* This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations on outlying islands.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS:

(1) All sections of the forward echelon will occupy their stations at forward command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis.

(2) All sections of the rear echelon will continue their usual duties at their present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will remain in condition of mobile readiness at their permanent stations, pending instructions from this headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Defend its assigned sector on OAHU.

(2) Protect all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

(3) Release all available Bands to the Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

(5) Place 240 mm howitzers in position.

(6) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 *e* below.

(7) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 16 *m* below.

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attacked Detachment Field [8] Artillery, will:

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions.

(2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(4) Support the Infantry Divisions.

(5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(6) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(7) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.
(8) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.
(9) Protect all vital installations on post and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 16 *l* (2) below.
(10) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.
f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:
(1) Destroy enemy aircraft.
(2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.
(3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.
(4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air and ground attacks.
(5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 16 *h* below.
(6) Arm all planes, except that normally bombs will not be loaded on ships dispatched to outlying islands.
(7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.
(8) Disperse bombers with crews.
(9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
(10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions.
(11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.
g. G–5 will be prepared to establish the following:
(1) Food administration.
[*9*] (2) A Labor Procurement Service.
h. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS OF HAWAII, MAUI (includes MOLOKAI) and KAUAI Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments present within the districts, will:
Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.
i. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:
(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.
(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.
(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.
(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.
(6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 16 *l* (2) below.
j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control to include:
(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.
(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.
(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.
k. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:
(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
(2) Insure the joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.
(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications.
l. STATION COMPLEMENTS:
(1) The SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Complement will protect all vital installations on the SCHOFIELD Reservation.
(2) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and [*10*] Tripler General Hospital.
(3) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELD Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

m. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 16 *d* (2) and *h* above."

Alert #1 is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprising within the islands with no threat from without. In addition to the duties prescribed in Alert #1, the Aircraft Warning Service was directed to operate all mobile aircraft warning stations from two hours before dawn to one hour after dawn.

My reasons for ordering Alert #1 rather than Alert #2, which is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert #1, security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprising, were as follows:

1. There was a strong probability of sabotage by the Japanese population in Hawaii.
2. I had no information to indicate the probability of an attack.
3. Alert #2 or Alert #3, which provides for the maximum defense of OAHU and of army installations on outlying islands, interfere very seriously with training.

These three reasons will be discussed in detail:

1. Defense against sabotage can be carried out better where there is not too, much dispersion of the command. Where the defense is against sabotage only the planes are grouped on the landing mats and the apron, while in a defense against air attack the pursuit planes would be dispersed in their bunkers and the bombardment planes would be sent to landing fields on outlying islands or placed in the air if time were available. If time were not available, they would remain in their bunkers. From this can be seen that the action for the two different types of defense is quite different. Since sabotage was considered far more probable [*11*] than air attack, the planes were dispersed to all of the landing fields on the island of OAHU, but were not placed in bunkers. This was especially desirable as man-proof fencing and flood-lights had not as yet been provided for the fields. $240,000.00 for this purpose was requested on May 15, 1941, and the authorization of $102,000.00 was made on July 11th and $91,975.00 on August 12, 1941. Orders for the material had to be placed in the mainland as it was not available in the Hawaiian Islands. Owing to the difficulties of obtaining priorities, both for material and for shipping, the District Engineer has not yet received the material. The Constructing Quartermaster was allotted funds for fencing of other than air fields, and a small amount of the material had been received and installed prior to December 7th.
2. The Hawaiian Department is provided with no means of collecting information as to the location of Japanese or other ships throughout the world and is not responsible for distant reconnaissance. The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District"—Section I, par. 3, 18 and 21, definitely place the responsibility for such reconnaissance upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. The following quotation makes this evident:

EXTRACT from "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan"—Exhibit "D":

"3. *METHOD OF COORDINATION.* The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9 *b*.

* * * * * * *

18. *NAVY.* The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

* * * * * * *

i. Distant reconnaissance.

* * * * * * *

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF–41 (JCD–42) supercedes HCF–39 (JCD–13) except that the annexes, Nos.

1 to VII of latter remain effective and constitute annexes 1 to VII inclusive, of this plan."

[12] Annex #7 to the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" provides as follows—Exhibit "E":

"When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

1. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

2. Defensive Air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control.

3. When Naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

4. In the special instance in which army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this situation will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission".

These documents make it clearly evident that the Hawaiian Department had no responsibility for distant reconnaissance, and that when army bombardment planes are actually placed under the command of the Navy whenever they operate upon distant reconnaissance missions, they receive their mission and all instructions from the [13] Naval Commander, and report to him upon the completion of their mission. This method of procedure has been followed strictly since March 21, 1941, including the period since December 7th.

3. If upon consideration of the available facts the calling of Alert No. 1 would be sufficient to handle the situation Alert No. 2 or No. 3 should not be called because to do so would seriously interfere with the training of the command. When the troops are in battle positions it is practically impossible to carry on any orderly training. With the number of new man in the command it is highly important to conduct their training regularly. This was particularly true of the Hawaiian Air Force on November 27th due to the fact that they had been given the mission of training combat crews and ferrying B–17 planes from the mainland to the Philippine Islands. September 8th the Hawaiian Air Force sent nine (9) trained combat teams to the Philippine Islands. Previous to November 27th eighteen (18) trained combat teams had been sent to the mainland, and seventeen (17) more combat teams were ready to go to the mainland for ferrying purposes. In addition, twelve (12) combat crews had to be trained for planes that were expected at an early date in this Department. With only six (6) B—17 planes available for training combat teams, it was imperative that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force make the maximum use of these planes for training, and any order that would take them out of training for any considerable period would prevent him from carrying out the ferrying mission that had been assigned to him.

I replied as follows to the radiogram from the Chief of Staff of November 27th—Exhibit "F":

"CHIEF OF STAFF,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.:

Reurad four seven two twenty seventh report department alerted to prevent sabotage period liaison with navy

SHORT".

Upon receipt of my radiogram of November 28th, I received the following reply from The Adjutant General—Exhibit "G":

"Hawn Dept., Ft. Shafter, TH:

482 28th critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of [14] War Department Paren See paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five End paren Stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage Stop *This does not repeal not mean that any illegal measures are authorized* Stop *Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm* Stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.

ADAMS".

This par. of MID SC 30-45 referred to in the above mentioned radiogram is attached as Exhibit "H", and this paragraph refers wholly to subversive activities.

Careful consideration of the radiograms of October 16th, November 27th and November 28th discloses that the War Department emphasizes that action taken would not alarm the civil population, would not disclose strategic intention, constitute provocative actions against Japan, and would avoid unnecessary publicity. Alert #2 or #3 would have disclosed tactical positions and given more publicity to preparations and might have alarmed the civil population.

If the War Department at that time had considered it necessary to alert the Hawaiian Department against air and ground attack, it undoubtedly would have so directed instead of sending a long radiogram outlining the various steps that should be taken in connection with sabotage and subversive activities.

In my radiogram of November 29th I replied to the radiogram of the War Department of November 28th, and explained in detail the steps I was taking to prevent sabotage and subversive activities, and of the authority that I had obtained from the Governor of Hawaii and of the Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu to legalize all the steps which I had taken—Exhibit "I":

"The ADJUTANT GENERAL,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.:

Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth Comma Full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department Paren Paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five End paren And military establishments including personnel and equipment Stop As regards protection [15] of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants Comma Telephone exchanges and highway bridges Comma This headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides Comma In effect Comma That the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence Comma Invasion Comma Insurrection etc Stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand of this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage Comma And lawless violence in connection therewith

Comma Being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory Stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations Stop In this connection Comma At the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordnance which permits the commanding general Hawaiian Department Comma to close Comma Or restrict the use of and travel upon Comma Any highway within the city and county of Honolulu Comma whenever the commanding general deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense Stop The authority thus given has not yet been exercised Stop Relations with FBI and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.

SHORT"

EVENTS TRANSPIRING FROM NOVEMBER 27TH TO DECEMBER 6TH

From November 27th to December 6th the troops remained on the Alert for sabotage, and carried on routine training with the men not required to be on duty during this Alert. The Aircraft Warning Service operated daily from two hours before daylight until one hour after daylight. It also carried out this usual practice, closing the information center at 7:00 A. M., December 7th. Routine training was also carried out by this Detachment from 7:00 to 11:00 A. M. except on Sunday. Memorandum of the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, states as follows—Exhibit "J":

Subject: Detector Operation.
To: Department Signal Officer.

1. On November 27, 1941, after conference with Assistant Chief of Staff G–3, and receiving instructions to operate all mobile detectors from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn, I, as Acting Department Signal Officer, gave immediate instructions [16] to Captain TETLEY, Commanding Officer of the Aircraft Warning Company, to initiate the above detector operation so long Alert No. 1 was in force.

2. The detectors in question operated daily thereafter during the prescribed period except when having occasional operational trouble. In addition, the six detector stations operated daily except Sundays from 7:00 A. M. to 11:00 A. M. for routine training. Daily except Saturday and Sunday, to hours 12:00 noon until 4:00 P. M. were devoted to training and maintenance work.

(Signed) W. H. Murphy,
W. H. MURPHY,
Lt. Col., Sig. C.

During the period November 27th to December 6th I had conferences with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District as follows:

November 27th: Conference on the reinforcement of the marine garrisons at Midway and Wake Islands by squadrons of army pursuit planes. I was accompanied on this conference by Major General Frederick L. Martin, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force, and Lt. Colonel James A. Mollison, Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Air Force.

December 1st: Conference relative to the relief of the marine garrisons on the islands of Midway and Wake, and the taking over of the defense of Canton Island by the army.

December 2nd: Conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet with reference to a letter that he was sending to the Chief of Naval Operations relative to the relief of the marines at Midway and Wake by the army.

December 3rd: Conference with reference to a radiogram I was sending to the War Department relative to the relief of the marines at Midway and Wake by the army.

December 4th: Major Fleming, of my staff, conferred with Col. Pfeiffer, Fleet. Marine Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet relative to the use of marine 5" guns at Canton Island.

At these conferences the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District had ample opportunity to acquaint me with information of the location of Japanese carriers, which would

render possible an attack on the island of OAHU. If they believed carriers so located, they unquestionably [17] would have discussed the possible danger to any troops attempting to effect a relief at Midway and Wake. There is at least a strong inference that they had no such knowledge of the location of the Japanese carriers which would have rendered an attack possible. The fact that the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District did not request the employment under naval command of army bombardment planes for distant reconnaissance, as provided for by the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" indicates that they were satisfied with their information with reference to Japanese carriers, and there was nothing new in the situation to cause me to change from an Alert for sabotage to an Alert for defense against an air attack. The following certificate shows that no request was made by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to the Hawaiian Air Force for long range aerial reconnaissance—Exhibit "K":

HICKAM FIELD, T. H., *20 December 1941.*

I, JAMES A. MOLLISON, certify that during the period of 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941 the Navy made no requests to the Hawaiian Air Force for in shore or long range aerial reconnaissances.

(Signed) Jas. A. Mollison,
JAS. A. MOLLISON,
Lt. Col., A. C.,
H. A. F. C/S.

To what extent such reconnaissance was made by the Navy planes is not known.

At the conference on November 27th, a staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet made a statement about the improbability of a Japanese air attack in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief. This statement is covered by certificate of Lt. Col. James A. Mollison, as follows—Exhibit "L":

"I certify that on November 27, 1941, I accompanied General Short and General Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending Army pursuits planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the defenses of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows:

Admiral KIMMEL: McMorris, what is your idea of the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu?

Captain MCMORRIS: I should say *none* Admiral——.

(Signed) JAMES A. MOLLISON,
Lt. Col., A. C.

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[18] December 5th one B–24 plane arrived at Hickam Field from the mainland. This plane had insufficient armament for combat, only one .30 caliber and two .50 caliber guns in the tail, and was without ammunition for the guns that were installed. In spite of the fact that this plane arrived without being in condition to fire, the following radiogram was received from the War Department—Exhibit "M":

"COMMANDING GENERAL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Ft. Shafter, TH.:

Four six five twenty sixth.

Reference two B dash twenty four airplanes for special photo mission Stop It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the Caroline group Jaluit in the Marshall group Stop Visual reconnaissance should be made simultaneously Stop Information desired as to the number and location of naval vessels including submarines comma airfields comma aircraft comma guns comma barracks and camps Stop Pilots should be warned islands strongly fortified and manned Stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity Stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed Stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self preservation Stop The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice Stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philippines by usual route photographing Ponape while enroute Moresby Stop Advise

pilots best time of day for photographic Truk and Jaluit Stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of Naval Operations comma and the War Department Stop *Insure that both B dash twenty four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu.*

ADAMS.

The combination of the arrival of the plane in this condition and of the instructions for it to be placed in instant readiness for firing during the remainder of the journey plainly indicates that the War Department considered Honolulu not the subject of a probably attack, and that flying from the mainland to Honolulu the hazard of carrying the extra weight of ammunition was greater than the possibility of being attacked by the Japanese.

After the receipt of radiogram 46526, quoted above, the following radiogram was sent—Exhibit "N":

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES,
Washington, D. C.:

Reference secret photographic mission of two B twenty fours Stop One of B twenty fours [*19*] Lieutenant Faulkner which landed Hickam this date short following equipment considered essential to safety and success of mission colon fifty caliber machine guns comma mounts comma adapters and accessories for upper hemisphere semicolon fifty caliber tunnel gun comma adapter and accessories semicolon fifty caliber guns comma adapters comma mounts and accessories for starboard and port sides semicolon second thirty caliber nose gun comma adapter and accessories Stop Guns can be removed from our equipment and ammunition is available Stop Strongly recommend that second B twenty four bring necessary equipment from mainland for installation on both planes prior their departure from Hickam field Stop Plane being held here until satisfactorily armed Stop Subject plane has no armor plate installation Stop Except for removal of passenger seats plane equipped as for ferry service North Atlantic Signed MARTIN HAF *141.*

SHORT

In spite of radiogram quoted above, airplanes continued to be dispatched from the mainland without ammunition and with guns not in condition to fire. Twelve B–17 airplanes, under orders from the War Department, left the mainland in two squadrons at 9:30 P. M., Dec. 6th, Pacific time (12:30 A. M., Dec. 7th, Eastern time) and 10:30 P. M., Dec. 6th, Pacific time (1:30 A. M., Dec. 7th, Eastern time). None of these guns were equipped with ammunition for the defensive armament. Machine guns were still cosmolined and had not been bore-sighted. Ferry crews were skeletonized, consisting of pilot, co-pilot, navigator, engineer and radio operator. Such crews were incapable of manning gun positions, even if the guns had been properly prepared for combat and supplied with ammunition. (Exhibit "O"). The inference is plain that up to 1:30 A. M., December 7th, the War Department felt that the hazard of carrying the extra weight in ammunition was greater than the danger of an attack by the Japanese. These planes actually arrived at Hickam Field in the midst of the first attack. Four of the twelve planes were destroyed by the Japanese without being able to fight. Had the War Department considered an attack by the Japanese probable, these planes would not have been permitted to leave the mainland without ammunition, and without guns in condition to be fired. Up to that moment the War Department had given me no indication of a crisis in the American-Japanese relations.

Later in the morning of December 7th apparently alarming news was received and the Chief of Staff sent the following message to me by *commercial radio*—Exhibit "P":

[*20*] "Hawn Dept.,
Ft. Shafter, T. H.:

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one PM eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately Stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly Stop Inform naval authorities of this communication

MARSHALL".

The message was filed at 12:18 P. M., December 7th, Eastern time (6:48 A. M., December 7th, Honolulu time). It was received by the R. C. A. in Honolulu at 7:33 A. M., December 7th, and delivered to the Signal Office, Fort Shafter, at 11:45 A. M. (Delivery probably delayed by the Japanese attack). The deciphered message was delivered to the Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department, at 2:58 P. M., December 7th. Thus this important message was received seven hours after the attack. If the message had been telephoned by secret telephone direct to me as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding there would have been time to warm up the planes and put them in the air, thus, in all probability, avoiding a large loss of planes in the initial attack at 8:00 A. M. The fact that the War Department sent this message by radio in code instead of telephoning it in the clear and putting it through in the minimum amount of time indicates that the War Department, even as late as 6:48 A. M., December 7th, Honolulu time, did not consider an attack on Honolulu as very probable.

When the Chief of Staff, War Department, was informed by the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department, by secret commercial telephone of the first attack, he inquired if the message with regard to the Japanese ultimatum had been received prior to the attack. He was informed that it had not been received up to the time of that conversation.

On December 9th the following radiogram was received from the War Department—Exhibit "Q":

"Hawn Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.:

Five four nine ninth please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what staff officer received.

COTTON, *Acting*".

The following reply was made by this Headquarters—Exhibit "R".

[*21*] "Re your five four nine radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning seventh Stop Received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren Stop Deciphered message received by adjutant general HQ Hawn Dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh

SHORT.

Two instances occurred early on the morning of December 7th, which, if interpreted differently at the time, might have had a very great result upon the action that followed.

About 7:15 A. M. a two-man submarine entered Pearl Harbor and was destroyed by ships on duty. Had the Naval authorities foreseen this as a possible forerunner of an air attack and notified the army, time would have been available for the dispersion of the planes. However, the naval authorities did not connect this submarine attack with a possible general attack. The army was not notified until after the attack at 8:00.

After the Air Craft Warning Service Information Center was closed at 7:00 A. M., December 7th, the OPANA station remained in operation for further practice. At 7:20 A. M. a very significant event occurred, as shown by the following affidavits—

Exhibit "8":

"FORT SHAFTER, T. H.
Territory of Hawaii, ss:

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Grover C. White, Jr. O–396182, 2nd Lieut., Signal Corps. Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison Officer the AWS agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two hours before until one hour after dawn. The first schedule required operation of all stations from 4 A. M. to 6 P. M. This schedule was modified to the hours of 4 A. M. to 4 P. M. A temporary schedule was next devised which required all stations to operate from 4 A. M. to 11 A. M. and to have "staggered" operation, i. e., 3 stations from 11 A. M. to 1 P. M., the remaining 3 stations from 1 P. M. to 4 P. M. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all

stations operate from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941; this was agreed to by the Control Officer.

2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Wichas, SCAWH, acting RDF Officer, reports that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the information received [22] by the AWS Information Center from 4 A. M. to Sunday, December 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, who was the only officer in the Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M.

3. At approximately 7:20 A. M. a report was received from a Detector station at Opena that a large number of planes was approaching Oahu on a course North 3 degrees East at a distance of approximately 192 miles. This information was immediately transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc. Joseph McDonald to Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opana about the flight. The statement of Pfc. Joseph McDonald, SCAWH, the switchboard operator is attached.

4. The Navy Liaison Officer's position within the Information Center was not manned when I reached the Information Center at about 8:30 A. M. This position was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. Stouffer, SCAWH, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 P. M. when the position was taken over by Naval Officers.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

(Signed) GROVER C. WHITE, Jr.
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of Dec. AD 1941, at Fort Shafter, T. H.

(Signed) ADAM R. HUGGINS,
2nd Lt., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.

"FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,
ss:
Territory of Hawaii,

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Joseph P. McDonald, 13006145, Pvt. 1cl, Signal Company Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

I was on duty as telephone operator at the AWS Information Center on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. I received a telephone call from Opana at 7:20 A. M. stating that a large number of planes were heading towards Oahu from North 3 points east. I gave the information to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, 78th Pursuit Squadron, Wheeler Field, T. H., and the Lieutenant talked with private Lockhard at the Opana station. Lt. Tyler said that it wasn't anything of importance. At that time the planes were 132 miles out. I asked if we shouldn't advise Corporal Beatty and have the plotters come back. The Opana Unit stressed the fact that it was a very large number of planes and they seemed excited. Lt. Tyler [23] said that it was not necessary to call the plotters or get in touch with anyone. Further the deponent sayeth not.

(Signed) Joseph P. McDonald,
JOSEPH P. MCDONALD,
Sig. Co., Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of December A. D. 1941 at Fort Shafter, T. H.

(Signed) Adam R. Huggins,
ADAM R. HUGGINS,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.

STATEMENT OF LIEUT. KERMIT A. TYLER

20 DECEMBER 1941.

On Wednesday, 3 December 1941, I was first detailed to learn the operation of the plotting board in the Interception Control Center. I reported for duty at 1210, just as the crew on duty was leaving. I spoke with Lt. White, Signal Corps, a few minutes and he showed me the operating positions for Navy, Bombardment, Antiaircraft, Controller's position and Aircraft Warning Service. I remained on duty until 1600. Only a telephone operator was on duty with me.

On Sunday, 7 December 1941, I was on duty from 0400 to 0800 as Pursuit Officer at the Interceptor Control Center. From 0400 until approximately 0610

there were no plots indicated on the interception board. From that time until 0700 a number of plots appeared on the control board at various points surrounding the Island of Oahu. I particularly remember at least one plot South of Kauai and I believe there was one South of Molokai. There were two plots at some distance north of Oahu and which I remember seeing on the historical record. At the time, I questioned the plotter of the historical record who stated that he makes a record of all plots as they come in. There were a number of plots over and around the Island of Oahu. Having seen the plotters work once before with about the same general layout, this did not seem irregular to me. At 0700 all of the men except the telephone operator folded up their equipment and left. At about 0700 the operator at the OPANA RDF Station called me and said that the instrument indicated a large number of planes at 132 miles to the North. Thinking it must be a returning naval patrol, a flight of Hickam bombing planes, or possibly a flight of B–17 planes from the coast, I dismissed it as nothing unusual. (It is common knowledge that when Honolulu radio stations are testing by playing Hawaiian music throughout the night that coincidentally B–17s are apt to come in using the station [24] for radio direction finding. The radio station was testing on the morning of 7 December, 0230–0400). At about 0750 I heard some airplanes outside and looking toward Pearl Harbor saw what I thought to be the navy practicing dive bombing runs. At a little after 0800, Sergeant Eugene Starry, A. C., Wheeler Field, called me to tell me that Wheeler Field had been attacked. I immediately had the telephone operator call all men back to duty. Most of the men had returned to duty by 0820 when Major L. N. Tindal arrived and took charge of the Control Center. I remained on duty assisting Major K. P. Bergquist and Major L. N. Tindal as Pursuit Control Officer until about 1615, 8 December 1941, with the exception of rest periods from 2000 to 2400, 7 December, and 0600 to 1000, 8 December.

(Signed) Kermit A. Tyler,
KERMIT A. TYLER,
1st Lieut., Air Corps.

Had Lieut. Tyler alerted the Hawaiian Air Force instead of deciding that the planes were friendly, there would have been time to disperse the planes but not to get them in the air as they were not warmed up. Dispersion, in all probability, would have decreased the loss in planes, but would not have prevented the attack on Pearl Harbor.

ACTION AT TIME OF ATTACK

At 7:55 A. M., December 7th, the enemy planes attacked Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor and Wheeler Field. At 9:00 a second attack was made, and a third about 11:00 A. M., each lasting approximately fifteen minutes. At 8:03 A. M. the Chief of Staff reported the attack, and by 8:10 order had been given to all units (major echelons) by telephone to put Alert #3 in effect.

Antiaircraft Artillery: All antiaircraft batteries had skeleton crews guarding them. All units had in their possession ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns. 3" ammunition had been placed in positions accessible to all batteries except four batteries of the 64th C. A. C. (AA). The first of these batteries began drawing ammunition at the Aliamanu Crater at 8:15 A. M. At 10:15 all these batteries had drawn the initial unit of fire.

The automatic weapon batteries at Fort Kamehameha, Pearl Harbor and Camp Malakole took the enemy planes under firing during the eight o'clock raid. The first 3" gun fire was opened at 8:30, and all batteries of the south group were in action by 10:00 A. M. East group opened fire between 11:00 A. M. and 12:00 noon. (For detailed firing of batteries, see Exhibit "S").

[25] *Hawaiian Air Force:* During the first attack men started pulling planes out of the fire, and at 8:50 the serviceable pursuit planes took off. At 11:40 A. M. the serviceable bombers took off on a mission under naval control.

Before the attack December 7th status of planes in Hawaiian Department was as follows:

Pursuit planes in commission	80
Pursuit planes out of commission	69
Reconnaissance planes in commission	6
Reconnaissance planes out of commission	7
Bombers in commission	39
Bombers out of commission	33

Damaged in Raid:		
Pursuit planes		88
Reconnaissance planes		6
Bombers		34
Status as of December 20th, 1941:	*In commission*	*Reparable locally*
Pursuit planes	61	22
Reconnaissance	6	2
Bombers [1]	50	13

[1] Includes 29 bombers from mainland.

Exhibit "T"

A comprehensive study of the losses inflicted on the enemy by the army places the number of enemy planes brought down by aviation and antiaircraft fire at twenty-nine (29).

Exhibit "U"

24th Division: Troops of the 24th Division at Schofield were attacked at 8:10 A. M. Men with automatic rifles returned the enemy's fire. At 8:30 A. M. the Division started moving to its battle positions, and all units were in position by 5:00 P. M. and had one unit of ammunition on the position. The second unit of fire was issued during the night.

25th Division: The 25th Division opened antiaircraft fire at 8:30 A. M. It also started to move to battle positions at 8:30 A. M., and completed movement to position by 4:00 P. M. and had issued one unit of fire. The second unit of fire was issued during the night.

All movement and action of troops was carried out as prescribed in [26] standing operating procedure (See Exhibit "B") without confusion. The value of planning and training with everyone made familiar with the plans was brought out very clearly.

At 9:00 A. M. the first civilian surgical teams began reporting at Tripler General Hospital.

At 12:00 noon the Civilian Relief Committee began the evacuation of Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and Schofield, and continued throughout the afternoon and part of the evening. Most of the women and children were moved to school buildings, although a few from these posts and all of the women and children from Shafter, Tripler, Ordnance Depot and Signal Depot were sheltered in the incompleted underground Interceptor Command Post.

During December 7th the foreign agents previously listed by F. B. I. and G-2 were arrested and confined at the Immigration and Quarantine Stations as follows:

Japanese	370
Germans	98
Italians	14
Total	482

The 804th Engineers began clearing the runways at Hickam Field and Wheeler Field as soon as the first attack was over. The fire fighters, while still fighting fire, assisted in moving the debris. During the evening of the 7th the District Engineer began repairing broken water pipes and other utilities at Hickam Field.

Governor Poindexter put the M-Day Bill in effect on December 7th, and on December 8th declared martial law and requested the Department Commander to assume the responsibility as Military Governor.

December 8th the District Engineer took over all building materials, supplies and equipment, called all construction companies into service and started the construction of bunkers and the extension of runways at the air fields. On the 9th he started construction of evacuation camps for army dependents and civilians. December 8th the Department Engineer distributed material to the troops and got field fortifications under way. December 9th he started construction of slit trenches on posts and in the vicinity of school buildings and parks in the city, and started plans for construction of shelters throughout the city.

Martial law was placed in effect on December 8th, and the following action was taken:

1. Courts were closed.
2. All civilian officials were asked to remain in their positions and carry on the work of their offices.

[27] 3. An Advisory Committee headed by Governor Poindexter was appointed.

4. A Military Commission and Provost Court were appointed.

5. The sale of intoxicating liquors, beer and wine was prohibited.

[28] EFFORTS TO IMPROVE DEFENSES OF HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

My efforts to improve the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands has a bearing upon all work under me since assuming command of the Hawaiian Department, February 7, 1941. The following are some of the most important items taken up and the action taken by the War Department. Each item is supported by exhibits.

1. The need for additional facilities and troops in this Department became evident very soon after arrival. On February 19th a letter was transmitted to the Cheif of Staff of the Army outlining some of the deficiencies discovered and recommending action which should be taken to correct them. Among these points were:

(1) Cooperation with the Navy,
(2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft,
(3) Improvement of anti-aircraft defense,
(4) Improvement of the harbor defense artillery,
(5) Improvement of the situation regarding searchlights,
(6) Roads and trails,
(7) Necessary bombproof construction,
(8) Increase in the number of engineer troops.

A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit "V".

2. On February 19, 1941, a secret letter was submitted to the War Department, subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft", file Engr. 452. This letter explains the urgent necessity of providing protective bunkers for bombardment and pursuit aviation in this Department and recommended that funds in the amount of $1,565,600.00 be allotted for this purpose. This cost included the costs of the necessary taxiways and hard standings to permit the dispersion of planes at Hickam Field. A large part of the ground surrounding the landing mat at Hickam Field is made up of a soft fill and it is not possible to disperse planes onto this ground without the provision of taxiways and hard standings. This correspondence was indorsed back to this Department by the 6th Ind., AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-G, September 12, 1941, which stated that the plans for revetments had been approved and that funds in the amount of $1,358,000.00 [29] would be available about January 1, 1942. At the time of the attack on December 7th, no money had been received for this project and it was impossible to adequately disperse the planes at Hickam Field. Construction of these bunkers was initiated immediately after the attack under the Emergency Authority granted.—Exhibit "W".

3. It was apparent that the facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot which had been constructed in a very concentrated area at Hickam Field would be extremely vulnerable to an attack. As a result, a letter was submitted to the War Department on September 10, 1941, file Engr. 600.96, subject: "Underground Repair Facilities Hawaiian Air Depot", which strongly recommended the approval of bombproof facilities for the repair of aircraft in this Department, and requested funds in the amount of $3,480,650.00. This correspondence was indorsed back by 1st Ind., file AG 600.12 (9-10-41) MC-G, Adjutant General's Office, October 27, 1941, stating that due to the cost of providing bombproof facilities that it was the War Department's policy not to provide them, and suggesting that splinterproof installations be provided. During the attack of December 7th, the Air Depot was one of the main targets and suffered tremendous damage. Construction of an underground bombproof facility was started under the Emergency Authority subsequent to the attack. Steps have also been taken to decentralize the Hawaiian Air Depot to several smaller shops around the island.—Exhibit "X".

4. Fortifications and Camouflage Funds.—A letter was submitted to the War Department on July 28th, file AG 121.2, subject: "Reallocation of Special Field Exercise Funds", requesting that these funds be made available for purchase of fortification and camouflage equipment. This letter was answered by confidential radiogram No. 31, August 12, 1941, stating these special field exercise funds could not be made available for this purpose. This radiogram was followed by letter dated August 13, 1941, file AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D, subject: "Realloca-

tion of Special Field Exercise Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Projects", in which it was stated that the interest of the Hawaiian Department in providing field fortifications was appreciated by the War Department, but that funds could not be allotted for this purpose. This letter was returned by 1st Ind. this headquarters, file AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D, September 14, 1941, again recommending an immediate allotment of $125,000.00 for field fortification and camouflage purposes. In 2nd Ind. to [30] the same correspondence September 26, 1941, the Adjutant General stated that the allotment could not be made. Also on this same subject, this headquarters submitted to the War Department a clipper letter on October 28, 1941, file Engr. 400.312, subject: "Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Material", which recapitulated the previous correspondence on this subject, and requested an allotment of $1,445,542.00 be made available immediately for the purpose of fortification and camouflage materials. No funds had been received for this purpose at the time of the attack.—Exhibit "Y".

5. Camouflage: The necessity of camouflaging treatment of all airfields in this Department was brought to the War Department's attention in letter File Engr. 000.91, July 15, 1941, subject: "Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field". This letter stated, "There is definite need for camouflage treatment on all airfields in the Hawaiian Department. Up to this time no camouflage treatment had been undertaken at any airfield in this Department." This proposal was finally approved in 3rd Ind., file AG 007.5 (7-12-41) MC-G from the Adjutant General's Office to the Chief of Engineers which directed that funds in the amount of $56,210.00 be included in the next budget estimate for Wheeler Field. At the time of the attack on December 7th, no funds had been received for this purpose. The question of camouflage was also submitted to the War Department by letter this headquarters February 27, 1941, file Engr. 000.91, subjects "Camouflage of Defense Installations". This project was approved by 4th Ind., AG 007.5 (2-27-41) MC-E, Adjutant General's Office June 27, 1941. At the time of the attack, no funds for this purpose had been received, and although considerable work had been done by troop labor to camouflage these installations, its effectiveness was limited by our inability to buy the necessary materials.—Exhibit "Z".

6. The revised Roads and Trails Project was submitted by letter this headquarters, file Engr. 611, February 19, 1941, which recommended that funds in the amount of $1,370,000.00 be allotted for construction of the military roads, railroads and trails in this Department. At the time of the attack, only $350,000.00 had been allotted for this purpose.—Exhibit "1A".

7. The need for additional airports was brought to the War Department's attention in letters file Engr. 600.12, according to the following [31] schedule:

(1)	Bellows Field	April 5, 1941
(2)	Barking Sands	May 2, 1941
(3)	Hilo Airport	May 2, 1941
(4)	Homestead Field	May 2, 1941
(5)	Morse Field	May 2, 1941
(6)	Haleiwa	May 22, 1941
(7)	Burns Field	May 22, 1941
(8)	Lanai	May 22, 1941
(9)	Parker Ranch	June 2, 1941
(10)	Kipapa	May 14, 1941

At the time of the attack no funds had been allotted specifically for construction at these airfields. The War Department disapproved the proposed site at Kipapa and directed construction at Kahuku. This relocation required protracted negotiations with the Fourteenth Naval District which had a bombing range on the Kahuku site. These negotiations were completed only a short time before the attack, but as no funds had been received, no construction had been started. In this connection, several expedients had to be adopted due to the non-availability of funds. Construction work at Molokai, Burns, Morse and Barking Sands was actually done by troop labor using materials provided by the WPA. The need of an additional airdrome on Oahu was recognized as acute. The only possibility for immediate development was in improving the field at Bellows, and the only funds which had been made available for construction work at Bellows Field applied to housing only. The project letter on Bellows Field included a request for funds for improvement of runways, installation of gasoline storage and other facilities to make this a first class operating base. As stated, no funds had been allotted for these improvements. Since the need for these vital facilities was

acute, this Department authorized the District Engineer to proceed with their construction, utilizing any funds which might be available to his office. At the time of the attack, provision had been made for gasoline storage at Bellows and a 5000′ runway was about half done, and the District Engineer was able to complete this ruuway by Thursday night following the attack. Bellows Field is now a useable base, but all construction which [32] has been done to make this an operating base has been done without any funds being allotted by the War Department. The improvement of other airdromes on Oahu at either the Kipapa or Kahuku area or at Haleiwa had not been undertaken at the time of the attack because no funds had ever been allotted for this purpose.—Exhibit "1B".

8. Kaneohe Bay Defenses: It was recognized that the preceding arrangement under which the Army disclaimed any responsibility for the defense of the new Naval Air Station at Kaneohe Bay was a mistake. A letter was prepared and transmitted to the War Department on the 18th of February 1941, subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file 381. This letter informed the War Department that this Department had assumed responsibility for the defense of this area. This subject was again covered in letter this headquarters, file Engr. 600.96, dated April 14, 1941, subject: "Protection of Seacoast Defense Batteries" to the Adjutant General, and recommendation was made that a 12-inch gun battery similar to Battery Closson be obtained and shipped to this Department for installation in the Kaneohe Bay area. The War Department recognized the need of this protection for Kaneohe Bay, but was unable to supply a 12-inch gun battery for this. The project for the permanent defenses at Kaneohe Bay was submitted by letter of this headquarters 31 July 1941, file AG 381/20 Kaneohe Bay project, subject: "Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station Kaneohe Bay", which recommended both additional personnel and additional armament required. This was answered by 3rd Ind. Adjutant General's Office, file AG 381 (7–31–41) MC–D, October 30, 1941, which approved the temporary utilization of armament now on hand in this Department. This indorsement also stated that the reinforcements of peace or war garrison of the Hawaiian Department for the beach and land defense of this area was not contemplated. The project for the utilization of temporary armament was submitted on the 18th of September 1941, file Engr 662/4 x 662/7 which recommended the provision of funds for the construction of Panama mounts for three 155-mm batteries and a railroad gun emplacement, and requested that funds in the amount of $215,265.00 be alloted for the construction of these positions. This matter was also followed up in radiogram No. 320 this headquarters, September 18, 1941, which recommended that funds in the amount of $215,265.00 be made available for the construction at Kaneohe Bay and also that $117,256.00 be made available for the completion of the project for [33] construction of railroad gun positions. At the time of the attack no funds had been allotted for this construction. Exhibit "1C".

9. The necessity of improvement of the landing strips at Wheeler Field was brought to the War Department's attention by letter this headquarters, file Engr. 686/d, 21 June, 1941. In 2nd Ind. on this correspondence, from the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, August 25, 1941, question was raised as to the adequacy of the second proposed north-south runway, and the statement was made that no funds were available at that time for the construction and improvements recommended. In 2nd Ind. Chief of the Air Corps, Washington, D. C., September 2, 1941, to this Department, statement was made that $25,000.00 had been requested for the leveling of the main runway at Wheeler Field. At the time of the attack, however, no funds had been received for the improvement of this landing strip. Some improvements had been made utilising troop labor of the 804th Engineers; however, due to the lack of funds these improvements were limited and did not adequately solve the problem.—Exhibit "1D".

10. The Aircraft Warning Service is probably the most important single project for the defense of Oahu. At the time of the attack, however, none of the three fixed stations in the original project had been completed due to the impossibility of securing materials under the priorities system. The Kaala station, for example, depended for its construction on construction of the cableway approach. In radiogram 3009 on June 10th, this headquarters reported to the War Department that this cableway material could not be delivered unless a higher priority rating was received, and in War Department radio 904, June 26th, the Adjutant General reported that this priority rating had been advanced to an A–1–c rating. With this rating it was not possible to secure the material to install this installation and the others expeditiously. Revised estimates for engineer construction of the superseding project of six fixed stations and six mobile

stations and preliminary estimates for the cost of the signal communications involved in this revised project, were submitted by letter this headquarters 29 September, 1941, file Sig 676.3. Pending the allotment of these additional funds, this Departme it authorized the District Engineer to proceed with construction of AWS stations with any funds available to his office. At the time of the attack, however, due to this priority difficulty, none of the three original fixed stations were in operation.—Exhibit "1E".

[34] 11. The entire construction program in this Department has been delayed due to the situation regarding priorities. It was extremely difficult to secure materials for the construction program, not only those which were ordered specifically for a defense project, but particularly those materials which are ordinarily purchased as an "over the counter" transaction. From a study of the the priorities situation, and also of the shipping situation, it became evident in June that the local dealers who ordinarily maintain stocks and materials necessary for defense projects would not be able to secure delivery from the mainland until after a purchase order from a Government agency had been placed. This meant that after the priority was placed, if the item was not available in local stock that there would be a delay of from six weeks to two months even under the most favorable conditions before mainland delivery could be effected. To remedy this situation a letter was sent to the War Department by clipper airmail, file Engr. 523.07, subject: "Priorities and Preference Ratings," July 3, 1941. This letter presented the problem in detail and recommended to the War Department that action be taken to correct this situation. The letter was followed up by radio on the 14th of August, and was answered by 1st and 2nd Inds. from the Priorities Committee dated August 18, 1941, and the Adjutant General dated August 26, 1941. The problem was again presented to the War Department by letter dated October 23, 1941, file Engr. 523.07, which recommended that the Office of Production Management be opened in Honolulu. In 2nd Ind. on this correspondence, the Priorities Committee advised that the Office of Production Management had been requested to establish a field office in Hawaii. This field office had not been established at the time of the attack and due to this difficulty in securing materials, many of our projects were not completed at the time of the attack.—Exhibit "1F".

12. Another effort was made to solve this supply problem by securing funds for the advance procurement of certain essential materials. It was originally requested in clipper airmail letter this headquarters July 28, 1941, file Engr. 600.12, which recommended that a revolving fund of $1,000,000.00 be set up to permit the advance procurement of essential materials before the specific allotments had been made for individual projects. This letter had not [35] been answered on the 13th of September when a follow-up radiogram was sent to the War Department, and on the same day the matter was brought to the personal attention of the Deputy Chief of Staff in the War Department, who very quickly secured a solution of the problem by the allotment of $500,000.00 for the advance purchase of essential materials. Before these materials could be secured, however, the $500,000.00 was diverted by the War Department for the construction of housing at Kaneohe Bay, with the result that on the day of the attack, no reserve supplies of materials other than lumber had been accumulated.—Exhibit "1G".

13. The following letter shows appreciation by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air of the difficulties in the carrying out of the project for the creation of air fields to permit ferrying of planes to the Philippine Islands, and of the rapidity with which the arrangements were completed.—Exhibit "1H".

NOVEMBER 27, 1941

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT, U. S. A.,
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR SHORT: The copy of your report on the additional air routes has been received. The quantity of details requiring coordination, and the distances involved in the projects make the short time consumed in getting rolling almost unbelievably short.

I extend you my personal thanks for the effort you have expended on this job and the results you are getting.

The way things are working out now, it looks as if we will be using trans-Pacific airways almost continuously from now on. Our plans are O. K. for 4-engine

bombers, but what are the prospects for medium bombers? Do you think we should even study that phase of trans-Pacific operations?

Best regards.

Sincerely,

/s/ H. H. ARNOLD,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

[36] 14. Increase in Engineer Troops:

February 10, 1941.—TAG sent 3d Ind., file AG 320.2 (11-1-40) M-C saying that 3d Engineer Regiment was to be increased. Regular Army personnel not available to further increase Engineer Regiment. Selectees prohibited from being sent and it was not possible to aid in creating Engineer Battalion here as requested. On 19 Feb. 1941, letter to TAG file Engr. 322.03 requested that War Department send an Eng. Regiment (Aviation) and an Eng. Regiment (General Service) here. 1st Ind., May 15th, A. G. 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M; TAG, stated that 34th Eng. Regiment (C) would be activated and that the personnel would probably arrive in June. This Regiment was to take the place of the Regiment (General Service) requested. On June 18th, letter AG 320.2 (6-5-41) MR-MC, the War Department issued orders expanding 804 Eng. Company to the 804th Eng. Battalion. The troops for the 304th Eng. Battalion arrived in this Department 21 July 1941. Previous instructions concerning the activation of the 34th Eng. Battalion had been rescinded with the result that the unit was not activated until 17 October 1941. It had not been completely trained and lacked many items of equipment at the time of the attack. See Exhibit "1 I".

15. Increase in Coast Artillery Troops:

February 18, 1941.—Letter written to TAG urgently requesting two (2) Regiments CA Mobile; 1 Battalion CA (AA) gun, Mobile (less searchlight battery); one Regiment CA (TD) 155 mm. gun; AA filler replacements (90 officers and 2064 enlisted men); Harbor Defense Artillery reinforcements (150 officers and 2700 enlisted men). TAG replied by first indorsement May 10, 1941, file AG 320.2 (2-18-41) (56) that the Hawaiian Department CA Garrison would be augmented with a total of 276 officers and 5734 enlisted men between June 1941 and March 1942, as follows: (See Exhibit "1J").

June 1941:

(1) AA fillers, 60 officers, 1337 enlisted men.

(2) 98 CA 62 officers, 1329 enlisted men

(3) Second Battalion, 97 CA less Battery H (Gun) Battery E (SL) (17 officers, 359 enlisted men)

[37] *November 1941:*

(1) 97 CA less 2 Battalion, 3 Battalion—(48 officers, 885 enlisted men).

(2) Battery H, 97 CA (4 officers, 134 enlisted men).

(3) Medical Personnel, 98 CA (7 officers, 49 enlisted men).

March 1941:

(1) AA fillers (24 officers, 661 enlisted men).

(2) 3 Battalion, 97 CA (37 mm. gun) less Battery H, 3 Battalion, 98 CA (37 mm. gun) less Battery M (54 officers, 980 enlisted men).

February 25th, 1941.—Letter written to TAG, file AG 320.2/57 (Exhibit requesting increase in enlisted men in 251st C. A. Regiment NG from 1181 to 1450. Disapproved by TAG March 8, 1941 (Exhibit 1J) 1st indorsement, file 320.2/57.

February 25th, 1941.—Letter written to TAG, file 320.2/58 (Exhibit 1J) requesting following reinforcements of Hawaiian Department:

(1) That CAC requested February 18th (Exhibit 1J) be given priority.

(2) That 11th F. A. be organized under T/O dated November 1, 1940.

(3) One Tank Battalion.

(4) Two (2) M. P. Companies for guarding air fields.

(5) Reinforcements of Inf. Regiments so as to be organized under T/O November 1, 1940.

(6) That 11th F. A. Brig. (less 11 F. A.) be reinforced and organized under T/O November 1, 1940.

TAG replied by first indorsement, file 320.2 (2-25-41) (53) (Exhibit 1J) that CAC and Engineering increases would be considered separately; that reinforcements for F. A. and Inf. Regiments were not considered urgent; that Tank Battalion and 2 M. P. Companies for Hawaiian Department were disapproved; and that any reorganization of units was to be accomplished by reducing size

of existing units and by carrying others as inactive. On May 28th, orders for the shipment of CAC increases were rescinded file 320.2/70. On July 15, letter from TAG, file 320.2/82m (Exhibit 1J) activated the following units:

[38] 97th CA Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2 Battalions, and Batteries F and G.

98th CA Regimental Headquarters Battery (less band), Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 1st and 2nd Battalions, and Batteries A, B, C, D, F, G and H.

16. Increase in Air Corps Strength:

April 9th, 1941.—Letter from TAG, file 320.2 (3–5–41) (61) (Exhibit 1K) directing that Air Defense Command be set up. First indorsement, May 3, 1941 (Exhibit 1K) to TAG called attention to the fact that the plan was presented to War Department in letter of April 25th, 1941, Paragraph 7 "Reorganization of Forces in Hawaiian Department" (Exhibit 1K).

April 24th, 1941.—Letter written to TAG from COHAF (thru channels) file 320.2/94 (Exhibit 1K) subject "Air Base Group" requesting:

(1) Bellows Field as permanent Air Corps Station
(2) Permanent Station 15 Pursuit Group
(3) A redistribution of Air Base Groups
(4) That two Air Base Groups be authorized.

By second indorsement TAG to COHD dated June 26th, 1941, file 320.2 (4–24–41) (94) (Exhibit 1K):

(1) War Department stated that Troop Unit Basis FY 1942 provided for two additional material squadrons for HAF. This is believed to provide sufficient air base units to care for Bellows Field.

(2) Organization of Air Base Unit for 15th Pursuit Group held in obeyance pending decision on new station. By third indorsement CGHD to TAG, file 320.2/94 (Exhibit 1K) request was made for two additional material squadrons to be stationed at Bellows Field. On August 7th, 1941, radio, file 320.2/100 (Exhibit 1K) was sent to Chief of Air Corps requesting Headquarters Detachment in absence of Air Base Group. On August 15th Radio No. 380 (Exhibit 1K) was sent to TAG requesting information of status of Air Base Groups for Bellows Field. Administrative situation there very difficult. In answer, Chief of Air Corps sent radio no. 172, file 320.2/108c (Exhibit 1K) stating [39] not favorably considered because it would exceed the 59,000 allotted and also that TAG had been requested to activate Headquarters Detachment. On September 27th, 1941, by letter (exhibit 1K) from TAG, file 320.2/108d, subject "Activation of Air Corps Unit" a Headquarters Detachment was authorized at Bellows Field but personnel had to be furnished by the Department.

On August 30, 1941, Radio No. 779, file 320.2/108 (Exhibit 1K) was received asking:

(1) What are total AC personnel requirements.
(2) Total requirements for personnel for arms and services with AC.
(3) Number AB groups needed and their locations.

On September 9, 1941, Radio No. 272 to TAG, file 320.2/108a (Exhibit 1K) answering Radio No. 779 requesting the following:

(1) Two AB Groups (one for Bellows, one for Kahuku)

(2) Air Corps enlisted men now in Department sufficient to organize these groups.

(3) One Squadron (HB) (Exhibit 1K) consisting of 27 officers, 220 enlisted men to replace 14th Bombardment Squadron transferred to Phillipine Islands.

(4) Personnel for Bellows. Medical Department (1 officer, 7 enlisted men) Dental Corps (1 officer) Quartermaster (1 officer, 30 men) Ordnance Dept. (1 A. B. Co. of 4 officers and 60 enlisted men).

(5) Personnel for Kahuku Point. Medical Department (3 officers, 12 enlisted men) Dental Corps (1 officer) Quartermaster (1 officer, 30 enlisted men) Signal Corps (10 enlisted men specialists)

(6) Following personnel needed: Air Corps (3871 enlisted men) Medical Corps (6 officers, 36 enlisted men); Dental Corps (1); Quartermaster (4 officers, 70 enlisted men). 3 AB Squadrons one each at Barking Sands, Kauai; Morse Field; Hilo, Hawaii.

(7) Near Future. Two (2) additional AB Squadrons—(1) Lanai (under construction) (2) Parker Ranch (project to be submitted).

On November 8th Radio no. 786 was sent to TAG, file 320.2/126 (exhibit 1K) requesting immediate assignment.

(1) Three airdepot Groups to HAF

(2) Procurement of civilian employees impossible and discharge of enlisted men for employment does not help.

[40] (3) 30% tactical planes grounded due to shortage in depot maintenance. Becoming acute.

(4) Must have personnel and material at once. No personnel available here for activation of units.

On November 15th Radio no. 402, file 320.2/126a, (exhibit 1K) from TAG stating that three Air Depot Groups were under advisement but that groups not available now. If and when available, will it come within strength of war garrison?

On November 19th Radio no. 889, file 320.2/126b (exhibit 1K) to TAG—Increase of three Air Depot Groups will not come within authorized war garrison but should be furnished as soon as possible due to shortage in personnel. War garrison must be increased to accommodate Air Base Groups.

On November 18th the War Department activated Seventh Airways Squadron from existing personnel in Department, file 320.2/127 (exhibit 1K). On November 18th Radio no. 873, file 320.2/128 (exhibit no. 1K) was sent to TAG requesting Station Complements at Hickam, Wheeler, Morse Field and Barking Sands. Urgently requested. On November 25th 1941 Radio no. 455, file 320.2/128a (exhibit 1K) from TAG stated that until war garrison limitation was lifted, no additional personnel could be sent to the Hawaiian Department.

17. Reorganization Hawaiian Division & Increase in War Garrison April 25th, 1941. Letter written to TAG, file 220.3/37, (exhibit 1L) requesting that two triangular divisions be organized from the Hawaiian Division (Square) and the organization of station complements be made at Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter; also Air Defense Command is to be created. By first indorsement dated July 29, 1941, file 320.3 (4–25–41) (37) (exhibit 1L). TAG returned this letter without action.

May 29th, 1941. TAG sent radio no. 837, file 320.3/37a (exhibit 1L) stating that the initial war garrison would be reduced to 58,000. Reductions would come from troops other than Air Corps, Anti aircraft, and Aircraft Warning Service.

[41] *June 5th, 1941.*—Letter was written to TAG. file 320.3/37b (Exhibit 1L) subject "War Garrison for Initial War Operations" stating

(1) That Table I, (Exhibit 1L) shows forces recommending totaling 59,425.

(2) Statement that proper defense of Kaneohe Bay, Airfields, beaches and provisions for mobile reserve cannot be successful with only 59,000 troops.

(3) Statement of minimum increase for Kaneohe Bay as follows: 1 Regiment Inf; 1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155 How (T. D.); 1 Battalion C. A. 155 guns plus one additional battery; 1 Regiment C. A. (AA); 1 Battery C. A. 12" Barbette guns.

(4) Urgently requested that strength be increased from 58,000 to approximately 71,500 as follows: 2 Inf. Regiments; 1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155 How 1 Regiment CA (AA) SM; 1 Battalion CA 155 guns; 1 Battery CA 12" Barbette guns . . . total 11,279.

(5) Again recommended that station complements for Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter be organized. This would give an increase of 731 officers and men for Schofield Barracks and 131 officers and men for Fort Shafter.

(6) Plans are to be submitted in the near future for garrisons each of outlying islands with a force consisting of approximately 1 regiment of Infantry and a composite battalion of Field Artillery, all of which will not be within war garrison strength.

On July 22, 1941, 1st indorsement to exhibit 1L file 320.3/37b (Exhibit 1L) TAG said

(1) War Garrison of 59,425 recommended by CGHD is reduced to 57,429 and augmented by following units: 1 Regiment CA (AA) SM (less 1 gun battalion, band, basics), 1 Battalion CA 155 M guns with 1 additional Battery, 1 Battery CA.

(2) Recommendation of war garrison for 71,500 officers and men is disapproved.

(3) Troops in excess of 59,690 authorized will be sent to Hawaii only in case the situation develops a need and if such troops are available.

18. *May 2nd, 1941.*—Letter written to TAG, file 320.3/38 (Exhibit 1M) subject "Organization of Anti Aircraft Artillery Brigade" requesting authority to activate the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 53 CA Brig. and the Intelligence Battery, 53rd CA Brig. about June 1, 1941.

June 12, 1941.—First indorsement from TAG to CGHD, file 320.2 (5/2/41) (38) (exhibit 1M) gives authority to activate.

[42] 19. *November 6, 1941.*—Radio No. 759 to Chief Ordnance, file 320.2/121 (exhibit 1N) stated that 6–37 mm. batteries now in Hawaiian Department. Plans made for six more by March, 1942, but only twenty (20) guns on hand. When and in what quantities will the one hundred (100) 37 mm. guns listed under 1941 funds be sent? Reply not yet received.

20. *STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE.* Before February 7, 1941, Field Orders No. 1 (Landing Operations) No. 1W (Sabotage) and 1 NS (Naval Security) had been prepared. It was found during Maneuvers, May 1941, that these field orders were too cumbersome. On July 14th, 1941, a tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department was issued to each officer in the Department with instructions that any suggested changes were to be reported to Department Headquarters by August 15, 1941. During the preparation of the final form of the Standing Operating Procedure, the tentative S. O. P. was in effect. The final form was issued on November 5, 1941. Each unit knew its mission in the event Alert No. 1, 2 or 3 was put into effect. Due to this planning (the S. O. P.) each unit was able to act quickly and promptly when the air raid took place on December 7, 1941.

EFFORTS TO BETTER PREPARE THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY FOR DEFENSE

[43] Soon after taking command of the Hawaiian Department I made a survey with reference to possible defense measures to enable the civilian population to meet any emergency which might arise. I had been asked to speak to the Chamber of Commerce on Army Day, April 6th, and decided that this day was the best opportunity to obtain publicity, as practically all the important business men of Oahu were present on this occasion. I proposed the following items of prime importance:

1. Production and storage of food.
2. Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured and wounded.
3. Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard utilities and prevent sabotage.
4. Preparation of plans and provision for evacuation of women and children and preparation of shelters for workers in the vicinity of central industries.

(For complete remarks on this occasion, see Exhibit "1O".

Production and storage of food: As a result of my talk and support by the papers and certain men of importance in the community, the storage of food in the pantry of the home was put into effect at once, and the purchases from the retailers increased about 20% during the first month.

For some years a study had been made of food production required and possible in the islands. A committee completed this work, and made definite assignment of acreage and crops to all plantations on the Islands. Plantation managers and the five big companies which act as factors for the various plantations all agreed to this plan. Necessary implements for changing from cane and pineapples to truck gardening were listed for each plantation. Orders for seed for planting the first crop were placed with firms in the mainland, orders to be filled upon telegraphic advice.—Exhibit "1P".

On December 10th, after completion of the inventory of food on hand, a meeting was held with the Presidents of the five big companies and of the Governor's Food Committee. The District Engineer was directed to purchase the seed and equipment at once, as it was believed the matter could be handled in less time in this [44] manner instead of having each plantation make purchases.

The committee on storage of food determined the articles and tonnage of the essential elements of diet necessary to provide for the civil population for six months. The cost of these items was estimated to be $2,500,000 for human consumption and $900.000 for feed for dairy cattle and poultry. This matter was taken up with the War Department.

Governor Poindexter and Delegate Sam King gave the storage of food their full support. However, the item was eliminated by the Bureau of the Budget and no action was gotten through Congress. The purchase of this emergency food reserve by the Department of Agriculture and the allocation of shipping therefor was authorized December 17th. Recent press dispatches indicate that the President has made an allotment for food production.

Organization of Doctors and Nurses for care of injured and wounded: The Medical Society of Honolulu got squarely behind my effort to prepare the doctors and

nurses for an emergency. Twenty (20) civilian-aid station groups were organized and have had considerable practice in setting up their stations. They actually functioned efficiently on December 7th. Sixteen (16) surgical teams were organized. They started reporting at 9:00 A. M. December 7th, and by 9:30 all were employed. They are representative of the leading surgeons, anesthetists, etc., in the city. The regular operating staff at Tripler General Hospital was operating at 8:45 A. M.

After several conferences the Red Cross agreed to purchase and store in Honolulu $200,000.00 worth of medicines and surgical supplies and equipment. Much of the equipment and supplies had been received prior to December 7th.

Buildings suitable for hospitals were surveyed, and many of these have actually been equipped and operated since December 7th.

Organization of auxiliary police force: The organization of an auxiliary police force was effected and placed under the command of Major Douglas King by the Mayor of Honolulu. This force was given some training in taking over leading utilities and the use of firearms. It proved to be a very efficient force immediately after the raid.

Auxiliary fire fighters and fire wardens have been organized. Requests for fire-fighting equipment have been made to the Office of Civilian Defense, and also sent direct by the Governor to the same organization.

[46] *Evacuation and shelters:* Detailed plans were drawn for evacuation camps, for trenches in parks, schools, etc., and for splinter-proof shelters in the vicinity of public utilities. A request for $2,800,000 for construction of these camps and shelters was made through the War Department and also direct by Governor Poindexter. The funds were not provided until after the attack December 7th. Since that date the President has made funds available to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii for this purpose.—Exhibit "1Q"

M-DAY BILL

At the request of the Senate of the Territory of Hawaii I appeared before that body and explained the value and the necessity for the passage of the M-Day bill. The passage was effected in the next few days and the measure was signed by the Governor. The bill enabled the Governor to organize emergency committees and carry out many things of great benefit in the medical work, evacuation and police work immediately following the attack on December 7th.

LETTERS FROM CIVILIANS WITH REFERENCE TO MY EFFORTS TO IMPROVE CIVILIAN DEFENSE

The following copies of letters have been received: Exhibit "1R"

HONOLULU, T. H., *December 22, 1941.*

The PRESIDENT, *The White House, Washington, D. C.*

SIR: We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organizations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan.

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to our "Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound "M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the de- [46] cision to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention of sabotage. He has shown a correct and sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians.

He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts" from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans,

now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency.

We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned.

Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be.

This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short or any other officials, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity or otherwise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation.

With very best respects and wishes, we are

Yours very truly,

Lester Petrie, City of Honolulu, Mayor; C. R. Hemenway, President, Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd.; A. L. Dean, Vice-President, Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.; Walter F. Dillingham, President, Oahu Railway & Land Co.: F. D. Lowrey, President, Lewers & Cook, Ltd.; H. H. Warner, Asst. Food Administrator, O. C. D.; J. B. Poindexter, Governor of Hawaii; S. B. Kemp, Chief Justice, Supreme Court; T. G. S. Walker, Director, Civilian Defense for Oahu; John E. Russell, President, Theo H. Davies & Co., Ltd.: George S. Waterhouse, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop National of Hawaii and Honolulu; Cyril F. Damon, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop Trust Co., Ltd.: Briant H. Wells, Executive Vice-President, Hawaiian Sugar Plants Association; H. A. Walker, President, American Factors, Ltd.; S. M. Lowrey, Treasurer, American Factors, Ltd.; P. E. Spalding, President C. Brewer & Co., Ltd.; Frank E. Midkiff, Trustee, Bernice P. Bishop Estate; Edouard R. L. Doty; Terr. Director of Civilian Defense; James Winne, Mgr. Mdse. Dept., Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd. (now acting as Food Administrator and Supply Officer).

C. C. to General Walter C. Short.

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[47]

MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU

Office of the Director, Island of Oahu

HONOLULU, HAWAII, *December 20, 1941.*

Lt. General WALTER C. SHORT,
Fort Shafter.

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Please allow me to express my sincere regret that our contact through Civilian Defense Plans has terminated.

It was greatly due to your help and backing that our Civilian Organizations were so far advanced that they were able to function so splendidly during the attack.

You will always be able to recollect that your determination to have our Civilian Groups Prepared saved many lives of our Sailors and Soldiers through the organized effort of our Civilian Defense Medical committee and the many trucks that we had ready to be turned into ambulances at a minute's notice.

Please be assured that you will carry the sincere thanks and Aloha of your many friends here who realize the distress you saved by urging and helping us to be prepared.

Yours very sincerely,

(s) T. G. S. Walker,
T. G. S. WALKER,
Director, Civilian Defense, Island of Oahu.

[47a] SEAL OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII

TERRITORY OF HAWAII

Executive Chambers

HONOLULU

23 DECEMBER 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Having noted in the public press that an investigation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a statement as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7, 1941.

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was magnificently rewarded.

It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations which bore fruit on December 7, 1941:

(1) *The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act* by a special session of Legislation called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian [47b] defense was planned and many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941.

(2) *The production and conservation of food:* Householders were persistently urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve. This appropriation has, since December 7, 1941, been authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of these crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives.

(3) *The medical facilities* for the care of the injured and wounded during any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 1941.

(4) *Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the* [47c] *preparation of shelters* for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of perfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.

(5) *An auxiliary police force* to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. Their work of this force was exceptional and excellent.

(6) *Legislation authorizing a home guard* was enacted at the special session of the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members of the Army for other military duty.

(7) *There were many other matters* too numerous to detail here which were planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public service in times of emergency.

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authorities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as a direct result of prior planning and training.

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory.

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit. THIS IS A TRUE COPY.

Very sincerely yours,

(S) J. B. POINDEXTER,
Governor of Hawaii.

L. W. TRUMAN,
Captain, Infantry.

[48] I have presented many of my actions, both with reference to the military defense of the islands and the preparations of the civil community for defense, to show that I have taken both a very active and an intelligent part in this work from the time of my arrival in the Hawaiian Department.

I should be very glad if this Committee would see fit to call before it a number of officers of my command, preferably from officers of high enough rank to know what I have accomplished, and from staff officers who are familiar with the work that has been carried out during the past ten months. I would also like very much to have the Governor and some of the leading business men called before the Commission to tell what the civil community thinks of the work that I have done over the past ten months.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The radiogram from the War Department thu CINCUS fleet UCS of October 16th emphasized that measures taken by me during the grave situation of the Japanese negotiations should not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

The radiogram of November 27th reiterated that action should be carried out so as "not repeat not to disclose intent", not alarm civil population, and avoid unnecessary publicity.

When the War Department was notified that the Hawaiian Department was alerted against sabotage it not only did not indicate that the command should be alerted against a hostile surface, sub-surface, ground or air attack, but replied emphasizing the necessity for protection against sabotage and subversive measures. This, taken in connection with the two previous radiograms mentioned, indicated to me a tacit consent to the alert against sabotage ordered by the Hawaiian Department.

2. The Hawaiian Department is not provided with an agency for locating enemy ships in various parts of the world. Such information as it may acquire on this subject must be obtained from the Fourteenth Naval District or from the War Department.

The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" places upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the responsibility for distant reconnaissance. Annex # 7 to the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" provides that when naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and army aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical control of the naval command during search operations. That means that the army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the naval commander and carry out the search as he deems necessary in order to carry out his responsibility for distant reconnaissance.

[49] During the period November 27th to December 6th, the Navy made no request for army planes to participate in distance reconnaissance. To me this meant that they had definite information of the location of enemy carriers or that the number unaccounted for was such that naval planes could make the necessary reconnaissance without the assistance from the army. During this period I was in frequent conferences with the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and at no time was anything said to indicate that they feared the possibility of an attack by the Japanese by air. In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff officer that there was no probability of such an attack. With a large part of the United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information, I was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and of the possibility of an air attack.

3. Action of the War Department on December 5th and as late as 1:30 A. M., Eastern standard time, December 7th, in dispatching planes from the mainland to Honolulu without ammunition indicated that the War Department did not believe in the probability of an early Japanese attack upon Honolulu.

I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to furnish me by the most rapid means possible information should a real crisis arise in Japanese relations. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the desire for secrecy would be considered more important than the element of time. Had the message in regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code machines been given me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding and decoding, etc., I, in all probability, would have had approximately two hours in which to make detailed preparations to meet an immediate attack.

4. I feel that my work in the Hawaiian Department should be judged by my activities throughout the complete period from the assumption of command on February 7, until my relief upon December 16th. I believe that any careful examination of my work during that period will prove that I have worked very seriously at the job and have accomplished measures of very considerable importance. I do not see how I could better have carried out what appeared to be the desires of the War Department unless I was supposed to know more than the War Department about the danger of Japanese attack and more than the Navy Department about the location of the Japanese carriers. To have taken more steps in preparation against a Japanese attack than I did would have alarmed the civil population and caused publicity contrary [50] to War Department instructions. I do not believe that I should be found guilty even of an error in judgment because I did not have the vision to foresee that the War Department would not notify me of a crisis in the least possible time and that the Navy with its large fleet in Hawaiian waters would not be able to carry out its mission of intercepting Japanese carriers, or at least detecting their presence in Hawaiian waters and informing me of the fact.

[57a] [Exhibit A]
[57] *copy*

[SECRET]

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

[*Paraphrase*]

NOTE FOR COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT:

THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A DISPATCH FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WHICH I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO PASS TO YOU QUOTE:

Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation x if a new cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic x if the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States x either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible x since Britain and the US are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility Japan may attack these two powers x view of these possibilities you will take due pre-

cautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan x

CBO CRJ	DATE 16 OCT 41	SERIAL NO. 1Ø-34Ø
ORIGINATOR	ACTION	
OPNAV	CINCLANT	INFORMATION
	CINCPAC	
	CINCAF	

A True Copy:

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit B]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

P1 WAR PRTY

WASH DC 611 PM *Nov 27 1941*

C G

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter T. H.

472 27th negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictible but hostile action possible at any moment stop if hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act stop this policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent stop report measures taken stop should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan stop limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers

MARSHALL

116P/27

True copy
O. M. Cutler
O M CUTLER
Lt Col Infantry

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR 380-5)

Form H. D. No. 1173 (Revised)—1664 Honolulu 10-10-40 5M.

[Exhibit C]

[RESTRICTED]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 November 1941.

Subject: Standing Operating Procedure
To: Distribution "B", "L", and "G" less 1, 2, 3 and 5

1. Attention is directed to attached Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, which supersedes Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, 14 July 1941.

2. Issuing headquarters will collect and destroy all copies of Tentative Standing Operating Procedure in the possession of units and officers.

3. Department General and Special Staff Sections and Commanders of major echelons, districts, department troops and station complements directly under this headquarters will submit, for approval of this headquarters, Standing Operating Procedures, Movement and Loading Tables. Chiefs of Special Staff Sections, HHD, will include in their SOP HD all installations under their supervision.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

Robert H. Dunlop
ROBERT H. DUNLOP,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

1 Inclosure: SOP HD

[RESTRICTED]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 November 1941.

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To: Distribution "B", "L", and "G" less 1, 2, 3 and 5

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By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

Robert H. Dunlop,
ROBERT H. DUNLOP,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

1 Inclosure: SOP HD

RESTRICTED

[a] [RESTRICTED]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H. 5 November 1941.

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

SECTION I—GENERAL

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[1] SECTION I—GENERAL

1. *PURPOSE.*—The purpose of a "Standing Operating Procedure" is stated in paragraph 159, FM 100–5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, and paragraph 56, FM 101–5, Staff Officers' Field Manual.

2. *UNIT PROCEDURES.*—Conforming to the Department Procedure, subordinate units and staff sections will develop appropriate Standing Operating Procedures.

3. *SHORT TITLE.*—"SOP HD" will signify this Standing Operating Procedure.

4. *DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS.*—Department Headquarters may operate either as a whole or in two groups. When divided, the headquarters will consist of a forward and a rear echelon, the composition of which ordinarily will be as follows:

a. FORWARD ECHELON.—
Commanding General and Aides
General Staff (less G–1 and G–5)
Secretary to General Staff
Engineer Officer
Signal Officer
Chemical Officer
Ordnance Officer
Surgeon
Headquarters Commandant
Provost Marshal.

b. REAR ECHELON.—
G–1
G–5
Special Staff (less those in forward echelon).

5. *TACTICAL PRINCIPLES.*—See FM 31–10, Coast Defense. The chief tactical principles applicable to the problem of the defense of OAHU and the air fields on the outlying islands are as follows:

a. Complete organization of the ground
b. Position to be held lightly
c. Large reserves, held mobile, with motor transportation sufficient to transport them
d. Automatic counter-attack.

6. *SECURITY.*—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces. See paragraphs 233 to 273, inclusive, FM 100–5.

7. *LIAISON.*—*a.* OFFICERS.—During all operations and alerts, a liaison officer with motor transportation will be sent from each of the following units to Department Headquarters and will remain thereat except when on a mission to their own headquarters:
24th Infantry Division
25th Infantry Division
[2] Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command
Hawaiian Air Force
86th Observation Squadron
Each Department Reserve Unit.

b. UNITS.—Both lateral and vertical liaison are mandatory. The responsibility therefor is from right to left and from front to rear. Combat teams operating in areas where coast artillery group stations are in operation will establish liaison with those stations.

8. *ORDERS.*—*a.* The Department Commander will issue orders covering the action of the Infantry Divisions, the Hawaiian Air Force, the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, Department Reserve units and all attached troops.

b. Orders issued by the Department (except as in *c* below) will be brief written field orders with an operation map. Circumstances may require the issuance of an oral order, but this will be confirmed later in writing.

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

c. Fragmentary orders, oral or written, may be issued when appropriate. Copies of the Department Commander's decision or directives, together with a roughly sketched operation map, will be sent by staff officers to lower units as soon as issued in order that plans may be initiated prior to receipt of the field order from the Department.

d. To expedite issue and to conserve time, unit commanders and staff officers will dictate their decisions, directives, plans and orders. All commanders and staff officers will perfect themselves in the dictation of orders. Competent stenographer-clerks and draftsmen will be trained within each headquarters.

9. *MOVEMENT.*—*a.* In general, all troops will be moved by motor. The maximum space in trucks will be utilized for the troops (standing if necessary) since all movements are necessarily for short distances.

b. Trucks will not close up and every effort will be made to avoid halting in the open. Maximum use will be taken of overhead cover, and vehicles either in bivouac or assembly areas will always be dispersed when in the open, and will be dispersed to the maximum extent practicable when in concealed positions.

c. In tactical movements, vehicles will be maintained at maximum speed authorized by law, consistent with safety. (This may be satisfactorily accomplished by restricting the leading vehicle to 10 miles per hour less than the maximum authorized; the others, not exceeding the maximum authorized speed).

d. All tactical movements in daylight will be by infiltration, FM 25–10, the distance between vehicles being not less than 300 yards. Administrative marches will be made with not less than safe driving distance between vehicles, or any distance greater than safe driving distance which will facilitate the movement (paragraph 31, FM 25–10). When necessary, officers' control points and route markers (paragraph 94, FM 25–10) will be utilized.

e. All movements under Alert No. 1 will be administrative.

f. Motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders, will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others, or (3) no lights when operating on *one-way* secondary roads, and cross-country, on military reservations and leased lands. On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.

[1] *g.* Trucks attached to a unit for a specific mission will revert to control of the parent unit when the specific mission has been accomplished.

10. *ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE.*—*a.* Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility of every unit. See paragraphs 261–273, FM 100–5.

b. All Infantry units not occupying front line positions will have their automatic weapons habitually in readiness for antiaircraft defense, and all other units will be prepared likewise to engage hostile aircraft.

c. On marches, all small arms suitable for use against aircraft will be in readiness for action. When enemy air action is imminent trucks normally will halt, troops will detruck, disperse and fire on enemy planes.

d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:

(1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation.

(2) Adoption of necessary measures to prevent hostile observation and aerial photography through advantageous use of terrain, utilization of cover, and use of camouflage.

(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of personnel and materiel when in bivouac or in position and by increased speed during movement.

11. *INSTALLATIONS AND ALARM SYSTEM.*—All important installations not protected by the Territorial Home Guard will be guarded by troops. An adequate alarm system will be established in connection therewith.

12. *GUIDES.*—*a.* In case of a relief, guides from the relieved organization will meet the incoming unit and remain with it until ordered back to their organization by the commander of the incoming unit.

b. Whenever units are ordered to another sector for support or attachment, the sector commander will provide the necessary guides to assist the supporting or attached units.

SECTION II—ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15 *f* (8) below.

14. *ALERT NO. 1.—a.* This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and Special Staff Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending further orders.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

[4] (2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(3) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

Police District No. 1, see paragraph 14 *h* (2) below
Command and Fire Control Cable System, see inclosure No. 1
Railway and Highway Bridges, see inclosure No. 2
Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS
Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA
WAIAU Generating Plant
Telephone Exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALEIWA), LAIE and KANEOHE
Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO-WAHIAWA-SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAU switch station—BELLOWS FIELD, see inclosure No. 3.
Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA
Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU.

(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

(5) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 14 *j* below.

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND will:

(1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command.

(3) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.

(4) Provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

(1) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces

(2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 14 *g* below.

g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.

h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, in addition to his normal duties, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will:

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.

[5] (3) Establish liaison with the local police force.

i. The STATION COMPLEMENTS of HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the protection of all vital installations on their respective posts.

j. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Com-

manders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 14 *d* (3) and *g* above. Instructions will be issued.

15. *ALERT NO. 2.—a.* This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and air-craft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

(2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present strength, except those required under (3), (4) and (5) below.

(3) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(4) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

Police District No. 1, see paragraph 15 *h* (2) below
Command and Fire Control Cable System, see inclosure No. 1
Railway and Highway Bridges, see inclosure No. 2
Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS
Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA
WAIAU Generating Plant
Telephone exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALEIWA), LAIE and KANEOHE
Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO-WAHIAWA—SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAU switch station—BELLOWS FIELD, see inclosure No. 3
Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA
Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU.

(5) The 25th Infantry Diision will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

[6] (6) Place 240mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards and, when directed, place ammunition at positions.

(7) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 15 *e* below.

(8) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 15 *l* below.

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Field Artillery, will:

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that railway batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced.

(2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(3) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 15 *k* (1) below.

(5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(9) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.

(10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

(1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters. See paragraph 17.

(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.
(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.
(4) Disperse bombers with crews.
(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces.
(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 *g* below.
(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:
(a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of readiness "A". The bomber commander will report to the Commander of Patrol Wing TWO.
[7] (b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighte planes in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Command for operational control.
g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:
Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.
h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:
(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.
(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.
(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.
(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.
(6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 15 *k* (1).
i. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:
(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.
j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will:
Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:
(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.
(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.
(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.
k. STATION COMPLEMENTS:
(1) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.
(2) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.
[8] *l.* TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 15 *d* (4) and *g* above. Instructions will be issued.
16. *ALERT NO. 3.*—*a.* This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations on outlying islands.
b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS:
(1) All sections of the forward echelon (see paragraph 4 *a*) will occupy their stations at forward command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis.
(2) All sections of the rear echelon (see paragraph 4 *b*) will continue their usual duties at their present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will remain in condition of mobile readiness at their permanent stations, pending instructions from this headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Defend its assigned sector on OAHU.

(2) Protect all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

(3) Release all available Bands to the Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

(5) Place 240mm howitzers in position.

(6) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 *e* below.

(7) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 16 *m* below.

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Detachment Field Artillery, will:

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions.

(2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(4) Support the Infantry Divisions.

(5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(6) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(7) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

[*9*] (8) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(9) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 16 *l* (2) below.

(10) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

(1) Destory enemy aircraft.

(2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.

(3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.

(4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

(5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 16 *h* below.

(6) Arm all planes, except that normally *bombs* will not be loaded on ships dispatched to outlying islands. See paragraph 25 *e* (8).

(7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(8) Disperse bombers with crews.

(9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

(10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions.

(11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

g. G–5 will be prepared to establish the following:

(1) A Food Administration.

(2) A Labor Procurement Service.

h. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS of HAWAII, MAUI (includes MOLOKAI) and KAUAI Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments present within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

i. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.

(3) Establish liasion with the local police force.

(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.

(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.

[*10*] (6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 16 *l* (2) below.

j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and

Marine Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

k. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications.

l. STATION COMPLEMENTS.—

(1) The SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Complement will protect all vital installations on the Schofield Reservation.

(2) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

(3) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

m. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 16 *d* (2) and *h* above. Instructions will be issued.

SECTION III—CONDITION OF READINESS FOR AIRCRAFT

17. Condition of readiness for aircraft will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number as indicated in paragraphs *a* and *b* below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

a. MATERIAL READINESS.—

A—All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

[*11*] B—One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C—Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D—Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E—All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

b. DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS.—

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and prepared to carry out the assigned task.

1—For pursuit and VF types: Four minutes. Types other than fighters: Fifteen minutes.

2—All types: 30 minutes.

3—All types: One hour.

4—All types: Two hours.

5—All types: Four hours.

SECTION IV—INTELLIGENCE

18. The Intelligence Standing Operating Procedure indicated below will be followed generally where applicable.

19. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ENEMY INFORMATION.—

a. Will the enemy attempt to destroy or neutralize NAVAL BASES at PEARL HARBOR, at KANEOHE BAY, and air fields on OAHU with the object of denying their use to the UNITED STATES without occupation? If so, will

his air attacks be accompanied by Naval bombardment and blockading operations?

b. Will the enemy attempt to capture OAHU by expeditionary forces with the object of utilizing the NAVAL BASES at PEARL HARBOR, at KANEOHE BAY, and air fields thereon? If so, when, where, and with what strength will he make his main attack?

c. Will the enemy attempt to capture any other of the principal islands of the Hawaiian Group with the object of utilizing the air fields and establish bases thereon?

d. Will the enemy military operations be accompanied by acts of sabotage and terrorism on the part of resident sympathizers?

e. Will the enemy utilize local foreign population, local aliens or nationals of foreign origin for sabotage operations, raids to assist landing operations, or other acts of assistance?

20. MEASURES TO OBTAIN INFORMATION.—

a. NAVY.—

(1) Transmit, through the Joint Intelligence Loop, information received from the Offshore and Inshore Patrols, from any escort or attack forces formed, and from any other Naval Ships relative to:

(*a*) Location, composition, course, and speed of enemy units encountered, with particular reference to location of aircraft carriers and transports.

[*12*] (b) Indications of landings on any island of the main Hawaiian Group, with particular attention to the number and type of landing boats, and the composition of supporting Naval units.

(c) Indications of attempts to block HONOLULU and/or PEARL HARBORS.

(d) Indications of any hostile aerial activity in strength.

(e) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately.

(f) Report damage by hostile Naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately.

(g) See paragraph 20 *c* below.

b. ARMY.—

(1) *Hawaiian Air Force.*—

(a) Observe all waters within an area bounded as follows:

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OPANA POINT, MAUI; KAUIKI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI; LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII; KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTHWEST HEADLAND, KAHOOLAWE; LEAHI POINT, NIIHAU; LEHUA ISLAND, NIIHAU; KAILIU POINT, KAUAI; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

Report location, composition, course and speed of enemy units encountered. Maintain continuous contact with major subdivisions of enemy units. Particular attention to location of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, material changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers to be reported immediately by Joint Intelligence Loop; thereafter on the hour by department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report indications of landing on any island, giving location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting Naval group. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed by their operations. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop; other damage at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report any hostile aerial activity in strength, including number, type, direction and area of attack or observation, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(2) *86th Observation Squadron.*—

(a) Same as for "HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE"—see 20 *b* (1) above.

[*13*] (b) Be prepared to provide, on call, observation for the control of long-range artillery fire.

(3) *Interceptor Command.*—

(a) Report immediately any and all information of hostile air force or surface vessel.

(b) Report, upon completion of action by or with enemy air force, composition of enemy forces, direction of approach, time of action, area attacked, and damage to enemy airplanes.

(4) *Each Infantry Division.*—

(a) Report location, number, type and formation of transports and landing boats and composition of supporting naval group. Report when observed thereafter hourly, on the hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report *enemy front lines* and boundaries between units. Report immediately any significant change. Otherwise report every two hours, on the even hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(c) Report location of *own front lines.* Report every two hours, on the even hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report all identifications. Infantry identifications are most important. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report indications of landing of artillery, including caliber of same, and tanks. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(f) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment. Important damage immediately; other damage at 1830, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(g) Report time, place, kinds and method of employment of chemicals. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(h) Report weather and surf conditions on all favorable landing beaches. Report at 0300, 0700, 1200 and 1700 and 2200, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(i) The 25th Division will assign G–2 personnel to assist the Provost Marshal in the examination and questioning of enemy documents and personnel in South Sector.

(5) *Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command.*—

(a) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, initial contact with enemy units, giving location, composition and course of formation.

(b) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, when an action is begun by hostile vessels or by the seacoast artillery, giving location of naval vessels, locality being attacked, and units engaged.

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report upon completion of any action, by Department Intelligence Loop, important damage from hostile naval and air [14] bombardment, and report the use of chemicals immediately. Other damage at 1900 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop, location, number, type, and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval force.

(f) Report, when observed, by Joint Intelligence Loop, indications of attempts to block HONOLULU HARBOR, PEARL HARBOR, or KANEOHE BAY.

(g) Report as soon as practicable important damage to ground installations, including damage to use of chemical agents.

(h) Report visibility at 0400, 0700, 1200, 1700 and 2200, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(i) Any of the above reports may be transmitted by telephone when necessary to avoid delay.

(6) *District Commanders of HAWAII, MAUI and KAUAI Districts.*—Report when observed, by radio to Hawaiian Air Force, thence by Department Intelligence Loop:

(a) Nature of hostile activity, including number, type, direction and area of attack or observation.

(b) Damage by hostile naval and air bombardment.

(c) Location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval group.

(d) Enemy front lines and boundaries between units.

(e) All identifications. Infantry identifications are most important.

(f) Time, place, kinds and method of employment of chemicals.

(7) *Department Signal Office.*—

Radio intercept and goniometric service. Report when obtained.

c. ALL ELEMENTS OF HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.—

(1) Report presence of parachute troops and assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers and overt acts of sabotage or terrorism, giving location, time, numbers involved, and probable intentions or damage accomplished.

(2) Report of location of floating or stranded mines, in order that this information may be relayed to the Navy. No other action, i. e., attempts at destruction, than to report location immediately, should be taken.

d. MISCELLANEOUS.—

(1) *Transmission of G–2 Information.*—

In the absence of specific instructions as to transmission, or in the event of failure or overload of specified channels, G–2 information will be transmitted by direct line, where available, or by the most expeditious routing over the circuits set forth in current Signal Operations Instructions. [*15*] If wire and radio signal communication are out, important intelligence information will be sent back by any means at hand: Wire circuits of near-by units, motor messenger, commandeered vehicle, any means necessary commensurate with the value of the information.

21. *MEASURES FOR HANDLING.*—

a. PRISONERS: Examination stations will be located at all Prisoner of War collection points.

b. DOCUMENTS AND CAPTURED MATERIAL.—

(1) Documents will be sent to G–2's of Department or Divisions, with the minimum of delay, by regularly scheduled messenger service.

(2) Reports of captured material will be sent to the same stations by the same means.

(3) Documents and material identifying organizations or indicating the use of chemicals are of major importance. They will be given special priority in shipment to examination stations and will be reported to Department G–2 by the most expeditious means.

(4) Liaison officers from the office of G–2, H. H. D., will be assigned to all Examination Stations, and will assist the Provost Marshal in examining enemy personnel, materiel and documents, and in determining destination of reports.

c. MAPS.—Maps will be supplied initially by the Department Engineer.

22. *REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.*—

Distribution of reports from Department Headquarters: Summaries of Intelligence at 0800, 1300, 1800 and 2300.

23. *THE DEPARTMENT G–2* will:

a. Keep the Commanding General and all interested staff officers informed regarding the enemy situation and of his deductions concerning it.

b. Insure that counterintelligence measures are adequately provided for and adhered to.

c. Establish a counter-espionage service that will not only guard against the subversive activities of the external enemy, but will also enable the Department G–2 to keep the Department Commander constantly advised as to the attitude, trend of thought, and probable course of action of the civil population, particularly that of alien extraction. This service will maintain close liaison with the Department Provost Marshal, with a view to:

(1) Furnishing the Department Provost Marshal with all information gained, through the counter-espionage service of value in the prevention of civil disorders, sabotage and incipient uprisings.

(2) Receiving and evaluating information relative to the internal situation collected by the Department Provost Marshal through his agencies set up for the actual control of the civil population.

d. Collect, evaluate, and disseminate information relative to assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers, and overt acts of sabotage and terrorism.

[*16*] *e.* Prepare propaganda and publicity for the encouragement of the loyalty and support of the civil population, particularly that of alien extraction.

24. *G–2 FORMS.*—

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation, see Inclosure No. 4.

b. Periodic Reports, see page 1, Inclosure No. 5. For combat Air Force see page 2, Inclosure No. 5.

SECTION V—ADMINISTRATION

25. *SUPPLY* (See paragraphs 75–80, FM 100–10).—

a. SUPPLY AREAS.—

(1) Schofield Supply area includes the area of OAHU north and west of a general line extending LAE O KAOIO—PUU KAAUMAKUA—KIPAPA STREAM—KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY at (97.9—91.0)—KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY—PEARL CITY JUNCTION—PEARL HARBOR ENTRANCE.

(2) The Honolulu Supply area includes the remainder of OAHU and outlying islands.

b. CLASS I SUPPLIES (rations); including QMC class II and IVS.:

Schofield Supply Area—Quartermaster, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply Area—Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, HONULOLU.

(1) Supplies, for a small unit of an organization, when moved nearby into a different supply area from the parent organization, may be continued thru the parent organization or may be obtained separately from the D. P. for the new supply area as warranted by the situation.

(2) Distribution will be based on consolidated daily strength reports submitted by organizations to the Depot or Quartermaster supplying the area in which the organization is stationed (copy to Dept. QM) by 0800 daily.

(3) Schedules of distribution will be arranged by issuing quartermasters by direct agreement with unit commanders supplied. Distribution schedules will be set up and copies furnished Dept. QM and G–4, H. H. D.

(4) A standard menu ration is established for Alert No. 3.

c. CLASS III SUPPLIES.—

(1) All units leaving their normal posts under any alert will take with them the authorized allowance of gasoline containers *filled.* Replenishment will be made in the following manner:

(a) Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS will establish DPs at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS for all units operating in the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS area.

(b) Commanding officers of each post in the Honolulu Supply Area, except MALAKOLE, BELLOWS FIELD and KANEOHE, will establish DPs at their posts for the supply of all units operating in this area. MALAKOLE, BELLOWS FIELD and KANEOHE will establish a DP at their respective posts for the supply [17] of their own units operating in the immediate vicinity of their own post.

(c) In the event units are moved, placing them in another supply area, gasoline will be supplied from the DP nearest the unit, regardless of supply area.

(d) Normally, the supply of gasoline from DPs will be by 5 and 10 gallon drums, rather than filling individual trucks.

(e) Units will furnish personnel for refilling of their containers at the DP. Post Commanders will provide suitable equipment for refilling containers.

(f) 11th Tank Company will draw aviation gasoline from the nearest Air Corps Station.

(g) Replenishment of stocks at posts will be accomplished in the normal manner. Following the period of the maneuvers, necessary monetary adjustments will be made through Department Headquarters.

(h) Class III supplies on outlying islands will be the responsibility of the District Commanders.

d. CLASS II & IV SUPPLIES (except Quartermaster Corps).—

(1) *Medical Supply:*

Schofield Supply Area—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Medical Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply Area—Hawaiian Medical Depot, FORT SHAFTER.

(2) *Signal Supply* (except Signal Corps aircraft radio):

Schofield and Honolulu Supply areas—Hawaiian Signal Depot, FORT SHAFTER.

(3) *Signal Supply*—aircraft radio only:

Schofield and Honolulu Supply areas—Hawaiian Air Depot, HICKAM FIELD.

(4) *Chemical Supplies*—all supply areas—Hawaiian Chemical Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(5) *Engineer Supplies*—all supply areas—Hawaiian Engineer Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T. H. Distributing points for class IV supplies will include SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT RUGER, FORT KAMEHAMEHA, FORT BARRETTE and North Shore in vicinity of (86.9–04.2). Credits at DP's to major echelon commanders will be announced separately to commanders concerned.

(6) *Water Supply:* Will be secured locally and will be inspected by a medical officer before use except from post and CITY of HONOLULU water systems.

(7) *Air Corps Supply:* All supply areas—Hawaiian Air Depot, HICKAM FIELD and WHEELER FIELD Branch, when so designated, for types of services announced by Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

(8) *Ordnance Supply* (other than ammunition Class V).—
Schofield Supply area—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
Honolulu Supply area—(General Storage and Shop) Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, HONOLULU.
[*18*] *e.* CLASS V SUPPLIES:
(1) Schofield Supply Area—all types—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS (See (3) below).
(2) Honolulu Supply Area—all types—Ammunition Storage Area, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot. (See (3) below.)
(3) Aircraft pyrotechnics and bombs, 8-inch railway and 240mm ammunition and chemical ammunition (other than grenades)—Ammunition Storage Area, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot—all supply areas.
(4) Credits of an "initial issue" and of one "unit of fire" are automatically placed at the disposal and under the control of all major echelon commanders whenever an Alert is ordered. Quantities of various types of ammunition included in the "initial issue" and in a "unit of fire" are shown in Inclosures Nos. 6 and 7 herewith. Load of Aircraft Ammunition per airplane is indicated in Inclosure No. 8.
(5) At the time Alert No. 2 or No. 3 is ordered, all units will draw such of their "initial issue" as has not already been drawn, except that for Alert No. 2 the Infantry Divisions will draw initially only 1/5 of the "initial issue" and the balance thereof will be drawn after occupation of positions with their organic and/or sector weapons. Whenever issues cannot be made simultaneously, they will be made according to the following order of priority and according to a schedule to be mutually arranged between the Unit Supply Officer and the Supply Point concerned.
Aircraft bombs and ammunition for aircraft weapons.
Antiaircraft 3", 37mm and Machine Gun ammunition.
Ground machine gun ammunition—all types.
Other small arms ammunition.
All artillery ammunition, less antiaircraft.
(6) At the time Alert No. 1 is ordered, only small arms ammunition included in the "initial issue" will be drawn.
(7) Aircraft bombs will not be issued in "initial issue" but will be held available in bomb storage areas.
(8) Two "units of fire" of bombs and machine gun ammunition will be maintained on outlying islands for each airplane operating therefrom.
f. Dumps and Ammunition Distributing Points will be established as directed by this headquarters.
26. *EVACUATION.*—
a. PERSONNEL:
(1) North Sector Division by 24 Medical Bn. to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
(2) South Sector Division by 25 Medical Bn. to Tripler General Hospital except for troops in the area west of the line: PEARL HARBOR CHANNEL—EWA JUNCTION. The latter will be evacuated to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
(3) *Hawaiian Air Force.*—
(a) HICKAM FIELD, by the Surgeon, HICKAM FIELD to Station Hospital, HICKAM FIELD or Tripler General Hospital. [*19*] Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies, will be attached as needed.
(b) WHEELER FIELD and HALEIWA Landing Field, by Surgeon WHEELER FIELD to Station Hospital Schofield. Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies will be attached as needed.
(c) BELLOWS FIELD, by Surgeon, BELLOWS FIELD to Tripler General Hospital. Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies, as needed.
(d) Air fields on outlying islands, by vehicle to local hospital or by air to Tripler General Hospital or Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. Collection by respective medical detachment. Details of evacuation to be arranged by the responsible commanders for each field.
(e) HCAC, by the Surgeon, HCAC (collection by respective medical detachments, reinforced if necessary). One ambulance company to be attached to the command prior to combat. Evacuation from the area north and west of the line: PEARL HARBOR Channel—EWA Junction—LAE O KAOIO Point to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. Evacuation from the area south and east of this line to Tripler General Hospital.

(f) KAUAI District, MAUI District and HAWAII District to local hospitals as directed by District Commanders under provisions of letter, this headquarters to each District Commander, dated 31 July 1941, subject: "Medical Service."

(g) Elements not included elsewhere: North Sector by 24th Medical Bn., on call; South Sector by 25th Medical Bn., on call.

b. ANIMALS:

(1) North Sector to Veterinary Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, by provisional Veterinary Detachment attached to Hawaiian Pack Train.

(2) South Sector to Veterinary General Hospital, FORT SHAFTER, by provisional Veterinary Detachment, attached to units having animals.

c. SALVAGE: To supply points designated in paragraph 25 above for services indicated.

d. PRISONERS OF WAR.—

(1) Collecting Points—SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT SHAFTER, FORT RUGER, KANEOHE BAY. To be established and operated by Department Provost Marshal, assisted by Provost Marshals, Infantry Divisions.

(2) Prisoner of War Inclosures—Establishment and operation by Department Provost Marshal, as directed by this headquarters.

27. *TRAFFIC.*—

The Department Provost Marshal, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will regulate traffic on OAHU.

28. *MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.*—

a. Motor pools will be established by the Infantry Divisions and the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. These pools will [*20*] consist of all available tactical vehicles and administrative vehicles, the latter obtained by reducing to a minimum administrative requirements.

b. The assignment of motor vehicles for one specific purpose will be the exception. All motors will be used to the maximum for all purposes.

c. Current movement and loading tables will be maintained by the Infantry Divisions and the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command as follows:

(1) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative in the pool, showing the number of men and amount of impedimenta that can be moved initially into position. See paragraph 9 above.

(2) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative, subsequent to move into position which are available for movement of reserves, and the number of men which can be moved.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

Walter C. Phillips,
WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Lt. Col., G. S. C., Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
Wm. E. Donegan,
WM. E. DONEGAN,
Lt. Col., G. S. C., Asst. Chief of Staff. G–3.

Inclosures:
No. 1—Map, Communications Installations.
No. 2—Map, Bridges and Police Districts.
No. 3—Map, Electric Installations.
No. 4—Estimate of Enemy Situation.
No. 5—Periodic Intelligence Report Forms.
No. 6—Allowances of Ammunition.
No. 7—Unit of Fire.
No. 8—Load of Aircraft Ammunition.

Inclosure No. 1

(Inclosure No. 1 is a map of Communications Installations on the Island of Oahu, T. H. as of 7 July 1941. This map is reproduced as Item No. 34 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

Inclosure No. 2

(Inclosure No. 2 is a map of the Island of Oahu, T. H., showing Police Districts, Railroad Bridges and Highway Bridges. This map is reproduced as Item No. 35 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

RAILROAD BRIDGES

Number	Location	Type		Height	Span
		Bents	Girders		
1	0.9 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0′	100′
2	1.0 mi. W. of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Concrete	6.0′	32′
3	1.9 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	4.5′	160′
4	2.4 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0′	160′
5	2.6 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0′	32′
6	2.6 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0′	12′
9	0.7 mi. E of Aiea	Concrete pile	Timber	4.3′	208′
10	0.2 mi. W of Aiea	Concrete pile	Timber	4.5′	48′
11	0.3 mi. E of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	4.3′	96′
12	0.2 mi. E of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	3.5′	28′
13	0.4 mi. W of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0′	112′
14	Waiau Station	Timber pile	Timber	3.5′	27′
15	0.2 mi. W of Waiau	Timber pile	Timber	1.5′	32′
16	0.3 mi. W of Waiau	Concrete pile	Timber	2.0′	32′
17	0.4 mi. W of Waiau	Concrete pile	Timber	6.0′	32′
18	0.3 mi. W of Pearl City	Concrete pile	Timber	5.6′	160′
19	0.8 mi. W of Pearl City	Concrete pile	Timber	3.0′	16′
20	Waipahu	Timber Trestle	Timber	6.5′	63′
29	1.3 mi. W of Gilbert	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.6′	64′
36	2.2 mi. S of Nanakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	12.5′	64′
40	0.6 mi. S of Nanakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.3′	96′
42	1.0 mi. N of Nanakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.5′	64′
43	2.5 mi. S of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	7.0′	64′
44	1.1 mi. S of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	12.0′	96′
47	0.5 mi. N of Waianae	Timber pile	Timber	7.0′	96′
50	3.3 mi. N of Waianae	Timber pile	Timber	7.0′	64′
51	3.4 mi. N of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.6′	80′
57	0.2 mi. S of Makua	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.5′	62′
58	0.1 mi. S of Makua	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.5′	114′
74	0.7 mi. W of Mokuleia	Concrete pile	Timber	8.0′	80′
75	0.5 mi. W of Mokuleia	Concrete pile	Timber	9.2′	112′
77	0.6 mi. W of Waialua	Concrete pile	Timber	7.0′	448′
78	Haleiwa	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.0′	224′
81	2.1 mi. N of Haleiwa	Timber Trestle	Timber	14.0′	96′
84	0.7 mi. S of Waimea	Concrete pile	Timber	20.0′	272′
87	0.7 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	15.0′	60′
88	1.0 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	13.0′	90′
89	2.2 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	20.0′	96′
90	2.9 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	14.0′	75′
92	4.0 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.5′	128′
101	0.6 mi. N of Waipahu	Concrete arch	Timber	23.5′	98′
102	2.0 mi. N of Waipahu	Wood Trestle	Timber	22.0′	144′
103	4.1 mi. N of Waipahu	Wood Trestle	Timber	11.0′	64′
104	3.4 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	22.0′	224′
105	3.3 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	20.0′	160′
106	2.7 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	30.0′	320′
107	0.6 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	75.0′	272′
108	0.4 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	115.0′	608′
109	2.0 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	107.0′	448′
110	2.3 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	55.0′	272′
111	0.2 mi. N of Brodie Junction	Wood Trestle	Timber	13.0′	112′

HIGHWAY BRIDGES—PRIORITY

Number	Location	Coordinates
52	Kam Highway over Waiawa Stream	01.95–84.12
49	Kam Highway over Kipapa Stream	98.4 –87.8
17	Kam Highway over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	96.46–95.68
16	Kam Highway over N. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	96.37–96.75
9	Kam Highway over Anahulu R. Haleiwa	87.98–07.98
74	Kam Highway over Waimea R., Waimea	92.82–13.52
15	Kam Highway over Poamoho Gulch	95.27–98.92
45	Old Kam Highway over Kaukonahua Gulch, Schofield Barracks	93.72–96.96
13	Kam Highway over Opaeula (Twin Bridges) at Waialua	87.78–06.33
127	Kam Highway at Kuapa Pond (Koko Head)	32.45–70.22
5	Between Waialua Mill and Thompson Corner	86.06–04.57
6	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa	86.12–05.76
7	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa	86.52–06.20
61	Dillingham Blvd. at Keehi Lagoon	11.76–76.55
99	Kam Highway at Kahana Bay	14.34–03.25
160	East Range Road over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	97.79–95.34
161	Waipahu cut-off over O. R. & L. RR at Waipahu	98.56–82.46
57	New Kam Highway over Halawa Stream S. of Aiea	06.82–80.30
109	Kam Highway at Heeia fish pond	21.04–89.11

Inclosure No. 3

(Inclosure No. 3 is a map of the Island of Oahu, T. H., showing Electric Installations and Generating Plants. This map is reproduced as Item No. 36 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

Inclosure No. 4

Title
Place
Date and hour

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.
   a. Enemy Naval Operations.—Movements (by fleet or groups).
   b. Enemy land operations.
      (1) Enemy activities in forward areas and new identifications.
      (2) Movements, concentrations and establishments in rear areas.
      (3) Sabotage.
      (4) Terrain, weather, visibility and surf as they affect the enemy.
2. CONCLUSIONS.
   a. Enemy capabilities.—An enumeration of lines of action open to the enemy which may affect accomplishment of the mission of the command.
   (*b*) (1) A statement of the relative probability of adoption of the foregoing lines of action when such statement can be justified.
   (2) Reasons justifying any statement made in (1) above.

Chief of section.

Inclosure No. 5

From: (Date and hour)
To: (Date and hour)
Issuing unit
Place
Date and hour of issue

PERIODIC REPORTS

No. ------
Maps. (Those needed for an understanding of the report.)
1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
a. Enemy front line (or nearest elements).—Location and nature.
b. Defensive organization.—Trenches, emplacements, observation posts, command posts, obstacles, etc.
c. Units in contact.—Composition of units, with identifications if known; location of their flanks, estimated combat efficiency (strength, training, physical condition, morale, and other pertinent factors).
d. Artillery.—Location and calibers.
e. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention.—Location, strength, composition, dispositions, estimated combat efficiency, and where and when they probably can be employed.
f. Supply and evacuation establishments.—Location and nature.
2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
a. General summary—action of enemy forces as a whole.
b. Operations of component elements.
(1) Enemy Naval Operations.—Movements (by fleet or groups).
(2) Enemy Land Operations.
(*a*) Landings. (By areas. Each entry to show, for that area, the front lines and identifications).
(*b*) Operations of Land Components.
1. Antiaircraft artillery.
2. Antitank units.
3. Armored forces.
4. Artillery.
5. Aviation, combat.
6. Aviation, observation.
7. Parachute Troops.
8. Cavalry.
9. Chemical warfare.

10. Engineers.
11. Infantry.
12. Tanks.
13. Administrative elements.

c. Sabotage.

d. Miscellaneous.—Such enemy activities, movements or changes since last report as are not conveniently included in *b* above.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Estimated enemy casualties, including prisoners.

b. Morale.

c. Supply and equipment.

d. Terrain not under our control.

e. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation—observation, reconnaissance, prisoners and documents lost by us, inhabitants, etc.

f. Weather, visibility and surf, by areas.

g. Any enemy intelligence not specifically covered by headings of this report.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.—A discussion of each of the lines of action open to the enemy which may affect the accomplishment of our mission, in the order of their possible imminence. For each capability, the effect of time, space, terrain, present known dispositions, and other factors in the situation should be evaluated. The earliest estimated time at which the enemy can put each into effect should be stated. When applicable, the possible result of the adoption by the enemy of any capability should be included.

AC of S, G–2.

INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURE IN AVIATION UNITS

Form G

A form for

Periodic Intelligence Report

for

Air Combat Units

(Adapted to telegraph printer transmission)

Periodic Intelligence Report

From: (Date and hour)
To: (Date and hour)
Issuing unit
Place of issue
Date and hour of issue

1. ENEMY ACTIVITIES AIR.—(Appropriate resume.)
2. ENEMY ACTIVITIES GROUND.—(Appropriate resume.)
3. ENEMY ACTIVITIES NAVAL.—(Appropriate resume.)
4. OBJECTIVE FOLDERS DATA.—(Additions or changes giving serial number of folder in each case.)
5. IDENTIFICATIONS.—(Additions or changes in enemy units.)
6. ENEMY KNOWLEDGE OF OUR SITUATION.—(Brief estimate.)
7. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.—(list in priority of their probable adoption or, if no priority, so state.)
8. MISCELLANEOUS.—(Any items not covered by above.)

NOTE.—Information contained in previous intelligence reports will not be repeated; only changes or additions thereto. If no change has occurred under a given heading, the number of the paragraph only will be transmitted.

Inclosure No. 6.

ALLOWANCES OF ORDNANCE AMMUNITION PER WEAPON (OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT) FOR INITIAL ISSUE HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Weapon	Arm or service	No. of rds. per weapon			
		AP	Ball	Tracer	Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1903	CA	25	140	20	185
	Eng		40		40
	FA		32	8	40
	Inf	16	112	32	160
	(Rifle Plat.) Inf. (except Rifle Plat.)	4	28	8	40
	QM		40		40
	Sig		25		25
	Others	30	105	15	150
Rifle, US, cal. .30, M1	Eng	48	80	24	152
	Inf	24	162	46	232
	(Rifle Plat.) Inf. (except Rifle Plat.)	4	28	8	40
	Ord		64	16	80
	Sig		40		40
	MP		48		48
	Others	30	105	15	150
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30	CWS		460	120	580
	CA	60	560	60	680
	FA	960		240	1200
	Inf	60	992	120	1, 172
	Ord		240	60	300
	QM	30	30	20	80
	Others	150	525	75	750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4)	Eng	250	1, 500	250	2, 000
	Inf	500	3, 500	1, 000	5, 000
	Tanks or Armd. Cars	4, 800		1, 200	6, 000
Machine gun, cal. .30, WC (M1917A1)	CA	7, 200		1, 800	9, 000
	(AW Bn.) CA (except AW Bn.)	3, 600		900	4, 500
	Eng	250	1, 500	250	2, 000
	Inf	675	4, 725	1, 350	6, 750
	Others	600	2, 100	300	3, 000
Pistol, cal. .45	CWS, CA, Eng., Inf		28		28
	FA, Ord., QM, Sig., MP, others		21		21
Submachine gun, cal. .45	Sig. (motorcycles)		340		340
	Sig. (other than motorcycles)		250		250
	MP		440	110	550
	Others		240	60	300
Machine gun, cal. .50, WC (AA)	CA	5, 760		1, 440	7, 200
	(AW Bn.)				
	CA (except AW Bn.)	2, 880		720	3, 600
	Others	2, 880		720	3, 600
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB	FA	600		150	750
	Inf	960		240	1, 200
	Tanks or Armd. Cars	1, 568		392	1, 900
Shotgun	All				25K
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.).	Inf				150K
Signals, ground (asstd.)	Inf				25
	Sig. (Avn. or Wg. Co.)				5
	Sig. (Opn. or Tri. Div. Co.).				30
Lights, Very signal (assorted)	All				24
37mm gun, M1916				240	240
37mm gun, Antitank (M3)	FA	200			200
	Inf	180		20	200
37mm gun, Antiaircraft	CA	180		1, 620	1, 800
60mm Mortar	Inf			120	120
81mm, or 3" Trench Mortar	Inf		Light.	132	1
			Heavy	18	
75mm gun, Truck-D	All				#459
75mm gun, Antitank	FA				#144
105mm How	FA				#205
155mm How	FA				#117
3" AA mobile	CA	15		285	300
90mm AA mobile	CA	12		238	250
3" AA fixed	CA			300	300
155mm gun, M1918M1	All			100	100
240mm How. M1918	FA			60	60
8" Ry. Gun	CA	85			85

Inclosure No. 6—Continued

Weapon	Arm or service	No. of rds. per weapon			
		AP	Ball	Tracer	Total
FIXED SEACOAST ARTILLERY					
3"gun, M1903				505	505
6" gun		1,000			1,000
8" gun		350		200	550
12" gun (Barbette Carriage)		335			335
12" gun (Disappearing Carriage)		275			275
12" Mortar		300			300
14" gun		280			280
16" gun		250			250

Notes: Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not avialable in Haw. Dept.
Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.
Proportions of types (Shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and normal charge HE) will be shown on requisitions kept on file at the designated supply points.

Inclosure No. 7.

UNIT OF FIRE (OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT)—HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Weapon	No. rds. for one (1) unit of fire				
	AP	Ball	Tracer	HE	Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1 or M1903	30	105	15		150
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30	150	525	75		750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4) (other than combat vehicle).	150	525	75		750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A2 or A4) (combat vehicle).	600		150		750
Machine gun, cal. .30 (M1917–17A1)	600	2,100	300		3,000
Pistol, cal. .45		20			20
Submachine gun, cal. .45		160	40		200
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB	720		180		900
Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (except in Gun Batteries).	1,920		480		2,400
Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (in Gun Batteries)	960		240		1,200
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.)					150
Projector, signal ground (assorted)					25
Pistol, Very, MkIII					24
37mm gun, M1916				120	120
37mm gun, antitank, M3	84			36	120
37mm gun, antiaircraft	60			540	600
60mm Mortar				400	400
81mm Mortar			Light	234	300
			Heavy	66	
3" Trench Mortar					300
75mm Field Gun			Super	36	300
			Normal	150	
			Reduced	114	
75mm gun, antitank	111			39	150
105mm How				225	225
155mm How. M1918				150	150
3" AA gun, mobile	15			285	300
90mm AA gun, mobile	12			238	250
3" AA gun, fixed				300	300
155mm gun, M1918 MI	112			38	150
240mm How. M1918				60	60
8" Ry Gun	85				85
4" Chemical Mortar					200
4.2" Chemical Mortar					200

Notes: Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.
Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

Inclosure No. 8

LOAD OF AIRCRAFT AMMUNITION PER AIRPLANE

Type airplane	Bombers			Pursuit			OBS. (C&D)
Item	Hv. (B17D)	Med. (B-18)	Lt. (A20A)	(P-40)	(P36A)	(P-26)	1-engine (O-47)
Ctg. AP Cal 30							
Ctg. ball Cal 30	480	1,280	1,920	1,600	400	800	640
Ctg. tr Cal 30	120	320	480	400	100	200	160
Total Cal 30#	600	1,600	2,400	2,000	500	1,000	800
Ctg. AP Cal 50	60			20	10		
Ctg. ball Cal 50	900			300	150		
Ctg. tr Cal 50	240			80	40		
Total Cal 50#	1,200			400	200		
BOMBS							
Bomb frag. 30# and			40			10	
Bomb Demo. 100# or	20	32	12				
Bomb Demo. 300# or	14	14	4				
Bomb Demo. 500-600# or	8	6	2				
Bomb Demo. 1,000#1,100# or	6	4	1				
Bomb Demo. 2,000#	4	2					
PYROTECHNICS							
Bomb Photoflash	[1] 4	[1] 4					[1] 4
Flare M26 [2]	3	3	1				1
Flare M9	6	6	6				5
Sig. AC Asstd	20	20	20				20
Sig. Drift	10	7					

[1] For Reconnaissance squadrons only.
[2] Flare M8A1 used as temporary substitute on the basis of 2-M8 or M8A1 flares per M26 flare.

[CORRECTED COPY]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 10 December 1941

Subject: Coordination of Traffic Control. (Paragraph 9*h* (TENTATIVE) added to SOP HD.)

To: Distribution: Special, and Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H.

1. The attention of all commanders is directed to provisions of Paragraphs 27 and 9*f*, SOP HD, 5 November 1941, repeated below:

"27. *Traffic*: The Department Provost Marshal, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will regulate traffic on OAHU.

"9. *f*. Motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders, will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others. *Standard blackout light or approved modifications are authorized for use at all times and all places during hours of darkness on vehicles carrying military personnel on a military mission.* On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic."

2. The following additional instructions are published for the strict compliance of all troops in this Department:

Paragraph 9*h* (TENTATIVE), SOP HD.

(1) The civil police (special and regular) and the Military Police will have COMPLETE and EXCLUSIVE control of traffic on the island of OAHU with the following exceptions:

a. Guards on entrances to vital installations operating under special instructions.

b. In case of accidents or other emergencies.

(2) Route markers are authorized for tactical or convoy movements.
(3) Except in case of military necessity and except as otherwise hereinafter provided, the present civil regulations relating to traffic shall remain in force.
(4) Only such military and civilian personnel as are actually needed on defense work, public utilities, and conducting emergency work or on a military mission will be authorized to operate motor vehicles on the highways between 1800 and 0600 (6:00 P. M. and 6:00 A. M.), tactical movements excepted. In this connection, contractors' trucks working on 24 hour basis on approved defense projects will not be delayed. All cars authorized to operate between the above hours (6:00 P. M. to 6:00 A. M.) shall have standard blackout, or blue lights using Moss Blackout Blue Paint (quick-drying) or its equivalent.
(5) All modified lights must conform to a standard pattern and be visible for a distance of not to exceed 100 feet.
(6) The Military Police assisted by the civil police, will approve and check modified blackout lights and will not permit modified lights to be used that do not conform to the standard of blackout lighting equipment, as pertains to visibility from the air. Special instructions and detailed specifications will be issued later by the Provost Marshal.
(7) Persons operating vehicles at night without approved blackout lights will be arrested promptly.
(8) Parking is prohibited on the following streets in Honolulu:

School Street
Lusitania Street
Beretania Street
King Street
Waialae Street
Dillingham Boulevard
Middle Street
Nuuanu Avenue
Alapai Street between Lusitania and Beretania
Iwilei Road between King and railroad tracks
Queen Street on mauka side between Iwilei Road and Fort Street

(9) During air raids all vehicles are prohibited from operating, except the following:
a. Military vehicles on a military mission.
b. Civilian police cars.
c. Certain civilian vehicles specifically authorized by the Provost Marshal. All other operators will halt their vehicles off the main roads or streets where they will remain until authorized to be moved by the police (civil or military) or until ALL CLEAR is given.
(10) Immediate action will be taken by all commanders to insure that their personnel are informed of the above contents.
(11) The cooperation of all personnel, civil and military, is directed.
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
WILLIAM E. DONEGAN,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION: Special, plus 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H., plus 500 for file w/SOP.

[CORRECTED COPY]

(Please destroy all previous copies)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Forward Echelon,
0500 17 December 1941.

Subject: Coordination of Traffic Control (Corrections to Par 9 *f* and 9 *h* (tentative) SOP-HD)
To: Distribution, Special, plus one to each holder of SOP–HD and Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H.

1. Reference letter, HHD, Corrected copy, subject "Coordination of traffic control", dated 10 December 1941, SOP-HD is further corrected as follows:
a. "9 *f.* Motor vehicles operating at night at the discretion of local commanders, will be:

"(1) in convoy with Standard Blackout lights or *approved modifications* with tail light shielded or painted all blue, on all vehicles, or,

"(2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout lights or *approved modifications* on the leading vehicle and a tail light shielded or painted all blue on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others.

"(3) Standard blackout lights or approved modifications are authorized for use at all times and all places during hours of darkness on vehicles carrying military personnel on a military mission.

"(4) On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.

"(5) All motor vehicles not having standard blackout lighting equipment shall have modified lights conforming to the following specifications:

"Headlights to be painted all black with the exception of a two and one-half inch circle, slightly below the center of the headlight lens. This circle will be painted with Moss Blackout Blue paint (quick-drying) or equivalent. Tail lights will be shielded or painted all blue. Sufficient coats of the Blackout Blue paint will be used to insure that the "modified lights" conform to the standard of blackout lighting equipment, as pertains to visibility from the air."

b. Par 9 h (tentative), sup-par 4, changed to read as follows:

"(4) only such military and civilian personnel as are actually needed on defense work, public utilities, and conducting emergency work or on a military mission will be authorized to operate motor vehicles on the highways between 1800 and 0600 (6:00 PM and 6:00 AM), tactical movements except. In this connection, contractors' trucks working on 24 hour basis on approved defense projects will not be delayed. All cars authorized to operate between the above hours (6:00 PM to 6:00 AM) shall have standard blackout lights or "approved modifications" using Moss Blackout Blue paint (quick-drying) or its equivalent and with tail light shielded or painted all blue."

c. Par 9 *h* (tentative) sub-paragraph (5) deleted.

d. Par 9 *h* (tentative) sub-paragraph (6) delete the last sentence which reads as follows: "Special instruction and detailed specifications will be issued later by the Provost Marshal."

2. The above corrections will be made on all copies of the corrected SOP–HD (see corrected copy of letter, same subject, HHD, dated 10 Dec 1941).

By command of Lieutenant General EMMONS:

J. LAWTON COLLINS,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
Wm. Donegan
WILLIAM E. DONEGAN,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G–3.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 10 December 1941.

Subject: Air Raid Alarm Instructions. (Paragraph 11 *b*, *c*, *d*, *e* and *f* (TENTATIVE) added to SOP HD.)

To: Distribution Special, Plus 90 to Navy and 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H.

1. Paragraph 11, SOP HD, is repeated below and changed by inserting paragraph *a* and adding paragraphs *b*, *c*, *d*, *e* and *f*.

"11. Installations and Alarm System.—*a.* All important installations not protected by the Territorial Home Guard will be guarded by troops. An adequate alarm system will be established in connection therewith."

b. (1) A general Air Raid Alarm will be started by sounding a long blast on the siren in the Aloha Tower. Orders for such Air Raid Alarm will be given only by the Air Corps Warning Service Information Center by direct communication with the Navy Detail at the Aloha Tower.

(2) This alarm will immediately be taken up by units, small groups, patrols and individuals who will immediately sound the alarm by a continuous blast on their alarm equipment until it is picked up and relayed by adjacent groups. Usually one (1) minute duration should be sufficient.

(3) Alarm equipment is listed below and will be used for no other purpose except in connection with Air Raid Alarm and recall therefrom or All Clear Signals.

(*a*) Siren on Aloha Tower.
(*b*) Stewart type Klaxon Horn.
(*c*) Ambulance sirens.
(*d*) Fire truck sirens.
(*e*) Police sirens.
(*f*) All other sirens not covered above.

c. The "Recall from Air Raid Alarm" or "All Clear Signal" will be relayed by the alarm equipment indicated above, starting with the siren on the Aloha Tower, on instructions from the Air Corps Warning Service Information Center. The signal will be "broken short blasts" repeated until relayed by adjacent units.

d. In addition to the above signals, Air Raid Alarms and "All Clear" instructions will be announced over teletype networks, relayed over tactical communication nets, and announced over KGNB and KGU.

e. The above Air Raid Alarm signals will not be given except as indicated above unless units are actually attacked by enemy aircraft.

f. The above Air Raid Alarms and All Clear Signals will be relayed to the District Commanders of the outlying islands by the Department Signal Officer.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
Wm. Donegan,
WILLIAM E. DONEGAN,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G–3.

DISTRIBUTION: Special, plus 90 to Navy and 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H., 500 for file w/SOP.

HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Fort Shafter, T. H.
11 April 1941

HEADQUARTERS
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H.
11 April 1941

[Exhibit D]

[SECRET]

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

SECTION I—DIRECTIVES

[*Extract*]

* * * * * * *

3. *Method of coordination.* The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9*b*.

* * * * * * *

18. *Navy.* The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

* * * * * * *

i. Distant reconnaissance.

* * * * * * *

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF–41 (JCD–42) supercedes HCE–39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos.

I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan.

(Signed) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,
Commanding,
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch
C. C. BLOCH
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commandant,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

True Extract Copy:
O. M. Cutler
O. M. CUTLER
Lt. Col., Infantry

[Exhibit E]

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT;
Fort Shafter, T. H., 20 March 1941.

JOINT AIR OPERATIONS:—To be included as a part of Annex No. VII, HCF-39, (14-ND-JCD 13) RCT, Joint Security Measures for the protection of the PACIFIC FLEET and PEARL HARBOR BASE, (now in preparation).

When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

1. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

2. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control.

3. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

4. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

Approved: 21 March, 1941

(sgd) C. C. Bloch
C. C. BLOCH
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commandant
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

(sgd) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

True Copy: O. M. Cutler
O. M. CUTLER
Lt. Col., Infantry

[Exhibit F]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

CHIEF OF STAFF
War Department, Washington DC

Reurad four seven two twenty seventh report department alerted to prevent sabotage period liaison with Navy

SHORT

Enc sec by
Lt Jos Engelberts SC
5:40 P 27 Nov 41

True copy
O. M. Cutler
O M CUTLER,
Lt Col Infantry

[Exhibit G]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

Signature and Title

114 War Kr 189 WD PRTY
C G

WASHN, D. C., 842 *Nov 28, 1941.*

Hawn Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.

482 28th critical situation demands that all precaution be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren see paragraph three mid sc thirty dash forty five end paren stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions

ADAMS

True copy
O. M. Cutler
O. M. CUTLER
Lt col Infantry

[Exhibit H]

[CONFIDENTIAL]

[*Extract*—MID-SR 30-45]

3. DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITY. *a.* (1) By direction of the President, investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters are controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of the Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. In accordance with this directive, the War Department assumes responsibility for the investigation of officers, enlisted men, and civilians employed on military reservations or under military control. Similar personnel of the naval establishment is covered by Naval Intelligence. The investigation of other civilians suspected of subversive activities, except in certain overseas possessions, is the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, hereinafter referred to as the F. B. I.

(2) Cooperation with the agencies of Naval Intelligence and the F. B. I. will be effected by appropriate echelons of our CS system, to the end that full protection may be obtained without duplication of effort.

b. Corps Area and Department Commanders are charged with the supervision of countersubversive operations, in accordance commands, including those of exempted stations and tactical units temporarily present, except the activities coordinated by the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff.

True Extract Copy
O. M. Cutler
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col., Infantry

[Exhibit I]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

---------- (date)

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.
This message is Priority

/sgd/Thomas H. Green,
THOMAS H. GREEN,
Lt. Col. J. A. G. D.,
Department Judge Advocate.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of war department paren paragraph three mid SC thirty dash forty five end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment stop as regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in effect comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection etc stop pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish and continued to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures in the territory stop pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations stop in this connection comma at the instigation of this Headquarters the City and County of Honolulu on June Thirtieth Nineteen Forty One enacted an ordnance which permits The Commanding General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and County of Honolulu comma whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of National Defense stop the authority thus given has not yet been exercised stop relations with F B I and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters

SHORT

Enc Sec by
LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC
Lt Jos Engelbertz SC
2:45 P 29 Nov 41
True copy

O. M. Cutler,
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt Col Infantry

[Exhibit J]

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER

Fort Shafter, T. H., 20 December, 1941.

In reply refer to:
Sig.
Subject: Detector Operation.
To: Department Signal Officer.

1. On November 27, 1941, after conference with Assistant Chief of Staff G–3, and receiving instructions to operate all mobile detectors from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn, I, as Acting Department Signal Officer, gave immediate instructions to Captain TETLEY, Commanding Officer of the Aircraft Warning Company, to initiate the above detector operation so long as Alert No. 1 was in force.

2. The detectors in question operated daily thereafter during the prescribed period except when having occasional operational trouble. In addition, the six detector stations operated daily except Sundays from 7:00 A. M. until 11:00 A. M. for routine training. Daily except Saturday and Sunday, the hours 12:00 noon until 4:00 P. M. were devoted to training and maintenance work.

W. H. MURPHY,
Lt. Col, Sig C.

True Copy:
O. M. Cutler
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col., Infantry.

[Exhibit K]

SECRET

HICKAM FIELD, T. H.
20 December 1941.

AFFIDAVIT

I, JAMES A MOLLISON, certify that during the period 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941 the Navy made no requests to the Hawaiian Air Force for in shore or long range aerial reconnaissances.

JAS. A. MOLLISON,
Lt. Col., A. C.,
H. A. F. C/S.

True Copy:
O. M. Cutler
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col., Infantry.

[Exhibit L]

CERTIFICATE

I certify that on November 27, 1941, I accompanied General Short and General Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the defenses of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows:

Admiral Kimmel: McMorris what is your idea of the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu.

Captain McMorris: I should say *none* Admiral.

JAMES A. MOLLISON,
Lieut. Colonel, A. C.

True Copy:
O. M. Cutler,
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col., Infantry

[Exhibit M]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

RCA 831 US GOVT

WASHINGTON, DC *Nov 26 1941* L149P

COMMANDING GENERAL,
Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, TH.
Four six five twenty sixth

Reference two B Dash Twenty four airplanes for special photo mission Stop It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the Caroline Group Jaluit in the Marshall Group Stop Visual reconnaissance should be made simultaneously Stop Information desired as to the number and location of naval vessels including submarines Comma airfields Comma aircraft Comma guns Comma barracks and camps Stop Pilots should be warned islands strongly fortified and manned Stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity Stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed Stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self preservation Stop The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice Stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great Comma suggest one B dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake Comma Then Philippines by usual route photographing Ponape while enroute Moresby Stop Advise pilots best time of day for photographic Truk and Jaluit Stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur Comma Admiral Hart Comma Admiral Kimmel Comma the chief of naval operations Comma and the War Department Stop *Insure that both B dash twenty four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu.*

ADAMS

Decoded by: Lt. G E Haven SC, 147A November 27, 1941.
True copy:
O. M. Cutler
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col., Infantry.

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 465—26th

[Exhibit N]

(Copy)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority.

/s/ CHENEY L. BERTHOLF,
Lt. Col., A. G. D.
Adjutant General.

Approved for Transmission:
/s/ O. M. MCDOLE,
Major A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES,
Washington, D. C.

Reference secret photographic mission of two B twenty fours stop One of B twenty fours Lieutenant Faulkner which landed Hickam Field this date short following equipment considered essential to safety and success of mission colon

fifty caliber machine guns comma mounts comma adapters and accessories for upper hemisphere semicolon fifty caliber tunnel gun comma adapter and accessories semicolon for starboard and port sides semicolon second thirty caliber nose gun comma adapter and accessories stop Guns can be removed from our equipment and ammuntion is available stop Strongly recommend that second B twenty four bring necessary equipment from mainland for installation on both planes prior their departure from Hickam Field stop Plane being held here until satisfactorily armed subject plane has no armor plate installation stop Except for removal of passenger seats plane equipped as for ferry service North Atlantic signed Martin HAF 141 C

SHORT.

Enc sec by Lt. G. E. Haven, S. C. 225P 5 Dec/41
A True Copy
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2d Lt. F. A.

[Exhibit O]

20 DECEMBER 1941.

CERTIFICATE

On the morning of 7 December, 1941, the 18th Wing had 6 B-17s in commission, with 6 B-17s out of commission for maintenance. Of the 8 B-17s destroyed during the attack, 4 were from those stationed at Hickam Field, 2 from those in commission and 2 from those out of commission. The other 4 were lost while attempting to land upon arrival from the Mainland. These B-17s arrived at Hickam Field between 8:00 A. M. and 8:20 A. M., 7 December, 1941. These planes took off from Hamilton Field, California in two squadrons, one at 9:30 P. M. December 6, Pacific time (12:30 A. M. December 7, Eastern time) and the other at 10:30 P. M. December 6, Pacific time (1:30 A. M. Eastern time).

Of the 8 B-17s which arrived safely from the mainland, none had sufficient gasoline to permit dispatching them on missions, nor were they equipped with ammunition for these defensive armament. Machine guns were still cosmolined and had not been bore sighted. Ferry crews were skeletonized, consisting of pilot, copilot, navigator, engineer and radio operator. Such crews were incapable of manning all gun positions even if the guns had been properly prepared for combat and supplied with ammunition.

The B-24 which arrived at Hickam Field on 5th December, 1941, previous to the attack, had insufficient armament for combat, only 1 .30 cal. and twin .50 cal. guns in the tail, and was without ammunition for the guns that were installed.

JAMES A. MOLLISON,
Lieut. Colonel, A. C.

True Copy
O. M. Cutler,
O. M. CULTER,
Lt. Col. Infantry.

[Exhibit P]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

1549ws Washington D C 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P
C G
Hawn Dept Ft Shafter TH

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one pm eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop inform naval authorities of this communication

MARSHALL.

Decoded by: Lt. J. H. Babcock 251P Dec. 7, 1941
Code Message No. 529 7th
True Copy
O. M. Cutler,
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col. Infantry.

[Exhibit Q]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

P 4 war L 54 WD 1 Extra Urgent

WASHINGTON DC 219P DEC 9 1941.

C G

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter TH

Five four nine ninth Please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what staff office received

COLTON
Acting.

Decoded by: Lt L G Forbes SC 910AM Dec 9 1941
True Copy
O M Cutler
O M CUTLER
Lt Col Infantry.

[Exhibit R]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,
Washington, D. C.

Re your five four nine radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning seventh stop Received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren stop Deciphered message received by Adjutant General HQ HAW dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh

SHORT

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR 380-5).

Form H. D. No. 1173 (Revised)—2892 Honolulu 10-31-41 10M.

[Exhibit S]

Copy SECRET
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.
Territory of Hawaii, ss:

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Grover C. White, Jr. O-396182, 2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison Officer the AWS agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two hours before until one hour after dawn. The first schedule required operation of all stations from 4 A. M. to 6 P. M. This schedule was modified to the hours of 4 A. M. to 4 P. M. A temporary schedule was next devised which required all stations to operate from 4 A. M. to 11 A. M. and to have "staggered" operation, i. e., 3 stations from 11 A. M. to 1 P. M., the remaining 3 stations from 1 P. M. to 4 P. M. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all stations operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941; this was agreed to by the Control Officer.

2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Wichas, SCAWH, acting RDF Officer, reports that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the information

received by the AWS Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M. Sunday, December 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, who was the only officer in the Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M.

3. At approximately 7:20 A. M. a report was received from a Detector station at Opana that a large number of planes was approaching Oahu on a course North 3 degrees East at a distance of approximately 132 miles. This information was mmediatzly transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc. Joseph McDonald to Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opana about the flight. The statement of Pfc. Joseph McDonald, SCAWH, the switchboard operator is attached.

4. The Navy Liaison Officer's position within the Information Center was not manned when I reached the Information Center at about 8:20 A. M. This position was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. Stouffer, SCAWH, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 P. M. when the position was taken over by Naval Officers.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

/s/ GROVER C. WHITE, JR.,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of Dec. A. D. 1941 at Fort Shafter, T. H.

/s/ ADAM R. HUGGINS,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.
Territory of Hawaii, ss:

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Joseph P. McDonald, 13006145, Pvt 1cl, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

I was on duty as telephone operator at the AWS Information Center on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. I received a telephone call from Opana at 7:20 A. M. stating that a large number of planes were heading towards Oahu from North 3 points east. I gave the information to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, 78th Pursuit Squadron, Wheeler Field, T. H. and the Lieutenant talked with private Lockard at the Opana Station. Lt Tyler said that it wasn't anything of importance. At that time the planes were 132 miles out. I asked if we shouldn't advise Corporal Beatty and have the plotters come back. The Opana Unit stressed the fact that it was a very large number of planes and they seemed excited. Lt. Tyler said that it was not necessary to call the plotters or get in touch with anyone.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

JOSEPH P. MCDONALD,
Sig. Co., Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of December A. D. 1941 at Fort Shafter, T. H.

ADAM R. HUGGINS,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps.
Summary Court.

True copy:
O. M. Cutler,
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col., Infantry.

STATEMENT OF LIEUT. KERMIT A. TYLER

20 DECEMBER 1941.

On Wednesday, 3 December 1941, I was first detailed to learn the operation of the plotting board in the Interception Control Center. I reported for duty at 1210, just as the crew on duty was leaving. I spoke with Lt. White, Signal Corps, a few minutes and he showed me the operating positions for Navy, Bombardment, Antiaircraft, Controller's position and Aircraft Warning Service. I remained on duty until 1600. Only a telephone operator was on duty with me.

On Sunday, 7 December 1941, I was on duty from 0400 to 0800 as Pursuit Officer at the Interception Control Center. From 0400 until approximately 0610 there were no plots indicated on the interception board. From that time until 0700 a number of plots appeared on the control board at various points surrounding the Island of Oahu. I particularly remember at least one plot South of Kauai and I believe there was on South of Molokai. There were two plots at some distance North of Oahu and which I remember seeing on the historical record. At the time, I questioned the plotter of the historical record who stated that he makes a record of all plots as they come in. There were a number of plots over and around the Island of Oahu. Having seen the plotters work once before with about the same general layout, this did not seem irregular to me. At 0700 all of the men except the telephone operator folded up their equipment and left. At about 0720 the operator at the Opana RDF Station called me and said that the instrument indicated a large number of planes at 132 miles to the North. Thinking it must be a returning naval patrol, a flight of Hickam Field Bombing planes, or possibly a flight of B–17 planes from the coast, I dismissed it as nothing unusual. (It is common knowledge that when Honolulu radio stations are testing by playing Hawaiian Music throughout the night that coincidentally B–17s are apt to come in using the station for radio-direction finding. The radio station was testing on the morning of 7 December, 0230–0400). At about 0750 I heard some airplanes outside and looking toward Pearl Harbor saw what I thought to be a navy practicing dive bombing runs. At a little after 0800, Sergeant Eugene Starry, A. C. Wheeler Field, called me to tell me that Wheeler Field had been attacked. I immediately had the telephone operator call all men back to duty. Most of the men had returned to duty by 0820 when Major L. N. Tindal arrived and took charge of the Control Center. I remained on duty assisting Major K. P. Bergquist and Major L. N. Tindal as Pursuit Control Officer until about 1615, 8 December 1941, with the exception of rest periods from 2000 to 2400, 7 December, and 0600 to 1000, 8 December.

(s) Kermit A. Tyler,
KERMIT A. TYLER,
1st Lieut., Air Corps.

True copy:
O. M. Cutler,
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col. Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS 53RD COAST ARTILLERY BRIGADE (AA),
OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 20 December 1941.

Subject: Report on action by 53d C. A. Brigade (AA) from 0755 to 2400, 7 December 1941.
To: General Short.

1. At the beginning of the attack on Oahu 7 December 1941, the 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) was operating under the conditions of Alert No. 1, S. O. P., N. C. A. C., 26 November 1941. The 97th C. A. and the AA Detachments of the East Group had anti-sabotage guards at their fixed 3-inch gun Batteries. All anti-aircraft equipment was being guarded.

2. *a. Fort Weaver.* Headquarters 2nd Battalion 97th C. A. (AA).
Alerted 0810
Ready to fire 0813
Engaged enemy at 0814
Amm. fired: 407—.30 Cal. ball.
117—.30 Cal. A. P.
53—.30 Cal. Tracer.
12—Pistol.

South Group Command Post detail at stations at 0810. NO repeat NO interruption in communications in South Group during this period. There was rifle and automatic rifle fire on low flying enemy planes by officers and men.

Battery G 97th, were in camp at Fort Weaver. Its battle position is at fixed battery at Fort Weaver.
Alerted at 0810
Ready to fire 0830
Engaged enemy 0830
Fired 30 rds—3" A. A. Shrapnel. Approximately 200 rds of .30 Cal. ball Amm. One .50 Cal. Machine Gun was in action at approximately 8:40 A. M. During this firing Private YORK gunner was wounded while engaging the enemy, he stayed at his post although ordered to take cover. Lieutenant KING states that the battery fire broke up and definitely turned back one formation of 15 enemy planes. Casualties—One (1) Officer dead - Killed while proceeding through Hickam Field to his battle position. Four (4) enlisted men wounded.
(Basic: Ltr., Hq. 53d C. A. Brigade (AA), dated 20 December 1941. Subject: "Report on action by 53d C. A. Brigade (AA) from 0755 to 2400, 7 Dec. 1941".)

Battery F 97th, was camped at Fort Weaver. Its battle position at Fixed Battery Closson, Fort Kamehameha, T. H.
Alerted 0755, and moved to Battery position across Pearl Harbor Entrance.
Ready to fire 0855
Engaged Enemy 0900 to 0920
Amm. fired: 27—3" A. A., H. E., M. K. fuse M3.
Approximately 400 rds .30 Cal. ball.
Approximately 150 rds .30 Cal. A. P.

Battery G 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shafter, battle position at Ahua Point.
Alerted approximately 0815, and moved to battery position at Fort Kamehameha.
Ready to fire 1030
Engaged Enemy with .30 Cal. M. G. at 1030
Amm. Fired: Approximately 50 rds of .30 Cal. ball.

Battery H 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shafter. Its battle position is at Fort Weaver.
Alerted 0830
Ready to fire 1145
Engaged Enemy 2100
Amm. fired: 40 rds—.50 Cal. ball.
40 rds—.50 Cal. A. P.
30 rds—.50 Cal. Tracer

Marine detachment: The Fleet Machine Gun School at Fort Weaver. Operations were in cooperation with South Group although not tactically assigned.
Alerted 0800
Ready to fire 0810
Engaged Enemy 0810
Amm. fired: Approximately 8000 rds of .50 Cal. A. P. ball and tracer.
Approximately 450 rds of 20 mm A. A.

This Detachment shot down 4 enemy planes and saved a 4 engined bomber by causing enemy plane firing on it's tail to pull out and cease it's attack. Much shrapnel and some small arms bullets fell about Fleet M. G. School. There was excellent cooperation from Fort Weaver personnel in the liaison, phone, etc.

b. 98th Coast Artillery, Schofield Barracks.
Alerted at 0800

The communications section at the Command Post, Wahiawa, shot down one enemy plane flying at less than 100 feet, with their automatic rifles at 0855.

1st Battalion 98th C. A. (AA), was in position and ready for action at the following time:

B—98: 0955
D—98: 1000
C—98: 1030

Battery M 64th, stationed at Fort Shafter, was alerted at 0815, moved to Wheeler Field, and was ready for action at 1155.

2nd Battalion 98th C. A. (AA). This Battalion has two batteries at Kaneohe and one at Waipahu School. They were in position and ready for action at the following times:

F—98: 1315
G—98: 1315
H—98: 1330

c. Camp Malakole 251st C. A. (AA). All units were alerted at 0805 when fired upon by a single enemy plane. All units returned the fire with small arms and the plane was shot down.

1st Battalion 251st C.A. (AA), was in position and ready for action as follows:

B—251: at West Loch, 1145
C—251: Ewa Beach, 1145
D—251: South of Ewa, 1145

2nd Battalion 251st C. A. (AA), was in position as follows:

E—251: Navy Yard
F—251: Navy Recreation Area
G—251: Tank Farm
H—251: Navy Yard

At 1120 and again at 1122, E, 251st fired on enemy planes, shooting down one plane. 100 rds of .50 Cal. were fired on the first plane and 200 rds of .50 Cal. were fired on the second plane.

d. Fort Kamehameha. Battery A, 97th C. A. (AA) fired 1500 rds of .30 Cal. at one enemy plane offshore at 0835.

e. Sand Island. The AA Detachment of Battery F, 55th C. A., present at Sand Island when the attack started was ready for action at 0815. This battery fired 89 rds of 3" AA and shot down two (2) enemy planes at 0815.

f. Fort Shafter.

(1) Three (3) enemy dive bombers were fired on by the Headquarters Battery and the Intelligence Battery of this Brigade and by Battery E, 64th C. A. (AA). Ammunition Expended—3,000 .30 Cal.

(2) Enemy planes were fired on at 0900 and 1000 by Battery A, 64th C. A. (AA). Ammunition Expended—1000 .30 Cal.

(3) All 3" gun batteries and Automatic Weapons batteries of the 64th C. A. (AA) were alerted at 0815 and were in position as follows:

B—64: at Aiea, 1000
C—64: at Aliamanu, 1030
D—64: South of Aliamanu, 1100
F—64: at Pearl City, 1105
G—64: See Par. 2 *a*, above.
H—64: See Par. 2 *a*, above.
I—64: at Aliamanu
K—64: at Hickam Field
L—64: at Hickam Field.
M—64: See Par. 2 *b*, above.

All of these units except M, 64th fired during the second attack from 1000 to 1145. Ammunition expended as follows:

3", 23 rds.
.50 Cal., 2361 rds.
.30 Cal., 2821 rds.

g. Fort Barrette. Battery H, 97 C. A. (AA), was stationed at Fort Weaver. The battery was alerted at 0755, moved out of Fort Weaver at 0830, and arrived at Fort Barrette at 0910. Enemy planes were engaged by small arms fire at Fort Weaver, while enroute, and at Fort Barrette. The detachment on guard at Fort Barrette shot down one enemy plane at 0910 by small arms fire.

3. Three (3) Marine AA Batteries were attached to the Brigade at 2245.

4. *Ammunition.* Status at 0730, 7 December 1941. All units of the Brigade had in their possession, the initial issue of small arms ammunition. This included ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns. In addition,

the 3-inch ammunition was so positioned that it was readily accessible to all units of the Brigade except four (4) batteries for which ammunition was at Aliamanu Crater. These batteries completed drawing their initial allowance, 1200 rounds per battery, by 1015.

C. K. Wing
C. K. WING,
Colonel, 53d C. A. Brigade (AA), Commanding.

[Exhibit T]

Status of aircraft of 7 December 1941 before attack—Continued

HICKAM FIELD

Name	Total	Out	In
A-20 A	13	7	6
B-17 D	12	6	6
B-18	32	12	20
B-12 A	2	2	0
O-47 B	1	1	0
BT 2 BR	2	0	0
BT-2 CR	1	0	1
C-33	2	0	2
A-12	3	1	2
P-26 A	2	2	0
P-26 B	1	1	0
B-24	1	1	0
	72	33	39

BELLOWS FIELD

O-47 B	10	6	4
O-49	3	1	2

WHEELER FIELD

P40 C	13	100	4	9	64
P40 B	87		32	55	
P 36 A	44		24		20
P 26A	8—14		1—4		7—10
P 26B	6		3		3
B 18	1		0		1
B 12	3		2		1
AT 6	4		1		3
OA 9	3		0		3
O 47B	1		0		1
A 12A	2		0		2
OA 8	1		0		1
VT 2	2		2		0

Type	Damaged in raid	Percent of damage
HICKAM FIELD:		
A-20	2	18
B-17	10	40
B-18	21	65
B-24	1	100
WHEELER FIELD:		
P-40	67	65
P-36	21	55
BELLOWS FIELD:		
O-47	4	40
O-49	2	66

James A. Mollison
Lt. Col. A. C.

A true copy
Edward von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN
2nd Lt. F. A.

Aircraft status as of 1800, 20 December 1941

	B-17	B-18	A-20	P-40	P-36	O-47
In Commission	31	9	10	40	21	5
1st Echelon	6	5	.....	2	3	2
2nd Echelon	.....	.....	.....	3	.....	.....
3rd Echelon	2	.....	.....	8	6	.....
Total	[1] 39	14	10	53	30	7

12 B-17 on hand Hickam 0600-7 Dec.

[1] 29 B-17s arrived from the Mainland from 7 Dec. to 20 Dec. inclusive.

JAMES A. MOLLISON,
Lt. Col. A. C.

A true copy
Edward von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN
2nd Lt. F. A.

[Exhibit U]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,
Forward Echelon, 21 December 1941.

MEMORANDUM TO LIEUT COL. KENDALL J. FIELDER.

The following report of planes shot down, crashing or otherwise destroyed in the attack on Oahu, 7 December 1941, is submitted for your information. All of these losses have as yet not been verified, and it is very likely that some of the reports from different sources will be in reference to the same plane. Verifications are being received daily:

Time	Source	Details	Remarks	Total
0800-1000	6 officers from emergency landing field at Haleiwa.	Accounted for 10 planes	Some of these may appear in other reports.	10
	CO Mil District of Kauai.	1 plane crashed off North shore, 1 wrecked on Niihau.	Verified	2
	Civilian report	1 plane crashed in Gulch, rear Aiea Hgts.	Verified	1
	Group of officers on fishing trip.	3 planes crashing in Honolulu Harbor.	Verified	3
0940	Capt. Ebby, "B" Btry 55th C. A. C.	2 planes destroyed by machine-gun fire.	Verified	2
0922-1130	Btry "F", 55 CAC	2 planes	0922 report not verified, 1130 rpt verfd.	2
0805	251st C. A. C	1 plane, 200 yds. off Malikoli	Verified	1
1020	Btry "H" 97th CAC	1 plane crashed flaming 2 mi. SW Ft. Barrette.	.....	1
0855	98th C. A. C	1 plane shot down near Wahiawa.	Verified	1
0830	Hq. Btry 15th CAC	1 plane crashed in Ord shops at Ft. Kam.	Verified	1
1100	35th Infantry	Observed 1 plane crash in sea SW Barbers Pt.	Verified	1
	27th Infantry	Observed 1 plane crash in cane field nr Aiea.	Not verf	1
	298th Inf	1 plane shot down over Bellows Fld. fell in sea.	Verified	1
	24th Division	1 plane down at Brody Camp #4:1 nr Kaawa.	Verified	2
	Haw. Air Force	1 plane at Ft Weaver 1 at Wheeler Field, 1 at Hickam Field, 1 at Pearl Harbor, 1 at Ft Barrette, 1 at Ewa. Witnessed 1 shot down back of Naval Hospital.	2 doubtful	7
	Navy	1 plane by AA at Beckoning Pt, 1 on deck of a ship.	Verified	2
	Total	.....	.....	38

The Navy reports are not available.

T. H. DAVIES,
Lt. Col., Inf, Asst. A. C. of S., G-2.

REMARKS: While some of the planes enumerated are undoubtedly duplications it is believed that a minimum of at least 29 enemy planes were shot down.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lt. Col., G. S. C., A. C. of S., G–2.

[Exhibit V]

[SECRET]

A true copy
Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN
2nd Lt. F. A.

[1] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 19 February 1941

In reply refer to
Engr. 660

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army, War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I was very glad indeed to have your letter of February 7th as it gave us some very definite information on aircraft we did not have.

Since assuming command I have had two conferences with Admiral Kimmel and two with Admiral Bloch. I have found them both most approachable and cooperative in every way. I have told them that from my point of view there will be no hair splitting, but that the one thing that would affect any decision where there is an apparent conflict between the Army and the Navy in the use of facilities would be the question of what could produce the greatest combined effort of the two forces. They have assured me that they will take exactly the same view. From my brief intercourse with them I feel that our relations should be extremely cordial.

As a result of my short study of conditions here I believe that the following are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes:

(1) Cooperation with the Navy.
(2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft.
(3) Improvement of the Antiaircraft defense.
(4) Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery.
(5) Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.
(6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails.
(7) Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication centers.
(8) Increase in the number of Engineer troops.

Cooperation with the Navy. A series of joint committees consisting of Army and Navy officers has been appointed with a view to the study of cooperation of the Army and Navy especially with reference to employment of air and Aircraft. These committees have been directed to report on March 1st. Copy of the letter creating these committees is attached hereto as well as copy of
[2] instructions to the echelon commanders concerning cooperation with the Navy.

Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft. Provision has been made for a number of emergency fields upon the various islands but no provision has been made for dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of fields and other protection by either camouflage or by bunkers. The emergency fields on other islands will be valueless for pursuit aviation except possibly on the Island of Molokai. The pursuit aviation is capable of only approximately one hour's flying with the throttle wide open. This means that the dispersion of pursuit aviation must take place upon the Island of Oahu if it is to be able to meet an attack from any direction. The dispersion and bunkers for the greater part of the pursuit aviation can be made in the immediate vicinity of Wheeler Field by the use of ravines and bunkers. The maintenance and repair facilities can be placed in ravines under ground without an exhorbitant cost in time or money. Tanks are now available for the distribution of gas and we are asking for money to install tanks.

The bombers can make use of the landing fields on other islands but it will be necessary to make provisions for their dispersion in the vicinity of those fields and also on the Island of Oahu. Their dispersion is more difficult than that of the pursuit. The repair and maintenance facilities require so much space that it will be necessary, at least temporarily, to place them above ground protected by hills. At present the only repair facilities for the bombers are in buildings on Hickam Field which would undoubtedly be attacked by any surprise raid. Up to the time that we make runways for dispersion of planes on all the fields surprise enemy raids would be extremely serious.

Improvement of the Antiaircraft Defense. The major shortages in Antiaircraft artillery armament are sixteen 3-inch or 90 m.m. antiaircraft guns (six enroute) 135 37-mm antiaircraft guns, 236 .50 caliber machine guns and 30 sound locators. The locators are expected in June. The shortage of personnel, however, is much more serious than the shortage in materiel. Practically all the coast artillery units have dual roles. If they man antiaircraft artillery the Harbor Defense Artillery will not be manned, and vice versa. To man the entire antiaircraft artillery defense project avoiding dual assignments to all but four Harbor Defense batteries requires an increase in the existing antiaircraft personnel as follows:

Two regiments of Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (Mobile) T–O 4–11.

One Battalion Gun Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (Mobile (less searchlight battery) T. O. 4–15.

[3] Approximately 90 officers and 2,000 enlisted replacements to activate three gun batteries and three 37-mm batteries of the 64th Coast Artillery Antiaircraft, now inactive. With the increasing critical international situation at this time it is urgently recommended that all reinforcements of Antiaircraft Artillery personnel, both unit and individual reinforcements mentioned above, together with the shortage in antiaircraft artillery matériel, be furnished to this department with the least practicable delay.

These reinforcements to the antiaircraft artillery garrison, as well as those for the Harbor Defense Artillery listed below, are required to complete the approved defense project. No provision of the defense of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station has been made in the defense project. This problem has been made the subject of a separate letter, copy attached as Inclosure No. 4.

Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery. There are no major shortages of equipment for Harbor Defense Artillery. However, about 150 officers and 2,700 enlisted men as individual reinforcements and one regiment, Coast Artillery (T. D.) T. O. 4–31W are required to fully man the Harbor Defense Artillery, not including the three obsolescent seacoast mortar batteries. It is urgently requested that these replacements and reinforcements be furnished at the earliest practicable moment.

As an accessory to the Harbor Defense Artillery, the north shore Railroad connection is extremely important to give access to railway gun positions on the north shore.

Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights. The only serious shortage is in beach defense searchlights. A 24-inch carbon-arc light is under development; but the receipt of these lights here may be unduly delayed. This shortage can be overcome immediately by supplying power units for 42 Mack 36-inch projectors which are now on hand. The trucks and power units for these lights are unserviceable but the projectors are in fair to good shape.

There is a shortage throughout of spare parts for 60-inch searchlights, which were requisitioned some months ago. These would be required for any prolonged action. Information from the Chief of Engineers indicates that they will probably be furnished in the near future.

Provision for more rapid movements of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails. With the increase in the number of motors available in the department it is most necessary that roads be provided to make the maximum possible use of the motors in the movement of reserves and supplies. The Engineers have made a very careful study of the roads and trails which are necessary or the defense of the island.

[4] There are numerous bottlenecks in the islands where it is not practicable to construct alternate roads. If these roads are damaged by shelling or bombing it is most important that they be repaired in the minimum of time. To provide for this stores of repair material should be placed in close proximity to the vital points. It is believed that the Territorial government will cooperate with the Army in this matter, thus reducing expenses to be charged to National Defense.

Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication centers. Command Posts, communication centers and items of critical supply should be bombproofed. This protection of Command Posts particularly should be done immediately in order that these installations can be trained to function in these locations before hostilities start.

Increase in the number of Engineer Troops. The protection of aircraft and the construction of air fields will keep one regiment of engineers employed constantly. The work on roads and trails would be such as to employ one General Service Regiment constantly. The combat Engineer regiment of the Hawaiian Division should be left available for bombproofing of Headquarters and communication centers and other tactical work.

Previous recommendations for a regiment of Aviation Engineers, less 1 battalion, and an increase in enlisted strength of Third Engineers were based on assumption that some civilian labor would be available. The situation on civilian labor has become acute, and while it has been necessary to import skilled labor, the recent increase in defense work is going to necessitate importing unskilled labor as well. The only alternative would be to curtail activities of the plantations and much of our defense work should not be postponed until that is done.

Communications covering all the above recommendations are being or have been submitted to The Adjutant General. The following are the titles and dates of letters covering these subjects:

Cooperation with the Navy.

Joint letter, HHD 14th Naval District, 14 February 1941, subject: "Army and Navy Aircraft in Hawaiian Area", copy attached, Inclosure No. 1 AG 354.2/JAX–(pencil)

Letter, HHD to major echelon commanders, 17 February 1941, subject: "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," file 354.2/JAX, copy attached, Inclosure No. 2.

[5] *Dispersion and protection of aircraft.* Letter Engr. 452, 19 February 1941, subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft," Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 3.

Improvement of Antiaircraft defense and of Harbor Defense Artillery. Letter, HHD to TAG, 19 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department," file 320.2/55 copy attached, Inclosure No. 4.

Letter, HHD to TAG, 18 February 1941, subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file 381, copy attached, Inclosure No. 5.

North Shore Railroad Connection. Letter, HHD Engr. 662.7, 19 February 1941, copy attached, Inclosure No. 6.

Improvement of situation with reference to searchlights. *a.* Beach defense Lights: Letter, Engr. 470.3/6 x 470.3/10, 29 January 1940 with 11 Indorsements, 11th Indorsement AG 470.3 (1–29–40) M–D, 26 August 1940. 12th Indorsement, HHD dated 18 February 1941, to TAG being transmitted, copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 7.

b. Searchlight Parts. Letter, Engr. 470.3/8, 2 November 1940, to the Chief of Engineers, subject: "Priority Items, Engineer Status Report, Revision 1940." 1st Indorsement, O., C. of E., (381.4) (Hawaii) 101, 28 January 1941, states: "Reference Par 1 *c*, the requisition for spare parts for searchlights was concurred in by this office. The requisition now is undergoing review by G–4 and action is expected shortly. You will be promptly informed of the action taken." Copy of 1st Indorsement inclosed, Inclosure No. 8.

Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in Roads and Trails.

Letter, Engr. 611, 19 February 1941, subject: "Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department." Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 9.

Bombproofing of vital installations. Letters, Engr. 800.96, following subjects and dates. (Copies attached)

1. Bombproof Command Posts, Hawaiian Air Force, 4 February 1941. Inclosure No. 10.
2. Bombproof Protection, Command Posts, Hawaiian Division, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 11.
3. Bombproof Construction for Magazines at Fort Barrette and Fort Weaver, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 12.
4. Splinterproof Protection for Antiaircraft and Mobile Seacoast Batteries, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 13.

[6] 5. Bombproof Command Post, Antiaircraft Groupment, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 14.

6. Bombproof Gasoline Storage, Hawaiian Department, 5 February 1941, Inclosure No. 15.

7. Bombproof Protection for Signal Installations, Hawaiian Department, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 16.

8. Storage of Defense Reserves, Aviation Gasoline, Hawaiian Air Force, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 17.

9. Department Command Post, Aliamanu Crater, last correspondence 660.9 (S), copy attached, Inclosure No. 18.

Increase in number of Engineer Troops.—Letter Engr. 322.03, 19 February 1941, subject "Additional Engineer Troops", copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 19.

Enclosures herewith are made for your ready reference and information.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, Commanding.

19 Incls.

[Exhibit W]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 19 February 1941.

In reply refer to:
Engineer 452.
SECRET

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.
To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. With the present set-up of existing facilities in this Department the pursuit ships are forced to operate to a large extent from Wheeler Field and similarly the bombardment ships are forced to operate from Hickam Field. In times of actual operation some of the bombardment ships will be operating from bases on the outlying islands, but to a large extent the pursuit ships will continue to operate from Oahu due to the limited time and radious of operation without refueling.

2. The concentration of these airplanes at Wheeler Field and at Hickam Field presents a very serious problem in their protection against hostile aviation. Wheeler Field is too small for the operation of the number of pursuit ships to be furnished to this Department and it will be necessary to develop another base for at least one group of pursuit aviation. A site in the vicinity of Barbers Point has been tentatively selected and is now being discussed with the Navy Department in connection with that Departments activities on its new air base in the Ewa Plain Area. The new Army air base will be the subject of a subsequent letter.

3. While this new base will provide some opportunity for dispersion of the pursuit ships this dispersion cannot be counted upon to give adequate protection and it will be necessary to provide protection bv means of bunkers in the vicinity of existing fields for both pursuit and bombardment aviation. I have asked the District Engineer of Honolulu to study this problem and to sbbmit cost estimates on the most economical satisfactory means of providing this protection. The District Engineer has recommended that the protection be provided by a rolled fill embankment of dirt and has estimated the cost at $1,200.00 each for pursuit planes, $8,000.00 each for two engine bombardment planes and $15,000.00 each for four engine bombardment planes. In arriving at these figures he has given consideration not only to present unit costs, but has included funds to cover increasing cost of both labor and non-labor items in this Department; the figures shown include both direct and indirect costs. This bunkering protection will cost about the same regardless of its location; the unit price includes cost of taxi strips and accessories.

4. This protection should be provided for 142 single engine pursuit ships and 121 double engine pursuit ships and for 25 two engine bombers and 70 four engine bombers. Using the unit costs quoted above the total for pursuit planes is $315,600.00 and the total for bombing planes is $1,250,000.00. The total for

the two types is $1,565,600.00. It is recommended that funds in this amount be allotted to this Department as soon as possible to initiate the installation of this protection.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

A true copy:
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

[SECRET]

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.
AG 600.12 (2-19-41) M 1st Ind ACW/mme

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *March 3, 1941.* To the Chief of the Air Corps and Chief of Engineers, *IN TURN.*

For remark and recommendation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

_____ _____.
Adjutant General.

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.

2nd Ind (12)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF AIR CORPS,
Washington, D. C., March 5, 1941.

To Chief of Engineers.

This office concurs in the recommendations as contained in basic communication. It is recommended that action be taken to provide funds for this project in the next supplemental bill.

For the Chief of the Air Corps:

WALTER J. REED,
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps,
Executive, Building, & Grounds Div.

A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

600.1 (Haw. Dept. Airfields)—38
Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.
3rd Ind. 3-N

Office, C. of E., *April 1, 1942.*
To the Adjutant General.

1. Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of basis letter which gives unit prices for rolled fill bunkers for pursuit planes, two-engine and four-engine bombardment planes. It is noted that the unit prices given include funds to cover increasing cost of both labor and non-labor items and direct and indirect costs. It is also noted that the unit prices include the cost of taxi strips and accessories.

2. For the reason that the basic letter gave no basis on which this office could check the estimate of cost, a radiogram was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, March 25, 1941, requesting detailed information sufficient for checking. A copy of this radiogram is inclosed. A reply was received thereto by radiogram from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated March 29, 1941, copy of which is inclosed.

3. It is recommended that approval in principle of the proposed protective arrangements be granted and that an initial allotment of $1,000,000 be made at this time, authorizing the preparation of complete plans and initiation of construction with a view to providing necessary balances when costs are more fully determined.

For the Chief of Engineers:

WILLIAM F. TOMPKINS,
Lieut Col., Corps of Engineers,
Executive Assistant.

2 Incls:
Copy of Radiogram dated 3/25/41;
Copy of Radiogram dated 3/29/41.

A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN
2nd lieut F. A.

Via Air Mail

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.
AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-E 4th Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *May 31, 1941.*

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Authority is granted for the construction of revetments in the Hawaiian Department for 70 four-engine bombardment, 13 light bombardment and 170 pursuit planes. This is the total number of airplanes which at present are visualized as an obtainable objective in Hawaii within a reasonable time.

2. In locating these revetments, "battle stations" of airplanes should be visualized in view of present and projected airdromes in the Hawaiian Islands. Revetments should be dispersed over the widest practicable area around and adjacent to airdromes.

3. In the designs of revetments for use in the present war in the British Isles, provision is made for a splinter-proof shelter for airplanes crews and maintenance personnel who may be caught in the revetments during an air attack. In the British design, this splinter-proof, shelter is placed in the rear wall or back of the revetment. In the construction of the revetments proposed for the Hawaiian Department, it is believed that this feature should be incorporated.

4. It is desired that you submit revised estimates covering the construction of the revetments approved in paragraph 1 above incorporating splinter-proof shelters for plane crews.

5. Funds, in the amount of $1,358,000 for the completion of this project as finally approved after receipt of your revised estimates, are being included in estimates for funds now being prepared.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General, The Adjutant General.

Incls. w/d
A True Copy:
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut., F. A.

Engr. 452 5th Ind

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, *Fort Shafter, T. H., 31 July 1941.*
The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Provisions in plans have been made for splinter-proof shelters for airplane screws and maintenance personnel.

2. Revised estimates based on obtainable objectives are as follows:

a. Personnel shelters 5′ x 9′ @ $635.00 each for 85 pursuit planes, bunkers having already been built on Wheeler Field by troop labor $53, 975. 00

b. 85 Pursuit Bunkers @ $1,200.00 and 85 personnel shelters, 5′ x 9′ @ $635.00 to be constructed at locations other than Wheeler	$155,975.00
13 Lt. Bombardment bunkers @ $8,000 and 8 personnel shelters 5′ x 13′ @ $800.00	$114,400.00
d. 70 four-engine bombardment bunkers @ $15,000 and 70 personnel shelters 5′ x 17′ @ $925.00	$1,050,000.00
Total	$1,374,350.00

3. The bunkers for pursuit planes will be built at the new pursuit field and at Bellows Field. These for A–20–A planes will be at Bellows Field and for the 4-engine bombardment planes will be started at Hickam Field. It is not planned at this time to construct any bunker for these 4-engine planes on the outlying airports, but it is possible that when these airports are completed, the installation of some bunkers at these airports with the majority at Hickam may be desirable. This question has been discussed with the District Engineer, Honolulu, who states that the costs at these field will be about the same as his estimate for Hickam.

4. Since the figure of $1,374,350.00 is so close to the figure of $1,358,000.00 mentioned in 4th Indorsement, it is recommended that the latter figure included in the estimates be adopted and that funds in this amount be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, for this purpose.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department.
A–G 600.12 (2–19–41) MC–G 6th Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *September 22, 1941.*

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Plans for revetments proposed in the preceding correspondence are approved.

2. Funds in the amount of $1,358,000 for the completion of revetments in the Hawaiian Department have been included in Project C–21, preliminary estimates 1943. It is expected that they will become available about January 1, 1942.

3. Final design of the revetments is being prepared by the Fortification Division, Corps of Engineers, and will be coordinated with the Chief of the Army Air Forces, upon completion.

4. When available, funds will be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, for the construction of the required revetments.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General, The Adjutant General.

A True Copy:
EDWARD VON GELDERN
2nd Lieut., F. A.

[Exhibit X]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., Sept. 10, 1941.

In reply refer to:
Engr. 600.96 SECRET
Subject: Underground Repair Facilities, Hawaiian Air Depot.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. The provision of bombproof facilities for the repair of aircraft by the Hawaiian Air Depot is vital to the continued functioning of the Hawaiian Air Force during an attack on Oahu.

2. At present all shop and repair facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot are crowded into a small area at Hickham Field. This area is located close to the entrance channel of Pearl Harbor which is a perfect landmark even during blackouts. Concealment or confusion as to the purpose of this installation by camouflage is impracticable by any means known to this headquarters. In any attack or raid on this island, it is not only probable, but almost unavoidable that the Depot would be put of of action.

3. Considerable study has been made of the problem of insuring continued maintenance facilities for the Air Force and the only logical solution is to provide bombproof shelter for part of the existing maintenance facilities. Provision of bombproofed protection for all of these facilities is manifestly impracticable due to the tremendous cost. It is believed that bombproofed space for one complete B–17 type airplane and for two B–17's without wing and tail assemblies, together with required space for all subassembly overhaul an repair represents the minimum space required. The District Engineer, Honolulu, has prepared a preliminary design of this structure and estimates its cost at $3,480,650.00. Copies of the design drawings and his estimate are inclosed as Inclosures 1 and 2. Proposed location of this repair depot is shown on print, inclosure No. 3. This location has been selected because it is at a considerable distance from any other probable target, because the terrain is adapted to camouflage and because the soil will offer no construction difficulties. Location adjacent to the present facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot at Hickam Field is impracticable; rock and ground water are reached only a few feet underground and this location is close to other primary targets of an air attack.

4. It is recommended that one underground repair depot of the type shown on inclosed plans be approved for construction at Wheeler Field and that funds in the amount of $3,480,650.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, for this construction.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

3 Incls: #1 Design Dwgs. (3 sheets)
2 Estimate
3 Location Drawing

A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut., F. A.

Subject: Underground Repair Facilities, Hawaiian Air Depot.
AG 600.12 (9–10–41) NC–G 1st Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *October 27, 1941.*

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The cost of providing bombproof underground repair facilities compared with the advantages to be gained is so great, that it is a policy that such facilities will not be provided.

2. Although the advantages of greater security which could be achieved by the provision of bombproof underground repair facilities must be recognized, the additional cost involved makes it necessary for air base installations exposed to possible bombardment attacks to assume this risk.

3. One hangar being built for our Atlantic base is to provide sidewalls of bomb-splinter proof construction. If you desire installations of this type, due consideration will be given your request, considering funds are available, and the needs of other bases similarly exposed to danger of air attack.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. S. ADAMS,
Major General, The Adjutant General.

3 Incls n/c
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut., F. A.

[Exhibit Y]

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., October 28, 1941.

In reply refer to:
Engr. 400.312
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Subject: Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Materials.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to the following project letters from this headquarters:

a. Letter to The Adjutant General, Engr. 600.94, 4 February 1941, subject: "Splinterproof Protection for Antiaircraft and Mobile Seacoast Batteries," recommending that $306,000 be allotted to initiate protective shelters for personnel and propellants at antiaircraft and mobile seacoast batteries. In 4th Indorsement, AG 662.1 (2-4-41) M-WPD, 31 March 1941, this headquarters was advised that the recommendation was not favorably considered, and that "protective installations of this type should be improvised by ordinary field fortification methods."

b. Letter to The Adjutant General, Engr. 000.91, 7 July 1941, subject: "Request for funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field," recommending that an allotment of $56,210.00 be made for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing field, hangers and warming apron at Wheeler Field.

c. Letter to the Adjutant General, Engr. 000.91, 27 February 1941, subject: "Camouflage of Defense Installations," recommending that $29,000 be allotted for camouflage of batteries at Fort DeRussy, Fort Kamehameha, Fort Ruger, and Fort Barrette. 4th Indorsement, AG 007.5 (2-27-41) MC-E, 27 June 1941, approved the project and stated that funds for this purpose would be included in the next estimates and would be made available at the earliest practicable date. Radio from the Chief of Engineer 10 October 1941 advises that $29,000 for camouflage of coast artillery batteries had been disapproved by the Budget Advisory Committee.

[2] *d.* Letter of The Adjutant General, Engr. 452, 19 February 1941, subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft," recommending that an initial allotment of $1,565,600 be made for the construction of bunkers for the dispersion and protection of aircraft. 4th Indorsement AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-E, 31 May 1941, granted authority for the construction of revetments for 70 four-engine bombardment, 13 light bombardment and 170 pursuit planes, and stated that funds in the amount of $1,358,000 for the completion of the project after receipt of revised estimates would be included in estimates for funds being prepared. 5th Indorsement Engr. 452, 31 July 1941, submitted a revised figure of $1,374,350, and recommended that it be adopted instead of the $1,358,000. 6th Indorsement, AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-G, 22 September 1941, approved plans for revetments, and advised funds in amount of $1,358,000 for completion of revetments in department were included in Project C-21, preliminary estimates 1943, funds expected to become available about January 1, 1942.

e. Letter from the Adjutant General, AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D, 13 August 1941, subject: "Reallocation of Special Field Exercise Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Projects," and 1st Indorsement thereon, AG 121[illegible]1, 14 September 1941, recommending the immediate allotment of $125,000 for necessary materials and tools for the construction of field fortifications. This indorsement was followed up by radio 25 September 1941, recommending immediate favorable action on allotment of $125,000 for execution of field fortifications and camouflage projects. War Department radio, 29 September 1941, advised request was not favorably considered, confirmed by 1st Indorsement War Department 14 September 1941.

f. Letter to the Chief of Engineers, Engr. 121.2, 17 May 1941, subject: "Annual Estimates, Fiscal Years 1942 and 1943," and supporting data under Project 5, which requested $50,000 each for fiscal year 1942 and 1943 for local purchase of supplies for units of the Hawaiian Garrison other than Engineer troops, these supplies to be used in the construction of fortified works other than command posts for major echelons and camouflage measures, letter, Office, Chief of Engineers, to Department Engineer, 1 July 1941, subject: "Allotment of Engineer Service, Army Funds, Fiscal Year 1942," advised that only $5,000 was being allotted. It further stated "It is believed the amount of $50,000 requested for this purpose is greatly excessive. Field fortifications or camouflage to this extent goes beyond the training stage and reaches the status of a construc-

tion project. It is suggested that such requirements for the defenses of Hawaii be obtained from construction funds, which should be estimated and appropriated for this purpose."

[3] 2. The field fortification and camouflage works that will be required to insure the adequate defense of this island are of such magnitude that their accomplishment after the outbreak of hostilities is entirely out of the question. All installations located on Government owned or leased land should be constructed at the present time eliminating those tasks from the work that cannot be done until after complete mobilization when it will be possible to enter on and organize private land.

3. The program for immediate construction contemplates semi-permanent emplacements for all coast artillery weapons in the present defense project. These weapons are sited in their most advantageous positions covering all approaches to the island and fixed Naval installations and their movement is not contemplated under any change of situation. Protection for infantry units is based on lightly held beach positions with a strong and highly mobile reserve in accordance with latest tactical principles. Dispersed and camouflaged Bunker protection must be provided for aircraft and airfield installations must be protected by machine gun emplacements and fencing.

4. The peculiar topographic and geologic conditions and the nature of the vegetation of the Hawaiian Islands require a greater expenditure of materials for field fortification than would normally be anticipated. In their maneuvers and field training, troops have constructed many field fortification works. Salvage and local materials have been used to the utmost and many methods have been improvised to take into consideration the coral and lava rock, sand, and peculiar volcanic soil of the islands. This effort has been largely wasted because of the rapid deterioration of the local materials used. Sand bags and local timbers have a maximum life of about six months in this locality.

5. The War Department has repeatedly directed this Headquarters to construct certain works by Field Fortification methods but neither materials nor funds have been supplied. This letter presents a new computation of all material requirements for field fortification works and camouflage which should be constructed at once. This tabulation does not include those materials which must be used to complete the field fortification works after the outbreak of hostilities. These requirements may be divided into three groups as follows:

a. The Air Corps requirements. The airfields in the Hawaiian Islands are limited in number and there are very few places aside from regular airfields where enemy planes might land. Consequently, it is expected that determined efforts would be made to capture existing airfields. To prevent this, protected machine gun positions must be placed to guard the sensitive points on each airfield, and [4] mobile forces provided for counter-attacks on enemy air-borne or sea-borne troops who are attempting a landing or who have landed. Airplanes on the ground must also be hidden and dispersed, to prevent their loss in surprise air attacks, hence camouflage is needed to conceal them. For this purpose, the local vegetation must be augmented by additional planting. In case an airfield on the outlying islands must be abandoned, its runways and other essential features should be destroyed, hence demolition chambers should be installed in advance. These matters cannot be deferred because of the time required for vegetation to grow and the time required to install protection and demolition works.

b. Coast Artillery requirements. The Coast Artillery includes permanent fixed defenses, mobile guns in positions prepared in time of peace, and antiaircraft guns protecting fixed Naval or military installations. The Coast Artillery cannot maneuver; the mobile elements, including antiaircraft, are held in fixed positions to defend fixed installations or to cover intervals in the permanent defenses, and the best positions have been prepared. Since these positions are known to the general public, the enemy also knows them. The operating personnel must have shelters to protect them and their ammunition during air attack, and the positions must be camouflaged to prevent accurate aim by enemy bombers. Coast Artillery troops must be constantly on the alert during active operations, and can then spare no men for fortification work after hostilities have begun.

c. Infantry requirements. The Infantry divisions will occupy beach positions very lightly held, and will have highly mobile motorized reserves. The beach positions have additional weapons, beyond table of organization allowances. Emplacements, trench shelters, observation and command posts for the beach positions must be ready when the enemy appears offshore, and field works should

be used to develop the maximum efficiency of automatic and heavy weapons and release as many men as possible to the reserve. There will be neither time nor men available to construct beach positions after the enemy arrives; fields of fire must be cleared, barbed wire, road blocks, anti-tank mines, and other obstacles must be installed at that time because these defenses will be placed on private property or will unduly interfere with civilian enterprise if set up in advance.

6. Inclosed are tabulations showing the material requirements of the Air Force, the Coast Artillery Command and the two Infantry divisions.

[5] 7. It is recommended that an allotment of $1,455,542 be made immediately available for the purchase of fortification and camouflage materials so that the work can be initiated and carried along concurrently with normal training activities.

8. The only alternative for having these positions prepared in advance is to have a large increase in the garrison authorized for the defense of the islands.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

1 Incl: in six sheets (in dupl.)
A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd. Lt., F. A.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

10 WAR TG 61 WD

WASHN, D. C., 252P *Aug. 12, 1941.*

CG
Haw Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H.
31 12th

AGMC reurlet July twenty eighth AG one two one point two subject reallocation of special field exercise funds for field fortification and camouflage projects stop special field exercise funds are not available for purpose requested further information follows by mail

ADAMS
1017A

A True Copy
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit Z]

[1] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., July 15, 1941.

In reply refer to:
Engr. 000.91

Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. There is definite need for camouflage treatment of Air Fields in the Hawaiian Department. Up to this time no camouflage treatment has been undertaken at any air field in this department.

2. Attached is a plan for camouflage of Wheeler Field prepared by the 804th Engineer Company Aviation (Separate). The plan includes photographs of the type of camouflage to be applied to the bunkers, together with itemized estimates of costs and recommendations.

3. In reporting on this proposed plan, Major J. F. Ohmer, Jr., Corps of Engineers, Camouflage Officer, has commented as follows:

"The place for camouflage of Wheeler Field as prepared by the 804th Engineer Company Aviation (separate) is a good treatment for the field and the bunkers. The plan generally calls for 'blending' the buildings of Wheeler Field into the Schofield Barracks building area and endeavoring to restore the air field proper to the original condition as shown by the present earth scars, such as the old

Kamehameha Road, the gully through the field and the pineapple fields, roads and irrigation ditches."

"The plan is practicable and can be readily accomplished by the 804th Engineer Company Aviation."

"The Commanding General, Wheeler Field, has approved the plan and urged that the work be expedited."

"While the air photographs of the two planes in the camouflaged bunkers show the wing tips and the harsh straight shadows of the deciding line between the upper and lower nets, this can be blended by additional garnishing and small nets tying the lower nets under the upper terrace. This work is now being completed."

"It is recommended that the camouflage plans for Wheeler Field be approved."

[2] 4. It is recommended that an allotment of funds be made to this office in the amount of $56,210.00 for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing field, hangars, and warning apron at Wheeler Field, the work to be done by the 804th Engineer Company Aviation (Separate). An itemized estimate is incorporated as a part of the plan substantiating the amount requested.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

1 Incl: Plan
A True Copy:
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[3] Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.

AG 007.5 (7-12-41) MC 1st Ind. RPM/gt-1712.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. C., *July 29, 1941.*

To Chief of Engineers and Chief of the Army Air Force, *IN TURN.*

For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ Carl Robinson.
Adjutant General.

1 Incl. n/c.
A true copy
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN
2nd Lt., F. A.

[4] Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.

600.1 (Wheeler Fld) 71 2nd Ind. 6-C

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, D. C., September 16, 1941.

To: The Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

1. The proposed plan for the camouflage of Wheeler Field, Hawaii, has received careful consideration by The Engineer Board. As camouflage is essentially a local problem long range criticism may be entirely in error. Consequently, the following comments are offered only to supplement and should not invalidate decisions made on the spot by officers with initimate knowledge of local conditions.

2. Specific comments on Part I:

a. Bunkers.—The bunkers do not appear in the best arrangement to give maximum protection and to afford natural concealment. Their regular curving alignment throws a great burden on the artificial camouflage measures. The outer berm of the bunkers should be more irregular at the toe of the slope and should not be permitted to appear as a series of parallel lines as seen in photograph (V-112.101). Portions of the light colored pattern which show on the photograph could be continued over the revetment by sand or the native soil and over the net by weaving in appropriately colored garnishing. Extensive planting in native patterns will assist in this blending, and it is suggested that vines could be planted in the bunker tops and trained to grow into the nets to aid in defeating disclosure by means of infra-red photography. If additional dispersal pens are constructed, they should be spaced further apart, be more irregularly arranged, and the outer surface of the earth walls should be more irregular, especially at the toe of the slope.

b. Landing Field.—The division of the field boldly into three sections by natural boundaries as described is excellent, and, if carried out as indicated, should be very successful. The following detail criticisms may aid in the execution, but are not arbitrary. The field roads might be made a little more conspicuous by sprinkling a light colored earth, gravel or lava on the stripped surface as noted by contrast in the field roads in lower left corner of photograph (V–109–916–N–18). The same technique may be useful in the reproduction of the old Kamohameha road. If the fertilizer method does not produce dark enough contrasts it may be necessary to use black emulsified asphalts or a mixture of iron sulphate and tannin. The dark areas of the reproduced gully should not be used for taxiing and warming up any more than absolutely necessary, as this will destroy the desired effect.

[5] *c.* Hangar Line.

(1) The effort to make the buildings of Wheeler Field appear as a more homogeneous portion of Schofield Barracks might be more effective if more roads, dummy or real, were built between the two areas.

(2) The athletic track is a dangerous subterfuge, because of its characteristic outline and east-west orientation, and is not generally recommended as it becomes a reference point when detected.

(3) The painting of buildings on the aprons appears satisfactory; maintenance will be required and should not be neglected.

(4) The hangar painting presents a fine appearance. More disruption might be achieved by a larger and bolder plan of painting. The roads which terminate at hangars might be carried over the building successfully and the buildings painted on the roof tops might be connected with painted walks and service roads to help create the illusion of a reduced scale of construction. The general trace of the shadows of buildings should be studied and wherever possible, there should be painted, or preferably planted, trees and shrubs to break up their characteristic outline. Planting, which may appear relatively ineffective in vertical views, may help materially against the bombers' approach.

(5) Inasmuch as the concrete hangar line apron is of brighter material and more reflective than other roadways in the area, it should be generally toned down with a thin solution of tar or asphalt in kerosene, in addition to the other treatment suggested.

3. Specific comments on Part II.

a. It is suggested an asphalt emulsion for roofs would be cheaper and more suitable. In general, the type of paint should be selected with regard to the material to be coated, instead of the classification by roofs, walls, etc. Under "Concrete" it is assumed that aprons are included. The American Betumuls Company, which maintains a branch in Hawaii, should be able to furnish asphalt emulsion paints and adhesives more advantageously than Rejuvo. The matter of granules to cover surfaces should be investigated carefully to see whether local materials of indigenous colors or of a nature which will absorb bituminous colors, such as lava, are not more easily procurable.

[6] 4. It is recommended that:

a. That the plan of camouflage be approved.

b. That the camouflage office, Hawaiian Department, or the Commanding Officer of the 804th Engineer Battalion (Avn.) (Sep.) be granted permission to communicate directly with the Engineer Board on matters of materials and technical details to expedite the work.

c. That the Engineer Board be furnished a report to be made upon completion of the work, including photographs of intermidiate the final stages. It is suggested that oblique photographs be furnished as well as vertical. The oblique photographs should be taken at 10,000 feet and three to four miles from Wheeler Field from four directions.

d. That the amount of $56,210.00 be alloted to the Department Commander, Hawaiian Department, for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing field, hangars and warming aprons at Wheeler Field, the work to be done by the 804th Engineer Company.

For the Acting Chief of Engineers:

[s] HOMER SAINT-GAUDENS,
Lt. Co., Corps of Engineer,
Acting Chief, Operations and Training Section.

1 Incl
Sub. 1.
A True Copy:
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[7] Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.
AG 007.5 (7-12-41)MC-G. 3rd Ind. WR-1712.
WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *October 28, 1941.*
To Chief of Engineers.

1. The camouflage treatment of Wheeler Field as outlined in basic correspondence is authorized when funds become available for this construction.

2. It is desired that you take the necessary action to include the sum of $56,210 in the next available budget estimate for camouflage treatment of Wheeler Field.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. R. VAN SICKLER,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl. n/c/
Copy to:
Chief of Air Corps w/cy of basic com., 1st Ind., 2nd Ind.
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department ref. his basic ltr. 7-12-41, together w/cy of 1st Ind., and 2nd Ind.
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

27 FEB 1941.

Engr. 000.91

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Investigations conducted by this headquarters have demonstrated that effective measures can and should be taken to reduce the visibility of exposed defense installations to hostile aerial observation. Admittedly these installations cannot be concealed to such an extent that they will be invisible on aerial photographs; at the same time, however, any camouflage which will render visual observation more difficult and will decrease the effectiveness of enemy bombardment is of the utmost importance.

2. Time has not permitted the submission of a comprehensive program for the camouflage of all defense installations in this department which require some degree of concealment; this matter is undergoing continuous study. Fixed seacoast batteries have received first attention and plans of procedure and cost estimates have been prepared. The following table shows the various installations on which camouflage work should be undertaken immediately with the tentative costs:

Installation	Armament	Inclosure No.	Cost
Ft. DERUSSY:			
Battery Randolph	2-14" (Disappearing)	Incl. No. 1	$6,000.00
Battery Dudley	2-6" (Disappearing)	Incl. No. 1	
Ft. KAMEHAMEHA:			
Battery Closson	2-12" (Barbette)	Incl. No. 2	6,000.00
Battery Selfridge	2-12" (Disappearing)	Incl. No. 3	5,000.00
Battery Jackson	2-6" (Disappearing)	Incl. No. 3	1,500.00
Ft. RUGER:			
Battery Adams	2-8" (Barbette)	Incl. No. 4	2,000.00
Ft. BARRETTE:			
Battery Hatch	2-16" (Barbette)	Incl. No. 5	8,500.00
Total cost			$29,000.00

The measures contemplated include construction of various types of overhead cover, dummy positions, extension of roads, painting and the transplantation of trees and shrubbery.

3. Experience in the present World War has shown the very considerable success of the Germans in concealing by camouflage, their long range guns on the channel coasts. The several millions of dollars invested in the installations enumerated in paragraph 2 above and their general value in the defense of this island justify expenditure which will render them less vulnerable to enemy

attack. It is therefore recommended that the sum of $29,000.00 be allotted this department as soon as practicable to permit initiation of this camouflage work.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, Commanding.

Incls. 1–5: Aerial Photos
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations.
AG 007.5 (2–27–41) M 1st Ind. ACW/lfl

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
March 13, 1941.

To: The Chief of Engineers.
For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:

_____,
Adjutant General.

5 Incls. n/c
C. of E. 618.33 (Oahu) 3 2nd Ind. 6–E

OFFICE, C. OF E., *May 28, 1941.*

To: The Adjutant General, THROUGH THE CHIEF OF COAST ARTILLERY.

1. This paper was held in this office to permit direct inspection of the installations by a representative of this office who visited Hawaii on this and other fortification matters. Reference is made to Hawaii on this and other fortification matters. Reference is made to memorandum of March 22, 1941, to The Adjutant General, in this connection.

2. The importance of protective concealment for existing seacoast batteries is recognized by this office and a directive bulletin is now being prepared for issue to the field showing methods of such concealment for different type batteries.

3. The estimate submitted is considered an absolute minimum that will be required even omitting from consideration at this time Batteries Hatch and Closson which are to be casemated and more funds will probably be required at a later date. It is recommended that the project be approved and funds be made available at the earliest practicable date.

For the Chief of Engineers:

GEORGE MAYO,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Fortification Section.

5 Incls.—n/c
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations.

618.3/45–B 3rd Ind. 5

WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE, CHIEF OF COAST ARTILLERY,
June 12, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General.

1. The need for camouflaging the seacoast Batteries listed in paragraph 2 of the basic letter is evident from inspection of the inclosures, Nos. 1 to 5, inclusive. The program as outlined in paragraph 2 of the basic letter, is concurred in, subject to the proviso that the protective concealment of Batteries Hatch and Closson will be coordinated, both in time and character, with the casemating of these batteries.

2. No Seacoast Defense funds are available, at this time, for application to camouflage projects and none are included in current estimates.

3. It is recommended that the camouflage project, described in paragraph 2 of the basic letter, be approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Department Defense Project.

For the Chief of Coast Artillery:

JOE D. MOSS,
Major, C. A. C.,
Acting Executive.

5 Incls—No change.

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations, Hawaiian Department.
AG 007.5 (2-27-41) MC-E BSA

4th Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
June 27, 1941.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The program for the camouflaging of Batteries Randolph, Dudley, Closson, Selfridge, Jackson, Adams and Hatch, as proposed in paragraph 2 of the basic letter, is approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Defense Project.

2. Funds to the amount of $29,000 for this purpose will be included in the next estimates to be submitted and will be made available at the earliest practicable date.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

5 Incls. w/d.

5th Ind.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
FT. SHAFTER, T. H.,
July 24, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, Ft. DeRussey, T. H.

1. To note and return to this headquarters.

2. The Department Engineer will be directed to include this project in the next revision of the Hawaiian Defense Project and to prepare plans for the execution of this work when funds are received.

By command of Lieutenant General Short:

O. M. McDOLE,
Major, A. G. G.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

A true copy:

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

(Basic: Ltr., HHD, Engr. 000.91, 27 February 1941, subject: "Camouflage of Defense Installations.")

000.91 6th Ind.

HQ. H. S. C. A. BRIGADE, Pt. DeRussy, T. H., July 29, 1941—To CG Haw. Dept.

Noted.

FULTON Q. C. GARDNER,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1A]

[1] [SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 19 February, 1941.

Engr. 611
Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, Engr. 611, this headquarters, 8 November 1940, covering the recommendations for the revision of the military Roads and Trails Program. As indicated in paragraphs 5 and 8 of that letter, the revised program was not complete and additional roads and trails were under consideration.

2. A detailed study made by this headquarters indicates that the following additional improvements are necessary:

a. Wiliwilinui road and trail improvement, estimated cost $33,550.00. Construction covering improvement of the existing 15,000 lineal feet of road at Wiliwilinui Ridge, eliminating sharp curves and providing adequate turnouts. It also covers construction of a 6-foot pack trail extending from the end of the existing road to the main crest of Koolaupoko Ridge area.

b. Improvement of Pupukea-Kahuku trail estimated at $12,720.00. This project consists of the general widening of the existing trail from 3 to 6 feet along its 13,000-foot alignment. This improvement will provide desirable communication between the northeasterly section of the Island and northern end of Wahiawa-Pupukea trail.

c. Coincidental with the improvement of the Koolau Ridge trail, feeder trails to the ridge should be developed and improved. As a part of its reforestation program, the CCC has constructed several trails from forest reserve boundaries to the main ridge of the Koolaua along the lateral ridges. These trails, shown in the following list, should be partially relocated and improved as 6-foot pack trails:

(1)	Poamono trail, 22,800 feet, estimated cost	$35, 100. 00
(2)	Kawailoa trail, 24,000 feet	22, 750. 00
(3)	Schofield-Waikane, 33,000 feet	45, 750. 00
(4)	Waiawa trail, 30,000 feet	28, 650. 00

d. A road to Fuu Palailai. This project ———(copy illegible)——— of a 10′ class "B" supply road extending from the main government road to Fuu Palailai. This road is desired to improve access to a group of fire c ntrol stations manned by a detail of from 50 to 100 men. The approximate length of this road is 8,700 feet and estimated cost $10,000.00.

e. Iunia-Palehua road. This project will connect an existing plantation road with the Palehua spur via the Mauna Kapu and the Honouliuli trails. The need for an alternate route to the Manauahua Defense Area is extremely important, particularly in view of the exposed condition of the Falehua road to hostile observation. This project calls for the construction of 24,000 lineal feet of a 10-foot class "B" road at an estimated cost of $136,500.00.

f. Radial Ridge roads, Manauahua area. This project calls for the constructionof three roads along the ridges, south and west of Fuu Nanauahua as shown on the attached map. These roads serve vital defense areas which must be made accessible to truck transportation. The total length of these ten-foot roads is approximately 20,000 feet and the estimated cost of construction is $84,900.00.

3. These additional roads and trails have been combined with the 19 items listed in paragraph 7 of letter, this headquarters, file Engr. 611, 8 November 1940, and are shown in the table below in order of their relative priority. The location of each item is shown on the map, scale 1/125,000, Inclosure No. 1 hereto.

1. Fort Weaver 155-mm position Road 10′ Class B	$8, 900
2. Fort Roger Roads 10′ Class B	4, 000
3. Barbors Point East 3L Pos. Trail 3L Trail	1, 000
4. Malil Marker 3L Position Trail 3L Trail	6, 000
5. Mallilii 3L Position Trail 3L Trail	1, 400
6. Easna Point 3L Position Trail 3L Trail	1, 000
7. Wailoa Point 3L Position Trail 3L Trail	1, 000
8. Completion of Barbors Point Road Net Class A	133, 000
9. North Shore RR Connection R. R.	250, 000
10. Improvement Waklaua Pupukea Road 10′ Class A & B	216, 000

11. Waimoa-Pupukea Road 10' Class B	$35,000
12. Alternate RR Schofield-Wahiuau Bypass R. R.	70,000
13. Connection-Leilohua Spur to Oahu Sugar Co. tracks (rail only) R. R	48,600
14. Ordnance Magazine Area, Schofield 25' Class A	33,000
15. Feeder Roads Wahiaua Pupukea Road, Improvement	111,800
16. Eahuku 155-mm Position Road, 10' Class B	9,500
17. Rahuku CP Trail, CP Trail	2,100
18. Kepuhi CP Trail, CP Trail	8,000
19. Koolau Ridge Trail, 6' Pack Trail	20,000
20. Wiliwilimoa Road, Improvement	17,900
21. Wiliwilimi Trail, 6' Pack Trail	15,650
22. Poamoho Trail, 6' Pack Trail	35,100
23. Pupukoa-Mahuhu Trail, 6' Pack Trail	12,720
24. Hawaiian Trail, 6' Pack Trail	22,750
25. Schofield-Wahiwan Trail, 6' Pack Trail	45,750
26. Waiwan Trail, 6' Pack Trail	28,650
27. Pau Palailai CP Road, 10' Class B	10,000
28. Kunia-Palahua Road, 10' Class B	135,500
29. Ridge Roads, Manamam Area, 10' Class B	34,900
	1,370,020

4. It is recommended that the roads and trails program shown in the table above be approved in lieu of the present program approved in 4th Indorsement (AG 611 Hawaii (3-31-38 (Misc.) (X) dated 23 May 1939, on War Department letter (AG 611 Hawaii (3-28-38) Misc. WPD) dated 31 March 1938, subject: "Military Priority Highways in the Hawaiian Department". It is further recommended that the sum of $1,370,020.00 be allotted to this department as soon as possible to permit early completion of this program.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

1 Incl: Map
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.
AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41)M 1st Ind. AGW/ric

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
February 27, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers and Chief of Coast Artillery, *IN TURN.*

For remark and recommendation, reference being made to files C. of E. 611 (Haw) 10 and OCGA 611/45 A 7.

By order of the Secretary of War:

_____,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl. a/c
C. of E., March 12, 1941.—
To: The Chief of Coast Artillery.

1. Items 1 to 19, inclusive, in this program were approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Defense Project in 3rd Indorsement dated February 18, 1941, AG 611 Hawaiian Department (11-8-40)M-WPD; OCGA 611/45 A 7; C. of E. 611 (Hawaii) 10. It was further directed that the Commanding General confer with Mr. Moskowitz, the representative of the Commissioner of Public Roads in Hawaii, with a view to securing the maximum aid permissible from the Public Roads Administration for the accomplishment of the construction authorized Federal Highway Act of 1940. It was also directed that a revised estimate be submitted covering Items 9, 12 and 13. The above action was not available to the Commanding General at the time of preparation of basic paper.

2. Items 20 to 29, inclusive, are new items of work. The estimated cost appears reasonable, and their inclusion in the program is recommended.

3. Attention is invited to letter from the Commanding General Hawaiian Department dated February 19, 1941, subject: "Construction of North Shore Railroad Connection" file Engr. 611; AG 112.05 (2-19-41)M; C. of E. 611 (Hawaii) 11 in which it was recommended that funds in the amount of $230,000

be allotted as soon as possible to initiate construction. The item referred to is included in this paper as item 9.

For the Chief of Engineers:

[S] George Mayo,
GEORGE MAYO,
Lt. Col. Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Fortification Section.

1 Inclosure n/c.
611/45A-10

3rd Ind. 5.
OFFICE, CHIEF OF COAST ARTILLERY,
WAR DEPARTMENT,
March 15, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General.

1. The remarks and recommendations of the Chief of Engineers appearing in the 2nd indorsement are concurred in.

2. In addition to the funds referred to in paragraph 1, 2nd indorsement, $300,000 is included in current Seacoast Defense estimates for application on items Nos. 9, 12 and 13 (railroad construction projects).

For the Chief of Coast Artillery:

[S] E. T. BLOOD,
Colonel, C. A. C., Executive.

1 Incl. n/c
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.
AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41) M-WPD 4th Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A.G.C.,
April 1, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Attention is invited to the preceding 2d and 3d Indorsements.

2. The program for road, trail and railroad construction contained in paragraph 3, basic communication, is approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Defense Project in place of the road, trail and railroad program approved by 3d Indorsement, February 18, 1941, to the letter, subject: "Military Road and Trail Program, Hawaiian Department", AG 611 Haw. Dept. (11-8-40) H-WPD.

3. It is desired that you submit a breakdown of the items contained in the road and trail program approved herein to show the expenditures contemplated for augmentation and for maintenance. In this connection, attention is invited to your 1st Indorsement, January 16, 1941, to the letter, subject: "Maintenance and repairs of Fortifications, Estimate of Funds for FY 1943" (Engr. 121.2, Forts), in which you request funds for the maintenance of roads. The breakdown requested is necessary to insure that no duplication will be encountered in the defense of estimates to be submitted for the completion of this program.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General, The Adjutant General.

Incl. w/d
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

Proposed program, tactical items

Priority			Type		Estimated cost by troop constr.
Old	Rec.		Present	Rec.	
25	1*a*	Schofield-Waikana	Pack Trail	Motor Trail	$170,000
28	*b*	Kunia-Palehua	Motor Trail	10′ WB Macadam	75,000
23	*c*	Pupukea-Black Junction	Pack Trail	Improve	12,720
32	*d*	Poanoho Trail	Foot Trail	Improve	10,000
20	*e*	Wiliwilinui Road	Dirt Road	10′ Class B	17,900
21	*f*	Wiliwilinui Trail	Foot Trail	Pack Trail	10,000
1	2*a*	Fort Weaver-155mm Gun Positions.	None	10′ Class B	8,900
2	*b*	Fort Rugor Roads	None	10′ Class B	4,000
3	*c*	Barbers Point East SL Route	None	SL Trail	1,000
4	*d*	Malli Marker SL Route	None	SL Trail	6,000
5	*e*	Mailiili SL Route	None	SL Trail	6,600
8	3*a*	Barbers Point Road Net Paving	Coral Roads	Paved Motor Roads	75,000
10	*b*	Wahiawa-Pupukea Paving	Motor Trail	10′ Class A & B	200,000
6	*c*	Koera Point SL Route	None	SL Trail	1,000
7	*d*	Wailea Point SL Route	None	SL Trail	1,000
17	*e*	Fahuhu CP Route	None	OP Trail	2,100
11	4*a*	Wainea Pupukea	Foot Trail	10′ Class B	45,000
None	4	Alternate Crossing S. Faloraun Gulch.	Raised Ford	Bridge	6,000
14	5*a*	Ordnance Magazine Area, Schofield Barracks.		22′ Class A	33,000
20	*b*	Manaushua Ridge Route	Motor Trail	Water Bound Macadam.	74,900
19	*c*	Koolau Ridge Trail	Foot Trail	Improve	
24	*d*	Kaiwailon Trail	Foot Trail	Improve	
26	*e*	Waiawa Route	Foot Trail	Improve	
15*a*	6*a*	Haleiwa-Opaeula Approach Road	Dirt Road	Improve	111,800
15*b*	*b*	Fawalloe-Anahulu " "	Dirt Road	Improve	
15*c*	*c*	Ashley Station " "	Dirt Road	Improve	
18	*d*	Kopuhi OP Route	Foot Trail	Improve	
16	7*a*	Kahuhu-155mm Gun Positions	Dirt Road	10′ Class A	9,300
27	*b*	Fua Palailai OP Route	Foot Trail	10′ Class B	10,000
		Total			$901,020

A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

[7] Engr. 611 5th Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 26 May 1941.

To: The adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to the following correspondence:

a. AG 611, Haw. Dept. (11–8–40) M–WPD; Military Road and Trail Program, Hawaiin Department.

b. AG 660 (4–19–41) M; Expenditure Program, Seacoast Defense Fund, Fiscal Year 1942

c. Eng. 121.2 (Forts); Maintenance and Repair of Fortifications, Estimate of Funds for Fiscal Year 1943, (cited in Paragraph 3, 3rd Indorsement above).

2. *a.* Road, trail and railroad program submitted in reference *a* was approved by War Department 3rd Indorsement, February 18, 1941, subject to the following:

(1) That Mr. Moskowitz be contacted to secure a maximum of the unobligated portion of $446,000.00, previously allotted the PRA for Hawaii, for the construction of the road and trail items in the approved program.

(2) That revised estimates be submitted for the railroad items in the approved program.

b. 4th Indorsement, this headquarters, April 4, 1941, submitted the following:

(1) Recommendation that $446,000.00 available to the PRA be not diverted from the purpose for which originally allotted, namely, construction of the Wahiama cut-off and the Kolokolo-Waiamoa Road.

(2) Revised estimates for the railroad items and reduced estimates for the road and trails portions of the program by the $70,400.00 made available on December 7, 1940.

(3) Cross-referenced the originally approved program, items 1–19 inclusive, with the additional items, 20–29 inclusive, approved herein and submitted revised estimates in the amount of $951,020.00 for the road and trail items and $298,000.00 for the railroad items. The total cost, $1,249,620.00 supersedes estimate of $1,370,020.00 reported in basic letter herewith.

[*8*] 3. Reference *b* informed this headquarters that regular estimates for Seacoast Defense funds, FY 1942 include $300,000.00 for the construction of the railroad items and $50,000.00 for road and trail items. Release of these funds will cover the construction of the railroads $298,600.00) and will reduce the required funds for the completion of the roads and trails to $901,020.00.

4. *a.* Reference *c* submitted estimates in the amount of $286,000.00 for the upkeep of military roads and trails during FY 1943. These estimates were based upon the maintenance of these roads and trails already constructed in this department, since at the time of submission, the augmentation program did not have War Department approval. The great increase in FY 1943 estimates over those of previous years has been due primarily first, to the necessity of procuring new plant and equipment as replacements for outworn units and second, to the necessity supplanting WPA employees with hired labor as a result of the increasing non-availability of the former.

b. The breakdown of the $286,000.00 estimate showed the proportional amounts of the total which would be expended on existing roads and trails. In view of the approval by 4th Indorsement of the revised road, railroad, and trail program, which contains funds for the improvement of certain existing roads, the original breakdown of FY 1943 maintenance estimates is no longer applicable. Specifically, maintenance funds for the Wahiana-Purukea Road and Barbers Point Road net can be reduced considerably; at the same time, however, the construction of new roads and trails during FY 1943 and ensuing years. Attached as inclosure No. 1 is a revised tabulation of maintenance funds required during FY 1943 for all existing roads and trails and those to be constructed under the approved program. This breakdown shows specifically the purposes for which these funds will be expended. Revised estimates decrease the funds originally requested by $34,000.00.

c. 1st Indorsement, January 16, 1941, which forwarded the estimates cited in paragraph 5a, recommended immediate release of $100,000.00 of the $286,000.00. This $100,000.00 is necessary for the purchase of materials and additional plant and the hiring of labor for the maintenance of long neglected existing roads and trails, funds for the improvement of which have not been included in the approved augmentation program.

[*9*] 5. As explained in the foregoing paragraphs, there is no duplication in the funds still required for the construction of the approved augmentation program, $1,249,620.00 or $901,020.00 if the $350,000.00 in FY 1942 estimates is made available and the funds, totaling $252,000.00, required for maintenance: the $1,249,620.00 construction estimate includes no funds for maintenance and the $252,000.00 maintenance estimate includes no funds for new construction.

6. It is recommended:

a. That in accordance with the revised estimates cited in paragraphs 3b (3) and 4, above, funds in the amount of $901,020.00 for the completion of the approved road, trail and railroad program be included in FY 1942 estimates to supplement the $350,000 expected to be released.

(*b*) That the revised estimates in the amount of $252,000.00 be substituted for the $236,000.00 now included in FY 1943 estimates for the maintenance and repair of military roads and trails and that $100,000.00 of this amount be released to this department during FY 1942.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

1 Incl: Revised estimate.
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[*10*] Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.
AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41) MC 6th Ind. 21-H/agb-1712

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *June 9, 1941.*

To: Chief of Coast Artillery and Chief of Engineers, IN TURN:
For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:

1 Incl. n/o

———— ————,
Adjutant General.

611/45-A-10 7th Ind. 3.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Office, Chief of Coast Artillery,
June 12, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers.

1. The records of this office indicate that the necessary action has been taken with a view to accomplishing the recommendations appearing in paragraph 6 *a* of 5th Indorsement, assuming that that portion of the recommendation reading "FY 1942" was intended to read "Fy 1943"

2. With respect to the recommendation appearing in paragraph 6 *b* of 5th indorsement, preliminary estimates for FY 1943 do not now include a specific item for maintenance and repair of military roads and trails. The total sum now appearing in the preliminary estimates FY 1943 under Project 11—Alteration, maintenance and repair of fortifications—is $225,000. Fy 1942 estimates for Project 11 total $173,710. The portion of these funds to be applied to maintenance of roads and to strictly fortification works appears to be discretionary with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. However, the basis for estimating these funds for FY 1941 included specifically $59,000 as applicable to road maintenance.

For the Chief of Coast Artillery:

LEONARD L. DAVIS,
Lt. Col., C. A. C.,
Assistant.

1 Inclosure
(Dup. w/d).
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GEIDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[*11*] C. of E. 611 (Hawaii) 12.
Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.

8th Ind. 6-E

OFFICE C. OF E.,
July 1, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General.

1. Reference paragraph 6 *a* of 5th Indorsement and paragraph 1 of preceding Indorsement, it is recommended that authority be granted to include the $901,000 required for the completion of the approved road, trail and railroad program in the supplemental estimates for Fiscal Year 1943 at the first opportunity.

2. The remarks of the Chief of Coast Artillery in paragraph 2 of 7th Indorsement are concurred in.

For the Chief of Engineers:

GEORGE MAYO,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Fortification Section.

1 Inclosure n/c.
CG of OCCA
A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[12] Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.
AG 611 (2-10-41) MC-K EGA

9th Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *July 18, 1941.*
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Funds in the amount of $300,000 for railroads and $50,000 for roads and trails are now available from FY 1942 appropriations for construction contained in the approved Road, Trail, and Railroad Program. These funds will soon be released to the District Engineer. Additional funds in the amount of $900,000 have been included in tentative estimates, FY 1943 for the completion of the approved Road and Trail Program. This latter amount will be requested at an earlier time in the event that further supplemental FY 1942 estimates are prepared.

2. General maintenance funds to the amount of $173,710 are now available from FY 1942 appropriations and a substantial amount thereof has been released to the District Engineer, Honolulu. The portion of these funds to be applied to the maintenance of roads is discretionary with you. Additional general maintenance funds to the amount of $223,000 have been included in preliminary estimates, FY 1943.

3. An additional amount of $140,000 will be included at the first opportunity in estimates to be submitted to provide further funds for maintenance of roads and trails in your department.

By order of the Secretary of War:

_____ _____,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Incl. w/d
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1B]

Via "Clipper"
Air Mail
Engr. 600.12

COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 April '41

[EXTRACT]

Subject: Construction at Bellows Field, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to 1st Indorsement, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 370.5 (2-15-41) M-D, dated 5 March 1941 which authorized the permanent assignment of the 86th Observation Squadron and the 58th Bombardment Squadron at Bellows Field.

* * * * * * *

5. The improvement of the runways consist in lengthening the present runway from about 2800′ to 3400′ and widening from 150′ to 300′. The new runway is 5000′ long and 300′ wide. Cross-connection the existing and the new runway is a paved taxi strip and parking strip 300′ wide and 2200′ long with a servicing mat 300′ x 600′ adjacent to the taxi strip. All runways, servicing mats and taxi strips will be asphaltic concrete. Other installations required are an airdrome control tower and an aqua-gasoline system of 600,000 gallon capacity. The necessary

tanks for this gasoline system are on hand. A complete system of airport lighting and sewer, water, and power utilities will be necessary. Miscellaneous installations include man-proof fences around vital installations, improvement of the drainage of the camp area, pistol and 1000'' machine gun ranges, and roads and sidewalks.

* * * * * * *

7. The improvements recommended are all necessary. Funds for improving the runways in particular should be expedited. The District Engineer has informed me that it is possible at this time to secure on the mainland the necessary plant and equipment for this paving but that unless contracted for in the very near future, it will not be much longer available.

* * * * * * *

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls:
No. 1 Tabulation of Housing Needs
2 Layout Map*
3 Tabulation of Cost Estimates

*(Filed in Drafting Room; Bellows Field #1)

No R/S was prepared. Verbal approval of C/S and signature secured by Major Fleming, 5 April 1941.
Copy to Hawaiian Air Corps 4/8/41
Copy to District Engineer 4/17/41

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Additional funds for Completion of Authorized Mobilization Housing Project, Hawaiian Department

2nd Ind. (12-P3)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,
Washington, D. C., June 26, 1941

To: The Quartermaster General.

1. Reference is made to Paragraph 1.c. of basic communication which indicates that funds in the amount of $990,769 will be included in future estimates for the projects at Wheeler, Hickam, and Bellows Fields, as requested in Paragraph 2.*a*,*b*, and *c* of basic communication.

For the Chief of the Air Corps

FRANK M. KENNEDY
Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Buildings and Grounds Division

Copied from Project Letter B-1
A true copy:
Edward von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F.A.

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941.

Engr. 600.12
Subject: Construction at Barking Sands Field, Kauai, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's Office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The

Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Barking Sands Field on Kauai be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 6 officers and 107 men, and 1 National Guard company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 10 officers and 223 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, two heavy bombardment squadrons of 37 officers and 206 men each from Hickam Field will be sent to Barking Sands for training. While these bombardment squadrons will change, two will be temporarily stationed at all times at this field. The total garrison at Barking Sands including temporary and permanent troops will be 84 officers and 635 men.

3. Some buildings have been and are being erected at this field by the WPA. Additional buildings will be necessary and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required program. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 1 a tabulation showing the buildings, built and building by the WPA and the additional buildings required which include administration buildings, shops, warehouses, recreation buildings, mess halls, officers' quarters and other structures. Complete utility system should be provided for this camp. All buildings to be mobilization type.

4. Other construction recommended consists in improvement of flying conditions by the grading of two runways 5000′ by 500′ and the paving of a 200-strip on each runway for a length of 5000′, the construction of a servicing mat and the installation of a complete airport lighting system. Storage for 450,000 gallons of gasoline will soon be installed by the District Engineer with funds now available to him; in this storage nine of the eighty [2] 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks are now designed for the aqua system; at this time, however, the tanks are being installed for storage only and if at a later date the necessity develops, this storage system can be readily converted into the aqua system. Also included in the cost estimates are miscellaneous items such as an airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000″ ranges and man-proof fencing around vital installations. Roads within the camp area have also been included in the cost estimates; an improvement to the access road to this military reservation from the nearest point on the Kauai belt road has been the subject of discussion with the local public roads administration under the provision of Section 18 of the Federal Highway Act of 1940. Surveys of this road are now being made by the Territorial Highway Department; these surveys have not been completed. The local Public Roads Administration officials, based on a reconnaissance, estimate that this access road will cost about $150,000. As it is doubtful whether either territorial or Federal Highway funds will be available for construction on this amount has also been included in the estimates. Telephone costs have been estimated at 2½% of building costs as directed in Chief Signal officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the building costs a constructive evaluation of the work already done by the WPA based upon costs of the new buildings recommended in this letter was used to arrive at the total costs.

5. There are inclosed as Inclosures Nos. 2 and 3, a layout drawing of this field and a tabulation of cost estimates of the buildings and other improvements required. These cost estimates were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include not only direct but also the indirect costs of the job. The total required to complete the installation is $1,772,220.

6. It is recommended that the improvement of Barking Sands be authorized and that funds in amount of $1,772,220.00 be released to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to initiate this construction.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls: #1—Bldg tabulation
#2—Layout drawing
#3—Cost Estimate

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[1] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941.

In reply refer to:
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 600.12

Subject: Construction at Hilo Airport.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Hilo airport be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men, and 2 National Guard companies to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men each, total 12 officers and 382 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, one heavy bombardment squadron of 37 officers and 206 men from Hickam Field will be sent to this field for training. While this squadron will change, at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison at Hilo therefore will be 49 officers and 588 men.

3. Some buildings are now being erected at this field by the WPA. Additional buildings are needed and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required program. The buildings now being built and the additional ones required are tabulated in the cost estimates. A complete utility system is recommended. Buildings will be mobilization type.

4. The runways at the Hilo airport will be improved through a CAA contract under supervision of the District Engineer, Honolulu. Additional improvements needed are the installation of storage for 450,000 gallons of gasoline; for this 9 of the 80 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks were designed for the aqua system, but simple storage only is recommended at this time. If the need later develops, this storage can readily be converted to the aqua system as all fittings will be available on the tanks.

[2] 5. There are inclosed as Inclosure No. 1 a tabulation of cost estimates, and as Inclosure No. 2 a layout map of the field. In addition to the items already mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous items such as roads, airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000 inch ranges and telephone installations. These telephone costs have been estimated at 2½ per cent of the building costs as directed in Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the total building costs a constructive evaluation of the work now being done by the WPA was combined with the estimated costs of construction recommended in this letter. The estimates in the tabulation were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include indirect as well as direct costs of the job.

6. It is recommended that this construction on the present military reservation at the Hilo airport be authorized and that funds in the amount of $670,140 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.

2 Incls: #1 Cost Estimates
#2 Layout map

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941

In reply refer to:
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Subject: Construction at Homestead Field, Molokai, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's Office, file AG 560 (3-7-41)M-G-M, 14 March 1941, Subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Homestead Field, Molokai, T. H., be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men, and 1 National Guard Company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, one pursuit squadron of 33 officers and 157 men from Wheeler Field will be sent to this field for training. While this squadron will change, at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison at Homestead Field therefore will be 41 officers and 323 men.

3. Some buildings have been and are being built at this field by the WPA. Additional buildings are needed and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required program. The buildings now being built and the additional ones required are tabulated in the cost estimates. A complete utility system is recommended. Buildings will be mobilization type.

4. The runways at the Homestead Field will be improved through a CAA contract under supervision of the District Engineer, Honolulu. Additional improvements needed are the installation of storage for 350,000 gallons of gasoline; for this 7 of the 30 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks were designed for the aqua system, but simple storage only is recommended at this time. If the need later develops, this storage can readily be converted to the aqua system as all fittings will be available on the tanks.

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

[2] 5. There is inclosed a tabulation of cost estimates. In addition to the items already mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous items such as roads, airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000 inch ranges and telephone installations. These telephone costs have been estimated at 2½ per cent of the building costs as directed in Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the total building costs a constructive evaluation of the work now being done by the WPA was combined with the estimated costs of construction recommended in this letter. The estimates in the tabulation were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include indirect as well as direct costs of the job.

6. It is recommended that this construction on the present military reservation at Homestead Field be authorized and that funds in the amount of $407,600.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.

1 Incl: Cost Estimates.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., May 2, 1941.

Engr. 600.12
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Subject: Construction at Morse Field, Hawaii
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating condition. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Morse Field on Hawaii be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 6 officers and 107 men, and 1 National Guard company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 10 officers and 223 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, two heavy bombardment squadrons of 37 officers and 206 men each from Hickam Field will be sent to Morse Field for training. While these bombardment squadrons will change, two will be temporarily stationed a large part of the time at this field. The total garrison at Morse Field including temporary and permanent troops will be 84 officers and 635 men.

3. Some buildings have been built at this station by troop labor. Other buildings have been and are being built by the WPA. Additional buildings and improvements are necessary; I believe that the requirements of training preclude any extensive use of troop labor and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither his material money nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required program. These additional buildings will all be of mobilization type construction for use as operations buildings, shops, administrative and supply buildings, barracks, mess halls, magazines, etc. A complete system of utilities should be provided.

4. Other construction recommended consists in improvement of flying facilities by the paving of a main runway 3400 feet long and 300 feet wide, and its extension by grading, leveling and light paving to a length of 4150 feet and width of 400 feet. Because of prevailing wind conditions, only one paved runway is considered necessary by the Commanding General, [2] Hawaiian Air Force. Necessary taxi mats, service mats and warming up aprons will be graded and paved. A complete airport lighting system will be installed. Gasoline storage for 450,000 gallons utilizing nine of the eighty 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be installed; because of the shortage of water at this field, this will be plain storage and not the aqua system. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 1, a layout map of this field. It will be noted that considerable areas in the vicinity of the runway are shown for light paving. This is necessary; the soil at this field is very fine and with the prevailing high velocity wind there is a serious dust problem as this dust affects the engines of the planes. The shortage of water makes stabilization by sodding or vegetation impracticable, and the most practical way that this problem can be solved is to stabilize by light paving.

5. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 2 a tabulation of cost estimates of the buildings and other improvements required. In addition to the items already mentioned, miscellaneous items such as roads, pistol and 1,000 inch ranges, an Airdrome Control tower, and telephone installations have been included. These telephone costs have been estimated at 2½ percent of building costs as directed in Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the building costs a constructive evaluation of the work already done by troop labor and the WPA based upon costs of the new buildings recommended in this letter was used to arrive at the total costs. The estimates in the tabulation were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include the indirect as well as the direct costs of the job.

6. It is recommended that the improvement of Morse Field be authorized and that funds in the amount of $1,687,530 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2. Incls: #1—Layout Map
#2—Cost Estimates

A true copy
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

[CONFIDENTIAL]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Ft. Shafter, T. H.

Engr. 600.12
Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. At present the Hawaiian Air Force has under lease an unimproved landing field located at Haleiwa, on the north shore of Oahu, about ten miles airline distance from Wheeler Field. There are no paved runways, and no installations other than boundary marking lights. No permanent detachment is quartered there. The field is used for practice landings, etc. by the pursuit aviation at Wheeler Field.

3. It is proposed that this field be improved by the grading and paving of one runway 4000' by 300' and by the installation of other facilities for flying operations. These will include an operations building and airdrome control tower and storage for 100,000 gallons of gasoline using two of the eighty 50,000 gallon tanks now on hand. This storage will utilize the aqua system. A small galvanized warehouse for oil storage will be provided.

4. The only garrison at this field will consist of a small permanent detachment to refuel and handle planes on the ground and to operate radio and control installations. For this detachment a combined barracks and mess hall will be provided.

5. It is recommended that the improvement of Haleiwa Airport be authorized

as outlined above and that funds in the amount of $450,000 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu for this construction.

1 Incl: Cost Estimate

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2d Lt. F. A.

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H.
AG 580 (5-22-41) MC RPM/agb-1712

1st Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *May 27, 1941.*
To: Chief of the Air Corps and Chief of Engineers, IN TURN:

For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:

_____ _____,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl. n/c

2nd Ind. (9)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,
Washington, D. C., May 31, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers.
Approval recommended.
For the Chief of the Air Corps:

[S] Edward P. Curtis,
EDWARD P. CURTIS,
Major, Air Corps, Executive, Plans Division.

1 Incl. n/c
A True Copy:
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

600.1 (Haleiwa Airfield, T. H.) 1

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H. (Let. from Hawaiian Dept. H", to AGO, 5/22/41)

3rd Ind. 3-N

OFFICE, C. OF E., *June 10, 1941.*
To the Adjutant General.

1. Approval recommended.

2. It is assumed that the District Engineer at Honolulu collaborated with the Hawaiian Department Commander in preparation of the estimate inclosed with the basic communication. Further delay in verification of this estimate is not considered advisable inasmuch as the funds required can be rectified if necessary in the future.

3. Funds for this construction at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H. are available in this office under the Miscellaneous Construction Reserve provided this construction is of a high priority, the urgency for which is not known in this office.

4. If authorized it is requested that the amount of $450,000 be approved for allotment from funds reserved under the Miscellaneous Construction Reserve for construction of the buildings, gasoline storage and runways as specified in the inclosed estimate.

For the Chief of Engineers:

JOHN R. HARDIN,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Construction Section.

Inclosure: Sub 1
A True Copy:
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H.
AG 580 (5-22-41) MC-D 4th Ind. RPM/agb-1712

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *June 25, 1941.*

To: Chief of Air Corps.

1. You are authorized to proceed with plans for construction of an airfield at Haleiwa, on the island of Oahu, as indicated in basic communication.

2. You are authorized to include in the next available estimates, funds for the accomplishment of this project, in the amount of $450,000, as recommended in basic communication.

3. The allotment of Miscellaneous Construction Reserve Funds for this project, as recommended in paragraph 3, 3rd Indorsement, is not favorably considered as these funds are required for other purposes.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. R. VAN SICKLER,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl.—n/c
Copies to:
Chief of Engrs. Ref. his 3rd Ind., 600.1 (Haleiwa Airfield, T. H.) 1. 6-10-41, to TAG.
Commanding General, Haw. Dept. Ref. his basic ltr., Engr. 600.12. 5-22-41, to TAG, w/cys. of 1, 2, & 3 Inds.
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[1] [CONFIDENTIAL]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
22 May 1941.

In reply refer to:
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 600.12
Subject: Construction at Burns Field, Kauai, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Burns Field be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men, 1 National Guard company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 enlisted men. In addition to this garrison, one heavy reconnaissance squadron of 43 officers and 233 men will be sent to this field for training. Either this squadron or a heavy bombardment squadron will be stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison at the field will therefore consist of 51 officers and 399 men.

3. Some buildings have been erected at this field by soldier labor. Other buildings are necessary and soldier labor is not available for their construction. These buildings have been tabluated in the cost estimates, Inclosure No. 1. All buildings will be of mobilization type construction. The installation of a complete system of utilities is recommended.

4. The runways at Burns Field are authorized for improvement by a CAA project. Additional improvements needed are the installation of storage for 200,000 gallons of gasoline; for this four of the eighty 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks were designed for the aqua system, but simple storage only is recommended at this time. If the need later develops, this storage can be readily converted to the aqua system as all fittings will be available on the tanks.

[2] 5. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 1 a tabulation of cost estimates. In addition to the items already mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous items such as roads, airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000-inch range and telephone installations. These telephone costs have been estimated at 2½% of the building costs as directed by the Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 1941. The estimates include direct as well as indirect costs of the job.

6. It is recommended that this construction be authorized on the present military reservation at Burns Field and that funds in the amount of $636,163.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S Army, Commanding.

1 Incl: Cost Estimates
A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 600.12
Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, the Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. Included in the plan for dispersion of facilities is a proposed airport on the Island of Lania. A location has been selected and preliminary negotiations for leasing have been made. The land is owned by the Hawaiian Pineapple Company which is willing to lease it to the government on a twenty-five (25) year lease in return for one dollar a year rental and the use of the flying field. The location of the field, barracks area, and a proposed bombing range are shown on map, scale 1/62,500 inclosed as Inclosure No. 1. Project letter for the bombing range has already been submitted by letter to The Adjutant General, subject: "Construction of Night Bombing Range, Island of Lanai" file Engr. 686 dated 16 May 1941.

3. It is proposed to improve this field by the grading and paving of two 5,000' runways 300' wide and by the installation of facilities for flying operations. These will include the necessary operations buildings and shops, airdrome control tower and storage for 200,000 gallons of gasoline using four of the eighty 50,000 gallon tanks now on hand. Although these tanks were designed for the aqua system, only simple storage is proposed, although all the necessary fittings for later conversion to the aqua system will be installed.

4. The rotating garrison at this field will consist of an air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men and a National Guard company for local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this garrison, a pur-

suit squadron of 33 officers and 157 men will be temporarily stationed at this field for training. While this squadron will change at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison, therefore, will be 41 officers and 323 men.

5. There is attached as Inclosure No. 2 a tabulation showing in detail the buildings and other construction proposed with estimated costs. These costs include not only direct but also indirect costs of the job. The total cost shown on this tabulation is $1,990,000.00.

6. The following is recommended:

a. That this headquarters be authorized to proceed with negotiations for the lease of this site.

b. That construction and improvements outlined in Inclosure No. 2 be authorized.

c. That funds in the amount of $1,990,000.00 be alloted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete this installation.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2 Incls: #1 Map; #2 Cost Estimates.
A True Copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai.

AG 580 (5-22-41)MC 1st Ind. RPM/agb-1712

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *May 27, 1941.*

To: Chief of the Air Corps and Chief of Engineers, *IN TURN:*

For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:

_____ _____,
Adjutant General.

2 Incls. n/c

2nd Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,
Washington, D. C. June 2, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers.

Approval recommended. Attention is invited to the Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, (WPD 2550-22), 6-10-41, Subject: Estimates for the Construction of Airports for Hawaiian Air Force.

For the Chief of the Air Corps:

EDWARD P. CURTIS,
Major, Air Corps, Executive, Plans Division.

2 Incls. n/c
A true copy.
Edward von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

600.1 (Hawaiian Dept. Airfields) 83
Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai.

3d Ind. 3-N

OFFICE, C. OF E., *June 16, 1941.*

To the Adjutant General.

1. Approval recommended.

2. The estimate of cost as given in the basic communication was prepared by the District Engineer at Honolulu, T. H.

3. If authorized, it is requested that the amount of $1,990,000 be approved for allotment to the District Engineer at Honolulu for the construction of buildings, utilities, runways, and other installations on the Island of Lanai, as recommended

in the basic communication and inclosure thereto, from funds reserved under the Fifth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act (Pilot Training Schools Reserve), approved April 5, 1941.

For the Chief of Engineers:

JOHN R. HARDIN,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Construction Section.

Inclosures: Subs 1–2
A true Copy:
Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

Subject: Construction of Airfield at Lanai, T. H.
AG 580 (5–22–41) MC–G ESA

4th Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *August 8, 1941.*

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. You are authorized to proceed with negotiations for the lease of the site referred to in basic communication.

2. The construction as recommended by you is authorized except that "Theatre Operations Type of Construction" be substituted for the "mobilization type" requested.

3. It is desired that funds required be included in the next budget estimates.

By order of the Secretary of War:

———— ————,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls. n/c
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut F. A.

[1] [CONFIDENTIAL]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941.

Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 600.12

Subject: Construction at Proposed Airport, Parker Ranch Area, Hawaii, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3–7–41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. There has been for some time a realization that an additional field was necessary on the Island of Hawaii, and extensive studies have been made on its location. The best location found was about four miles from the town of Waimea on land owned by the Territory of Hawaii, and at present under lease to private cattle interests. The site consists of about 1,360 acres, and it is believed that the land can be transferred to the Federal government under Section 91 of the Organic Act. Preliminary negotiations to this end have been opened with the Territory. The location of the field is shown on map, scale 1/62,500, inclosed as Inclosure No. 1.

3. It is proposed that this field be improved by the grading and paving of three 5000-foot runways and by the installation of facilities for flying operations.

These will include the necessary operations buildings, and shops, airdrome control tower, and storage for 300,000 gallons of gasoline, using 6 of the eighty 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand. Although these tanks were designed for the aqua system, only simple storage is proposed, as the shortage of water will preclude use of the aqua system. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 2 a print of Department Engineer Map No. 11-1-25D41 which shows the boundary of the land and the location of the three 5000-foot runways.

4. The rotating garrison at this field will consist of an air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men and a National Guard company for local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, a heavy bombardment squadron of 37 officers and [2] 206 men will be temporarily stationed at this field for training. While these squadrons will change at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison therefore will be 45 officers and 372 men.

5. There is attached as Inclosure No. 3 a tabulation showing in detail the buildings and other construction proposed with estimated costs. These costs include not only direct but also indirect costs of the job. The total cost shown on this tabulation is $1,992,600.00.

6. The following is recommended:

a. That this headquarters be authorized to proceed with negotiations for the acquisition of this site.

b. That construction and improvements outlined in Inclosure No. 3 be authorized.

c. That funds in amount of $1,992,600.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete this installation.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls:
#1 Map
#2 Print, Map No. 11-1-25D41
#3 Estimated Costs

A True Copy
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

[1] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., April 14, 1941.

In reply refer to:
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 600.12
Subject: Additional Airdrome, Hawaiian Department
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. The recent and anticipated increases in the Pursuit Wing of the Hawaiian Air Force have emphasized the need of an airdrome to supplement the existing facilities at Wheeler Field. The latter field is now badly overcrowded with the planes stationed there.

2. A very thorough study has been made of the location of this additional air field by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Department Engineer and the District Engineer. At least five separate locations were given serious consideration; one of these in the Barbers Point area was discarded first because of its proximity to the beach and second, because of objections by the Navy to interference with the new carrier aviation base in the Ewa plane area. Another location at Kahuku was discarded because of its proximity to the beach. A third on the flat ground about three miles north of Wahiawa was discarded by the Hawaiian Air Force because of bad flying conditions from turbulent air conditions. A fourth location in the general area to the east of the crossing over Kipapa Gulch by the Kamehameha Highway was discarded for similar flying reasons. The area finally selected between the Kipapa and Waikakalua Gulches and west of the Kamehameha Highway is believed to be the best possible location of this airdrome on the island of Oahu. There is inclosed a map on the scale of 1/20,000 showing the location of this field.

3. The garrison to be stationed at this field will consist of the 15th Pursuit Group of 84 officers and 729 enlisted men, an air base group (single) 28 officers and 490 men, and miscellaneous detachments of 5 officers and 75 men. Total strength 117 officers and 1,294 men. Complete construction with mobilization type facilities must be provided for the housing of this garrison. The present construction authorized for Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields is insufficient or the needs of those three stations and it will be impossible to transfer any of the existing authorization to this new field.

4. It is estimated that at least 75% or 88 of the officers will be married and of this number 10% or 9 will be senior officers. Since there are no locations in this vicinity where these officers can be placed upon commutation and live in private quarters and also because of the tremendous housing shortage on Oahu, it is believed that Government quarters should be provided for these married officers. Recognizing that this [2] field must be constructed under emergency appropriations, it is proposed that these quarters not be as elaborate as usually constructed on Army Posts. With the unit costs estimated, houses similar in construction to the average in Honolulu can be provided. In addition it is also estimated that there will be135 married noncommissioned officers in this garrison. Adequate quarters will also be provided for these married enlisted men and it is recommended that the War Department secure from the Federal Building Administration authorization for the construction of 135 low cost housing units at this field.

5. The improvement for flying operations consists of the installation of three runways each 5,000 feet long with a graded width of 400 feet and a paved width of 200 feet; the paving of taxy strip 200' x 5,000' and a servicing apron 300' x 600'. A complete installation of airport lighting is proposed. Bunkers for the protection of airplanes against hostile bombardment will be installed as part of the airport and the cost of these bunkers and necessary approaches are included in the cost estimates. It is also proposed to install storage for 900,000 gallons of gasoline with the aqua system. In this storage 18 of the 80 50,000 gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized.

6. The housing proposed will be mobilization type construction. It will include barracks, mess halls, and recreation facilities for the men, buildings for flying operations such as an airdrome control tower, Air Corps technical schools, supply rooms, and housing for maintenance facilities. In addition mobilization type construction is proposed for the necessary post overhead, buildings such as a fire station, a guard house and an infirmary and warehouses for commissaries, etc. A complete system of utilities is covered in the estimates. In designing the water supply and sewage disposal systems provision has been made for the eventual expansion of the garrison to 4,000 men. This increase in capacity is proposed to take care of the possibility of assigning an antiaircraft regiment as part of this garrison. Shown on the map accompanying this letter are two areas shaded in blue. The area near the runway will be used for the construction of the service buildings incidental to flying operations. The 40 acre tract shown to the north of the runways will be utilized for construction of housing facilities for both officers, married noncoms, and enlisted men. The land where the runways and the adjacent blue area are located is now cultivated cane land. The area of the 40 acre tract is cultivated pineapple land; the cane land involved is about 250 acres minimum. If these sites are secured by lease it is estimated that the cane land will cost $30.00 per acre per year and the pineapple land $25.00 per acre per year, or a total annual rental of $8,500. If this land is purchased the cane land will cost about $1,000 and the pineapple land about $500.00 per acre; a total cost of about $270,000.

7. There is inclosed a tabulation showing the buildings which should be constructed with cost figures and cost estimates on runways and other flying facilities and on utility systems. These estimates show a total estimated cost of $4,668,950 not including cost of land. As stated shows if the land is leased there will be a yearly rental of $8,500. If the land is purchased the total cost is estimated at $4,938,950.

[3] 8. It is recommended that the proposed location of this new field be approved and that funds in the amount of $4,668,950 be allotted for construction if the War Department decides that securing the land on a lease basis is satisfactory. It is further recommended that if the War Department decides that this land should be purchased, additional funds in the amount of $270,000 be made available.

(s) WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2 Incls:
#1 Map
#2 Tabulation
A true copy.
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[CONFIDENTIAL]

PARAPHRASE OF RADIO FROM T A G:

Fifteenth Pursuit airbase at Kipapa is disapproved Stop Base is to be located at Kahuku Stop Personal letter twenty one July (?) from General Marshall to General Short covers this subject.

ULIO.

True copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1C]

[1] [SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., April 14, 1941.

In reply refer to: Engr. 600.96
Subject: Protection of Seacoast Defense Batteries.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to your secret radiogram No. 708, 4 April 1941, which was on the subject of protection for the seacoast defense batteries in this department and which suggested a conference with Mr. J. C. Letts of the Office of the Chief of Engineers during his recent visit in this department.

2. This radiogram stated that a letter covering this construction was being forwarded by mail. This letter has not as yet been received in this department In order to save time, however, we're submitting recommendations without waiting for the arrival of this letter as its subject matter was explained in general by Mr. Letts.

3. There are three batteries involved in this protection; these are the two 16-inch gun batteries, Battery Hatch at Fort Barrette and Battery Williston at Fort Weaver and a 12-inch barbette gun battery, Battery Closson at Fort Kamehameha. A study of this problem has been made jointly by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, the District Engineer and Mr. Letts. They recommend the casemating of Battery Hatch and Battery Closson and provision of a tunnel type shield for Battery Williston. There is inclosed a chart showing the fields of fire of these batteries after the protection is installed. From this chart it will be seen that Battery Hatch has a field of fire from azimuth 295 to azimuth 80; and Battery Williston, a 360° field of fire. The red shading on this chart indicates the area in which the fire of four 16-inch guns can be placed. The yellow shading shows the additional area which can be covered by the fire of two 16-inch guns at Fort Weaver. The existing range circle of Battery Hatch is shown by the red line and Battery Williston by the black line. The chart indicates that there is an area about 5,000 yards in range west of Oahu which is now covered by the fire of Battery Hatch and which is not covered by the fire of Battery Williston. On the east side of the island the area now covered by fire from Battery Hatch, which is sacrified by the casemating is well in the field covered by Battery Williston. The only loss in coverage is in the 5,000 yards to

the west of the island and in the fact that the general area is now covered by the fire of only two 16-inch guns while under present arrangement this area is in part covered by the fire of four 16-inch guns.

[2] 4. I do not believe that this loss in coverage is at all important when compared to the necessity of providing protection for Battery Hatch in particular, and therefore concur in the recommendations of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

5. Your radio also referred to our letter, subject: "Bombproof Construction for Magazines at Fort Barrette and Fort Weaver," dated 4 February 1941. The recommendations contained in this letter are reiterated. Since the recommendation is made that Battery Williston should have tunnel type shield protection which does not provide any protection for ammunition, a bombproof magazine for at least one-half of the propelling charges should be provided at that battery. Also due to the exposed position of Battery Hatch and the impossibility of camouflaging the existing magazines, it is believed that a bombproof magazine for one-half of the propelling charges should be provided at that battery in addition to the bombproof storage for 50 complete rounds in each casemate.

6. Reference is now made to letter, this headquarters, subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneche Bay, Oahu, T. H." dated 18 February 1941, file 381, in which the War Department was advised that this department was assuming responsibility for the defense of the Kaneche Bay Area. It is believed that the growing military and naval importance of Kaneche Bay aera makes it essential that a major calibre seacoast battery be installed for its protection. The need for this battery is urgent and its installation should not wait upon the manufacture of the armament. It is understood that there are some 12-inch long range gun batteries similar to Battery Closson on the mainland where the need for them no longer exists and it is recommended that the armament of one of these batteries be shipped to this department and funds provided for its emplacement in the Kaneche Bay area.

7. The following is therefore recommended:

a. That protection be provided for Battery Hatch by the construction of casemates and overhead cover, at Battery Closson by the construction of overhead cover, and at Battery Williston by the installation of tunnel type shields.

b. That a bombproof magazine for one-half of the propelling charges be authorized for Battery Williston and a similar magazine be authorized for Battery Hatch in addition to the storage of 50 rounds in each of the casemates.

c. That the armament of a 12-inch gun battery similar to Battery [3] Closson to be obtained from a location on the mainland where it is no longer needed and shipped to this department and installed to cover the Kaneohe Bay area.

(s) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

1 Incl: Chart (Orig of Incl No. 1 is on file at H S C A B)

A True Copy:
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[1] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 31 July 1941.

In reply refer to:
AG 381/20
Kaneohe Bay Project.
Secret

Subject: Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. References:—

A Secret letter HHD to TAG, 14 April 1941, subject: "Protection of Seacoast Defense Batteries" file AG 662.1 (4-14-41)MC-E, HD Engr 600. 96, with 4 indorsements.

B Secret letter TAG to HHD, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-WPD, with 1st Indorsement HHD to TAG dated 16 June 1941.

2. The attached study was prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade in accordance with the directive contained in the 4th indorsement to reference A. In considering this study, reference should be made to a similar study which was submitted as on enclosure to 1st indorsement, reference B.

3. The recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of the attached study of the seacoast and antiaircraft defenses required for the protection of the Kaneohe Bay Naval Base (Incl. #1) are approved with the following exceptions:

a. It is believed a large proportion of the 15 AA searchlights recommended in paragraph 6*a.* should be equipped with SCR 268 sets instead of the M2 sound locators. The severe limitations imposed by the terrain and normal atmospheric conditions present in this area make mandatory the early detection of hostile aerial targets.

b. In order that personnel may be available to establish a headquarters for the Harbor Defenses of Kaneohe Bay, it is believed that instead of augmenting the seacoast personnel, as recommended in paragraph 6*d.* (2) by one battalion (TD) and three separate batteries (HD), that the increase should consist of one Coast Artillery regiment (HD), type B, (T/O 4–71, Nov 1/40), less band and one battalion. This organization will provide the necessary command and staff and attached medical personnel to permit the proper tactical organization of the defenses. The 155mm battalion can take the place of the second battalion of the Harbor Defense Regiment.

[2] 4. It is recommended;

a. That the eventual project for defense of the Kaneohe Bay Naval Air Station and Bellows Field, based on the installation of fixed armament, be as follows:

(1) *Armament:*

(a) Seacoast:

2 155 mm Gun Batteries (latest type).
2 6″ Fixed Gun Batteries (2 guns each).
1 16″ Long Range Casemated Gun Battery of 2 guns on Barbette Carriages.

(b) Antiaircraft:

3 90 mm AA Gun Batteries.
3 37 mm AA Gun Batteries to consist of 10 guns each.
48 Caliber .50 AA Machine Guns.
15 AA searchlights together with a minimum of 6 SCR 268 sets and 9 M2 sound locators.

(2) *Personnel:*

(a) Seacoast Artillery:

1 Battalion Coast Artillery (TD), 155 mm guns, (T/O 4-35, Nov 1/40).
1 Regiment Coast Artillery (HD), type B, less band and one battalion, (T/O 4-71, Nov 1/40).

(b) Antiaircraft Artillery:

1 Regiment Coast Artillery (AA), semi-mobile, less one gun battalion, (T/O 4-111, Nov 1/40).

b. That initially based on armament now available in the Hawaiian Department, the defense be constituted as shown below. The seacoast armament and personnel to be used in this defense must be moved from previously assigned positions in other parts of the island, thereby weakening the defense in other areas.

(1) Considering only personnel now present and available:

1 155 mm Gun Battery.
1 155 mm Gun Battery with additional assignment of five antiaircraft searchlights.
1 8″ Railway Gun Battery.
2 3″ Antiaircraft Gun Batteries.
1 Seacoast Searchlight Battery.

(2) Assuming that personnel under paragraph 4 *a* (2) (a) above will be made available at an early date and using armament now available in War Reserve, the defense can be organized as shown below. Under this plan no movement of armament from present assigned positions is required:

2 155 mm Gun Batteries
1 155 mm Gun Battery with additional assignment of five antiaircraft searchlights.
1 8″ Railway Gun Battery.
2 3″ Antiaircraft Gun Batteries.
1 Seacoast Searchlight Battery.

[3] *e.* That the increase in personnel and in major items of armament recommended in paragraphs 6 *a* and *b*, reference B, insofar as they relate to the Coast Artillery be amended to conform to paragraph 4 *a*, above.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

1-Incl: Revised Study on Seacoast and Antiaircraft Artillery Defense of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station (Secret) in trip.

A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern.
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

[1]
Subject: Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaiian Department.

AG 381 (7-31-41) MC-E 3rd Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *October 30, 1941.*

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Reference is made to:

a. Letter, this office, April 8, 1941, AG 381 (3-13-41) N-WPD, subject: Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.

b. Radio No. 320, your headquarters, September 13, 1941.

c. Letter, your headquarters, September 18, 1941, Engr. 662/4 x 662/7, subject: Provision of three (3) Panama mount 155-mm Battery Positions and one (1) 8-inch Railway Gun Battery Position for the defense of Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.

2. The following temporary measures for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area are approved:

a. Movement of one battery of 8" railway guns now in storage at Fort Kamehameha to Mokapu Peninsula and temporary installation at site designated by you in reference *c* subject to local coordination of site with the Navy.

b. Installation of two batteries 155-mm guns on Panama mounts at sites to be selected by you.

3. Immediate personnel and armament requirements will be set:

a. By the transfer to the Hawaiian Department of the following units at their allotted strengths:

(1) One battalion, 57th Coast Artillery, TD, with battalion section, supply platoon (T/O 4-32) and battalion section, Medical detachment (T/O 4-31), attached, less guns and fire control equipment.

(2) 95th Coast Artillery (AA), Semimobile (less one gun battalion), with armament and equipment on hand. Authority is granted for the reorganization of the 37-mm gun battalion of this regiment into three [2] 37 mm gun batteries (8 guns each) and one (1) Caliber .50 MO battery (AA) (12 guns).

b. By the local activation of one 8" railway battery (R/O 4-47) from personnel available in the Hawaiian Department.

4. Guns and fire control equipment for the battalion of 155 mm guns and the 8" railway battery will be furnished from defense reserves on hand in the Hawaiian Department. Shortages will be filled in accordance with approved War Department priorities.

5. Personnel and equipment mentioned in Paragraph 3 *a.* above will be dispatched to the Hawaiian Department by first available shipping. It is estimated that troops will begin to arrive in your department about December 1, 1941. The shipment of the major items of organizational equipment and armament for reinforcing units is dependent upon the availability of bottoms of which no accurate forecast can be made at this time.

6. Theater of operations type housing is authorized for the personnel listed in paragraph 3 above. It is desired that estimates covering housing for this increased garrison be made the subject of separate correspondence.

7. Ultimate approval of one 8" seacoast battery (fixed) in lieu of the 16" battery recommended by you, and of two 6" seacoast batteries (fixed) to replace the two batteries of 155 mm guns authorized for temporary defense is probable.

The 8" seacoast guns will not be available before July, 1942, and the 6" seacoast guns not before December, 1942.

8. In view of the expected approval of fixed armament for the Kaneohe Bay Area the plan submitted by reference *c* for the installation of the 8"railway battery on Mokapu Peninsula and for the construction of 155 mm gun positions is considered too elaborate. Plans should be revised to provide for temporary installation of the 8" railway battery, and for construction of Panama mounts for two 155 mm gun batteries. Provision should be made for splinterproofing magazines and plotting room only and should be confined to that which can be constructed by field fortification methods and materials.

9. A revised project, to include detailed estimates of cost, is desired for the defense of Kaneohe Bay based on two batteries of two 6" BC guns, and one battery of two 8" BC guns, all shielded type.

[5] 10. No change in the eventual project for the antiaircraft defense of Kaneohe Bay over that prescribed for the temporary defense Paragraph 3 *a* (2) above, is contemplated.

11. Reinforcement of either the peace or war garrisons of the Hawaiian Department by additional troops for the beach and land defense of Kaneohe Bay is not contemplated at this time.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(s) E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls:
#1 Memor from Ch. of Eng. to Ch. of Coast Artillery, C. of E. 662B (Oahu), August 26, 1941.
#2 1st Ind. frm Ch. of Coast Artillery, to A. C. of S, WPD 663/45-F-1, July 23, 1941. (added)
Original Incl. #1 w/d)
A true copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

Paraphrase

Radio 320—13th

SEPTEMBER 13, 1941

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL.
Washington, D. C.

Additional funds needed to complete railway gun position project also funds needed to erect positions in Kanoehe Bay area as para four B paren two paren letter this headquarters thirty one July nineteen forty one subject coast artillery armament for naval air station Kaneohe Bay paragraph due added costs of materials and labor in this area railway gun positions in approved project could not be built with funds allotted last fiscal year Stop Estimates prepared by district engineer Honolulu aver that one hundred seventeen thousand two hundred fifty six dollars required to add to funds received last fiscal year for railway gun positions Stop Building of positions for one four gun eight inch railway battery and three four gun one fifty five batteries in Kaneohe Bay area estimated to cost two hundred fifteen thousand two hundred sixty five dollars Stop Above amounts include direct and indirect costs and are for sites recommended as first priority by commanding general Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command in which I agree for immediate construction paragraph project will follow Stop District engine Honolulu is submitting cost estimates to chief of engineers by radio Stop Pending the receipt of this letter strongly recommend that money in amount of three hundred thirty two thousand five hundred twenty one dollars be contained in pending appropriation bill.

SHORT.

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

[1] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 18 September 1941.

In reply refer to:
Engr. 662/4 x 662/7
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Subject: Provision of three (3) Panama Mount 155-mm Battery Positions and one (1) 8-inch Railway Gun Battery Position for the Defense of Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. References:

a. Secret letter TAG to HHD, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-WPD, with 1st Indorsement HHD to TAG dated 18 June 1941.

b Secret letter HHD to TAG, 5 June 1941, Subject: "War Garrison for Initial War Operation", file AG 320.3/37b, with 1st Indorsement TAG to HHD, dated 22 July 1941.

c. Secret letter HHD to TAG 31 July 1941, Subject: "Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay", file AG 381/20.

2. Reference *a.* directs that the Army assumes the responsibility for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area. A study by this headquarters of the armament requirements for the defense of Kanoche Bay and submitted by my 1st Indorsement to reference *a.* requested the inclusion of the following items of Seacoast Defense Armament in the Hawaiian Defense Project for this purpose:

3 Batteries of 155-mm guns.
1 Battery of two 12-inch barbette guns with related equipment

3. A restudy of the project for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area submitted by reference *b.* recommended that the following armament be provided:

Two 155-mm gun batteries
Two 6-inch fixed gun batteries of two guns each
One 16-inch long range casemated gun battery of two guns on barbette carriages.

[2] 4. A realization of the fact that it will be at least two years before these items of fixed armament, namely, the two 6-inch batteries and the one 16-inch battery, can be installed, makes it necessary that some provision be made immediately for the employment of mobile artillery to defend this area. The 1st Indorsement from The Adjutant General's Office to reference *b.* authorized the following additional units for the defense of Kaneohe Bay:

One battalion of Coast Artillery, 155-mm guns with one additional gun battery.
One Harbor Defense Battery.

Pending the installation of the fixed batteries, it is recommended that the Seacoast Defenses of the Kaneohe area consist of the following items of mobile artillery:

Three 155-mm gun batteries.
One 8-inch railway gun battery.

The proposed locations and fields of fire of these batteries are shown on map, Inclosure No. 1.

5. Since there is no railroad running from Honolulu to Kaneohe Bay, it will be necessary to move this railway battery to Kaneohe Bay by truck trailer, and it is proposed to install this battery on fixed mounts similar to those of Battery Granger Adams on Black Point.

6. Each of the 155-mm battery positions should include the following:

(1) 4 Panama mounts.
(2) 4 splinterproof ammunition shelters for 25 rounds at each gun position.
(3) 4 gun bunkers.
(4) 4 splinterproof personnel shelters.
(5) 2 splinterproof propellent shelters for 150 charges each.
(6) 2 splinterproof projectile shelters for 150 projectiles each.
(7) 1 splinterproof plotting room.
(8) The roads and ramps necessary for the occupation of the position.
(9) Camouflage treatment of all the above listed installations.

Considering the urgent need for combat training and the large amount of labor required to complete field works now being constructed by the troops of this command, it is believed advisable to construct these positions by contract.

[3] 7. The cost of installation of the three batteries of 155-mm guns including the acquisition of land has been estimated at $93,630.00. The cost of the transportation and installation of the 8-inch railway battery in an emplacement similar to that of Battery Granger Adams has been estimated at $121,635. These estimated costs include both direct costs and indirect costs. Inclosure No. 2 is a tabular breakdown of these cost figures.

8. It is recommended that the installation of these three batteries of 155-mm guns with the necessary field fortifications and the construction of one 8-inch gun battery position be approved, and that funds in the amount of $215,265.00 be allotted to the U. S. District Engineer, Honolulu, for construction.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2 Incls:
(1) Map
(2) Breakdown

A True copy.
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1D]

[SECRET]

27 AUGUST 1941.

Deslege Brown
1st Lieutenant, Corps of Engrs.
Assistant Department Engineer.

To: The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C.

Beurad anno fifteen July district engineer estimates cost of forty five hundred foot runway at three hundred thirty thousand dollars due to railroad relocation and heavy fill Stop Thirty five hundred foot runway is longest that can be provided without railway relocation Stop Reduction from thirty seven hundred feet due to bunker construction and new housing Stop Strongly recommend construction of thirty five hundred foot runway as auxiliary landing strip comma forty five hundred feet economically unfeasible Stop main runway can be used by planes requiring longer run Stop Auxiliary also needed for use while main runway is being leveled recommend immediate allotment of twenty five thousand dollars for levelling of main runway and thirty thousand seven hundred for thirty five hundred foot auxiliary runway.

SHORT.

A true copy.
Edward von Gildern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieutenant, F. A.

Subject: Improvement of Landing Facilities at Wheeler Field, T. H.

2nd Ind. (12-E10)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,
Washington, D. C., August 25, 1941.

To The Adjutant General *THRU* Chief of Engineers.

1. Attached hereto is a copy of the radiogram transmitted to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. on July 15, 1941.

2. In explanation thereof, you are advised that this office concurs with the opinion that the uneven areas in the runways, referred to in the basic communication, should be eliminated in the interests of safe operation.

3. This office considers runways of 4,500 feet in length to be an absolute minimum for military airports at sea level, with an additional 500 feet of length for

each 1,000 feet of elevation or fraction thereof. This minimum likewise meets the requirements for the future installation of an instrument landing facility, if there is provided that the same time forty to one clear angles of approach at both ends of the runway in question.

4. If such clearances are not available at the north end of the present N–8 runway, or of the proposed new N–8 runway, because of quarters built at that end of the field, then the runway lengths should be extended on the southerly ends sufficiently to insure that a 4,500 foot length of runway will exist south of a point where a forty to one clearance angle may be realized.

5. There is no objection to the runway crossing the railroad spur, if necessary, providing the runway pavement is kept flush with the top of the rails and there is; no break in the runway grade, and providing, of course, rail traffic is controlled. If a difference in grade exists, the rail grade should be brought to that of the runway, or the spur relocated.

6. It is requested that the District Engineer be advised of these considerations, and that his new estimates be made accordingly.

7. No funds are available at this time for the construction and improvements recommended in the basic communications. The recommendation, however, will be placed in our "Suspense File" for further consideration upon receipt of a revised estimate, and when funds therefore become available.

For the Chief of the Air Corps:

WALTER J. REED,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Asst. Chief, Bldgs. & Grounds Div.

Incl. Cy, Radio 8/21/41
cc: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
For information only
This is not an authorization

A true copy.
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

WAR DEPARTMENT MESSAGE CENTER,
ROOM 3441, MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

56 WTJ 125 WD
Ft Shafter TH 1057 A Aug 27
THE AG
Washington DC.

Keurad Agmo fifteen July district engineer estimates cost of forty five hundred foot runway as three hundred thirty thousand dollars due to railroad relocation and heavy fill stop thirty five hundred foot runway is longest that can be provided without railway relocation stop reduction from thirty seven hundred feet due to bunker construction and new housing stop strongly recommend construction of thirty five hundred feet runway as auxiliary landing strip comma forty five hundred feet economically unfeasible stop main runway can be used by planes requiring longer run stop auxiliary also needed for use while main runway is being levelled . . Recommend immediate allotment of twenty five thousand dollars for levelling of main runway and thirty thousand seven hundred for thirty five hundred foot auxiliary runway.

SHORT.

305 AM

A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

IMMEDIATE ACTION

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington.

1st Ind.

AG 580.82-Wheeler .
Field (8-27-41) NO JJF lr

War Department, AGO, August 28, 1941—To the Chief of the Air Corps.
In connection with letter your office dated July 11, 1941, file 611.
By order of the Secretary of War:

[S] JOHN B. COOLEY,
Adjutant General.

A True Copy:
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Improvement of Landing facilities at Wheeler Field, T. H.

2nd Ind.

(12-E10)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,
Washington, D. C., September 2, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. With reference to your radiogram dated August 27, 1941, attention is invited to 2nd Indorsement of basic letter dated June 21st, subject as noted above, a copy of which is attached hereto.
2. A request has been made this date that $25,000.00 be included in the funds estimated to be required for use in future airfield development. This sum is to be used for the leveling of the main runway at Wheeler Field.
3. No request will be made for the inclusion of funds for the construction of the auxiliary runway, pending receipt of the revised estimate as requested in the 2nd Indorsement referred to above.

By order of the Chief of the Air Corps.

FRANK M. KENNEDY,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Building & Grounds Division.

Incl. Cy 2nd Ind. 8/25/41
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1E]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 10 June 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.
This message is routine.

ROBERT J. FLEMING, JR.,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Department Engineer.

A true copy:
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
Washington, D. C

Division engineer San Francisco has informed me that the priority covering contract W dash four one four ENGR seven eight four with Interstate Equipment Corporation Elizabeth New Jersey is now a dash one dash G stop This contract is the one for furnishing all materias for cableway to Kaala aircraft

Warning station Stop Motor and all electrical equipment sub contracted to General Electric Stop Division engineer states that with this priority there is strong probability that delivery this electrical material to contractor will be delayed about fifteen weeks Stop This Kaala station is the most important in aircraft warning system and early completion of this cableway is essential Stop I consider this aircraft warning service as the most important single project in this Department Stop Strongly recommended that the War Department give all possible assistance to Chief of Engineers to have priority on this contract changed to a dash one dash B

[S] SHORT.

ENC-SEC by Capt. C. J. Harrison SC—715P June 10 1941

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

75 War EM 61 WD

WASHN DC. *740P June 26 1941.*

C G

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter T. H.

904 26th

Agmc reurad three zero zero nine priority contract W dash four one four Engr seven eight four kaala AWS Station advanced to A dash one dash C Chief of Engineers will instruct Division Engineer on procedure should results under this priority be unsatisfactory

ADAMS.

616P

True Copy
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

[1]

29 SEPTEMBER 1941.

SIG 676.3
Subject: Aircraft Warning Service Installation Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, file AG 660.2 A. A. (7-5-41) MC-E, 8 July 1941, subject: "Aircraft Warning Service Philippine and Hawaiian Departments." A report of a Board of Officers convened at this headquarters to restudy the AWs project is being transmitted to the War Department by Clipper mail under separate cover. This board has considered the employment of the six fixed and six mobile stations allocated to this Department by the War Department. The increased number of stations now available has necessitated some adjustments in both type and location of the stations in the previously approved project of three fixed and five mobile units, as well as new locations. The results of this restudy are covered fully in the report being submitted, and are summarized in the following paragraphs.

Locations a. Kauai. There have been no changes in the fixed station now approved at Kokee. In the former project the mobile station on Kauai was planned for operation on the Waimea Kokee road. This mobile station is now recommended for operation on the coast north of Kilauea Village at latitude 22°13'50", longitude 159°23'54". There is no change in the base camp at Kauai which is now under construction at Kokee for the personnel of both the fixed and mobile stations.

b. Maui. No change has been made in the previously approved fixed station which is now under construction at Red Hill on Haleakala. Formerly approved project contained a mobile station to operate along the road up Haleakala. The project now being submitted makes no change in this mobile unit.

c. Hawaii. The former project contained a mobile station for the Island of Hawaii, which was to be operated from the upper terminus of the Mauna Loa truck trail, with a base camp for personnel at the Kilauea Military Camp. This station has been eliminated in the restudy and has been replaced by a fixed station in the vicinity of Pahoa at latitude 19°26'50" and longitude 154°57'5", and by a mobile station to operate from an initial position near Kahuku Ranch at latitude 19°30'30", longitude 155°41'40". A base camp similar to that on Kauai will be constructed near the fixed station for the personnel of both that station and the mobile unit.

d. Oahu (1) There is no change in the previously approved fixed station for Mt. Kaala.

(2) The formerly approved mobile station at Manawahua is to be replaced by a fixed station.

(3) Opana. Under the former project, there were not sufficient [2] stations to emplace one on the north shore of Oahu. With the increase in the number of stations allowed, this is now possible and it is recommended that a fixed station be installed at the Opana Triangulation station at coordinates (98.655–19.182).

(4) The increase in the number of stations has also made advisable the consideration of other locations for mobile units on Oahu. This reconsideration indicated that a location at Makapuu Point had many advantages over the former approved Pali location, and it is accordingly recommended that the Makapuu Point Station be considered as an initial operating position in lieu of the former Pali location.

(5) The increase in the number of stations allowed has also made possible the provision of units in reserve against the possibility of failure of one of the primary stations. Since Oahu is the central point in the islands for which protection must be secured, it has been decided to concentrate the reserve units on this island. For this purpose two mobile units are recommended as a mobile reserve and for general operations on Oahu and on other islands if necessary. These stations will be utilized as needed to either replace the other Oahu stations or reinforce the coverage in certain sectors. Locations on Oahu which have been considered for their employment are the Pali location discussed above, on the high ground along Tantalus Road, at Fort Shafter, and at various points along the coast.

(6) Information center. There has been no change in the previous location for the Information Center which is now under construction at Fort Shafter. In compliance with other directives, this installation has been combined with various command posts into an air defense command post.

(7) No base camps are being provided for the stations on Oahu as the personnel will be housed in construction already approved for the Signal Area, Fort Shafter. The same construction, however, will be built at the Manawahua and Opana fixed stations as is now approved for Kaala.

2. Reference is made to 2d Ind, Hq Haw Dept, OSigO, 31 May 1941, to the letter Sig. 676.3 (AWS) dated 17 October 40 in which Signal funds totalling $75,281.84 were requested for the installation of radio and wire facilities for the original three fixed and five mobile stations. Due to the abandonment of the mobile station at the Nuuanu Pali on Oahu and the Moana Loa Station on Hawaii, this sum can be reduced by $2,296.00 to $72,985.84. The allocation of additional stations has necessitated increased demands for Signal communications. These additional communication facilities are summarized as follows:

a. Radio facilities for the control from the Information Center of pursuit task forces. This includes a station at the control airdrome with four satellite stations at the principal pursuit fields on Oahu.

Total cost $55,000

b. Emergency power for pursuit radio control transmitters. This power is to allow the operation of pursuit control during commercial power failure.

Total cost $12,000

c. Commercial power extensions to include provision of adequate commercial power for the base camps and the principal alert stations at locations where this is economically feasible.

Total cost $39,000

[3] d. AWS radio communication facilities to include additional transmitters and receivers at the new fixed stations, receivers at the Information Center and allied antenna and control equipment as established by standard practice.

Total cost $18,000

e. AWS wire and cable facilities to include additional cable extensions for the added stations on Oahu, together with additional telephone and teletype equipment. This item also includes a cable installation from the Hawaii base camp to the detector unit at Pahoa.

Total cost $10,900

f. Commercial wire facilities to include leased lines from all base camps to the nearest commercial exchange, leased lines from the principal alert stations to the nearest exchanges, together with the yearly rental charge.

Total cost $10, 463. 67
Total Sig funds 145, 400. 00

3. Estimates for the internal wire facilities of the Information Center and the allied Air Defense wire facilities are being held in abeyance pending more reliable information upon which to estimate the necessary funds. It is believed, however, that estimates for the Information Center should be included in the next available appropriation bill. Information Center layouts and schematic diagrams of the Information Center Wire Net have been forwarded to the Chief Signal Officer for review. This data is being transmitted as an inclosure to the aforementioned board proceedings.

4. Funds in the amount of $890,804 have been made available to the Dist. Engr. Honolulu, to complete the previously approved project of three fixed and five mobile stations. Some of these funds were for stations which are being superseded by other stations in the revised program. The tabulation below shows cost estimates on the new stations, less the amounts available from the superseded stations, and the total of engineer funds supplementing those now on hand required to complete the revised projects.

Item No.	Description	Oahu Manawahua	Opana	Makapuu	Kauai Kilauea	Hawaii Pahoa	Kahuku
1	Cost of Site	$2,000	$2,000		$2,000	$7,500	$500
2	Clearing	300	200			300	
3	Grading	2,700	800	$500	500	700	200
4	Right of Way-Access Road	500	500		500	1,800	200
5	Road Constr	58,470	28,000	5,700	24,800	9,000	3,000
6	Bldg. Constr	26,280	29,250	11,965	12,300	74,720	12,070
7	Fuel Storage	1,900	1,900			2,700	
8	Water Supply	2,970	4,400	200	2,000	9,000	1,000
[41] 9	Sewage Disposal	900	1,000	1,000	500	2,970	500
10	Man Proof Fence	2,000	2,000			3,000	
		98,000	70,050	19,365	42,600	111,690	17,470

	Oahu	Kauai	Hawaii
Subtotals by Islands	$187,415	$42,600	$129,160
Funds now available from superseded sites	76,735	12,600	36,217
Supplemental funds required	110,680	30,000	98,943

Total	$233,623
Mobilization of Personnel and Plant at 3%	$7,010
Total direct costs	240,633
Contingencies, Contractors Fee, Social Security, Workmen's Compensation and Insurance at 15%	36,100
Engineering, Surveys, Inspection and Auditing at 18%	19,250
General Office Overhead at 8%	19,250
Grand Total Engineer funds	315,233

5. Secret radiogram No 321, this hq, 13 September 41, submitted for advance consideration the above cost estimates with the exception of those which had been previously submitted as stated in par 2 above. Since no information has been received concerning the previous recommendation, those estimates are being added to the figures submitted by the radiogram cited.

6. I strongly recommend that funds in the amount of $315,233 for engineer construction, and $218,400 for signal communications and one year's rent of leased wire facilities, total $533,633, to be included in pending appropriation bills, and made available as soon as possible for the completion of the revised project.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

True Copy.
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

[Exhibit 1F]

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT ENGINEER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., July 3, 1941.

Via Clipper Airmail
Engr. 523.07
Subject: Priorities and Preference Ratings.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. On 4 June 1941 I wrote a letter, file Engr. 523.07, subject: "Priority in Shipping Space for the Hawaiian Electric Company", in which the question of securing shipping space priorities for this company was discussed. A copy of this letter is inclosed for ready reference. At that time the main problem was the securing of shipping space; since then it has developed that difficulties are also arising concerning the procurement of materials. I have directed that an investigation be made of this priority question, and the results of this investigation indicate that some clarification and coordination is highly desirable.

2. At the present time priorities and preference ratings for Army activities are assigned by the various procurement agencies and contracting officers. There is now no coordination in the Department between these various agencies, each of which is dealing direct on priorities questions with its Chief in the War Department. This is satisfactory as long as only one procurement agency or contracting officer is involved. There are cases, however, in which more than one agency is involved, and the number of these will undoubtedly increase in the future; I believe it is advisable to have a coordinating agency in the Department to not only coordinate these cases locally, but also to bring to the attention of the War Department the advisability of similar coordination between the Chiefs of the respective agencies. Also there are many procurement problems on which the establishment of priorities and preference ratings is necessary which no agency is now handling. The 14th Naval District has already established a central priority office in the local bureau of supplies and accounts where priorities information is kept available, and where preference ratings on all Navy orders are issued.

3. The following outlines in greater detail some of the problems on which difficulty has already been encountered:

a. We have some projects in which more than one supply or construction branch is interested. While there is no complaint with the present system by which each agency handles priority matters with its Chief in the War Department there is a probability that desirable action by one agency may be overlooked with the result that the second agency might be held up in its work even though it had taken all action necessary.

[2] *b.* Hawaii presents a special problem in procurement as do the other overseas departments, due to the shipping situation. The present priorities instructions are concerned with procurement; in this Department, however, priorities on shipping space are important. There are large quantities of essential materials transported on commercial shipping. These shipments involve not only government shipments but also shipments by private concerns of materials which are to be incorporated in defense installations.

c. Practically all construction materials must be imported into the island. The various constructing agencies are, of course, anticipating their needs and are having materials procured on the mainland and shipped to the department. It is impossible to anticipate every item needed, and in the past the various supply houses in the department, such as the Honolulu Iron Works, the Hawaiian Electric Company, and others, have maintained local stocks from which small items could be procured as they were needed. These local stocks are now becoming a matter of concern. For example, the mainland agents of the Hawaiian Electric Company have advised the company that it can not expect to obtain replacements for its ordinary warehouse and operations stocks unless a preference rating is placed on this procurement. Practically all of our defense contracts demand electric power and unless the company's local stocks are maintained it will be impossible to install power connections without waiting for the arrival of necessary materials for each connection from the mainland. A specific example of this occurred recently where a sub-contractor on the Hickam Field low-cost housing had to import by Clipper air express at an expense of $1,000.00, some plumbing items which under normal conditions could have been obtained from local stocks.

d. As stated above shipping priorities are also important. To our knowledge there is now no coordinated shipping priorities, although the Matson Navigation Company, which handles the bulk of the shipments, is granting unofficial priority to items on which a procurement priority has been obtained. As far as government bought and shipped materials are concerned there has been no great difficulty although considerable detail work has been involved in radioing about specific shipments. There are large quantities of materials, however, which are being ordered by private firms either for direct supply to government agencies or for incorporation in defense works directly or indirectly, and these private concerns are encountering great difficulties in securing shipping space for this material.

4. To meet this increasing problem I propose to set up an office in this department to be responsible for coordinating all priorities matters, and I have selected the Department Engineer's office as the section in which this control can best be established. Additional officers, not necessarily engineers, will be placed on duty in that office to furnish needed assistance. [3] The following is a preliminary outline of the duties of this section:

a. To establish an information bureau where request for information on priorities can be promptly filled.

b. To keep me informed of the priorities and preference ratings assigned by regular supply branches to their own procurement in order to insure that these are coordinated. In this work with the regular supply branches and construction agencies it is not intended that the coordinating office will assume any control over these agencies; it is intended, however, that the coordinating office keep informed of what action these agencies are taking in priority matters.

c. We assign preference ratings covering procurements which are essential to defense work and which are not now covered by existing instructions.

5. In the directive of the Priorities Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, 27 November 1940, it is noted that all Panama Canal defense projects are placed in priority classification A–1–b. There is no similar blanket coverage for devents projects in this department; and the rating which can be assigned to any project in this department depends upon its classification as a general project under the other entries in this directive. The aircraft Warning Service project is the most important single project in the department, and under the general classification in this directive the highest priority which could be assigned to it would be A 1–f. It is believed that the conditions facing this department are similar to those in Panama and that a similar blanket priority classification for our defense projects should be authorized, and that this rating should be high. If this is done it would not be necessary to assign this high a rating to all projects, and this department could reserve the high rating for the exceptional projects which were considered absolutely essential.

6. As stated above, the maintenance of adequate local stocks by local supply firms is essential. Existing instructions on the issuance of preference ratings are predicated on the fact that the firm to whom the rating is issued is a government contractor. The local supply firms who must obtain preference ratings to maintain stocks are not actually government contractors at the time they place their mainland orders. These firms become contractors, however, when a government agency orders materials from their stocks. The question involved here is one of time; and obviously we should not wait until the specific need for a stock item arises to issue a preference rating then delay the job while the item is being procured and shipped. It is believed that some authority should exist for us to give preference ratings for the procurement of any items which we, through experience and knowledge of future projects, select as essential.

[4] 7. The following is therefore recommended:

a. The establishment of a blanket priority for Hawaiian defense projects as has been done for Panama Canal defense projects, and authorization to this headquarters to apply this high rating to cases of exceptional importance.

b. Waiving of the requirement that preference ratings can be issued only to government contractors and authorization to this Headquarters to issue these ratings for the procurement of those items which we anticipate will be essential to the defense program.

c. Consideration of the establishment of a liaison with shipping agencies on the West Coast to insure that defense materials ordered by private firms receive proper priorities in shipping space.

It is further recommended that prompt consideration be given to subparagraphs *a* and *b* above and this headquarters advised by radio of the War Department's attitude.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

1 incl: C/Ltr. Engr 523.07 4 Jun 1941
Record copy Engineers
A true copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

114.14-18-C-32 RGC/amw
(8-18-41

1st Indorsement

PRIORITIES COMMITTEE,
ARMY & NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD,
WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING,
Washington, D. C., August 18, 1941.

To Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the Department Engineer, Fort Shafter, T. H. (THRU: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.)

1. The following information is submitted in answer to the recommendations on page 4 of letter from Lieutenant General Walter C. Short:

2. The establishment of a blanket priority specifically to Hawaiian Defense Projects is not considered necessary inasmuch as the Directive, Priorities Committee, Army and Navy Munitions Board, established the preference rating A-1-c for "Construction, equipment, defense and development of outlying bases, not included in the Continental United States". This Directive is the cumulative result of an exhaustive study of the military importance of the various items required by the military and naval forces of the United States, and has received the approval of the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy.

3. Attention is invited to a copy of communication of July 31, 1941, from the Army and Navy Munitions Board to "Supply Arms and Services of the Army and Bureaus and Offices of the Navy", which explains the procedure covering the issuance of project rating orders to Army and Navy construction projects outside of the Continental United States. It will be noted that the project rating orders issued in accordance with these instructions will not be confined to items on the Critical List, but will include all items necessary to complete the construction of a particular project. These ratings may be extended in the usual way, and it is believed should cover the recommendation as made in paragraph 7 *b*.

4. Attention is invited to the "Defense Supply Rating Plan" recently inaugurated by the Office of Production Management. This is a plan developed whereby the manufacturers who supply so-called "Off the shelf" items to defense industries are permitted to get material with which to manufacture additional stock so as to make a supply available to defense customers. This plan may be of value to some of the concerns in the Hawaiian District and is mentioned for your consideration.

5. The establishment of a liaison with shipping agencies of the West Coast has been referred to the Division of Emergency Shipping, Maritime Commission. That Commission has a record of the situation as it exists and as it has been for some time. They are further checking into the situation, but definite decision to establish a liaison agency has not been made.

For the Priorities Committee:

ROBT. G. COOK,
Major, Ordnance, USA.

1 Incl. no change.
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[IMMEDIATE ACTION]

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON

Via Air Mail
AG 523 Priority
(7-7-41) MB 2nd Ind. JAU

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *August 26, 1941.*
To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Attention is invited to preceding Indorsement.
By order of the Secretary of War:

_____ _____,
Brigadier General,
Acting The Adjutant General.

1 Incl. n/c.
A True Copy.
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

14 AUGUST 1941.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.

Relet this headquarters third July file engr five two three point zero seven subject priorities and preference ratings stop. This question of priorities becoming more pressing and many local supply houses are now advised by mainland agents that no shipment can be made until priority is secured stop. Request radio advice as to action on recommendations paragraph seven of letter cited.

SHORT.

A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., Oct. 23, 1941.

In reply refer to:
Engr. 523.07
Subject: Office of Production Management Field Service.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter dated 13 August 1941 from the Army and Navy Munitions Board, a copy of which is inclosed. Reference is also made to letter from his headquarters, file Engr. 523.07, subject "Priorities and Preference Ratings," and 1st Indorsement from Priorities Committee, Army and Navy Munitions Board, 18 August 1941, file 114.14-18-C-32-RGC-amw (8-18-41).

2. The conditions as to securing priorities for materials needed in the Hawaiian Islands are growing worse steadily, and a large part of the difficulties encountered can be traced to lack of information and to failure of field offices, whose region includes this Territory, to make themselves known to local Federal officials and business men. The long distances involved in travel, the difference in time, and the high cost of telephonic communication, all make contact with any regional office difficult.

3. Governor Poindexter has already submitted a request to Washington for the establishment of a local office of the Priorities Division, OPM, and at his request I concurred in his suggested action. A copy of my letter of September 13, 1941 to the Governor is inclosed for your information.

4. It is therefore requested that the War Department propose the establishment in Honolulu of a field office of the Office of Production Management, to include the Priorities Division, initially, with provision for adding representatives of other divisions later, if required.

[s] WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2 Incls: (1) Cy of ltr Army & Navy Munitions Board, 8/13/41; (2) Cy of ltr to Gov. Poindexter, 13 Sept 41.

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

AG 334.8 Production Management Board
(10-23-41) MB 1st Ind IG/mm-1713

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
October 31, 1941.

To: The Under Secretary of War.
2 Incls. No change.
A true copy.
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

2d Indorsement

18-C-32 RGC/amw
(11-13-41)

PRIORITIES COMMITTEE
ARMY & NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD

WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING,
Washington, D. C., November 13, 1941.

To Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the Department Commander, Fort Shafter, T. H. (THRU: The Adjutant General, War Dept., Washington, D. C.)

1. Recommendation has been made to the Office of Production Management and a field office of the Office of Production Management be established in Hawaii at an early date. They have requested to advise this Committee as to the action contemplated or already accomplished in this direction. Such information will be forwarded when received.

For the Priorities Committee:

(/s/) ROBT. G. COOK,
Major, Ordnance, USA.

2 Incls. No change.

3rd Ind.

AG 334.8 Production Management Board (10-23-41) MB

IG:wc-1713

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
November 17, 1941.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Attention is invited to preceding Indorsement.
By order of the Secretary of War:

(/s/) E. L. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls. n/c.
A true copy.
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1 G]

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., July 28, 1941.

VIA "CLIPPER" AIR MAIL
Engr. 600.12 (Gen.)
Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. The delay in securing necessary materials for our construction program has become a matter of serious concern. Experience indicates that from three to four months are necessary to procure construction materials from the United States after funds for projects are allotted, and increasing transportation difficulties may lengthen this time.

2. The following is the situation of the two constructing agencies:

a. The District Engineer has no revolving fund for advance procurement of materials. Among the first Engineer projects approved, however, were two large projects; one the additional ammunition storage facilities, and the other the Air Corps mobilization housing. As soon as these allotments were received, the District Engineer immediately ordered all or a large part of the necessary materials to complete the entire project. With his construction crews now well organized, the rate of using these materials has greatly accelerated and the stock is being depleted because the rate of use is greater than the rate of arrival from the mainland.

b. The Constructing Quartermaster is in somewhat the same situation. While the Quartermaster General has authorized the establishment of a stock pile of lumber, no funds have been advanced for the procurement of other materials. These other materials are not available for local purchase in any appreciable quantities, and as a result, there will undoubtedly be delays.

3. I understand that the Division Engineer, San Francisco, has recommended to the Chief of Engineers that a revolving working fund of $1,000,000.000 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to permit that officer to procure materials in advance. This fund would be a revolving fund. All expenditures from it for materials would be reimbursed from other projects funds as these projects were approved and utilize the materials.

4. I think that this materials situation may become critical. As stated in previous communications, a large part of our construction forces have been imported from the mainland on contracts which require either their continued employment or return to the mainland at Government expense. It is obvious that if there is any lack of materials not only will the jobs be delayed, but also the cost to the Government will be increased. I therefore strongly recommend that the suggestion of the Division Engineer, San Francisco, be adopted, that the District Engineer, Honolulu, be allotted a revolving fund of $1,000,000.00, and that similar arrangements be made for the Constructing Quartermaster to permit him to stock materials in addition to lumber.

(s) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials.
AG 600.12 Hawaiian Dept (7-28-41) MO 1st Ind. ET/rm

WAR DEPARTMENT, AGO,
August 1, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers AND The Quartermaster General, IN TURN.

For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:

_____,
Adjutant General.

A true copy.
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

400.31 (Honolulu) 335.
Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials.

2nd Ind. 3-N

OFFICE, C. OF E.,
August 7, 1941.

To The Adjutant General (Through The Quartermaster General.)

It is recommended that a revolving fund of $1,000,000.00 be authorized for the purposes indicated in the basic letter. If the necessary funds are not available to the War Department from any other source, it is believed that this amount could be advanced from the Fifth Supplemental, 1941, Deferred Storage Program, (Air Corps), Items *a* & *b*, Parking Storage Areas, Reserve Airplanes. As a final resort, the sum of $1,000,000.00 now reserved for construction at the Mobile Air Depot, (Brookley Field) could be advanced for this purpose. In either case, reimbursement should be effected upon the appropriation of funds for construction in Hawaii under the 1943 Construction Program.

For the Chief of Engineers:

(s) John R. Hardin,
JOHN R. HARDIN,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Construction Section.

A true copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

20 AUGUST 1941.

FRED W. HERMAN,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Dept. Engineer.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.

Reference clipper letter this headquarters July twenty eighth file Engr six hundred point one two parenthesis gen period parenthesis subject revolving fund for purchase of materials Stop Information has been received from district engineer Honolulu that allotment of one million one hundred thousand dollars has been received which can be utilized for advanced purchases of materials as recommended in letter cited Stop Constructing quartermaster has not repeat not received similar allotment as revolving fund to permit advance purchases of materials nor any information thereof Stop Strongly recommend revolving fund allotment similar to that established for district engineer be made to constructing quartermaster to permit advanced ordering of materials for defense contracts

SHORT

A true copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

QM 411.1 C-P
(Hawaiian Dept.)

3rd Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL,
Washington, D. C., August 21, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. The Quartermaster Corps has established a stock-pile reserve of lumber in Hawaii in the amount of $600,000.00. It is therefore recommended that a revolving fund in an amount not to exceed $500,000.00 be authorized. If the

necessary funds are not available to the War Department from any other source, funds in allotted status to the Quartermaster Corps can be made available.

For the Quartermaster General:

(s) L. R. Groves.
L. R. GROVES,
Colonel, Q. M. C.,
Assistant.

A true copy.
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials—Hawaiian Department
AG 600.12 Haw. Dept.
(7-28-41) MO-D 4th Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, AGO, *September 27, 1941.*
To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

The establishment of revolving funds as requested in basic communication is not favorably considered. The Quartermaster General will, however, augment the lumber stock pile now maintained in the Hawaiian Department sufficiently to meet requirements for War Department approved projects for both Engineer and Quartermaster construction. A similar stock pile of other classes of construction materials will also be established by The Quartermaster General without delay. The materials used from these stock piles will be replaced from applicable funds of projects for which used as soon as such funds become available to local constructing agencies.

By order of the Secretary of War:

———— ————,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

A true copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., September 13, 1941.

In reply refer to: Engr. 600.12 (Gen.)
Major General R. C. MOORE
Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR DICK:

The situation surrounding the obtaining of materials for defense contracts is becoming more and more critical. On many items a delay of between three and four months occurs between the time an allotment of funds for a project is received and the materials necessary are obtained from the mainland. We have recently received word on some electrical equipment which indicates that delivery cannot be made for six months.

In a conference with Colonel Hannum, Division Engineer is San Francisco, when he was here sometime ago, he mentioned that he had recommended to The Chief of Engineers that a revolving fund of $1,000,000.00 be set up to permit the District Engineer to make advance purchases of materials and plant. I followed up Hannum's recommendation to the Chief of Engineers with a strong letter to the War Department urging that this revolving fund be set up for the District

Engineer and that similar arrangements be made for the Constructing Quartermaster. The District Engineer informed me today that he had received an allotment of $1,100,000.00 from the Chief of Engineers which could be utilized for the advance purchase of materials. The Constructing Quartermaster, however, has not yet received similar information, and while he is authorized to stock lumber locally, he has no revolving fund for which to make advance purchases of materials other than lumber.

I am following up my previous recommendation by radio to The Adjutant General today. I think that the matter is sufficiently important to bring it to your attention, and I will appreciate it if you would have someone look into this matter. A copy of my letter of July 28th and of the radio follow up of September 13 are inclosed for ready reference.

Very sincerely.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

2 Incls: Cy. ltr. Engr. 600.12 (Gen.) 28 Jul 41, Cy. rad. 20 Aug 41.

A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, September 29, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR WALTER:

I have your letter of the thirteenth relative to the establishment of revolving funds in connection with construction in Hawaii.

Owing to legal restrictions we cannot approve your request for revolving funds. However, it appears that the wording of the appropriation from which the Quartermaster General maintains the lumber pile you mention is such that those funds may be used to make advance purchases of other materials required for construction.

The Quartermaster General will take immediate measures to establish a stock pile of construction materials other than lumber, sufficient to meet requirements for both Engineer and Quartermaster construction. The conditions under which these stock piles will be reimbursed will be covered in the reply of the War Department to your official request of July 28, 1941.

The Chief of Engineers advises that the allotment of $1,100,000 made to your District Engineer, to which you refer, is from funds now available for approved projects. This allotment should not be construed as making these funds available to you as a revolving fund, nor for advance purchase of materials, except for the projects to which the funds apply.

I believe that when these stock piles have become established the situation you outline will be greatly relieved.

Sincerely yours.

[S] R. C. Moore,
R. C. MOORE,
Major General, Deputy Chief of Staff.

A true copy.
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1 H]

[SECRET]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, November 27, 1941.

Air Mail via Clipper
Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT, U. S. A.,
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander, Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR SHORT: The copy of your report on the additional air routes has been received. The quantity of details requiring coordination, and the distances involved in the projects make the short time consumed in getting rolling almost unbelievably short.

I extend you my personal thanks for the effort you have expended on this job and the results you are getting.

The way things are working out now, it looks as if we will be using trans-Pacific airways almost continuously from now on. Our plans are O. K. for 4-engine bombers, but what are the prospects for medium bombers? Do you think we should even study that phase of trans-Pacific operations?

Best regards.

Sincerely,

[S] H. H. ARNOLD,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1I]

Subject: Increase in the Strength of the Third Engineers.
AG 320.2 (11-1-40) M-C 3rd Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT. A. G. O., February 10, 1941.

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Action is being taken to increase the allotment of Regular Army enlisted men for the Corps of Engineers, Hawaiian Department by 107. This allotment will permit the organization of the 3rd Engineers in accordance with Table of Organization 5-11, November 1, 1940. Regular Army personnel are not available to increase further the strength of this regiment.

2. Since War Department policy forbids sending trainees to the Overseas Departments it will not be practicable to aid you in creating an Engineer Battalion (Separate) as recommended in your radio of January 23, 1941.

3. As previously advised, plans provide for the activation of a separate Engineer Company (Avn) for your Department.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[sgd] E. S. ADAMS.

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., February 19, 1941.

In reply refer to:
Engr. 322.03
Subject: Additional Engineer Troops.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, Engr. 322.03, 23 August 1940, which recommended the assignment to the Department of an Engineer regiment

(Aviation) less one battalion, and to letter, Engr. 210 x220.03, 1 November 1940, which recommended an increase in the strength of the Third Engineers, and to letter, Engr. 322.03, 5 February 1941, recommending a redesignation in the Third Engineers from a combat regiment, Division, to a combat regiment, Corps.

2. These previous recommendations for an increase in the Engineer component in the Department were based upon the assumption that some civilian labor would be available. It has been necessary with the various agencies involved in defense construction to import skilled labor from the mainland. A recent increase in the defense contracts of the Navy will now necessitate the importation of unskilled labor as well. This development now makes it impossible to assume that any appreciable local labor will be available and requires that previous estimates of the minimum force of Engineers necessary be revised upwards.

3. I consider it essential that a regiment of Engineers (Aviation) be furnished this Department as an integral part of the Hawaiian Air Force and that a regiment of Engineers, General Service, be furnished this department as Department Engineer troops. There is sufficient work immediately on hand in connection with Air Corps activities on the outlying islands and on Oahu to keep a regiment of Engineers continuously occupied. There is also sufficient work in connection with military roads and trails in department units to keep a regiment of General Service Engineers continuously occupied. There is also sufficient work in connection with the Hawaiian Division such as bombproofing of Division command posts and communication centers, road blocks and other tactical employment to keep the Third Engineers continuously occupied.

4. It is therefore recommended that one regiment of Engineers (Aviation) (T. O. 5-411) and one regiment of Engineers, General Service, (T. O. 5-21) be authorized for this Department and that these units complete with personnel and equipment be furnished as soon as possible..

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

Record copy: Engineers.
A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.

Subject: Additional Engineer Troops. Hawaiian Department.
AG 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M 1st Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
May 15, 1941.

To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. *a.* The 34th Engineers (Combat), will be activated in your department with an allotted strength of 1127 enlisted men under T/O 5-171, November 1, 1940, less band and basic privates, on June 1, 1941 (AG 320.2 (4-8-41) M-C, radio April 9, 1941).

b. The regiment will be organized with cadres to be furnished by units now in your department, as directed by you, and with selectees to be dispatched from the Continental United States.

c. Every effort will be made to send individuals who have completed their basic training; however, in order to make maximum use of the available shipping, some curtailment in their basic training may be required. If this is done, you will be informed so that they can complete their training in Hawaii. Under the present tentative schedule, it is proposed to dispatch the full quota except thirty-six attached medical, in June. The Medical Department personnel will be dispatched in November.

d. The actual date of activation of the regiment will conform to the arrival of personnel in your department.

2. While your recent request for additional medical enlisted men was disapproved because of non-availability of personnel, the 34th Engineers (and the 97th and 98th Coast Artillery Regiments whose activation is covered in separate correspondence) is allotted a full quota of attached medical personnel, less basics. You are authorized to make a redistribution of this attached medical personnel, reporting such readjustment to this office.

3. It is desired that you submit a report on the following:
a. The actual date of activation of the 34th Engineers.
b. Changes in the distribution of three-year men in engineer units in connection with the organization of the 34th Engineers.
4. Attention is invited to letter, this office, April 21, 1941, AG 381.4 (1-27-41) M-D-M, subject: Reports of change in status reports—Defense Reserves, Overseas Departments.
5. Your request for aviation engineers is being considered separately.
6. The allotment of commissioned personnel and the grades and ratings of enlisted personnel will be made separately.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[S] E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

3 Inclosures—

Incl. 1.—Copy of ltr., 5–15–41, to C. G., Third Corps Area.
Incl. 2.—Copy of ltr., 5–15–41, to C. G., New York Port of Embarkation.
Incl. 3.—Copy of ltr., 5-15–41, to The Quartermaster General.

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12–22–41

[CONFIDENTIAL]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, June 18, 1941.

AG 320.2
(6–5–41) MR-M-C

Subject: Constitution and Activation of Certain Engineer Units (804th Engineer Battalion, Aviation (Separate), and Personnel for Engineer Headquarters, Hawaiian Department Air Force).
To: The Commanding Generals, Fourth Army, Hawaiian Department, Ninth Corps Area, and San Francisco Port of Embarkation.

Extract

1. The 804th Engineer Company, Aviation (Separate), now in Hawaii, will be disbanded at the earliest practicable date and concurrently therewith the 804th Engineer Battalion, Aviation (Separate), will be constituted and activated with an authorized strength of 21 officers and 625 enlisted men, including 10 attached medical. The personnel, unit funds, and equipment of the 804th Engineer Battalion, Aviation (Separate).

* * * * * * *

By order of the Secretary of War:

[S] E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12–22–41

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, May 28, 1941.

AG 320.2 (5–28–41) MC-C-M
Subject: Additional Engineer Troops and Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department.
To: The Commanding General, Third Corps Area.

The Sailings of USATs Manhattan, Washington, and Wood for Hawaii have been indefinitely postponed. So much of letters, this office, May 15, 1941, AG

320.2 (2-19-41)MC-C-M, subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department, and May 10, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-18-41)MC-C-M, subject: Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison Hawaiian Department, as pertains to movement of trainees to Ports of Embarkation and overseas movement is rescinded. Instructions covering final disposition of trainees earmarked by the two letters mentioned above will follow this communication.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Adjutant General.

Copies furnished:

The Commanding Generals, First Army, GHQ Air Force, Hawaiian Department, San Francisco and New York Ports of Embarkation;
The Chief of Staff, GHQ
The Chief of Chaplains
The Chief of Coast Artillery
The Chief of the Air Corps
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service
The Chief of Engineers
The Chief of Ordnance
The Chief Signal Officer
The Quartermaster General; and
The Chief of Finance.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, June 23, 1941.

AG 320.2 (6-16-41) MC-C-M
Subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department.
To: The Commanding Generals, Hawaiian Department, Third Corps Area and the New York Port of Embarkation;
The Quartermaster General.

Letter this office, May 15, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M, subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department, to the Commanding Genral, Third Corps Area, the Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation, and The Quartermaster General, respectively; and 1st Indorsement this office, May 15, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M, same subject, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, are rescinded. Letters, this office May 23, 1941, AG 320.2 (5-23-41) MC-M, May 24, 1941, AG 320.2 (5-24-41) MC, and May 27, 1941, AG 320.2 (5-26-41) MC, subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department, to the Commanding General, Third Corps Area are also rescinded.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[sgd] E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Copies Furnished:
Chief of Staff, GHQ
The Commanding Generals, First Army, and S. F. P. of E
The Chief of Chaplains
The Chief of Coast Artillery
The Chief of the Air Corps
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service
The Chief of Engineers
The Chief of Ordnance
The Chief Signal Officer
The Chief of Finance
The Surgeon General

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

Subject: Additional Selective Service Trainees for the Hawaiian Department.
AG 320.2 (4-21-41) MC-C 1st Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
May 21, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Radio No. 721, this office, April 9, 1941, requested your views on the practicability of securing additional selectees locally, and it was not intended that an appeal be made to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii to secure 1,127 additional selectees in excess of the existing quota.

2. In connection with your remarks on labor shortage in Hawaii, a resolution recently passed by the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu, copies of which were sent to the Secretary of War and other governmental heads, protested the organization of a port company in Hawaii on the grounds that the supply of labor was ample and that needs of National Defense projects could be met without importation of additional personnel from the United States. This matter is brought to your attention for information only. No further action appears necessary or desirable at this time.

3. Personnel for the 34th Engineers will be provided from the Continental United States in two increments. Details have been communicated to you in separate correspondence.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[sgd] E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 21 April 1941.

In reply refer to:
AG 381
Subject: Additional Selective Service Trainees for the Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. War Department radio No. 721, of 9 April 1941, proposes activation in this Department of the 34th Engineer Regiment (C) in June with a strength of 1127, including 36 attached medical personnel. It further proposes that the 3d Engineers (C) will furnish the cadre; the balance to be local selectees.

2. As the existing Territorial quota of 1400 Selectees has already been exceeded by approximately 500, and those now inducted assigned to organizations, an appeal was made to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii to secure the additional personnel required to activate this new unit. The Governor's reply, attached, states that he is without authority to call additional quotas of trainees, and even if such authority existed, he is opposed to providing additional manpower at the expense of National Defense projects and local industry which have already absorbed all available labor.

3. The labor shortage in Hawaii is acute. Skilled labor for work on National Defense projects is now being imported and it is quite likely that the importation of unskilled labor will become necessary to maintain defense work schedules.

4. In view of these circumstances it is urged that the War Department provide personnel from the Mainland U. S. for the activation of new or expansion of existing units in the Hawaiian Department.

[sgd] Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2 Incls.
1. Letter to Governor, T. H.
2. Letter from Governor, T. H.

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[Exhibit 1J]

[1]

[SECRET]

18 FEBRUARY 1941.

AG 320.2/55
Subject: Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to:

A. Letter the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated 24 January 1941, with reference to the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against a surprise attack, copy forwarded to this headquarters as inclosure to letter TAG to HHD, 7 February 1941, subject: "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii," file AG 381 (1-24-41) M.

B. Letter HHD to TAG, 5 September 1940, subject: "Additional Antiaircraft Troops for the Hawaiian Department", file 320.2/49.

C. Letter TAG to HHD, 27 September 1940, subject: War Reinforcements, Hawaiian Department", file 320.2 (9/27/40) M-WPD, with 1st and 2nd Indorsements thereon.

2. The increasingly critical international situation, together with the vital need, as expressed in Reference *A*, for adequate provision for the best defense which can be provided for the security of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the Fleet against surprise attacks makes it essential that the antiaircraft artillery garrison of Oahu be placed upon a war footing without delay. While not specifically mentioned in Reference *A*, there is a similar requirement for a sound defense of the Fleet and its base against raids by surface ships. This would have special importance if the fleet should be withdrawn from Pearl Harbor. An adequate defense, ready for prompt action, can not be provided with the present garrison because of the necessity for dual assignments of Coast Artillery batteries to antiaircraft and harbor defense missions. The reinforcements required for the antiaircraft artillery and harbor defense garrisons to provide the degree of defense considered essential are discussed below.

3. Antiaircraft Artillery.

a. The approved defense project provides for twenty-five (25) gun batteries, five (5) searchlight batteries, and sixteen (16) automatic weapons batteries manning a total of seventy-two (72) mobile and twenty-six (26) fixed AA guns, seventy-five (75) searchlights, one hundred and twenty (120) 37 mm AA guns, and two hundred (200) cal. .50 AA machine guns. (NOTE: Three hundred and
[2] forty five (345) cal. .50 AA machine guns are provided in the defense project, of which two hundred (200) are manned by antiaircraft artillery and the remainder by other troops.) With the present garrison, including the assignment of all but two (2) harbor defense artillery batteries to antiaircraft assignments, only nineteen (19) gun batteries, three (3) searchlight batteries, no 37mm batteries and six (6) machine gun batteries can be manned because of the shortage of both personnel and equipment. The major shortages in antiaircraft artillery armament are sixteen (16) three inch AA guns and associated equipment (of which six (6) guns are understood to be enroute to this Department), all one hundred and thirty-five (135) 37 mm AA guns, two hundred and thirty-six (236) cal. .50 machine guns, and thirty (30) sound locators.

b. To man the entire antiaircraft artillery defense project, avoiding dual assignments to all but four harbor defense batteries, requires an increase in the existing garrison of the following antiaircraft artillery personnel:

2 Regiments Coast Artillery AA (Mobile) T/O 4-11.
1 Battalion Gun Coast Artillery AA (Mobile) (less searchlight battery) T/O 4-15.

Approximately ninety (90) officers and two thousand (2000) enlisted men as individual filler replacements to activate three (3) gun batteries and three (3) 37 mm batteries of the 64th CA (AA), now in active, and to bring to war strength the active elements of this regiment.

c. In paragraph 10 *a* of 2nd Indorsement of Reference *C*, the War Depratment provided for only one half of the reinforcements of the peacetime garrison of antiaircraft artillery which, at that time, were considered essential to provide a reasonably effective antiaircraft defense prior to the date unit reinforcements from the mainland could affect the situation. With the increasingly critical international situation at this time, it is urgently recommended that all war

reinforcements of antiaircraft artillery personnel, both unit and filler reinforcements described above, together with the existing shortages in antiaircraft artillery material be sent from the mainland with the least practicable delay.

4. Harbor Defense Artillery.

The status of the defense which can be established with existing personnel of the peace garrison of harbor defense artillery is described in detail in par 6*f*, of the basic document, Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision of 1940. Briefly, only one 16-inch battery and the seacoast searchlights of the Ulupau Group can be manned by batteries with harbor defense as their only mission. By employing the undesirable expedient of dual assignments to harbor defense and antiaircraft missions, and of harbor defense and Field Artillery missions, both 16-inch gun batteries, the one 14-inch battery, one of the two 12-inch gun batteries, none of the three mortar batteries, three of the five 8-inch batteries (fixed and railway), six of the twelve 155 mm batteries (two manned by Field Artillery personnel) and none of the two 6-inch and two 3-inch [3] batteries can be manned upon initial deployment. As shown in Table I, par. 7 to HDP-40, an increase of approximately 165 officers and 3400 enlisted men as individual filler reinforcements and One Regiment Coast Artillery (TD, T/O 4-31W) is required to fully man the harbor defense artillery. By not manning the three fixed seacoast mortar batteries, which are not essential to a defense against raids, the total number of individual filler reinforcements may be reduced to approximately 150 officers and 2700 enlisted men. This increase in the garrison will be sufficient to provide only one relief as manning details for harbor defense guns, but will be adequate so that key observation stations, air guards and similar details can be maintained continuously.

5. Summarizing, it is urgently recommended that:

(*a*) The Coast Artillery garrison of this Department be brought to substantially war strenght by the dispatch from the mainland of the following reinforcements:

(1) Two Regiments CA (AA) Mobile, T/O 4-11.
(2) One Battalion CA (AA) gun, Mobile (less searchlight battery), T/O 4-15.
(3) One Regiment CA (TD), 155mm gun, T/O 4-31W.
(4) Individual antiaircraft artillery filler reinforcements to include 91 officers and 2064 enlisted men.
(5) Individual harbor defense artillery reinforcements to include approximately 150 officers and 2700 enlisted men.

b. Existing major shortages in the armament of the approved antiaircraft artillery projects, as set forth in par. 3 above, be filled as soon as practicable.

WALTER C SHORT,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.

[1]

[SECRET]

Subject: Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department.
AG 320.2 (2-18-41) MC-C-M 1st Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
May 10, 1941.

To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The Coast Artillery garrison, Hawaiian Department, will be augmented by approximately 276 officers and 5,734 enlisted men between June, 1941, and March, 1942, in three increments paralleling the estimated delivery of material, as follows:

a. June, 1941:

(1) AA filler replacements, 60 officers and 1,337 enlisted men.
(2) 62 officers and 1,329 enlisted men required to activate the following units in the Department:

98th Coast Artillery (AA) (Semi-mobile), less band, 3d Battalion (37-mm Gun), Battery E (Searchlight), basic privates and attached medical, under T/O 4–111, November 1, 1940, and component tables.

(3) 17 officers and 359 enlisted men to activate the 2d Battalion, 97th Coast Artillery (AA) (Semi-mobile), less Battery H (Gun), Battery E (Searchlight) and basic privates, under T/O 4–115, November 1, 1940 and component tables.

b. November, 1941:

(1) 48 officers and 885 enlisted men to activate the 97th Coast Artillery (AA) (Semi-mobile), less band, 2d Battalion (Gun), 3d Battalion (37-mm gun), and basic privates, under T/O 4–111, November 1, 1940, and component tables.

(2) 4 officers and 134 enlisted men to activate Battery H (Gun), 97th Coast Artillery, less basic privates, under T/O 4–17, November 1, 1940.

(3) Attached Medical personnel, 98th Coast Artillery, 7 officers and 49 enlisted men.

[2] *c. March, 1942:*

(1) AA filler replacements, 24 officers and 661 enlisted men.

(2) 54 officers and 980 enlisted men to activate the 3d Battalion (37-mm Gun), 97th Coast Artillery and 3d Battalion (37-mm gun), 98th Coast Artillery, each less Battery M (Gun) and basic privates, under T/O 4–125, November 1, 1940 and component tables.

2. Cadres for the new units will be furnished from existing units in the Hawaiian Department; their source, strength and composition will be determined by you.

3. Every effort will be made to send individuals who have completed their basic training; however, in order to make maximum use of available shipping, some curtailment in their basic training may be required. If this is done, you will be informed so the individuals can complete their basic training in Hawaii.

4. The actual activation of the various units will conform to the arrival of personnel in the Department.

5. While your recent request for additional medical enlisted men was disapproved because of non-availability of personnel, the 97th and 98th Coast Artillery Regiments (and the 34th Engineers whose activation is covered in separate correspondence) are allotted full quotas of attached medical personnel, less basics. You are authorized to make a redistribution of this personnel, reporting such readjustment to this office.

6. It is desired that you submit a report on the following:

a. The actual dates on which various units are activated.

b. Changes in the distribution of three-year men in Coast Artillery units in connection with activation of new units.

c. List of all Coast Artillery units and installations in the Department including allotted strengths and tables of organization under which organized; this report to be submitted upon completion of the activation of all new units and distribution of the last increment of AA filler replacements.

[3] 7. Attention is invited to letter, this office, April 21, 1941, AG 381.4 (1-27-41) M-D-M, subject: Reports of Change in Status Reports—Defense Reserves, Overseas Departments.

8. The allotments of commissioned personnel and the grades and ratings for enlisted personnel will be made separately.

9. Recommendation for augmentation of harbor defense artillery is not favorably considered at this time because the additional personnel is not available. The antiaircraft reinforcements will strengthen the seacoast defenses by the relief of all but four harbor defense batteries from dual antiaircraft missions.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(sgd) E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

3 inclosures—Added.

Incl. 1—Copy of Ltr., 5/10/41.
AG 320.2 (2/18/41) MC–C–N, to C. G., Third Corps Area.

Incl. 2—Copy of ltr., 5/10/41, AG 320.2 (2/18/41) MC–C–M, to C. G.s, N. Y. & San Fran. Ports of Emb.

Incl. 3—Copy of ltr., 5/10/41, AG 320.2 (2/18/41) MC–C–M, to The Quartermaster General.

Copies furnished:
The Commanding Generals, Third Corps Area and New York & San Francisco Ports of Embarkation:
The Chief of Staff, GHQ;
The Chief of Chaplains;
The Chief of Coast Artillery;
The Chief of the Air Corps;
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service;
The Chief of Engineers;
The Chief of Ordnance;
The Chief Signal Officer;
The Quartermaster General;
The Surgeon General; and
The Chief of Finance.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

[1]
AG 320.2/57 25 FEBRUARY 1941

Subject: Increase of enlisted strength, 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard (California).

To: The Adjutant General.

1. On January 9, 1941, the then Department Commander, Lieutenant General Herron, radioed for authority to increase the enlisted strength of the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard, from present allotted strength to a peace strength of 1450 by assignment of selectees from Ninth Corps Area. On January 17, 1941, the War Department replied by radiogram to the effect that the recommendation made in Janurary 9, 1941 radiogram was not favorably considered and that the policy of the War Department is that selective service personnel in overseas garrisons will be limited to those procured within the overseas department itself and that no additional selective service personnel will in time of peace be sent from the continental United States to overseas departments.

2. I am again submitting this request as I am of the firm opinion that the situation here is different than in the United States, and that this is a special case which deserves further consideration. The facts are:

The 251st National Guard is the only National Guard organization on duty outside of the continental limits of the United States;

This regiment is composed of white officers and enlisted men;

The selective service trainees now in being in this Department are composed of 469 Japanese out of the quota 700. The next draft quota of 700 which is to be inducted in March will undoubtedly be composed of approximately the same ratio of Japanese; namely, about 67%;

The selective service trainees are of varied mixture, such as Japanese, Hawaiian, Part Hawaiian, Filipinos, Chinese, Korean, and other mixtures;

Any assignment of the selective service trainees to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) would result in a mixture of races, largely Japanese, being assigned to a white organization, which is contrary to War Department policy, as stated in War Department Letter AG 291.21 (10/9/40) M-A-M, October 16, 1940, Subject: "War Department Policy in regard to Negroes", paragraph g;

The Colonel, Commanding the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), states that because of the feeling in California against orientals, any assignment of selective service trainees from this Department to his command would cause dissension, and lessen the efficiency of his command fully 50 percent.

[2] All replacements now coming from the mainland are required for the Regular Army troops here.

All the selective service trainees in this Department will be needed to fill the Hawaii National Guard units which are composed of races of the same type as in the selective service draft.

3. In view of the above, the only justifiable solution of this problem is to assign selective service trainees from the mainland, and preferably from the 9th Corps Area, to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard. It is my opinion that it will be contrary to the best interests of all concerned to assign selective service trainees in this Department to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) to increase its strength.

4. Since this is a special situation incident to this Department. I do not believe the present War Department policy, as stated in WD Radiogram, January 17, 1941; i. e., of not sending any additional selective service personnel from the continental United States to overseas departments, should apply to this Department.

5. I therefore again request that the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard, be increased from present allotted strength to a peace strength of 1450 by assignment of selective service trainees from the 9th Crops Area.

(sgd) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

Subject: Increase of Enlisted Strength, 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard (California).
AG 320.2 (2-25-41) M-C 1st Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
March 8, 1941.

To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Your recommendation that the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) be increased from its present allotted strength of 1181 to a strength of 1450 by assignment of selectees from the Ninth Corps Area is not favorably considered.

2. As stated in radiogram from this office, January 17, 1941, all selective service personnel to be procured in the current fiscal year have already been allotted to units and activities. Additional personnel could be allotted to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) only at the expense of other units or activities.

3. If trainees were sent to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) at the present time, it is not considered that they could be of great value to the regiment or to the defense of the Hawaiian Islands due to the short period of time they would be available after completing their basic training. Selectees inducted now would probably reach the Hawaiian Department some time in April 1941. Their basic training would require approximately three months making them fully available about July 1941. As the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) is scheduled to be returned to the United States for return to an inactive status of September 16, 1941, it appears that any selective service personnel sent at this late date would be available to the regiment for a maximum of two months.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(sgd) E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

A true copy.
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

[1]
AG 320.2/58 25 FEBRUARY 1941.

Subject: Reinforcements for Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to:

A. Letter, TAG to HHD, 4 February 1941, subject: "Tables of Organization, Overseas Departments", file AG 320.2 (1-17-41)P(C):

B. Letter, TAG to HHD, 27 December 1940, Subject: "Equipment for Field Artillery Units", file AG 320.2 (12/20/40) P.

C. Letter, HHD to TAG, 18 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department", file AG 320.2/55.

D. Letter, HHD to TAG, 19 February 1941, subject: "Additional Engineer Troops", file Engr. 322.03.

2. The requests for troop reinforcements as stated in Reference *C* and *D*, hold priority over the requests given herein. The following reinforcements are requested for this Department at the earliest possible date and in the priority in which they are listed.

a. In accordance with Reference *A*, authority is requested to organize the 11th Field Artillery under WD T/O 6–41, dated November 1, 1940. The 11th Field Artillery (less 3d Battalion) is now organized under Standard War Department Tables of Organization with units organized and maintained at war strength, as follows:

(1) 11th Field Artillery (less 3d Bn), T/O 6–41, January 3, 1939.
(2) Hq & Hq Btry, 11th Field Artillery, T/O 6–42, January 3, 1939.
(3) 1st and 2d Bn, 11th Field Artillery, T/O 6–45, December 7, 1938.
(4) Hq & Hq Btry, 1st and 2d Bn, 11th Field Artillery, T/O 6–46. January 7, 1938.
(5) Four (4) batteries, 11th Field Artillery, T/O 6–47, December 7, 1938.

b. That one Infantry Battalion, Light Tanks, be authorized for and the necessary personnel and material to organize same, be furnished this Department. The number of possible localities for hostile beach landings make the availability of a mobile reserve having the characteristics of light tanks of [2] great tactical importance for counterattacks. The 11th Tank Company (Light Tanks) organized under Standard WD, T/O 7–8, dated March 17, 1938, is the only tank unit in this Department and could be the nucleus for the Infantry Battalion of Light Tanks, requested herein.

c. That the organization of two (2) Military Police Companies, under WD, T/O 7–55, dated November 1, 1940, (Military Police Battalion) be authorized and that the necessary personnel be furnished from the Mainland for organization of the two (2) companies in this Department. The technical duties required of Air Corps enlisted personnel are retarded due to the required training for and actual performance of interior guard duty at both Hickam and Wheeler Fields. It is believed that an organized Military Police Company stationed at each of these fields would release Air Corps personnel for necessary air activities and also render more efficient interior guard and military police duty. The Military Police personnel could be efficiently trained in anti-sabotage work and also in close-in defense without disrupting scheduled training. It is the intention to use the Military Police personnel to perform similar work at outlying air fields under the control of the Commanding Officers of Hickam and Wheeler Fields and also to accompany Air Corps Units to those outlying fields when either Wing is operating under its Dispersion Plan.

d. That the necessary reinforcements be furnished so that the Infantry Regiments of the Hawaiian Division, be organized under WD, T/O No. 7, dated November 1, 1940: Infantry Division (Square). These regiments are now organized under Standard WD, T/O 7–11, dated December 6, 1938, as modified to fall within the "Allotment of Grades and Ratings for Enlisted Men, and authorized Recruiting Strength" as published in mimeograph letter, TAG, August 7, 1940, file AG 221 (8–7–40) E. Approval of this request would permit compliance with Reference *A*, above, and also make available the necessary personnel and material authorized by current standard War Department Tables of Organization.

e. That the 11th Field Artillery Brigade (less 11th Field Artillery) be organized under WD, T/Os dated November 1, 1940 and that the necessary reinforcements be furnished this Department. That War Department, Tables of Basic Allowances for Field Artillery, No. 6–1, dated November 1, 1940, be made applicable to the 11th Field Artillery Brigade (less 11th Field Artillery).

3. A Study is now being made of all Special Tables of Organization at present in use by units in this Department, with a view of submitting recommendations for changes that will permit organization and functioning under current Standard WD, Tables of Organization.

[sgd] Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12–22–41.

[SECRET]

SUBJECT: Reinforcements for Hawaiian Department.

1st Ind.

AG 320.2 (2-25-41) M-C WVC

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
April 11, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The augmentation of Coast Artillery and Engineer components of the Hawaiian Department is being considered separately, and you will be advised in the near future of the action taken thereon.

2. The augmentation of the Field Artillery and Infantry components of the Hawaiian Division, and the addition of a Tank Battalion and two Military Police Companies to the peace garrison are not considered urgent, nor is it practicable to provide the personnel at this time. It is believed the necessary guard duties can and should be performed by troops in the Department without organizing Military Police Companies for this purpose.

3. The reorganization of Infantry and Field Artillery elements of the Hawaiian Division under latest War Department tables of organization is approved. This can be accomplished without additional personnel. The majority of the units in other foreign garrisons and in the Continental United States are below table of organization strengths yet conform to standard tables. As stated in letter, February 4, 1941, AG 320.2 (1-17-41) P (C), subject: "Tables of Organization, Overseas Departments", this can be accomplished by reducing the size of component elements of a unit or by carrying certain elements inactive.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(sgd) W. V. Carter,
W. V. CARTER,
Brigadier General,
Acting The Adjutant General.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.

[Exhibit 1K]

[SECRET]

AG 320.2 (3-5-41) M-WPD ACW/1fl

APRIL 9, 1941.

Subject: Aircraft Warning Service and Air Defense.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Reference is made to letter, this office, December 15, 1939, AG 676.3 (12-15-39) M-WPD, subject: "Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaiian Department", to subsequent communications on the same subject; to letter G-2/183-316, February 12, 1941, subject: "Final Report of Commanding General, Air Defense Command"; and to letter, this office, March 17, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-28-41) M-WPD-M, subject: "Defense Plans, Continental United States".

2. It is suggested that you consider the advisability of organizing your department for air defense, along lines similar to those described in letter, this office, March 17, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-28-41) M-WPD-M, i. e., charging your senior air officer with functions corresponding to those of the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force in the United States. These functions would include the peacetime organization and training of both fixed and mobile Aircraft Warning Services and of Interceptor pursuit aviation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. R. VAN SICKLER,
Adjutant General.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-23-41.

[SECRET]

AG 320.2/61 1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 3 May, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

Considerable study has been given to the organization of a Hawaiian Air Defense Command and the proposed plan was presented in paragraph 7, secret letter, this headquarters to TAG, dated 25 April 1941, subject: "Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department."

For the Commanding General:

CARL GROSSE,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.

[SECRET]

(IG-24)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 24 April 1941.

In reply refer to: 320.2
Subject: Air Base Group.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., (thru: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.).

1. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, recently requested the War Department to designate Bellows Field, T. H., a permanent Air Corps station under the jurisdiction of Headquarters Hawaiian Department.

2. A further request is being prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to have the War Department authorized the creation of a separate Air Corps station for the 15th Pursuit Group on Oahu, T. H.

3. Subject to the approval of the above mentioned recommendations, a redistribution of Air Base Group units will be necessary and the following is recommended:

a. The 18th Air base Group (R) (tentative T/O 1-411) Wheeler Field, T. H., be redesignated an "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single).

b. An "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single) (tentative T/O 1-411) be authorized for Bellows Field, T. H.

c. An "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single) (tentative T/O 1-411) be authorized for the new station of the 15th Pursuit Group.

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[CONFIDENTIAL]

SUBJECT: Air Base Group
AG 320.2 (4-24-41) MC-C 2nd Ind. RPM/ihw-1217

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
June 26, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The Troop Unit Basis FY 1942, provides for two additional materiel squadrons for the Hawaiian Department Air Force. It is believed that this provides sufficient air base units to care for Bellows Field.

2. Action on your recommendation for the organization of an additional air base group for station with the 15th Pursuit Group is held in abeyance pending decision on the new station.

3. It is desired that you submit without delay your recommendations for station and construction for the two additional materiel squadrons.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. B. VAN SICKLE,
Adjutant General.

A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

AG 320.2/94 — 3rd Ind. — OMM/ajk

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 22 July 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

Reference paragraph 3, 2nd Indorsement, it is recommended that the two additional material squadrons be stationed at Bellows Field. Construction to care for these squadrons has been included in letter this Headquarters to the War Department dated 5 April 1941, Engineer file 600.12, subject: "Construction at Bellows Field, T. H."

For the Commanding General:

O. M. McDOLE,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

7 AUGUST 1941.
CHENNEY L. BERTHOLF,
Lt. Co., A. G. D.,
Adjutant General

CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,
Washington, D. C.

.Request authority be obtained for the activation of Bellows Field of a headquarters detachment to provide officer and enlisted staff for the post commander Stop Absence of an air-base group in the Bellows Field set-up necessitates the above Stop Minimum personnel for Hq Bellows Field now being furnished on DS from Hickam and Wheeler Fields Stop First two grade personnel available locally Stop Request for allotment of grades and ratings for the above follows by airmail Stop Request radio reply signed Martin.

SHORT.

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

Confidential
380-22
CHIEF OF ARMY AIR FORCES,
Washington, D. C.

Request information as to status of air base group for Bellows Field Stop Seven hundred troops now station thereat and the administrative situation is becoming difficult Stop Refer thirty nine August fifteen Signed Martin

SHORT.

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

Confidential
From
6 War WD

Washington, D. C., Sept. 27, 1941.

C G, *Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.*
172—27th

The activation of the air base group for Bellows Field reurad three eighty was not favorably considered by Secretary War because this would exceed the garrison strength now allotted Hawaii Stop The Adjutant General has been requested to activate a headquarters detachment in accordance with your letter August fifteen same subject A one dash seven.

ARNOLD.
316P/27.

Decoded by Lt Jos Engelbertz SC 10:00A, 29 Sept. 41.
A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, September 27, 1941.

AG 320.2 (8 15 41)
MR-M-AAF

Subject: Activation of Air Corps Units.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The Headquarters Detachment, Bellows Field, T. H., is constituted and will be activated by you at the earliest practicable date.

2. Grades and ratings for this detachment will be as indicated on the attached inclosure.

3. Personnel for this detachment will be furnished from personnel now available in the Hawaiian Department with no increase in strength of the Hawaiian Air Force.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(S) OTTO THUSON,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl. Copies furnished:
Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force
Chief of Staff, GHQ.
Chief of the Army Air Forces
Chief of the Air Corps
Divisions of the War Department General Staff.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

SECRET

56 WAR RC WD

Washington, D. C., 554P, AGU 30, 1941.

C G *Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter, T. H.*

Seven Nine Thirtieth Air base group at Bellows Field and URAD August Seven reference hdqrs Bellows Field reulst April Twenty-four Stop Desired that following information be furnished by most expeditious means to this office Stop One what are total Air Corps personnel requirements for Hawaiian Dept quy rtewo what are total personnel requirements for arms and services with Air Corps query three number of air base groups and location that will be required for Hawaiian Dept.

ULIO.
352P.

Decoded by: Capt. C. J. Harrison, SC. 1030A, Aug. 31, 1941.
A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

9 September 1941.

[S] CHEMEY L. BERTHOLF,
Lt. Col. AGD
Adjutant General.

272–9

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.

Following Air Force requirements submitted re your seven nine thirtieth Stop Following units and personnel required at present two air base groups paren single paren comma one for Bellows Field and one for Kahuru Point semicolon Air Corps enlisted personnel now in department sufficient to organize these units Stop One heavy bombardment squadron consisting of twenty seven officers and two hundred twenty enlisted men required to replace Fourteenth Bombardment Squadron transferred to Philippine Department Stop Other services required as follows Bellows Field colon Medical Corps one officer seven enlisted Dental Corps one officer semicolon Quartermaster Corps one officer thirty enlisted comma Ordnance Department one air base company of four officers and sixty men Stop For Kahuru Point colon Medical Corps three officers twelve enlisted one Dental Corps comma/Quartermaster Corps one officer thirty enlisted comma Signal Corps ten enlisted specialists Stop In order that the Hawaiian Air Force may be brought to the strength necessary to enable that force to provide the air defense of Oahu it is necessary that the following additional personnel be provided as soon as possible colon Air Corps three thousand eight hundred seventy one enlisted comma Medical Corps six officers thirty six enlisted one Dental Corps comma Quartermaster four officers seventy enlisted Stop Also three air base squadrons one each at Barking Sands Kauai comma MORSE Field and Hilo Hawaii Stop In the near future two additional air base squadrons will be required one at Lanay paren under construction paren one at Parker Ranch paren Project to be submitted paren Stop This need covered in full detail in confidential letter commanding General Hawaiian Air Force to Chief Army Air Forces dated twenty August forty one forwarded from this headquarters twenty-fifth August Stop The above increased personnel both Air Corps, arms and services was not repeat not included in my letter ag three twenty zero point three slant thirty seven 2 dated June fifth forty one

SHORT.

EMC secret by Lt. G. Lennox S. C., 1146A Sept. 9, 1941.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12–22–41

SECRET

126 WAR EM WD

Washington, D. C. 731 P Oct 17, 1941.

C. G., *HAWN DEPT Ft. Shafter T. H.*

17th Fourteenth Bombardment Squadron H is relieved from assignment to Eleventh Bombardment Group H and from permanent station at Hickam Field and assigned to Commanding General U S Army Forces in the Far East Manila P I for permanent station to be designated by him

ADAMS,
1101P.

Decoded by Capt. C. J. Harrison, 1138P Oct 17 1941.
A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12–22–41

8 NOVEMBER 1941.

CHENEY L. BERTHOLF,
Lt. Col., A. G. D., Adjutant General.

786–6th

CHIEF OF ARMY AIR FORCES,
Washington, D. C.

Request immediate consideration be given to the assignment of three repeat three air depot groups to the Hawaiian Air Force Stop Procurement of sufficient civilian employees for the Hawaiian Air Depot is impossible Stop Discharge of enlisted men at the convenience of the Government for the purpose of accepting

employment in the Hawaiian Air Depot fails to remedy the shortage in personnel Stop At present our depot maintenance is far behind schedule Comma resulting in the grounding of thirty percent of our tactical planes Stop Lack of both personnel and material is becoming increasingly acute Stop From a standpoint of second and third echelon maintenance we are poorly prepared for any augmentation in airplane strength Stop We must have maintenance personnel and material at once Stop No no personnel is available here for the activation of these groups signed Martin

SHORT.

ENC secret by LTCR Tiemah SC 310PM Nov. 8, 1941.
A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

SECRET

59 WAR MC WD

Washington, D. C., 748P Nov. 15, 1941.

C G Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter, T. H.

Four zero two fifteenth. Reference your radiogram number seven eight six of Nov eighth for additional air depot groups period This matter is now under advisement period Answer will be made in the immediate future period At the present time the air depot groups are not available for transfer to your department period When depot groups can be made available to your dept will this increase in Air Force personnel come within the authorized war garrison strength now approved for the Hawaiian Dept period From Arnold.

ADAMS,
120A/15/16.

Decoded by: Capt C. J Harrison SC 435P Nov. 16, 1941.
A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN.
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

18 NOVEMBER 1941.
WM E DONEGAN,
Lt. Col. G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-3

889—19th
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.

Reference your four zero two fifteenth of November fifteenth increase of Air Depot groups will not repeat not come within authorized war garrison strength now approved for Hawaiian Department Stop Request that personnel for Air Depot groups be furnished as soon as possible Stop Air groups urgently needed due to difficulty in procuring civilian employees Stop Hawaiian Air Force will be severely handicapped in proposed augmentation in airplane strength Stop Demands for depot maintenance will be unlimited Stop Authorized war garrison strength must be increased to accommodate air depot groups End

SHORT.

Enc sec by Lt J H Babcock, 137P Nov. 19, 1941.
A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, November 18, 1941.

AG 320.2 (11-1-41)
MR-M-AAF
Subject: Activation and Redesignation of Air Corps Units.
To: Commanding Generals,
Caribbean Defense Command, Panama Canal,
Hawaiian and Philippine Departments,
Newfoundland Base Command and
U. S. Forces in Far East
Chief of Army Air Forces.

1. The following units are constituted and will be activated at the earliest practicable date by the Department commanders concerned:

Unit	Source of Personnel	Station of Activation	Permanent Station
5th Air Corps Squadron, Communications, (Regional Control).	Existing Units in Phil. Dept.	Phil. Dept....	Sq. Hq. Nichols Field, P. I., Airways detachments as directed by Dept. Commander.
5th Airways Squadron.....	Existing Units in Phil. Dept.	Phil. Dept....	Sq. Hq. Nichols Field, P. I., Airways detachments as directed by Dept. Commander.
6th Airways Squadron.....	Existing Units in Caribbean Defense Command.	P. C. Dept....	Sq. Hq. Albrook Field, Panama, Airways detachments as directed by Dept. Commander.
7th Airways Squadron.....	Existing Units in Haw. Dept.	Haw. Dept....	Sq. Hq. Hickam Field, Haw., Airways detachments as directed by Dept. Commander.

2. The initial strength of the 5th and 7th Airways Squadrons will be 19 officers and 110 men. Grades and ratings will be issued in a separate communication.

3. The 5th and 7th Airways Squadrons will furnish the servicing detachments for Airways stations in the Pacific Area. Weather and Communications personnel for the Airways stations will be furnished by the Chief of the Army Air Forces upon receipt of a requisition from the appropriate Department commander.

4. These units will be activated from personnel now available to the respective Department commanders.

5. Further replacements for the 5th Airways Squadron and 5th Air Corps Squadron, Communications, will be furnished by the Chief of the Army Air Forces upon receipt of a requisition from the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in Far East.

6. Attached is a Manning table for an Airways station.

7. The following units are redesignated as indicated:

OLD DESIGNATION	NEW DESIGNATION
Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Philippine Islands.	5th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control).
Air Corps Squadron, Communications, Caribbean.	6th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional Control).
Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Panama.	6th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control).
Air Corps Detachment, Communications, Hawaii.	7th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional Control).
Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Hawaii.	7th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control).
Air Corps Detachment, Communications, Newfoundland Base Command.	8th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (regional control).
Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Newfoundland Base Command.	8th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional Control).

8. Assignment of units:

Caribbean Air Forces:

6th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Albrook Field.

All Communications detachments in the Caribbean Area including Puerto Rico and the Communications detachments at all Airways stations in the Caribbean Area.

6th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Albrook Field.

All Weather detachments in the Caribbean Area including Puerto Rico and the Weather detachments at all Airways stations in the Caribbean Area.

Far East Air Force:
5th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Nichols Field.
All Communications detachments in the Far East Area. 5th Air Corps squardon, Weather (Regional Control) with squadron headquarters at Nichols Field.
All Weather detachments in the Far East Area.
Hawaiian Department Air Force:
7th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron headquarters in the Hawaiian Department Area.
7th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron headquarters in the Hawaiian Department Area.
Newfoundland Base Command:
8th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Newfoundland Airport.
All communications detachments at the British Bases in the Northeast, and Bermuda.
8th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Newfoundland Airport.
All Weather detachments at the British Bases in the Northeast, and Bermuda.

9. Weather Sections and Communications Sections now assigned as a part of Airways detachments are removed from assignment thereto and reassigned as a Weather or Communications detachment to the appropriate Weather or Communications squadron of that area. The detachments will remain at their Airways stations.

10. Weather and Communications personnel for the Airways stations will be furnished by the Chief of the Army Air Forces on receipt of a requisition from the Department commander concerned.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[S] OTTO JOHNSON,
Adjutant General.

Copies furnished: Chief of Staff GHQ, Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command, Chief of Air Corps, Divisions of the War Department, General Staff. 1 Incl.

A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.

[CONFIDENTIAL]

873-18
CHIEF OF ARMY AIR FORCES,
Washington, D. C.

Request that authority be obtained to activate station complements of a strength in grades and ratings equal to those at present organized on the mainland at the following Air Corps Fields within this department colon Hickam Field Wheeler Field Morse Field Barking Sands Stop No provision has been made for personnel for Base and Post functions with the result that the wings at Hickam Field and Wheeler Field are forced to provide administrative personnel for the posts in addition personnel from the Eighteenth Wing Hickam Field and from the Air Base Group Hickam Field are required to man Barking Sands and Morse Field comma both major outlying fields. Personnel for post administration must be obtained somewhere and it is now being obtained at the expense of our tactical organizations Stop If the tactical organizations should be moved into the field post administration would collapse Stop It is urgently recommended that the authority requested above be obtained immediately signed Martin

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[CONFIDENTIAL]

144 WAR WE

Washington, D. C., 219A, Nov. 26 1941.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.

455–25th

Until such time as present initial war garrison limitations imposed upon Hawaiian Department have been lifted additional personnel can not repeat not be sent to that department Stop With view to securing an increase in the air strength for that station action has been initiated and you will be advised when final action is taken Stop Referring to your eight seven three

ADAMS,
730A/25/26/1PM.

Decoded by Lt. Jos Engelbertz SC, 3:15 P, 26 Nov 41.
A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12–22–41

[Exhibit 1L]

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 25 April 1941.

In reply refer to:
AG 230.3/37

Subject: Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to:

A. Secret letter, HHD to TAG, 25 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for Hawaiian Department", file AG 320.2/58.

B. Secret radio, TAG to HHD, 19 April 1941, 744–18th and reply thereto, HHD to TAG, 22 April 1941. AG 325/18–18a.

C. Secret letter, HHD to TAG, number 2645–18, dated 18 April 1941, in connection with Medical Department Enlisted Reinforcements. On file in Department Surgeon Office.

2. It is recommended that authority be given this headquarters to organize the present Hawaiian (Square) Division into two (2) separate and independent Triangular Divisions. Under War Department, tables of Organization, No. 70, dated November 1, 1940, current shortages exist in both personnel and material but it is believed that a desirable reorganization can be accomplished without increases in present strength other than the expansion of certain units as requested in my References *A*, *C*, and *D*, and requested reinforcements to organize a Reconnaissance Troop in each of the proposed Triangular Divisions. In paragraph *d*, Reference *A*, I requested the necessary reinforcements to organize the Infantry Regiments of the Hawaiian (Square) Division under current War Department, Tables of Organizations, No. 7, dates November 1940, and assuming favorable action on the recommendation, the reinforcements requested herein for the expansion of existing units are in accordance with Reference *A*. A summary of the proposed reorganization with tables showing personnel shortages hereto as Inclosure No. 1.

3. Primary reasons for this request are as follows:

a. For tactical purposes the Defense of Oahu is conducted in two sectors, they are, the North Sector and the South Sector. Two (2) Triangular Divisions are considered more flexible to accomplish defensive operations in the two separate sectors.

b. The proposed reorganizations presents no serious problems as to organization, command, staff and tactical unity.

c. The Hawaiian (Square) Division, as now organized and employed, constitutes a separate channel of command. Due to present organization it is less flexible than the proposed two (2) Triangular Divisions and also retards the prompt execution of missions requiring the employment of one or more units of the Division in coordination with units of the other echelons under the control of the Department Commander.

d. As now constituted the land defense is assigned to the Division Commander as the Beach and Land Defense Officer, with the result that it permits the Department Commander to play no part in the defensive action, if and when, the air and coast defenses are knocked out.

4. National Guard and Selectee Units.

a. It is proposed to assign one of the two National Guard Infantry regiments now in Federal Service to each of the Triangular Divisions.

b. If the two National Guard Infantry regiments now in Federal Service are demobilized upon completion of one year's training and the Department's full yearly quota of three thousand (3,000) selectees are authorized, then it is planned to form two Infantry regiments from the selectees and assign one selectee Infantry regiment to each of the Triangular Divisions. See Reference *B*.

c. Should the two (2) National Guard regiments now in Federal Service and two (2) tentatively planned selectee regiments be in Federal Service at the same time then, it is planned to assign one selectee Infantry regiment to each of the Triangular Divisions and one or both of the National Guard regiments to defense missions on the Outlying Islands or retain one National Guard regiment as a Department reserve unit on Oahu.

d. By employing one National Guard regiment with each of the Triangular Divisions it will forstall an expected request for a Brigade organization of the two Hawaiian National Guard Regiments.

5. Station Compliments.

a. Schofield Barracks,

(1) It is recommended that a Brigadier General be assigned to Schofield Barracks for duty as an administrative Post Commander and that he be provided with a staff and commissioned assistants, warrant officer, nurses, enlisted men and civilian employees as shown in Inclosure No. 2, attached hereto, which lists the net minimum requirements desired in addition to permanent personnel now on duty at Schofield Barracks and not assigned to units of the present Hawaiian (Square) Division.

b. Fort Shafter.

(1) It is recommended that a Lieutenant Colonel be assigned to Fort Shafter as the Administrative Post Commander and that he be provided with the officer and enlisted Station Complement personnel as shown in Inclosure No. 3, attached hereto. The necessity for a station complement for the post of Fort Shafter is predicted upon operational missions of its garrison, the 64th Coast Artillery (Antiaircraft) regiment. When thus employed the regiment is absent from its station and because of post and administrative requirements is deprived of its maximum fighting strength. It is believed this serious handicap could be eliminated by employment of a Station Complement at Fort Shafter.

c. Station Complements are not requested for stations under control of the Hawaiian Air Force and the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade for the following reasons:

(1) Hawaiian Air Force: The duties of units of the 18th Bombardment Wing (Hickam Field) and the 14th Pursuit Wing (Wheeler Field) necessitate maximum operation, maintenance and control from Air Fields under the control of the Wing Commanders and from which the Post Administrative Staff and enlisted assistants will not be moved. With full consideration of the anticipated complement of three hundred (300) airplanes, no need for Station Complements exists.

(2) Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade: Practically all of the field operational functions will be performed in the vicinity of the permanent station and no necessity for Station complements is considered except for Fort Shafter, as noted above.

6. After preparation of this letter, your 1st. Indorsement to our reference *A* was received. This request is being forwarded with a view of having it available for reference in the War Department, under the following conditions:

a. That this communication with its request for reinforcements as listed in Inclosure #1, be given reconsideration at the earliest date it is practicable to provide the reinforcements requested.

b. That authority be granted me to reorganize the present Hawaiian (Square) Division into two (2) Triangular Divisions by using the present available personnel and material. This can be accomplished in accordance with the last of your paragraph 3, 1st Indorsement, dated April 11, 1941, to my Reference *A*.

7. Organization of Air Defense Command.

a. In order that maximum coordination in all activities pertaining to the Air Defense of Oahu may be accomplished, I propose to create an Air Defense Com-

mand to be commanded by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, who will continue control of the 18th Bombardment Wing. I propose to constitute the Air Defense Command as follows:

(1) Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.
(a) Headquarters and Staff, Hawaiian Air Force.
(b) 18th Bombardment Wing.
(c) Air Defense Command.
1. Aircraft Warning Service.
2. 14th Pursuit Wing.
3. Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.

b. In the organization of an Air Defense Command no interference with normal antiaircraft training is contemplated. Only while actually performing operational missions is it planned to place the antiaircraft Artillary under the control of the Air Defense Commander. Furthermore, no increase in the numbers of the Staff of the Hawaiian Air Force is believed necessary in order to create an air defense Command for this Department. It is planned to have the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and his staff also perform the duties of the Commander and the Staff of the Air Defense Command. In order to avoid divided responsibilities due to the dual missions now required of some beach defense batteries, no action will be taken to form an Air Defense Command until the first increment of the antiaircraft artillary reinforcements, described in secret radiograms War Department, 25 and 26 April, 1941, have been received.

c. An Air Defense Command for the Hawaiian Department is believed peculiarly adaptable to this theater and will best meet the needs for defense against attacks from the air.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incl.
#1—Summary of Proposed Reorganization
#2—Station Complement, Schofield Barracks.
#3—Station Complement, Fort Shafter.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

Subject: Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department.

AG 320.2 (4-25-41 MC-C 1st Ind. ESA
WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
July 29, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Reference is made to 1st Indorsement, this office, July 22, 1941, AG 320.2 (6-5-41) MC-E, subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations, Hawaiian Department.

2. In view of the action taken on the correspondence referred to above, basic communication is being returned without action.

By order of the Secretary of War:

_____ _____,
Major General.
The Adjutant General.

3 incls. n/c

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

17 WVY MX 109

Wahn D. C. 610A May 29 41.

CG

Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter T. H.

Eight three seven twenty ninth Secretary of War has decided that in connection with other vital needs total war repeat war garrison of your department for initial war operations must be reduced to approximately fifty eight thousand officers and men stop It is not believed advisable to reduce Air Corps combat comma antiaircraft and AWS units now set up stop Therefore a reduction must be made with respect to other troops stop Recommendations desired as expeditiously as possible as to manner of effecting required reduction

ADAMS.
657A

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

AG 320.37/37B

5 June 1941.

Subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to:

A. Secret Radio, TAG to HHD, 29 May 1941, 837-29th.

B. Secret letter HHD to TAG, 25 April, 1941, subject: "Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department", file AG 320.37/37.

2. In compliance with instructions contained in Reference A, the composition of the war garrison for initial war operations has been studied. Table I herewith, shows the forces recommended, totaling 59,425 officers, warrant officers, nurses, and enlisted men, but not including the civilian employees now shown in Table I, par. 7, HDP-40.

3. The proposed war garrison consists of the following major units:

a. Two Triangular Divisions, less reconnaissance troops, with the Infantry and Signal Corps personnel at reduced strength.

b. Corps troops consisting of a light tank battalion, the existing 11th Ordnance Company, Division Pack Train, and Co. A, 1st Separate Chemical Battalion, and the recently authorized 34th Engineers, Combat, and the 804th Engineer Battalion (Avn.).

c. The Hawaiian Air Force with service elements at present strenths.

d. Harbor Defense Coast Artillery as now provided in the approved defense project reduced by the personnel required to man three fixed seacoast mortar batteries and three 155-mm GPF batteries.

e. Antiaircraft Artillery with no reduction from the approved defense project.

f. Service, elements, with reductions in the mobilization strengths as shown in par. 7 HDP-40, and with many units entirely eliminated.

4. (*a*) The necessity for the defense of existing military air fields on the outlying islands of the Hawaiian group, together with the recently assumed responsibility for the defense of the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe, Oahu, directed by secret letter WD to HHd, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.", file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-NPD, and provision of a suitable mobile reserve for the beach and land defense of Oahu are three vital missions which can not be performed with any degree of success with an initial war garrison of approximately 59,000 troops.

b. The 299th Infantry recently has been transferred from Oahu to the islands of Hawaii, Kauai, Molokai, and Maui for the defense of air fields, thus leaving the proposed North Sector division short one Infantry Regiment.

c. Plans for the defense of the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe, now in preparation in this headquarters, indicate the minimum increase in the war garrison for this mission will include the following:

1 Regiment Infantry.
1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155mm How., truck drawn.
1 Battalion C. A., 155mm guns plus one additional battery.
1 Regiment C. A., (AA), (semi-mobile) (less one gun battalion).
1 Battery C. A., 12-inch barbette guns.

d. Assuming that two Infantry regiments will be furnished, one to replace the 299th Infantry and one for the defense of Kaneohe Bay, it is believed that the mobile reserve for the beach and land defense should be comprised of the light tank battalion now included in Table I herewith, and Infantry units detached from one or both of the triangular divisions recommended in Table I herewith.

e. It is therefore urgently recommended that the strength of the war garrison for this department be increased from approximately 58,000 to approximately 70,600 men so as to provide the following unit reinforcements from the mainland not now shown in Table I herewith:

2 Infantry Regiments, T/O 7–11 Nov. 1, 1940	6,898
1 Regiment F. A. 155mm How T/O 6–41 Nov. 1, 1940	1,733
1 Regiment C. A. (AA) Semi-mobile (less 1 gun bn) T/O 4–111 Nov. 1, 1940	1,797
1 Bn C. A. 155mm guns, w/1 additional gun btry, T/O 4–35 Nov. 1, 1940	694
1 Btry C. A. 12-inch barbette guns, T/O 4–67 Nov. 1, 1940	157
Total	11,279

5. Reference is invited to par. 5 and inclosures 1 and 2 of reference B in which it was recommended that station complements be provided for Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter. Table I herewith includes provisions for the Quartermaster Corps, Finance Dept., Medical Corps, Signal Corps, and Ordnance personnel required for these station complements. It is highly desirable that the war garrison be increased sufficiently to provide the complete station complements for these two stations, an increase of 731 officers and men for Schofield Barracks and 131 officers and men for Fort Shafter.

6. Summarizing, in Table I herewith the war garrison for this Department has been reduced to a strength of 59,425. To provide a mobile reserve for the beach and land defense of Oahu, and to defend the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe and military air fields on outlying islands, an increase to approximately 70,600 officers and men is essential. A further increase of about 860 officers and men is highly desirable to furnish station complements for Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter. I therefore recommend that the war strength of this command for initial war operations be fixed at approximately 71,500 officers and men.

7. Recent operations in Europe, particularly the failure of the British to hold the island of Crete, indicate the vital importance to the defense of Oahu of the nearby air fields on the other islands of the Hawaiian group. Hostile use of any of these air fields, considering modern methods of air warfare, would be extremely hazardous to the defense of Oahu. While not yet included in the war garrison recommended for this Department, it is probable that in the near future, plans will be submitted for the garrisoning of each of the outlying islands by a force consisting of approximately one regiment of Infantry and a composite battalion of Field Artillery.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

1–Incl.—Table I.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12–22–41

Subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations, Hawaiian Department.
AG 320.2 (8–5–41) MC–E 1st Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *July 22, 1941.*

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The war garrison recommended in paragraph 2 of the basic communication, totalling 59,425 officers, warrant officers, nurses and enlisted men, reduced to

57,249 as shown in inclosure 2, and augmented by the following units for the defense of Kaneohe Bay:

1 Regt CA (AA), semi-mobile (less one gun Bn, band and basies)	T/O 4–111	11–1–40	1, 590
1 Bn CA 155 MM Guns with 1 addit. gun btry	T/O 4–35	11–1–40	694
1 Btry CA	T/O 4–67	11–1–40	157
		Total	2, 441

is approved. Paragraph 7, HDP–40 will be amended accordingly.

2. The recommendation contained in paragraph 6 of the basic communication to establish a war garrison of 71,500 officers and men for initial war operations in your department is not favorable considered. Troops in excess of the 59,690 authorized in paragraph 1, above, will be sent to Hawaii only in case the situation develops a need therefor and provided such additional troops can be made available in connection with other requirements.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(Signed) E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls;
#1—N/c.
#2—Initial War Garrison, Haw. Dept. (Added)

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12–22–41

Initial war garrison—Hawaiian Department

Organization	T/O	Date	Mobilization strength				
			Off	WO	ANC	E. M.	Total
a. Department Headquarters:							
Gen & Spec Staff Sections			144	30		152	326
Hq Sp Troops			7			41	48
Hq Company			3			59	62
MP Co Haw Dept	7-7	11- 1-40	5			170	175
QM Co (Car)	10-87P	11- 1-40	2			70	72
Total Dept HQ			161	30		492	683
b. North Sector Division (Triangular).	70	11- 1-40					
Div Hq	70-1	10- 1-40	26	2		74	102
Hq & MP Co	70-2	10- 1-40	7			123	130
Reconn Troop					Omitted		
Div Sig Co	Sp		4			114	116
19th & 21st Inf	7-11	10- 1-40	206	2		4, 660	4, 868
299th Inf WD Ltr AG 221E and WD radio.		10-12-40 5-11-41	65			1, 577	1, 642
Div Arty	6-80	10- 1-40	121	1		2, 563	2, 685
Engr Bn	5-75	10- 1-40	18			616	634
Med Bn	8-65	10- 1-40	38			482	520
QM Bn	10-15	10- 1-40	16			296	312
Total Div			501	5		10, 505	11, 011
Attached Med			43			380	423
Attached Chap			11				11
Aggregate			555	5		10, 885	11, 445
c. South Sector Division (Triangular).	70	11- 1-40					
Div Hq	70-1	10- 1-40	26	2		74	102
Hq & MP Co	70-2	10- 1-40	7			123	130
Recon Troop					Omitted		
Div Sig Co	Sp		4			114	118
27th & 35th Inf	7-11	10- 1-40	206	2		4, 660	4, 868
298th Inf WD Ltr AG 221E & Radio.		10-12-40 5-11-41	50			1, 308	1, 358

Initial war garrison—Hawaiian Department—Continued

Organization	T/O	Date	Mobilization strength				
			Off	WO	ANC	E. M.	Total
c. South Sector Division—Con.							
Div Arty	6-80	10- 1-40	121	1		2,563	2,685
Engr Bn	5-78	10- 1-40	18			616	634
Med Bn	8-65	10- 1-40	38			482	520
QM Bn	10-15	10- 1-40	16			296	312
Total Div			486	5		10,236	10,727
Attached Med			43			380	423
Attached Chap			11				11
Aggregate			540	5		10,616	11,161
d. Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force:							
Hq & Hq Sq HAF	1-10-1	8- 1 39	70			336	406
18th Bomb Wing							
Hq & Hq Sq 18th Bomb Wing	1-10-1	6- 1-41	13			122	135
Hq & Hq Sq 5th Bomb Grp (Hv)	1-112	6- 1-41	21			232	253
23d Bomb Sq (Hv)	1-115	6- 1 41	37			217	254
31st Bomb Sq (Hv)	1-115	6- 1-41	37			217	254
72d Bomb Sq (Hv)	1-115	6- 1 41	37			217	254
4th Recon Sq (Hv)	1-215	6- 1-41	43			229	272
Hq & Hq Sq 11th Bomb Gp (Hv)	1-112	6- 1-41	21			232	253
14th Bomb Sq (Hv)	1-115	6- 1-41	37			217	254
16th Bomb Sq (Hv)	1-115	6- 1-41	37			217	254
42d Bomb Sq (Hv)	1-115	6- 1-41	37			217	254
50th Recon Sq (Hv)	1-215	6- 1-41	43			229	272
19th Transport Sq	1-355	8- 1-39	40			182	222
17th Air Base	1-411	6- 7-40	40			682	722
Haw Air Depot			18				18
Total			531			3,546	4,077
Attached Med			17			95	112
Attached Chap			1				1
Service Units:							
53d Sig Maint Co	11-227	12- 1-40	3			44	47
324th Sig Co (Air Wg)	11-247	12- 1-40	3			71	74
328th Sig Co (Avn)	11-217	12- 1-40	3			71	74
Sig Sections (HAF)			2			7	9
Sig Sections 18th Wing			2			2	4
12th Sig Plat (Air Base)	11-237	3-19-40	1			21	22
Ord Sect Hq HAF			3			10	13
740th Ord Co Avn (AB)	9-167	12-16-40	3			38	41
481st Ord Co Amm (Bomb)	9-157	12-16-40	5			125	128
482nd Ord Co Avn (Bomb)	9-157	12-16-40	5			123	128
QM Sec Hq HAF & 18th Wing						4	4
13th QM Co (Truck)	10-57	11- 1-40	3			70	73
259th QM Co (AB)	10-357	4-18-40	3			102	157
39th QM Co (LM)	10-27	11- 1-40	2			60	62
Total attached			56			841	897
e. 14th Pursuit Wing & Attached Units:							
Hq & Hq Sq 14th Pur Wing	1-10-1	6- 1-41	13			122	135
Hq & Hq Sq 18th Pur Grp (1)	1-12	6- 1-41	23			209	232
6th Pur Sq (1)	1-15	6- 1-41	35			201	236
19th Pur Sq (1)	1-15	6- 1-41	35			201	236
78th Pur Sq (1)	1-15	6- 1-41	35			201	236
44th Pur Sq (1)	1-15	6- 1-41	35			201	236
Hq & Hq Sq 15th Pur Grp (F)	1-12	6- 1-41	13			122	135
45th Pur Sq (F)	1-12	6- 1-41	33			279	312
46th Pur Sq (F)	1-15	6- 1-41	33			279	312
47th Pur Sq (F)	1-15	6- 1-41	33			279	312
86th Obs Sq	o-255	1- 1-41	21			137	158
58th Bomb Sq	1-135	8- 1-39	25			196	221
18th Air Base Grp	(Tentative 1-441)	6- 7-40	30			499	529
Total			364			2,926	3,290
Attached Med			17			84	101
Attached Chap			1				1

Initial war garrison—Hawaiian Department—Continued

Organization	T/O	Date	Mobilization strength				
			Off	WO	ANC	E. M.	Total
e. 14th Pursuit Wing & Attached Units—Continued							
Service Units:							
Sig Sed 14th Wing			2			2	4
307th Sig Co (Air Wing)	11-217	12- 1-40	3			71	74
47th Sig Plat (AB)	11-237	3-19-40	1			21	22
258th QM Bn (AB)	10-357	4-18-40	2			102	118
14th QM Co (Truck)	10-57	10- 1-40	3			70	73
741st Ord Co (AB) (Avn)	9-167	12-16-40	3			38	41
674th Ord Co AVN (Pur)	9-157	12-16-40	4			50	54
696th Ord Co AVN (Pur)	9-157	12-16-40	4			50	54
Total Attached			40			498	538
Total Hawaiian Air Force (Air Units).			895			6,472	7,367
Total Hawaiian Air Force & Attached Units.			991			7,811	8,802
f. Harbor Defense Troops:							
Hq & Hq Btry HSCAB	4-10-1	11- 1-40	10			75	85
15th CA (HD) (Less 1 gun btry).	4-41	11- 1-40	46	1		1,122	1,169
16th CA (HD) (Less 2 gun btry).	4-71	11- 1-40	42	1		969	1,012
41st CA (RY) (Less 1 gun bn) (Less Bd).	4-41	11- 1-40	49			1,108	1,157
55th CA (TD) (Less bd)	4-31	11- 1-40	67			1,678	1,745
Nth CA (TD) (Less Hq & CTn 2d & 3d Bns & Btrys D, E, & F, SL Btry & Band).	4-31	11- 1-40	37			800	837
Total Harbor Defense			251	2		5,752	6,005
Attached Med:							
16th CA			6			37	43
15th CA			6			37	43
41st CA			6			35	41
55th CA			7			46	53
Nth CA			4			26	30
Attached Chaplains			5				5
Total Attached			34			181	215
Total Harbor Defense & Attached Troops.			285	2		5,933	6,220
g. Anti-aircraft Artillery:							
Hq & Hq Btry AA Brig	4-10-1	11- 1-40	10			75	85
Intelligence Brty AA Brig Spec.	4-08	1- 1-39	4			134	138
64th CA (AA) (Rein)	4-11 & 4-13	11- 1-40 W Date—12-12-38	97			2,451	2,549
251st CA (AA)	4-11	11- 1-40	69	1		1,807	1,877
97th CA AA (less Band SL and one (1) 37mm Btry and basics in part plus 1 AA MG Btry).	4-111	11- 1-40	87			1,979	2,066
98th CA AA (Less Band SL and one (1) 37mm Btry and basics in part plus 1 AA MG Btry).	4-111	11- 1-40	87			1,979	2,066
Total AA Coast Artillery			354	2		8,425	8,781
Attached Medical:							
64th CA (AA)	4-11	11- 1-40	6			41	47
251st CA (AA)	4-11	11- 1-40	6			41	47
Xth CA (AA)	4-111	11- 1-40	7			48	55
Yth CA (AA)	4-111	11- 1-40	7			49	56
Attached Chaplains	4-11	11- 1-40	6				6
Total Attached			32			180	212
Total AA & Attached			386	2		8,605	8,993

Initial war garrison—Hawaiian Department—Continued

Organization	T/O	Date	Mobilization strength				
			Off	WO	ANC	E. M.	Total
h. Department Troops:							
11th Tank Co	17-57	11-15-40	5			106	111
Xth Tank Bn (Less 1 Co)	17-55	11-15-40	26			406	432
11th Ordnance Co	9-7	11- 1-40	6			140	146
Haw Div Pack Train	Sp		3			82	85
Co A 1st Sep Chem Bn	3-17	11- 1-40	2			168	170
Total			42			902	944
i. Chemical Warfare Service			3			32	35
Chemical Depot & filling Plant	Sp						
j. Engineer Corps:							
34th Engrs (Less Band & Basics)	5-171	11- 1-40	39			1,090	1,129
Attached Med & Chap	5-171	11- 1-40	7			35	43
804th Engr Bn Avn	5-435	4-22-40	21			625	646
Engr Depot	Spec		5			51	56
Total Engrs			65			1,766	1,831
Total Engrs plus attached Med & Chap			72			1,802	1,874
k. Ordnance Department:							
Ordnance Depot	Spec		12			92	104
61st Ord Co (Amm)	9-17	11- 1-40	2			50	52
62nd Ord Co (MM)	9-7	11- 1-40	6			140	146
63rd Ord Co (MM)	9-7	11- 1-40	6			140	146
74th Ord Co Depot	9-18	11- 1-40	6			180	186
Ordnance Personnel Attached to Units			6				6
Total Ordnance Department			38			602	640
l. Finance Department:							
Finance Officer USA Hon			3			10	3
Mis Fin Est			8			38	46
Total Finance Department			11			48	59
m. Quartermaster Department:							
QM Depot			24	2		212	236
QM Det Scho Bks			15	2		227	244
QM Det (Ex Scho)			15	1		300	316
Co B 90th QM Bn (HY M)	10-47	11- 1-40	3			224	227
32nd Sep QM Co (LM)	10-27	11- 1-40	4			185	189
33rd Sep QM Co (LM)	10-27	11- 1-40	4			185	189
15th QM Co Truck	10-57	10- 1-40	3			110	113
16th QM Co truck	10-57	10- 1-40	3			110	113
72nd QM Co (Bakery)	10-147	11- 1-40	5			158	163
Co A 395th QM Bn (Port)			4			196	200
School, Bakers & Cooks			1			121	22
Total QM			81	5		1,928	2,014
Attached Med QM Depot			1			15	16
Total QMC and Attached			82	5		1,943	2,028
n. Signal Corps:							
Signal Co (Depot) (Less Dets)	11-107		2			60	62
9th Sig Serv Co	Spec		3			230	233
2nd Sig Co. (Det)	Spec		1			30	31
Xth Sig Bn	11-15	11- 1-40	20			542	562
Aircraft Warning Co	11-157	11- 1-40	12			357	369
Total Signal Corps			38			1,219	1,257
Attached Medical			3			11	14
Total Sig Corps & Attached Units			41			1,230	1,271

Initial war garrison—Hawaiian Department—Continued

Organization	T/O	Date	Mobilization strength				
			Off	WO	ANC	E. M.	Total
o. Hospitalization Forces:							
Tripler Gen Hosp	(SP) 8-507	7-25-40	73		120	500	693
Scho Bks Gen Hosp	(SP) 8-507	7-25-40	73		120	500	693
Vet Gen Hosp			2			8	10
Haw Med Depot			4			31	35
School Farriers & Horseshoers						6	6
2 Gen Hosps	8-507	7-25-40	146		240	1,000	1,386
8th Amb Co	8-118	2- 1-40	3			90	93
9th Amb Co	8-118	2- 1-40	3			90	93
Total Med Corps			304		480	2,225	3,009
p. Districts Hawaiian Department:							
OAHU District Hq (Dept Ser Comd).			25	1		2	28
HAWAII District Hq			12			19	31
MAUI District Hq			12			5	17
KAUAI District Hq			5			2	7
Total (Less Dets 299th Inf)			54	1		28	83
Recapitulation:							
Department Headquarters			161	30		492	693
Beach & Land Defense			1,137	10		22,403	23,550
Hawaiian Air Force			991			7,811	8,802
Harbor Defenses			285	2		5,933	6,220
Anti-Aircraft Artillery			386	2		2,605	8,993
Service Organizations			247	5		5,657	5,911
Hospitalization Forces			304		480	2,225	3,009
Service Command			54	1		28	83
Total			3,565	50	480	53,114	5,7241

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[Exhibit 1M]

2 MAY 1941

AG 320.3/38
Subject: Organization of Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington D. C.

1. References:
A. War Dept. Secret Radio No. 739, 24 April 1941.
B. War Dept. Secret Radio No. 760, 26 April 1941.
C. Letter CO, RECAB to CG, Reun. Dept, dated 16 April 1941, subject: "Constitution and Activation of Antiaircraft Intelligence Battery," forwarded to the War Department by 1st. Indorsement dated 21 April 1941, file RECAB 320.3, IHD 320.3/36.
D. Letter FED to TMG, subject "Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department", dated 25 April 1941, file 320.3/37.
E. Letter VD to FED dated 2 April 1941, subject: "Coast Artillery units for Hawaiian Department", file AG 3GC.2 3G26–41 M (Ret) M–C. WD 320.2 straight Misc.

2. Upon the arrival of the first increment (Ref. A) of the war reinforcements of the Antiaircraft Artillery Garrison of this Department in June 1941, the organization of the Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade will be required. This brigade will be composed of all Antiaircraft Artillery Units in the Department except the one or two batteries of harbor defense artillery regiments which still have dual assignments to harbor defense and Antiaircraft Artillery missions. The organization of this brigade is mandatory not only because of the strength of the units involved but also because of the organization of the Air Defense Command (Reference D) this brigade will be required to function independently of the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade for tactical operations and in training therefore.

3. It is proposed that the Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, Hawaiian Department, will be organized as follows:

53rd C. A. Brigade (AA) (RRF.N.).
Hq. and Hq. Btry, 53rd CA Brigade (RefH.).
Intel. Btry, 53d CA Brigade (T/O 4–08 (a) HAD) (Ref. C & R).
64th C. A. (AA)
251st. C. A. (AA)
"Tch" CA (AA) easi-mobile (less 3d Ea) (Ref. A)
"Eth" Rs, AA gun, semi mobile (less searchlight battery and one gun Battery) (Ref. A); to be expanded into the "8th" Regt. upon arrival of the remainder of the reinforcements (Ref. B)

4. Accordingly it is recommended that:

a. Authority be granted to activate the Hq. and Hq. Btry, 53d CA Brigade (T/O 4–10–1, 1. Nov. 40) and the Intel. Btry. 53d. CA Brigade (T/O 4–06 (c) New), on or about 1 June 1941.

b. A brigadier General be assigned to this Department to command the 53d CA Brigade.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12–22–41

[SECRET]

Subject: Organization of Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.
AC 340.2 (5–2–41)
MR–O

1st. Ind.
WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *June 12, 1941.*

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. You are authorized to activate the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and Intelligence Battery, 53rd. Coast Artillery Brigade, within the recently authorized organization of Coast Artillery garrison, Hawaiian Department, by 1998 filler replacements. No additional personnel can be made available at this time.

2. It is desired that the date of activation of these units and report showing the reallotment to units of grades and ratings of your present allotment, Coast Artillery Corps, to include these units be furnished this office.

3. Separate action will be taken on the allotment of additional grades and ratings and on the recommendation to assign a brigadier general to the Department.

4. Table of Organization 4–06 (S) (HAD) is approved as submitted, and is being reproduced and distributed.

By order of Secretary of War:

_____,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12–22–41

[Exhibit 1N]

DOO 320.2/141
W A GARRON COL ORD DEPT
759—6th
CHIEF OF ORDNANCE,
Washington, D C

Attention invited to fact that there are six each activiatec thirty seven MM AA btrys at present in Haw Dept comma that present plans contemplate six additional of this type battery by March nineteen forty two comma and that only twenty guns are on hand Period Radio information therefore requested as to which and in what quantities we may expect the one hundred each thirty seven

MM AA guns listed as under procurement from by nineteen forty one funds in 00 secret file six six zero point two slant eleven capron.

SHORT.

ENC TIEMAN
Nov. 6, 1941
A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[Exhibit 1 O]

TALK GIVEN BY GENERAL SHORT TO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ON ARMY DAY

GENTLEMEN:

I am especially pleased to be able to come before this representative gathering of Honolulu business men on the occasion of the celebration of Army Day. Today our military establishment is being brought closer to the view of the general public throughout the entire United States by exhibits and various demonstrations, in order that the people may become better acquainted with some of our equipment, methods and procedures, and now I am afforded the opportunity of discussing some of our plans which will demand close and active cooperation on the part of the civil community and by various departments of your civil government.

You are all aware of the tremendous effort being expended by industry, labor and all departments of the government toward the accomplishment of a gigantic program of national defense. While there are many evidences of this activity here in Hawaii, through defense projects being carried on both by the Army and by the Navy, the tempo of action has not reached as deeply into the private life of the average citizen as has been the case in many cities on the Mainland. Conditions are changing overnight and procedures and practices of today may be changed by the plans and activities of tomorrow. None of these matters are being handled, or even considered, in the light of actual warlike moves nor with any feeling of hysteria, but simply as carefully considered plans which are to be effected for the future security of each and every individual, including the youngest child and the oldest adult, of our nation.

I have been asked many times what the community can do to assist National Defense. The following items are of prime importance:

(a) Production and storage of food.

(b) Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured and wounded.

(c) Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard utilities and prevent sabotage.

(d) Preparation of plans and making of provisions for evacuation of women and children and preparation of shelters for workers in vicinity of essential industries.

These islands are in no way self sustaining in the matter of food. This is due not to lack of fertility of your soil but to your specialized agriculture.

All of you are vitally interested in the food supply of these islands. In any emergency, which might include the possibility of a disruption of communications with the Mainland, a most important safety measure would be to begin at once the planting of basic food crops which are known by actual practice to be the most easily grown in this soil and climate. Such produce might include sweet potatoes, string beans, lima beans, Chinese cabbage, peanuts and some other local varieties of vegetables. The plantations have done important development work and are prepared to produce these articles in quantity should the necessity arise. An immediate increase in the stocks of such items as rice, flour, canned milk, fats and oils would be a great safety factor and with rising prices is sound economy. Shortage of storage for the food shipped in is now a problem. This condition can be materially alleviated if housewives will well stock their cupboards with non-perishable items. This action would operate to clear needed space on retail and wholesale merchant's shelves for further storage of additional foods. This plan is good present day economy because of steadily rising food prices. There is at present a plan on foot for the construction of large warehouse storage by government subsidy and I believe that this plan should have the support of us all as a defense measure. In the pursuit of this project speed is all important.

Along this same thought I read with much interest in the local press of March 19, 1941, an item which referred to the possible repeal of the personal property tax which so greatly affects the merchant or importer who desires to cooperate

in holding large stocks of food available in his warehouse or store. I would like to voice my approval to such an Act, or other similar legislation which would freeze the tax for any corporation or individual at an amount not to exceed that paid in the past year. This would make it possible for more adequate and plentiful stores of food stuff to be maintained without imposing a hardship on any individual or organization.

It is further important that the local fishing fleet be kept in operation, as it supplies a very large proportion of our daily subsistence. Increased cold storage for meats should be provided. Existing dairy herds on Oahu should be conserved and feed stored.

In the general defense measures for these islands there is no civilian effort of higher importance than preparedness now for an adequate food supply for all the people in time of emergency.

The preparation of your emergency medical service in the case of an extreme emergency such as an air attack or actual assault upon the city is of vital importance. The functions of the military forces under such conditions or control, would be to take measures to insure that civilian agencies, expanded as required, continued to function and not to displace them by a military operating agency. It is therefore definitely necessary that prompt action be taken to organize your medical service into the maximum possible number of teams with mobile equipment capable of being rapidly moved from place to place and set up in existing buildings. Staffs of doctors, nurses, technicians, and others required for the stations should be selected and trained and be ready at any time for immediate duty.

Adequate initial medical supplies for these stations should be obtained, classified, packed, and stored in a manner making them readily available. Necessary vehicles must be on hand by loan or otherwise. Suitable trucks, of the delivery type, for rapid conversion to use as ambulances should be listed and obtainable at once. Necessary personnel for the immediate expansion of hospitals properly located to the extent at least of the porches, dayrooms, etc., should be listed by each. All of these preparations should be accompanied by the preparation of shelters, from air attack, of the best types available. Suitable buildings should be selected to replace hospitals in the zones of probable bombardment. Preparations of this nature should be made in cooperation with the Red Cross.

The organization of a force of ex-service men to supplement the police force in guarding utilities and preventing sabotage I understand is under way. This move will release troops for defense purposes. Consideration should be given to the employment of the R. O. T. C. of the University of Hawaii for the same purpose.

Here in Hawaii we all live in a citadel or gigantically fortified Island. Many residents have their homes well within the limits of actual military fortifications, docks, arsenals or many other types of legitimate military targets. Should we ever be faced with a military operation by any enemy against this island (which we fervently hope may never come true), the residents in these areas must be cared for and protected. Plans for such care and protection quite properly come under the jurisdiction of your civil governmental agencies, and I believe these should now receive careful, detailed and mature consideration. I repeat that these matters are not to be viewed with alarm or hysteria, but simply as defense projects and exactly in the same classification as any of the present housing activities which you see around you every day. If you, as civilian organizations, are making plans for adequate warehouse and pier space for the handling of defense materials should you not give some degree of the same effort toward the security and protection of your families from any possible contingency? I believe that you already have a Defense Committee, under the leadership of the Governor of the Territory and the Mayor of Honolulu which has given, or is about to give, some consideration to these matters, and I advance, for the consideration of this committee, some of my ideas on this subject.

There has been considerable information in the New York newspapers as to the plans which are being formulated and discussed by the Mayor of that city for the protection of its inhabitants from any possible air raids. Elaborate measures have been suggested for shelters, fire protection, and other phases of which you are well aware. It is my suggestion that some such plans be initiated for the city of Honolulu. My belief is that any such proposals should be considered not only from a possible wartime condition but also with a view of fitting into the plans for the expansion, betterment and improvement in the civil facilities. In other words, why should we not make plans which will not only form the nucleus for protective measures and which will, at the same time, furnish additional recrea-

tion centers for our civil and military population. My plans envision a recreational center for each precinct, or perhaps smaller section of the city, which would be located somewhere in the highlands away from military targets. There might properly be selected by the Forestry Service, the City Planning Commission or other appropriate body. These camps would be located where a source of fresh water is available, some degree of natural shelter and with a view of accessibility. Here would be installed, in the following order of importance, water, sanitary facilities, outdoor grills and other cooking installations, and mess halls. The Forestry Service, National Parks Administration, and the CCC have already had considerable experience in the construction and laying out of such installations as many such recreational camps already exist on the Mainland. You yourselves have seen some of the results of these activities in your National Park on Hawaii.

Thousands of you people spend your hours of leisure and recreation at the beaches. Why would it not be feasible as well as healthful to divert a portion of such time to comfortable and attractive camps in the hills? Forming the habit of such excursions to adequate and well planned camps would accomplish a dual purpose in establishing not only additional recreation features but at once establishing the basis for evacuation camps should they ever be required in the future.

In case of actual hostilities, which involved this community, all able-bodied males would be utilized by industry or by the military services in one manner or another. Normal business routine would be continued to the greatest extent possible. Any evacuation camps would thus be dedicated to the use of women, children, and male citizens who would not be qualified for other duties. The Army has definite plans to go ahead immediately on the construction of similar camps for the use of the faimilies of Army personnel should such an occasion ever demand that drastic action. In the meantime the camps will be utilized as recreation centers by all of our personnel.

I take this opportunity of laying before you the foregoing plan as deserving your consideration. I believe the evacuation of the women and children from the area of probable bombardment the most essential and difficult problem confronting the community. Without advance planning the greatest confusion and loss of life might result.

I again repeat that the foregoing suggested plans are to be considered as important defense measures with the same priority as given other defense plans. They are not to be thought of as indications of any immediate pending threat, but rather as carefully considered measures to safeguard our homes and families in case of any future dangers. The bill now before the Legislature creating a major Disaster Relief Department, if enacted, will put you in a position to complete these plans and preparations. The Army is ready to do all within its power to help you and you must feel free to call upon us for advice at any time.

My thoughts have been expressed to you quite frankly, as I believe we must understand each other on all questions and work out our common plans together. Army Day was inaugurated with such an ideal as its basis and I am pleased to have had this opportunity of bringing before you some ideas and suggestions which may have material work to you now and in the uncertain days of the future.

I thank you.

[Exhibit 1P]

[1]

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT IN CONNECTION WITH PREPAREDNESS OF THE CIVIL POPULATION TO MEET A FOOD EMERGENCY IN HAWAII.

Item No. 1 21 Mar 41	Letter from General Short to Governor Poindexter, re storage facilities for Food Supply. General Short states that after a conference with a civilian committee on food supply and facilities for storage, he is in hearty accord with action taken to date. He feels strongly that the problem is of vital interest to both the civil population and the military. The civil authorities should take the initiative for their own supplies, and their actions will receive his utmost support. (See Inclosure No. 1).
Item No. 2 4 Apr 41	Letter from General Short to War Dept. asking authority to issue invitations for purchase of Irish potatoes grown in Hawaii, stating serious problem of food supply under emergency conditions, and stating his objective is to stimulate continuous Irish potato production in Hawaii. (See Inclosure No. 2).

Item No. 3 — Radio from Gen. Short to War Dept. referring to his letter of 4 April 41, and asking priority radio advice as soon as decision has been reached. (See Inclosure No. 3).
12 May 41

Item No. 4 — 1st Indorsement to Gen. Short's letter of 4 April 41, from War Dept., granting authority to contract for Hawaiian-grown potatoes, providing price does not exceed 2½¢ per pound. (See Inclosure No. 4).
2 May 41

[2]

Item No. 6 — Memo to Board of Directors, Honolulu Chamber of Commerce from the Executive Secretary, John A. Hamilton:
5 May 41

1. Prior to April 7, 1941, there was very little buying of food supplies for emergency use. However, on April 7, Lt. General Walter C. Short, Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department, United States Army, suggested the desirability of purchasing additional food supplies for use during a possible emergency.

2. Beginning with April 7, the consumer began to purchase additional food supplies in quantities ranging from an extra can of milk to as much as $800.00 per family as reported by one retailer. Retail merchants report that 20 to 30 per cent of their customers have purchased additional food supplies in the last 30 days. This means that the retailers' stocks on hand would be depleted rapidly.

3. It would be expected that the retailer, when food stocks are moved rapidly from the shelves as a result of heavy consumer purchases, would reorder quickly from the wholesaler or the manufacturer. This has been done. In fact it would appear that retailers have increased their purchases by 20 to 25 per cent above normal.

4. Wholesalers generally support the report of the retailers with regard to the increase of consumer buying as reflected in the increase in the buying done by the retailer from the wholesalers.

5. Of the three wholesale firms visited, two reported large stocks of foodstuffs on hand as a result of additional warehousing space secured to care for the additional demand and the prospective needs in the event of an emergency. Also these firms report a satisfactory replenishment of stocks although additional time is required to get merchandise from the manufacturers to the docks in Honolulu.

Note. The direct result of Gen. Short's public address of 7 April 1941 was to increase the supply of food in storage in Hawaii from 20 to 35%.

[3]

Item No. 7 — In a published statement prior to a general meeting of agriculturists thru-out the islands at the University of Hawaii, Gen. Short said, "All efforts to increase local food production are steps toward increased security for Hawaii".
16 June 41

Item No. 8 — At an address to the University Assembly on Aug. 13th Gen. Short stated:
13 Aug 41

"Among defense projects which I have publicly emphasized has been that of the home production of food to sustain the civilian population during an emergency. I regard this project of local food production as of primary importance to the defense of Hawaii."

"So far as food supply is concerned, the military organization here is self-sufficient as to its reserves of essential items. It will look after itself in time of war, and it is now projecting food production on military reservations to supply its needs—so far as is practicable.

"I have also supported shipping priorities for all foods—cattle, dairy and poultry feeds, as well as food for human consumption. This support includes farm machinery which is important for large-scale crop production."—(From the Honolulu Advertiser, 14 Aug 41)

Item No. 9 — Copy of radiogram from Delegate King to Gov. Poindexter stating the War, Navy and State Departments and the Budget Bureau were lukewarm in their interest in procuring food reserve stocks for Hawaii. (See Inclosure No. 5 attached).
16 Sept 41

For reply to Delegate King, stating Gen. Short's continued support, see Inclosure No. 6.

[4]

Item No. 10
23 Oct 41

The Food Production Plan for Hawaii was formally presented in complete form to the Directors of the Hawaiian Sugar Planter's Association and accepted by them as the basic operating plan for local production of food crops, cattle and dairy products. This plan covers production not only of Oahu but of all the out-islands as well, setting up acreage and crops allocations to plantations, both sugar and pineapple, which were accepted by them as defense requirements. Small farmers were included in the plan as well. Seed requirements were set up; as well as insecticide, fertilizer and machinery requirements for producing crops sufficient to sustain the entire population for six months.

This plan was based on the Army plan and was supported and urged thru-out by Gen. Short. It is now in operation in its initial phases as planned. Gen. Short arranged for the procurement of all seed, insecticides, fertilizer and machinery for harvesting this crop, as well as arrangements for procuring the necessary priority allocations of shipping space required. (See Incl. No. 7.)

Item No. 11
3 Dec 41

Letter from Gen. Short to War Dept., stating that the project of the Emergency Food Reserve for Hawaii which failed of approval by the Bureau of the Budget should be brought up for reconsideration, and asking the support of the War Dept. when it comes up. (See Inclosure No. 8.)

Item No. 12
3 Dec 41

Letter from Gen. Short to Gov. Poindexter, stating that he has always regarded a reserve food supply as of primary importance in defense plans, giving supporting data, and asking the Governor to obtain an inventory of food on hand in the Territory, in order to support his request for an emergency reserve food supply. (See Inclosure No. 9.)

Item No. 13
14 Dec 41

Radiogram from General Short to War Dept. stating in detail the immediate requirements of food, seed, livestock feed, farm machinery, insecticides and fertilizers, including shipping space required, for current civilian needs. (See Inclosure No. 10.)

[5]

Item No. 14
17 Dec 41

WD Radio #685, 17 Dec. 41 "Shipment of Food for Civilian Population".

In reply to Haw'n Dept. radio #1182, the War Dept. states food will be procured and delivered to civil authorities in Hawaii, first shipment to leave within one week, second shipment following week; every effort to be made to provide critical items indicated by the radios of Gen. Short and of the Governor. (See Inclosure No. 11.)

As a direct result of Gen. Short's letter to the War Department of December 3, 1941, the attached radiogram (Inclosure No. 11) from the War Department, dated December 17, 1941, was received, indicating the immediate shipment of the Food Reserve Supply to Hawaii.

While Gen. Short was not asked for letters of support for certificates of necessity for the construction of storage for the Emergency Food Supply because this was not needed, he has consistently supported such construction, both by the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. for the dry storage, and by the Oahu Ice and Cold Storage Co. for the refrigerated storage.

When the Emergency Food Reserve was turned down by the Bureau of the Budget Gen. Short stated publicly that storage completed, or under construction for the Emergency Food Supply would be specifically reserved for the purpose for which the certificate of necessity was granted by the War Dept.

At present the warehouse space of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. is ready, and that of the Oahu Ice and Cold Storage Co. will be ready in the very near future.

The Civilian Food Administration, as planned by Gen. Short, is now in full operation under Governor Poindexter's Council of Civilian Defense, which in turn is affiliated with the National Office of Civilian Defense.

Civilian authorities of the Food Administration freely acknowledge the impetus of Gen. Short's consistent urging of plans to implement the Food Administration for an emergency, so that it has been able to get into operation without delay on the basis of plans set up by the Army.

Enclosure No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., March 21, 1941.

Honorable JOSEPH B. POINDEXTER,
Governor, Territory of Hawaii, Honolulu, T. H.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR POINDEXTER: Mr. H. H. Warner and Mr. Richard Kimball, acting as your committee on emergency food storage, conferred with me March 19th relative to storage facilities and food supply, and the adequacy in general of the supply of food stuffs during any emergency in which incoming shipments might be curtailed. The conference included the action taken to date to obtain storage facilities, including their meeting with local importers and bankers, the action taken by Delegate King, and your radiogram of March 18th to Delegate King. I assure you that I am in hearty accord with the action taken to date and am in full concurrence therewith.

I strongly feel that the problem of assuring the civil population an adequate supply of food stuff during any emergency in which incoming shipments might be curtailed or cut off is of vital interest both to the civilian community and the military. I believe that the civilian community should take the initiative as this problem is primarily and initially the concern of the civil authorities. However, the military cannot be divorced of its concern in this problem as it is relatively of equal vital interest to the military. Any action which you may take to insure such an adequate supply of food for the civil population will be concurred in by me and have my utmost support.

With kindest personal regards,
Sincerely,

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

Enclosure No. 2

[1] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 4 April 1941.

Subject: Authority to Issue Invitations for Purchase of Irish Potatoes Grown in Hawaii.
To: The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

1. In view of the present military situation it is of high importance to increase the local production of food within these islands so that they may become self-supporting.

Hawaii at present imports 85% of its food supplies from the mainland. In the event of an interruption of communications the sustenance of the civil population would become a serious problem. Under certain conditions the solution of this problem becomes a mission of this Department.

In view of these conditions it is believed that the subsidizing of local food production by governmental agencies is entirely justified as an emergency defense measure provided that the increase in cost to the government is not unreasonable.

In this connection attention is invited to Radiograms (381) this Headquarters, to the Quartermaster General, 22 and 23 August 1940, and to his reply thereto of 26 August 1940, authorizing this Department to contract for Irish potatoes under conditions as set forth in 1st Indorsement, W.D. -OQMG, July 5, 1938; and to related correspondence over the past four years.

2. Under the authority above quoted 1,929,000 pounds of Hawaiian-grown Irish potatoes have been contracted for delivery during February, March and April of this year at an average cost of $.025 per pound. Mainland-grown potatoes were delivered to the Navy during this period at an average of $.018 per pound. Therefore, the project of Irish-potato growing in Hawaii for the purpose of increasing local food production as an emergency defense measure

was carried out in this case at an increased cost to the Army of $.007 per pound, or approximately $13,500 for the total project in terms of money. It is believed that this differential would hold good as an average throughout any year until growers have established a year-around crop when the spread would become less. Actually, the wastage on Island-grown potatoes is nil for shrinkage, loss of weight or spoilage such as occurs with mainland potatoes in their shipment to Hawaii. This fact materially reduces the differential cost to the government as above indicated. The increase in cost is considered justified as a safety defense measure to assure the future expansion of the local crop. This can be accomplished [2] only by this assurance to the grower of the return of his cost of production. Sugar planters—who provide the bulk of the production, are entirely willing to go along on this project and break even.

3. The efforts of this Department during the past year have directly resulted in the increase in production of 1,242,086 lbs of locally grown Irish potatoes over 1940.

4. It is believed that for a part of the first year Island production will not be able to meet the requirements of the Army for Irish potatoes, but the project is still considered well worth the added cost to the government during the period that the requirements can be met. Local producers feel that they can quickly build up the industry to a point where Hawaii can meet the demand throughout the entire year.

5. It is now proposed to stimulate continuous Irish potato production in Hawaii. For this purpose authority is requested to contract for Hawaii-grown Irish potatoes for the fiscal year 1942, for monthly or quarterly periods, or for periods of six-months, or for one year as seem most likely to accomplish the purpose at the time of the offering.

(Sgd) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

Enclosure No. 3.

R. S. BAMBERGER,
Colonel, A.G.D., Adjutant General,
12 May 1941.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington D. C.

Remylet four April subject authority to issue invitations for purchase of Irish potatoes grown in Hawaii Stop As soon as decision has been reached relative to request contained in paragraph five thereof request priority radio advice

SHORT

Enclosure No. 4

AG 432 Hawaiian
Dept. (4–4–41) M–D 1st Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *May 2, 1941.*

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Authority is granted to contract for Hawaiian-grown Irish potatoes for the fiscal year of 1942 on the basis proposed in Paragraph 5, basic letter, provided the contract price shall not exceed 2½¢ per pound.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(Sgd) E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Enclosure No. 5

Poindexter
Warner

September 16, 1941.

Further reference my wire September 15th regarding food storage at recent meeting attended by Maverick Ashby and representatives War Navy Interior State and Budget Bureau spokesman for service departments indicated rather luke warm interest in program for producing surplus food stocks for Hawaii Period Would appreciate your asking commanding general and commandant if their letters dated last March endorsing this project still represent their views and wire me this information.

DELEGATE KING.

Enclosure No. 6

September 17, 1941.

Honorable SAMUEL WILDER KING,
Delegate to Congress,
604 House Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

In opinion of local well informed persons recent international developments only increase the likelihood of demand exceeding the supply of cargo space available for carrying civilian food requirements from mainland to the territory which formed the basis for the original surplus food program Period Commanding general endorses his previously expressed view for the needs of this project as stated in his letter to Governor Poindexter March twenty first Period Admiral Bloch presently on off island vacation and unavailable Period Opinion of governors food commission made plain in radiogram to you of August twenty second Period Regardless of current situation in Pacific personally feel that as we approach shooting operations with accelerated local defense construction projects the shipping facilities for civilian supplies to the islands are more likely to be restricted than when plan was originally drawn Period Your suggestion that Maverick appraise local problem himself as soon as possible is receiving hearty support of interested parties and strongly urge you to persuade him make such a trip to obtain first hand information on this matter

WARNER (Poindexter).

H. H. WARNER,
Director Agricultural Extension Service
University of Hawaii and
U. S. Department of Agriculture Cooperating

Enclosure No. 8

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 3 December 1941.

In reply refer to:
AO430

Subject: Emergency Reserve Food Supply for the Civilian Population of Hawaii.
To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. The present military situation in this area has engendered a strong feeling among the civil authorities that the project of the Emergency Food Reserve for Hawaii which has lately failed of approval by the Bureau of the Budget, should be brought up again at this time for reconsideration based on new data to be presented.

2. It is my feeling that this project should be progressed as a sure way to meet any food shortage with which the Territory may be confronted in emergency, and for this reason I have written a letter to the Governor of Hawaii in support of this project. A copy of this communication is enclosed.

3. In view of the necessity of a reserve food supply as indicated above, and in the enclosure herewith, I request the support of the War Department for this project when it comes up for reconsideration by the Bureau of the Budget.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

1 Incl—
Ltr. Gov. of Hawaii re
food storage dated
12-3-41.

Enclosure No. 9

DECEMBER 3, 1941.

AG-430

Honorable JOSEPH B. POINDEXTER,
Governor of Hawaii, Honolulu, T. H.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR: The present military situation in the Pacific indicates the necessity of advancing certain plans for the care and protection of the civil population of Hawaii in the event of an interruption of normal shipping between the Islands and the mainland.

I have always regarded the accumulation of a reserve food supply for Hawaii as of primary importance in our defense plans, and I have publicly announced this view on appropriate occasions.

I feel strongly that the project for the reserve food storage which has lately been refused approval by the Bureau of the Budget, might well be again advanced at this time.

In support of this view I should like to quote from the annual report of the Diversified Crops Committee of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association transmitting the final Food Production Plan for Hawaii to the Trustees of that organization:

"We think that our year of work on these plans has given us a sufficiently clear understanding of the various phases of the problems of emergency food supply to enable us to express an opinion. And that opinion is, that no stone should be left unturned in the effort to have adequate supplies of essential basic foods stored here against an emergency."

Additionally I should like to quote in part from a radiogram from Delegate King of October 24, 1941, addressed to yourself and to Mr. H. H. Warner of your Emergency Food Commission, on the subject of the refusal of the Bureau of the Budget to approve the Food Storage Plan. This communication was submitted at the time as information to the members of the commission, including the Army representative present.

"Perhaps appeal by Governor addressed to President through Interior Department supported by inventory of specified food commodities and length of time such supplies could meet local needs would help bring about further consideration this program.

"Direct appeal from local administration based on factual data would bring quicker action."

It is apparent from the above that the surety of a food supply during the initial phases of a war situation and prior to any supplementary local food production, can be safely predicated only upon the presence of a reserve of food stored here, and that the chance of getting the approval of the Bureau of the Budget for this project rests largely upon the ability of local authority to submit factual data as to amounts of food currently in Hawaii.

This requirement cannot be met with any degree of accuracy except by data obtained through a physical inventory of food on hand.

It is my feeling that as a matter of safeguarding the public welfare against the coming emergency, the project of a defense reserve of food for Hawaii should be again advanced at this time, and that it should be supported in this case by a factual statement of the amount of food currently on hand in the Islands.

For this purpose it is believed that the local importers and others concerned would voluntarily take an inventory to supply the required data in response to a request from you. It would seem that an appropriate date for this inventory might well be the end of this calendar year to tie in with other legal inventory requirements of the territory, or even sooner in view of the time element involved in assembling the figures.

May I take this opportunity to assure you of my continued wish to be of any assistance in the present emergency.

Very sincerely yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

Copy of this let. furnished War Department

Enclosure No. 10

[Radiogram]

14 December 1941.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Oahu food inventory of December ninth shows thirty seven days of essential foods on hand for two hundred fifty five thousand civilian population Stop This reserve must be constantly maintained by immediate shipments to supply current consumption Stop Thirteen days rice comma eighteen days potatoes and onions are most serious deficiencies Stop One hundred thirteen thousand head of cattle equal to one hundred fifty two days reserve supply for all civilians in Territory comma and twelve thousand head swine equal to ten days reserve supply for all

civilians in Territory are on hand Stop Important that this reserve be maintained by no more than normal slaughter Stop Food store inventories on outlying islands being taken Stop Sugar and pineapples on hand ample for Territory Stop Shipment of twenty thousand net tons of food for civilians in Territory per month for current needs requiring one million two hundred and fifty thousand cubic feet of shipping space per month Stop It is expected that commercial firms will place orders on mainland for necessary subsistence for current needs of civilian population providing there is an allocation of shipping made available Stop It is essential that allocation for this shipping space be made immediately Stop In addition shipments of seven thousand two hundred net tons of food for Army personnel per month requiring four hundred fifteen thousand cubic feet of shipping space per month comma first shipment immediately comma are urgently needed Stop Shipment of emergency food reserve for storage to value of two million five hundred thousand dollars for human food and nine hundred thousand dollars value of animal and poultry feed comma total three million four hundred thousand dollars equal to forty eight thousand net tons requiring two million seven hundred fifty thousand cubic feet of shipping space is urgently needed Stop Letter will follow showing items for purchase for this emergency food reserve for storage Stop Requisition has been already communicated by Governor Poindexter to Swope Department of Interior and Delegate King Stop Orders have been placed for seed comma insecticides comma fertilizer comma and agricultural implements through Division Engineer South Pacific Division San Francisco Stop Forty thousand weight tons and fifty five thousand ship tons of shipping required for these items Stop This must be shipped immediately Stop Request War Department obtain shipping spaces or Government shipping for all shipments covered in this communication both for immediate shipment and future monthly shipments.

SHORT.

Enclosure No. 11.

[Radiogram]

Washn D. C. 403 A Dec 17 1941.

C G

Hawn Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H.

685 16th Department of Agriculture will procure and deliver to civil authorities in Hawaii food for civilian population comma URAD one one eight two period First shipment planned to leave within one week followed by second shipment following week period Every effort will be made to provide critical items indicated in URAD and that of Governor.

ADAMS.

346A

[Exhibit 1 Q]

[1] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., July 11, 1941.

In reply refer to:
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 383

Subject: Protection of the Civilian Population against Air and Other Attack.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to radiogram from Delegate Sam King to me, a copy of which is inclosed for ready reference. This radiogram raised questions concerning funds to be allotted to Hawaii under the Lanham Act for the protection of the civilian population against air and other forms of attack. These questions are answered in this letter which is submitted to the War Department in accordance with request in the radiogram. A copy of this letter and all inclosures is being forwarded direct to Dr. C. E. Fronk, in care of Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Department of the Interior. Dr. Fronk is now in Washington as the Governor's representative in this matter.

2. Evacuation camps will be built in units designed to care for 240 people. This size is determined by the capacity of the standard mess hall (Fig. 74, FM 5 35) which will serve 120 people at one sitting. The ideal unit would be built in a quadrangle 100 yards wide by 120 yards long. This arrangement will facilitate guarding against prowlers, contribute to privacy, and shorten average distances between shelters and latrines, mess hall, baths, and wash rooms. See typical layout plan inclosed herewith (Incl. No. 1).

a. This typical layout will be modified as necessary to adapt it to ground forms, streets, etc.; but the general principle of using shelters to form a partially inclosed communal area will be observed.

b. The design has been made extremely simple to permit erection by unskilled labor, and the use of any type of building material. Materials available in local stocks will be used to the utmost to conserve shipping space. Windows and doors are omitted. Occupants will devise curtains to secure such privacy as they wish. It is proposed to construct all units except bath houses and water served latrines without floors initially. If lumber is available, wooden floors will eventually be laid on wooden sleepers. If lumber is not available, floors will be finished with volcanic cinders, crushed rock, or sand stabilized with portland cement if available. If floors cannot be provided, occupants will have to provide themselves with something to stand on.

[2] *c.* Canec, a locally available product, will be used to the fullest extent practicable. Studding, rafters, flooring, and probably sleepers supporting flooring will have to be imported if not in stock. Roofs will be made from galvanized iron, if obtainable.

d. All structures have been designed to utilize standard sheets of canec, plyboard, and standard lengths of lumber.

e. The mess hall is an adaptation of the standard mess hall shown in Fig. 74, FM 5–35. Construction is greatly simplified by omitting doors and windows which permits spacing all studs uniformly 24″ on centers (See Incl. No. 6).

f. All other buildings are simple shed construction. See inclosed sketches of shelters, latrines, bath houses, and wash houses. (Incls. 2 to 5).

(1) 960 lineal feet of living room shelters will be provided for each camp. They will be built in lengths which are multiples of 8′. Standard double bunks (Fig. 71, FM–5–35) will be placed 8′ apart. (Incl. No. 2). Partitions will be of canec so nailed that they may be easily removed. Occupants will remove and shift canec partitions to give any length room desired.

(2) The same type construction will be used for latrines, bath houses, and wash rooms as in living quarters. Details of interior arrangements are indicated on inclosed sketches. Latrines will be equipped with water closets when a sewer system is available and the necessary plumbing supplies can be secured. Otherwise pit latrines will be used. Running water will be available at all camps. Plumbing will be installed in mess halls, bath houses, and wash houses in the order named as far as available materials will permit.

g. Protection against bombardment will be provided by slit trenches as indicated in the typical layout sheet (Incl. No. 1) when camps are on flat ground. Camps in gulches will be provided with conveniently located alcoves dug into deep slopes.

h. Dispensary buildings and administration buildings will not normally be built. In the general instance sufficient space in permanent residences or other buildings will be available for those purposes.

i. Protection of funds and valuables may be made a function of a central administration service. No provision will be made for that in construction plans.

[3] *l.* Evacuees will be encouraged to bring small articles of furniture such as mirrors, chairs, hammocks, mattresses, curtains, etc. They will also be encouraged to bring simple hand tools. It is presumed that subsequent to evacuation a systematic collection will be made of abandoned articles required for camp comfort.

3. *a.* Camp locations have been selected with a view to the following. For locations see Incl. 7.

(1) Utilizing existing roads, utilities installations, and community service units such as stores, post offices, churches, etc.

(2) Avoiding ground at present under cultivation.

(3) Placing a large percentage of evacuees near areas suitable for growing vegetables.

(4) Securing dispersion.

b. The equivalent of 42 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 10,080 people will be constructed as extensions of existing permanent plantation villages. In addition to this extension many villages will be increased by one mess hall, latrine, bath house, and wash house to permit increasing the number of occupants in the permanent buildings which will be utilized solely as dormitories. Plantation villages in the higher altitudes are usually built on the edges of gulches. The camp extensions will, in the general instance, be sited in these gulches and will vary greatly in size and layout, depending on terrain conditions. These camps will be spread throughout the central valley in areas least subject to probable enemy activity. Distances from Honolulu will vary from 8 to 26 miles. The estimated average distance is about 20 miles. Locations are shown on Incl. 7. These camps will have running water, but will not have sewer connections. The following advantages are characteristic of these units:

(1) Provide a high degree of dispersion.

(2) Sited in excellent locations for protection.

(3) Well located for utilization of occupants in food production.

(4) Adaptable to race segregation which will be desirable to present communal discord.

(5) Can readily be amalgamated with existing village administrations which will facilitate government.

(6) Utilize existing installations.

[4] *c.* 42 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 10,080 people will be located at Wahiawa, north of the Schofield Barracks East Range boundary and south of the North Fork of Wahiawa Reservoir. The distance from Honolulu is about 21 miles by Kamehameha Highway. This location offers the following advantages:

(1) Will be an extension of an existing city in areas fairly well supplied with roads.

(2) Can readily be supplied with sewer facilities if materials are available.

(3) Will be included in anti-aircraft defense of Schofield Barracks and Wheeler Field.

(4) Is in an area of rich soil adaptable to utilization of evacuees in food production.

d. 21 units (240 persons each) with capacity for 5,040 people will be located in four valleys leading into the Koolau Range from the evacuated areas. For location see Incl. 7. They will be between 2 and 3 miles of the evacuated area.

e. 21 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 5,040 people will be located in gulches west of Aiea. For location see Incl. 7. They will be an average of about 13 miles from Honolulu.

4. The projected air-raid shelters are intended to protect 6,000 persons other than military personnel whose continued presence in the danger area is essential to the defense of Oahu. The number is based upon reports submitted by essential governmental agencies, public utilities, and commercial firms.

b. The proposed locations of shelters is shown on the inclosed map of Honolulu (Incl. No. 8). These locations have been determined from reports of probable distribution of personnel submitted by the organization affected.

c. It is proposed to construct the shelters of reinforced concrete and to limit the normal capacity of each shelter to from 10 to 15 persons which can shelter from 16 to 25 people for short periods. However, other materials will be substituted for reinforced concrete if cement and steel are not available in sufficient quantities. When practicable existing structures will be utilized by increasing protective characteristics. Tunneling will be practicable in some locations. Inclosures 9 to 12 show details of the various types to be used, depending on conditions.

[5] *d.* The cost of reinforced concrete shelters has been estimated at $100.00 per person to be sheltered. That is each shelter will cost from $1,000 to $1,500. No estimate of unit cost can be made for shelters built of substitute materials. Should shortage of materials limit the number of concrete shelters built, the available funds will be applied to building as many shelters of substitute materials as possible.

e. It is presumed that the shelters provided for personnel essential to defense will be supplemented by private individual shelters and by shelters erected by commercial interests not essential to defense. The costs of these shelters should be borne by the individual.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

13 Incls:
Incl. #1 Layout plan
#2–5 Sketches
#6 Fig. 74
#7 Map
#8 Map of Hono
#9–12 Drawings
#13 Radio, 4 July 41

A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

5 ND DJ 243 Govt REP

ZPN 1 Radio, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 4 0128 1941.

Govt Rep Lt General Walter C. Short,
Fort Shafter, TH Oahu

Following from Doctor C. E. Fronk quote Reurletter June twenty reference number three eight one War Department considering whether problem lies purely within military jurisdiction or should be responsibility of civilian agency period In latter case Office of Civilian Defense may be made responsible for program of Federal Works Agency with funds from Lanham Act period In conference with General Lorenzo D. Gasser Army representative on LaGuardias committee I was requested obtain as soon as possible full details proposed evacuation period Am advised allocation of funds according to estimate submitted by Colonel Lyman in memorandum dated June nineteenth reference number three eight three would not be made on basis data so far available here period More explicit information regarding number and exact location of camps comma number of persons at each camp comma together with areas to be evacuated and distances from city to proposed camp sites will be required substantiated with maps period Recommend provision for shelters be included in which case character and material of shelters should be incorporated in your estimates period Referring to splinter shelters exact location and number also necessary together with any other data that may be pertinent period Would greatly appreciate your forwarding this material by fastest mail through War Department with compy direct to me addressed care Division of Territories and Island Possessions Department of Interior period Outlook encouraging letter follows unquote Delegate Sam King.

TOD,
1628
610A/4

A true copy:
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1R]

DECEMBER 22, 1941.

MY DEAR GENERAL SHORT: I have the honor to present an entirely unsolicited expression of interest from many leading men of Honolulu.

There are a hundred more who I am sure would have felt honored to sign this, if time had been available. I wished to place a copy of this letter in your hands without further delay.

Yours very truly,

FRANK E. MIDKIFF.

A true copy:
Robert J. Fleming, Jr.,
ROBERT J. FLEMING, JR.,
Major, G. S. C.,
Asst. to G-4.

HONOLULU, T. H., *December 22, 1941.*

The PRESIDENT,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

SIR: We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organizations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan.

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to our Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound "M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the decision to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention of sabotage. He has shown a correct and a sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians.

He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts" from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans, now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency.

We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned.

Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be. This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short or any other officials, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity or other wise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation.

With very best respects and wishes, we are

Yours very truly,

Lester Petrie, City of Honolulu, Mayor; C. R. Hemenway, President, Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd.; A. L. Dean, Vice-President, Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.; Walter F. Dillingham, President, Oahu Railway & Land Co.; F. D. Lowrey, President, Lowers & Cook, Ltd.; H. H. Warner, Asst. Food Administrator, O. C. D.; J. B. Poindexter, Governor of Hawaii; S. B. Kemp, Chief Justice, Supreme Court; T. G. S. Walker, Director, Civilian Defense for Oahu; John E. Russell, President, Theo H. Davies & Co., Ltd.; George S. Waterhouse, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop National of Hawaii and Honolulu; Cyril F. Damon, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop Trust Co., Ltd.; Briant H. Wells, Executive Vice President, Hawaiian Sugar Planters Assn.; H. A. Walker, President, American Factors, Ltd.; S. M. Lowrey, Treasurer, American Factors,

Ltd.; P. E. Spalding, President C. Brewer & Co., Ltd.; Frank E. Midkiff, Trustee, Bernice P. Bishop Estate; Edouard R. L. Doty, Terr. Director of Civilian Defense; James Winne, Mgr. Mdse Dept., Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.; (now acting as Food Administrator and Supply Officer).

c. c. to General Walter C. Short.
A true copy:
Robert J. Fleming, Jr.,
ROBERT J. FLEMING, Jr.,
Major, G. S. C.
Asst. to G-4.

MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU,
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, ISLAND OF OAHU,
Honolulu, Hawaii, December 20, 1941.

Lt. General WALTER C. SHORT,
Fort Shafter

DEAR GENERAL SHORT.

Please allow me express my sincere regret that our contact through Civilian Defense Plans has terminated.

It was greatly due to your help and backing that our Civilian Organizations were so far advanced that they were able to function so splendidly during the attack.

You will always be able to recollect that your determination to have our Civilian Groups Prepared saved many lives of our Sailors and soldiers through the organized effort of our Civilian Defense Medical Committee and the many trucks that we had ready to be turned into ambulances at a minutes notice.

Please be assured that you will carry the sincere thanks and Aloha of your many friends here who realizes the distress you saved by urging and helping us to be Prepared.

Yours very sincerely,

(s) T. G. S. Walker
T. G. S. WALKER, *Director,*
Civilian Defense,
Island of Oahu.

True Copy
O. M. Cutler
O. M. CUTLER
Lt. Col. Infantry

[1] [SEAL OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII]

TERRITORY OF HAWAII,
Executive Chambers,
Honolulu, 23 December 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Having noted in the public press that an investigation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a statement as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7, 1941.

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was magnificently rewarded.

It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations which bore fruit on December 7, 1941:

(1) *The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act* by a special session of Legislation called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian defense was planned and many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941.

(2) *The production and conservation of food:* Householders were persistently urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve. This appropriation has, since [2] December 7, 1941, been authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of those crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives.

(3) *The medical facilities* for the care of the injured and wounded during any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 1941.

(4) *Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the preparation of shelters* for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of perfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.

(5) *An auxiliary police force* to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. Their work of this force was exceptional and excellent.

(6) *Legislation authorizing a home guard* was enacted at the special session of the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members of the Army for other military duty.

(7) *There were many other matters* too numerous to detail here which were planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public service in times of emergency.

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authorities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as a direct result of prior planning and training.

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authorities The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory of

Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory.

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit.

Very sincerely yours,

(S) J. W. POINDEXTER,
Governor of Hawaii.

This is a True Copy.
L. W. Truman
L. W. TRUMAN,
Captain, Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF A. C. OF S., G–4
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

EXHIBIT NO. 134

STANDARD FORM NO. 14A
APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT
MARCH 16, 1935

SECRET

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

FROM WAR DEPARTMENT
A. G. O.
BUREAU

AG . (11-29-41)MC-E

EHB/cdm - 1712

NOVEMBER 29 1941

CABLEGRAM

COMMANDING GENERAL

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER T H

CONSULT C IN C PACIFIC FLEET REFERENCE HIS DISPATCH NUMBER TWO EIGHT ZERO SIX TWO SEVEN TO CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS PERIOD IN VIEW OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN ABOVE DISPATCH COMMA THE MOVEMENT OF THE TWO ARMY PURSUIT SQUADRONS AS INDICATED IN WAR DEPARTMENT CABLE NUMBER FOUR SIX SIX COMMA NOVEMBER TWO SIX COMMA ONE NINE FOUR ONE COMMA WILL BE SUSPENDED PERIOD THESE SQUADRONS SHOULD HOWEVER BE PREPARED TO MOVE ON SHORT NOTICE PERIOD PARAGRAPH WAR DEPARTMENT HAS OFFERED TO TAKE OVER DEFENSE OF PACIFIC ADVANCE BASES FROM THE NAVY EXCEPT FOR FURNISHING ANTIAIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT PERIOD CONSULT C IN C PACIFIC FLEET REFERENCE REQUIREMENTS AND AREAS TO BE DEFENDED PERIOD WAR DEPARTMENT HAS ALSO ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE OF CHRISTMAS AND CANTON PERIOD IT IS CONTEMPLATED THAT YOU WILL FORM BASE DEFENSE UNITS FROM THE HAWAIIAN GARRISON SPECIALLY ORGANIZED AS TASK FORCES FOR PARTICULAR AREAS PERIOD IF THESE UNITS ARE MOVED FROM OAHU COMMA NECESSARY REPLACEMENTS FROM THE UNITED STATES WILL BE FURNISHED PERIOD REPORT YOUR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE

ADAMS

OFFICIAL: SECRET

ADJUTANT GENERAL.

SECRET

This original should be returned to The AGO upon completion of action in connection with which it may be required.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY



DEFENSE FUNDS - REQUESTS & GRANTS 7 FEB TO 7 DEC 1941



REQUESTED $22,953,697 GRANTED $350,000

NON-FISCAL REQUESTS

- 18 FEB. - TWO REGIMENTS OF MOBILE COAST ARTILLERY
- 25 FEB. - INCREASE OF STRENGTH OF 251st C.A. REGIMENT
- 25 APR. - ORGANIZATION OF 2 TRIANGULAR DIVISIONS
- REQUESTS FOR PRIORITIES ON MATERIALS

CHART No 2

DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE POPULATION - OAHU




CHINA


7 DEC. 1941
PEARL HARBOR
3³⁰ AM War Dept recd 1⁰⁰ PM message
HAWAIIAN TIME
12
3
6
9
2⁵⁰ PM Marshall warning recd.
6⁴⁵ AM Navy destroys two man submarine
6⁴⁸ AM Marshall sends warning
7²⁰ AM Planes reported by Opana radar station
7⁵⁵ AM First attack on Hickam Field and elsewhere
8⁰⁰ AM First unarmed B-17s arrive at Hickam Field
8⁰³ AM Col. Phillips reported attack
8⁰⁵ AM First enemy plane shot down
8¹⁰ AM Alert #3 ordered Schofield Barrack attacked
8³⁰ AM Infantry division moved to battle positions
8⁵⁰ AM Pursuit planes took off
9⁰⁰ AM Second attack Civilian surgical teams reported
10³⁰ AM Third attack
12⁰⁰ NOON Civilians evacuated
CHART NO 5


U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
16TH CENSUS
OF THE UNITED STATES
1940
POPULATION
Second Series
Characteristics of the Population
Hawaii

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

J. C CAPT, *Director (Appointed May 28, 1941)*

WILLIAM LANE AUSTIN, *Director (Retired January 31, 1941)*

PHILIP M. HAUSER, *Assistant Director*

Population—LEON E. TRUESDELL, *Chief Statistician.*
HOWARD G. BRUNSMAN, *Assistant Chief Statistician.*

Occupation Statistics—Alba M. Edwards.
General Population Statistics—Henry S. Shryock, Jr.
Economic Statistics—William H. Mauts.
Housing Statistics—Edward P. Staudt.
Mathematical Adviser—W. Edwards Deming.
Technical Operations—Regis W. Holmberg.
Population Analyst—Joel Williams.
Employment Analyst—John D. Durand.
Tabulation Expert—Karl L. Benson.
Technical Editing—Bruce L. Jenkinson.
Technical Instructions—James L. McPherson.

Administrative Service—F. R. PITMAN, *Acting Chief.*
Agriculture—ZELLMER R. PETTET, *Chief Statistician.*
Business—JOHN ALBRIGHT, *Chief Statistician.*
Geography—CLARENCE E. BATSCHELET, *Geographer.*
Information and Publications—A. W. VON STRUVE, *Acting Chief.*
Machine Tabulation—RALPH E. GALLOWAY, *Chief.*
Manufactures—THOMAS J. FITZGERALD, *Chief Statistician.*
State and Local Government—EDWARD R. GRAY, *Chief Statistician.*
Vital Statistics—HALBERT L. DUNN, *Chief Statistician.*

SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940

REPORTS ON HAWAII

Population:
Number of Inhabitants—Hawaii.
Characteristics of the Population—Hawaii.
Housing:
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Agriculture:
Farms, Farm Property, Livestock, and Crops—Hawaii.
Business:
Census of Business, 1939—Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.
Manufactures:
Census of Manufactures—Outlying Areas.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
JESSE H. JONES, Secretary

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
J. C. CAPT, Director (Appointed May 28, 1941)
WILLIAM LANE AUSTIN, Director (Retired January 31, 1941)
PHILIP M. HAUSER, Assistant Director

SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES : 1940

POPULATION

Second Series
Characteristics of the Population

HAWAII

Prepared under the supervision of
Dr. LEON E. TRUESDELL
Chief Statistician for Population

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

HAWAII BY COUNTIES, ISLANDS, AND CENSUS TRACTS

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

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION

INTRODUCTION

This second Population bulletin for the Territory of Hawaii presents data on the characteristics of the population, including sex, age, race, nativity, place of birth, citizenship, marital status, school attendance, highest grade of school completed, employment status, class of worker, occupation, industry, wage or salary income, and months worked in 1939. In the first Population bulletin, entitled "Number of Inhabitants," the total population of the Territory on April 1, 1940, was given for all of its political subdivisions, including counties, judicial districts, representative districts, census tracts, cities, towns, and villages. There remain to be presented for the Territory and for Honolulu city statistics on age by marital status, relationship to head of household, and education, data on occupation by age, wage or salary income, and class of worker, and on industry by race.

Arrangement of tables.—The tables in the present bulletin are arranged on the basis of the areas for which figures are presented. Tables 1 to 17 present statistics for the Territory as a whole and for Honolulu city. Tables 18 to 20 contain the figures for counties. Table 21 gives data by judicial districts and census tracts. Figures for cities of 5,000 to 100,000 are shown in tables 22 and 23. The amount of detail presented in this bulletin is generally greater for the larger places than for the smaller ones, and data from earlier censuses are presented for the larger areas only.

Availability of unpublished data.—The statistics in this bulletin presented for the Territory as a whole and for Honolulu city represent practically all of the data tabulated in this phase of the 1940 program. Although similar statistics have been tabulated for Hilo and Wailuku cities, and almost as much detail has been tabulated for counties and for Honolulu census tracts, it is not possible, because of space limitations, to publish the data in full detail.

These unpublished statistics, however, can be made available upon request, for the cost of transcribing or reproducing them. Requests for such statistics, addressed to the Director of the Census, Washington, D. C., will receive a prompt reply which will include an estimate of the cost of preparing the data.

EXPLANATIONS AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

Sex and race.—Because of the importance of the classification of the population by sex, practically all of the data in this bulletin are presented separately for males and females. Moreover, as far as feasible, the data are also presented by race. Seven major race classifications are distinguished in the tabulations; namely, Hawaiian, part Hawaiian, Caucasian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, and "other races" the latter comprising mainly Koreans and Puerto Ricans. In the 1940 census, several revisions were made in the race classification. Portuguese, Spanish, and "other Caucasian" were combined into one group, "Caucasian"; persons from Puerto Rico were classified as a separate group because of special interest in their number; and all persons of mixed Hawaiian and other blood were classified as part Hawaiian. All statistics in this bulletin classifying the population by race are in accordance with the 1940 definition. The complete classification by race, sex, and nativity is shown in the following table:

POPULATION OF THE TERRITORY BY RACE, NATIVITY, AND SEX: 1940

RACE	ALL CLASSES			NATIVE		FOREIGN BORN	
	Total	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
All races	423,330	245,135	178,195	214,665	156,762	30,470	21,433
Hawaiian	14,375	7,413	6,962	7,413	6,962	....	....
Part Hawaiian	49,935	24,650	25,285	24,636	25,272	14	13
Caucasian	103,791	64,473	39,318	60,034	36,496	4,439	2,822
Chinese	28,774	16,131	12,643	12,738	11,192	3,393	1,451
Filipino	52,569	40,791	11,778	40,791	11,778	....	....
Japanese	157,905	82,820	75,085	61,910	58,642	20,910	16,443
Korean	6,851	3,965	2,886	2,287	2,194	1,678	692
Negro	255	172	83	165	83	7	....
Puerto Rican	8,296	4,407	3,889	4,407	3,889	....	....
All others	579	313	266	284	254	29	12

Nativity.—In the classification by nativity, a person born in continental United States or in any of its territories or possessions is counted as native. Likewise included as native are the small number of persons who, although born in a foreign country or at sea, are American citizens by birth because their parents were American citizens.

Place of birth.—The native population is classified, with respect to place of birth, into five groups: Those born in the Territory of Hawaii, those born in the Philippine Islands, those born in Puerto Rico, those born in other United States territories or possessions (including American citizens born abroad or at sea), and those born in continental United States.

The foreign-born population is classified according to country of birth. All classifications of the 1940 population according to country of birth are based on the political boundaries of January 1, 1937, which were practically the same as in 1930.

Age.—The age classification is based on the age of the person at his last birthday before the date of the census, that is, the age of the person in completed years.

Age data for the Territory, Honolulu city, and counties are presented by 5-year periods up to 54 years and by 10-year periods to 74 years. For cities of 5,000 to 100,000 figures are presented by 5-year periods up to 34 years and 10-year periods from 35 to 74 years. Data are also available in various tables for additional age groups having some special significance, i. e., 21 years and over and the various groups shown in connection with school attendance and employment status.

Citizenship.—The classification of the foreign born by citizenship comprises two main groups, naturalized and alien; the second group is further subdivided into those having first papers (that is, those who have made formal declaration of intention to become citizens of the United States) and those having no papers. In addition, there is a third group made up of foreign-born persons for whom no report on citizenship was obtained. Since it is likely that most of these persons are aliens, they are often included with the aliens in summary figures for citizens and noncitizens.

Marital status.—In the classification by marital status four major groups are shown: Single, married, widowed, and divorced. In all censuses there were a few persons for whom the enumerators failed to report marital status. All these persons are here classified as single.

School attendance.—The school attendance tabulation for 1940 is based on the replies to the enumerator's inquiry as to whether the person had attended, or been enrolled in, any regular school or college between March 1 and April 1, 1940. Night schools or vocational schools were not included unless they were a part of the regular school system; and no correspondence schools were included. The school attendance question in the Census of 1930 applied to a somewhat longer period, namely, the seven months between September 1, 1929, and April 1, 1930. Furthermore, in the earlier censuses the question was not restricted as to type of school.

Highest grade of school completed.—In 1940 the census, for the first time, included a question on the formal educational attainment of each person. The question on the schedule asked for the last full grade that the person had completed in the regular school system—public, private, or parochial school, college, or university. This question replaced the inquiry on illiteracy included in previous censuses and provides data on educational status, a characteristic which is significant for every population group, especially in combination with other characteristics.

The tabulations on last year of school completed which are presented in this bulletin, are restricted to persons 25 years old and over, practically all of whom have completed their formal education. All tables presenting data on education include the median year of school completed. The median year of school completed may be defined as that year which divides the population group into equal parts, one-half having completed more schooling, and one-half having completed less schooling than the median. These medians are expressed in terms of a continuous series of numbers representing years of school completed. For example, the completion of the first year of high school is indicated by 9 and of the last year of college by 16.

Employment status.—In the classification by employment status in the 1940 Census of Population, all persons 14 years old and over are classified on the basis of their activity during the week of March 24 to 30, 1940, into two principal groups: (1) Persons in the labor force, including those employed for pay or profit or at unpaid family work, those on public emergency work, and those seeking work; and (2) persons not in the labor force. The latter group includes persons reported as engaged in their own home housework; those in school; those unable to work; all inmates of penal and mental institutions and homes for the aged, infirm, and needy, regardless of their activity during the census week; others not employed, not on public emergency work, and not seeking work; and persons for whom employment status was not reported.

The various categories of persons in the labor force are defined below:

Employed (except on public emergency work).—The group classified as employed includes: (*a*) Persons who worked for pay or profit at any time during the week of March 24 to 30, 1940, in private work or nonemergency Federal, Territorial, or local government work, or assisted without pay on a family farm or in a family business; and (*b*) persons not actually at work and not seeking work during the week of March 24 to 30, 1940, but with jobs, businesses, or professional enterprises from which they were temporarily absent because of vacation, illness, industrial dispute, bad weather, or lay-off not exceeding 4 weeks with definite instructions to return to work on a specific date. The group "Employed (except on public emergency work)" includes not only employees but also proprietors, farmers, other self-employed persons, and unpaid family workers.

On public emergency work.—This category includes persons who, during the week of March 24 to 30, 1940, were at work on, or assigned to, public emergency work projects conducted by the Work Projects Administration (WPA), the National Youth Administration (NYA), or the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC).

In the interpretation of the data for persons on public emergency work, allowance must be made for the misclassification of considerable numbers of public emergency workers. The number of persons reported in the census as on public emergency work in Hawaii was 2,326, whereas the number recorded on the pay rolls of the Federal emergency work agencies at the time of the census was 3,568.

Seeking work.—This category represents persons without work of any sort in the week of March 24 to 30, 1940, who were actively seeking work during that week. The group seeking work was subdivided into experienced workers and new workers, the latter being persons who had not previously worked full time for 1 month or more. Persons seeking work for whom a report on work experience was lacking were classified as experienced workers.

Persons with a job but not at work were classified as employed because the strict definition of this group and the fact that these persons were reported as not seeking work, tended to eliminate all except those who would shortly return to the employment from which they were temporarily absent.

Number of unemployed.—The total number of unemployed, as usually defined, includes (1) persons seeking work and without any form of public or private employment and (2) those on public emergency work programs established to provide jobs for the unemployed. Because of the misclassification of public emergency workers, the census total of these two groups understates the amount of unemployment. More satisfactory figures can be obtained by adding to the census figures for persons seeking work, the number of persons on pay rolls of the Federal emergency work agencies at the time of the census. This procedure yields a total of 8,678 unemployed persons.

Comparison of 1940 data for the labor force with previous data for gainful workers.—The 1940 data for the labor force are not directly comparable with the census statistics for gainful workers in 1930 and earlier years because of differences in definition. "Gainful workers" were persons reported as having a gainful occupation, that is, an occupation in which they earned money or a money equivalent, or in which they assisted in the production of marketable goods, regardless of whether they were working or seeking work at the time of the census. The labor force is defined in the 1940 census on the basis of activity during the week of March 24 to 30, and includes only persons who were employed, seeking work, or on public emergency work in that week. Thus seasonal workers who were neither working nor seeking work during the census week were excluded from the labor force in 1940; such persons were classified for the most part as gainful workers in 1930. In addition certain classes of persons, such as retired workers, some inmates of institutions, and recently incapacitated workers were frequently included among gainful workers in 1930, but in general, such persons are not in the 1940 labor force. On the other hand, the 1940 labor force includes persons seeking work without previous work experience, that is, new workers, and persons reported as in the labor force for whom neither occupation nor industry was entered on the schedule. Most of the relatively few new workers at the time of the 1930 and earlier censuses were probably not counted as gainful workers. Likewise, some persons who were actually gainful workers, but for whom neither occupation nor industry was reported, were not included in the gainful worker figures for 1930 and earlier years.

The 1940 labor force figures are restricted to persons 14 years old and over, whereas the number of gainful workers shown in earlier censuses included persons 10 years old and over. The number of workers 10 to 13 years old has become relatively small and no longer justifies the additional burden of enumeration and tabulation necessary to retain the 10-year age limit. In making comparisons between the 1940 labor force data and the gainful worker statistics in earlier census reports, the slight difference in age limits should be taken into consideration. The gainful worker statistics shown in this bulletin for earlier censuses exclude those 10 to 13 years old.

Class of worker.—Class-of-worker statistics for employed workers (excluding persons on public emergency work) are given

in table 12, which shows the numbers of wage or salary workers, employers and own-account workers, unpaid family workers, and workers who failed to report class of worker. The composition of the various categories is described below:

Wage or salary workers.—This class consists of persons who worked as employees for wages or salary (in cash or kind). It includes not only factory operatives, laborers, clerks, etc., who worked for wages, but also persons working for tips or for room and board, salesmen and other employees working for commissions, and salaried business managers, corporation executives, and government officials.

Employers and own-account workers.—This group consists of persons who operated their own business enterprises. It includes not only the owner-operators of large stores and manufacturing establishments, but also small merchants, independent craftsmen, farmers, professional men, peddlers, and other persons conducting enterprises of their own. It does not include managers paid to operate businesses owned by other persons or by corporations; such workers are classified as wage or salary workers.

Unpaid family workers.—This class is composed of persons who assisted without pay on farms or in stores or other enterprises operated by other members of their families. The great majority of unpaid family workers are farm laborers.

Occupation and industry statistics.—In the 1940 Population Census of Hawaii, inquiries relating to occupation and industry were made for all experienced persons 14 years old and over in the labor force during the census week (March 24 to 30, 1940). The occupation and industry data presented in this bulletin, however, are limited to employed persons (except those on public emergency work), and relate to their jobs during the census week.

Occupation classification.—The detailed occupation classification used in the 1940 Population Census for Hawaii contains 278 titles.[1] In this bulletin, the detailed occupation classification is used only for the presentation of occupation statistics for employed workers (except those on public emergency work), by sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu city (table 13). In other tables, occupation data are shown in terms of 12 major occupation groups, representing major groupings of the detailed classification.

Industry classification.—The industry classification, used in the 1940 Census for Hawaii contains 131 titles.[2] The detailed industry classification is used here only for the presentation of industry statistics for employed workers (except those on public emergency work), by sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu city (table 13). In other tables, a condensed list of 44 industries is used. This abbreviated list represents selections and combinations of the titles in the complete classification.

Coverage of industry classifications "Government" and "Domestic service."—The industry classification "Government (not elsewhere classified)" does not include all persons employed by governmental agencies. Persons are included in this classification only if they were engaged in activities that are peculiarly governmental functions. Government employees who were engaged in activities that are commonly performed by employees of private enterprises are included in the industry classification in which their activities fall. For example, a tax collector is included in the industry classification "Government," but a carpenter employed on a Federal building project is classified in the category "Construction." The total number of persons employed by governmental agencies, therefore, cannot be obtained from the industry classification.

[1] With some exceptions, this classification is convertible to the 297-item Convertibility List of Occupations, which was prepared by the Joint Committee on Occupational Classification (sponsored by the Central Statistical Board and the American Statistical Association) to increase comparability among occupational statistics compiled by various governmental and private sources.

[2] This classification is a condensation of the Standard Industrial Classification of 1,411 titles, which was prepared for use in classifying industry returns from workers or members of their families, by the Joint Committee on Occupational Classification, in cooperation with the Committee on Industrial Classification sponsored by the Central Statistical Board.

The industry group "Domestic service" is somewhat more inclusive than the major occupation group "Domestic service workers," which is limited to "Housekeepers, private family," "Laundresses, private family," and "Servants, private family." The industry classification "Domestic service" includes not only these workers but also persons in occupations such as practical nurse, chauffeur, and gardener, if they were employed by private families.

Comparison of occupation and industry statistics for 1940 with data from earlier censuses.—No comparisons of the 1940 census data on occupation and industry with similar data from previous censuses are included in this bulletin. Such comparisons are complicated by three important considerations.

First, gainful workers, the group for which occupation and industry statistics were presented in previous censuses, are not strictly comparable with the 1940 labor force.

Second, the occupation and industry data shown here do not cover the entire labor force, being limited to employed persons.

Third, the 1940 classifications of occupation and industry differ from those used in earlier censuses, with respect to arrangement and content of titles. For example, in 1930, most of the occupation titles were grouped under a few major industrial headings ("Agriculture," "Forestry and fishing," "Extraction of minerals," etc.), based upon the industry in which the occupation was most commonly followed. In 1940, however, the occupation titles are grouped into 12 major occupation groups ("Professional and semiprofessional workers," "Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers," "Operatives and kindred workers," etc.), regardless of industrial attachment.

Wage or salary income and receipt of other income.—In the 1940 census, all persons 14 years old and over (except inmates of specified institutions) were asked to report the amount of money wage or salary income received in 1939. (Those who received over $5,000 were required only to report that they had received more than that amount.) Persons 14 years old and over were also asked to report whether they had received $50 or more from sources other than money wages or salaries in 1939. This comparatively small amount was chosen in order to identify those persons whose incomes, for all practical purposes, were limited to receipts from wages or salaries. A question regarding the exact amount of nonwage income was not included because of the very considerable additional burden of enumeration that such a question would have entailed.

Wage or salary income, as defined for the purposes of the 1940 census, includes all money received by persons as compensation for work or services performed as employees, including commissions, tips, piece-rate payments, bonuses, etc., as well as receipts commonly referred to as wages or salaries. Enumerators were instructed not to consider as wage or salary income receipts from business profits, fees, travel reimbursements, sale of crops, unemployment compensation, etc., nor compensation in forms other than money, such as meals, lodging, clothing, fuel, etc.

"Other income" includes all income other than money wages or salaries, such as income from roomers or boarders, business profits, professional fees, income in kind, receipts from the sale of farm products, rents, interest, dividends, unemployment compensation, direct relief, old-age assistance, pensions, annuities, royalties, and regular contributions from persons other than members of the immediate family. Other income does not include receipts in the form of lump-sum insurance settlements, occasional gifts of goods or money, inheritances, receipts or profits from the sale of properties (unless the person earned his living by buying and selling such properties) or reimbursements for travel expenses.

In this bulletin, the group of persons for whom the receipt or nonreceipt of other income was not reported is combined with the

group without other income of $50 or more, since the majority of the persons failing to report probably had no other income.

Data on wage or salary income and other income in 1939 are presented in table 16 for the experienced labor force, which comprises employed persons, those on public emergency work, and persons other than new workers seeking work, during the week of March 24 to 30, 1940. In this table statistics are presented separately for wage or salary workers and for other experienced workers (that is, for the combination of employers, own-account workers, unpaid family workers, and persons for whom class of worker was not reported). The group of wage or salary workers is subdivided into (a) private and nonemergency government workers, and (b) public emergency workers. The category "public emergency workers" includes both persons who were on public emergency work during the census week and persons seeking work during that week who had last worked on public emergency projects. This category is therefore somewhat larger than the employment status group "on public emergency work."

The statistics on wage or salary income and receipt of other income refer to the calendar year 1939, while the classifications by employment status and class of worker refer to the week of March 24 to 30, 1940. Because of the rapid turn-over of emergency project employment, the difference in time reference is probably most important in connection with the wage or salary income distribution of public emergency workers. A considerable proportion of the wage or salary income reported by public emergency workers was derived from private employment. Likewise, some persons who were employers, own-account workers, and unpaid family workers at the time of the census had been employed as wage or salary workers during a part or all of the year 1939, and reported themselves as having received various amounts of wage or salary income.

Two important factors may have made for inaccurate reporting of wage or salary income. First, persons who received their compensation in many installments of irregular amounts may not have been able to determine accurately the total amount received. Second, some informants who replied to the census inquiries for the whole family undoubtedly did not know the precise amount of wage or salary income received by each member. Nevertheless, the statistics present a reasonably accurate picture of the amount and distribution of wage or salary income received in 1939.

Months worked in 1939.--In order to show the relationship between income and amount of employment during the year, statistics on wage or salary income and receipt of other income are presented for wage or salary workers classified according to number of months worked in 1939. The classification by number of months worked was obtained from a question regarding the number of weeks worked for pay or profit, including public emergency work, or at unpaid family work, which was asked for all persons 14 years old and over except inmates of certain institutions. For persons with periods of part-time work, the report was to be made in terms of equivalent full-time weeks, a full-time week being defined as the number of hours locally regarded as full time for the given occupation and industry. Paid vacations or other absences with pay were included in the number of weeks worked.

The returns for weeks worked in 1939 have been converted into months in the tables in this bulletin, because a large proportion of the reports were only approximate, and did not represent valid statements of the precise number of weeks of work. The groupings of months worked that are used in this bulletin are listed below, with their equivalents in terms of the original reports of weeks worked.

Number of months worked	Number of weeks worked
Less than 6 months, or not reported	0 to 23 weeks, or not reported.
6 to 8 months	24 to 35 weeks.
9 to 11 months	36 to 49 weeks.
12 months	50 to 52 weeks.

Data on months worked in 1939 were not tabulated for employers, own-account workers, and unpaid family workers. For such workers, the data on months worked are less significant and less reliable than for wage or salary workers. Moreover, for workers in these groups, the amount of employment in 1939 has little relation to the amount of wage or salary income received.

TABLE 1.—RACE, BY NATIVITY AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1910 TO 1940

[Percent not shown where less than 0.1]

AREA, NATIVITY, SEX, AND CENSUS YEAR	All classes	Hawaiian	Part Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Other races	PERCENT BY RACE: Hawaiian	Part Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Other races	PERCENT BY NATIVITY: All classes	Hawaiian	Part Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Other races
THE TERRITORY																							
Total																							
1940	423,330	14,375	49,983	103,791	28,774	52,569	157,905	15,981	3.4	11.8	24.5	6.8	12.4	37.3	3.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native	370,717	14,375	49,908	95,840	23,930	52,569	120,552	13,542	3.9	13.5	25.9	6.5	14.2	32.5	3.7	87.6	100.0	99.9	92.3	83.2	100.0	76.3	84.7
Foreign born	52,613		27	7,951	4,844		37,353	2,438		0.1	15.1	9.2		71.0	4.6	12.4		0.1	7.7	16.8		23.7	15.3
1930	368,336	22,636	28,294	80,373	27,179	63,052	139,631	7,241	6.1	7.7	21.8	7.4	17.1	37.9	2.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native	299,799	22,636	28,224	70,815	19,711	63,052	91,185	4,176	7.6	9.4	23.6	6.6	21.0	30.4	1.4	81.4	100.0	99.8	88.1	72.5	100.0	65.3	57.7
Foreign born	68,537		70	9,558	7,468		48,446	3,065			13.9	10.9		70.7	4.5	18.6			11.9	27.5		34.7	42.3
1920	255,912	23,723	18,027	54,743	23,507	21,031	109,274	5,636	9.3	7.0	21.4	9.2	8.2	42.7	2.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native	168,671	23,723	18,027	42,961	12,342	21,031	48,586	2,001	14.1	10.7	25.5	7.3	12.5	28.8	1.2	65.9	100.0	100.0	78.5	52.5	100.0	44.5	35.7
Foreign born	87,241			11,781	11,165		60,688	3,607			13.5	12.8		69.6	4.1	34.1			21.5	47.5		55.5	64.3
1910	191,909	26,041	12,506	44,048	21,674	2,361	79,675	5,604	13.6	6.5	23.0	11.3	1.2	41.5	2.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native	98,157	26,041	12,506	28,930	7,195	2,361	19,889	1,235	26.5	12.7	29.5	7.3	2.4	20.3	1.3	51.1	100.0	100.0	65.7	33.2	100.0	25.0	22.0
Foreign born	93,752			15,118	14,479		59,786	4,369			16.1	15.4		63.8	4.7	48.9			34.3	66.8		75.0	78.0
Male																							
1940	245,130	7,413	24,650	64,473	16,131	40,791	92,890	8,857	3.0	10.1	26.3	6.6	16.6	33.9	3.6	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native	214,645	7,413	24,626	60,074	12,738	40,791	61,910	7,127	3.5	11.5	28.0	5.9	19.0	28.8	3.3	87.6	100.0	99.9	93.1	79.0	100.0	74.8	80.4
Foreign born	30,490		14	4,439	3,393		20,910	1,734			14.6	11.1		68.6	5.7	12.4		0.1	6.9	21.0		25.2	19.6
1930	222,640	11,311	14,042	48,706	16,861	32,566	75,008	4,446	5.1	6.3	21.9	7.4	22.6	33.7	2.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native	180,627	11,311	14,042	43,100	10,677	32,566	46,759	2,172	6.3	7.8	23.9	5.9	29.1	25.9	1.2	81.1	100.0	100.0	88.5	64.5	100.0	62.3	48.9
Foreign born	42,013			5,606	6,184		28,249	2,274			13.3	14.0		67.2	5.4	18.9			11.5	35.5		37.7	51.1
Female																							
1940	178,195	6,962	25,333	39,318	12,643	11,778	65,015	7,124	3.9	14.2	22.1	7.1	6.6	43.1	4.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native	156,072	6,962	25,282	35,766	11,192	11,778	58,642	6,424	4.5	16.2	22.9	7.2	7.5	37.6	4.1	87.6	100.0	99.9	91.1	88.5	100.0	78.1	90.1
Foreign born	22,123		51	3,552	1,451		6,373	700		0.1	15.9	6.6		74.3	3.2	12.4		0.1	8.9	11.5		21.9	9.9
1930	145,696	11,325	14,252	31,667	10,318	30,486	64,623	2,795	7.8	9.7	21.7	7.3	7.2	44.4	1.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native	119,172	11,325	14,192	27,715	9,034	30,486	44,426	2,004	9.5	11.9	23.3	7.6	8.8	37.3	1.7	81.8	100.0	100.0	87.5	85.1	100.0	68.7	71.7
Foreign born	26,524		60	3,952	1,284		20,197	791			14.9	6.0		76.1	3.0	18.2			12.5	14.9		31.3	28.3
Males per 100 females																							
1940	137.6	106.5	97.5	164.0	127.6	346.3	110.3	124.3															
Native	137.5	106.5	97.5	167.7	113.8	346.3	105.6	111.0															
Foreign born	137.8		107.7	126.4	233.8		127.2	246.3															
1930	153.8	99.9	99.0	153.8	156.0	501.3	116.1	159.1															
Native	151.6	99.9	99.0	155.3	118.2	501.3	105.3	108.4															
Foreign born	158.4			141.9	371.5		129.9	287.5															
HONOLULU CITY																							
Total																							
1940	179,326	5,457	25,563	50,892	22,445	6,887	80,163	7,485	3.0	14.2	28.4	12.5	3.8	33.8	4.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native	156,653	5,457	25,563	46,349	19,217	6,887	66,903	6,333	3.5	16.3	29.6	12.3	4.4	29.9	4.0	87.3	100.0	99.9	91.1	85.6	100.0	77.2	84.6
Foreign born	22,718		20	4,544	3,228		13,790	1,136		0.1	20.0	14.2		60.7	5.0	12.7		0.1	8.9	14.4		22.8	15.4
1930	137,582	9,675	14,242	39,043	19,354	4,776	47,488	2,044	7.0	10.4	28.4	14.1	3.5	34.5	2.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native	110,652	9,675	14,242	33,935	13,204	4,776	30,854	1,966	8.7	12.9	30.7	12.7	4.3	27.9	1.8	80.4	100.0	100.0	86.9	68.2	100.0	65.0	96.1
Foreign born	26,930			5,108	6,150		16,634	1,078			19.0	15.3		61.7	4.0	19.6			13.1	31.4		35.0	35.9
Male																							
1940	94,734	2,778	12,402	26,944	12,304	5,102	31,229	3,981	2.9	13.1	25.4	13.0	5.4	33.0	4.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native	82,071	2,778	12,411	24,614	10,284	5,102	23,642	3,241	3.4	15.1	30.0	12.5	6.2	28.8	3.9	86.6	100.0	99.9	91.4	83.6	100.0	73.7	81.4
Foreign born	12,663		11	2,330	2,020		7,587	722		0.1	18.4	16.0		59.9	5.7	13.4		0.1	8.6	16.4		26.3	18.2
1930	74,456	4,739	6,913	21,694	11,146	3,337	24,955	1,654	6.4	9.3	29.1	15.0	4.5	33.5	2.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native	58,808	4,739	6,913	18,933	8,277	3,337	15,624	985	8.1	11.8	32.2	14.1	5.7	26.6	1.7	79.0	100.0	100.0	87.3	74.3	100.0	62.6	59.5
Foreign born	15,648			2,751	2,869		9,329	699			17.6	18.3		59.6	4.5	21.0			12.7	25.7		37.4	41.5
Female																							
1940	84,592	2,679	13,161	23,948	10,141	1,785	49,271	3,507	3.2	15.6	32.3	12.0	2.1	34.7	4.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native	74,582	2,679	13,152	21,734	8,933	1,785	23,161	3,093	3.6	17.6	29.2	12.0	2.4	31.1	4.1	88.1	100.0	99.9	90.8	88.1	100.0	78.9	88.2
Foreign born	10,055		9	2,214	1,208		6,210	414		0.1	22.0	12.0		61.8	4.1	11.9		0.1	9.2	11.9		21.1	11.8
1920	63,126	4,936	7,329	17,359	8,188	1,439	22,515	1,360	7.8	11.6	27.5	13.0	2.3	35.7	2.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native	51,844	4,936	7,329	15,002	6,927	1,439	15,230	981	9.5	14.1	28.9	13.4	2.8	29.4	1.9	82.1	100.0	100.0	86.4	84.6	100.0	67.6	72.1
Foreign born	11,282			2,357	1,261		7,285	379			20.9	11.2		64.6	3.4	17.9			13.6	15.4		32.4	27.9
Males per 100 females																							
1940	112.0	103.7	94.4	113.0	121.3	285.8	106.3	113.5															
Native	110.1	103.7	94.4	113.3	115.1	285.8	102.1	104.8															
Foreign born	125.9		122.2	105.2	167.2		122.1	174.4															
1930	117.9	96.0	94.3	124.9	136.1	231.9	110.1	123.8															
Native	113.4	96.0	94.3	126.2	119.5	231.9	102.6	102.4															
Foreign born	136.7			116.7	227.5		128.1	184.4															

TABLE 2.—AGE, BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 AND 1930

[Percent not shown where less than 0.1]

AREA, AGE, AND CENSUS YEAR	ALL CLASSES			HAWAIIAN		PART HAWAIIAN		CAUCASIAN		CHINESE		FILIPINO		JAPANESE		OTHER RACES	
	Total	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
THE TERRITORY																	
All ages, 1940	423,330	245,135	178,195	7,418	6,957	24,650	25,285	64,473	39,318	16,131	12,643	40,791	11,778	82,820	75,085	8,537	7,194
Under 5 years	40,085	20,411	19,674	556	572	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	3,272	1,116	[illegible]	2,431	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	791	805
5 to 9 years	43,431	21,951	21,480	631	614	4,379	4,147	[illegible]	3,227	[illegible]	[illegible]	2,426	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	951	902
10 to 14 years	47,494	24,110	23,384	705	720	3,832	3,658	[illegible]	3,258	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1,120	1,092
15 to 19 years	48,338	26,359	21,979	647	631	4,071	3,963	7,177	3,345	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1,062	1,017
20 to 24 years	41,077	22,044	19,033	688	586	2,220	2,514	16,400	3,969	[illegible]	[illegible]	1,131	713	9,192	[illegible]	804	795
25 to 29 years	42,330	27,114	15,216	686	567	1,779	1,833	8,711	4,504	[illegible]	[illegible]	7,662	563	6,474	[illegible]	808	801
30 to 34 years	33,387	21,571	11,816	543	529	1,778	[illegible]	[illegible]	4,210	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	448	604
35 to 39 years	28,888	17,969	10,919	477	547	1,034	1,111	[illegible]	3,318	[illegible]	[illegible]	6,442	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	274	350
40 to 44 years	22,111	12,963	9,148	802	457	713	779	3,343	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	290	322
45 to 49 years	17,487	9,648	7,839	806	477	671	701	2,744	2,192	736	480	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	237	238
50 to 54 years	14,116	9,422	4,694	438	380	422	480	2,019	1,653	351	312	1,212	159	[illegible]	[illegible]	362	183
55 to 64 years	20,818	12,811	8,007	567	611	480	566	2,117	2,129	1,137	453	856	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1,171	264
65 to 74 years	10,112	6,767	3,345	372	288	175	219	1,041	1,096	1,357	[illegible]	165	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	501	123
75 years and over	2,802	1,792	1,010	137	119	63	90	[illegible]	476	[illegible]	64	[illegible]	8	[illegible]	[illegible]	119	66
Not reported	156	104	52	8	2	9	3	31	24	7	5	25	1	22	14	1	3
21 years and over	232,649	145,046	87,603	4,708	4,343	8,358	9,071	43,461	27,528	9,645	6,432	37,500	3,818	41,631	35,346	4,773	3,066
All ages, 1930	368,336	[illegible]	[illegible]	11,311	11,325	14,042	14,182	[illegible]	31,047	16,561	10,618	52,566	10,486	75,008	64,623	4,444	2,794
Under 5 years	48,180	24,530	23,650	1,247	[illegible]	3,246	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	518	517
5 to 9 years	47,119	23,894	23,225	1,270	[illegible]	2,640	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	560	573
10 to 14 years	39,042	19,735	19,307	1,161	1,222	2,113	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	458	471
15 to 19 years	33,490	19,324	14,166	1,127	1,071	1,617	1,599	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	268	216
20 to 24 years	42,767	31,778	10,989	852	1,031	1,075	1,202	10,492	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	180	140
25 to 29 years	36,671	25,333	11,338	780	915	814	917	6,129	2,957	1,076	677	[illegible]	[illegible]	4,191	4,199	105	166
30 to 34 years	27,474	17,263	10,211	728	794	617	661	3,627	2,067	1,139	741	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	73	250
35 to 39 years	22,251	12,644	9,607	798	858	594	630	3,132	2,483	[illegible]	547	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	128	116
40 to 44 years	18,756	12,082	6,674	689	682	375	412	[illegible]	1,737	[illegible]	334	[illegible]	229	[illegible]	[illegible]	289	74
45 to 49 years	15,687	10,077	[illegible]	728	635	531	327	1,079	1,515	565	316	1,349	175	[illegible]	[illegible]	636	81
50 to 54 years	13,440	8,968	4,472	646	512	202	210	1,472	1,072	1,144	243	456	83	4,720	2,281	528	66
55 to 59 years	8,043	4,982	3,061	487	455	160	150	970	730	[illegible]	209	231	37	3,390	1,424	371	47
60 to 64 years	6,836	4,986	1,850	380	340	81	106	793	580	[illegible]	124	171	19	2,542	739	219	41
65 to 69 years	3,866	2,866	1,000	288	196	75	61	606	383	708	62	71	10	[illegible]	725	89	22
70 to 74 years	2,012	[illegible]	[illegible]	161	125	48	40	375	297	434	47	14	6	[illegible]	96	51	14
75 years and over	1,767	1,115	652	197	166	28	30	364	381	388	31	13	9	106	27	21	8
Not reported	103	62	41	12	17	2	1	15	11	6	2	5	1	15	9	2	-
21 years and over	192,802	129,292	63,510	6,361	6,390	4,142	4,665	30,610	17,150	9,954	6,299	40,980	4,189	34,860	26,029	2,906	1,089
Percent, 1940	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years	9.5	8.3	11.0	7.5	7.5	19.0	18.6	5.4	8.3	6.9	8.3	6.0	19.0	8.8	9.4	8.9	11.2
5 to 9 years	10.3	9.0	12.1	8.5	8.8	17.1	16.4	5.1	8.2	8.6	11.0	5.9	19.5	10.9	11.8	10.7	12.5
10 to 14 years	11.2	9.8	13.1	9.5	10.5	15.5	14.6	5.1	8.3	11.4	13.7	4.9	17.4	13.7	14.4	12.6	15.2
15 to 19 years	11.4	10.8	12.3	8.7	9.1	12.5	12.2	11.1	8.5	11.2	13.8	3.0	10.2	13.7	14.6	12.0	14.3
20 to 24 years	12.1	13.1	10.7	9.3	8.4	9.0	9.9	25.4	10.1	9.4	12.1	2.8	6.1	11.1	11.9	10.0	11.2
25 to 29 years	10.0	11.1	8.5	8.6	8.4	7.2	7.2	13.5	11.5	7.9	9.1	18.8	4.8	7.8	8.0	6.6	7.8
30 to 34 years	7.9	8.8	6.6	7.3	7.6	5.2	5.5	8.7	10.7	6.0	7.2	20.4	5.7	5.3	4.9	5.2	8.7
35 to 39 years	6.8	7.3	6.1	6.4	7.9	4.2	4.4	7.1	8.4	6.7	7.1	15.8	7.4	4.9	5.1	3.2	4.9
40 to 44 years	5.2	5.3	5.1	6.8	6.6	2.9	3.1	5.2	6.9	6.5	7.3	10.1	4.2	3.6	5.0	2.7	4.5
45 to 49 years	4.1	3.9	4.4	6.8	6.9	2.7	2.8	4.3	5.6	4.8	3.8	[illegible]	3.0	2.6	4.5	2.7	3.3
50 to 54 years	3.6	3.8	3.2	5.9	5.2	1.7	1.9	3.1	4.2	2.2	2.3	3.0	1.3	5.6	3.4	4.1	2.1
55 to 64 years	4.8	5.3	4.3	7.6	7.3	1.9	2.2	3.5	5.4	7.0	3.6	2.1	1.1	7.7	4.8	13.2	3.6
65 to 74 years	2.4	2.8	1.9	5.0	4.2	0.7	0.8	1.6	2.8	8.4	2.1	0.4	0.2	3.7	1.9	6.7	1.7
75 years and over	0.7	0.7	0.6	1.8	1.7	0.3	0.3	0.6	1.2	3.1	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.3	1.3	0.9
Not reported	...	...	...	0.1			...		0.1			0.1				...	...
21 years and over	55.0	59.2	49.2	63.5	62.4	33.9	35.9	67.4	64.9	59.8	50.9	79.7	32.4	50.3	47.1	55.9	43.0
Percent, 1930	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years	13.1	11.0	16.2	11.0	10.8	23.1	21.8	7.7	11.7	10.6	15.2	5.4	27.3	14.9	16.5	11.6	18.5
5 to 9 years	12.8	10.7	15.9	10.9	10.6	19.1	18.7	8.1	11.9	10.9	16.6	3.5	17.1	15.7	17.8	12.5	20.5
10 to 14 years	10.3	8.6	13.9	10.3	10.8	15.0	14.8	7.2	10.8	9.3	14.7	1.8	8.9	12.6	14.1	10.3	16.1
15 to 19 years	9.1	8.7	9.7	10.0	9.5	11.5	11.3	10.2	9.6	8.3	11.5	6.3	5.4	9.0	10.0	5.6	7.7
20 to 24 years	11.6	14.3	7.5	8.4	9.1	7.7	8.5	21.5	9.1	6.5	8.8	28.1	7.6	5.8	6.2	3.4	5.3
25 to 29 years	10.0	11.4	7.8	6.7	8.1	5.8	6.5	13.0	9.4	6.5	8.3	22.9	13.2	5.6	6.4	2.4	5.9
30 to 34 years	7.5	7.8	7.0	6.4	7.0	4.4	4.7	7.4	8.4	6.9	7.0	15.0	8.1	4.2	6.6	1.6	9.3
35 to 39 years	6.0	5.6	6.5	7.0	7.6	4.0	4.4	6.4	7.8	4.9	5.1	9.9	6.7	2.9	6.3	2.9	4.2
40 to 44 years	5.1	5.4	4.6	5.9	5.8	2.7	2.9	4.9	5.6	2.5	3.1	4.5	2.5	7.4	4.9	6.1	2.6
45 to 49 years	4.2	4.5	3.8	6.5	5.6	2.4	2.3	4.1	4.8	3.6	3.0	2.6	1.7	5.9	3.9	14.1	2.9
50 to 54 years	3.6	4.0	3.1	5.9	4.5	1.4	1.5	3.0	3.4	6.9	2.3	0.9	0.8	6.3	3.5	11.9	2.3
55 to 59 years	2.7	3.1	2.1	4.3	4.0	1.1	1.1	2.0	2.3	7.7	2.0	0.4	0.4	4.5	2.2	8.3	1.7
60 to 64 years	1.9	2.2	1.3	3.1	2.1	0.6	0.7	1.6	1.9	6.7	1.2	0.3	0.2	3.1	1.1	4.9	1.5
65 to 69 years	1.0	1.3	0.7	2.3	1.7	0.5	0.4	1.2	1.1	4.3	0.6	0.1	0.1	1.4	0.8	2.0	0.8
70 to 74 years	0.5	0.6	0.4	1.4	1.1	0.4	0.3	0.8	0.8	2.6	0.5	...	0.1	0.5	0.1	1.1	0.5
75 years and over	0.5	0.5	0.4	1.7	1.5	0.3	0.2	0.7	1.2	2.4	0.3		0.1	0.1	...	0.5	0.3
Not reported	...	...	...	0.1	0.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
21 years and over	52.3	58.1	43.8	56.2	56.4	29.5	31.5	62.8	54.2	58.5	60.2	77.7	39.9	46.5	40.3	65.6	39.1

TABLE 2.—AGE, BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 AND 1930—Continued

[Percent not shown where less than 0.1]

AREA, AGE, AND CENSUS YEAR	ALL CLASSES			HAWAIIAN		PART HAWAIIAN		CAUCASIAN		CHINESE		FILIPINO		JAPANESE		OTHER RACES	
	Total	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
HONOLULU CITY																	
All ages, 1940	179,896	94,734	85,162	2,779	2,679	12,422	13,161	26,944	23,963	12,204	10,141	5,188	1,785	31,288	26,271	5,988	3,987
Under 5 years	16,947	8,649	8,298	184	186	2,228	2,251	1,949	1,721	926	819	290	226	2,630	2,438	360	367
5 to 9 years	17,019	9,082	8,857	214	198	2,054	2,004	1,760	1,745	1,095	1,099	345	210	3,172	3,088	422	413
10 to 14 years	19,626	9,964	9,672	239	229	1,857	1,838	1,735	1,721	1,446	1,264	273	202	3,998	3,691	606	621
15 to 19 years	20,293	10,429	9,864	236	236	1,497	1,376	2,423	1,785	1,471	1,420	226	217	4,120	4,122	495	606
20 to 24 years	21,342	11,207	10,135	269	237	1,194	1,447	3,972	2,444	1,255	1,248	236	179	3,898	4,150	423	439
25 to 29 years	18,165	9,713	8,452	258	261	1,026	1,045	3,206	2,926	1,011	900	1,018	126	2,936	2,894	293	296
30 to 34 years	14,089	7,530	6,559	231	225	753	815	2,669	2,751	794	722	874	77	1,952	1,730	267	253
35 to 39 years	12,390	6,720	5,660	204	231	599	637	2,356	2,182	690	727	695	111	1,865	1,597	131	178
40 to 44 years	9,571	5,083	4,488	222	202	347	414	1,922	1,713	671	550	432	67	1,264	1,308	125	164
45 to 49 years	7,665	3,920	3,745	206	196	348	380	1,489	1,377	616	395	367	53	781	1,227	113	117
50 to 54 years	6,543	3,804	2,741	166	149	193	249	1,208	1,057	290	280	130	23	1,673	939	154	74
55 to 64 years	9,077	5,291	3,786	196	179	233	315	1,447	1,444	770	576	100	22	2,068	1,323	477	127
65 to 74 years	4,253	2,596	1,757	116	113	79	119	663	734	664	217	18	2	854	502	352	70
75 years and over	1,291	717	574	32	46	19	51	228	335	228	50	4	1	189	61	47	30
Not reported	73	49	24	5	1	5		17	13	5	4	4		12	5	1	1
21 years and over	100,114	54,242	45,872	1,539	1,794	4,527	5,144	18,279	16,581	7,099	5,179	3,825	617	16,846	14,945	2,126	1,613
Percent, 1940	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years	9.5	9.1	9.8	6.6	6.2	17.9	17.1	7.2	7.2	7.4	8.1	7.6	12.6	8.4	9.0	9.1	10.5
5 to 9 years	10.0	9.6	10.5	7.7	7.4	16.5	15.2	6.5	7.3	8.9	10.8	6.8	17.4	10.2	10.5	10.7	11.8
10 to 14 years	10.9	10.5	11.4	8.6	8.9	14.9	14.1	6.4	7.2	11.8	12.6	5.4	14.0	12.5	12.5	12.8	14.9
15 to 19 years	11.3	11.0	11.7	8.5	8.8	12.1	12.0	9.0	7.5	12.0	14.0	4.4	12.2	13.2	14.1	11.8	14.2
20 to 24 years	11.9	11.8	12.0	9.7	8.8	9.6	11.0	14.7	10.2	10.2	12.3	4.6	9.5	12.4	14.1	10.7	12.5
25 to 29 years	10.1	10.3	10.0	9.3	9.7	8.3	7.9	11.9	12.2	8.2	8.9	20.0	7.2	9.3	9.9	7.2	8.8
30 to 34 years	7.8	7.9	7.7	8.3	8.4	6.1	6.2	8.9	11.5	6.5	7.1	17.1	4.2	6.2	5.9	6.5	6.1
35 to 39 years	6.9	7.1	6.7	7.3	8.6	4.7	4.8	8.7	9.1	7.2	7.2	13.4	6.2	6.0	5.4	3.2	5.6
40 to 44 years	5.3	5.4	5.3	8.0	7.5	2.8	3.1	6.8	7.2	7.1	5.2	8.5	3.8	4.0	4.8	3.2	4.7
45 to 49 years	4.3	4.1	4.4	7.4	7.3	2.8	2.9	5.5	5.7	5.0	3.9	7.2	3.0	2.5	4.2	2.9	3.3
50 to 54 years	3.6	4.0	3.2	6.0	5.6	1.6	1.9	4.5	4.4	2.3	2.5	2.5	1.3	5.4	3.2	3.9	2.1
55 to 64 years	5.1	5.6	4.5	7.1	6.7	1.9	2.4	5.4	6.0	6.3	5.7	2.0	1.2	6.6	4.5	12.0	3.6
65 to 74 years	2.4	2.7	2.1	4.2	4.2	0.6	0.9	2.5	3.1	5.4	2.1	0.4	0.1	2.7	1.7	5.1	2.0
75 years and over	0.7	0.8	0.7	1.2	1.7	0.2	0.4	0.8	1.4	1.9	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.2	1.2	0.9
Not reported		0.1		0.2				0.1	0.1			0.1					
21 years and over	55.8	57.3	54.2	66.2	67.0	36.4	39.1	67.8	69.2	57.7	51.1	73.0	34.6	53.8	56.9	53.6	46.0

TABLE 3.—FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 AND 1930

[Percent not shown where less than 0.1 or where base is less than 100]

AREA, RACE, AND SEX	FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION—ALL AGES						FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION 21 YEARS OLD AND OVER					
	Total	Naturalized		First papers		No papers and not reported	Total	Naturalized		First papers		No papers and not reported
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent			Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
THE TERRITORY: 1940												
Total	52,615	5,553	10.6	397	0.8	46,663	33,041	5,419	16.4	396	0.8	26,226
Male	30,490	3,545	11.6	277	0.9	26,668	20,145	3,422	11.4	272	0.9	16,441
Female	22,123	2,008	9.1	120	0.5	19,995	21,896	1,997	9.1	120	0.5	15,785
Hawaiian												
Part Hawaiian	27	14				13	24	14				10
Male	14	6				8	12	6				6
Female	13	8				5	12	8				4
Caucasian	7,951	5,141	64.7	388	4.9	2,422	7,774	5,015	64.5	383	4.9	2,376
Male	4,439	3,292	74.2	269	6.1	878	4,303	3,185	74.0	264	6.1	854
Female	3,512	1,849	52.6	119	3.4	1,544	3,471	1,830	52.7	119	3.4	1,522
Chinese	4,844	199	4.1	1		4,644	4,730	193	4.1	1		4,536
Male	3,390	115	3.4	1		3,277	3,320	110	3.3	1		3,209
Female	1,454	84	5.8			1,367	1,410	83	5.9			1,327
Japanese	37,353	148	0.4	4		37,201	37,089	147	0.4	4		36,938
Male	20,910	87	0.4	3		20,820	20,784	86	0.4	3		20,695
Female	16,443	61	0.4	1		16,381	16,305	61	0.4	1		16,243
Other races	2,439	51	2.1	4	0.2	2,383	2,434	50	2.1	4	0.2	2,379
Male	1,734	45	2.6	4	0.2	1,685	1,728	45	2.6	4	0.2	1,677
Female	704	6	0.9			698	686	5	0.7			702

TABLE 3.—FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 AND 1930—Continued

[Percent not shown where less than 0.1 or where base is less than 100]

AREA, RACE, AND SEX	FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION—ALL AGES						FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION 21 YEARS OLD AND OVER					
	Total	Naturalized		First papers		No papers and not reported	Total	Naturalized		First papers		No papers and not reported
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent			Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
THE TERRITORY: 1940												
Total	68,537	5,280	7.7	828	1.2	62,449	67,485	5,094	7.5	791	1.2	61,600
Male	42,013	3,262	7.8	708	1.7	38,033	41,360	3,180	7.7	675	1.6	37,535
Female	26,524	1,978	7.5	120	0.5	24,426	26,065	1,914	7.3	116	0.4	24,065
Hawaiian												
Part Hawaiian												
Caucasian	9,838						9,211	4,779	51.9	773	8.4	3,659
Male	5,606						5,384	3,674	57.1	660	12.3	1,050
Female	3,962						3,827	1,705	44.6	113	3.0	2,009
Chinese	7,408						7,304	179	2.5	3		7,122
Male	5,994						5,777	67	1.2	2		5,708
Female	1,594						1,527	112	7.3	1	0.1	1,414
Filipino												
Japanese	48,446						47,930	103	0.2	7		47,820
Male	28,249						27,970	18	0.1	6		27,946
Female	20,197						19,960	85	0.4	1		19,874
Other races	3,065						3,040	33	1.1	8	0.3	2,999
Male	2,274						2,259	21	0.9	7	0.3	2,231
Female	791						781	12	1.5	1	0.1	768
HONOLULU CITY: 1940												
Total	22,718	3,368	14.9	265	1.2	19,085	22,372	3,340	15.0	263	1.2	18,768
Male	12,663	1,968	15.5	166	1.3	10,529	12,464	1,937	15.6	164	1.3	10,363
Female	10,055	1,420	14.1	99	1.0	8,556	9,908	1,409	14.2	99	1.0	8,400
Hawaiian												
Part Hawaiian	20	11				9	18	11				7
Male	11	5				6	9	5				4
Female	9	6				3	9	6				3
Caucasian	4,344	3,112	68.5	261	5.7	1,171	4,471	3,075	68.8	259	5.8	1,137
Male	2,330	1,792	76.9	163	7.0	375	2,282	1,765	77.3	161	7.1	356
Female	2,214	1,320	59.6	98	4.4	796	2,189	1,310	59.8	98	4.5	781
Chinese	3,228	173	5.4	1		3,054	3,123	168	5.4	1		2,954
Male	2,020	99	4.9	1		1,920	1,953	95	4.9	1	0.1	1,857
Female	1,208	74	6.1			1,134	1,170	73	6.2			1,097
Filipino												
Japanese	13,790	60	0.4	2		13,728	13,634	60	0.4	2		13,572
Male	7,580	42	0.6	1		7,537	7,503	42	0.6	1		7,460
Female	6,210	18	0.3	1		6,191	6,131	18	0.3	1		6,112
Other races	1,136	32	2.8	1	0.1	1,103	1,126	32	2.8	1	0.1	1,093
Male	722	30	4.2	1	0.1	691	717	30	4.2	1	0.1	686
Female	414	2	0.5			412	409	2	0.5			407

TABLE 4.—MARITAL STATUS OF THE POPULATION 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1920 TO 1940

[For each year a small number of persons for whom marital status was not reported are included in the figures for "single"]

AREA AND CENSUS YEAR	MALES 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER							FEMALES 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER						
	Total	Single		Married		Widowed		Divorced	Total	Single		Married		Widowed		Divorced
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent			Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
THE TERRITORY																
Total, 1940	178,663	98,128	54.9	71,715	40.1	6,211	3.5	2,609	113,657	36,152	31.8	66,369	58.6	8,819	7.8	2,117
Total, 1930	154,991	79,142	51.1	68,187	44.0	6,030	3.9	1,622	80,014	19,609	24.5	53,948	67.4	5,523	6.9	934
Total, 1920	104,910	45,966	43.8	52,977	50.5	5,011	4.8	956	60,197	10,752	17.9	45,550	75.7	3,479	5.8	416
HONOLULU CITY																
Total, 1940	67,080	31,061	46.3	32,446	48.4	2,249	3.4	1,303	57,765	18,451	31.9	32,812	56.8	4,893	8.5	1,609
Total, 1930	46,224	20,331	42.2	25,179	52.2	2,038	4.2	676	77,598	10,216	27.2	23,665	62.9	3,042	8.1	675

TABLE 5.—SCHOOL ATTENDANCE BY AGE, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 AND 1930

[Percent not shown where base is less than 100]

AREA, AGE, SEX, AND CENSUS YEAR	ALL RACES			HAWAIIAN		PART HAWAIIAN		CAUCASIAN		CHINESE		FILIPINO		JAPANESE		OTHER RACES	
	Total number	Attending school		Attending school	Percent	Attending school	Percent	Attending school	Percent	Attending school	Percent	Attending school	Percent	Attending school	Percent	Attending school	Percent
		Number	Percent														
THE TERRITORY: 1940																	
Total, 5 to 24 years	190,340	110,439	58.0	2,737	52.7	17,949	64.4	13,696	55.7	9,148	70.6	8,371	63.7	35,261	66.9	4,777	60.7
5 years	8,575	2,562	29.9	50	18.6	457	25.2	338	27.6	250	47.7	130	12.7	1,258	37.6	79	21.2
6 years	8,069	6,016	74.6	140	58.6	1,184	73.1	888	74.5	420	83.5	577	61.1	2,557	79.7	230	69.3
7 to 9 years	26,787	26,372	98.5	716	97.2	4,821	98.0	4,015	98.1	1,735	98.7	2,683	97.7	11,235	99.0	1,165	95.7
10 to 13 years	38,128	37,722	98.9	1,103	97.5	5,999	98.6	5,169	98.6	2,618	99.3	3,276	98.5	17,367	99.3	1,760	98.4
14 years	9,366	9,091	97.1	274	90.7	1,374	94.9	1,261	97.0	733	99.5	683	95.4	4,383	98.3	393	92.5
15 years	9,774	8,802	90.1	215	73.9	1,176	87.0	1,242	86.4	739	98.0	552	83.3	4,307	93.4	371	81.7
16 and 17 years	18,111	12,152	67.1	187	38.8	1,688	58.8	1,940	58.6	1,320	88.9	499	50.3	6,655	72.8	463	54.3
18 and 19 years	20,453	5,267	25.8	58	11.5	551	24.3	829	12.8	705	53.8	131	16.8	2,903	33.5	190	24.6
20 years	11,333	1,025	9.0	8	2.8	87	8.0	174	3.9	173	27.9	21	5.5	504	12.2	58	14.4
21 to 24 years	39,744	1,450	3.6	6	0.6	112	3.1	240	1.5	255	10.5	17	1.2	762	5.4	58	4.5
Male, 5 to 24 years	104,484	56,707	54.3	1,370	51.3	8,896	63.2	6,915	56.6	4,698	71.6	4,347	64.1	17,173	66.4	2,414	60.1
5 years	4,367	1,236	28.3	29	21.6	221	23.5	168	27.2	124	47.3	52	9.6	600	35.6	42	22.1
6 years	4,125	3,056	74.1	73	58.4	586	71.8	448	71.9	224	85.8	297	60.4	1,307	80.1	121	68.8
7 to 9 years	13,459	13,242	98.4	358	96.2	2,399	97.8	2,006	98.3	856	99.0	1,351	97.0	5,698	99.1	574	98.1
10 to 13 years	19,525	19,129	99.0	544	97.8	3,005	98.9	2,591	98.6	1,446	99.2	1,634	98.6	8,923	99.3	686	98.1
14 years	4,785	4,672	97.6	136	91.3	672	95.9	647	97.9	380	99.5	326	96.2	2,317	98.7	194	94.6
15 years	4,972	4,581	92.1	107	79.3	588	89.3	661	88.8	364	98.4	295	87.5	2,264	94.9	192	85.3
16 and 17 years	9,113	6,406	70.3	89	38.2	735	59.0	812	61.1	687	88.9	287	52.0	3,563	77.7	231	64.5
18 and 19 years	12,274	2,943	24.0	26	9.3	290	25.1	440	8.6	372	55.9	77	20.8	1,539	38.2	99	24.0
20 years	7,258	575	7.9	4	2.4	44	8.9	90	2.4	100	30.0	18	8.5	292	13.9	27	13.9
21 to 24 years	24,786	967	3.5	4	0.8	56	3.2	152	1.2	139	11.7	19	1.1	471	6.6	35	5.2
Female, 5 to 24 years	85,876	53,732	62.6	1,367	54.2	8,553	63.6	7,691	55.7	4,496	69.6	4,024	67.5	25,088	69.4	2,363	61.3
5 years	4,208	1,326	31.5	21	15.6	236	27.0	170	28.0	126	48.1	78	16.0	658	39.7	37	20.3
6 years	3,944	2,960	75.1	67	58.8	598	74.4	440	77.3	196	81.6	280	61.8	1,250	79.3	129	69.7
7 to 9 years	13,328	13,130	98.5	358	98.1	2,422	98.1	2,009	98.0	879	98.4	1,334	98.5	5,537	98.9	591	96.2
10 to 13 years	18,603	18,593	98.9	559	97.2	2,994	98.4	2,578	98.4	1,172	99.5	1,642	98.4	8,577	99.3	861	98.6
14 years	4,591	4,419	96.5	138	90.2	702	94.0	614	96.1	353	99.4	357	94.7	2,066	98.3	189	90.4
15 years	4,802	4,221	87.9	108	69.2	578	84.9	581	83.8	375	97.7	257	78.8	2,143	91.9	179	78.2
16 and 17 years	8,998	5,746	63.9	98	39.4	753	58.6	728	58.1	633	88.9	212	45.1	3,092	67.8	232	54.2
18 and 19 years	8,179	2,324	28.4	32	14.2	291	23.4	389	28.7	333	51.6	54	13.2	1,364	28.6	91	25.3
20 years	4,075	450	11.0	4	3.2	43	7.3	84	12.2	73	25.4	3	1.7	212	10.5	31	16.1
21 to 24 years	14,958	563	3.8	2	0.4	56	2.9	88	2.7	116	9.3	7	1.3	291	4.2	23	3.9
THE TERRITORY: 1930																	
Total, 5 to 20 years	197,354	82,428	64.7	4,471	60.3	9,411	70.8	14,510	57.7	7,338	75.8	3,989	32.5	40,717	71.5	1,995	76.8
5 years	10,391	956	9.2	34	6.3	113	9.6	146	9.4	151	18.8	39	3.9	434	8.6	39	15.1
6 years	9,847	5,362	54.5	224	46.7	675	60.8	856	55.9	485	65.4	304	35.1	2,668	54.4	130	68.4
7 to 9 years	26,881	24,884	92.6	1,253	87.5	2,830	92.7	4,320	93.1	1,865	92.3	1,530	86.8	12,454	93.6	632	94.8
10 to 13 years	31,255	30,229	96.7	1,812	94.5	3,383	97.2	5,436	96.2	2,329	93.1	1,906	95.3	15,024	97.9	735	94.7
14 years	6,787	5,989	88.2	379	81.5	646	88.9	1,080	82.1	547	90.0	229	75.6	2,987	91.9	121	81.0
15 years	6,383	4,801	75.2	280	65.0	527	74.7	803	67.0	483	86.5	174	57.2	2,437	79.7	107	79.9
16 and 17 years	12,239	6,246	51.4	331	37.0	758	55.7	1,120	43.2	815	76.7	146	34.2	3,612	54.3	117	66.5
18 and 19 years	14,869	3,172	21.3	148	17.0	407	34.8	611	14.5	523	55.4	69	1.7	1,374	30.2	60	39.5
20 years	8,702	739	8.5	30	7.5	80	16.5	136	5.5	140	32.2	10	0.3	227	17.0	11	.....
Male, 5 to 20 years	98,818	43,555	61.6	2,191	59.2	4,750	71.4	7,425	51.6	3,774	76.3	2,126	34.0	21,256	72.3	1,026	77.4
5 years	5,257	476	9.1	11	4.1	52	9.1	73	9.0	77	18.5	15	3.1	228	8.9	20	15.3
6 years	4,911	2,705	55.1	104	45.0	331	60.6	451	57.7	246	68.9	168	38.0	1,335	54.4	70	70.0
7 to 9 years	13,726	12,711	92.6	627	86.1	1,455	93.4	2,206	93.5	961	92.9	785	87.9	6,330	93.5	537	93.9
10 to 13 years	15,835	15,323	96.8	886	93.9	1,694	96.8	2,772	96.6	1,165	93.3	784	95.8	7,640	97.8	380	95.7
14 years	3,400	3,074	90.4	173	79.7	229	90.6	553	85.6	286	89.3	121	82.9	1,577	94.5	55	.....
15 years	3,268	2,585	79.1	144	64.0	272	73.3	410	67.5	258	87.2	107	66.9	1,333	86.2	61	.....
16 and 17 years	6,320	3,452	54.6	160	35.0	380	54.7	562	42.1	442	80.1	101	23.8	1,746	62.4	51	.....
18 and 19 years	9,736	1,816	18.7	73	16.4	188	34.6	325	10.8	295	58.3	39	1.4	859	34.2	37	.....
20 years	6,365	413	6.5	13	7.0	39	16.6	73	3.8	69	26.2	6	0.3	208	20.8	5	.....
Female, 5 to 20 years	98,536	39,873	68.1	2,280	61.5	4,661	70.5	7,085	63.6	3,564	73.2	1,861	34.1	19,461	69.6	969	78.1
5 years	5,134	480	9.3	23	8.5	61	10.1	73	9.8	74	19.1	24	4.7	206	8.3	19	14.5
6 years	4,936	2,657	53.8	120	48.2	344	60.9	405	54.1	239	62.1	136	32.2	1,333	54.4	60	68.0
7 to 9 years	13,155	12,173	92.5	626	89.0	1,365	91.9	2,114	92.8	904	91.7	745	86.6	6,124	93.7	315	95.7
10 to 13 years	15,420	14,906	96.7	926	95.1	1,689	97.5	2,666	95.9	1,164	93.9	724	93.7	7,384	96.1	355	93.7
14 years	3,387	2,915	86.1	206	83.1	317	87.1	527	80.7	281	90.6	108	68.8	1,410	88.1	60	.....
15 years	3,115	2,216	71.1	136	66.0	245	74.0	393	66.5	225	83.6	67	46.5	1,104	73.0	46	.....
16 and 17 years	5,919	2,844	48.0	171	39.1	373	56.7	558	44.3	373	73.0	45	21.5	1,866	48.0	66	.....
18 and 19 years	5,133	1,356	26.4	75	17.5	219	34.1	286	23.8	228	52.1	30	4.7	515	23.6	23	.....
20 years	2,337	324	13.9	17	8.0	46	15.4	63	11.5	71	37.4	2	1.4	119	12.8	6	.....
HONOLULU CITY: 1940																	
Total, 5 to 24 years	79,190	48,396	61.1	965	51.8	8,328	65.5	5,730	49.8	7,393	71.0	1,961	61.7	18,911	66.9	2,990	62.2
5 years	3,419	1,447	42.3	27	.....	300	38.3	221	35.1	228	54.5	36	26.5	585	52.0	50	30.9
6 years	3,377	2,765	81.9	54	.....	631	79.3	512	75.9	342	85.1	101	70.6	1,000	89.1	125	78.6
7 to 9 years	11,123	10,906	98.0	229	97.4	2,372	98.3	2,160	98.2	1,355	98.6	368	97.9	3,905	98.8	507	96.6
10 to 13 years	15,806	15,629	98.9	373	98.9	2,965	98.7	2,707	98.5	2,236	99.4	431	98.2	6,962	99.2	826	96.9
14 years	3,831	3,757	98.1	84	.....	663	98.4	692	97.7	880	99.7	95	93.1	1,461	99.0	180	97.8
5 years	4,071	3,781	92.9	91	75.2	609	90.6	693	90.5	892	98.3	78	.....	1,531	95.8	188	93.5
6 and 17 years	7,945	5,790	72.9	73	43.2	815	68.8	946	68.3	1,099	90.0	101	58.4	2,830	78.4	204	62.6
8 and 19 years	5,277	2,776	52.6	28	14.3	314	27.9	530	25.7	562	55.4	39	22.2	1,177	36.6	98	27.4
0 years	4,417	611	13.8	4	3.6	58	9.9	115	9.6	152	29.0	6	.....	246	14.3	30	16.0
1 to 24 years	16,925	884	5.2	2	0.5	79	3.8	175	3.4	218	11.0	6	1.8	364	5.8	40	5.9

TABLE 5.—SCHOOL ATTENDANCE BY AGE, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 AND 1930—Continued

[Percent not shown where base is less than 100]

AREA, AGE, SEX, AND CENSUS YEAR	ALL RACES			HAWAIIAN		PART HAWAIIAN		CAUCASIAN		CHINESE		FILIPINO		JAPANESE		OTHER RACES	
	Total number	Attending school		Attending school	Percent	Attending school	Percent	Attending school	Percent	Attending school	Percent	Attending school	Percent	Attending school	Percent	Attending school	Percent
		Number	Percent														
HONOLULU CITY: 1940—Continued																	
Male, 5 to 24 years	40,602	24,831	61.1	496	51.9	4,410	66.9	4,479	45.5	3,791	72.0	661	61.2	9,855	65.5	1,139	63.0
5 years	1,753	714	40.7	17	.....	188	34.3	110	34.5	115	55.3	13	.....	271	48.4	30	.....
6 years	1,721	1,362	80.3	28	.....	204	75.4	273	74.0	181	86.2	49	.....	494	87.9	63	.....
7 to 9 years	5,588	5,503	98.5	119	96.7	1,180	98.1	1,055	98.4	669	98.8	200	97.1	2,027	98.9	253	98.4
10 to 13 years	8,034	7,916	98.9	188	96.9	1,506	98.8	1,340	98.5	1,145	99.3	225	98.7	3,100	99.2	412	98.6
14 years	1,960	1,924	98.2	42	.....	323	97.3	366	97.9	292	99.7	41	.....	772	98.8	88	.....
15 years	2,097	1,969	93.9	51	.....	312	91.2	369	92.0	295	98.7	38	.....	812	98.9	92	91.1
16 and 17 years	5,973	3,041	76.5	35	.....	406	65.7	510	71.8	579	90.0	59	59.0	1,340	81.5	112	61.9
18 and 19 years	4,359	1,505	34.5	12	.....	158	29.4	284	21.6	304	57.5	29	.....	668	41.0	50	28.7
20 years	2,389	346	14.5	2	.....	32	12.4	39	7.4	90	31.6	4	.....	145	17.1	14	.....
21 to 24 years	8,819	531	6.0	2	1.0	81	4.4	133	3.6	121	12.5	3	1.5	226	7.5	25	7.6
Female, 5 to 24 years	38,626	23,363	61.2	467	51.3	4,413	64.2	4,271	55.3	3,602	69.9	600	62.2	9,006	69.9	1,151	61.3
5 years	1,666	733	44.0	16	.....	142	36.5	111	35.7	113	53.8	23	.....	314	55.5	20	.....
6 years	1,666	1,393	83.5	26	.....	337	83.0	239	78.1	161	83.9	52	.....	506	90.4	62	.....
7 to 9 years	5,535	5,453	98.5	110	98.2	1,192	98.6	1,105	98.0	696	98.4	168	98.8	1,938	98.8	254	98.8
10 to 13 years	7,801	7,713	98.9	185	94.9	1,479	98.6	1,367	98.6	1,090	99.5	206	97.6	2,962	99.2	424	99.3
14 years	1,871	1,833	98.0	42	.....	343	95.5	325	97.6	288	99.7	54	.....	889	98.1	92	.....
15 years	1,974	1,812	91.8	40	.....	297	90.0	323	88.7	297	98.0	40	.....	719	95.1	96	81.4
16 and 17 years	3,972	2,749	69.2	38	.....	409	62.1	436	64.9	520	90.0	42	.....	1,180	69.6	124	63.3
18 and 19 years	3,919	1,271	32.4	14	.....	156	26.6	246	32.8	268	53.4	10	.....	509	30.3	48	26.1
20 years	2,029	265	13.1	2	.....	26	7.9	56	14.2	62	25.8	2	.....	101	11.4	16	.....
21 to 24 years	8,106	353	4.4	.....	.....	38	3.4	62	3.0	97	9.6	3	2.3	138	4.2	15	4.4

TABLE 6.—PERSONS 25 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940

AREA, SEX, AND YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED	ALL RACES		HAWAIIAN		PART HAWAIIAN		CAUCASIAN		CHINESE		FILIPINO		JAPANESE		OTHER RACES	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
THE TERRITORY																
Total, 25 years old and over	192,905	100.0	8,367	100.0	13,770	100.0	53,070	100.0	13,849	100.0	34,889	100.0	62,979	100.0	6,511	100.0
No school years completed	35,643	18.5	517	6.4	271	2.0	1,865	3.5	3,595	26.3	15,445	44.3	11,437	18.2	2,513	38.6
Grade school: 1 to 4 years	35,607	18.5	2,246	27.8	1,537	11.2	4,115	7.8	2,243	16.4	12,545	36.0	11,482	18.2	1,439	22.1
5 and 6 years	25,978	13.5	2,114	26.2	2,163	15.7	4,561	8.6	1,321	9.7	3,295	9.5	11,630	18.5	894	13.7
7 and 8 years	36,077	18.7	1,937	24.0	3,661	26.6	10,965	20.7	1,300	13.2	2,111	6.1	14,918	23.7	685	10.5
High school: 1 to 3 years	19,543	10.1	741	9.2	2,514	18.3	7,981	15.0	1,346	9.9	834	2.4	5,717	9.1	410	6.3
4 years	21,319	11.2	375	4.6	2,494	18.0	10,817	20.4	2,040	14.9	378	1.1	5,092	8.1	333	5.1
College: 1 to 3 years	7,693	4.0	72	0.9	649	4.7	5,307	10.0	431	3.2	80	0.2	1,055	1.7	89	1.4
4 years or more	10,252	5.3	36	0.4	444	3.2	7,373	13.8	840	6.2	54	0.2	1,448	2.3	127	2.0
Not reported	663	0.3	29	0.4	47	0.3	156	0.3	33	0.2	117	0.3	200	0.3	21	0.3
Median school years completed	6.9	.....	6.2	.....	8.6	.....	10.9	.....	6.5	.....	1.6	.....	6.5	.....	3.0	.....
Male, 25 years old and over	100,260	100.0	4,186	100.0	6,623	100.0	30,823	100.0	8,456	100.0	31,580	100.0	34,341	100.0	4,049	100.0
No school years completed	23,869	19.8	240	5.7	126	1.9	780	2.5	2,152	25.4	13,808	43.7	5,165	15.0	1,598	39.5
Grade school: 1 to 4 years	23,769	19.8	1,221	29.2	809	12.1	2,048	6.6	1,445	17.1	11,541	36.5	5,870	17.0	844	20.8
5 and 6 years	14,988	12.5	1,092	26.1	1,067	16.1	2,908	9.1	830	9.8	3,045	9.6	5,903	17.1	540	13.3
7 and 8 years	22,252	18.5	925	22.2	1,642	24.8	7,307	24.3	1,118	13.2	1,893	6.0	8,732	25.3	436	10.8
High school: 1 to 3 years	12,706	10.6	389	9.5	1,235	18.6	5,470	17.7	901	10.7	745	2.4	3,671	10.6	285	7.0
4 years	12,414	10.3	231	5.5	1,285	19.4	5,695	18.3	1,338	15.8	331	1.0	3,383	9.8	191	4.7
College: 1 to 3 years	3,511	2.9	33	0.8	228	3.4	2,343	7.6	200	2.4	62	0.2	591	1.7	56	1.4
4 years or more	6,297	5.2	21	0.5	210	3.2	4,404	14.3	444	5.2	46	0.1	1,087	3.1	85	2.1
Not reported	454	0.4	20	0.5	32	0.5	113	0.4	27	0.3	109	0.3	139	0.4	14	0.3
Median school years completed	6.6	.....	6.1	.....	8.6	.....	10.4	.....	6.5	.....	1.7	.....	7.1	.....	3.0	.....
Female, 25 years old and over	92,645	100.0	3,881	100.0	7,147	100.0	22,247	100.0	5,191	100.0	3,279	100.0	28,638	100.0	2,462	100.0
No school years completed	11,774	16.2	277	7.1	145	2.0	1,085	4.9	1,443	27.8	1,637	49.9	6,272	22.1	915	37.2
Grade school: 1 to 4 years	11,838	16.3	1,025	26.4	737	10.3	2,067	9.3	798	15.4	1,004	30.6	5,612	19.7	595	24.2
5 and 6 years	10,990	15.1	1,022	26.3	1,096	15.3	2,053	9.2	488	9.4	250	7.6	5,727	20.1	354	14.4
7 and 8 years	13,825	19.0	1,008	26.0	2,019	28.2	3,463	15.6	682	13.1	218	6.6	6,186	21.8	249	10.1
High school: 1 to 3 years	6,837	9.4	342	8.8	1,279	17.9	2,811	11.3	445	8.6	89	2.7	2,046	7.2	125	5.1
4 years	9,105	12.5	144	3.7	1,199	16.8	5,182	23.2	702	13.5	47	1.4	1,709	6.0	142	5.8
College: 1 to 3 years	4,172	5.7	39	1.0	423	5.9	2,964	13.3	231	4.5	18	0.5	494	1.6	33	1.3
4 years or more	3,955	5.4	15	0.4	234	3.3	2,899	13.0	396	7.6	8	0.2	361	1.3	42	1.7
Not reported	149	0.2	9	0.2	15	0.2	43	0.2	6	0.1	8	0.2	61	0.2	7	0.3
Median school years completed	7.2	.....	6.2	.....	8.6	.....	11.9	.....	6.4	.....	1.0	.....	5.8	.....	3.1	.....

TABLE 6.—PERSONS 25 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940—Continued

AREA, SEX, AND YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED	ALL RACES		HAWAIIAN		PART HAWAIIAN		CAUCASIAN		CHINESE		FILIPINO		JAPANESE		OTHER RACES	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
HONOLULU CITY																
Total, 25 years old and over	[illegible]	100.0	[illegible]	100.0	7,617	100.0	[illegible]	100.0	[illegible]	100.0	4,136	100.0	[illegible]	100.0	[illegible]	100.0
No school years completed	10,477	12.5	180	5.5	142	1.9	[illegible]	2.8	[illegible]	24.5	[illegible]	31.2	[illegible]	17.4	[illegible]	[illegible]
Grade school: 1 to 4 years	10,434	12.5	736	22.3	[illegible]	9.1	[illegible]	6.5	[illegible]	14.4	[illegible]	31.5	2,570	14.3	[illegible]	[illegible]
5 and 6 years	10,315	12.4	[illegible]	25.8	1,047	13.7	[illegible]	7.1	[illegible]	9.7	[illegible]	12.8	4,346	17.2	687	[illegible]
7 and 8 years	16,542	19.9	[illegible]	25.7	[illegible]	25.0	[illegible]	18.1	[illegible]	13.8	[illegible]	12.3	[illegible]	24.0	[illegible]	11.3
High school: 1 to 3 years	10,404	12.5	[illegible]	10.1	[illegible]	19.6	4,141	14.0	[illegible]	12.6	[illegible]	6.1	[illegible]	11.3	[illegible]	8.1
4 years	[illegible]	16.4	211	6.5	[illegible]	21.3	[illegible]	23.9	[illegible]	15.4	128	3.0	2,719	10.8	[illegible]	7.4
College: 1 to 3 years	[illegible]	5.5	[illegible]	0.6	[illegible]	4.4	[illegible]	11.2	315	3.1	[illegible]	0.9	[illegible]	1.8	[illegible]	1.9
4 years or more	[illegible]	7.9	16	0.5	270	3.5	[illegible]	16.1	[illegible]	6.2	[illegible]	0.5	[illegible]	3.0	[illegible]	[illegible]
Not reported	270	0.3	10	[illegible]	26	0.3	[illegible]	0.3	[illegible]	0.3	[illegible]	0.6	[illegible]	0.3	13	0.4
Median school years completed	8.2		6.6		8.9		12.1		7.0		3.3		7.1		4.0	
Male, 25 years old and over	[illegible]	100.0	[illegible]	100.0	[illegible]	100.0	15,166	100.0	6,120	100.0	[illegible]	100.0	[illegible]	100.0	[illegible]	100.0
No school years completed	5,504	12.1	[illegible]	5.2	[illegible]	1.7	[illegible]	2.2	[illegible]	21.5	[illegible]	30.4	1,967	14.4	[illegible]	35.9
Grade school: 1 to 4 years	5,622	12.5	380	26.5	348	9.7	[illegible]	6.0	945	15.4	1,157	31.0	1,787	13.0	[illegible]	18.1
5 and 6 years	[illegible]	12.1	431	26.3	[illegible]	14.1	1,075	7.1	616	10.1	[illegible]	14.3	[illegible]	15.5	[illegible]	[illegible]
7 and 8 years	9,281	20.4	[illegible]	24.0	874	24.3	[illegible]	21.0	870	14.3	[illegible]	12.5	[illegible]	24.4	213	11.9
High school: 1 to 3 years	5,970	13.1	167	10.2	706	19.7	[illegible]	15.6	714	11.8	[illegible]	6.0	1,720	12.6	[illegible]	8.0
4 years	7,193	15.8	138	8.4	[illegible]	23.1	3,133	20.7	1,101	18.0	[illegible]	3.0	[illegible]	12.6	126	6.9
College: 1 to 3 years	1,974	4.3	6	0.4	115	3.2	1,361	9.0	157	2.6	[illegible]	0.9	271	2.0	[illegible]	1.8
4 years or more	3,907	8.6	12	0.7	126	3.6	2,812	18.6	[illegible]	5.9	17	0.5	[illegible]	4.5	[illegible]	2.2
Not reported	180	0.4	15	0.9	18	0.5	56	0.4	17	0.3	21	0.6	[illegible]	0.4	6	[illegible]
Median school years completed	8.3		6.6		9.0		11.7		7.4		3.4		7.6		4.7	
Female, 25 years old and over	[illegible]	100.0	[illegible]	100.0	[illegible]	100.0	[illegible]	100.0	4,171	100.0	[illegible]	100.0	[illegible]	100.0	[illegible]	100.0
No school years completed	4,973	13.0	164	6.5	[illegible]	2.1	[illegible]	2.4	1,157	28.5	191	27.4	[illegible]	28.0	444	33.0
Grade school: 1 to 4 years	4,612	12.3	[illegible]	22.5	345	8.6	[illegible]	7.0	645	15.5	139	20.7	[illegible]	15.6	276	21.6
5 and 6 years	4,837	12.8	[illegible]	25.3	541	13.4	1,034	7.0	387	9.3	[illegible]	9.0	[illegible]	19.3	170	12.9
7 and 8 years	7,261	19.3	472	28.4	1,110	27.6	[illegible]	15.3	544	13.0	84	11.2	2,741	23.6	[illegible]	[illegible]
High school: 1 to 3 years	4,424	11.7	161	10.0	[illegible]	18.6	1,876	12.9	377	9.0	[illegible]	6.8	1,111	9.5	87	6.9
4 years	6,484	17.2	73	4.6	794	19.7	[illegible]	27.3	[illegible]	14.3	14	2.9	[illegible]	8.3	[illegible]	8.0
College: 1 to 3 years	2,504	6.6	14	0.9	220	5.5	1,872	12.6	135	3.5	7	1.4	[illegible]	1.6	[illegible]	1.7
4 years or more	[illegible]	6.6	4	0.2	135	3.4	[illegible]	12.5	278	6.7	6	1.2	[illegible]	1.3	[illegible]	2.3
Not reported	81	0.2	4	0.2	8	0.2	[illegible]	0.2	4	0.1	2	0.4	[illegible]	0.2	5	0.4
Median school years completed	8.2		6.6		8.9		12.2		6.3		2.7		6.4		3.7	

TABLE 7.—PLACE OF BIRTH, BY SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY: 1940 AND 1930

NATIVITY AND PLACE OF BIRTH	TOTAL NUMBER		PERCENT		MALE		FEMALE	
	1940	1930	1940	1930	1940	1930	1940	1930
Total	[illegible]	[illegible]	100.0	100.0	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Native	370,717	[illegible]	87.6	81.4	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Hawaii	[illegible]	214,517	65.9	58.2	141,871	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Philippine Islands	[illegible]	[illegible]	8.5	14.3	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Puerto Rico	[illegible]	[illegible]	0.4	0.6	[illegible]	1,374	641	[illegible]
Other outlying areas	[illegible]	[illegible]	0.1	0.1	[illegible]	[illegible]	162	[illegible]
Continental United States[1]	[illegible]	30,101	12.8	8.2	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Foreign born	52,613	[illegible]	12.4	18.6	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Foreign-born population	[illegible]	[illegible]	100.0	100.0	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1,519	[illegible]	2.9	2.6	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Irish Free State (Eire)	[illegible]	[illegible]	0.3	0.2	97	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Norway	116	150	0.2	0.2	79	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Sweden	127	[illegible]	0.2	0.2	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Denmark	[illegible]	110	0.2	0.2	70	81	[illegible]	[illegible]
Netherlands	57	[illegible]	0.1	0.1	41	45	16	18
Belgium	67	......	0.1	......	44	......	[illegible]	......
France	131	116	0.2	0.2	37	44	[illegible]	72
Germany	614	675	1.2	1.0	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Poland	112	136	0.2	0.2	[illegible]	112	[illegible]	[illegible]
Austria	[illegible]	100	0.2	0.1	71	76	[illegible]	[illegible]
Russia (U. S. S. R.)	[illegible]	[illegible]	0.5	0.4	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Italy	167	134	0.3	0.2	[illegible]	126	[illegible]	9
Spain	345	413	0.7	0.6	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Portugal	2,397	3,713	4.6	5.4	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Other Europe	[illegible]	130	0.5	0.2	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
China	[illegible]	7,477	9.3	10.9	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Japan	[illegible]	[illegible]	71.0	70.7	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Korea[2]	2,434	[illegible]	4.7	4.3	[illegible]	[illegible]	712	[illegible]
Canada	[illegible]	[illegible]	1.5	1.0	377	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Central and South America	[illegible]	[illegible]	0.2	0.1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Australia	[illegible]	[illegible]	0.4	0.3	[illegible]	81	[illegible]	127
Atlantic Islands	[illegible]	......	0.2	......	[illegible]	......	[illegible]	......
Pacific Islands	[illegible]	267	0.3	0.3	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
All other and not reported	[illegible]	[illegible]	0.1	0.6	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

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[1] Includes persons born at sea under the United States flag and American citizens born abroad.

[2] Includes (for 1930 only) a few persons from "Other Asia."

TABLE 8.—EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940

AREA, RACE, AND SEX	Population 14 years old and over	IN LABOR FORCE								NOT IN LABOR FORCE		
		Total		Employed (exc. on emerg. work)		On public emergency work	Seeking work			Total	In institutions	Other and not reported
		Number	Percent of population 14 years and over	Number	Percent of labor force		Total	Experienced workers	New workers			
THE TERRITORY												
Total	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	180,790	96.0	2,320	5,110	4,130	977	112,434	3,[illegible]	109,851
Hawaiian	10,921	5,2[illegible]	47.9	4,530	8[illegible].8	367	234	2[illegible]0	64	5,691	528	5,164
Part Hawaiian	2[illegible],118	12,874	48.1	11,121	8[illegible].5	349	[illegible]	[illegible]	210	13,841	545	12,[illegible]
Caucasian	85,201	[illegible]	68.1	56,419	97.2	302	1,180	[illegible]	220	27,190	[illegible]	[illegible],531
Chinese	20,[illegible]	11,[illegible]	53.9	10,[illegible]	94.8	127	401	[illegible]	95	9,679	408	9,272
Filipino	[illegible]	[illegible]	82.6	32,122	97.6	194	812	570	42	6,915	390	6,525
Japanese	107,[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	60,973	97.4	244	1,356	1,064	292	44,294	630	44,[illegible]
Other races	10,[illegible]	5,[illegible]	51.8	4,914	[illegible]	222	[illegible]	237	46	5,156	[illegible]	4,787
Male	[illegible]	151,[illegible]	[illegible].7	144,[illegible]	96.1	2,[illegible]	3,741	3,130	[illegible]	31,[illegible]	2,481	[illegible]
Hawaiian	5,670	4,212	74.3	3,578	84.9	302	273	233	40	1,458	228	1,133
Part Hawaiian	12,[illegible]	9,[illegible]	72.7	7,991	87.0	324	[illegible]	519	139	3,441	300	3,141
Caucasian	55,061	[illegible]	[illegible]	48,772	97.5	463	743	625	118	5,063	415	4,648
Chinese	12,160	8,[illegible]	[illegible]	7,853	94.6	111	341	281	60	3,864	340	3,524
Filipino	34,270	32,[illegible]	94.1	31,470	97.6	198	801	567	34	2,025	341	1,684
Japanese	57,448	43,204	75.2	42,048	97.3	343	916	733	183	14,241	425	13,816
Other races	6,[illegible]	4,482	72.5	3,[illegible]	97.9	222	220	186	34	1,708	285	1,423
Female	118,[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible],137	[illegible]	78	1,[illegible]	1,[illegible]	304	[illegible]	1,977	[illegible]
Hawaiian	5,281	1,018	19.4	961	94.4	5	52	28	24	4,233	201	4,032
Part Hawaiian	12,401	2,301	18.1	2,140	9[illegible].6	15	236	165	71	10,100	245	9,855
Caucasian	30,[illegible]	8,073	26.7	7,647	94.7	19	407	305	102	22,127	224	21,903
Chinese	8,815	3,001	34.0	2,[illegible]	94.5	16	150	112	38	5,814	68	5,746
Filipino	5,578	[illegible]	12.5	[illegible]	96.6	1	22	13	9	4,880	40	4,841
Japanese	50,[illegible]	19,370	38.4	18,[illegible]	97.7	11	440	331	109	31,043	204	30,[illegible]
Other races	4,484	1,037	23.1	984	98.0	11	62	51	11	3,447	63	3,384
HONOLULU CITY												
Total	1[illegible],[illegible]07	78,837	57.4	[illegible]	96.7	1,187	2,427	1,770	657	54,870	1,[illegible]	[illegible],610
Hawaiian	4,211	2,008	47.7	1,748	85.1	123	184	144	40	2,203	187	2,076
Part Hawaiian	14,[illegible]	6,[illegible]	48.9	6,087	88.4	215	[illegible]	443	139	7,170	212	6,958
Caucasian	40,[illegible]	24,[illegible]	59.8	23,234	95.7	207	891	731	160	16,460	[illegible]	16,[illegible]
Chinese	16,277	8,[illegible]	54.1	8,[illegible]	93.9	92	444	355	89	7,474	212	7,262
Filipino	5,087	3,757	74.1	3,[illegible]	90.4	122	240	222	18	1,310	167	1,143
Japanese	42,[illegible]	25,313	58.9	24,[illegible]	96.0	125	885	706	179	17,641	140	17,[illegible]
Other races	5,[illegible]	2,[illegible]	49.4	2,0[illegible]	85.5	213	201	169	32	2,569	139	2,430
Male	69,081	[illegible]	77.9	[illegible],570	96.4	1,134	2,[illegible]	2,016	410	15,[illegible]	1,[illegible]	14,173
Hawaiian	2,191	1,616	72.8	1,345	83.2	121	150	124	26	575	154	421
Part Hawaiian	6,[illegible]	4,815	72.7	4,204	87.3	203	411	323	88	1,810	182	1,628
Caucasian	21,[illegible]	18,[illegible]	85.9	17,[illegible]	96.5	279	564	475	89	3,[illegible]	153	2,[illegible]
Chinese	9,149	6,418	70.1	6,028	94.0	76	330	284	56	2,736	196	2,540
Filipino	4,159	3,[illegible]	87.2	3,201	90.3	122	227	211	16	539	162	377
Japanese	22,[illegible]	16,[illegible]	74.7	15,[illegible]	96.6	119	612	491	121	5,637	133	5,504
Other races	2,7[illegible]	1,907	69.0	1,547	81.1	204	156	132	24	855	115	740
Female	69,[illegible]	19,904	28.5	18,[illegible]	94.7	[illegible]	[illegible]	760	[illegible]	50,045	[illegible]	50,437
Hawaiian	2,120	[illegible]	20.7	403	91.8	3	34	20	14	1,681	23	1,658
Part Hawaiian	7,[illegible]	2,046	27.6	1,883	91.1	12	171	120	51	5,360	60	5,300
Caucasian	19,[illegible]	5,721	30.0	5,376	94.0	18	327	256	71	13,374	80	13,294
Chinese	7,128	2,390	33.5	2,230	93.7	16	135	101	34	4,738	16	4,722
Filipino	[illegible]	147	15.8	134	91.2		13	11	2	781	15	766
Japanese	29,[illegible]	8,[illegible]	41.9	8,376	96.8	6	273	215	58	12,004	16	11,988
Other races	2,[illegible]	[illegible]	23.9	542	90.9	9	45	37	8	1,704	15	1,689

TABLE 9.—EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY AGE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940

(Percent not shown where base is less than 100)

AREA, AGE, AND SEX	Population 14 years old and over	IN LABOR FORCE							Not in labor force	PERCENT OF LABOR FORCE		
		Total		Employed (except on emergency work)	On public emergency work	Seeking work				Employed (except on public emergency work)	On public emergency work	Seeking work
		Number	Percent of population			Total	Experienced workers	New workers				
THE TERRITORY												
Total, 14 and over	301,686	188,252	62.4	180,796	2,326	5,130	4,158	972	113,434	96.0	1.2	2.7
14 and 15 years	19,140	1,118	5.8	1,047	8	63	24	39	18,022	93.6	0.7	5.6
16 and 17 years	16,111	4,515	24.9	3,898	215	402	186	216	11,596	86.3	4.8	8.9
18 and 19 years	20,452	12,330	60.3	11,309	264	727	462	265	8,122	91.7	2.4	5.9
20 to 24 years	51,077	38,081	74.6	36,349	336	1,375	1,045	330	12,996	95.5	0.9	3.6
25 to 34 years	75,716	56,511	74.6	54,957	428	1,126	1,039	87	19,205	97.3	0.8	2.0
35 to 44 years	50,999	37,169	72.9	36,111	393	665	642	23	13,830	97.2	1.1	1.8
45 to 54 years	32,603	22,315	68.4	21,495	389	431	423	8	10,288	96.3	1.7	1.9
55 to 64 years	20,518	12,100	59.0	11,610	239	251	248	3	8,418	96.0	2.0	2.1
65 to 74 years	10,112	3,652	36.1	3,573	19	60	60		6,460	97.8	0.5	1.6
75 years and over	2,802	350	12.5	343	2	5	5		2,452	98.0	0.6	1.4
Not reported	155	91	58.7	84	3	4	3	1	64			
Male, 14 and over	193,446	151,646	92.7	145,639	2,248	3,741	3,133	608	31,800	96.1	1.5	2.4
14 and 15 years	9,757	765	7.8	717	6	42	16	26	8,992	93.7	0.8	5.5
16 and 17 years	9,113	2,761	30.3	2,302	201	258	123	135	6,352	83.4	7.3	9.3
18 and 19 years	12,274	9,102	74.2	8,330	280	492	315	177	3,172	91.5	3.1	5.4
20 to 24 years	32,044	29,809	93.0	28,543	326	940	740	200	2,235	95.8	1.1	3.2
25 to 34 years	48,685	47,313	97.2	46,086	409	818	764	54	1,372	97.4	0.9	1.7
35 to 44 years	30,932	29,808	96.7	28,991	382	525	516	9	1,094	97.0	1.3	1.8
45 to 54 years	19,070	17,744	93.0	16,991	353	370	367	3	1,326	95.8	2.2	2.1
55 to 64 years	12,911	10,499	81.3	10,022	237	250	227	23	2,412	95.6	2.2	2.2
65 to 74 years	6,767	3,352	49.5	3,276	19	57	57		3,415	97.7	0.6	1.7
75 years and over	1,792	326	18.2	319	2	5	5		1,466	97.9	0.6	1.5
Not reported	103	79	76.7	72	3	4	3	1	24			
Female, 14 and over	118,236	36,584	30.9	35,157	78	1,389	1,005	384	81,634	96.0	0.2	3.7
14 and 15 years	9,383	353	3.8	330	2	21	8	13	9,030	93.8	0.6	5.9
16 and 17 years	8,998	1,754	19.5	1,596	14	144	63	81	7,244	91.0	0.8	8.2
18 and 19 years	8,179	3,228	39.5	2,979	14	235	147	88	4,951	93.8	0.4	5.8
20 to 24 years	19,033	8,272	43.5	7,826	10	436	306	130	10,761	94.6	0.1	5.3
25 to 34 years	27,651	9,198	34.0	8,871	19	308	275	33	17,833	96.4	0.2	3.3
35 to 44 years	20,067	7,271	36.2	7,120	11	140	126	14	12,796	97.9	0.2	1.9
45 to 54 years	13,533	4,571	33.8	4,504	6	61	56	5	8,962	98.5	0.1	1.3
55 to 64 years	7,607	1,601	21.0	1,578	2	21	21		6,006	98.6	0.1	1.3
65 to 74 years	3,345	300	9.0	297		3	3		3,045	99.0		1.0
75 years and over	1,010	24	2.4	24					986			
Not reported	52	12		12					40			
HONOLULU CITY												
Total, 14 and over	128,687	73,917	57.4	69,903	1,187	3,427	2,770	657	54,870	93.7	1.6	4.6
14 and 15 years	7,902	282	3.6	247	4	31	11	20	7,620	87.6	1.4	11.0
16 and 17 years	7,945	1,801	20.2	1,223	100	278	137	141	6,144	78.4	6.2	17.4
18 and 19 years	8,277	4,315	52.1	3,698	115	502	328	174	3,962	85.7	2.7	11.6
20 to 24 years	21,349	14,729	69.0	13,606	138	965	741	224	6,620	92.4	1.1	6.6
25 to 34 years	32,249	22,190	68.8	21,236	217	747	681	66	10,059	95.7	1.0	3.4
35 to 44 years	21,958	15,297	69.7	14,671	213	413	393	20	6,661	95.9	1.4	2.7
45 to 54 years	14,213	9,318	65.6	8,824	229	265	257	8	4,895	94.7	2.5	2.8
55 to 64 years	9,077	4,767	52.5	4,447	137	183	180	3	4,310	93.3	2.9	3.8
65 to 74 years	4,353	1,172	26.9	1,125	11	36	36		3,181	96.0	0.9	3.1
75 years and over	1,391	107	8.3	100	2	5	5		1,284	93.5	1.9	4.7
Not reported	73	39		36	1	2	1	1	34			
Male, 14 and over	69,051	53,923	77.9	50,970	1,134	2,439	2,010	419	15,228	93.4	2.1	4.5
14 and 15 years	4,057	198	4.9	175	2	21	6	15	3,859	88.4	1.0	10.6
16 and 17 years	3,973	918	23.1	641	88	189	95	94	3,055	69.8	9.6	20.6
18 and 19 years	4,359	2,704	62.0	2,261	105	338	222	116	1,655	83.6	3.9	12.5
20 to 24 years	11,214	9,916	88.4	9,112	150	654	516	138	1,298	91.9	1.5	6.6
25 to 34 years	17,258	16,561	96.0	15,852	204	505	462	43	697	96.7	1.2	2.9
35 to 44 years	11,810	11,306	95.7	10,801	202	303	297	6	504	95.5	1.8	2.7
45 to 54 years	7,727	7,063	91.4	6,623	223	217	214	3	664	93.8	3.2	3.1
55 to 64 years	5,261	4,004	75.7	3,706	136	162	159	3	1,257	92.6	3.4	4.0
65 to 74 years	2,696	1,028	39.6	984	11	33	33		1,668	95.7	1.1	3.2
75 years and over	717	92	12.8	85	2	5	5		625			
Not reported	49	33		30	1	2	1	1	16			
Female, 14 and over	59,636	19,994	33.5	18,933	53	988	760	228	38,643	94.7	0.3	5.0
14 and 15 years	3,845	84	2.2	72	2	10	5	5	3,761			
16 and 17 years	3,972	883	17.2	582	12	89	42	47	3,089	85.2	1.8	13.0
18 and 19 years	3,918	1,611	41.1	1,437	10	164	106	58	2,307	89.2	0.6	10.2
20 to 24 years	10,135	4,813	47.5	4,494	8	311	225	86	5,322	93.4	0.2	6.5
25 to 34 years	14,991	5,629	37.5	5,374	13	242	219	23	9,362	95.5	0.2	4.3
35 to 44 years	10,148	3,991	39.3	3,870	11	110	96	14	6,157	97.0	0.3	2.8
45 to 54 years	6,486	2,256	34.8	2,201	6	45	43	5	4,231	97.6	0.3	2.1
55 to 64 years	3,786	763	20.2	741	1	21	21		3,023	97.1	0.1	2.8
65 to 74 years	1,787	144	8.2	141		3	3		1,643	97.9		2.1
75 years and over	374	15	2.6	15					359			
Not reported	24	6		6					18			

TABLE 10.—PERSONS IN THE LABOR FORCE, 1940, AND GAINFUL WORKERS, 1930 AND 1920, BY AGE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY

[Percent not shown where less than 0.1 or where base is less than 100]

AREA, CENSUS YEAR, AND AGE	POPULATION			PERSONS IN LABOR FORCE OR GAINFUL WORKERS[1]			PERCENT OF POPULATION IN LABOR FORCE OR GAINFUL WORKERS			PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS IN LABOR FORCE OR GAINFUL WORKERS[1]		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
THE TERRITORY												
1940												
Total, 14 and over	301,684	183,446	118,238	188,238	151,648	36,590	62.4	82.7	30.9	100.0	100.0	100.0
14 and 15 years	19,140	9,757	9,383	1,118	765	353	5.8	7.8	3.8	0.6	0.5	1.0
16 and 17 years	18,111	9,113	8,998	4,515	2,761	1,754	24.9	30.3	19.5	2.4	1.8	4.8
18 and 19 years	20,453	12,274	8,179	12,336	9,102	3,234	60.3	74.2	39.5	6.6	6.0	8.8
20 to 24 years	51,077	32,044	19,033	38,081	29,809	8,272	74.6	93.0	43.5	20.2	19.7	22.6
25 to 34 years	75,714	48,683	27,031	56,511	47,313	9,198	74.6	97.2	34.0	30.0	31.2	25.1
35 to 44 years	50,999	30,932	20,067	37,169	29,898	7,271	72.9	96.7	36.2	19.7	19.7	19.9
45 to 54 years	32,603	19,070	13,533	22,315	17,744	4,571	68.4	93.0	33.8	11.9	11.7	12.5
55 to 64 years	20,518	12,911	7,607	12,100	10,499	1,601	59.0	81.3	21.0	6.4	6.9	4.4
65 to 74 years	10,112	6,767	3,345	3,652	3,352	300	36.1	49.5	9.0	1.9	2.2	0.8
75 years and over	2,802	1,792	1,010	350	326	24	12.5	18.2	2.4	0.2	0.2	0.1
Not reported	155	103	52	91	79	12	58.7	76.7			0.1	...
1930												
Total, 14 and over	241,795	158,384	83,411	154,086	136,400	17,686	63.7	86.1	21.2	100.0	100.0	100.0
14 and 15 years	13,170	6,668	6,502	1,131	593	538	8.6	8.9	8.3	0.7	0.4	3.0
16 and 17 years	12,239	6,320	5,919	3,647	2,251	1,396	29.8	35.6	23.6	2.4	1.7	7.9
18 and 19 years	14,868	9,736	5,132	8,849	7,346	1,503	59.5	75.5	29.3	5.7	5.4	8.5
20 to 24 years	42,767	31,778	10,989	32,975	29,746	3,229	77.1	93.6	29.4	21.4	21.8	18.3
25 to 34 years	64,148	42,599	21,549	45,999	41,305	4,694	71.7	97.0	21.8	29.9	30.3	26.5
35 to 44 years	41,007	24,926	16,081	27,596	24,125	3,471	67.3	96.8	21.6	17.9	17.7	19.6
45 to 54 years	29,077	19,045	10,032	19,924	17,905	2,019	68.5	94.0	20.1	12.9	13.1	11.4
55 to 64 years	16,768	11,848	4,920	10,832	10,128	704	64.6	85.5	14.3	7.0	7.4	4.0
65 to 74 years	5,881	4,287	1,594	2,755	2,645	110	46.8	61.7	6.9	1.8	1.9	0.6
75 years and over	1,767	1,115	652	348	327	21	19.7	29.3	3.2	0.2	0.2	0.1
Not reported	103	62	41	30	29	1	29.1					
1920												
Total, 14 and over	169,164	107,026	62,138	111,613	97,437	14,176	66.0	91.0	22.8	100.0	100.0	100.0
14 and 15 years	7,993	4,189	3,804	1,333	882	451	16.7	21.1	11.9	1.2	0.9	3.2
16 and 17 years	7,818	4,172	3,646	3,478	2,440	1,038	44.5	58.5	28.5	3.1	2.5	7.3
18 and 19 years	8,891	5,301	3,590	5,631	4,474	1,157	63.3	84.4	32.2	5.0	4.6	8.2
20 to 24 years	24,763	14,820	9,943	16,886	14,346	2,540	68.2	96.8	25.5	15.1	14.7	17.9
25 to 44 years	78,653	48,308	30,345	54,674	47,617	7,057	69.5	98.6	23.3	49.0	48.9	49.8
45 to 64 years	36,138	26,806	9,332	27,231	25,392	1,839	75.4	94.7	19.7	24.4	26.1	13.0
65 years and over	4,796	3,352	1,444	2,270	2,183	87	47.3	65.1	6.0	2.0	2.2	0.6
Not reported	113	79	34	78	71	7	69.0			0.1	0.1	...
HONOLULU CITY												
1940												
Total, 14 and over	128,687	[illegible]	[illegible]	73,817	53,913	19,904	57.4	77.9	[illegible]	100.0	100.0	100.0
14 and 15 years	7,902	4,057	3,845	282	198	84	3.6	4.9	2.2	0.4	0.4	0.4
16 and 17 years	7,945	3,973	3,972	1,601	918	683	20.2	23.1	17.2	2.2	1.7	3.4
18 and 19 years	8,277	4,359	3,918	4,315	2,704	1,611	52.1	62.0	41.1	5.8	5.0	8.1
20 to 24 years	21,340	11,214	10,126	14,729	9,916	4,813	69.0	88.4	47.5	20.0	18.4	24.2
25 to 34 years	32,249	17,258	14,991	22,190	16,561	5,629	68.8	96.0	37.5	30.1	30.8	28.3
35 to 44 years	21,958	11,810	10,148	15,207	11,306	3,901	69.3	95.7	38.4	20.7	21.0	19.6
45 to 54 years	14,213	7,727	6,486	9,318	7,063	2,255	65.6	91.4	34.8	12.6	13.1	11.3
55 to 64 years	9,077	5,291	3,786	4,769	4,004	765	52.5	75.7	20.2	6.5	7.4	3.8
65 to 74 years	4,355	2,598	1,757	1,172	1,028	144	26.9	39.6	8.2	1.6	1.9	0.7
75 years and over	1,291	717	574	107	92	15	8.3	12.8	2.6	0.1	0.2	0.1
Not reported	73	49	24	30	23	6				0.1	0.1	...

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[1] Figures for 1930 and 1920 represent gainful workers.

TABLE 11.—AGE OF PERSONS IN THE LABOR FORCE, BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940

[Percent not shown when less than 0.1]

AREA, SEX, AND AGE	Total	Hawaiian	Part Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Other races	PERCENT DISTRIBUTION Total	Hawaiian	Part Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Other races
THE TERRITORY																
Total, 14 and over	[illegible]	[illegible]	12,876	[illegible]	11,[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
14 and 15 years	1,118	31	128	173	45	86	601	86	0.6	0.6	1.0	0.3	0.4	0.3	1.0	1.0
16 and 17 years	4,515	182	573	687	180	281	2,373	230	2.4	2.9	4.6	1.2	1.7	0.6	3.8	4.7
18 and 19 years	12,320	298	1,038	4,984	514	348	4,806	494	6.6	4.9	8.2	8.5	4.5	1.1	7.7	7.3
20 to 24 years	[illegible]	690	2,665	17,704	2,070	1,180	11,219	1,004	20.2	13.4	21.4	[illegible]	18.3	3.6	[illegible]	18.7
25 to 34 years	[illegible]	1,273	2,925	16,819	2,107	15,[illegible]	14,207	1,227	30.0	24.3	21.2	[illegible]	27.5	[illegible]	22.8	[illegible]
35 to 44 years	37,100	1,152	2,231	9,471	2,670	10,[illegible]	10,100	687	19.7	22.0	18.5	16.7	[illegible]	31.8	16.3	[illegible]
45 to 54 years	22,318	1,004	1,320	5,367	1,215	3,[illegible]	8,787	506	11.9	19.2	10.5	9.0	10.7	11.0	14.0	[illegible]
55 to 64 years	12,100	601	483	2,313	800	730	6,200	946	6.4	9.4	3.7	4.0	7.0	2.2	10.0	17.1
65 to 74 years	2,652	128	94	382	506	96	1,894	202	1.9	2.6	0.7	1.0	5.0	0.3	3.0	5.3
75 years and over	300	22	12	76	60	13	140	18	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.5	.....	0.2	0.3
Not reported	91	10	8	25	9	20	18	1	.....	0.2	0.1	.....	0.1	0.1	.....	.....
Male, 14 and over	151,[illegible]	4,213	9,1[illegible]	60,[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	4,[illegible]	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
14 and 15 years	766	20	90	131	31	62	386	37	0.5	0.5	1.0	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.9	0.8
16 and 17 years	2,761	106	399	471	126	225	1,299	176	1.8	2.5	4.3	0.8	1.5	0.7	2.0	4.0
18 and 19 years	9,102	198	751	4,501	301	278	2,[illegible]	286	6.0	4.7	8.2	8.2	3.6	0.8	6.2	6.6
20 to 24 years	28,[illegible]	578	1,[illegible]	16,030	1,[illegible]	1,[illegible]	8,151	772	18.7	13.7	21.6	[illegible]	14.9	3.3	18.0	17.3
25 to 34 years	47,312	1,006	2,[illegible]	14,128	2,144	15,712	10,[illegible]	[illegible]	21.3	[illegible]	21.6	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
35 to 44 years	29,[illegible]	[illegible]	1,647	7,499	2,032	10,204	6,[illegible]	483	19.7	21.0	17.9	15.4	[illegible]	[illegible]	14.9	[illegible]
45 to 54 years	17,744	813	967	4,481	1,006	3,728	6,307	515	11.7	19.3	10.5	9.0	12.1	11.6	14.4	11.5
55 to 64 years	10,490	417	380	1,587	810	721	5,[illegible]	918	6.9	9.9	3.9	2.8	9.6	2.3	12.6	[illegible]
65 to 74 years	2,282	114	77	382	462	95	1,726	285	2.2	2.7	0.8	1.0	6.6	0.3	4.0	6.4
75 years and over	236	20	11	64	59	13	141	18	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.7	.....	0.3	0.4
Not reported	79	8	8	21	6	20	15	1	0.1	0.2	0.1	.....	0.1	0.1	.....	.....
Female, 14 and over	38,[illegible]	1,[illegible]	3,301	8,073	3,001	686	18,370	1,087	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
14 and 15 years	352	11	37	42	14	24	206	10	1.0	1.1	1.1	0.5	0.5	3.5	1.1	1.0
16 and 17 years	1,734	65	190	216	65	56	1,110	81	4.5	4.5	5.3	2.7	2.2	8.2	5.7	7.5
18 and 19 years	3,228	60	285	373	213	70	2,178	160	8.5	4.9	8.6	4.6	7.1	10.2	11.9	15.5
20 to 24 years	9,272	121	708	1,166	831	122	5,068	282	22.6	11.9	20.7	14.4	27.7	17.8	27.3	25.8
25 to 34 years	9,196	217	1,027	2,087	965	170	3,877	267	23.1	21.3	30.3	25.4	32.1	24.8	20.0	[illegible]
35 to 44 years	7,271	280	604	1,972	686	144	3,340	284	18.9	26.4	28.2	24.4	22.3	20.9	17.3	26.7
45 to 54 years	4,571	182	373	1,086	290	70	2,800	81	12.5	18.9	10.6	12.5	7.0	10.2	15.3	7.5
55 to 64 years	1,601	74	104	436	80	8	900	30	4.4	7.2	3.1	5.3	1.7	1.2	4.7	2.0
65 to 74 years	300	24	17	80	14	1	160	4	0.8	2.4	0.5	1.0	0.5	0.1	0.8	0.4
75 years and over	24	2	1	12	1		8	.....	0.1	0.2	.....	0.1	.....	.....	.....	.....
Not reported	12	2	.....	4	3		3	.....	.....	0.2	.....	.....	0.1	.....	.....	.....
HONOLULU CITY																
Total, 14 and over	73,817	2,[illegible]	[illegible]	24,[illegible]	[illegible]	3,787	26,315	2,[illegible]	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
14 and 15 years	282	8	30	60	31	8	104	12	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.5
16 and 17 years	1,601	64	267	280	152	30	743	95	2.2	2.1	3.6	1.1	1.7	1.0	2.9	3.8
18 and 19 years	4,315	90	304	1,212	420	67	1,849	175	5.6	4.4	7.3	4.9	4.8	1.8	7.2	7.0
20 to 24 years	14,729	282	1,487	4,551	1,708	280	5,[illegible]	365	20.0	12.7	21.7	18.5	19.4	6.7	22.7	20.1
25 to 34 years	22,190	588	2,325	7,682	2,461	1,822	6,672	670	30.1	27.2	22.9	31.3	28.0	[illegible]	25.4	[illegible]
35 to 44 years	15,297	497	1,308	5,400	2,200	1,083	4,407	283	20.7	24.7	18.1	22.3	25.0	28.3	17.4	14.0
45 to 54 years	9,318	304	687	3,344	906	425	3,301	284	12.6	19.0	10.0	13.6	11.3	11.0	12.6	[illegible]
55 to 64 years	4,767	167	213	1,494	606	67	1,909	281	6.5	8.1	3.1	6.1	6.4	1.8	7.3	14.4
65 to 74 years	1,172	30	38	300	345	4	404	62	1.6	1.5	0.6	1.6	2.8	0.1	1.5	2.3
75 years and over	107	3	4	40	15	1	30	7	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2		0.1	0.3
Not reported	30	6	4	12	8	1	7	1	0.1	0.3	0.1	.....	0.1	.....	.....	.....
Male, 14 and over	[illegible]	1,610	4,[illegible]	18,[illegible]	6,413	[illegible]	18,[illegible]	1,907	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
14 and 15 years	188	4	36	84	25	5	64	8	0.4	0.2	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.4
16 and 17 years	918	27	165	174	108	28	366	62	1.7	1.7	3.5	0.9	1.6	0.8	2.1	3.3
18 and 19 years	2,704	65	327	996	237	48	926	117	5.0	4.0	6.8	5.2	3.7	1.3	5.5	6.1
20 to 24 years	9,916	238	1,057	3,726	1,031	212	3,364	300	18.4	15.4	21.6	19.9	16.0	5.9	18.1	18.4
25 to 34 years	16,361	445	1,296	5,741	1,727	1,736	4,000	385	30.8	27.5	26.2	30.5	26.9	[illegible]	22.0	22.6
35 to 44 years	11,306	378	893	4,062	1,687	1,000	3,682	234	21.0	23.4	18.2	21.6	26.3	28.5	18.2	12.3
45 to 54 years	7,063	314	475	2,335	830	420	2,268	219	13.1	19.4	9.9	12.5	12.9	11.9	12.0	11.5
55 to 64 years	4,004	142	188	1,152	581	67	1,606	342	7.4	8.8	3.4	6.1	8.3	1.9	8.6	17.9
65 to 74 years	1,028	19	27	321	204	4	304	80	1.9	1.2	0.6	1.7	3.6	0.1	2.2	2.1
75 years and over	92	1	3	38	14	1	25	7	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	.....	0.2	0.4
Not reported	23	5	4	11	5	1	6	1	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	.....	.....	0.1
Female, 14 and over	19,[illegible]	430	2,0[illegible]	5,701	[illegible]	147	8,[illegible]	[illegible]	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
14 and 15 years	84	4	14	15	6	3	38	4	0.4	0.9	0.7	0.3	0.3	2.0	0.4	0.7
16 and 17 years	683	17	79	106	50	11	377	33	3.4	3.9	3.9	1.9	2.1	7.5	[illegible]	[illegible]
18 and 19 years	1,611	25	174	227	183	19	925	58	8.1	5.7	4.5	4.0	7.7	12.9	10.7	8.7
20 to 24 years	4,813	46	430	806	677	38	2,694	158	24.1	10.5	22.0	14.1	28.7	25.9	[illegible]	[illegible]
25 to 34 years	5,829	113	630	1,941	734	35	2,012	102	29.2	26.7	30.8	33.9	26.7	[illegible]	[illegible]	27.2
35 to 44 years	3,991	119	425	1,407	613	33	1,375	119	20.0	27.1	20.6	24.6	21.3	22.4	15.9	20.0
45 to 54 years	2,256	77	212	606	167	7	936	46	11.3	17.5	10.4	14.1	7.0	4.6	10.9	7.6
55 to 64 years	700	25	80	221	30	.....	305	19	3.5	5.7	2.4	3.8	1.3	.....	3.5	3.3
65 to 74 years	144	11	11	60	11	.....	45	3	0.7	2.5	0.5	1.2	0.5	.....	0.5	0.5
75 years and over	15	1	1	11	1	.....	1	.....	0.1	0.2	.....	0.2	.....	.....	.....	.....
Not reported	6	1	.....	1	3	.....	1	.....	.....	0.2	.....	.....	0.1	.....	.....	.....

TABLE 12.—CLASS OF WORKER OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK), BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940

AREA, CLASS OF WORKER, AND SEX	Total	Hawaiian	Part Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Other races	PERCENT DISTRIBUTION: Total	Hawaiian	Part Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Other races
THE TERRITORY																
Total employed (exc. emerg.)	**180, 796**	**4, 539**	**11, 131**	**56, 419**	**10, 688**	**52, 152**	**60, 973**	**4, 914**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Wage or salary workers	138, 525	3, 978	10, 246	53, 762	8, 738	30, 950	46, 362	4, 292	87.7	87.6	92.0	95.2	81.7	96.3	76.4	87.3
Employers and own-account workers	15, 967	473	628	2, 309	1, 564	985	9, 555	453	8.8	10.4	5.6	4.1	14.6	3.1	15.7	9.2
Unpaid family workers	5, 725	89	175	234	349	148	4, 629	131	3.2	1.3	1.6	0.4	3.3	0.4	7.6	2.7
Class of worker not reported	579	29	82	114	40	69	227	38	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.8
Male employed (exc. emerg.)	145, 639	3, 578	7, 991	46, 772	7, 553	31, 470	42, 045	5, 950	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Wage or salary workers	131, 731	3, 344	7, 304	46, 078	6, 385	30, 553	33, 417	3, 550	90.4	93.5	93.9	96.3	81.3	97.1	79.5	89.9
Employers and own-account workers	11, 659	198	365	1, 642	1, 016	810	7, 005	323	8.0	5.5	4.6	3.4	16.8	2.6	16.7	8.2
Unpaid family workers	1, 981	28	87	101	131	77	1, 508	54	1.4	0.8	1.1	0.2	1.7	0.2	3.6	1.4
Class of worker not reported	268	8	35	51	21	35	115	23	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.6
Female employed (exc. emerg.)	35, 157	961	3, 140	7, 647	2, 835	662	18, 928	964	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Wage or salary workers	26, 794	634	2, 742	6, 784	2, 350	397	13, 145	742	76.2	66.0	87.3	88.7	82.9	60.0	69.4	77.0
Employers and own-account workers	4, 308	275	263	667	248	175	2, 550	130	12.3	28.6	8.4	8.7	8.7	26.4	13.5	13.5
Unpaid family workers	3, 744	51	88	133	218	76	3, 121	77	10.7	5.3	2.8	1.7	7.7	11.8	16.5	8.0
Class of worker not reported	291	21	47	63	19	14	112	15	0.8	2.2	1.5	0.8	0.7	2.1	0.6	1.6
HONOLULU CITY																
Total employed (exc. emerg.)	**69, 303**	**1, 748**	**6, 067**	**23, 234**	**5, 267**	**3, 395**	**24, 303**	**3, 089**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Wage or salary workers	59, 380	1, 630	5, 706	21, 515	4, 901	3, 200	18, 646	1, 782	85.8	94.4	94.0	92.2	83.5	94.3	76.7	84.3
Employers and own-account workers	7, 613	87	276	1, 657	1, 124	183	4, 041	245	11.0	5.0	4.5	7.1	13.6	5.4	16.6	11.7
Unpaid family workers	1, 973	8	38	98	211	8	1, 539	71	2.9	0.5	0.6	0.4	2.6	0.2	6.3	3.4
Class of worker not reported	337	3	47	64	31	4	77	11	0.3	0.2	0.8	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.5
Male employed (exc. emerg.)	50, 270	1, 345	4, 204	17, 958	5, 028	3, 261	15, 927	1, 547	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Wage or salary workers	43, 835	1, 309	3, 996	16, 735	4, 953	3, 087	12, 390	1, 336	87.2	97.3	95.0	93.2	82.7	94.7	77.8	86.4
Employers and own-account workers	5, 697	36	177	1, 172	900	167	3, 022	174	11.3	2.6	4.2	6.5	15.8	5.1	19.0	11.2
Unpaid family workers	626	1	16	20	79	3	476	31	1.2	0.1	0.4	0.1	1.3	0.1	3.0	2.0
Class of worker not reported	112	.....	16	31	16	4	39	6	0.2	.....	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.4
Female employed (exc. emerg.)	18, 933	403	1, 863	5, 376	2, 239	134	8, 376	542	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Wage or salary workers	15, 545	341	1, 711	4, 780	1, 918	113	6, 256	426	82.1	84.6	91.8	88.9	85.7	84.3	74.7	78.6
Employers and own-account workers	1, 916	52	99	485	174	16	1, 019	71	10.1	12.9	5.3	9.0	7.8	11.9	12.2	13.1
Unpaid family workers	1, 347	7	22	79	132	5	1, 063	40	7.1	1.7	1.2	1.5	5.9	3.7	12.7	7.4
Class of worker not reported	125	3	31	32	13	.....	38	5	0.7	0.7	1.7	0.6	0.7	.....	0.4	0.9

TABLE 13.—DETAILED OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK), BY SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940

["N. e. c." means not elsewhere classified]

OCCUPATION	THE TERRITORY		HONOLULU CITY		OCCUPATION	THE TERRITORY		HONOLULU CITY	
	Male	Female	Male	Female		Male	Female	Male	Female
All occupations	**145, 639**	**35, 157**	**50, 270**	**18, 933**	Semiprofessional workers	1, 094	317	546	224
Professional and semiprofessional workers	**5, 392**	**5, 581**	**3, 097**	**3, 229**	Designers and draftsmen	205	13	170	13
Professional workers	4, 228	5, 264	2, 451	3, 005	Designers	7	12	7	12
Authors, editors, and reporters	163	48	122	31	Draftsmen	198	1	163	1
Authors	18	12	12	9	Surveyors	167	.....	96	.....
Editors and reporters	145	36	110	22	Other semiprofessional workers	724	304	410	211
Chemists, assayers, and metallurgists	180	8	77	3	Athletes	16	.....	11	.....
Clergymen	408	34	153	16	Aviators	39	.....	22	.....
College presidents, professors, and instructors	137	30	135	29	Dancers, dancing teachers, and chorus girls	9	90	9	63
Dentists	204	7	135	5	Funeral directors and embalmers	24	.....	15	.....
Civil engineers	316	.....	217	.....	Healers and medical service workers (n. e. c.)	79	43	53	36
Mechanical engineers	167	.....	116	.....	Optometrists	13	.....	9	.....
Other technical engineers	144	1	102	.....	Photographers	116	13	70	10
Chemical engineers	6	.....	4	.....	Radio and wireless operators	79	.....	55	.....
Electrical engineers	116	.....	87	.....	Religious workers	49	45	18	37
Industrial engineers	22	1	11	.....	Showmen	24	6	1	.....
Lawyers and judges	196	5	136	2	Sports instructors and officials	34	7	13	4
Musicians and music teachers	182	114	147	53	Technicians and assistants, laboratory	130	71	67	39
Physicians and surgeons	258	25	207	15	Technicians, except laboratory	23	1	18	1
Teachers (n. e. c.) (including county agents)	1, 192	3, 509	478	1, 809	Semiprofessional workers (n. e. c.)	89	28	61	21
Teachers (n. e. c.)	1, 083	3, 501	457	1, 806	**Farmers and farm managers**	**3, 048**	**508**	**604**	**140**
County agents and farm demonstrators	109	8	21	3	Farmers (owners and tenants)	2, 822	502	596	139
Other professional workers	581	1, 482	396	1, 009	Farm managers	136	4	8	1
Actors and actresses	4	5	3	2					
Architects	80	1	70	1	**Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm**	**9, 504**	**1, 098**	**5, 813**	**1, 101**
Artists and art teachers	59	29	52	25					
Librarians	20	105	17	50	Postmasters and miscellaneous government officials	2, 000	126	1, 098	61
Osteopaths	2	6	2	6	Inspectors, United States	108	1	95	1
Pharmacists	76	.....	63	.....	Inspectors, Territorial	35	.....	23	.....
Social and welfare workers	105	122	54	133	Inspectors, city	62	.....	36	.....
Trained nurses and student nurses	8	1, 072	4	732	Inspectors, county and local	14	.....	3	.....
Veterinarians	18	2	11	2					
Professional workers (n. e. c.)	209	73	120	49					

TABLE 13.—DETAILED OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK), BY SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940—Continued

OCCUPATION	THE TERRITORY		HONOLULU CITY	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Prop., managers, and officials, exc. farm—Continued.				
Postmasters and miscellaneous government officials—Continued.				
Officials, United States	1,532	76	824	42
Officials, Territorial	61	7	41	2
Officials, city	49	10	41	10
Officials, county and local	85	9	28	6
Postmasters	54	23	2	
Other specified managers and officials	357	33	256	27
Advertising agents	21	6	17	5
Buyers and department heads, store	48	9	36	8
Conductors, railroad	11		1	
Country buyers and shippers of livestock and other farm products	4		2	
Credit men	14		9	
Floormen and floor managers, store	5	6	3	3
Managers and superintendents, building	8	5	7	5
Officers, pilots, pursers, and engineers, ship	151		117	
Officials, lodge, society, union, etc	28	5	14	4
Purchasing agents and buyers (n. e. c.)	67	2	50	2
Proprietors, managers, and officials (n. e. c.), by industry	7,207	1,799	4,459	1,013
Sugar industry	176	5	39	2
Construction	527	2	266	2
Manufacturing (exc. sugar)	615	78	417	38
Food and kindred products (exc. sugar)	300	38	175	25
Bakery products	60	5	37	5
Beverage industries	51	5	32	4
Canning and preserving fruits, vegetables, and sea food	82	4	57	2
Miscellaneous food products (exc. sugar)	107	24	49	14
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries	315	40	242	13
Lumber, furniture, and lumber products	34	3	28	2
Printing, publishing, and allied industries	120	6	92	3
Chemicals and allied products	44	1	31	
Other manufacturing industries	117	30	93	8
Transportation, communication, and other public utilities	423	13	268	9
Railroads (incl. railroad repair shops)	28	1	15	1
Street railways and bus lines	25	1	5	
Taxicab service	91	1	63	1
Trucking service	72	1	44	1
Water transportation	40	2	34	2
Miscellaneous transportation	64	3	43	2
Communication	39	2	25	2
Utilities	64	2	39	
Wholesale and retail trade	3,667	1,055	2,231	542
Wholesale trade	369	19	313	14
Food and dairy products stores, and milk retailing	1,222	329	669	174
General merchandise and variety stores	367	87	119	36
Apparel and accessories stores	235	110	135	57
Motor vehicles and accessories retailing, and filling stations	308	14	196	5
Motor vehicles and accessories retailing	132	4	91	3
Filling stations	176	10	105	2
Eating and drinking places	471	317	285	170
Miscellaneous retail trade	745	179	514	86
Furniture, home furnishings, and equipment stores	130	43	95	9
Drug stores	86	11	64	6
Hardware, farm implement, and building material retailing	82	5	68	4
Liquor stores	63	2	36	1
Retail florists	34	37	31	27
Jewelry stores	60	4	41	2
Other retail trade	290	75	179	37
Finance, insurance, and real estate	386	58	289	54
Banking and other finance	235	16	167	13
Insurance and real estate	161	42	122	41
Insurance	58	1	48	1
Real estate	103	41	84	40
Business and repair services	366	14	296	12
Automobile storage, rental, and repair services	212	3	99	1
Business and miscellaneous repair services	154	11	107	11
Business services	61	10	47	10
Miscellaneous repair services and hand trades	93	1	60	1
Personal services	585	421	365	264
Hotels and lodging places	143	146	100	108
Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing services	229	94	129	42
Miscellaneous personal services	213	191	126	114
Amusement, recreation, and related services	190	33	91	10
Theaters and motion pictures	61	3	39	1
Miscellaneous amusement and recreation	109	30	52	9
Miscellaneous industries and services	272	120	157	80
Agriculture (exc. sugar)	57	7	14	1
Fishery	26	3	13	
Mining	12		9	
Professional and related services	122	93	87	70
Industry not reported	55	17	34	9
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	12,371	6,340	7,982	4,579
Clerical and kindred workers	6,998	3,676	4,611	2,743
Agents (n. e. c.)	166	14	114	6
Bookkeepers, accountants, cashiers, and ticket agents	2,031	866	1,393	495
Bookkeepers, accountants, and cashiers	1,902	664	1,370	483
Ticket, station, and express agents	39	2	23	2
Collectors, bill and account	210	4	120	3
Messengers, except express	200	34	162	18
Messengers, errand, and office boys and girls	181	34	144	18
Telegraph messengers	19		18	
Shipping and receiving clerks	249	11	205	11
Stenographers, typists, and secretaries	349	1,816	259	1,449
Other clerical and kindred workers	3,793	1,141	2,345	784
Attendants and assistants, library	4	1	2	
Attendants, physicians' and dentists' offices	18	82	8	54
Express messengers and railway mail clerks	5		4	
Mail carriers	73	1	59	
Office machine operators	17	19	14	18
Telegraph operators	18		6	
Telephone operators	40	803	22	184
Clerical and kindred workers (n. e. c.)	3,620	735	2,234	508
Salesmen and salespersons	5,373	2,658	3,341	1,027
Hucksters and peddlers	418	177	241	99
Newsboys	214	2	164	7
Insurance agents and brokers	268	13	170	7
Other sales agents and brokers	376	57	425	29
Auctioneers	2		2	
Real estate agents and brokers	78	10	64	9
Salesmen, finance, brokerage, and commission firms	13		9	
Traveling salesmen and sales agents	485	27	350	20
Other salesmen and saleswomen	3,957	2,435	2,341	1,360
Canvassers and solicitors	37	5	26	3
"Clerks" in stores	504	255	157	95
Demonstrators	7	7		5
Salesmen and saleswomen (n. e. c.)	3,356	2,086	2,158	1,267
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	14,598	465	8,440	379
Bakers	271	36	178	16
Blacksmiths, forgemen, and hammermen	318		63	
Carpenters	4,070	2	2,041	3
Compositors and typesetters	285	52	227	33
Cranemen, hoistmen, and construction machinery operators	207		108	
Electricians	551		478	
Foremen (n. e. c.), by industry	1,351	172	699	120
Sugar industry	220		3	
Construction	327	3	177	2
Manufacturing (exc. sugar)	298	134	210	99
Canning and preserving fruits, vegetables, and sea food	185	94	126	94
Miscellaneous food products (exc. sugar)	25	36	19	2
Tin cans, tinware, and miscellaneous iron and steel industries	30		22	
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries	58	4	41	3
Transportation, communication, and other public utilities	206		122	
Railroads (incl. railroad repair shops)	34		16	
Water transportation	35		21	
Miscellaneous transportation	55		35	
Communication	18		13	
Utilities	64		45	
Miscellaneous industries and services	300	35	177	19
Agriculture (exc. sugar), forestry, and fishery	28		10	
Mining	10		5	
Wholesale trade	22	2	19	2
Retail trade	69	2	31	2
Business and repair services	52		34	
Personal services	13	17	8	11
Amusement, recreation, and related services	3		2	
Professional and related services	14	13	9	3
Government	103	1	62	1
Industry not reported	4		4	
Inspectors (n. e. c.), by industry	101	13	73	13
Construction	24		17	
Transportation, communication, and other public utilities	32		28	
Miscellaneous industries and services	45	13	28	13
Locomotive engineers	219		16	
Machinists, millwrights, and tool makers	1,263	2	713	2
Machinists	1,252	2	704	2
Millwrights	1		1	
Tool makers, die makers and setters	9		7	

Most inspectors in manufacturing industries are classified as operatives.

TABLE 13.—DETAILED OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK), BY SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940—Continued

OCCUPATION	THE TERRITORY		HONOLULU CITY	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers—Continued.				
Masons, tile setters, and stonecutters	533	1	333	1
Brickmasons, stonemasons, and tile setters	513	1	319	1
Stonecutters and stone carvers	20		14	
Mechanics and repairmen, automobile	952	1	274	
Mechanics and repairmen, except automobile	1,462	2	990	2
Mechanics and repairmen, airplane	111		93	
Mechanics and repairmen, railroad and car shop	43		20	
Mechanics and repairmen (n. e. c.)	1,308	2	886	2
Painters (construction and maintenance) and glaziers	1,188	2	777	2
Painters (construction and maintenance)	1,180	2	774	2
Glaziers	8		3	
Plumbers, and gas and steam fitters	736	2	479	2
Stationary engineers	366	1	135	
Tailors and tailoresses	290	152	144	57
Other craftsmen and kindred workers	1,032	27	704	23
Boilermakers	118		46	
Cabinetmakers	94		22	
Cement and concrete finishers	42		34	
Decorators and window dressers	43	14	38	12
Electrotypers and stereotypers	3		3	
Engravers, except photoengravers	8		8	
Heat treaters, annealers, and temperers	1		1	
Jewelers, watchmakers, goldsmiths, and silversmiths	79	1	50	
Locomotive firemen	102		4	
Molders, metal	38		25	
Opticians and lens grinders and polishers	13		12	
Pattern and model makers, except paper	77		73	
Photoengravers and lithographers	32	1	31	1
Piano and organ tuners	12		10	
Plasterers	85		82	
Pressmen and plate printers, printing	48	2	37	1
Roofers and slaters	30		29	
Sawyers	6		3	
Shoemakers and repairers (not in factory)	66	3	40	3
Structural and ornamental metal workers	59		46	
Tinsmiths, coppersmiths, and sheet metal workers	109		85	
Upholsterers	27	6	26	6
Operatives and kindred workers [1]	14,428	4,039	7,033	3,010
Apprentices	325	102	204	49
Carpenters' apprentices	51		27	
Electricians' apprentices	24		18	
Machinists' apprentices	41		17	
Plumbers' apprentices	17		12	
Building and hand trade apprentices (n. e. c.)	39	1	22	1
Apprentices, printing trades	20	3	16	3
Apprentices, specified trades (n. e. c.)	124	98	85	45
Apprentices, trades not specified	9		7	
Attendants, filling station, parking lot, garage, and airport	533	25	303	9
Brakemen and switchmen, railroad	273	1	25	1
Brakemen, railroad	260		21	
Switchmen, railroad	13	1	4	1
Chauffeurs and drivers, bus, taxi, truck, and tractor [2]	4,263	20	1,750	4
Deliverymen [2]	1,235	8	711	4
Firemen, except locomotive and fire department	457	3	156	1
Laundry operatives and laundresses, except private family	328	753	181	415
Linemen and servicemen, telegraph, telephone, and power	307	1	209	
Meat cutters, except slaughter and packing house	190	3	130	1
Oilers, machinery	287	6	95	2
Sailors and deck hands, except U. S. Navy	216	1	131	1
Welders and flame-cutters	356		187	
Other specified operatives and kindred workers	730	997	405	575
Asbestos and insulation workers	9		7	
Blasters and powdermen	18		7	
Boatmen, canalmen, and lock keepers	55	1	23	1
Buffers and polishers, metal	4		3	
Chainmen, rodmen, and axmen, surveying	102		38	
Conductors, bus and street railway	12		11	
Dressmakers and seamstresses (not in factory)	30	952	14	539
Filers, metal	2		1	
Fruit and vegetable graders and packers, except in cannery	9	5	2	5
Furnacemen, smeltermen, and pourers	5		3	
Grinders, metal	1		1	
Heaters, metal	1		1	
Milliners (not in factory)	2	21		18
Mine operatives and laborers [3]	164		99	
Motion picture projectionists	96	2	47	1
Motormen, street, subway, and elevated railway	35		30	
Motormen (vehicle), mine, factory, logging camp, etc.	2		1	
Painters, except construction and maintenance	95	1	69	

[1] Mine laborers are included in "Mine operatives and laborers," in this group.
[2] Drivers for bakeries, laundries, dry cleaners, stores, etc., are included in "Deliverymen."

OCCUPATION	THE TERRITORY		HONOLULU CITY	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Operatives and kindred workers—Continued				
Other specified operatives and kindred workers—Continued.				
Photographic process workers	34	10	31	7
Power station operators	91	5	30	4
Operatives and kindred workers (n. e. c.), by industry	4,912	2,730	2,546	1,948
Sugar industry	1,847	55	5	
Construction	265	1	160	1
Manufacturing (exc sugar)	1,828	2,153	1,439	1,549
Food and kindred products (exc sugar)	1,226	1,778	966	1,349
Bakery products	42	46	38	42
Beverage industries	88	19	64	13
Canning and preserving fruits, vegetables, and sea food	956	1,638	764	1,257
Dairy products	29	11	24	9
Meat products	32	1	25	1
Miscellaneous food products (exc sugar)	82	63	51	27
Transportation equipment	248	6	222	6
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries	352	369	251	194
Textile mill products	8	148	1	4
Apparel and other fabricated textiles	9	97	9	83
Lumber, furniture, and lumber products	56	15	49	14
Paper and allied products	29	3	4	1
Printing, publishing, and allied industries	46	43	38	40
Miscellaneous chemical industries	26	11	9	5
Stone, clay, and glass products	22	1	19	1
Iron and steel and not specified metal industries	75	23	59	20
Other manufacturing industries	81	28	63	26
Transportation, communication, and other public utilities	273	20	222	19
Railroads (incl. railroad repair shops)	25		9	
Warehousing and storage	31	7	31	7
Water transportation	33	2	31	2
Miscellaneous transportation	68	10	57	10
Communication	12	1	9	
Electric light and power	60		49	
Gas works and steam plants	23		20	
Water and sanitary services	22		16	
Wholesale and retail trade	251	221	212	176
Wholesale trade	47	31	46	29
Food and dairy products stores, and milk retailing	53	24	34	12
Apparel and accessories stores, except shoes	32	119	25	99
Miscellaneous retail trade	119	47	107	36
Business and repair services	189	11	116	6
Automobile storage, rental, and repair services	124	1	77	1
Business and miscellaneous repair services	65	10	39	5
Government	319	12	259	10
Postal service	1	1	1	
National defense	126	3	114	2
Federal Government (n. e. c.)	149	7	124	7
Territorial and local government (n. e. c.)	43	1	20	1
Miscellaneous industries and services	240	266	133	187
Agriculture (exc sugar) and fishery	50	16	15	10
Insurance	2		2	
Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing services	106	187	59	148
Hotels and miscellaneous personal services	23	33	10	8
Amusement, recreation, and related services	18	11	13	7
Professional and related services	22	15	14	11
Industry not reported	19	4	14	3
Domestic service workers	2,003	6,319	1,060	5,445
Housekeepers, private family	30	1,186	12	494
Laundresses, private family	32	976	17	365
Servants, private family	1,940	4,356	1,031	2,086
Protective service workers	27,869	14	5,441	10
Firemen, fire department	183		124	
Guards and watchmen	916	8	511	6
Guards, watchmen, and doorkeepers	893	8	507	6
Watchmen (crossing) and bridge tenders	23		4	
Policemen, sheriffs, and marshals	537	6	225	4
Policemen and detectives, government	405	5	190	3
Policemen and detectives, except government	104	1	24	1
Marshals and constables	3		3	
Sheriffs and bailiffs	25		8	
Soldiers, sailors, marines, and coast guards [4]	26,233		4,583	
Service workers, except domestic and protective	4,815	3,702	3,117	2,966
Attendants, hospital and other institution	321	218	162	46
Barbers, beauticians, and manicurists	352	606	177	281
Charwomen, janitors, and porters	1,354	213	758	126
Charwomen and cleaners	13	10	4	8
Janitors and sextons	1,333	194	749	113
Porters	8	9	5	5

[4] Excludes commissioned officers, professional and clerical workers, and craftsmen, who are classified with other workers in their respective occupation.

TABLE 13.—DETAILED OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK), BY SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940—Continued

OCCUPATION	THE TERRITORY		HONOLULU CITY	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Service workers, except domestic and protective—Continued.				
Cooks, except private family	831	311	564	118
Servants, except private family	613	421	436	195
Waiters and bartenders	987	1,295	748	946
Bartenders	164	27	116	21
Waiters and waitresses, except private family	823	1,268	632	925
Other service workers, except domestic and protective	357	698	257	434
Attendants, professional and personal service (n. e. c.)	21	46	16	24
Attendants, recreation and amusement	74	5	48	-
Boarding house and lodginghouse keepers	6	25	3	15
Bootblacks	41	-	29	-
Elevator operators	64	6	63	6
Housekeepers, stewards, and hostesses, except private family	67	236	43	169
Practical nurses and midwives	2	298	1	168
Ushers, amusement place or assembly	82	82	54	52
Farm laborers and foremen	36,095	3,897	790	448
Farm foremen, sugar industry	1,315	2	-	-
Farm foremen, except sugar industry	515	12	21	6
Farm laborers (wage workers), sugar industry	25,750	1,927	25	-
Farm laborers (wage workers), except sugar industry	7,424	287	508	27
Farm laborers (unpaid family workers), sugar industry	39	35	-	-
Farm laborers (unpaid family workers), except sugar industry	1,052	1,634	236	415
Laborers, except farm and mine	14,856	1,234	6,773	670
Fishermen and oystermen	1,147	14	448	7
Gardeners, except farm, and groundkeepers	495	22	238	6
Longshoremen and stevedores	1,280	-	765	-
Other specified laborers	165	4	52	2
Garage laborers and car washers and greasers	45	1	34	1
Lumbermen, raftsmen, and woodchoppers	101	3	10	1
Teamsters	19	-	8	-
Laborers (n. e. c.), by industry	11,168	1,194	5,270	655
Sugar industry	2,411	56	14	-
Agriculture (exc. sugar), forestry, and fishery	212	16	52	8
Agriculture (exc. sugar)	163	9	27	3
Forestry, except logging	18	-	7	-
Fishery	31	7	18	5
Construction	3,195	14	1,749	4
Manufacturing (exc. sugar)	1,661	535	1,070	283
Food and kindred products (exc. sugar)	1,119	504	664	256
Beverage industries	111	14	64	7
Canning and preserving fruits, vegetables, and sea food	840	438	527	226
Dairy products	58	8	10	3
Miscellaneous food products (exc. sugar)	113	44	63	20
Ship and boat building and repairing	224	-	190	-
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries	318	31	207	27
Lumber, furniture, and lumber products	30	1	38	1
Paper and allied products	49	4	7	4
Laborers, except farm and mine—Con.				
Laborers (n. e. c.), by industry—Continued.				
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries—Continued.				
Paints and miscellaneous chemical industries	68	6	42	3
Stone, clay, and glass products	35	-	25	-
Iron and steel and not specified metal industries	71	3	50	2
Other manufacturing industries	45	17	20	16
Transportation, communication, and other public utilities	935	8	561	4
Transportation	564	6	298	3
Air transportation	26	-	13	-
Railroad (incl. railroad repair shops)	206	-	78	-
Trucking service	78	1	59	1
Warehousing and storage	73	4	41	1
Water transportation	100	-	69	-
Miscellaneous transportation	79	1	38	1
Communication	34	-	18	-
Utilities	337	2	245	1
Electric light and power	89	-	72	-
Gas works and steam plants	73	1	71	1
Water and sanitary services	175	1	102	-
Wholesale and retail trade	853	285	642	167
Wholesale trade	189	15	133	13
Food and dairy products stores, and milk retailing	177	164	118	99
Hardware, farm implement, and building material retailing	200	2	186	2
Miscellaneous retail trade	267	114	206	63
General merchandise and variety stores	54	22	33	5
Furniture, home furnishings, and equipment stores	40	5	37	4
Filling stations	30	1	22	-
Eating and drinking places	41	32	35	24
Other retail trade	102	54	79	32
Government	1,083	9	734	6
Postal service	3	1	3	-
National defense	310	1	272	1
Federal Government (n. e. c.)	437	3	306	3
Territorial and local government (n. e. c.)	333	4	93	2
Miscellaneous industries and services	818	259	468	182
Finance, insurance, and real estate	25	-	17	-
Automobile storage, rental, and repair services	97	2	58	1
Business and miscellaneous repair services	38	2	29	2
Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing services	30	39	27	34
Hotels and miscellaneous personal services	73	35	32	15
Amusement, recreation, and related services	114	21	64	8
Educational services	38	3	31	3
Medical and other health services	78	4	41	2
Legal, engineering, and miscellaneous professional services	5	-	4	-
Charitable, religious, and membership organizations	51	7	23	3
Industry not reported	267	146	102	112
Occupation not reported	379	308	180	89

TABLE 14.—MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT THOSE ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK), BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940

AREA, MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, AND SEX	Total	Hawaiian	Part Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Other races	PERCENT DISTRIBUTION: Total	Hawaiian	Part Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Other races
THE TERRITORY																
Total	180,796	4,539	11,181	56,419	10,698	28,129	60,973	4,914	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Professional workers	9,492	149	971	4,714	967	129	2,395	173	5.3	3.3	8.7	8.4	9.0	0.4	3.9	3.5
Semiprofessional workers	1,411	21	161	529	147	67	433	33	0.8	0.5	1.4	0.9	1.4	0.2	0.7	0.7
Farmers and farm managers	3,554	118	136	306	140	189	2,587	78	2.0	2.6	1.2	0.5	1.3	0.6	4.2	1.6
Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm	11,823	142	539	4,739	1,346	200	4,196	280	6.4	3.1	4.8	8.4	12.6	0.9	6.9	5.7
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	18,711	177	1,499	5,823	3,094	583	7,272	263	10.3	3.9	13.5	10.3	28.9	1.8	11.9	5.4
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	15,991	447	1,411	3,969	848	787	8,097	422	8.8	9.8	12.7	7.1	7.9	2.4	13.3	8.6
Operatives and kindred workers	19,081	943	2,251	3,798	1,407	2,614	7,288	780	10.6	20.8	20.2	6.7	13.2	9.1	12.0	15.9
Domestic service workers	8,520	117	400	669	260	467	6,342	265	4.7	2.6	3.6	1.2	2.2	1.5	10.4	5.8
Service workers, except domestic	36,460	419	1,101	27,623	1,194	1,866	4,113	418	20.2	9.2	9.9	49.0	11.2	5.0	6.7	8.4
Farm laborers (wage workers) and farm foremen	37,232	591	803	1,960	396	22,101	10,212	1,267	20.6	13.0	7.2	3.3	3.7	66.8	16.7	25.8
Farm laborers (unpaid family workers)	2,760	32	74	83	48	77	2,412	34	1.5	0.7	0.7	0.1	0.4	0.2	4.0	0.7
Laborers, except farm and mine	15,489	1,389	1,722	2,145	880	3,205	5,275	832	8.6	30.6	15.4	3.8	8.0	10.0	8.6	16.9
Occupation not reported	379	24	62	131	9	33	245	52	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.4	1.1

TABLE 14.—MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT THOSE ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK), BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940—Continued

AREA, MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, AND SEX	Total	Hawaiian	Part Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Other races	PERCENT DISTRIBUTION Total	Hawaiian	Part Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Other races
THE TERRITORY—Continued																
Male	146,069	3,070	7,891	48,773	7,866	31,470	42,048	3,600	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Professional workers	4,238	69	256	2,206	320	96	1,198	88	2.9	1.9	3.2	4.5	4.1	0.3	2.8	2.1
Semiprofessional workers	1,084	15	118	387	129	83	378	19	0.8	0.4	1.5	0.8	1.6	0.2	0.9	0.5
Farmers and farm managers	3,048	81	94	287	138	188	2,196	73	2.1	2.3	1.2	0.6	1.6	0.6	5.2	1.9
Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm	9,404	68	424	4,229	1,158	263	3,233	208	6.4	1.9	5.3	8.7	14.7	0.8	7.7	5.1
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	12,371	104	853	3,686	2,253	516	4,806	175	8.5	2.9	10.7	7.6	28.7	1.6	11.4	4.6
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	15,588	426	1,343	3,916	807	782	7,800	388	10.7	11.9	16.9	8.0	10.2	2.4	18.9	9.8
Operatives and kindred workers	14,422	600	1,694	3,284	945	2,877	4,683	545	9.9	16.7	21.2	6.7	12.0	8.6	11.6	13.8
Domestic service workers	2,083	16	36	58	86	201	1,437	84	1.4	0.4	0.5	0.1	1.1	0.5	3.4	2.1
Service workers, except domestic	32,684	310	666	25,966	880	1,524	2,066	303	22.4	8.7	8.3	53.2	11.2	4.8	4.9	7.6
Farm laborers (wage workers) and farm foremen	35,034	548	761	1,780	380	22,601	8,392	1,714	24.0	15.3	9.5	3.6	5.1	68.9	19.7	30.7
Farm laborers (unpaid family workers)	1,091	71	47	60	28	46	873	16	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.1	0.4	0.1	2.1	0.4
Laborers, except farm and mine	14,256	1,311	1,664	1,945	722	3,176	4,643	804	9.8	36.6	20.7	4.0	9.2	10.1	11.0	20.4
Occupation not reported	370	12	36	67	9	47	162	43	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	1.1
Female	35,137	961	3,140	7,667	2,886	668	18,886	964	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Professional workers	5,304	80	715	2,028	647	27	1,197	90	15.0	8.3	22.8	28.8	22.8	4.1	6.3	9.3
Semiprofessional workers	317	6	43	147	18	14	75	14	0.9	0.6	1.4	1.9	0.6	2.1	0.4	1.5
Farmers and farm managers	500	37	43	19	13	1	383	3	1.4	3.9	1.3	0.2	0.4	0.2	2.1	0.3
Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm	1,988	74	115	519	198	27	968	77	5.6	7.7	3.7	6.8	6.8	4.1	5.0	8.0
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	6,340	73	647	2,187	841	67	2,467	88	18.0	7.6	20.6	28.2	29.7	10.1	13.0	9.1
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	465	22	58	88	46	15	207	34	1.3	2.3	1.8	1.1	1.6	2.2	1.1	3.5
Operatives and kindred workers	4,659	344	557	544	482	92	2,436	235	13.3	35.8	17.7	7.1	16.3	13.9	12.8	24.4
Domestic service workers	6,518	102	364	616	154	176	4,906	201	18.6	10.6	11.6	8.1	5.4	26.6	26.0	20.9
Service workers, except domestic	3,776	109	436	687	314	72	2,046	113	10.7	11.3	13.9	9.0	11.1	10.9	10.8	11.7
Farm laborers (wage workers) and farm foremen	2,220	43	42	80		100	1,910	88	6.3	4.5	1.3	1.0		15.1	10.1	8.8
Farm laborers (unpaid family workers)	1,680	11	37	28	20	31	1,539	18	4.7	1.1	0.9	0.3	0.7	4.7	8.1	1.9
Laborers, except farm and mine	1,204	48	68	280	128	29	723	28	3.5	5.0	2.2	2.6	4.5	4.4	3.9	2.9
Occupation not reported	280	12	38	64		11	80	10	0.8	1.2	0.8	0.8	......	1.7	0.4	1.0
HONOLULU CITY																
Total	69,388	1,708	6,067	28,304	8,287	3,386	24,066	2,080	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Professional workers	5,486	72	323	3,080	656	35	1,004	108	7.9	4.1	5.6	13.1	7.9	1.0	4.1	5.1
Semiprofessional workers	870	12	102	354	128	20	238	36	1.3	0.7	1.7	1.5	1.5	0.6	1.0	1.1
Farmers and farm managers	764	1	9	46	56	3	612	30	1.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.1	2.5	1.0
Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm	6,914	42	307	3,118	1,009	80	2,172	186	10.0	2.4	5.1	13.4	12.2	2.4	8.9	9.0
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	12,294	102	1,010	4,886	2,630	127	3,648	172	17.7	5.8	16.6	18.4	31.8	3.7	15.0	8.3
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	8,713	225	868	2,887	717	218	3,545	283	12.6	12.9	14.3	11.2	8.7	6.4	14.8	11.2
Operatives and kindred workers	10,048	489	1,669	2,309	1,227	722	3,473	428	14.5	27.8	28.3	9.9	14.8	21.3	14.3	20.2
Domestic service workers	4,588	45	158	497	174	136	3,288	119	6.6	2.6	2.2	2.1	2.1	4.0	13.9	5.7
Service workers, except domestic	10,814	210	680	4,646	932	827	2,285	236	15.6	12.5	11.0	24.2	11.3	24.4	9.5	10.3
Farm laborers (wage workers) and farm foremen	587	10	21	68	72	163	267	28	0.8	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.9	4.8	1.0	1.3
Farm laborers (unpaid family workers)	641	......	6	21	16		587	11	0.9		0.1	0.1	0.2	......	2.8	0.5
Laborers, except farm and mine	7,443	557	900	1,018	687	1,068	2,782	841	10.9	30.7	14.8	4.4	7.7	31.2	11.3	28.9
Occupation not reported	200	3	47	78	19	7	45	10	0.3	0.2	0.8	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.5
Male	50,370	1,308	4,894	17,808	6,088	3,261	15,687	1,447	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Professional workers	2,461	35	134	1,457	242	26	508	81	4.9	2.6	3.2	8.1	4.0	0.8	3.2	5.5
Semiprofessional	646	7	72	241	112	13	188	13	1.3	0.5	1.7	1.3	1.9	0.4	1.2	0.8
Farmers and farm managers	604	1	5	38	47	1	494	18	1.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.8	......	3.1	1.2
Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm	5,813	31	286	2,730	874	74	1,711	124	11.6	2.3	6.1	15.2	14.5	2.3	10.7	8.7
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	7,922	60	549	2,730	1,339	110	2,427	119	15.8	4.4	12.5	15.3	22.0	3.4	15.3	7.7
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	8,440	209	808	2,540	675	212	3,764	238	16.8	15.5	19.6	14.2	11.2	6.5	23.6	14.1
Operatives and kindred workers	7,058	292	1,030	1,806	786	686	2,080	281	14.0	22.3	24.0	10.6	13.1	21.1	13.1	18.9
Domestic service workers	1,080	5	20	211	87	111	584	22	2.2	0.4	0.5	1.2	0.9	3.4	4.1	2.1
Service workers, except domestic	8,560	160	380	4,130	673	806	1,204	136	17.0	11.9	9.3	23.6	11.2	24.7	7.9	8.8
Farm laborers (wage workers) and farm foremen	554	10	30	66	72	163	217	26	1.1	0.7	0.6	0.3	1.2	5.0	1.4	1.7
Farm laborers (unpaid family workers)	236	......	3	9	9	......	210	5	0.5	......	0.1	0.1	0.1	......	1.3	0.3
Laborers, except farm and mine	6,773	381	873	876	551	1,061	2,501	505	13.5	28.7	20.5	4.9	8.8	32.2	16.0	34.1
Occupation not reported	120	2	27	64	19	7	16	6	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.4
Female	19,068	400	1,088	5,376	2,289	136	8,379	563	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Professional workers	3,025	34	305	1,628	414	9	501	55	15.9	8.4	20.9	28.8	18.5	6.7	6.0	10.1
Semiprofessional workers	224	5	20	113	11	7	47	11	1.2	1.2	1.8	2.1	0.5	5.2	0.6	2.0
Farmers and farm managers	140	......	4	7	8	1	113	2	0.7	......	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.7	1.4	0.4
Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm	1,101	11	81	388	135	6	461	54	5.8	2.7	2.7	7.1	6.0	4.5	5.5	10.0
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	4,372	48	461	2,006	701	17	1,211	53	22.6	16.7	28.7	38.6	31.3	12.7	14.5	9.8
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	273	16	48	88	43	6	91	15	1.4	4.0	2.4	1.1	1.0	4.5	1.1	2.8
Operatives and kindred workers	3,010	178	366	434	420	34	1,384	102	14.9	44.2	21.4	7.7	19.6	25.4	16.5	20.9
Domestic service workers	3,468	40	170	288	117	25	2,714	67	18.2	9.9	9.4	5.3	5.2	18.7	32.4	16.1
Service workers, except domestic	2,285	50	270	800	289	23	1,041	60	11.9	14.6	15.0	9.6	11.6	16.4	12.4	14.8
Farm laborers (wage workers) and farm foremen	38	......	1	2	......	......	30	......	0.2	......	0.1	......	......	......	0.4	......
Farm laborers (unpaid family workers)	418	......	3	13	7	......	387	6	2.2	......	0.2	0.2	0.3	......	4.6	1.1
Laborers, except farm and mine	670	16	35	102	106	7	381	13	3.5	4.0	1.8	2.6	4.7	5.2	4.3	2.4
Occupation not reported	80	1	20	34	......	......	20	4	0.5	0.2	1.1	0.6	......	......	0.4	0.7

TABLE 15.—DETAILED INDUSTRY OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK), BY SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940

INDUSTRY	THE TERRITORY		HONOLULU CITY	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
All industries	143,659	35,137	50,270	18,993
Sugar industry	38,289	2,491	945	62
Agriculture (exc. sugar), forestry, & fishery	14,226	2,026	2,029	631
Agriculture (exc. sugar)	13,110	2,493	1,574	612
Forestry, except logging, and fishery	1,216	33	455	19
Forestry, except logging	57		16	
Fishery	1,159	33	439	19
Mining	250	6	185	8
Crude petroleum and natural gas production	54	3	44	2
Metal mining	1			
Other mines and quarries	195	3	121	3
Sand and gravel production	5	1	2	1
Stone quarrying	178		107	
Miscellaneous nonmetallic mining	2	1	2	1
Not specified mining	10	1	10	1
Construction	10,633	94	6,700	77
Manufacturing (exc. sugar)	9,969	3,474	6,676	2,389
Food and kindred products (exc. sugar)	4,905	2,704	3,409	1,906
Bakery products	483	133	356	99
Beverage industries	414	57	279	37
Meat products	58	2	45	2
Other food industries	3,850	2,512	2,729	1,768
Canning and preserv'g fruits, veg., & sea food	3,301	2,358	2,432	1,690
Confectionery	39	18	24	9
Dairy products	209	37	119	26
Grain-mill products	32	2	22	1
Miscellaneous food industries (exc. sugar)	269	97	132	42
Tobacco manufactures	2		1	
Textile mill products	24	164	11	12
Cotton manufactures	6	5	3	3
Silk and rayon manufactures	2	1	2	1
Knit goods	4	4	2	2
Other textile mill products	12	154	4	6
Dyeing and finishing textiles	2	1	2	1
Carpets, rugs, and other floor coverings	1	14		
Hats, except cloth and millinery	1	62	1	1
Miscellaneous textile goods		1		1
Not specified textile mills	8	76	1	3
Apparel and other fabricated textile products	33	135	32	108
Apparel and accessories	23	127	22	104
Miscellaneous fabricated textile products	10	8	10	4
Lumber, furniture, and lumber products	311	32	215	28
Logging	35	1	7	1
Sawmills and planing mills	142	5	98	4
Furniture and store fixtures	84	19	70	17
Miscellaneous wooden goods	50	7	40	6
Paper and allied products	124	10	33	7
Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills	96	5	5	3
Paperboard containers and boxes	7	4	7	3
Miscellaneous paper and pulp products	21	1	21	1
Printing, publishing, and allied industries	1,200	260	960	194
Chemicals and allied products	248	31	146	17
Rayon and allied products	1		1	
Other chemical and allied products	247	31	145	17
Paints, varnishes, and colors	8		7	
Miscellaneous chemical industries	239	31	138	17
Petroleum and coal products	69	2	40	2
Petroleum refining	53	2	32	2
Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products	16		8	
Rubber products	16		15	
Leather and leather products	28	14	24	14
Footwear industries, except rubber	22	13	21	13
Leather and leather products, except footwear	6	1	3	1
Leather: tanned, curried, and finished		1		1
Leather products, except footwear	6		3	
Stone, clay, and glass products	109	1	78	1
Glass and glass products	4		4	
Structural clay products	17		15	
Other stone and clay products	88	1	59	1
Cement, & concrete, gypsum, & plaster prod.	69		47	
Cut-stone and stone products	13		7	
Pottery and related products	4	1	3	1
Miscellaneous nonmetallic mineral pr'ducts	2		2	
Iron and steel and their products	496	44	387	39
Blast furnaces, steel works, and rolling mills	17		11	
Other iron and steel products	479	44	376	39
Tin cans and other tinware	182	28	111	24
Miscellaneous iron and steel industries	227	16	265	15
Nonferrous metals and their products	35	3	27	2
Nonferrous metal primary products	2		2	
Clocks, watches, jewelry, and silverware [1]	26	2	18	1
Miscellaneous nonferrous metal products	7	1	7	1

INDUSTRY	THE TERRITORY		HONOLULU CITY	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Manufacturing (exc. sugar)—Continued				
Machinery	141	14	117	11
Electrical machinery and equipment	60	7	37	5
Machinery, except electrical	101	7	80	6
Agricultural machinery and tractors	7		6	
Office and store machines, equip., & supplies	11	2	11	2
Miscellaneous machinery	82	5	63	4
Transportation equipment	1,159	18	1,055	17
Aircraft and parts	10		9	
Automobiles and automobile equipment	24	1	19	1
Ship and boat building and repairing	1,114	17	1,018	16
Railroad and misc. transportation equipment	11		9	
Other manufacturing industries	162	42	126	31
Not specified metal industries	38	2	28	
Scientific and photographic equipment & supplies	25	8	23	7
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries	65	8	56	8
Not specified manufacturing industries	34	24	19	16
Transport., commun., & other public utilities	5,099	687	5,099	309
Transportation	5,744	157	3,513	122
Air transportation	267	6	152	6
Railroads and railway express	898	9	338	6
Railroads (including railroad repair shops)	875	6	317	5
Railway express service	23	3	21	1
Street railways and bus lines	499	10	215	6
Trucking service and warehousing	747	32	493	24
Trucking service	526	15	333	11
Warehousing and storage	221	17	160	13
Water transportation	2,120	68	1,546	42
Other transportation	1,213	32	669	36
Petroleum and gasoline pipe lines	16	1	8	1
Taxicab service	752	26	461	17
Services incidental to transportation	62	5	41	14
Not specified transportation	383	10	159	6
Communication	547	243	381	119
Telephone and telegraph (wire and radio)	446	226	268	106
Telephone (wire and radio)	363	224	249	105
Telegraph (wire and radio)	83	2	47	1
Radio broadcasting and television	101	17	55	13
Utilities	1,737	87	1,229	68
Electric light and power	1,071	61	739	47
Gas works and steam plants	235	10	213	9
Water and sanitary services	431	16	277	12
Wholesale and retail trade	14,794	7,089	9,884	4,408
Wholesale trade	2,285	317	1,828	278
Retail trade	12,499	6,715	7,868	4,127
Food and dairy products stores, & milk retailing	3,462	1,499	1,927	781
Food stores, except dairy products	3,175	1,470	1,744	757
Dairy products stores and milk retailing	287	29	183	24
General merchandise and variety stores	1,365	998	861	526
General merchandise stores	1,356	975	856	517
Limited price variety stores	9	13	5	9
Apparel and accessories stores	860	1,035	589	690
Apparel and accessories stores, except shoes	716	1,013	417	665
Shoe stores	153	22	142	15
Furniture, home furnishings, & equipment stores	680	195	548	99
Furniture and house furnishings stores	239	108	205	62
Household appliance and radio stores	441	68	343	37
Motor vehicles and accessories retailing	720	67	461	45
Filling stations	511	66	408	30
Drug stores	347	126	281	89
Eating and drinking places	1,719	1,809	1,266	1,265
Hardware, farm impl., and bldg. material retailing	537	60	522	50
Hardware and farm implement stores	257	43	215	34
Lumber and building material retailing	280	17	307	16
Other retail stores	1,680	835	1,136	863
Liquor stores	154	46	91	33
Retail florists	80	180	72	130
Jewelry stores	179	43	129	39
Fuel and ice retailing	110	7	79	5
Miscellaneous retail stores	691	336	542	671
Not specified retail trade	475	235	223	90
Finance, insurance, and real estate	1,011	501	1,009	486
Banking and other finance	765	220	573	177
Insurance and real estate	646	281	436	309
Insurance	515	141	306	131
Real estate	331	140	270	127

[1] Includes metal engraving (except for printing purposes), plating, and polishing.

TABLE 15.—DETAILED INDUSTRY OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK), BY SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940—Continued

INDUSTRY	THE TERRITORY		HONOLULU CITY	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Business and repair services	2,743	155	1,507	109
Automobile storage, rental, and repair services	1,878	45	973	23
Business and repair services, exc. automobile	865	108	534	86
Advertising	38	14	36	11
Business services, except advertising	235	70	175	54
Miscellaneous repair services and hand trades	592	24	373	21
Personal services	5,316	9,849	3,406	5,457
Domestic service	2,532	6,697	1,373	3,583
Hotels and lodging places	1,353	617	1,009	274
Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing services	786	1,030	490	647
Miscellaneous personal services	945	1,505	534	853
Amusement, recreation, & related services	1,017	479	600	273
Theaters and motion pictures	442	174	256	95
Miscellaneous amusement and recreation	575	295	344	178
Professional and related services	4,611	6,703	2,982	3,566
Educational services	1,818	4,196	994	2,286
Medical and other health services	1,478	1,872	879	1,116
Legal, engineering, and misc. professional services	448	165	356	132
Charitable, religious, & membership organizations	867	468	433	332
Government	33,911	898	9,793	945
Postal service	281	60	160	10
National defense	28,882	173	6,396	125
Government (n. e. c.)[1]	4,748	663	3,237	810
Federal government (n. e. c.)	2,304	353	1,983	310
Territorial and local government (n. e. c.)	2,444	310	1,254	200
Industry not reported	956	488	471	280

[1] "N. e. c." means not elsewhere classified.

TABLE 16.—WAGE OR SALARY INCOME AND RECEIPT OF OTHER INCOME IN 1939 FOR EXPERIENCED PERSONS IN THE LABOR FORCE IN 1940, BY CLASS OF WORKER AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY

[Percent not shown where less than 0.1; median or percent not shown where base is less than 100]

AREA, WAGE OR SALARY INCOME IN 1939, AND SEX	TOTAL				WITHOUT OTHER INCOME IN 1939[1]				WITH OTHER INCOME IN 1939			
	Total	Wage or salary workers		Other experienced persons in labor force	Total	Wage or salary workers		Other experienced persons in labor force	Total	Wage or salary workers		Other experienced persons in labor force
		Private and nonemergency government workers	Public emergency workers			Private and nonemergency government workers	Public emergency workers			Private and nonemergency government workers	Public emergency workers	
THE TERRITORY												
Male	151,040	134,051	2,433	14,556	78,139	73,166	2,108	2,861	72,901	60,885	325	11,691
None	15,378	2,851	166	12,351	3,926	1,845	134	1,957	11,452	1,016	42	10,394
$1 to $99	3,209	2,991	145	163	1,741	1,532	136	83	1,538	1,459	19	80
$100 to $199	5,126	5,129	235	162	3,118	2,805	208	105	2,408	2,324	27	57
$200 to $299	11,667	11,324	230	113	3,925	3,686	195	44	7,742	7,638	35	69
$300 to $399	14,461	13,906	457	98	6,569	6,134	401	44	7,892	7,782	56	54
$400 to $499	15,701	15,244	384	73	8,565	8,202	322	41	7,136	7,042	62	32
$500 to $699	14,104	13,720	321	63	6,852	6,516	300	26	7,252	7,204	21	27
$800 to $799	23,245	21,929	304	112	11,783	11,526	192	65	10,462	10,403	12	47
$800 to $999	13,201	13,001	117	83	8,245	8,093	100	52	4,956	4,908	17	31
$1,000 to $1,499	13,690	13,521	72	97	11,026	10,913	65	48	4,664	4,608	7	49
$1,500 to $1,999	7,445	7,353	42	51	4,334	4,276	34	24	2,111	2,076	8	27
$2,000 to $2,999	6,235	6,182	20	33	4,257	4,231	11	15	1,978	1,951	9	18
$3,000 to $3,999	2,136	2,105	6	25	1,201	1,187	3	11	935	918	3	14
$4,000 to $4,999	943	930	2	11	451	446	1	4	492	484	1	7
$5,000 and over	1,338	1,281	1	56	699	652	1	26	849	819		30
Not reported	1,671	575	31	1,065	657	323	25	310	1,014	253	6	755
Median wage or salary income for persons with $1 or more	$620	$627	$413	$447	$702	$715	$415	$456	$543	$549	$402	$434
Female	36,290	27,596	89	8,619	25,796	21,783	73	3,939	10,494	5,763	7	4,684
None	9,477	1,991	13	7,474	4,774	1,457	11	3,306	4,703	534	1	4,168
$1 to $99	2,173	2,016	19	138	1,831	1,699	18	114	342	317	1	24
$100 to $199	3,322	3,203	9	110	2,754	2,667	9	78	568	536		32
$200 to $299	2,910	2,857	1	52	2,353	2,314		39	557	543	1	13
$300 to $399	3,558	3,527	2	29	2,801	2,779	2	20	757	748		9
$400 to $499	3,003	2,977	3	23	2,339	2,318	3	18	664	659		5
$500 to $599	1,661	1,638	6	17	1,355	1,337	6	12	326	321		5
$600 to $799	2,351	2,313	6	32	1,909	1,886	6	17	442	427		15

[1] Includes statistics for persons for whom the receipt or nonreceipt of other income in 1939 was not reported

TABLE 16.—WAGE OR SALARY INCOME AND RECEIPT OF OTHER INCOME IN 1939 FOR EXPERIENCED PERSONS IN THE LABOR FORCE IN 1940, BY CLASS OF WORKER AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY—Continued

[Percent not shown where less than 0.1; median or percent not shown where base is less than 100]

AREA, WAGE OR SALARY INCOME IN 1939, AND SEX	TOTAL				WITHOUT OTHER INCOME IN 1939 [1]				WITH OTHER INCOME IN 1939			
	Total	Wage or salary workers		Other experienced persons in labor force	Total	Wage or salary workers		Other experienced persons in labor force	Total	Wage or salary workers		Other experienced persons in labor force
		Private and nonemergency government workers	Public emergency workers			Private and nonemergency government workers	Public emergency workers			Private and nonemergency government workers	Public emergency workers	
THE TERRITORY—Continued												
Female—Continued.												
$800 to $999	1,241	1,217	8	16	1,000	984	6	10	241	233	2	6
$1,000 to $1,499	1,985	1,958	9	18	1,586	1,565	8	13	399	393	1	5
$1,500 to $1,999	2,735	2,716	5	14	2,179	2,166	5	8	556	550	.....	6
$2,000 to $2,999	869	862	.....	7	552	549	.....	3	317	313	.....	4
$3,000 to $3,999	104	102	.....	2	53	53	.....	1	51	50	.....	1
$4,000 to $4,999	17	17	.....	.....	4	4	.....	.....	13	13	.....	.....
$5,000 and over	13	10	.....	3	2	1	.....	1	11	9	.....	2
Not reported	781	102	2	677	294	5	1	288	487	97	1	389
Median wage or salary income for persons with $1 or more	$434	$437	.....	$184	$427	$430	.....	$198	$460	$463	.....	$258
Percent distribution												
Male	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
None	10.2	2.1	6.8	84.9	5.0	2.5	5.9	68.3	15.7	1.7	12.9	88.9
$1 to $99	2.2	2.2	6.0	1.1	2.2	2.1	6.0	2.9	2.1	2.4	5.8	0.7
$100 to $199	3.7	3.8	9.7	1.1	4.0	3.8	9.9	3.7	3.3	3.8	8.3	0.5
$200 to $299	7.7	8.4	9.5	0.8	5.0	5.0	9.3	1.5	10.6	12.5	10.5	0.6
$300 to $399	9.6	10.4	18.8	0.7	8.4	8.4	19.0	1.5	10.8	12.8	17.2	0.5
$400 to $499	10.4	11.4	15.8	0.5	11.0	11.2	15.3	1.4	9.8	11.6	18.1	0.3
$500 to $599	9.3	10.2	13.2	0.4	8.8	8.9	14.2	1.3	9.9	11.8	6.5	0.2
$600 to $799	14.7	16.4	8.4	0.8	15.1	15.8	9.1	2.3	14.4	17.1	3.7	0.4
$800 to $999	8.7	9.7	4.8	0.6	10.6	11.1	4.7	1.8	6.8	8.1	2.2	0.2
$1,000 to $1,499	10.4	11.6	3.0	0.7	14.1	14.9	3.1	1.7	6.4	7.6	2.2	0.4
$1,500 to $1,999	4.9	5.5	1.7	0.4	6.8	7.2	1.6	0.8	2.9	3.4	2.5	0.2
$2,000 to $2,999	4.1	4.6	0.8	0.2	5.4	5.6	0.5	0.5	2.7	3.2	2.8	0.2
$3,000 to $3,999	1.4	1.6	0.2	0.2	1.5	1.6	0.1	0.4	1.3	1.5	0.6	0.1
$4,000 to $4,999	0.6	0.7	.....	0.1	0.6	0.6	.....	0.1	0.7	0.8	0.3	0.1
$5,000 and over	0.9	1.0	.....	0.4	0.6	0.6	.....	0.9	1.2	1.3	.....	0.2
Not reported	1.1	0.4	1.3	7.3	0.8	0.4	1.2	10.8	1.4	0.4	1.8	6.5
Female	100.0	100.0	.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	.....	100.0
None	26.2	7.2	.....	80.8	18.5	6.7	.....	84.2	45.1	9.3	.....	93.0
$1 to $99	6.0	7.3	.....	1.6	7.1	7.8	.....	2.9	3.3	5.5	.....	0.4
$100 to $199	9.2	11.6	.....	1.3	10.7	13.2	.....	2.0	5.4	9.3	.....	0.7
$200 to $299	8.0	10.4	.....	0.6	9.1	10.6	.....	1.0	5.3	9.5	.....	0.3
$300 to $399	9.8	12.8	.....	0.3	10.9	12.8	.....	0.5	7.3	13.0	.....	0.2
$400 to $499	8.3	10.8	.....	0.3	9.1	10.6	.....	0.5	6.4	11.5	.....	0.1
$500 to $599	4.6	6.0	.....	0.2	5.3	6.1	.....	0.3	3.1	6.6	.....	0.1
$600 to $799	6.5	8.4	.....	0.4	7.4	8.7	.....	0.4	4.2	7.4	.....	0.3
$800 to $999	3.4	4.4	.....	0.2	3.9	4.5	.....	0.3	2.3	4.1	.....	0.1
$1,000 to $1,499	5.5	7.1	.....	0.2	6.2	7.2	.....	0.3	3.8	6.8	.....	0.1
$1,500 to $1,999	7.6	9.9	.....	0.2	8.5	9.9	.....	0.2	5.3	9.6	.....	0.1
$2,000 to $2,999	2.4	3.1	.....	0.1	2.1	2.6	.....	0.1	3.0	5.5	.....	0.1
$3,000 to $3,999	0.3	0.4	.....	.....	0.2	0.2	.....	.....	0.5	0.9	.....	.....
$4,000 to $4,999	.....	0.1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	0.1	0.2	.....	.....
$5,000 and over	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	0.1	0.2	.....	.....
Not reported	2.2	0.4	.....	7.9	1.1	.....	.....	7.3	4.7	1.7	.....	6.3
HONOLULU CITY												
Male	53,404	45,449	1,206	6,749	50,852	34,319	1,194	1,199	16,883	11,180	82	5,660
None	7,243	1,502	100	5,641	1,646	952	77	617	5,597	550	23	5,024
$1 to $99	989	859	79	51	655	544	70	41	334	315	9	10
$100 to $199	1,705	1,509	121	75	1,213	1,043	113	56	492	466	9	17
$200 to $299	2,679	2,533	102	41	1,136	1,040	96	20	1,522	1,485	6	31
$300 to $399	2,509	2,309	168	32	1,486	1,305	159	22	1,033	1,004	9	10
$400 to $499	2,563	2,381	154	28	1,774	1,610	145	19	789	771	9	9
$500 to $599	2,253	2,032	220	33	1,739	1,499	218	22	845	823	9	11
$600 to $799	5,762	5,582	111	69	4,661	4,508	106	45	1,161	1,074	3	34
$800 to $999	5,406	5,284	72	50	4,714	4,613	67	34	692	671	5	16
$1,000 to $1,499	9,152	9,051	36	65	7,930	7,861	35	34	1,222	1,190	1	31
$1,500 to $1,999	4,796	4,738	14	34	3,987	3,956	13	17	799	780	2	17
$2,000 to $2,999	4,277	4,246	8	23	3,226	3,209	7	10	951	937	1	13
$3,000 to $3,999	1,451	1,442	3	16	957	946	2	9	504	496	1	7
$4,000 to $4,999	603	594	1	8	354	351	1	2	249	243	.....	6
$5,000 and over	952	904	1	47	417	393	1	24	535	512	.....	23
Not reported	1,033	681	16	336	527	388	14	126	496	93	2	401
Median wage or salary income for persons with $1 or more	$951	$971	$449	$675	$991	$1,021	$455	$584	$722	$723	.....	$869

[1] Includes statistics for persons for whom the receipt or nonreceipt of other income in 1939 was not reported.

TABLE 16.—WAGE OR SALARY INCOME AND RECEIPT OF OTHER INCOME IN 1939 FOR EXPERIENCED PERSONS IN THE LABOR FORCE IN 1940, BY CLASS OF WORKER AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY—Continued

[Percent not shown where less than 0.1; median or percent not shown where base is less than 100]

AREA, WAGE OR SALARY INCOME IN 1939, AND SEX	TOTAL				WITHOUT OTHER INCOME IN 1939 [1]				WITH OTHER INCOME IN 1939			
	Total	Wage or salary workers		Other experienced persons in labor force	Total	Wage or salary workers		Other experienced persons in labor force	Total	Wage or salary workers		Other experienced persons in labor force
		Private and nonemergency government workers	Public emergency workers			Private and nonemergency government workers	Public emergency workers			Private and nonemergency government workers	Public emergency workers	
HONOLULU CITY—Continued												
Female	19,736	16,189	67	3,000	14,256	12,940	61	1,255	5,470	3,249	6	2,115
None	4,139	1,261	11	2,867	1,923	856	11	1,055	2,217	405	.....	1,812
$1 to $99	1,083	1,008	13	62	872	804	12	56	211	204	1	6
$100 to $199	1,000	1,611	9	40	1,391	1,355	9	27	269	256	.....	13
$200 to $299	1,301	1,274	1	26	1,079	1,057	.....	22	222	217	1	4
$300 to $399	1,622	1,617	2	13	1,346	1,339	2	5	286	278	.....	8
$400 to $499	1,771	1,753	2	16	1,405	1,391	2	12	366	362	.....	4
$500 to $599	1,108	1,092	3	13	888	879	3	9	230	226	.....	4
$600 to $799	1,719	1,692	5	22	1,405	1,389	5	11	314	303	.....	11
$800 to $999	937	916	8	13	749	736	6	7	188	180	2	6
$1,000 to $1,499	1,389	1,337	8	14	1,121	1,103	7	11	238	234	1	3
$1,500 to $1,999	1,759	1,744	4	11	1,420	1,409	4	7	339	335	.....	4
$2,000 to $2,999	642	638	.....	4	409	407	.....	2	233	231	.....	2
$3,000 to $3,999	71	69	.....	2	36	35	.....	1	35	34	.....	1
$4,000 to $4,999	14	14	.....	.....	2	2	.....	.....	12	12	.....	.....
$5,000 and over	9	6	.....	3	2	1	.....	1	7	5	.....	2
Not reported	552	157	1	394	239	80	.....	159	313	77	1	235
Median wage or salary income for persons with $1 or more	$608	$511	.....	$287	$498	$501	.....	$211	$553	$554	.....	.....
Percent distribution												
Male	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	.....	100.0
None	13.6	3.3	8.3	83.6	4.5	2.8	6.9	55.6	53.2	4.9	.....	89.1
$1 to $99	1.9	1.9	6.6	0.8	1.8	1.6	6.2	3.7	2.0	2.8	.....	0.2
$100 to $199	3.2	3.3	10.0	1.1	3.3	3.0	10.0	5.2	2.9	4.2	.....	0.3
$200 to $299	5.0	5.6	8.5	0.5	3.2	3.0	8.5	1.8	9.0	13.4	.....	0.4
$300 to $399	4.7	5.1	13.9	0.5	4.1	3.8	14.1	2.0	6.1	9.0	.....	0.2
$400 to $499	4.8	5.2	12.8	0.4	4.9	4.7	12.9	1.7	4.7	6.9	.....	0.2
$500 to $599	4.3	4.5	18.2	0.5	4.8	4.4	19.4	2.0	3.2	4.8	.....	0.2
$600 to $799	10.8	12.3	9.2	1.0	12.8	13.1	9.6	4.1	6.5	9.6	.....	0.4
$800 to $999	10.1	11.6	5.0	0.7	12.9	13.4	6.0	3.1	4.1	6.0	.....	0.3
$1,000 to $1,499	17.1	19.9	3.0	1.0	21.7	22.9	3.1	3.1	7.3	10.7	.....	0.3
$1,500 to $1,999	9.0	10.4	1.2	0.5	10.9	11.5	1.1	1.5	4.7	7.0	.....	0.3
$2,000 to $2,999	3.0	3.3	0.7	0.3	2.1	2.6	0.6	0.9	1.6	3.4	.....	0.2
$3,000 to $3,999	2.7	3.2	0.2	0.2	2.0	2.8	0.2	0.8	3.0	4.5	.....	0.1
$4,000 to $4,999	1.1	1.3	0.1	0.1	1.0	1.0	0.1	0.5	1.5	2.3	.....	0.1
$5,000 and over	1.8	2.0	0.1	0.7	1.1	1.1	0.1	2.2	3.3	4.6	.....	0.4
Not reported	1.9	1.1	1.3	7.8	1.5	1.1	1.2	12.2	2.9	0.8	.....	7.1
Female	100.0	100.0	.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	.....	100.0
None	21.0	7.8	.....	81.9	13.5	6.7	.....	76.2	40.5	12.1	.....	85.7
$1 to $99	5.5	5.2	.....	1.8	6.1	6.3	.....	4.0	3.9	6.1	.....	0.3
$100 to $199	8.4	10.0	.....	1.1	9.7	10.6	.....	1.9	4.9	7.8	.....	0.6
$200 to $299	6.6	7.9	.....	0.7	7.6	8.2	.....	1.6	4.1	6.5	.....	0.2
$300 to $399	8.3	10.0	.....	0.4	9.4	10.4	.....	0.4	5.2	8.3	.....	0.4
$400 to $499	9.0	10.8	.....	0.5	9.8	10.8	.....	0.9	6.7	10.8	.....	0.2
$500 to $599	5.6	6.7	.....	0.4	6.2	6.8	.....	0.6	4.0	6.4	.....	0.2
$600 to $799	8.7	10.5	.....	0.6	9.8	10.8	.....	0.8	5.7	9.0	.....	0.5
$800 to $999	4.7	5.7	.....	0.4	5.3	5.7	.....	0.5	3.4	5.4	.....	0.3
$1,000 to $1,499	6.9	8.3	.....	0.4	7.8	8.5	.....	0.8	4.4	7.0	.....	0.1
$1,500 to $1,999	8.9	10.8	.....	0.3	9.9	11.0	.....	0.5	6.2	10.0	.....	0.2
$2,000 to $2,999	3.2	3.9	.....	0.1	2.9	3.2	.....	0.1	4.3	6.9	.....	0.1
$3,000 to $3,999	0.4	0.4	.....	0.1	0.3	0.3	.....	0.1	0.6	1.0	.....	.....
$4,000 to $4,999	0.1	0.1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	0.2	0.4	.....	.....
$5,000 and over	.....	.....	.....	0.1	.....	.....	.....	0.1	0.1	0.1	.....	0.1
Not reported	2.8	1.0	.....	11.3	1.7	0.6	.....	11.5	5.7	2.3	.....	11.1

[1] Includes statistics for persons for whom the receipt or nonreceipt of other income in 1939 was not reported.

TABLE 17.—WAGE OR SALARY INCOME AND RECEIPT OF OTHER INCOME IN 1939 FOR PERSONS WHO WERE WAGE OR SALARY WORKERS (EXCEPT PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORKERS) IN 1940, BY MONTHS WORKED IN 1939 AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY

[Percent not shown where less than 0.1]

AREA, WAGE OR SALARY INCOME IN 1939, AND SEX	TOTAL					WITHOUT OTHER INCOME IN 1939 [1]					WITH OTHER INCOME IN 1939				
	Total	Less than 6 months and not reported	6 to 8 months	9 to 11 months	12 months	Total	Less than 6 months and not reported	6 to 8 months	9 to 11 months	12 months	Total	Less than 6 months and not reported	6 to 8 months	9 to 11 months	12 months
THE TERRITORY															
Male	134,491	11,064	9,121	16,378	97,928	73,606	7,276	5,944	10,056	50,330	60,885	3,788	3,177	6,322	47,598
None	2,862	2,364	37	85	376	1,846	1,739	12	8	87	1,016	605	25	77	309
$1 to $99	3,040	2,715	142	42	141	1,581	1,376	107	27	71	1,459	1,339	33	15	70
$100 to $199	5,168	2,737	1,484	474	493	2,844	1,798	617	168	261	2,324	939	867	306	232
$200 to $299	11,330	1,368	1,953	1,084	6,915	3,692	952	1,217	544	979	7,638	406	736	540	5,946
$300 to $399	13,908	680	1,977	2,465	8,786	6,126	324	1,269	1,507	2,806	7,782	156	688	958	5,980
$400 to $499	15,246	339	1,187	3,339	10,381	8,204	263	830	1,883	5,228	7,042	76	357	1,456	5,153
$500 to $599	13,720	188	669	2,320	10,543	6,516	143	528	1,229	4,616	7,204	45	141	1,091	5,927
$600 to $799	21,929	166	825	2,408	18,530	11,526	125	656	1,930	9,215	10,403	41	169	478	9,315
$800 to $999	13,001	95	390	1,476	11,040	8,003	65	333	1,117	6,578	4,998	30	57	359	4,462
$1,000 to $1,499	15,521	77	251	1,318	13,875	10,913	51	205	1,042	9,615	4,608	26	46	276	4,260
$1,500 to $1,999	7,352	39	91	595	6,626	5,276	24	72	474	4,706	2,076	15	19	122	1,920
$2,000 to $2,999	6,182	35	34	467	5,646	4,231	18	28	342	3,843	1,951	17	6	125	1,803
$3,000 to $3,999	2,105	19	11	135	1,940	1,182	6	6	79	1,096	918	13	5	56	844
$4,000 to $4,999	930	5	3	44	878	446		1	22	423	484	5	2	22	455
$5000 and over	1,781	10	6	56	1,709	462	2	2	18	440	819	8	4	38	769
Not reported	916	227	51	89	549	663	160	41	66	396	253	67	10	23	153
Median wage or salary income for persons with $1 or more	$527	$156	$347	$531	$721	$714	$172	$378	$570	$854	$549	$123	$290	$490	$695
Female	27,870	6,075	2,905	4,982	13,908	23,127	5,225	2,435	3,927	10,550	5,743	850	480	1,055	3,358
None	1,094	1,656	23	37	278	1,400	1,417	7	6	30	534	239	16	31	248
$1 to $99	2,112	1,793	152	41	126	1,795	1,573	125	31	66	317	220	27	10	60
$100 to $199	3,249	1,567	907	249	526	2,713	1,341	765	203	404	536	226	142	46	122
$200 to $299	2,894	462	805	553	1,048	2,325	395	684	439	807	543	67	121	114	241
$300 to $399	3,530	176	420	650	2,214	2,753	151	416	516	1,669	748	25	74	134	515
$400 to $499	2,979	133	149	458	2,249	2,330	101	131	360	1,728	659	22	18	98	521
$500 to $599	1,658	78	88	240	1,252	1,337	63	70	210	994	321	15	18	30	258
$600 to $799	2,314	73	116	252	1,873	1,887	56	89	199	1,543	427	17	27	53	330
$800 to $999	1,717	24	74	221	898	984	19	61	165	709	233	5	13	26	189
$1,000 to $1,499	1,958	23	60	423	1,452	1,565	19	51	335	1,159	393	4	9	87	293
$1,500 to $1,999	2,716	8	25	1,294	1,289	2,166	8	15	1,134	1,012	550	3	10	280	277
$2,000 to $2,999	882	5	5	289	583	549	1	1	260	287	313	4	4	129	176
$3,000 to $3,999	102		1	41	60	52		1	18	33	50			23	27
$4,000 to $4,999	17		1	8	8	4			2	2	13		1	6	6
$5,000 and over	10			1	9	1				1	9			1	8
Not reported	284	97	9	25	163	187	84	9	18	76	97	3		7	87
Median wage or salary income for persons with $1 or more	$435	$124	$247	$815	$546	$427	$122	$246	$793	$552	$463	$137	$252	$981	$630
Percent distribution															
Male	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
None	2.1	21.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	2.5	24.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	1.7	16.0	0.8	1.2	0.6
$1 to $99	2.3	24.5	1.6	0.3	0.1	2.1	18.9	1.8	0.3	0.1	2.4	35.3	1.1	0.2	0.1
$100 to $199	3.8	24.7	16.3	2.8	0.5	3.9	24.7	10.4	1.7	0.5	3.8	24.8	27.3	4.8	0.5
$200 to $299	8.4	12.4	21.5	6.6	7.1	5.0	13.2	20.5	5.4	1.9	12.5	10.7	23.5	8.5	12.5
$300 to $399	10.3	6.1	21.7	15.1	9.0	8.3	7.2	21.7	15.0	5.6	12.8	4.1	21.7	15.2	12.6
$400 to $499	11.3	3.1	13.0	20.4	10.6	11.1	3.6	14.0	18.7	10.4	11.6	2.0	11.2	23.0	10.8
$500 to $599	10.2	1.7	7.3	14.2	10.8	8.9	2.0	8.9	12.2	9.2	11.8	1.2	4.4	17.3	12.5
$600 to $799	16.3	1.5	9.0	14.7	18.9	15.7	1.7	11.0	15.2	18.3	17.1	1.1	5.3	13.9	19.8
$800 to $999	9.7	0.9	4.3	9.0	11.3	11.0	0.9	5.6	11.1	13.1	8.1	0.8	1.8	5.7	9.4
$1,000 to $1,499	11.5	0.7	2.8	8.0	14.2	14.8	0.7	3.4	10.4	19.1	7.6	0.7	1.4	4.4	8.9
$1,500 to $1,999	5.5	0.4	1.0	3.6	6.8	7.2	0.3	1.2	4.7	9.4	3.4	0.4	0.6	1.9	4.0
$2,000 to $2,999	4.6	0.3	0.4	2.9	5.8	5.7	0.2	0.5	3.4	7.6	3.2	0.4	0.2	2.0	3.8
$3,000 to $3,999	1.6	0.2	0.1	0.8	2.0	1.6	0.1	0.1	0.8	2.2	1.5	0.3	0.2	0.9	1.8
$4,000 to $4,999	0.7			0.3	0.9	0.6			0.2	0.8	0.8	0.1	0.1	0.3	1.0
$5,000 and over	1.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	1.2	0.6			0.2	0.9	1.3	0.2	0.1	0.6	1.6
Not reported	0.7	2.1	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.9	2.2	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.4	1.8	0.3	0.4	0.3
Female	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
None	7.2	27.3	0.8	0.7	2.0	6.6	27.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	9.3	28.1	3.3	2.9	7.4
$1 to $99	7.6	29.5	5.2	0.8	0.9	8.1	30.1	5.2	0.8	0.6	5.5	25.9	5.6	0.9	1.8
$100 to $199	11.7	25.8	31.2	5.0	3.8	12.3	25.7	31.5	5.2	3.8	9.3	26.6	29.6	4.4	3.6
$200 to $299	10.3	7.6	27.7	11.1	7.5	10.5	7.6	28.2	11.2	7.6	9.5	7.9	23.2	10.8	7.2
$300 to $399	12.7	2.9	16.9	13.0	15.9	12.6	2.9	17.2	13.1	16.1	13.0	2.9	15.4	12.7	15.3
$400 to $499	10.7	2.0	5.1	9.2	16.2	10.5	1.9	5.4	9.2	16.4	11.5	2.6	3.7	9.3	15.5
$500 to $599	5.9	1.3	3.0	4.8	9.0	6.0	1.2	2.9	5.3	9.4	5.6	1.8	3.7	2.8	7.7
$600 to $799	8.3	1.2	4.0	5.1	13.5	8.5	1.1	3.7	5.1	14.6	7.4	2.0	5.6	5.0	9.8
$800 to $999	4.4	0.4	2.5	4.4	6.5	4.4	0.4	2.5	5.0	6.7	4.1	0.6	2.7	2.5	3.6
$1,000 to $1,499	7.0	0.4	2.1	8.5	10.4	7.1	0.4	2.1	8.8	11.0	6.8	0.5	1.9	8.2	6.7
$1,500 to $1,999	9.7	0.1	0.9	28.0	9.2	9.8	0.1	0.6	28.9	9.6	9.6	0.4	2.1	26.6	8.2
$2,000 to $2,999	3.1	0.1	0.2	7.8	3.3	2.5			6.6	2.7	5.5	0.5	0.6	13.3	5.2
$3,000 to $3,999	0.4			0.8	0.4	0.2			0.5	0.3	0.9			2.2	0.8
$4,000 to $4,999	0.1			0.2	0.1				0.1		0.2		0.2	0.6	0.2
$5,000 and over					0.1						0.2			0.1	0.2
Not reported	1.0	1.4	0.3	0.5	1.2	0.5	1.6	0.4	0.5	0.7	1.7	0.4		0.7	2.0

[1] Includes statistics for persons for whom the receipt or nonreceipt of other income in 1939 was not reported.

TABLE 17.—WAGE OR SALARY INCOME AND RECEIPT OF OTHER INCOME IN 1939 FOR PERSONS WHO WERE WAGE OR SALARY WORKERS (EXCEPT PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORKERS) IN 1940, BY MONTHS WORKED IN 1939 AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY—Continued

[Percent not shown where less than 0.1]

AREA, WAGE OR SALARY INCOME IN 1939, AND SEX	TOTAL					WITHOUT OTHER INCOME IN 1939 [1]					WITH OTHER INCOME IN 1939				
	Total	Less than 6 months and not reported	6 to 8 months	9 to 11 months	12 months	Total	Less than 6 months and not reported	6 to 8 months	9 to 11 months	12 months	Total	Less than 6 months and not reported	6 to 8 months	9 to 11 months	12 months
HONOLULU CITY															
Male	45,508	4,688	3,355	4,747	32,788	34,378	3,584	2,728	3,771	24,315	11,130	1,074	627	976	8,453
None	1,502	1,247	16	65	174	952	925	1	3	23	550	322	15	62	151
$1 to $99	820	783	33	6	37	544	485	26	6	25	313	298	5	.....	12
$100 to $199	1,509	1,014	264	107	124	1,043	810	136	28	69	466	204	128	79	55
$200 to $299	2,535	616	403	148	1,368	1,040	525	308	66	141	1,495	91	95	82	1,227
$300 to $399	2,309	369	635	235	1,080	1,305	327	519	159	300	1,004	42	106	76	780
$400 to $499	2,381	200	518	379	1,284	1,610	170	448	279	713	771	30	70	100	571
$500 to $599	2,032	100	391	413	1,128	1,499	83	358	348	710	533	17	33	65	418
$600 to $799	5,583	97	542	805	4,139	4,508	79	452	718	3,249	1,074	18	80	87	889
$800 to $999	5,284	54	245	803	4,182	4,613	39	211	720	3,643	671	15	34	83	539
$1,000 to $1,499	9,051	47	168	808	7,968	7,681	39	129	732	6,931	1,190	8	39	116	1,027
$1,500 to $1,999	4,738	19	63	370	4,286	3,958	16	53	314	3,575	780	3	10	56	711
$2,000 to $2,999	4,246	20	25	296	3,905	3,309	15	19	229	3,046	937	5	6	67	859
$3,000 to $3,999	1,443	5	9	97	1,331	946	3	5	58	880	496	2	4	39	451
$4,000 to $4,999	594	.....	2	33	559	351	.....	1	18	332	243	.....	1	15	227
$5,000 and over	904	3	6	50	845	392	1	2	18	371	512	2	4	32	474
Not reported	540	64	45	72	359	447	47	38	55	307	93	17	7	17	52
Median wage or salary income for persons with $1 or more	$970	$187	$462	$853	$1,174	$1,021	$200	$479	$870	$1,227	$723	$134	$370	$707	$864
Female	16,228	3,308	1,787	2,719	8,409	12,878	2,775	1,522	2,155	6,441	3,349	533	265	564	1,967
None	1,261	1,009	11	22	219	856	833	3	2	18	405	176	8	20	201
$1 to $99	1,008	855	79	15	63	804	714	62	12	16	204	141	11	3	49
$100 to $199	1,611	840	465	80	226	1,355	724	396	66	169	256	116	69	14	57
$200 to $299	1,274	273	471	196	334	1,057	235	406	151	265	217	38	65	45	69
$300 to $399	1,617	111	371	296	839	1,339	97	325	238	679	278	14	46	58	160
$400 to $499	1,753	59	115	257	1,322	1,391	47	104	206	1,034	362	12	11	51	288
$500 to $599	1,092	36	64	130	862	876	29	51	109	687	216	7	13	21	175
$600 to $799	1,692	50	93	170	1,379	1,389	36	73	134	1,146	303	14	20	36	233
$800 to $999	916	16	58	151	691	736	11	48	134	543	180	5	10	17	148
$1,000 to $1,499	1,337	14	41	239	1,043	1,103	10	36	185	872	234	4	5	54	171
$1,500 to $1,999	1,744	5	14	829	896	1,409	4	10	680	715	335	1	4	149	181
$2,000 to $2,999	638	4	2	288	344	407	1	.....	193	213	231	3	2	95	131
$3,000 to $3,999	69	.....	.....	21	48	35	.....	.....	11	24	34	.....	.....	10	24
$4,000 to $4,999	14	.....	1	6	7	2	.....	.....	1	1	12	.....	1	5	6
$5,000 and over	6	.....	.....	1	5	1	.....	.....	.....	1	5	.....	.....	1	4
Not reported	190	36	8	18	128	113	34	8	13	58	77	2	.....	5	70
Median wage or salary income for person with $1 or more	$511	$133	$273	$1,093	$655	$501	$133	$273	$1,027	$658	$554	$131	$275	$1,319	$643
Percent distribution															
Male	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
None	3.3	26.9	0.5	1.4	0.5	2.8	26.0	.....	0.1	0.1	4.9	30.0	2.4	6.4	1.8
$1 to $99	1.9	16.9	1.0	0.1	0.1	1.6	13.6	1.0	0.2	0.1	2.8	27.7	0.8	.....	0.1
$100 to $199	3.4	21.9	7.9	2.3	0.4	3.0	22.7	5.0	0.7	0.3	4.2	19.0	20.4	8.1	0.7
$200 to $299	5.6	13.3	12.0	3.1	4.2	3.0	14.7	11.3	1.8	0.6	13.4	8.5	15.2	8.4	14.5
$300 to $399	5.1	8.0	18.9	5.0	3.3	3.8	9.2	19.0	4.2	1.2	9.0	3.9	16.9	7.8	9.2
$400 to $499	5.2	4.3	15.4	8.0	3.9	4.7	4.8	16.4	7.4	2.9	6.9	2.8	11.2	10.2	6.8
$500 to $599	4.5	2.2	11.7	8.7	3.4	4.4	2.3	13.1	9.2	2.9	4.8	1.6	5.3	6.7	4.9
$600 to $799	12.3	2.1	16.2	17.0	12.6	13.1	2.2	16.9	19.0	13.4	9.6	1.7	12.8	8.9	10.5
$800 to $999	11.6	1.2	7.3	17.0	12.8	13.4	1.1	7.7	19.1	15.0	6.0	1.4	5.4	8.5	6.4
$1,000 to $1,499	19.9	1.0	5.0	18.3	24.3	22.9	1.1	5.1	19.9	28.5	10.7	0.7	4.6	11.9	12.3
$1,500 to $1,999	10.4	0.4	1.9	7.8	13.1	11.5	0.4	1.9	8.3	14.7	7.0	0.3	1.6	5.7	8.4
$2,000 to $2,999	9.3	0.4	0.7	6.2	11.9	9.6	0.4	0.7	6.1	12.5	8.4	0.5	1.0	6.9	10.2
$3,000 to $3,999	3.2	0.1	0.3	2.0	4.1	2.8	0.1	0.2	1.5	3.6	4.5	0.2	0.6	4.0	5.3
$4,000 to $4,999	1.3	.....	0.1	0.7	1.7	1.0	.....	.....	0.5	1.4	2.2	.....	0.2	1.5	2.7
$5,000 and over	2.0	0.1	0.2	1.1	2.6	1.1	.....	0.1	0.5	1.5	4.6	0.2	0.6	3.3	5.6
Not reported	1.2	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.3	67.8	1.6	1.1	1.7	0.6
Female	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
None	7.8	30.5	0.6	0.8	2.6	6.6	30.0	0.2	0.1	0.3	12.1	33.0	3.0	3.4	10.3
$1 to $99	6.2	25.8	4.1	0.6	0.8	6.2	25.7	4.1	0.6	0.2	6.1	26.5	4.2	0.5	2.5
$100 to $199	9.9	25.4	26.0	2.9	2.7	10.5	26.1	26.0	3.1	2.6	7.6	21.8	26.0	2.4	2.9
$200 to $299	7.9	8.3	26.4	7.2	4.0	8.2	8.5	26.7	7.1	4.1	6.5	7.1	24.5	7.7	3.5
$300 to $399	10.0	3.4	20.8	10.9	10.0	10.4	3.5	21.4	11.1	10.5	8.3	2.6	17.4	9.9	8.1
$400 to $499	10.8	1.8	6.4	9.5	15.7	10.8	1.7	6.8	9.6	16.1	10.8	2.3	4.2	8.7	14.6
$500 to $599	6.7	1.1	3.6	4.8	10.3	6.8	1.0	3.4	5.1	10.7	6.4	1.3	4.9	3.6	8.9
$600 to $799	10.4	1.5	5.2	6.3	16.4	10.8	1.3	4.8	6.3	17.8	9.0	2.6	7.5	6.2	11.8
$800 to $999	5.6	0.5	3.2	5.6	8.2	5.7	0.4	3.2	6.3	8.4	5.4	0.9	3.8	2.9	7.5
$1,000 to $1,499	8.2	0.4	3.3	8.8	12.4	8.6	0.4	2.4	8.7	13.5	7.0	0.8	1.9	9.2	8.7
$1,500 to $1,999	10.8	0.2	0.8	30.5	10.7	10.9	0.1	0.7	31.9	11.1	10.0	0.2	1.5	25.5	9.2
$2,000 to $2,999	3.9	0.1	0.1	10.6	4.1	3.2	.....	.....	9.0	3.3	6.9	0.6	0.8	16.3	6.7
$3,000 to $3,999	0.4	.....	.....	0.8	0.6	0.3	.....	.....	0.5	0.4	1.0	.....	.....	1.7	1.2
$4,000 to $4,999	0.1	.....	0.1	0.2	0.1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	0.4	.....	0.4	0.9	0.3
$5,000 and over	.....	.....	.....	.....	0.1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	0.1	.....	.....	0.2	0.2
Not reported	1.2	1.1	0.4	0.7	1.5	0.9	1.2	0.5	0.6	0.9	2.3	0.4	.....	0.9	3.6

[1] Includes statistics for persons for whom the receipt or nonreceipt of other income in 1939 was not reported.

TABLE 18.—COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION, BY COUNTIES: 1940 AND 1930

SUBJECT	The Territory	Hawaii County	Honolulu County	Kauai County	Maui County
SEX, RACE, AND NATIVITY					
Total population: 1940	**423,330**	**73,276**	**258,256**	**35,515**	**55,980**
Male	245,135	42,269	149,042	21,626	32,198
Female	178,195	31,007	109,214	14,192	23,782
Native (all races)	370,717	62,751	227,612	31,472	48,872
Male	214,645	36,003	131,621	19,017	28,004
Female	156,072	26,758	95,991	12,455	20,868
Foreign born (all races)	52,613	10,515	30,644	4,346	7,108
Male	30,490	6,266	17,421	2,609	4,194
Female	22,123	4,249	13,223	1,737	2,914
By race:					
Hawaiian	14,375	3,451	7,090	888	2,946
Part Hawaiian	49,935	7,901	31,453	2,566	7,915
Caucasian	103,791	9,821	82,516	4,465	6,989
Chinese	28,774	1,832	24,567	862	1,513
Filipino	52,569	12,845	19,066	10,149	10,509
Japanese	157,905	34,865	83,387	15,470	24,183
Other races	15,981	2,561	10,177	1,313	1,925
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Hawaiian	3.4	4.7	2.7	2.5	5.3
Part Hawaiian	11.8	10.8	12.2	7.4	14.1
Caucasian	24.5	13.4	32.0	12.5	12.5
Chinese	6.8	2.5	9.5	2.4	2.7
Filipino	12.4	17.5	7.4	28.3	18.8
Japanese	37.3	47.6	32.3	43.2	43.2
Total population: 1930	**368,336**	**73,225**	**202,223**	**33,042**	**58,146**
Hawaiian	22,636	4,864	12,103	1,363	4,306
Part Hawaiian	28,224	5,071	16,359	1,758	5,036
Caucasian	80,373	10,358	57,702	4,770	7,543
Chinese	27,179	2,096	22,068	1,201	1,812
Filipino	63,052	15,256	20,390	12,562	14,144
Japanese	139,631	33,748	69,585	13,005	22,393
Other races	7,241	1,230	4,716	383	912
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Hawaiian	6.1	6.6	6.0	3.8	7.7
Part Hawaiian	7.7	6.9	8.1	4.9	9.0
Caucasian	21.8	14.1	28.4	13.3	13.4
Chinese	7.4	2.9	10.9	3.3	3.2
Filipino	17.1	21.8	10.0	35.0	25.2
Japanese	37.9	46.0	34.3	38.7	39.9
PERSONS 21 YEARS OLD AND OVER					
Male	**145,048**	**24,763**	**86,703**	**13,513**	**18,065**
Native—All races	114,901	18,516	71,365	10,918	13,882
Foreign born—Naturalized	3,432	426	2,627	137	242
Foreign born—First papers	272	34	204	20	14
Foreign born—No papers and not reported	26,441	5,787	14,287	2,440	3,927
Female	**87,608**	**13,794**	**57,343**	**6,218**	**10,194**
Native—All races	65,707	9,561	44,297	4,523	7,326
Foreign born—Naturalized	1,987	192	1,580	91	124
Foreign born—First papers	120	5	103	5	7
Foreign born—No papers and not reported	19,789	4,026	11,363	1,633	2,767

SUBJECT	The Territory	Hawaii County	Honolulu County	Kauai County	Maui County
MARITAL STATUS					
Male, 15 years old and over	**178,663**	**29,676**	**111,215**	**15,213**	**22,564**
Single	98,128	15,648	62,489	8,542	11,449
Married	71,715	12,197	43,852	6,355	9,281
Widowed	6,211	1,455	3,097	706	953
Divorced	2,609	376	1,777	185	271
Female, 15 years old and over	**113,857**	**18,585**	**72,738**	**9,894**	**12,630**
Single	30,153	6,135	22,899	2,793	4,326
Married	66,569	10,793	43,269	6,096	6,390
Widowed	8,819	1,494	5,769	680	876
Divorced	2,117	153	1,782	53	139
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE					
Persons 5 and 6 years old	16,644	3,221	9,373	1,454	2,596
Number attending school	8,576	1,368	5,204	722	1,134
Percent attending school	51.5	42.5	55.7	49.7	43.7
Persons 7 to 13 years old	64,915	12,526	36,790	5,725	9,874
Number attending school	64,094	12,409	36,202	5,667	9,736
Percent attending school	98.7	99.1	98.4	99.0	98.6
Persons 14 and 15 years old	19,140	3,790	10,750	1,732	2,878
Number attending school	17,893	3,510	10,121	1,607	2,655
Percent attending school	93.5	92.9	94.1	92.8	92.3
Persons 16 and 17 years old	18,111	3,401	10,546	1,568	2,596
Number attending school	12,152	2,146	7,495	985	1,517
Percent attending school	67.1	63.1	70.2	62.8	58.3
Persons 18 to 20 years old	31,786	4,383	21,813	2,116	3,474
Number attending school	6,292	955	4,969	504	714
Percent attending school	19.8	22.5	18.7	23.8	20.5
Persons 21 to 24 years old	39,744	4,757	28,842	2,297	3,848
Number attending school	1,450	185	1,019	97	149
Percent attending school	3.6	3.9	3.5	4.2	3.9
YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED					
Male, 25 years old and over	**100,280**	**22,219**	**60,741**	**12,253**	**15,077**
No school years completed	23,969	5,669	10,194	3,444	4,663
Grade school: 1 to 4 years	23,769	6,245	9,649	3,881	3,994
5 or 6 years	14,988	3,429	7,804	1,527	2,228
7 or 8 years	22,252	3,139	14,589	1,539	3,985
High school: 1 to 3 years	12,705	1,226	9,535	557	1,096
4 years	12,434	1,261	9,736	541	896
College: 1 to 3 years	3,511	340	2,730	196	245
4 years or more	6,207	504	5,105	331	267
Not reported	454	86	277	38	53
Median school years completed	6.6	4.5	8.0	5.8	4.4
Female, 25 years old and over	**72,645**	**11,231**	**47,483**	**5,187**	**8,484**
No school years completed	11,774	2,010	7,032	1,079	1,653
Grade school: 1 to 4 years	11,838	2,401	6,283	1,203	1,751
5 or 6 years	10,990	2,426	6,158	789	1,617
7 or 8 years	13,823	1,999	8,956	1,105	1,763
High school: 1 to 3 years	6,837	822	5,230	284	515
4 years	9,105	807	7,468	318	512
College: 1 to 3 years	4,172	456	3,467	228	321
4 years or more	3,955	412	3,060	189	294
Not reported	149	18	105	9	19
Median school years completed	7.2	5.9	7.9	5.8	5.0

TABLE 19.—AGE, RACE, AND SEX, BY COUNTIES: 1940 AND 1930

County and age	All classes			Hawaiian		Part Hawaiian		Caucasian		Chinese		Filipino		Japanese		Other races	
	Total	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1940:																	
Hawaii County	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1,766	1,707	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1,347	1,014
Under 5 years	7,412	[illegible]	[illegible]	142	146	776	810	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	512	476	[illegible]	[illegible]	133	121
5 to 9 years	[illegible]	4,110	[illegible]	[illegible]	176	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	2,146	160	[illegible]
10 to 14 years	[illegible]	4,712	[illegible]	194	210	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	2,619	[illegible]	194	142
15 to 19 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	170	[illegible]	476	[illegible]	[illegible]	101	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	176	144
20 to 24 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	671	84	101	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	91
25 to 29 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	84	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1,212	1,121	86	77
30 to 34 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	114	[illegible]	170	[illegible]	[illegible]	401	[illegible]	[illegible]	2,347	119	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
35 to 39 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	146	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	44	[illegible]
40 to 44 years	3,775	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	127	[illegible]	[illegible]	276	[illegible]	41	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
45 to 49 years	[illegible]	1,761	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
50 to 54 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	111	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	31	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1,011	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
55 to 64 years	4,140	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	91	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
65 to 74 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	4	[illegible]	414	167	17
75 years and over	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	74	4	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	14
Not reported	[illegible]	[illegible]	14	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	1	1	[illegible]	1	1	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]		
21 years and over	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	7,413	[illegible]	[illegible]
Honolulu County	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Under 5 years	[illegible]	11,770	[illegible]	[illegible]	713	[illegible]	2,781	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	919	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
5 to 9 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	12,134	[illegible]	351	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	2,207	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
10 to 14 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	12,174	[illegible]	314	2,314	[illegible]	2,147	[illegible]	[illegible]	1,518	[illegible]	[illegible]	5,747	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
15 to 19 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	319	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
20 to 24 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	12,414	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
25 to 29 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
30 to 34 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
35 to 39 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	7,317	[illegible]	[illegible]	711	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
40 to 44 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	2,714	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
45 to 49 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
50 to 54 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	104
55 to 64 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
65 to 74 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	767	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	11	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
75 years and over	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	61	[illegible]	61	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	7	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Not reported	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	17	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	[illegible]
21 years and over	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	7,907	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	19,717	[illegible]	[illegible]
Kauai County	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Under 5 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	47	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	700	81	[illegible]
5 to 9 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	211	[illegible]	[illegible]	44	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	107
10 to 14 years	[illegible]	2,119	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
15 to 19 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	176	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	70	[illegible]
20 to 24 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	111	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
25 to 29 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	31	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	47
30 to 34 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	141	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
35 to 39 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	341	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
40 to 44 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	17	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	14	[illegible]
45 to 49 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	14	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	12	[illegible]
50 to 54 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	11	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	31	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	17
55 to 64 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	114	[illegible]	[illegible]	11	174	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	17
65 to 74 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	11	9	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	7	[illegible]	9	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	9
75 years and over	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	3	[illegible]	20	[illegible]	...	6		77	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Not reported	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	...	...	...	...	1	2	1	...	[illegible]		1		...	...
21 years and over	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	4,112	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Maui County	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Under 5 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	317	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1,164	[illegible]	[illegible]
5 to 9 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	711	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	131	[illegible]
10 to 14 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	142
15 to 19 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	70	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
20 to 24 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	117	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
25 to 29 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
30 to 34 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	142	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
35 to 39 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	191	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
40 to 44 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	211	67	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
45 to 49 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
50 to 54 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	77	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	121	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	6
55 to 64 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	16	134	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
65 to 74 years	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	70	[illegible]	12	[illegible]	4	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	9
75 years and over	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	11	[illegible]	9	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	6	4	...	[illegible]	81	17	4
Not reported	[illegible]	10	3	...	...	[illegible]	1	5	...	...	...	3	...	...	...	...	1
21 years and over	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	711	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

TABLE 19.—AGE, RACE, AND SEX, BY COUNTIES: 1940 AND 1930—Continued

County and age	All classes			Hawaiian		Part Hawaiian		Caucasian		Chinese		Filipino		Japanese		Other races	
	Total	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1930																	
Hawaii County	73,325	43,148	30,177	2,476	[illegible]	2,500	2,361	5,361	4,687	1,300	786	14,676	1,808	18,386	13,448	[illegible]	[illegible]
Under 5 years	9,882	4,978	4,904	285	265	606	601	700	654	103	108	827	560	2,700	2,647	79	75
5 to 9 years	9,752	4,930	4,822	292	279	571	476	732	681	113	116	336	326	2,831	2,846	100	76
10 to 14 years	7,996	4,106	3,890	279	284	432	414	667	610	115	104	186	160	2,266	2,280	82	77
15 to 19 years	6,504	3,807	2,697	255	300	277	295	561	533	90	94	1,002	97	1,886	1,440	16	28
20 to 24 years	7,697	5,799	1,898	192	188	162	175	446	430	66	80	4,095	135	881	805	12	12
25 to 29 years	6,779	4,943	1,836	124	155	119	118	366	379	58	82	3,374	212	[illegible]	[illegible]	13	28
30 to 34 years	5,001	3,293	1,708	128	144	106	88	335	319	80	42	2,026	157	848	915	7	28
35 to 44 years	7,835	4,871	2,964	265	268	132	132	613	542	57	50	1,971	154	1,736	1,708	87	28
45 to 54 years	5,994	4,094	1,900	260	251	104	94	480	325	148	42	667	57	2,313	1,170	287	21
55 to 64 years	4,010	2,980	1,030	200	146	82	66	304	170	284	15	127	10	1,520	602	148	8
65 to 74 years	1,435	1,104	331	108	90	31	28	268	98	197	4	30	3	813	115	22	3
75 years and over	391	266	125	88	52	7	7	68	64	98	3	3	1	32	9	6	......
Not reported	59	33	26	13	14	2	1	6	7	......	......	2	......	11	4	......	......
Honolulu County	202,923	119,108	83,815	6,965	6,136	7,000	8,370	26,756	22,940	13,082	9,998	15,661	4,730	36,900	32,500	2,765	1,870
Under 5 years	26,144	13,398	12,746	696	672	1,845	1,783	2,252	2,221	1,498	1,380	1,262	1,295	5,606	5,150	294	263
5 to 9 years	25,461	12,982	12,479	635	634	1,479	1,526	2,266	2,211	1,526	1,479	882	780	5,711	5,464	304	304
10 to 14 years	20,593	10,305	10,288	600	622	1,109	1,143	1,966	2,046	1,298	1,232	454	460	4,580	4,306	310	310
15 to 19 years	19,190	10,850	8,340	573	616	882	915	2,675	1,866	1,141	1,081	914	294	3,424	3,475	250	154
20 to 24 years	24,050	17,307	6,743	528	595	678	705	9,450	1,678	924	735	3,251	364	2,312	2,340	115	138
25 to 29 years	20,102	13,065	7,037	483	530	524	608	4,494	2,175	942	745	3,340	687	2,380	2,219	82	125
30 to 34 years	15,086	8,807	6,279	408	430	374	426	2,594	1,962	1,009	644	2,368	270	1,706	2,294	88	170
35 to 44 years	23,159	13,487	9,672	831	886	586	686	4,178	3,066	1,073	750	2,492	480	4,080	3,787	298	157
45 to 54 years	16,265	10,224	5,941	600	502	207	283	2,400	1,306	1,251	673	667	117	4,390	2,451	636	100
55 to 64 years	8,687	6,008	2,679	265	264	126	150	1,162	951	1,806	266	108	26	2,430	1,073	282	65
65 to 74 years	2,991	2,030	962	188	146	54	58	504	456	571	80	34	9	465	168	73	20
75 years and over	846	540	306	86	70	30	18	214	290	132	25	6	6	26	11	6	6
Not reported	41	26	15	......	3	......	......	9	4	5	3	3	1	4	5	2	......
Kauai County	35,942	22,672	13,270	696	677	661	687	2,047	2,[illegible]	985	813	9,916	1,046	7,401	6,414	365	139
Under 5 years	4,330	2,216	2,124	77	67	206	196	307	320	84	48	471	443	1,071	1,026	30	36
5 to 9 years	4,399	2,181	2,218	85	74	188	194	298	326	70	57	380	365	1,212	1,267	31	35
10 to 14 years	3,432	1,751	1,681	61	79	185	130	238	306	80	47	130	131	966	987	31	21
15 to 19 years	3,184	2,013	1,171	64	71	95	106	297	266	80	37	813	81	688	614	9	7
20 to 24 years	4,857	4,041	816	44	49	53	86	209	195	39	25	3,241	121	489	267	5	2
25 to 29 years	3,960	3,076	884	36	47	34	52	186	140	29	26	2,457	228	348	282	2	6
30 to 34 years	2,953	2,146	807	44	44	35	42	161	140	26	20	1,588	123	286	416	4	13
35 to 44 years	3,642	2,437	1,205	91	94	62	44	294	236	31	27	1,476	166	677	626	16	11
45 to 54 years	2,537	1,740	788	62	68	31	25	214	147	66	14	373	44	886	462	65	5
55 to 64 years	1,626	1,226	400	57	45	16	16	122	82	246	12	95	13	640	251	46	1
65 to 74 years	645	512	133	29	20	12	4	82	30	172	......	12	4	192	88	12	4
75 years and over	168	125	43	17	9	4	1	27	26	41	......	2	1	18	5	4	1
Not reported	3	3	......	......	......	......	......	......	......	......	......	3	......	......	......	......	......
Maui County	56,146	34,715	21,434	2,184	2,126	2,012	2,094	3,186	3,066	1,261	901	11,675	2,160	12,880	10,173	615	597
Under 5 years	7,815	3,979	3,836	319	224	601	540	494	500	103	73	614	606	1,873	1,814	73	66
5 to 9 years	7,507	3,800	3,707	318	224	501	468	503	543	84	107	575	390	2,044	1,917	76	76
10 to 14 years	6,021	3,073	2,948	223	255	429	400	526	473	84	80	188	180	1,591	1,580	84	45
15 to 19 years	4,608	2,646	1,962	235	184	310	298	415	409	64	58	579	94	1,081	897	25	15
20 to 24 years	6,163	4,631	1,532	178	160	182	182	348	364	60	74	3,460	173	680	580	13	11
25 to 29 years	5,651	4,230	1,381	146	138	137	130	276	202	62	86	2,876	315	648	642	6	14
30 to 34 years	4,425	3,012	1,413	133	146	106	97	287	246	56	36	1,680	186	586	570	9	22
35 to 44 years	6,181	3,981	2,200	280	270	168	160	485	408	80	58	1,677	187	1,276	1,160	68	35
45 to 54 years	4,251	2,908	1,343	343	236	66	56	330	340	146	36	576	40	1,380	680	160	11
55 to 64 years	2,345	1,684	611	186	149	47	35	194	116	246	15	76	7	865	287	81	11
65 to 74 years	800	632	168	96	86	23	18	169	67	160	4	9	......	169	46	36	......
75 years and over	274	187	87	36	35	5	4	44	41	81	3	3	1	16	2	3	1
Not reported	......	......	......	......	......	......	......	......	......	......	......	......	......	......	......	......	......

TABLE 20.—PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS, MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, INDUSTRY GROUP, AND SEX, BY COUNTIES: 1940

EMPLOYMENT STATUS, MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, AND INDUSTRY GROUP	THE TERRITORY		HAWAII COUNTY		HONOLULU COUNTY		KAUAI COUNTY		MAUI COUNTY	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Total population (all ages)	965,135	178,195	42,969	31,007	149,048	109,214	31,696	14,196	32,198	23,782
EMPLOYMENT STATUS										
Population 14 years old and over	183,448	118,238	30,614	19,457	113,857	75,696	16,280	9,294	22,677	14,556
In labor force	151,648	36,584	25,420	5,924	93,879	25,789	13,880	2,592	18,470	4,309
Percent of population 14 years old and over	82.7	30.9	82.9	30.4	82.5	31.6	85.4	28.7	81.4	29.6
Employed (except on emergency work)	145,659	35,137	24,570	5,748	89,844	22,649	13,588	2,532	17,657	4,208
On public emergency work	2,248	78	354	5	1,334	86	160	3	410	4
Seeking work	3,741	1,369	496	171	2,700	1,074	142	27	403	97
Not in labor force	31,800	81,654	5,194	13,533	19,979	51,909	2,379	6,962	4,208	10,250
EMPLOYED WORKERS BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP										
Employed (except on emergency work)	145,659	35,137	24,570	5,748	89,844	22,649	13,588	2,532	17,657	4,208
Professional workers	4,226	5,264	644	793	2,841	3,440	287	300	456	641
Semiprofessional workers	1,094	317	119	35	801	247	74	15	100	20
Farmers and farm managers	3,048	306	1,217	147	1,174	228	189	29	468	103
Proprietors, managers, and officials, exc. farm	9,564	1,958	1,162	347	7,299	1,373	432	87	681	171
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	12,371	6,340	1,543	777	8,927	4,752	779	316	1,122	495
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	15,526	465	2,244	56	10,950	311	1,413	43	1,619	51
Operatives and kindred workers	14,422	4,659	2,084	509	9,191	3,661	1,319	187	1,828	802
Domestic service workers	2,502	6,518	236	882	1,864	4,367	154	573	248	696
Service workers, except domestic	32,684	3,776	889	495	30,904	2,649	317	223	574	409
Farm laborers (wage workers) and farm foremen	35,004	2,228	11,642	857	7,748	309	6,976	395	8,638	667
Farm laborers (unpaid family workers)	1,091	1,669	601	708	346	642	28	89	116	230
Laborers, except farm and mine	14,255	1,224	2,066	104	8,823	765	1,285	176	1,747	189
Occupation not reported	370	203	91	36	194	125	33	7	60	35
EMPLOYED WORKERS BY INDUSTRY GROUP										
Employed (except on emergency work)	145,659	35,137	24,570	5,748	89,844	22,649	13,588	2,532	17,657	4,208
Sugar industry	33,289	3,491	13,619	1,015	5,079	407	5,094	431	7,504	648
Agriculture (exc. sugar), forestry, and fishery	14,326	2,926	2,995	611	5,925	1,063	1,094	155	4,734	497
Agriculture (exc. sugar)	13,110	2,493	2,749	607	4,887	1,040	1,016	154	4,458	492
Forestry, except logging and fishery	1,216	33	246	4	038	23	68	1	266	5
Mining	280	6	27	.....	201	5	7	.....	15	1
Construction	10,653	94	1,279	10	5,053	51	560	1	788	9
Manufacturing (exc. sugar)	8,962	3,474	690	287	7,106	2,508	648	191	716	494
Food and kindred products (exc. sugar)	4,805	2,704	238	73	3,617	1,988	390	178	560	465
Tobacco manufactures	2	.....	1	.....	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Textile mill products	24	164	9	142	12	14	.....	1	3	7
Apparel and other fabricated textile products	33	135	.....	13	32	117	.....	1	1	4
Logging	35	1	25	.....	8	1	2	.....	.....	.....
Sawmills and planing mills	142	8	24	1	103	4	12	.....	3	.....
Furniture and misc. wooden goods	134	26	13	2	112	23	1	.....	8	1
Paper and allied products	124	10	91	1	33	9	.....	.....	.....	.....
Printing, publishing, and allied industries	1,200	290	119	35	998	203	27	11	56	11
Chemicals and allied products	248	31	42	7	175	21	2	.....	29	3
Rubber products	16	.....	.....	.....	15	.....	.....	.....	1	.....
Leather and leather products	28	14	1	.....	25	14	.....	.....	2	.....
Stone, clay, and glass products	109	1	15	.....	81	1	1	.....	9	.....
Iron and steel and their products	496	44	62	1	394	40	7	.....	33	3
Nonferrous metals and their products	35	3	3	1	30	2	2	.....	.....	.....
Machinery	141	14	10	2	122	12	1	.....	8	.....
Transportation equipment	1,159	18	8	.....	1,146	18	2	.....	3	.....
Other and not specified manufacturing industries	231	44	26	9	202	35	1	.....	.....	.....
Transportation, communication, and other public utilities	8,095	687	1,069	63	5,731	507	647	97	791	69
Railroads (inc. railroad repair shops) and ry. exp. service	502	9	191	1	476	7	71	.....	160	1
Trucking service	576	18	67	.....	360	13	38	.....	61	2
Other transportation	4,320	133	564	13	3,124	109	279	4	353	7
Communication	547	243	56	37	408	157	25	20	28	29
Utilities	1,737	87	191	12	1,333	71	34	3	179	1
Wholesale and retail trade	14,794	7,029	1,835	988	10,912	5,058	800	410	1,257	576
Wholesale trade	2,285	317	249	30	1,904	289	37	4	95	4
Food and dairy products stores, and milk retailing	3,462	1,499	530	295	2,282	940	217	89	433	175
Eating and drinking places	1,719	1,869	129	202	1,460	1,438	52	91	48	140
Motor vehicles and accessories retailing, and filling stations	1,531	133	208	19	1,081	93	110	15	132	6
Other retail trade	5,787	3,214	719	452	4,155	2,300	384	211	529	251
Finance, insurance, and real estate	1,611	501	131	30	1,338	447	69	9	83	15
Business and repair services	2,743	133	375	10	1,890	194	215	10	353	9
Automobile storage, rental, and repair services	1,878	45	305	4	1,173	30	165	8	235	3
Business and repair services, exc. automobile	865	108	70	6	647	94	50	2	96	6
Personal services	5,516	9,549	579	1,319	4,176	6,929	353	748	409	953
Domestic service	2,532	6,697	283	904	1,818	4,505	217	582	214	706
Hotels and lodging places	1,253	617	109	112	1,051	416	29	32	64	57
Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing services	796	1,030	66	85	649	896	33	20	39	27
Miscellaneous personal services	945	1,205	120	218	658	1,010	75	114	92	163
Amusement, recreation, and related services	1,017	470	149	75	685	230	73	30	111	45
Professional and related services	4,611	6,706	676	1,023	3,079	4,431	295	488	561	901
Government	35,911	895	716	74	25,280	730	273	39	333	55
Industry not reported	968	439	945	43	863	305	71	33	88	73

TABLE 21.—RACE AND AGE, BY SEX, FOR JUDICIAL DISTRICTS AND CENSUS TRACTS, BY COUNTIES: 1940

COUNTY, JUDICIAL DISTRICT, AND CENSUS TRACT	Total population	Sex	All classes	RACE							AGE (YEARS)									
				Hawaiian	Part Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Other races	Under 5	5 to 14	15 to 24	25 to 34	35 to 44	45 to 54	55 to 64	65 to 74	75 and over and not reported	21 and over
Hawaii County	73,976	M	42,969	1,744	3,904	5,145	1,064	10,594	18,271	1,547	3,762	8,831	7,417	8,906	5,569	3,604	2,762	1,694	435	24,762
		F	31,007	1,707	3,997	4,676	768	2,251	16,584	1,014	3,656	8,786	7,034	3,964	3,070	2,369	1,375	658	199	12,794
Puna district	7,733	M	4,515	212	238	327	30	1,179	2,434	95	376	967	779	850	601	379	223	208	32	2,653
		F	3,218	181	247	313	25	207	2,179	66	412	914	744	332	290	271	109	74	12	1,286
Tract H-1	2,475	M	1,475	162	154	24	9	364	743	19	127	346	251	222	181	130	126	80	12	830
		F	1,000	133	147	27	11	59	622	1	135	303	216	80	101	84	59	20	2	415
Tract H-2	5,258	M	3,040	50	84	303	21	815	1,691	76	249	621	528	628	420	249	197	128	20	1,823
		F	2,218	48	100	286	14	148	1,557	65	277	611	528	252	189	187	110	54	10	868
South Hilo district	32,588	M	17,892	530	1,689	2,835	588	3,260	8,342	648	1,679	3,894	3,412	3,305	2,169	1,438	1,117	707	171	10,043
		F	14,696	512	1,778	2,676	419	876	7,972	462	1,567	3,948	3,484	2,014	1,515	1,096	629	222	111	6,879
Hilo city, total	23,353	M	12,427	499	1,564	2,176	530	1,607	5,659	422	1,207	2,803	2,463	2,131	1,445	968	756	504	120	6,838
		F	10,926	450	1,663	2,079	381	531	5,548	274	1,140	2,817	2,650	1,611	1,140	765	476	233	94	5,254
Tract H-3	2,963	M	1,552	265	482	168	29	55	544	8	175	406	278	245	180	128	87	51	7	796
		F	1,411	234	475	143	20	31	506	2	186	366	303	207	160	97	54	27	11	681
Tract H-4	9,886	M	5,192	120	660	912	275	583	2,468	174	593	1,153	1,027	884	590	388	314	195	48	2,793
		F	4,694	119	706	913	177	256	2,387	136	522	1,224	1,110	735	463	291	225	88	36	2,252
Tract H-5	6,402	M	3,298	60	343	851	213	201	1,382	158	247	761	711	536	385	284	178	157	39	1,823
		F	3,104	60	389	826	182	81	1,469	97	269	692	824	481	349	233	137	80	39	1,612
Tract H-6A	4,102	M	2,385	24	78	245	13	678	1,265	85	192	483	447	466	290	213	177	101	16	1,423
		F	1,717	37	93	197	2	163	1,186	38	163	535	413	188	168	144	60	38	8	729
Tract H-6B	893	M	569	1	2	75	......	207	255	28	38	105	98	125	89	51	43	15	5	338
		F	324	2	1	50	1	32	223	15	35	114	71	23	35	29	11	5	1	122
Tract H-7	6,790	M	3,996	55	99	498	46	1,254	1,897	147	348	797	694	891	511	312	259	152	32	2,339
		F	2,794	58	96	471	17	292	1,726	134	235	838	606	306	265	229	122	70	12	1,192
Tract H-8	1,552	M	900	5	24	86	12	192	531	50	66	189	157	158	124	87	59	36	4	530
		F	652	2	18	76	20	21	475	40	67	179	157	74	75	63	29	14	4	311
North Hilo district	4,468	M	2,828	71	168	246	48	1,048	1,110	137	191	517	457	659	386	301	203	93	21	1,795
		F	1,640	55	173	239	28	141	932	72	186	515	365	160	169	139	67	31	8	679
Tract H-9	1,439	M	851	25	22	40	......	226	490	48	54	303	167	135	98	85	74	32	3	465
		F	588	27	20	44	3	53	411	30	61	189	122	55	58	66	24	10	2	249
Tract H-10	2,279	M	1,490	38	118	147	23	616	498	50	106	251	209	370	230	170	103	38	13	986
		F	789	25	121	150	17	55	399	22	81	248	191	71	90	55	31	17	5	320
Tract H-11	750	M	487	8	28	59	25	208	122	39	31	63	81	154	58	46	26	23	5	344
		F	263	3	32	45	8	33	122	20	44	78	51	34	21	18	12	4	1	110
Hamakua district	8,244	M	5,081	60	251	781	69	1,939	1,678	303	419	894	761	1,180	795	442	349	195	55	3,269
		F	3,163	89	259	761	30	373	1,464	187	419	924	706	366	292	242	137	65	12	1,340
Tract H-12	3,951	M	2,457	27	77	332	13	1,021	825	162	197	449	350	543	397	223	173	109	21	1,590
		F	1,494	37	91	328	8	220	712	98	195	470	317	160	141	120	66	25	5	601
Tract H-13	4,293	M	2,624	33	174	449	56	918	853	141	227	445	411	637	398	219	167	86	34	1,680
		F	1,669	52	168	433	22	153	752	89	224	454	389	206	151	122	79	37	7	739
North Kohala district	5,362	M	3,226	200	396	245	154	959	1,097	187	316	692	539	683	436	271	157	103	29	1,874
		F	2,136	154	321	204	115	241	965	136	267	660	491	252	196	155	74	31	10	877
Tract H-14	4,878	M	2,952	158	308	232	143	943	997	177	283	627	489	648	407	242	143	87	26	1,731
		F	1,926	118	246	198	105	241	885	132	241	583	452	229	176	138	68	30	10	792
Tract H-15	484	M	274	42	88	13	11	16	100	4	33	65	50	35	29	29	14	16	3	143
		F	210	36	75	6	10	......	80	3	26	77	39	24	20	17	6	1	......	84
South Kohala district	1,352	M	720	49	267	57	26	33	283	5	62	186	161	100	64	64	49	30	4	364
		F	632	30	291	61	15	......	233	2	90	188	126	72	60	50	36	6	4	260
Tract H-16	1,352	M	720	49	267	57	27	33	283	5	62	186	161	100	64	64	49	30	4	364
		F	632	30	291	61	15	......	233	2	90	188	126	72	60	50	36	6	4	260
North Kona district	3,924	M	2,180	215	289	146	41	280	1,117	92	198	561	356	227	235	202	203	146	52	1,172
		F	1,744	230	317	127	41	52	906	71	219	521	342	205	150	141	97	58	11	737
Tract H-17	315	M	168	61	56	3	10	5	30	3	28	38	29	22	13	13	12	9	6	85
		F	147	62	52	5	5	......	23	......	22	43	31	19	12	8	7	4	1	59
Tract H-18	3,609	M	2,012	154	233	143	31	275	1,087	89	170	523	327	205	222	189	191	137	46	1,087
		F	1,597	168	265	122	36	52	883	71	197	478	311	186	138	133	90	54	10	698
South Kona district	4,024	M	2,187	229	351	91	17	311	1,124	64	224	524	399	235	243	208	196	116	42	1,134
		F	1,837	263	341	61	25	102	1,035	10	216	543	387	172	194	166	94	49	16	786
Tract H-19	3,294	M	1,789	112	185	64	10	295	1,081	42	169	426	328	192	201	177	170	98	28	951
		F	1,505	152	174	48	18	101	1,005	7	167	419	345	136	165	143	76	42	12	656
Tract H-20	730	M	398	117	166	27	7	16	43	22	55	98	71	43	42	31	26	18	14	183
		F	332	111	167	13	7	1	30	3	49	124	42	36	29	23	18	7	4	128
Kau district	5,581	M	3,640	178	255	417	91	1,585	1,091	23	297	596	553	967	639	299	174	96	19	2,445
		F	1,941	193	270	234	70	259	908	7	289	573	389	291	204	109	65	22	8	829
Tract H-21	2,085	M	1,280	124	122	145	38	463	382	6	130	219	173	367	203	80	63	40	6	836
		F	805	142	130	124	23	56	330	......	121	253	153	121	72	43	26	10	6	333
Tract H-22	3,496	M	2,360	54	133	272	53	1,122	709	17	167	377	380	600	436	219	112	56	13	1,612
		F	1,136	51	140	110	47	203	578	7	159	320	236	170	132	66	39	12	2	496
Honolulu County	258,256	M	149,049	3,684	15,401	53,470	13,576	13,984	43,477	5,500	11,770	26,057	41,474	29,323	17,812	11,050	7,229	3,463	965	88,768
		F	109,214	3,456	16,032	29,046	10,991	5,082	39,910	4,677	11,168	25,308	25,275	18,408	13,062	8,469	4,735	2,091	698	57,343
Honolulu district¹	258,224	M	149,010	3,679	15,388	53,457	13,575	13,984	43,477	5,500	11,770	26,057	41,467	29,308	17,805	11,047	7,229	3,463	965	88,671
		F	109,211	3,456	16,032	29,046	10,991	5,082	39,910	4,677	11,168	25,308	25,275	18,408	13,062	8,469	4,735	2,091	698	57,343
Honolulu city, total	179,326	M	94,734	2,778	12,422	26,944	12,304	5,102	31,222	3,962	8,649	19,026	21,638	17,243	11,803	7,724	5,291	2,586	792	54,242
		F	84,592	2,679	13,161	23,948	10,141	1,785	29,371	3,507	8,298	18,529	19,999	14,991	10,148	6,496	3,796	1,757	608	45,672
Tract 1	5,927	M	4,110	55	412	2,676	258	326	341	42	217	482	1,836	841	375	202	90	57	10	2,569
		F	1,817	89	446	482	232	191	326	51	251	499	346	311	217	103	56	26	8	832
Tract 2	8,752	M	4,720	369	1,184	1,150	348	365	1,027	277	548	1,103	1,056	790	562	334	211	103	13	2,472
		F	4,032	359	1,137	970	246	170	916	234	521	1,080	962	582	407	242	143	78	17	1,832
Tract 3	9,783	M	4,902	184	1,174	1,219	303	184	1,382	366	587	1,325	1,079	703	479	389	202	102	36	2,278
		F	4,881	192	1,382	1,245	329	128	1,275	330	591	1,355	1,114	744	482	370	178	69	31	2,241
Tract 4	2,731	M	1,407	24	103	54	57	105	1,014	50	147	371	308	215	143	99	80	34	10	662
		F	1,324	20	134	65	41	56	960	48	167	345	332	194	137	84	45	22	8	625
Tract 5	5,037	M	2,887	78	205	63	227	664	1,443	207	276	589	549	593	381	248	173	60	18	1,709
		F	2,150	63	236	36	155	228	1,268	165	275	556	549	297	224	142	75	28	6	900

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[1] Honolulu County exclusive of Palmyra Island.

TABLE 21.—RACE AND AGE, BY SEX, FOR JUDICIAL DISTRICTS AND CENSUS TRACTS, BY COUNTIES: 1940—Con.

COUNTY, JUDICIAL DISTRICT, AND CENSUS TRACT	Total population	Sex	All classes	RACE							AGE (YEARS)									
				Hawaiian	Part Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Other races	Under 5	5 to 14	15 to 24	25 to 34	35 to 44	45 to 54	55 to 64	65 to 74	75 and over and not reported	21 and over
Honolulu County—Continued.																				
Honolulu district—Continued.																				
Honolulu city—Con.																				
Tract 6	8,426	M	4,439	185	687	495	751	197	1,514	610	455	1,060	970	734	505	322	245	107	41	2,322
		F	3,987	191	700	471	653	64	1,358	550	474	1,013	925	625	400	280	171	74	28	1,926
Tract 7	6,024	M	3,354	125	382	62	583	510	1,191	501	316	743	753	611	354	254	211	94	18	1,835
		F	2,670	117	352	53	513	181	1,063	391	295	669	698	378	273	184	122	45	6	1,270
Tract 8	8,923	M	5,209	232	401	100	1,294	853	2,047	282	430	1,028	1,044	939	658	430	383	243	61	3,091
		F	3,714	204	413	54	806	244	1,769	224	419	916	983	604	416	279	134	47	16	1,726
Tract 9	5,021	M	2,994	112	258	83	1,049	211	1,184	97	213	422	579	508	455	306	288	199	28	2,027
		F	2,027	91	243	193	413	25	1,014	48	196	442	536	384	221	142	82	15	9	1,098
Tract 10	6,378	M	3,169	82	422	350	759	43	1,331	182	305	698	727	511	323	233	195	130	49	1,706
		F	3,209	84	474	416	691	28	1,350	166	327	745	829	492	330	234	154	73	25	1,632
Tract 11	3,633	M	1,702	30	278	844	162	25	345	18	167	295	311	313	258	189	101	48	20	1,040
		F	1,931	20	353	940	175	10	407	26	192	293	428	378	265	190	101	60	24	1,214
Tract 12	3,664	M	2,435	112	179	1,278	72	238	511	45	128	275	806	543	342	183	109	41	8	1,655
		F	1,229	116	209	237	63	96	475	33	136	287	299	193	139	91	54	25	5	638
Tract 13	4,510	M	2,597	115	324	275	638	108	974	163	205	413	690	525	312	201	165	51	35	1,626
		F	1,913	95	282	123	496	13	783	121	178	401	559	318	222	137	65	25	8	1,020
Tract 14	5,067	M	2,757	147	417	362	63	214	1,542	12	284	646	668	428	307	187	160	67	10	1,394
		F	2,310	154	388	313	47	97	1,303	8	276	619	549	337	231	160	94	36	8	1,111
Tract 15	4,864	M	2,329	26	327	982	169	207	469	154	216	384	478	572	292	173	130	61	23	1,462
		F	2,535	52	370	1,233	171	26	[illegible]	180	199	380	674	618	286	203	104	44	27	1,624
Tract 16	8,349	M	4,265	189	707	1,043	1,076	39	1,075	136	401	924	1,029	771	475	312	215	112	26	2,313
		F	4,084	167	732	1,029	980	16	1,019	141	419	922	1,011	710	419	312	179	89	23	2,165
Tract 17	1,846	M	865	16	73	504	52	4	201	15	54	145	160	145	124	123	79	28	7	861
		F	981	17	71	550	48	4	279	12	61	140	210	187	142	129	57	33	22	648
Tract 18	7,222	M	3,752	69	291	287	303	50	2,710	42	381	831	818	709	422	261	230	102	18	2,039
		F	3,470	72	293	270	269	24	2,496	46	327	814	862	621	376	214	173	72	11	1,813
Tract 19	4,388	M	2,085	23	192	788	402	36	590	74	200	344	449	418	301	175	127	54	18	1,286
		F	2,303	22	246	922	414	12	603	84	181	404	560	480	292	184	113	73	19	1,412
Tract 20	4,479	M	2,109	37	240	1,354	224	21	171	62	159	390	384	397	295	243	160	60	21	1,315
		F	2,370	33	257	1,574	212	4	235	55	137	340	504	472	363	256	173	82	43	1,568
Tract 21	5,939	M	2,747	36	156	1,522	75	55	882	21	221	488	520	450	387	342	226	82	28	1,705
		F	3,192	50	213	1,734	90	20	1,058	77	181	506	791	488	462	384	226	107	47	2,019
Tract 22	7,350	M	3,692	40	286	2,630	65	143	518	10	216	400	814	1,004	601	356	219	63	19	2,702
		F	3,658	44	299	2,730	62	6	504	13	173	397	678	1,029	680	371	207	98	25	2,793
Tract 23	5,990	M	3,119	63	258	216	285	57	2,216	24	354	728	678	550	350	210	151	81	17	1,612
		F	2,871	66	259	190	280	17	2,040	19	335	702	634	563	292	177	106	56	16	1,468
Tract 24	8,024	M	3,973	18	427	1,088	828	57	1,518	48	347	810	863	695	502	349	298	128	43	2,298
		F	4,051	26	473	1,204	801	28	1,459	60	326	798	953	744	483	330	251	133	35	2,366
Tract 25	9,68[illegible]	M	5,247	162	1,081	2,194	518	98	1,042	152	527	1,143	1,298	971	629	362	195	103	19	2,861
		F	4,435	146	1,042	1,540	477	33	1,049	148	458	1,049	997	836	543	282	172	74	27	2,353
Tract 26	7,01[illegible]	M	3,459	63	633	1,398	656	16	597	96	332	752	734	568	495	288	162	76	32	1,870
		F	3,553	54	712	1,446	650	8	580	103	305	729	734	708	515	268	170	88	36	2,089
Tract 27	4,57[illegible]	M	2,303	37	385	993	304	117	394	73	202	447	440	438	357	227	125	49	18	1,360
		F	2,270	25	422	1,060	302	9	372	80	196	471	454	466	324	190	97	51	21	1,333
Tract 28	9,292	M	4,707	75	728	1,933	648	58	1,123	142	451	1,074	898	819	656	392	207	152	90	2,625
		F	4,585	70	753	1,965	494	18	1,138	117	445	990	1,068	909	589	324	161	72	27	2,487
Tract 29	6,440	M	3,400	74	217	1,023	47	108	1,870	61	330	720	707	484	468	334	218	109	30	1,878
		F	3,040	41	235	903	31	34	1,769	27	267	672	760	433	421	274	126	64	23	1,621
Palmyra Island	32	M	32	5	13	13	1	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	7	15	7	3	-----	-----	-----	32
		F	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Koolaupoko district	9,006	M	4,979	170	878	1,031	363	759	1,634	144	450	1,034	754	784	746	584	381	206	60	2,988
		F	4,027	151	998	880	277	261	1,378	82	439	1,026	852	511	503	439	166	66	25	1,971
Tract 30	3,619	M	1,944	68	215	531	44	510	568	11	184	383	268	414	324	210	105	45	11	1,201
		F	1,675	66	344	511	60	156	517	21	206	396	429	243	175	144	59	15	8	756
Tract 31	5,387	M	3,035	105	663	500	319	249	1,066	133	266	651	486	370	422	354	276	161	49	1,787
		F	2,352	85	654	369	217	105	861	61	233	630	423	268	328	295	107	51	17	1,215
Koolauloo district	4,968	M	3,008	229	462	252	64	1,033	774	194	307	669	573	614	381	232	129	80	23	1,591
		F	1,960	200	387	182	51	422	594	124	299	601	370	234	191	142	82	33	8	847
Tract 32	1,869	M	1,085	184	314	74	43	138	248	84	125	278	171	158	115	94	67	67	17	553
		F	784	159	301	46	37	10	177	54	103	236	136	85	75	76	47	22	4	353
Tract 33	3,099	M	1,923	45	148	178	21	895	526	110	182	391	402	456	266	138	62	20	6	1,038
		F	1,176	41	86	136	14	412	417	70	196	365	234	149	116	66	35	11	4	464
Waialua district	8,397	M	5,029	76	329	445	105	1,920	1,955	199	479	952	870	1,179	719	391	287	126	26	3,039
		F	3,368	60	309	429	42	661	1,725	142	433	1,014	704	395	364	249	144	51	14	1,466
Tract 34	3,534	M	2,288	20	89	127	23	1,215	749	65	204	377	322	646	388	201	107	32	11	1,496
		F	1,246	15	74	98	-----	374	648	37	161	383	266	139	140	83	50	20	4	523
Tract 35	4,863	M	2,741	56	240	318	82	705	1,206	134	275	575	548	533	331	190	180	94	15	1,543
		F	2,122	45	235	331	42	287	1,077	105	272	631	438	256	224	166	94	31	10	943
Wahiawa district	22,417	M	18,146	48	179	15,144	194	622	1,542	418	465	1,051	9,971	4,298	1,374	698	242	89	20	12,333
		F	4,271	68	225	1,680	164	243	1,484	407	443	981	955	775	599	320	134	53	11	2,248
Tract 36	6,086	M	3,284	48	173	457	187	519	1,491	411	310	805	698	590	384	256	193	57	13	1,711
		F	2,802	66	203	440	157	192	1,366	378	290	731	687	386	346	215	103	36	8	1,333
Tract 37	16,331	M	14,862	-----	6	14,687	7	104	51	7	155	246	9,275	3,678	1,010	440	49	2	7	10,622
		F	1,469	2	22	1,240	7	51	118	29	153	250	268	389	253	105	31	17	3	915
Waianae district	2,948	M	1,699	172	470	257	33	275	472	20	181	411	289	258	216	159	118	52	15	931
		F	1,249	151	422	148	13	110	401	4	191	384	208	156	134	108	56	23	9	551
Tract 38	2,948	M	1,699	172	470	257	33	275	472	20	181	411	289	258	216	159	118	52	15	931
		F	1,249	151	422	148	13	110	401	4	191	384	208	156	134	108	56	23	9	551

Table 21.—RACE AND AGE, BY SEX, FOR JUDICIAL DISTRICTS AND CENSUS TRACTS, BY COUNTIES: 1940—Con.

COUNTY, JUDICIAL DISTRICT, AND CENSUS TRACT	Total population	Sex	All classes	RACE							AGE (YEARS)									
				Hawaiian	Part Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Other races	Under 5	5 to 14	15 to 24	25 to 34	35 to 44	45 to 54	55 to 64	65 to 74	75 and over and not reported	21 and over
Honolulu County—Continued.																				
Ewa district	30,602	M	20,858	137	575	8,973	500	4,272	5,877	524	1,239	2,914	7,212	4,645	2,452	1,278	789	344	55	13,034
		F	9,744	147	550	1,776	303	1,600	4,957	411	1,064	2,793	2,186	1,346	1,122	728	367	108	33	4,418
Tract 39	5,389	M	3,338	27	87	262	80	1,405	1,354	123	252	649	598	838	510	284	163	64	16	2,073
		F	2,051	16	107	230	50	410	1,125	113	231	629	465	211	241	165	70	30	9	875
Tract 40	9,495	M	5,614	29	138	349	258	1,860	2,803	177	506	1,253	1,096	995	746	472	353	169	24	3,121
		F	3,881	28	96	324	144	810	2,341	138	429	1,228	848	431	434	322	144	39	8	1,625
Tract 41	4,806	M	3,046	62	185	1,732	112	184	690	81	231	423	963	787	335	152	98	47	10	1,972
		F	1,760	85	207	661	87	73	588	59	177	403	429	402	188	93	53	10	5	923
Tract 42	10,912	M	8,860	19	165	6,630	50	822	1,030	143	250	589	4,585	2,025	861	320	155	64	11	5,898
		F	2,052	18	140	561	22	307	903	101	227	535	444	302	259	145	100	29	11	993
Outlying islands[1]	560	M	557	21	73	411	12	...	1	39	...	...	162	217	114	53	11	...	...	533
		F	3	...	...	3	...	...	...	...	1	...	1	...	1	...	...	...	...	2
Kauai County	35,818	M	21,626	467	1,352	2,340	588	8,025	8,132	722	1,722	4,086	3,535	5,104	3,283	1,881	1,157	707	211	13,513
		F	14,192	421	1,314	2,125	274	2,124	7,338	596	1,734	3,934	3,337	1,842	1,468	968	582	250	77	5,289
Waimea district	10,852	M	6,678	187	425	483	171	2,767	2,448	197	520	1,192	1,088	1,653	1,092	542	333	209	49	4,275
		F	4,174	185	360	440	77	699	2,264	149	521	1,145	1,039	538	436	258	156	64	17	1,793
Tract K-1	182	M	91	77	10	1	...	...	3	...	17	30	14	9	12	3	3	1	2	33
		F	91	79	9	...	...	...	3	...	25	22	16	17	5	3	1	2	...	35
Tract K-2	3,546	M	2,187	39	150	203	55	870	712	158	186	405	359	536	368	161	103	53	16	1,367
		F	1,359	40	140	190	21	250	609	109	196	410	317	191	125	73	31	11	5	535
Tract K-3	5,826	M	3,667	48	181	253	64	1,748	1,348	25	251	634	574	965	593	320	191	115	22	2,414
		F	2,159	48	144	224	24	431	1,264	24	228	577	556	258	245	149	94	42	10	968
Tract K-4	1,298	M	733	23	84	26	32	149	385	14	66	123	141	147	109	58	38	39	19	461
		F	565	20	67	24	32	19	388	16	77	135	150	82	51	33	30	9	2	254
Koloa district	8,493	M	4,970	52	183	797	44	1,459	2,147	288	418	1,034	866	1,105	687	377	285	152	45	2,946
		F	3,523	44	197	744	25	391	1,861	251	432	1,012	785	454	352	249	147	70	22	1,546
Tract K-5	5,256	M	2,999	25	96	627	19	701	1,338	193	292	674	541	625	369	222	170	83	23	1,677
		F	2,257	17	108	580	20	183	1,167	182	285	657	516	288	214	156	80	43	18	971
Tract K-6	3,237	M	1,971	27	87	170	25	758	809	95	126	360	325	480	318	155	115	70	22	1,269
		F	1,266	27	89	164	15	208	694	60	147	355	269	166	138	97	67	27	4	575
Lihue district	7,896	M	4,801	78	285	582	91	1,988	1,665	112	275	842	764	1,311	738	392	227	108	36	3,096
		F	3,095	65	299	519	35	523	1,548	106	379	780	759	440	313	196	160	48	11	1,417
Tract K-7	2,360	M	1,405	24	131	121	42	521	499	47	111	296	249	309	209	126	67	27	11	831
		F	955	21	145	99	21	142	475	52	121	273	224	114	101	61	35	18	8	396
Tract K-8	5,536	M	3,396	54	134	461	49	1,467	1,166	63	264	546	515	1,002	529	266	170	79	25	2,265
		F	2,140	44	154	420	14	381	1,073	54	258	516	535	326	209	135	125	30	6	1,021
Kawaihau district	6,512	M	3,901	51	340	417	166	1,368	1,469	90	309	770	625	821	585	379	221	142	49	2,403
		F	2,611	46	338	360	84	391	1,324	68	302	757	596	323	278	196	89	50	20	1,144
Tract K-9	1,284	M	787	4	53	68	66	236	337	25	61	154	126	160	113	69	50	38	16	487
		F	497	5	47	54	28	46	298	19	51	139	113	62	62	37	17	11	5	226
Tract K-10	3,219	M	1,829	28	184	205	74	556	731	51	150	391	312	343	249	207	104	59	14	1,074
		F	1,390	26	187	188	44	197	706	42	171	384	334	188	134	100	45	22	13	614
Tract K-11	2,009	M	1,285	19	103	146	38	576	401	14	98	225	187	318	223	103	67	45	19	842
		F	724	15	104	118	12	148	320	7	80	234	149	73	82	59	27	17	3	304
Hanalei district	2,065	M	1,276	99	119	61	116	443	403	35	100	248	192	214	191	131	81	97	22	795
		F	789	81	120	62	43	120	341	22	100	231	158	87	89	69	30	18	7	353
Tract K-12	1,160	M	731	14	33	49	9	375	224	27	55	139	110	163	123	79	35	19	8	466
		F	429	17	27	51	1	112	201	20	47	133	97	43	54	34	15	8	3	186
Tract K-13	905	M	545	85	86	12	107	68	179	8	45	109	82	51	68	52	46	78	14	329
		F	360	64	93	11	42	8	140	2	58	98	61	44	35	35	15	10	4	167
Maui County	55,980	M	32,198	1,568	3,993	3,518	903	8,188	12,940	1,088	3,157	7,087	5,977	6,159	4,269	2,595	1,764	896	294	18,088
		F	23,782	1,378	3,922	3,471	610	2,321	11,243	837	3,116	6,836	5,966	2,917	2,487	1,737	912	346	93	10,224
Hana district	2,663	M	1,583	297	421	67	29	468	217	84	162	329	249	306	239	132	91	53	22	923
		F	1,080	273	424	57	14	76	185	51	164	329	243	115	91	68	48	14	8	413
Tract M-1	387	M	214	54	125	8	9	6	6	6	39	57	27	25	23	14	14	5	4	100
		F	173	44	119	1	6	1	2	...	33	47	35	24	14	12	6	2	...	84
Tract M-2	2,006	M	1,228	177	239	58	17	457	203	77	108	228	198	264	190	109	63	42	17	795
		F	778	172	248	55	4	78	174	50	113	231	186	79	66	49	39	10	5	307
Tract M-3	270	M	141	66	57	1	3	5	8	1	15	44	24	16	15	9	14	3	1	64
		F	129	57	57	1	4	...	9	1	18	51	22	12	11	7	3	2	3	42
Makawao district	14,915	M	8,286	248	691	1,439	255	1,646	3,589	418	811	2,031	1,676	1,319	950	705	463	229	92	4,309
		F	6,629	221	686	1,454	212	588	3,095	373	762	1,972	1,523	744	670	544	280	99	35	2,546
Tract M-4	2,772	M	1,566	61	165	221	116	221	765	17	163	366	304	237	186	134	114	51	11	820
		F	1,206	46	149	271	104	12	613	11	139	362	264	122	139	103	57	16	7	522
Tract M-5	8,460	M	4,717	76	279	875	63	1,212	1,879	333	437	1,134	964	843	565	385	223	120	46	2,498
		F	3,743	63	268	883	45	499	1,681	304	434	1,122	889	415	366	295	147	55	20	1,370
Tract M-6	2,448	M	1,347	75	178	229	25	168	628	44	147	374	260	128	129	143	57	54	23	640
		F	1,101	82	187	208	17	64	499	43	118	356	218	108	115	102	56	22	6	452
Tract M-7	1,235	M	656	36	69	114	51	45	317	24	64	157	148	111	70	43	39	14	10	341
		F	579	29	82	92	46	13	302	15	71	132	132	99	53	44	30	6	2	292
Wailuku district	21,051	M	11,713	368	1,227	1,464	376	2,436	5,499	343	1,180	2,682	2,249	2,176	1,429	893	640	343	110	6,386
		F	9,338	357	1,292	1,475	271	762	4,900	281	1,233	2,612	2,191	1,205	951	646	325	141	34	4,051
Tract M-8	2,947	M	1,738	23	30	173	15	635	808	34	154	355	295	418	232	129	104	44	7	1,030
		F	1,209	11	41	195	8	186	748	20	151	381	263	141	108	104	46	13	2	501
Tract M-9	5,567	M	3,189	35	153	463	42	835	1,513	118	311	728	664	579	363	256	188	83	17	1,733
		F	2,378	30	164	435	28	308	1,300	113	322	695	568	262	232	176	85	36	2	953
Tract M-10	2,193	M	1,206	31	182	108	40	117	726	2	133	304	252	193	143	89	64	21	7	614
		F	987	19	168	95	31	28	641	5	130	258	257	122	114	86	26	12	...	427
Tract M-11[2]	7,319	M	3,811	126	602	543	250	380	1,864	66	425	909	724	639	454	272	191	140	57	2,010
		F	3,508	152	689	576	188	133	1,726	44	466	879	834	541	374	208	121	60	25	1,641
Tract M-12	1,073	M	650	7	61	45	3	217	298	19	54	117	123	130	99	57	46	17	7	399
		F	425	5	63	51	8	57	233	11	49	131	98	38	42	44	15	5	2	173
Tract M-13	1,950	M	1,119	145	169	132	26	252	290	104	112	269	191	217	128	90	47	46	15	600
		F	831	140	167	123	11	50	252	88	115	268	171	93	81	56	32	12	3	324

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[1] Baker, Canton, Enderbury, Howland, Jarvis, Johnston, and Midway Islands.

[2] Coextensive with Wailuku city.

TABLE 21.—RACE AND AGE, BY SEX, FOR JUDICIAL DISTRICTS AND CENSUS TRACTS, BY COUNTIES: 1940—Con.

COUNTY, JUDICIAL DISTRICT, AND CENSUS TRACT	Total population	Sex	RACE: All classes	Hawaiian	Part Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Other races	AGE (YEARS): Under 5	5 to 14	15 to 24	25 to 34	35 to 44	45 to 54	55 to 64	65 to 74	75 and over and not reported	21 and over
Maui County—Continued.																				
Lahaina district	8,291	M	4,783	177	649	333	99	1,288	2,208	28	467	1,037	887	910	630	374	279	154	34	2,606
		F	3,508	162	617	298	48	234	1,964	27	467	1,011	788	407	365	241	154	67	13	1,498
Tract M-14	1,063	M	621	29	142	27	12	166	244	1	75	144	103	110	82	53	29	21	4	328
		F	442	33	130	14	1	39	223	-	66	147	91	48	43	29	14	4	-	166
Tract M-15	7,228	M	4,162	148	507	311	87	1,122	1,964	23	392	893	784	800	548	321	241	132	30	2,370
		F	3,066	129	487	282	47	355	1,741	25	401	864	697	359	322	212	140	58	13	1,332
Lanai district	3,720	M	2,552	65	144	75	53	1,313	738	164	198	365	421	748	475	165	140	35	5	1,740
		F	1,168	50	119	63	18	251	572	9	181	333	247	172	130	61	41	2	1	490
Tract M-16	3,720	M	2,552	65	144	75	53	1,313	738	164	198	365	421	748	475	165	140	35	5	1,740
		F	1,168	50	119	63	18	251	572	9	181	333	247	172	130	61	41	2	1	490
Molokai district	4,894	M	3,015	314	808	176	79	1,008	559	41	330	641	450	616	468	285	136	63	26	1,782
		F	1,879	236	727	88	42	246	508	12	370	579	344	217	218	137	53	18	4	759
Tract M-17	3,828	M	2,367	196	668	81	62	899	536	25	244	484	361	556	380	220	80	32	10	1,468
		F	1,461	154	541	72	37	219	427	11	244	450	279	168	171	99	35	11	4	581
Tract M-18	1,066	M	648	118	240	25	17	109	123	16	86	157	89	60	88	65	56	31	16	344
		F	418	102	186	16	5	27	81	1	65	129	65	49	47	38	18	7	-	178
Kalawao district [1]	446	M	266	99	53	34	12	29	30	9	-	2	45	77	58	41	24	14	5	248
		F	180	59	57	36	5	1	19	3	-	-	30	57	42	30	11	10	-	167
Tract M-19	446	M	266	99	53	34	12	29	30	9	-	2	45	77	58	41	24	14	5	248
		F	180	59	57	36	5	1	19	3	-	-	30	57	42	30	11	10	-	167

[1] Coextensive with Kalawao County but included with Maui County for purposes of legislative representation.

TABLE 22.—COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION, FOR CITIES OF 5,000 TO 100,000: 1940

SUBJECT	Hilo	Lahaina	Wahiawa	Wailuku	Waipahu
SEX, RACE, AND NATIVITY					
Total population	23,558	5,917	5,420	7,519	6,906
Male	12,428	2,960	2,854	3,810	3,918
Female	10,925	2,257	2,566	3,709	2,988
Native (all races)	20,083	4,435	4,563	6,389	5,795
Male	10,534	2,503	2,706	3,261	3,263
Female	9,549	1,930	2,167	3,128	2,532
Foreign born (all races)	3,270	782	857	930	1,111
Male	1,894	455	458	549	655
Female	1,376	327	399	381	476
By race:					
Hawaiian	919	220	109	277	51
Part Hawaiian	3,226	829	263	1,291	192
Caucasian	6,256	474	997	1,119	649
Chinese	911	130	337	438	262
Filipino	2,138	795	444	493	1,723
Japanese	11,207	2,742	2,497	3,591	3,774
Other races	696	27	773	110	255
AGE					
Male, all ages	12,428	2,960	2,854	3,810	3,918
Under 5 years	1,207	285	285	424	396
5 to 9 years	1,295	314	332	454	433
10 to 14 years	1,508	338	407	455	478
15 to 19 years	1,343	297	346	492	447
20 to 24 years	1,118	253	263	322	356
25 to 29 years	1,153	321	262	322	357
30 to 34 years	976	247	185	318	278
35 to 39 years	820	226	166	273	246
40 to 44 years	625	144	126	181	217
45 to 49 years	452	104	102	122	163
50 to 54 years	536	117	137	150	159
55 to 64 years	757	168	177	191	252
65 to 74 years	506	111	84	139	126
75 years and over	134	25	12	53	22
Not reported	6	-	-	4	-
Female, all ages	10,925	2,257	2,566	3,709	2,988
Under 5 years	1,140	298	265	466	329
5 to 9 years	1,249	299	296	419	425
10 to 14 years	1,468	304	344	460	468
15 to 19 years	1,445	297	349	453	403
20 to 24 years	1,206	246	296	381	266
25 to 29 years	934	152	308	288	214
30 to 34 years	674	128	195	254	145
35 to 39 years	633	115	170	214	172
40 to 44 years	507	112	145	180	144
45 to 49 years	437	91	116	118	139
50 to 54 years	328	58	83	90	105
55 to 64 years	476	105	97	121	118
65 to 74 years	234	50	33	60	22
75 years and over	84	12	8	25	8
Not reported	10	-	-	-	-
MARITAL STATUS					
Male, 15 years old and over	8,415	2,023	1,830	2,477	2,021
Single	3,901	942	845	1,055	1,378
Married	4,035	957	914	1,282	1,123
Widowed	386	106	47	104	100
Divorced	96	18	24	36	20
Female, 15 years old and over	8,068	1,966	1,981	3,104	1,746
Single	2,466	429	574	723	567
Married	3,814	812	940	1,254	1,033
Widowed	604	109	111	165	117
Divorced	82	16	36	22	9

TABLE 23.—PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS, MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, INDUSTRY GROUP, AND SEX, FOR CITIES OF 5,000 TO 100,000: 1940

EMPLOYMENT STATUS, MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, AND INDUSTRY GROUP	Hilo city		Lahaina city		Wahiawa city		Wailuku city		Waipahu city	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Total population (all ages)	12,438	10,993	2,960	2,257	2,854	2,666	3,810	3,209	3,915	2,968
EMPLOYMENT STATUS										
Population 14 years old and over	8,722	7,986	2,089	1,434	1,907	1,784	2,574	2,258	2,704	1,967
In labor force	6,715	2,934	1,701	475	1,449	657	1,919	749	2,138	620
Percent of population 14 years old and over	77.0	32.0	81.4	33.1	76.0	36.1	74.6	33.2	79.0	32.7
Employed (except on emergency work)	6,259	2,196	1,654	469	1,370	631	1,801	734	2,082	615
On public emergency work	139	3	11	1	24		65		22	
Seeking work	297	125	36	5	55	26	53	15	31	5
Not in labor force	2,007	4,943	388	959	456	1,067	655	1,509	569	1,427
EMPLOYED WORKERS BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP										
Employed (except on emergency work)	6,259	2,196	1,654	469	1,370	631	1,801	734	2,082	615
Professional workers	268	367	56	70	54	66	108	139	37	35
Semiprofessional workers	64	16	13	2	10	5	24	4	11	1
Farmers and farm managers	126	24	6	1	43	9	20	5	26	7
Proprietors, managers, and officials, exc. farm	861	139	82	13	230	74	231	31	67	26
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	946	475	102	67	172	115	209	164	143	96
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	942	45	203	3	201	13	291	16	249	2
Operatives and kindred workers	780	193	195	74	229	142	227	94	211	87
Domestic service workers	49	442	5	63	14	89	19	121	6	73
Service workers, except domestic	406	278	53	64	188	86	133	79	79	46
Farm laborers (wage workers) and farm foremen	1,026	94	720	73	51	5	140	4	573	95
Farm laborers (unpaid family workers)	38	55		3	8	16	7	18	3	4
Laborers, except farm and mine	997	59	208	35	150	4	157	42	256	28
Occupation not reported	24	9	2	1		2	16	27	5	1
EMPLOYED WORKERS BY INDUSTRY GROUP										
Employed (except on emergency work)	6,259	2,196	1,654	469	1,370	631	1,801	734	2,082	615
Sugar industry	1,338	85	1,173	101	1		280	16	1,326	189
Agriculture (exc. sugar), forestry, and fishery	427	100	61	4	179	39	66	24	74	13
Agriculture (exc. sugar)	285	99	40	4	177	39	50	24	72	13
Forestry, except logging, and fishery	142	1	21		2		16		2	
Mining	16				9		5		1	
Construction	891	4	98		121	1	194	1	49	
Manufacturing (except sugar)	535	100	94	21	40	6	204	80	17	29
Food and kindred products (exc. sugar)	146	39	93	20	22	3	121	68	6	17
Tobacco manufactures	1									
Textile mill products	2	3					1	1		
Apparel and other fabricated textile products		13								1
Logging									1	
Sawmills and planing mills	19	1							1	
Furniture and misc. wooden goods	9	2					2	1		
Paper and allied products	51	1								
Printing, publishing, and allied industries	120	30			10	3	25	7	1	1
Chemicals and allied products	26	6			1		17	1		
Rubber products							1			
Leather and leather products							1			
Stone, clay, and glass products	15						1		1	
Iron and steel and their products	60	1		1	1		21	2	1	
Nonferrous metals and their products	2	1							2	
Machinery	9	2			1		2		1	
Transportation equipment	7		1				1		3	
Other and not specified manufacturing industries	26	2			1					1
Transportation, communication, and other public utilities	737	37	23	4	111	6	113	13	47	6
Railroads (inc. railroad repair shops) and ry. express service	115	1	1		5		21		9	
Trucking service	28		1		7		3		2	
Other transportation	385	9	14	1	86		41		27	
Communication	39	18	1	3	7	5	14	12	5	5
Utilities	170	9	5		86		33		4	
Wholesale and retail trade	1,179	553	143	93	350	196	360	183	180	94
Wholesale trade	222	15	5	1	21		42	1	5	
Food and dairy products stores, and milk retailing	292	180	79	61	63	33	69	61	60	32
Eating and drinking places	91	126	8	29	109	61	15	28	9	21
Motor vehicles and accessories retailing, and filling stations	163	16	12	1	31	3	66	5	17	3
Other retail trade	434	216	38	19	127	100	171	88	66	19
Finance, insurance, and real estate	101	30	4	1	20	4	45	8	9	
Business and repair services	243	4	10		35	3	107	1	26	2
Automobile storage, rental, and repair services	185	1	6		25	2	74		17	2
Business and repair services, except automobile	58	3	4		10	1	33	1	9	
Personal services	391	686	21	96	131	288	93	186	41	115
Domestic service	124	448	7	65	33	97	19	123	10	82
Hotels and lodging places	53	45	7	6	3	9	26	14	3	1
Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing services	49	61	4	6	120	136	14	13	20	7
Miscellaneous personal services	65	112	13	19	90	41	34	37	19	25
Amusement, recreation, and related services	93	33	14	2	33	13	34	7	13	3
Professional and related services	323	338	44	76	43	71	138	181	38	89
Government	341	44	30		110	3	148	13	21	1
Industry not reported	58	11	7	1	9	1	19	26	13	3

O

EXHIBIT NO. 135

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING TIME OF 27 AND 28 NOV 41 WAR DEPARTMENT WARNING MESSAGES TO HAWAII AND REPLIES THERETO

1. *27 Nov Marshall warning message* (Exhibit 32, p. 7)

received in War Dept code room—6:00 P. M. Washington time; 12:30 P. M. Hawaii time
filed in War Dept signal center—6:11 P. M. Washington time; 12:41 P. M. Hawaii time
received in Hawaii signal center—6:46 P. M. Washington time; 1:16 P. M. Hawaii time
decoded in Hawaii—7:52 P. M. Washington time; 2:22 P. M. Hawaii time

Received in Hawaii 1:16 P. M. 27 Nov—Short (APHB Tr. 420); Phillips (Roberts Tr. 220)

Phillips took to Short about 2:30 P. M. 27 Nov—Dunlop (Clausen Rep. 65)

Short immediately talked it over with Phillips and made alert decision—Short (APHB Tr. 282)

Decided on alert in "a very few minutes"—Short (APHB Tr. 520)

Put Alert No. 1 into effect within 30 minutes—Short (Navy Court Tr. 241)

2. *27 Nov G–2 warning message* (Exhibit 32, p. 10)

received in War Dept code room—6:06 P. M. Washington time; 12:36 P. M. Hawaii time
received in Hawaii signal center—7:14 P. M. Washington time; 1:44 Hawaii time
decoded in Hawaii—9:30 P. M. Washington time; 4:00 P. M. Hawaii time

Fielder doesn't recall whether he showed G–2 message to Phillips and Short before or after Alert No. 1 was ordered—Fielder (Roberts Tr. 311)

Fielder had already taken action under Alert No. 1 before 4:00 P. M. staff conference; G–2 message was decoded at 4:00 P. M., was not presented to staff conference but only to Phillips and Short—Fielder (Roberts Tr. 312–12)

Alert decision based on Marshall message, without G–2 message—Phillips (APHB Tr. 1116, 1131)

"Subsequent" message from G–2 seemed to confirm action—Phillips (APHB Tr. 1128)

"Subsequent" G–2 message taken by Short as tacit approval of alert against sabotage—Phillips (APHB Tr. 1131, 1142)

3. *27 Nov Short reply to Marshall warning* (Exhibit 32, p. 12)

encoded in Hawaii—11:10 P. M. 27 Nov. Washington time; 5:40 P. M. 27 Nov Hawaii time
filed in Hawaii signal center—11:35 P. M. 27 Nov Washington time; 6:05 P. M. 27 Nov Hawaii time
received in War Dept code room—5:57 A. M. 28 Nov Washington time; 12:27 A. M. 28 Nov Hawaii time

Short answered within 30 minutes—Short (APHB Tr. 395, 420)

4. *28 Nov Adjutant General sabotage warning* (Exhibit 32, p. 13)

filed in War Dept signal center—8:42 P. M. 28 Nov Washington time; 8:12 P. M. 28 Nov Hawaii time
decoded in Hawaii—4:25 A. M. 29 Nov Washington time; 10:55 P. M. 28 Nov Hawaii time*

Short considered as reply to his report of 27 Nov, felt it indicated tacit consent to alert against sabotage—Short (APHB Tr. 111, 345, 422; Roberts Tr. 48, 50)

No doubt that War Dept was fully cognizant of Short's 27 Nov report when Adj Gen message was sent—Short (APHB Tr. 296)

War Dept came back only with more sabotage, so Short thought they approved what he was doing—Short (APHB Tr. 421; Navy Court Tr. 244–46)

Sabotage messages caused Short to feel War Dept agreed with his own judgment that greatest danger was internal—Short (APHB Tr. 430)

Alert ordered prior to receipt of Adj Gen sabotage message—Phillips (Roberts Tr. 220–21)

*Not shown on available document; data taken from testimony of Hain (APHB Tr. 3310–11).

5. *28 Nov Arnold sabotage warning* (Exhibit 32, p. 14)
   received in War Dept code room—8:15 P. M. Washington time; 2:45 P. M. Hawaii time
   Short saw before Martin did—Martin (Roberts Tr. 346–47)
6. *29 Nov Short reply to Adjutant General sabotage warning* (Exhibit 32, p. 17)
   encoded in Hawaii—8:15 P. M. 29 Nov Washington time; 2:45 P. M. 29 Nov Hawaii time
   filed in Hawaii signal center—8:47 P. M. 29 Nov Washington time; 3:17 P. M. 29 Nov Hawaii time
   received in War Dept code room—12:57 A. M. 30 Nov Washington time; 7:27 P. M. 29 Nov Hawaii time
7. *4 Dec Martin-Short reply to Arnold sabotage warning* (Exhibit 32, p. 19)
   filed in Hawaii signal center—6:21 P. M. 4 Dec Washington time; 12:51 P. M. 4 Dec Hawaii time
   received in War Dept code room—1:24 P. M. 10 Dec Washington time; 7:54 A. M. 10 Dec Hawaii time



SECRET

[illegible]

RADIOGRAM

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

FROM WAR DEPARTMENT
BUREAU AGO
AG 381 (11-27-41)MC-E

ehb - 1712

PRIORITY

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

SECRET
Auth: T.A.G.
Initials:
Date: NOV 27 1941

COMMANDING GENERAL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
FORT SHAFTER, T.H.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE PERIOD JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT PERIOD IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT COMMA REPEAT CANNOT COMMA BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT PERIOD THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT COMMA REPEAT NOT COMMA BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE PERIOD PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT COMMA REPEAT NOT COMMA TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT PERIOD REPORT MEASURES TAKEN PERIOD SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN PERIOD LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS

MARSHALL

WAR DEPARTMENT MESSAGE CENTER: PLEASE SEND SAME RADIOGRAM TO:
COMMANDING GENERAL, CARIBBEAN DEFENSE COMMAND,
QUARRY HEIGHTS, C.Z.

ADJUTANT GENERAL.

SECRET

The original should be returned to The AGO [illegible]

See note on page 2 of basic memo. [illegible]

[stamped] CODE SECTION
W.D.M.C.
1941 NOV 27 PM 6:00

[handwritten] ready to send
at this time
DRV

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

PI WAR PRTY

[redacted] DC 611PM NOV 27 1941

C G

HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH

472 27TH NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE STOP JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTIBLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT STOP IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT COMMA REPEAT CANNOT COMMA BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT STOP THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT COMMA REPEAT NOT COMMA BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE STOP PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT COMMA REPEAT NOT COMMA TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT STOP REPORT MEASURES TAKEN STOP SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED

THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN STOP LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS

MARSHALL

1169/27

LSE

Received as a (SECRET / [redacted] communication / RESTRICTED) (Strike out two)

Decoded by LT [redacted] 22nd Nov 27 1941

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No 472 27TH

NOTE: See A.G. 2656 and 2656 for handling messages of this classification.

[redacted]



2224

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

[illegible] Radio Station WTJ = COLN.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED

[illegible]

WASHINGTON DC NOVEMBER 27 1941

G-2 HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FT SHAFTER TH

473 27TH

JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE COME TO PRACTICAL STALEMATE STOP HOSTILITIES MAY ENSUE STOP SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES MAY BE EXPECTED STOP INFORM COMMANDING GENERAL AND CHIEF OF STAFF ONLY

To AG - file.

MILES
143PM

Noted 11-27-41

1st Chlt

[illegible] in a [redacted] [illegible]
[redacted])
(Strike out one)

Decoded by.

LT JOS [illegible] SC
4:20PM 27 NOV 41

Reply should be marked ANSWER to Code Message No. 473 - 27TH

NOTE [illegible]

FILE:

119

63

War Dept G-2 file copy
stamped on back:

"CODE SECTION
W. D. M. C.
1941 NOV 27 PM 6:06"



HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL: .... (date)

Request that the following {*Secret / *Confidential / *Restricted} official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover any subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is {*Priority. / *Routine. / *Deferred.}

*Strike out words not applicable.

.... Signature and Title

Sent as Radiogram No.	Message Center No.	Time Filed	Check	Code Clerk
959-27th				

~~Adjutant General~~ Chief of Staff

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON D C

Approved for Transmission:

.... Adjutant General

REURAD FOUR SEVEN TWO TWENTY SEVENTH REPORT DEPARTMENT ALERTED TO PREVENT SABOTAGE PERIOD LIAISON WITH NAVY

SHORT

REC'D BY
LT JOE ENGELBERTZ SC
5:40P 27 NOV 41

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR 380-5)

L8E

3

P 9 J RADIOGRAM 0-4-c

605P

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY NOVEMBER 28, 1941

557A M.

From FORT SHAFTER TH

To CHIEF OF STAFF

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 959 NOVEMBER 27TH

REPORT DEPARTMENT ALERTED TO PREVENT SABOTAGE PERIOD

LIAISON WITH NAVY RELURAD FOUR SEVEN TWO TWENTY SEVENTH

SHORT

Noted 11-5

46 A G O
DEC 8 1941
Received

(WPD RTS

NOV 28 1941

Action Copy

P.F. 11/30/41

HEAD_JARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

(date)

Request that the following {*Secret / *[redacted] / *[redacted]} official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is {*Priority / *[redacted] / *[redacted]}

*Strike out words not applicable

Signature and Title

Sent as Radiogram No.	Message Center No.	Time Filed	Check	Code Clerk

Approved for Transmission

Adjutant General

114 WAR WR 189 WD PETT

WASHINGTON DC 842P NOV 28 1941

C G

HAWAIIAN DEPT FT SHAFTER T H

482 28TH CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF ARMY DEPARTMENT REPEAT SAB PARAGRAPH THREE MID SO THIRTY DASH FORTY FIVE SRD PARIS STOP ALSO DESIRED THAT YOU INITIATE FORTHWITH ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF YOUR ESTABLISHMENTS CODE A PROPERTY CODE A AND EQUIPMENT AGAINST SABOTAGE CODE A PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA AND PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE STOP THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT MEAN THAT ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES ARE AUTHORIZED STOP PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY CODE A AVOIDING UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY AND ALARM STOP TO INSURE SPEED OF TRANSMISSION IDENTICAL TELEGRAMS ARE BEING SENT TO ALL AIR STATIONS BUT THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AFFECT YOUR RESPONSIBILITY UNDER EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS

ADAMS

THIS COPY

G H BUTLER

LT COL, INFANTRY

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR 380-5)

/03

Form G.S. No. 3279 (5 sheets) - 1934 Standards 10-10 as GS

STANDARD FORM No. 144
APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT
March 10, 1930

PRIORITY

FROM WAR DEPARTMENT

CABLEGRAM

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

AG 381 (11-27-41)MC

COMMANDING GENERAL
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER T H

ATTENTION COMMANDING [illegible]

AS FOLLOWS BE ISSUED TO ALL [illegible]

DESIRED ACTION AGAINST [illegible]

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE [illegible]

FOUR FIVE [illegible]

ONCE PERIOD IT IS [illegible]

YOU IMMEDIATELY [illegible]

SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA [illegible]

PROTECTION AGAINST [illegible]

THIS DOES NOT [illegible]

AND PUBLICITY [illegible]

HAWAII IT IS [illegible]

THE CHIEF [illegible]

PERIOD SIGNED [illegible]

Official - Secret

Adjutant General.

A. G. No. 401

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

R. R. LOVETT
2nd Lieut., Air Corps
Aide-de-Camp

FILE

[stamped] CODE SECTION
W. D. M. C.
1941 NOV 28 PM 8:15



HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL: 29 November 1941
(date)

Request that the following {*Secret ~~*Confidential~~ ~~*Restricted~~} official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is {*Priority. ~~*Routine~~ ~~*Deferred~~}

THOMAS H. GREEN,
Lt. Col., J.A.G.D.,
Department Judge Advocate.
Signature and Title

*Strike out words not applicable.

Sent as Radiogram No.	Message Center No.	Time Filed	Check	Code Clerk
986 - 29th				

Approved for Transmission:

Major, A.G.D., Adjutant General
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON D C

AG 383.4/13

RE YOUR SECRET RADIO FOUR EIGHT TWO TWENTY EIGHTH COMMA FULL PRECAUTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF WAR DEPARTMENT PAREN PARAGRAPH THREE MID SC THIRTY DASH FORTY FIVE AND PAREN AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS INCLUDING PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT STOP AS REGARDS PROTECTION OF VITAL INSTALLATIONS OUTSIDE OF MILITARY RESERVATIONS SUCH AS POWER PLANTS COMMA TELEPHONE EXCHANGES AND HIGHWAY BRIDGES COMMA THIS HEADQUARTERS BY CONFIDENTIAL LETTER DATED JUNE NINETEEN NINETEEN FORTY ONE REQUESTED THE GOVERNOR OF THE TERRITORY TO USE THE BROAD POWERS VESTED IN HIM BY SECTION SIXTY SEVEN OF THE ORGANIC ACT WHICH PROVIDES COMMA IN EFFECT COMMA THAT THE GOVERNOR MAY CALL UPON THE COMMANDERS OF MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII TO PREVENT OR SUPPRESS LAWLESS VIOLENCE COMMA INVASION COMMA INSURRECTION ETC STOP PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY STATED THE GOVERNOR ON JUNE TWENTIETH CONFIDENTIALLY MADE A FORMAL WRITTEN DEMAND ON THIS HEADQUARTERS TO FURNISH AND CONTINUE TO FURNISH SUCH ADEQUATE

-1-

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR [illegible]

HLE

13a

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

(Date)

Request that the following {*Secret *Confidential *Restricted} official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is {*Priority. *Routine. *Deferred.

*Strike out words not applicable.

Signature and Title

Sent as Radiogram No.	Message Center No.	Time Filed	Check	Code Clerk

Approved for Transmission:

Adjutant General

PAGE TWO

PROTECTION AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO PREVENT SABOTAGE COMMA AND LAWLESS VIOLENCE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH COMMA BEING COMMITTED AGAINST VITAL INSTALLATIONS AND STRUCTURES IN THE TERRITORY STOP PURSUANT TO THE FOREGOING REQUEST APPROPRIATE MILITARY PROTECTION IS NOW BEING AFFORDED VITAL CIVILIAN INSTALLATIONS STOP IN THIS CONNECTION COMMA AT THE INSTIGATION OF THIS HEADQUARTERS THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU ON JUNE THIRTIETH NINETEEN FORTY ONE ENACTED AN ORDINANCE WHICH PERMITS THE COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT COMMA TO CLOSE COMMA OR RESTRICT THE USE OF AND TRAVEL UPON COMMA ANY HIGHWAY WITHIN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU COMMA WHENEVER THE COMMANDING GENERAL DEEMS SUCH ACTION NECESSARY IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL DEFENSE STOP THE AUTHORITY THUS GIVEN HAS NOT YET BEEN EXERCISED STOP RELATIONS WITH F B I AND ALL OTHER FEDERAL AND TERRITORIAL OFFICIALS ARE AND HAVE BEEN CORDIAL AND MUTUAL COOPERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN ON ALL PERTINENT MATTERS

ENC SEC BY
LT J [illegible] ENGELHARDT SC
[illegible] 29 NOV 41

SHORT

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR [illegible])

67E

[illegible]

[redacted] 0-4-0

[redacted]

FBIHJ 3250

PRIORITY

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 2401 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

[redacted] NOVEMBER 30, 1941.

SECRET

12:57A M.

From FBIHAWAII.

To THE AGO.

Copies furnished as noted

HONOLULU NO. 986. NOVEMBER 29TH.

RE YOUR SECRET RADIO FOUR EIGHT TWO TWENTY EIGHTH, FULL PRECAUTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF WAR DEPT PARIS PARAGRAPH THREE MID SC THIRTY EIGHT FORTY FIVE END PARIS AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS INCLUDING PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. AS REGARDS PROTECTION OF VITAL INSTALLATIONS OUTSIDE OF MILITARY RESERVATIONS SUCH AS POWER PLANTS, TELEPHONE EXCHANGES AND HIGHWAY BRIDGES, THIS BOIS BY CONFIDENTIAL LETTER DATED JUNE NINETEEN NINETEEN FORTY ONE REQUESTED THE GOVERNOR OF THE TERRITORY TO USE THE BROAD POWERS VESTED IN HIM BY SECTION SIXTY SEVEN OF THE ORGANIC ACT WHICH PROVIDES, IN EFFECT, THAT THE GOVERNOR MAY CALL UPON THE COMMANDER OF MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII TO PREVENT OR SUPPRESS LAWLESS VIOLENCE, INVASION, INSURRECTION ETC. PURSUANT TO THIS AUTHORITY GRANTED THE GOVERNOR ON JUNE TWENTIETH CONFIDENTIALLY MADE A FORMAL WRITTEN REQUEST ON THIS BOIS TO FURNISH AND CONTINUE TO FURNISH SUCH AID

SECRET



Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From

To

SHEET #2 OF HONOLULU NO. 986-29TH.

Copies furnished as noted:

PROTECTION AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO PREVENT SABOTAGE, AND LAWLESS VIOLENCE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH, BEING COMMITTED AGAINST VITAL INSTALLATIONS AND STRUCTURES IN THE TERRITORY. PURSUANT TO THE FOREGOING REQUEST APPROPRIATE MILITARY PROTECTION IS NOW BEING AFFORDED VITAL CIVILIAN INSTALLATIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION, AT THE INSTIGATION OF THIS HEADQUARTERS THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU ON JUNE THIRTIETH NINETEEN FORTY ONE ENACTED AN ORDNANCE WHICH PERMITS THE COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPT, TO CLOSE, OR RESTRICT THE USE OF AND TRAVEL UPON, ANY HIGHWAY WITHIN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, WHENEVER THE COMMANDING GENERAL DEEMS SUCH ACTION NECESSARY IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. THE AUTHORITY THUS GIVEN HAS NOT YET BEEN EXERCISED. RELATIONS WITH FBI AND ALL OTHER FEDERAL AND TERRITORIAL OFFICIALS ARE AND HAVE BEEN CORDIAL AND MUTUAL COOPERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN ON ALL PERTINENT MATTERS.

SHORT.

EHB/bjs-1712.

DEC 1

War Dept. A.G.O., December 1, 1941, - To: Secretary, General Staff.
(Exact Copy)

RECEIVED
840

DEC 1 1941

Elt/by - 1705

The making of an exact copy of this message is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked "SECRET". This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and will be returned to The Adjutant General without delay.

Action Copy

11 WTJ RADIOGRAM 0-4-e

1261P/44h

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DECEMBER 10, 1941

124P M.

From FT SHAFTER TH

To CHIEF ARMY AIR CORPS

Copies furnished as noted.

DEC 10 81 PM

RECEIVED
WD AAF, AIR A.G.

NO. 1082 DECEMBER 6TH

FOLLOWING REPORT IN COMPLIANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN AGWAR FOUR EIGHT FOUR DASH TWENTY EIGHT COLON INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN SUBJECT RADIOGRAM ISSUED TO ALL ESTABLISHMENTS AND UNITS UNDER CONTROL OF HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE ON TWENTY NINE NOVEMBER STOP ENTIRE SUBJECT OF PROTECTION RECENTLY RECEIVED COMMA AND CONTINUES TO RECEIVE COMMA DETAILED AND COMPREHENSIVE ATTENTION AS RESULT OF THREE REPORTS REPARED BY SPECIAL INSPECTOR DURING JUNE AND JULY PORT ONE STOP PARA ADDITIONAL STEPS INITIATED SPECIFICALLY TO COMPLY WITH SUBJECT RADIOGRAM SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS COLON ASSEMBLY OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS OF MAJOR SUBDIVISION OF HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE TWENTY NINE NOVEMBER STOP PERSONAL INSPECTION OF STATIONS AND ACTIVITIES BY AIR FORCE COMMANDER ONE AND TWO DECEMBER STOP INCREASE IN SIZE OF GUARD WHERE DESIRABLE STOP INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO EXPEDITE OVERHAULING OF PASS SYSTEM COMMA CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COMMA NOW IN PROGRESS STOP THIS ENTIRE DEPARTMENT IS NOW OPERATING AND WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE UNDER AN ALERT FOR PREVENTION OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES STOP PARA SECRECY DISCIPLINE BEING GIVEN ALL EMPHASIS PRACTICABLE THROUGH OFFICIAL AND QUASI OFFICIAL AGENCIES STOP WORK HAS ACTUALLY BEEN BEGUN ON ESSENTIAL PROTECTIVE FENCING AND FLOOD

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

_____ M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page two No. 1033 December 4th

LIGHTING PROJECTS STOP PARA WITH REFERENCE TO COUNTER PROPAGANDA COMMA THE PROBLEM IS EDUCATIONAL RATHER THAN REGULATORY AND AT PRESENT IS BEING DEALT WITH THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF SQUADRON TALKS STOP NEED IS FELT FOR A WAR DEPARTMENT PUBLICATION PAREN POSSIBLY IN FORM OF DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION OF FOREWORD TO SOLDIERS HANDBOOK COMMA FM TWENTY ONE DASH ONE HUNDRED PAREN SUITABLY ARRANGED AND WORDED FOR USE OF RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED PERSONNEL COMMA DEALING WITH STATUS OF SOLDIER AS CITIZEN COMMA IDEALS AND DOCTRINES INFLUENCING FOUNDERS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT COMMA STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT COMMA PLACE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN THE STRUCTURE COMMA NATIONAL OBJECTIVES COMMA BOTH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COMMA TOGETHER WITH DISCUSSION OF THOSE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT INIMICAL TO DEMOCRATIC FORM STOP SIGNED MARSHALL END SHORT

Action Copy

EXHIBIT NO. 136

M–3

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,
Washington, November 19, 1941.

Memorandum to Mr. Harvey H. Bundy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War
Subject: Performance of SCR–270

1. There is attached a copy of a memorandum from the Department Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, relative to the operation of Radio Set SCR–270 in the Hawaiian Islands, which is forwarded for your information.

/S/ Eugene V. Elder
EUGENE V. ELDER,
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.

NOVEMBER 14, 1941.

Memorandum for Colonel Colton, Chief, Matériel Branch.

In recent exercises held in the Hawaiian Department, the operation of the radio set SCR–270 was found to be very satisfactory. This exercise was started approximately 4:30 in the morning and with three radio sets in operation. We noted when the planes took off from the airplane carrier in the oscilloscope. We determined this distance to be approximately 80 miles, due to the fact that the planes would circle around waiting the assemblage of the remainder from the carrier.

As soon as the planes were assembled, they proceeded towards Hawaii. This was very easily determined and within six minutes, the pursuit aircraft were notified and they took off and intercepted the incoming bombers at approximately 30 miles from Pearl Harbor.

It was a very interesting exercise. All the general officers present were highly pleased with the proceedings of the radio direction finding sets and the personnel associated with the information centers.

We have had very little trouble with the operations of these sets. When the fixed stations are installed in the higher mountains surrounding Hawaii, we expect to have as good an air warning system available for use as is now operating for the British on their tight little island, as their situation is approximately the same as ours is on Hawaii.

C. A. POWELL,
Lt. Col. Signal Corps,
Department Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department.

EXHIBIT NO. 137

WAR DEPARTMENT

Classified Message Center Outgoing Clear Message

OPD 381 Haw (19 Nov 45)
Operations Div WDGS Current
Group WDOPD 74676

19 NOVEMBER 1945.

COMGENAFMIDPAC Ft Shafter T H
Information:
CINCAFPAC Admin Manila P I
Number: WCL 22214
From: WARSEC

Congressional Pearl Harbor Committee desires all orders and memoranda pertaining to time schedule for operation of and training at radar stations in Hawaiian Department during the period 27 November 41 to 7 December 41. Some evidence here indicates that schedule was initiated by verbal order on 27 November 41. In that case confirmatory written order or memorandum is requested.

End.

ORIGINATOR: OPD
MC–OUT–22214 (Nov 45) DTG 201810Z 1s
Unclassified

RADIO MESSAGE DATED 21 NOVEMBER 1945 FROM CG AFMIDPAC, FT. SHAFTER, TH TO WAR DEPARTMENT

[Paraphrase]

Will forward by air mail on 21 November four original papers relating to time schedule for radar stations' operation and training in Hawaiian Department from 27 November to 7 December 1941.

[Description of the four papers is omitted.]

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
MIDDLE PACIFIC
APO 958

AMR/rrm

In reply refer to:
SPOCT AG 413.684 ( )

Classified SECRET
Auth: WDGS
Date: 21 Jan 46
Initials: CPN

SUBJECT: Operating Time Schedule for Radar Stations on Oahu from 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941.

TO : The Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: AC of S, Operations Division.

References: (a) Radio, Nr: WCL-22214, DTG: 201834Z Nov 45, from the Secretary of War to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific.
(b) Radio, Nr: RJ-73381, DTG: 212004Z Nov 45, from the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific, to the War Department, Operations Division.

1. Inclosures are forwarded to furnish information requested by reference (a) and referred to in reference (b), both above.

2. An exhaustive search through the files designated under Headquarters Hawaiian Department has not disclosed the publication of Official Orders of any kind in connection with the time schedule of training at, or the operation of radar stations on Oahu during the period prior to 7 December 1941.

3. The inclosures consistently show that the time schedule, effective 27 November 1941, placed the aircraft warning radar stations on Oahu in tactical operation from 4:00 A. M. to 7:00 A. M. each day. Except for Sunday, operation was continued for training from 7:00 A. M. to 11:00 A. M., while the afternoon period, from 12:00 noon to 4:00 P. M., was set aside for routine maintenance duties.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

[redacted]
[redacted] A.G.D.

4 Incls:
#1 - Affidavit of Lt Grover C. White, Jr., Signal Corps.
#2 - Memorandum to the Department Signal Officer, Signed by W. H. Tetley, Captain, Signal Corps.

SECRET

SECRET

(Basic: Ltr, HAWMIDPAC, file KPOOT AG 413.684, sub: "Operating Time Schedule for Radar Stations on Oahu from 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941.

p3 - Memorandum to General Short, dated 19 December 1941, signed by C. A. Powell, Lt Colonel, Signal Corps.
p4 - Letter, Hq Hawaiian Department, subject: "Detector Operation", dated 20 December 1941, signed by Lt Colonel W. H. Murphy, Signal Corps.

SECRET

SECRET

Fort Shafter, T. H.)
) ss
Territory of Hawaii)

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Grover C. White, Jr. O-396182, 2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison Officer the ANS agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two hours before until one hour after dawn. The first schedule required operation of all stations from 4 A.M. to 6 P.M. This schedule was modified to the hours of 4 A.M. to 4 P.M. A temporary schedule was next devised which required all stations to operate from 4 A.M. to 11 A.M. and to have "staggered" operation, i.e., 3 stations from 11 A.M. to 1 P.M., the remaining 3 stations from 1 P.M. to 4 P.M. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all stations operate from 4 A.M. to 7 A.M. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941; this was agreed to by the Control Officer.

2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Michas, SCAMH, acting RDF Officer, reports that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the information received by the ANS Information Center from 4 A.M. to 7 A.M. Sunday, December 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, who was the only officer in the Information Center from 4 A.M. to 7 A.M.

3. At approximately 7:20 A.M. a report was received from a Detector station at Opana that a large number of planes was approaching Oahu on a course North 3 degrees East at a distance of approximately 132 miles. This information was immediately transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc. Joseph McDonald to Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opana about the flight. The statement of Pfc. Joseph McDonald, SCAMH, the switchboard operator is attached.

4. The Navy Liaison Officer's position within the Information Center was not manned when I reached the Information Center at about 8:20 A.M. This position was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. Stouffer, SCAMH, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 P.M. when the position was taken over by Naval Officers.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

GROVER C. WHITE, JR.,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

1 Incl,
Statement by Pfc. Joseph McDonald, AM

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of Dec A.D. 1941

at Fort Shafter, T. H.

ADAM R. HUGGINS,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.

SECRET

Incl #1 to Ltr HAWINCAC, File HPOCT AG413.644(21 Nov 45), dtd 21 Nov 45, subj: Operating Time Schedule for Radar Stations on Oahu from 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941.

SECRET

MEMO: To Department Signal Officer.

The instructions given me verbally by Colonel Murphy were to operate from Dawn-2 to Dawn+2, which at that time was from 04:00 to 07:00. This schedule was supplemented by a training schedule from 07:00 to 11:00 everyday except Sunday. The afternoon period was devoted to routine maintenance.

W. H. TETLEY,
Captain, Signal Corps.

SECRET

Incl #2 to HAFMIDPAC Ltr, file HPGCT AG 413.684 (21 Nov 45), dtd 21 Nov 45, subj: Operating Time Schedule for Radar Stations on Oahu from 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941.

4-1-~.

(1)

SECRET

In reply refer to: HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Office of the Signal Officer
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Sig.

19 December 1941.

Memorandum to General SHORT:

1. Instructions were issued by Lt Col W. H. MURPHY Acting Department Signal Officer to Capt W. H. TETLEY, C. O. Sig Co A.W.H. on November 27 to start immediately operating the radio locators from two hours before dawn to one hour after dawn which order was complied with to include December 7.

2. This schedule was supplemented by a training schedule from 7:00 A to 11:00 A every day except Sunday. The afternoon period was devoted to routine maintanence.

C. A. POWELL
Lt Col, Signal Corps
Dept Signal Officer

SECRET

Incl #3 to HAFMIDPAC Ltr,
file MPOCT AG 413.684 (21 Nov 45), dtd 21 Nov 45,
subj: Operating Time Schedule for Radar Stations
on Oahu from 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941.

SECRET

A G.

In reply refer to: Sig.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Office of the Signal Officer
Fort Shafter, T. H.

20 December, 1941.

SUBJECT: Detector Operation.

TO : Department Signal Officer.

1. On November 27, 1941, after conference with Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, and receiving instructions to operate all mobile detectors from two hours before before dawn until one hour after dawn, I, as Acting Department Signal Officer, gave immediate instructions to Captain TYLER, Commanding Officer of the Aircraft Warning Company, to initiate the above detector operation so long as Alert No. 1 was in force.

2. The detectors in question operated daily thereafter during the prescribed period except when having occasional operational trouble. In addition, the six detector stations operated daily except Sundays from 7:00 A. M. until 11:00 A. M. for routine training. Daily except Saturday and Sunday, the hours 12:00 noon until 4:00 P. M. were devoted to training and maintenance work.

W. H. MURPHY
Lt Col, Sig C.

Incl #4 to HAFMIDPAC Ltr, file MPGCT AG 415.694 (21 Nov 45) dtd 21 Nov 45, subj: Operating Time Schedule for Radar Stations on Oahu from 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941.

SECRET

EXHIBIT NO. 138

CONFIDENTIAL

Hawaii (Ltr [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] of the [illegible] to Hawaii.")

[illegible] 1st Ind.

[illegible] August 1941. To [illegible], War Department, Washington, D. C.

[illegible]

Walter C. Short

[illegible]

EXHIBIT NO. 139

CONFIDENTIAL

Issuing Office: G-2, [illegible]
Army Contact Office
Honolulu, T.H.

Date: 17 October 1941.- 1200

G-2 ESTIMATE OF INTERNATIONAL (JAPANESE) SITUATION

1. Summary of Situation

a. With the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet, the 16th instant, tension in the Pacific reached a new high. The fall of said cabinet is apparently primarily due to a breakdown of the rapprochement negotiations between America and Japan, and also due to extreme pressure from the rightist elements in Japan as a result of German success against Russia, and also for fear of complete encirclement of Japan by the ABCD group.

b. The situation is generally admitted as being extremely critical, and is still necessarily uncertain, due to the fact that the formation of the new cabinet has not been completed and, consequently, little or no definite information is available as to the attitude of individual members, and nothing as to what the attitude of the cabinet as a whole will be.

c. Based upon contemporary opinions from various sources, however, it is fairly certain that Japan's basic policy, as heretofore frequently stated, will remain unchanged; and it is expected that Japan will shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation or combination of nations which might oppose the execution of said policies - irrespective of what means she may choose to adopt or course she may decide to take in their achievement.

2. Conclusions

According to present indications, it is highly probable that Japan will, in the near future, take military action in new areas of the Far East. The primary reasons for such a move or moves are believed to be as follows:

a. Capabilities

1. Desperate economic conditions internally-making it perhaps preferable to risk a major foreign war rather than internal revolution.

2. Violent opposition by the "rightist" elements who are opposed to any appeasement of the democracies and desire more active cooperation with the Axis - for the time being.

3. That major successes of the Axis in Europe and the potential collapse of Russian resistance, afford an unparalleled opportunity for expansion with chances of minimum resistance - that is, when the strength of the Axis is at its maximum, and the strength of the democracies not yet fully mobilized.

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4. A desire to break the so-called encirclement of the ABCD block.

b. Probable Moves. The most likely moves which Japan may make in the near future, and the sequence thereof, are as follows:

1. Attack Russia from the east.

2. Pressure French Indo-China and Thailand for concessions in the way of military, naval, and air bases, and guarantees of economic cooperation.

3. Attack British possessions in the Far East.

4. Defend against an American attack in support of the British.

5. Attack simultaneously the ABCD block at which ever points might promise her greatest tactical, strategic, and economic advantages.

c. Reasons Justifying These Moves. The basis for each of the above possible moves are considered to be as follows:

1. Attack on Russia.

(a) Japan's desire to extend her first line of defense as far to the west as possible as a primary defense against potential aerial attacks on the heart of Japan proper by a continental power.

(b) To set up a buffer state between herself and Germany (assuming that Germany will eventually attempt to extend her influence and control eastward to the Pacific.)

(c) To secure immense quantities of much-needed raw materials known to be in Siberia.

(d) To secure effective control over, or perhaps stamp out, communism in the Far East by striking at the root or source of the doctrine.

(e) A possibility that an attack on Russia at this time can be undertaken with a reasonable chance of non-military intervention by the United States; and that even the British might not resort to active military action in support of Russia in the Pacific, due to the fact that both the Americans and British are preoccupied in Europe, and that neither power has any genuine desire to ever see the state of the USSR emerge sufficiently strong to again plague the democratic states with the sinister ideals of communism.

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(f) To open communications with Germany for the purpose of closer coordination and supply, in case it becomes necessary to continue the war against other Pacific powers.

(g) To achieve a spectacular victory which is now greatly needed to revive the morale of the people and prepare them for future efforts toward the south.

3. Pressure French Indo-China and Thailand.

Pressure on French Indo-China and Thailand for concessions of military, naval, or air bases, and guarantees of economic cooperation, is entirely to be expected, and this may either precede or follow, or occur simultaneously with an attack on Russia, in order to insure security in the south while her primary objective in the north is being achieved; and to afford her more and better strategic bases from which she can operate against Chungking's lines of communication, and/or American and British lines of communications in case it becomes necessary to defend herself against either or both of these powers. Also, to secure additional raw materials, food, etc.

3. Attack on British Possessions in the Far East.

Following the principle of defeating one opponent at a time - famous with her Axis partner, Hitler - it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain British military resistance to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British; and do so without a simultaneous attack on American possession, because of no known binding agreement between the British and Americans for joint military action against Japan, and that the American public is not yet fully prepared to support such action. However, it must be evident to the Japanese that in case of such an attack on the British, they would most certainly have to fight the United States within a relatively short time.

4. Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers

While a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle mentioned above, it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed.

An attack on the United States could not be undertaken without almost certain involvement of the entire ABCD block, hence there remains the possibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever points might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or economical advantages over her opponents.

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8. In conclusion, barring unforseen and untoward incidents, which might set off a conflict in any quarter and invite measures and counter-measures never contemplated, it is believed that the above represents the most logical major moves that Japan may take and the probable sequence thereof. This is assuming that the new cabinet will be, as generally predicted, "strongly military" and will support the present demands of the "rightists" elements which were largely responsible for the fall of the Third Konoye cabinet.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL
Lt. Colonel, C.A.C.
Asst. A.C. of S., G-2
Control Officer.

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-4-

C/S HED

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Issuing Office: G-2, H .H.D.,
Army Contact Office,
Honolulu, T.H.
Time and date: 1200 25 Oct. 1941.

G-2 ESTIMATE OF INTERNATIONAL (JAPANESE) SITUATION

1. Summary of Situation. Reference paragraph 1, G-2 Estimate of the International (JAPANESE) Situation, 1200 Oct. 17, 1941, there have been no fundamental changes in the international situation, centering on Japan, since the time mentioned; and the estimate is still in almost complete accord with contemporary opinions of most high officials and reputable observers who are known to be in close touch with the various phases of the present fast moving situation. However, the following generally summary is considered appropriate at this time:

a. A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. The fall of said cabinet was allegedly precipitated by unsatisfactory progress of the rapprochement negotiations between America and Japan, and by extreme pressure from "rightist" elements who have been clamoring for stronger ties with the Axis and more forceful opposition to the ABCD block, including Russia.

b. An apparently imminent collapse of the Russian forces in the west, together with the loudly proclaimed German successes everywhere, tended to accentuate the cry for action on the side of the Axis to such a degree that the Konoye cabinet could no longer resist, hence resigned en block, and was almost immediately replaced by a new cabinet headed by ex-War Minister, General Tojo.

c. Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis - which automatically underscores Japan's policies with "intensified aggression"; definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States and other democracies; makes all protestations of peaceful intentions a sham or objective of suspicion; and forces America into a state of constant vigilance - but at least clarifies the situation to such an extent that we do know where we stand, what to expect, and what should be done.

2. Conclusions. No change in paragraph 2 of G-2 Estimate of 17 Oct. 1941. However, several important incidents have transpired, or are scheduled to take place, which are certain to have a profound bearing on the probable course of events in question in the near future. These are:

a. The formation of a new Japanese "War Cabinet", headed by ex-War Minister, General Tojo.

b. The decision of Premier to continue his predecessor's order to permit three Japanese vessels to visit American ports for the purpose of transporting stranded Americans and Japanese nationals to their respective homelands.

c. Premier Tojo's expressed desire to continue rapprochement negotiations with the United States.

d. The order by the navy department to American vessels to avoid Asiatic ports in the north Pacific, including Shanghai.

e. The announced decision of the American government to abandon Vladivostok as a port of entry for war supplies to Russia, and to adopt the port of Archangel as the sole point of entry for such shipments.

CONFIDENTIAL

(a)

f. Announcement of Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for consultation with the new cabinet.

3. Justifications for conclusions. The following is a brief analysis and evaluation of the above, based on limited reports, and is not to be regarded as conclusive, but rather to assist in making accurate conclusions on the general situation as subsequent events and special situations are presented:

a. New Cabinet. Paragraph 1 g above is the general answer. The only other noteworthy viewpoint received, and considered to be worth mentioning, is that General Tojo was selected to head the new cabinet because he was the only man considered capable of controlling the "extremist" army elements, and thus stave off any precipitate action until such time as the situation in Europe has become definitely clear, and until at least a decisive stage has been reached in rapprochement negotiations with the United States.

b. Japanese vessels to America. The Japanese government's decision to permit three ships to visit America for the purpose of repatriating stranded nationals of both countries, may be regarded either as a peaceful gesture or as a measure to "clear the decks" in the Pacific with a view to future naval and military moves. It will be recalled that the Japanese were careful to remove Japanese nationals from the interior of south China before spreading military operations to that section. It is considered impracticable to remove all Japanese nationals from America and American territories.

c. Rapprochement Negotiations. Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet has openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis - definitely our enemy - we can only expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations as her partner, Hitler, i.e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies. From a military point of view such peaceful overtures should be preceded by concrete evidence of sincerity before they can be seriously considered.

d. Navy Order to Clear American Ships from North Pacific. This action on the part of the navy seems to have been largely "precautionary", which also appears fully justified - realising that we are now definitely dealing with an exponent and ally of Hitler.

e. Abandonment of Vladivostok as a Port of Entry for Russian Supplies. Two issues are here involved:

(1) Military. The crucial point as to whether we will be able to continue to face Hitler across the English Channel, across the Atlantic, or on American shores, centers in the British Isles. Convoys must cross the Atlantic in order to hold the British Isles at all cost, irrespective of what happens in the Pacific. Convoys to Archangel, for the greater part of the distance, could be carried on incidental to convoys going to the British Isles. Requirements of armed escorts for the remaining distance to Archangel, would probably be less than what would be required over any Pacific route. In fact, with a hostile Japanese fleet in the Pacific, any practicable route across the Pacific to Russia may have been entirely ruled out. Assuming this to be the case, the most logical step would be not to undertake a thing that would certainly have to be abandoned later.

(2) Diplomatic. Inasmuch as the shipping of supplies to Russia via Vladivostok has been one of the major issues between America and Japan recently, the abandonment of said route may serve to keep the door of diplomacy open for a longer period; and, in case of an unforeseen major reverse for the Axis in Europe, might provide an open door for successful negotiations at a time when Japan desired to change her mind, seeing that further ties with the Axis are useless, and that a compromise with the democracies has become inevitable.

CONFIDENTIAL

F. Nomura's report to New Cabinet. This is considered a very normal procedure with the Japanese government. Mr. Nomura will be expected to give a review of his efforts in Washington and perhaps the last word on the American attitude. If his previous work is still in harmony with Japan's new policy, he may return to Washington. If not, it seems a fair assumption that he may not even be replaced. In case the abnormal procedure is followed, of dispatching a subordinate to Tokyo, it may be taken as an attempt to conceal the real gravity of the situation. This is not, however, a prediction.

* * * * *

REMARK. Everyone is interested in the answer to the question, When will Japan move? - a question which no one dares predict with certainty. However, the following points are considered to be worthy of mentioning:

a. Things which tend to indicate that a major move will not take place for approximately another month are:

(1) The dispatch of Japanese vessels to the United States for return of stranded nationals of both countries to their respective homelands.

(2) Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for purpose of reporting to the new cabinet.

(3) Repeated declarations by Japanese officials that Japan desires to continue rapprochement negotiations.

(4) Extreme cold over Eastern Siberia makes military operations against Russia very risky before spring.

(5) A protracted Russo-German war seems much more likely now than it did immediately prior to the assumption of office by the new cabinet, and that the "rightists" who were crying for action against a "collapsing" Russia, may again hesitate to take the final plunge on the side of Hitler. If the intense cold plus a tired Russian army is able to stop the invincible legions of Hitler before Moscow (?), wisdom may dictate not to risk the matchless legions of Nippon against a rested Russian army under temperatures still lower than around Moscow.

(6) Announcement that Cabinet leaders have requested Emperor Hirohito to convoke a special five-day session of the Imperial Diet, beginning Nov. 15, at which time, it is predicted, the government will be asked to clarify its stand on international policies, particularly with reference to former Premier Konoye's message to President Roosevelt and the progress of the Washington negotiations.

b. In other words, it seems logical to believe that no major move will be made before the latter part of November - in any direction - with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring.

Distribution:
G/S N.H.D.
G-2 N.H.D.
G-3 N.H.D.
G-2 Schofield Barracks
G-2 24th Div.
G-2 25th Div.
F.B.I. (2)
O.N.I. (2)
Capt. Bryan, Trans. Dept.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL
Lt. Col., G.S.C.
Asst. A.C. of S., G-2
Contact Officer

EXHIBIT NO. 140

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM

To the J.A.G.

Will you kindly give me your opinion on a further question — in addition to those embodied in this opinion — viz

If Gen'l Short's proposed application for voluntary retirement were accepted, with the announced understanding that such action would not preclude a future Court martial for the alleged Offenses in the Pearl Harbor, would that be valid — could a subsequent Court martial be validly brought; should it be found advisable?

H L S

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

To Secretary of War.

Judge-advocate General's recommendations referred to by Gen. Wallace C. Short.

(Bill)

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON

January 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM for the Chief of Staff.

Subject: Course of action with respect to General Walter Campbell Short.

1. Pursuant to your instructions I submit the following comments with respect to possible courses of action against the above-named officer on account of the derelictions disclosed in the report of the President's Commission to investigate the Japanese attack on Hawaii on December 7, 1941. These comments are based solely upon the text of the report of the Commission. I have not seen or examined the 1667 typewritten pages of testimony taken by the Commission nor the 3000 printed pages of records and documents examined by it.

2. General Short may be tried by a general court-martial or he may be summarily discharged from the Army by the President pursuant to the provisions of Article of War 118.

3. With reference to trial by general court-martial, it is assumed that the evidence taken by the Commission sustains its findings of fact and conclusions and would warrant such procedure should it be deemed advisable. However, it is impossible to predict with certainty the result of any trial or the sentence which the court might impose. In this case should a court acquit or impose a sentence less than dismissal I can see no advantage resulting from such a trial. It will be noted that the offenses charged against General Short are offenses of omission or nonfeasance which require a much stronger showing to justify a trial than those involving misfeasance or malfeasance. General Short's nonfeasance or omissions were based on an estimate of the situation which, although proved faulty by subsequent events, was, in so far as I am able to ascertain from the report of the Commission, made or concurred in by all those officers in Hawaii best qualified to form a sound military opinion. That estimate was that an attack by air was in the highest degree improbable.

4. There are, in my opinion, serious questions of policy which should be considered in connection with a possible trial of this officer by general court-martial.

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a. If a court should find him guilty and sentence him to anything less than dismissal, the Army would be accused of whitewashing General Short. This accusation would be much more strongly made should the trial result in his acquittal.

b. Such trial would have to be in open court, otherwise the War Department would be subject to criticism of whitewashing General Short if acquitted, or of persecuting him if convicted.

c. The ramifications of this case are such that in a trial by court-martial it would be necessary to introduce in evidence numerous secret plans, orders and other papers which do not appear in the Commission's report. Both the prosecution and the defense would need these documents in order properly to present their cases. It certainly would be against the public interest to disclose some, at least, of these various war plans and documents. Such being the case, it would be impossible to prevent the publication of these plans and documents except by closing the court during those sessions in which these secret papers were read and discussed. The result of a trial by a court partly in open session and partly in secret session might be that the War Department would be subject to the same charges of whitewashing or persecution as referred to in subparagraph b above.

d. A general court-martial would require the time and energy for a considerable period of a large number of generals and other officers of high rank as members of the court-martial, and for personnel of the prosecution and defense. It would consume much time and effort of the numerous officers of the Army and Navy whose services would be required in order properly to present the case for trial, or whose attendance would be required as witnesses. The ramifications of such a trial would be so great and it would require the time of so many officers from the lowest to the highest rank that it would interfere seriously in the main job now before the War Department, namely the prosecution of the war.

e. The career of General Short as an active Army officer is finished and closed. Because of the lack of confidence which the public now has in him, which lack of confidence would no doubt be shared by his future subordinates, it is unthinkable that any command should again be entrusted to him. General Short knows this. That in itself is a very severe punishment. Furthermore, General Short has been relieved of his command which reduces him from a lieutenant general to a major general. The addition to that punishment of any punishment other than dismissal, such as a reprimand, loss of files, forfeiture of pay or suspension from

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a command, would be inappropriate.

5. For the President to discharge General Short summarily under the provisions of Article of War 118 would tend even more strongly than a dismissal by a sentence of a general court-martial to enable him afterward to claim persecution. Revised Statutes, section 1244, provides that when an officer is 62 years old he may be retired from active service at the discretion of the President. General Short will be 62 years old on March 30, 1942. However, it is unnecessary to discuss this course of action for the reason that you have informed me that General Short has offered to apply for retirement at any time you may desire to accept it. He may lawfully be retired upon such application.

6. General Short entered the Army as a second lieutenant of Infantry on February 2, 1901, and had, up to December 7, 1941, nearly 41 years of honorable and most creditable service. He reached the next to the highest rank that an Army officer can reach, namely that of a lieutenant general.

7. I realize that the question of what ought to be done in this matter has been the subject of heated discussion in the press and elsewhere and whatever may be done will probably subject the War Department to criticism. However, in view of all the considerations hereinabove discussed, I respectfully suggest the advisability and the desirability of accepting the application of General Short for retirement. However, in this connection I would further suggest that it would be both politic and just to coordinate the action taken by the War Department with that taken by the Navy Department in the case of Admiral Kimmel.

Myron C. Cramer

Myron C. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON

31 Jan 1942

MEMORANDUM for the Secretary of War.

Subject: Course of action with respect to Major General Walter Campbell Short.

1. After considering my memorandum for the Chief of Staff of January 27, 1942, on the above subject, you have asked me a further question, as follows:

> "If General Short's proposed application for voluntary retirement were accepted, with the announced understanding that such action would not preclude a future court martial for the alleged offenses in re Pearl Harbor, would that be valid - Could a subsequent court martial be validly brought, should it be found advisable?"

2. A retired officer is as a matter of law still an officer of the Army and still subject to court-martial as much as though he were still on the active list (A.W. 2a; Nat'l Defense Act, sec. 2; 10 U.S. C. 4). Neither does his retirement amount to a break in the continuity of his service which would prevent his trial after retirement for an offense committed before retirement (Dig. Op. JAG 1912, p. 992, par I G 2b). The real question involved is whether the retirement of an officer on his own application constitutes a condonation of his offense, barring trial for it.

3. There are opinions of this office to the effect that under certain circumstances release from arrest or confinement or promotion may constitute such a condonation. I find no precedent holding either way with respect to retirement. Retirement after thirty years' service upon the officer's own application under section 1243, Revised Statutes (10 U.S.C. 943; Mil. Laws, sec. 326), is "in the discretion of the President". The foregoing is one of the two statutes under which General Short may be retired at once on his own application. If he be retired under that statute, there may be some plausibility in a contention that the President's exercise of discretion in terminating the officer's active service on his own application constitutes a bargain between him and the officer to the effect that he will not further be prosecuted for known offenses occurring prior to retirement. There is no statutory or judicial authority for such a view, and I regard it as unsound as a strict matter of law. Therefore I

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answer your inquiry by saying that as a matter of law the retirement of General Short under the above statute upon his own application in the discretion of the President does not involve the passing of judgment by the President upon the officer's past services or a condonation by him of prior offenses which would prevent subsequent trial by court-martial.

4. Nevertheless, as a matter of fairness rather than law, there is force in the supposed contention above stated. General Short has volunteered to submit an application for retirement. He may reasonably suppose that a request to him from an official source, in answer to his voluntary suggestion, to submit his application for retirement, involves a tacit agreement that the issue of his official conduct of the defense of Hawaii prior to and on December 7 will be closed by his retirement, and that no charges will be preferred against him growing out of such conduct.

5. Another statute under which General Short might be retired immediately upon his own application, is the second proviso of section 3 of the act of June 15, 1940 (54 Stat. 380), reading:

> "Provided further, That any officer on the active list of the Regular Army or Philippine Scouts who served in any capacity as a member of the military or naval forces of the United States prior to November 12, 1918, shall upon his own application be retired with annual pay equal to 75 per centum of his active-duty annual pay at the time of his retirement unless entitled to retired pay of a higher grade as hereinafter provided, except that officers with less than twenty years' service and officers who are under investigation or who are awaiting trial by courts martial or the result of such trial, or whose cases are pending before courts of inquiry shall be retired only when the application for retirement in each case has been approved by the Secretary of War: * * *"

It is manifest that War Department approval of an application of General Short for retirement under the above statute, would amount in effect to a finding that he is not under investigation or awaiting trial by court-martial, and would thus tend even more strongly to support a contention that any offenses chargeable against him were condoned by the action.

6. If General Short should be retired on his own application under the above circumstances and if afterward he should be brought

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to trial for his conduct of the defense of Hawaii, it may be anticipated that charges of bad faith would be made against the War Department by him or by others in his behalf. I think it most desirable that no opportunity be afforded for such accusations. I assume that General Short's offer of retirement as made was not subject to any conditions. Therefore, I suggest that before his offer be accepted he be given to understand, preferably in writing for the purpose of the record, that such retirement will not constitute a condonation of his offenses, if any, on the part of the War Department, or be considered a bar to any future trial by general court-martial in case such trial should be deemed advisable.

7. Should General Short refuse to submit his application for voluntary retirement with such a condition attached, the President may, without any application by General Short, retire him upon his reaching the age of 62 years on March 30, 1942, pursuant to the provisions of Revised Statutes, section 1244 (10 U.S.C. 944; Mil. Laws, sec. 323), and may make announcement to that effect at the present time.

Myron C. Cramer.

Myron C. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

1 Incl.
Let. to C. of S.
1/27/42.

8

CHARGE—VIOLATION OF 96TH ARTICLE OF WAR

Specification 1: Failure to provide an adequate inshore aerial patrol.
Specification 2: Failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defenses.
Specification 3: Failure to set up an Interceptor Command.
Specification 4: Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service.
Specification 5: Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate warnings to interested agencies.
Specification 6: Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation and coordination with the Navy.
Specification 7: Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their duties in case of sudden attack.
Specification 8: Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.
Specification 9: Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation of a hostile attack, after having been warned of the danger thereof.
Specification 10: Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an attack.
Specification 11: Failure to provide for the protection of military personnel, their families, etc., and of civilian employees on various reservations.

---

[1]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
SERVICES OF SUPPLY,
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
Washington, April 20, 1942.

Memorandum for The Judge Advocate General.

Subject: Preparation of charges against Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired.

1. Pursuant to the oral direction of The Adjutant General to report to you for duty in connection with the preparation of charges against the above-named officer, in addition to my regular duties in his office, and having so reported and been directed to prepare tentative charges as aforesaid, the following comments are submitted with the tentative charges prepared.

2. *Possible Lines of Procedure.* An examination of the record of the board which investigated the attack by the Japanese on the Island of Oahu, on December 7, 1941, (hereinafter referred to as the Roberts Board), led to the conclusion that, at the present time, there were only three courses open:

(a) To prepare charges and specifications against General Short, not based entirely on the evidence adduced before the Roberts Board, but on that evidence and on evidence which it was believed may be further adduced, either (1) by recalling witnesses already examined for further questioning, or (2) by calling new witnesses from whom pertinent testimony may be expected.

(b) To prepare charges and specifications at this present time but based only on such evidence as was adduced before the Roberts Board which appears legally sufficient to support such charges and specifications.

(c) To refrain from drawing charges and specifications at this time, and to await a period when additional evidence may be adduced before a second board, and then to draw such charges and specifications as the accumulated evidence appears to warrant.

We have followed the first course, (a), because it not only appears to be in conformity with the direction that charges be now prepared, but because it is certain that the formal investigation of the charges which must precede arraignment will bring out additional evidence. For example, we believe that knowledge of the Navy Department radio of November 27, 1941, ("This is a war warning"), can be brought home to General Short, but from the Roberts record there would be difficulty in establishing that as a fact. General Short states categorically, "I didn't see it". Record, page 143. Only almost immediately to admit that he "did not know whether I saw it or not. I am not sure". Record, page 144. The Roberts record does not establish the fact, one way or another, for Admiral Kimmel's subordinates admit they did not carry out the Admiral's explicit direction that the radiogram was "for personal delivery to General Short", but, so far as they are concerned, it only reached G–3. (Record, page 662). Whether G–3 ever got the message to General Short was not brought out.

[2]

Again, Admiral Kimmel testified that the Navy Department informed him on December 3, 1941, that based upon information from reliable sources that Japanese diplomatic and consular officers in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Batavia were directed to destroy most of their codes and ciphers and to burn secret documents. (Record, page 583). But, while General Short testifies to conferences with Admiral Kimmel from November 27, 1941, to December 6, 1941, and, in fact, to a conference on that very date, December 3, 1941, there is nothing in the record to indicate whether or not this information was given him by Admiral Kimmel.

Further, we have noted newspaper statements by possible witnesses who did not appear before the Roberts Board on points covered by our charges. Thus, Mrs. Mary Kogan, wife of First Lieutenant Milton M. Kogan, D. C., a reserve officer, is quoted in the press as stating that they had never received any instructions at Schofield Barracks as to what to do in case of an air raid, and further that a Hawaiian newspaper had predicted an attack by the Japanese "that week end". (See clipping in Brief and Resume submitted herewith.) Also, Mr. Raymond Coll, a Hawaiian newspaper editor is quoted by a Washington newspaper, shortly after the submission of the report of the Roberts Board, as stating, in substance, that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had made clear by their utterances before December 7, 1941, the possibility and imminence of a Japanese attack at an early date. (We have not been able to examine the Hawaiian newspapers at the Library of Congress because we were informed that they are now at the bindery, but this is another "lead" which should be followed in preparing the case.) Staff Sergeant Joseph Lockard, the enlisted man who was operating the Opana radar on the northern tip of the Island of Oahu, and who gave warning of the approach of the Japanese airplanes on this morning of December 7, 1941, was not questioned.

It is not necessary to multiply other instances. The Roberts Board, of necessity, could not go into many matters which would properly concern a court-martial.

3. Theory upon which Charge and Specifications were framed. The theory on which we have prepared the charge and specifications is that of nonfeasance. We have endeavored in each specification to show a duty and then to allege a neglect or failure to perform that duty. The line which General Short's defense will take is obvious from his statements before and to the Roberts Board. He will contend that there was no neglect of duty, but simply errors of judgment; that he had reported the measures he had taken to the War Department, and if he was in error in not going beyond "Alert No. 1" (protection against sabotage only), the War Department was equally in error in not inviting his attention to the supposed neglect; that from the nature of his instructions many of the neglects or failures with which we may charge him concerned defensive measures which he could not take without "causing unnecessary publicity and alarm", contrary to the instructions in the Chief of Staff's radiogram of November 27, 1941; [3] that it was the duty of the War Department to warn him more specifically if it had thought hostilities imminent, and that it did not do so until the radiogram of December 7, 1941, which he did not receive until after the attack. The obvious answer to this line of denfense is that he had been warned, not once but repeatedly, both by the War Department and Navy Department messages, of the imminent dangers, well before December 7, 1941; that he had been placed in a position that every school-boy knows was one of exposure to sudden attack; that his own battle plans referred to it as "frontier"; that what the War Department may or may not have thought of the possibility of a sudden attack could not relieve him of his responsibility; that his failure to take effective and vigorous measures of defense against outside attack can not be condoned as mere errors of judgment. In short, the case will come down to this—Has the Government shown clearly and unequivocally neglect of duty or has it merely pointed out errors of judgment, excusable under the circumstances. We think that we can show such neglect, and that General Short will not be able to escape its consequences by any "Tu quoque" argument.

4. The Proposed Charge and Specifications. It will be noted that there is only one Charge, viz., violation of the 96th. Article of War. There are several reasons why it is not recommended that any other article be invoked. In the first place, no precedent has been found for employing the 95th. Article of War in a case of this nature—in fact, the case appears to be unique—and if it be conceded that the 95th. Article of War could be used, there would immediately be an outcry

that the War Department was practically informing the court-martial that it desired the officer dismissed the service. Then, to use the 96th Article of War avoids anything in the nature of a personal attack on General Short. A court-martial, whose members of necessity must, in most instances, know him personally, would hesitate to find him guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman unless it was very firmly convinced that he had deliberately falsified.

However, while General Short did not, in my opinion, deliberately falsify in his testimony before the Roberts Board, he certainly made statements without a sufficient background on which to base them, and actually the statements were contrary to the facts. A statement made "with disregard of a knowledge of the facts" may be a false official statement equally with one made with full knowledge of its falsity. (See, for example, specifications 119 and 141, Appendix 4, Manual for Courts-Martial, 1928.) Examples of such statements are, in substance, as follows:

(a) That the Interceptor Command was fully working from November 27, 1941, to December 6, 1941. (Record, page 51.) But General Davidson, who was supposed to be in charge of it, states that the Interceptor Command was not set up or functioning on or before December 7, 1941, and, in fact, that it was not activated until December 17, 1941. (Record, pages 170, 179, 196. See also Lt. Col. Powell, S. C., Department Signal Officer, Record, page 353.)

[4] (b) There were Navy liaison officers at the Interceptor Command Station—General Short thinks that three naval officers may have been detailed there to relay information to the Navy, but none were there on the morning of December 7, 1941. (Record, pages 68–70.) But no Navy liaison officers had as yet been detailed for this duty or had made their appearance at the Station. (Lt. Comdr. Taylor, Record, page 1230; Major Bergquist, Record, page 381; Admiral Kimmel, Record, page 632.)

(c) "The inshore reconnaissance was a daily thing. We had planes all around the Island constantly." (Record, page 107.) But General Davidson states, in answer to a question whether there were less planes in the air early Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, than usual, "Well, we don't generally have any planes in the air on Sundays." (Record, page 181.) And General Martin, Commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, states that up to December 7, 1941, there were no inshore aerial patrols for a possible enemy. (Record, page 1648.)

(d) First Lieutenant Tyler, Air Corps, was the control officer for the Interceptor Command (on December 7, 1941). (Record, page 66.) But Lieutenant Tyler was simply an observer who had only seen the "board" once before and had never operated it. He had no instructions whatever beyond observing for training purposes, and was at the Station after all the others but one had departed at 7:00 o'clock a. m. on December 7, 1941, only because he had been told to stay there until 8:00 o'clock a. m. (Record, page 368.) Major Bergquist had taken upon himself to have officers like Lieutenant Tyler assigned so that he could train them in the system. There was no assignment of this officer, Lieutenant Tyler, by order from General Short's headquarters or the headquarters of General Martin, commanding the Air Forces. (Record, page 379.)

If higher authority should reside specifications based on statements of General Short, such as are above mentioned, it would be easy to prepare them. But it is submitted that all such inconsistencies can best be developed by testimony relating to alleged acts of negligence, rather than by specifications charging false official statements. Thus, the proposed specification (number 3) as to the lack of an Interceptor Command, in effect contradicts flatly the allegation made by General Short that there was such a command functioning on December 7, 1941. The court-martial can determine whether he made the statement truthfully, deliberately, falsely, or with disregard of its truth or falsity. It should be kept in mind that a sentence of dismissal can be adjudged under A. W. 96 as well as under A. W. 95.

The specifications, all laid under the 96th Article of War and alleging a neglect or omission which was continuous down to and including December 7, 1941, are eleven in number, and, in substance, cover the following alleged offenses:

[5] (1) Failure to provide an adequate inshore aerial patrol.

(2) Failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defenses.

(3) Failure to set up an Interceptor Command.

(4) Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service.

(5) Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

(6) Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation and coordination with the Navy.

(7) Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their respective duties in case of sudden attack.

(8) Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

(9) Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation of a hostile attack, after having been warned of the danger thereof.

(10) Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an attack.

(11) Failure to provide for protection of military personnel, their families, et cetera, on various reservations.

Some, if not, all, of these specifications may be expanded into several specifications. Thus, the failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defense (specification 2) may be subdivided as follows, to-wit:

(a) Failure to have the available anti-aircraft guns in readiness.

(b) Failure to have the available ground machine guns in readiness.

(c) Failure to have adequate ammunition at hand for the anti-aircraft and the ground machine guns.

But it is believed that it will be much wiser to limit the specifications to a comparatively small number of distinct heads. When one begins to divide and subdivide he almost invariably ends by pleading evidence and unnecessarily hampering the prosecution by too great particularity. All three of the subdivisions set forth above are comprehended in failure to provide adequate antiaircraft defense. If, of a large number of specifications, the accused is found guilty but of a few, there is always an attempt to show persecution. Thus, in the wel lknown case of Oberlin M. Carter, the accused was tried on 37 specifications and found guilty of but four, and his defenders have constantly referred to that fact (overlooking that these four specifications were the most serious of the entire thirty-seven). Specifications of large and general import focus attention on the larger issues, and, in a case of this nature, that is highly desirable. General Short is not to be tried for some obscure military offense, but for neglect of duty in matters of the greatest moment to the whole country.

[6] Nor can General Short plead ignorance of the nature of the accusations against him on the ground that the specifications lack particularity, because in these specifications we have used language taken from battle plans and agreements to which either he was a subscribing party or of which he cannot deny knowledge without admitting gross ignorance. Certainly General Short cannot ask us to be more specific in our charges than he was in the written plans and agreements to which he was a party. If he knew what the plans and agreements meants, he cannot be deceived or misled by the same language in the charges.

It will be noted also that these specifications cover the specific matters in which General Short was found negligent by the Roberts Board. (See Report of Board under "Conclusions", pages 9, 10, 12, 13, 16 and 17.)

5. Statute of Limitations. From the nature of the offenses charged, it seems clear that it is proper to treat them as continuing down to and including the date of the attack, December 7, 1941. The failure to take adequate measures is not a single failure on a specific date but a failure on every day it continues. Hence, the statute of limitations, set forth in the 39th Article of War, for the offenses charged is two years and arraignment before a duly constituted court-martial must be had on or before December 6, 1943, if these charges are to be brought to trial. In order to give the investigating officer and the trial judge advocate ample time to perform their respective duties, it would seem that formal charges would have to be served not much later than January 1, 1943, for months would be required to secure depositions of absent witnesses and documentary evidence, not to speak of the difficulty of assembling a court of general officers. It is not unlikely, also, that the investigating officer or the trial judge advocate, or both, might find it necessary to visit the situs of the alleged derelictions.

6. Liaison with the Navy Department. As divers allegations of negligence are based on failure to cooperate with the Navy or to act on information received through the Navy, it will no doubt be necessary to call on the Secretary of the Navy for permission to examine the Navy officers who testified before the Roberts Board. The statute of limitations for any naval court-martial also appears to be two years. (See Section 1624, Revised Statutes, Art. 61.)

7. *Verification of Charges.* If desired, the charges can be verified, as on information and belief, by Major Steuart or myself, since from our examination of the Roberts record we believe that there is legal justification for trial.

[7] 8. *Assistance rendered by Major Dell King Steuart, J. A. G. D.* In the review of the voluminous record made by the Roberts Board, the examination of divers maps and other documents submitted, and in the analysis of and searching out of the evidence on which to base these charges and the intial ground-work in the preparation of the charges, I cannot speak too highly of the work done by my assistant, Major Dell King Steuart, J. A. G. D. Major Steuart was unknown to me when, with your approval, I selected him for this task, and, in my opinion, he has done a thorough piece of work in a highly efficient manner which has not only materially lightened my own review of the record, but which will be of the greatest assistance to anyone who is assigned to try this case. I desire to take this opportunity to express my appreciation of his loyal cooperation.

F. Granville Munson
F. GRANVILLE MUNSON,
Colonel, J. A. G. D.

4 Incls
Incl *a*—Charge and Specifications.
Incl *b*—Brief and Resume of Record of Roberts Commission.
Incl *c*—Pertinent notes—Roberts Commission (typewritten).
Incl *d*—Pertinent notes—Roberts Commission (longhand).

(WRITE NOTHING ABOVE THIS LINE)

CHARGE SHEET

....., ... 19....
(Place) (Date)

Name, etc., of accused: Short, Walter C. (O-1621), Major General, United States Army, Retired.
(Give last name, first name, and middle initial in that order followed by serial number, grade, company, regiment, branch or by other appropriate description of accused. Alias names, etc., to follow in same manner)

Age ..... Pay, $..... per month. Allotments to dependents, $..... per month.
(Base pay plus pay for length of service)

Government Insurance deduction, $..... per month.

Data as to service: .....
(As to each terminated enlistment, give inclusive dates of service and organization in which serving at termination. As to current enlistment, give the initial date and the term thereof. Give similar data as to service not under an enlistment)

Data as to witnesses, etc.: .....
(Give names, addresses, and note if for accused. List documentary evidence and note where each item thereof may be found)

As the question of the witnesses who may be called depends on the direction of higher authority as to the manner in which the case shall be tried (viz., on the testimony of only those witnesses who appeared before the Roberts Board, on the testimony of those witnesses plus that of additional witnesses, etc.) these data are left for future action. A list of the witnesses before the Roberts Board may be found in "Brief and Resume of Record of Roberts Commission" or "Notes Taken from Transcript of Roberts Commission to Investigate Attack on Pearl Harbor".

Data as to restraint of accused: .....
(Give date, place, and initial date of any restraint of accused)

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 116
April 2, 1928

CHARGE: Violation of the 96th Article of War.

Specification 1: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of providing for, and the execution of, defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of the Island of Oahu, in his command, and of the establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of Oahu defensive coastal area, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility, by failing to establish and provide for an adequate inshore aerial patrol of said area commensurate with the critical relations between the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 2: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of providing for, and the execution of, defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of the Island of Oahu, in his command, and of providing for the beach and land, sea-coast, and anti-aircraft defense of said Island of Oahu, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to provide adequate anti-aircraft defenses for such area commensurate with the critical relations between the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 3: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of providing for, and the execution of, defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of the Island of Oahu, in his command, and of providing for an interceptor command to coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery (including Naval and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to establish and provide for such interceptor command, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 4: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of providing for, an dthe execution of, defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of the Island of Oahu, in his command, and of providing an aircraft warning service for the Hawaiian Island, in his command, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to establish and provide for an adequate aircraft warning service commensurate with the critical relations between the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 5: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of providing for, and the execution of, defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of the Island of Oahu, in his command, and of establishing ain aircraft warning service for the Hawaiian Islands, with provision for the transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to provide for the transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies of the approach or movement of possible hostile aircraft received through any aircraft warning service for said Hawaiian Islands, or otherwise, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 6: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of

acting jointly and in coordination with the United States Naval Forces in holding the Island of Oahu, in his command, as a main outlying naval base, and of coordinating joint defensive measures of the military and naval forces for the security of the United States Fleet in and near Pearl Harbor, and the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, Island of Oahu, from hostile raids and air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing adequately to collaborate and cooperate with the said United States Naval Forces in their aforesaid joint defensive measures in a manner commensurate with the critical relations between the United States which he then knew to exist, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 7: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of holding the Island of Oahu, in his command, against attacks by land, sea and air forces, and in providing for the beach and land, sea coast, and anti-aircraft defense of said Island of Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor Naval Base on said Island of Oahu and the naval forces there present, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to issue to his subordinates adequate orders and instructions commensurate with the critical relations between the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, as to their various duties in the event of sudden hostile attack against said Island of Oahu, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 8: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of coordinating the joint defensive measures of the military and naval forces for the security of the United States Fleet in Pearl Harbor and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, Island of Oahu, in his command, and for the defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and of providing for the beach and land, sea coast, and anti-aircraft defense of said Island of Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the naval forces there present, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to take and provide for adequate and proper defense measures, commensurate with the critical relations between the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, for the security of the said Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the naval forces there present, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 9: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of holding the Island of Oahu, in his command, against attacks by land, sea and air forces, and of providing for the beach and land, sea coast, and anti-aircraft defense of said Island of Oahu, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to make proper ground disposition, commensurate with the critical relations which he then knew to exist between the United States and Japan, of aircraft under his command, in that the said aircraft were not properly dispersed in anticipation of hostile air attacks which might be delivered prior to a declaration of war, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 10: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of holding the Island of Oahu, in his command, against attacks by land, sea and air forces, and of providing for, and the execution of, all defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of said Island of Oahu, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to have the aircraft under his command in a

proper state of readiness, commensurate with the critical relations between the Untied States and Japan which he then knew to exist, for the defense of the Island of Oahu, as aforesaid, same being neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 11: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of providing for the defense of the Island of Oahu, in his command, against attacks by land, sea and air forces, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to provide adequate measures and means, commensurate with the critical relations between the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, for the protection of military personnel and their families, and of civilian employees of the Army, at and in the immediate vicinity of the various military reservations on sad Island of Oahu from air raid attacks, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

(WRITE NOTHING ABOVE THIS LINE)

(Signature of accuser) .....

.....
(Grade, organization, or branch)

AFFIDAVIT

Before me, the undersigned, authorized by law to administer oaths in cases of this character, personally appeared the above-named accuser this ..... day of ....., 19....., and made oath that he is a person subject to military law and that he personally signed the foregoing charges and specifications, and further that he* has personal knowledge of the matters set forth in specifications .....; and *has investigated the matters set
(Indicate by specification and charge numbers)
forth in specifications .....
(Indicate by specification and charge numbers)
, and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief

(Signature) .....
(Grade and organization)

.....
(Official character, as summary court, notary public, etc.)

NOTE.—At (*) strike out words not applicable.

If the accuser has personal knowledge of the facts stated in one or more specifications or parts thereof, and his knowledge as to other specifications or parts thereof is derived from investigation of the facts, the form of the oath will be varied accordingly. In no case will he be permitted to state alternatively, as to any particular charge or specification, that he either has personal knowledge or has investigated.

If the oath is administered by a civil officer having a seal, his official seal should be affixed.

1ST IND.

Headquarters ....., ..., ..., 19.....
(Place) (Date)

Referred for trial to .....
(Grade, name, and organization of summary court, or trial judge advocate)

..... court-martial appointed by paragraph ....., Special Orders No. .....,
(Summary) (Trial judge advocate of special or general)

Headquarters ...., 19.....

By ..... of .....
(Command or order) (Grade and name of commanding officer)

.....-....., *Adjutant.*

I have served a copy hereof on (each of) the above-named accused, this _____ day of _____, 19____

(Signature) _____, *Trial Judge Advocate.*

_____
(Grade and organization)

(SPACE FOR USE WHERE TRIAL IS BY SUMMARY COURT)

CASE No. _____

SPECIFICATIONS AND CHARGES	PLEAS	FINDINGS	SENTENCE OR ACQUITTAL AND REMARKS

Place _____, Date _____, 19____

_____ Summary Court.
(Signature, grade, and organization)

Headquarters _____, 19____
(Place and date)

_____
(Action of reviewing authority)

_____, *Commanding.*
(Signature, grade, and organization)

Entered on service record in cases of conviction _____
(Initials of personnel adjutant)

(4)

(WRITE NOTHING BELOW THIS LINE)

Secret

BRIEF AND RÉSUMÉ OF TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS TAKEN BEFORE ROBERTS COMMISSION INVESTIGATING ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR DECEMBER 7, 1941 WITH LIST OF POSSIBLE SPECIFICATIONS BASED THEREON

[NOTE: This Brief and Résumé is based upon, and a further condensation of, approximately 100 pages of notes taken from the Report of the Roberts Commission. For a more complete statement of the testimony of each witness reference may be had to the aforesaid 100 pages of notes.]

[1] INDEX

[2] In re Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired

NOTE: The specifications on the charge sheet number 1 to 11, inclusive. The evidence relied upon to sustain each specification will be found in this Brief and Resume under the headings of Documentary Evidence and "Possible Specifications", each bearing a number that corresponds to that of the specification as drawn. In addition to the evidence shown under each particular specification, evidence set out under other specifications may also be relevant. Hence, it is advisable to first read all the Documentary Evidence, then the evidence contained in said Brief and Resume under all the specifications with this fact in mind.

DELL KING STEUART,
Major, J. A. G. D.

[3] EXPLANATORY NOTE

This concise resume of pertinent evidence with suggestions of possible specifications that might be based thereon, is a concentration and evaluation of over 4,900 typewritten pages of testimony and exhibits.

From this vast fund of material it was found that certain evidence therein tended in a degree to establish certain specifications herein enumerated under the heading of "Possible Specifications", and each item of such evidence has herein been listed, together with page in the record where it may be found, under the appropriate "Possible Specification".

It will be found that certain evidence is lacking, in whole or in part necessary to sustain some specifications, but it is thought that from all of the other pertinent evidence that such deficiency might readily be supplied by a further search and the securing of such additional evidence as may be necessary to sustain the specification to which it pertains. In some instances, it will be found that from the evidence in the record it appears that any deficiencies might be supplied by an examination in greater detail of the same or other witness.

The "Possible Specifications" are but tentative suggestions, and may be divided, sub-divided or combined in various ways when put in final form.

It has been the purpose of this resume to set forth each scintilla of evidence that either proves or tends to prove a certain possible specification, as set out in the record that has been examined, and, as stated above, in any instance where the evidence is either lacking, insufficient or unsatisfactory to sustain such specification, it will have to be supplied by further investigation or other appropriate measures.

There are sixteen volumes of the Roberts Record and thirty-six exhibits. The method used herein for reference thereto is that R6–780 means volume number 6, page 780. Ex. 15, means exhibit number 15.

DELL KING STEUART,
Major, J. A. G. D.

[4] *Officers Examined and Their Official Capacities*

1. Lt. Col. W. E. Donegan, GSC, T. H.
2. Major Wm. S. Lawton, GSC, T. H.
3. Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, CG Dept. of Hawaii
4. Brig. Ken. Howard C. Davidson, CG 14th. Pursuit Wing
5. Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Rudolph, CG 18th. Bombardment Wing
6. Major Brooke E. Allen, AC Hickman Field
7. Col. Walter C. Phillips, C of S, Hawaiian Dept.
8. Brig. Gen. Durward S. Wilson, CG 24th. Div.
9. Major Gen. Maxwell Murray, CG 25th. Div.
10. Major Gen. Henry T. Burgin, CG CA (sea coast and antiaircraft artillery)
11. Lt. Col. Kendall F. Fielder, G–2, Hawaiian Dept.
12. Lt. Col. Melvin L. Craig, Provost Marshall
13. Lt. Col. Bicknell, Ass't to G–2.
14. Major Gen. Frederick L. Martin, CG Hawaiian Air Force
15. Lt. Col. Carrol A. Powell, Dept. Signal Officer
16. Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, AC
17. Major Kenneth P. Bergquist, AC
18. Major Lorry Norris Tindall, AC
19. Lt. Kenneth M. Taylor, AC—cited
20. Lt. Geo. S. Welch, AC—cited
21. Sergeant Mobley L. Hall, Wheeler Field
22. Capt. Frank W. Ebey, CAC
23. Col. Wm. J. McCarthy, CAC
24. Pvt. Creed Short, ambulance driver
25. Lt. Stephen Saltzman, CA
26. Pvt. Raymond F. McBriarty, Bellows Field
27. Sgt. Lowell Vincent Klatt, 98 CA
28. Lt. Col. Jack W. Howard, QMC
29. Lt. Howard Frederick Cooper, Hickam Field
30. Capt. Melbourne H. West, Camp Malakole
31. Lt. Willis T. Lyman, CA—Malakole
32. Civilian Chas. Utterbach
33. Rear Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, USN, Cincpf
34. Rear Adm. Claude Chas. Bloch, Commandant 14th. Naval District
35. Walter Stanley Delany, Ass't C of S, and Operations Officer of the CinC
36. Capt. Chas. H. McMorris, USN, War Plans Office
37. Vice Adm. Wm. Satterlee Pye, USN
38. Rear Adm. Patrick N. L. Bellinger, CO Naval Planes when on shore.
39. Lt. Com. Edwin T. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer
40. Comdr. Joseph J. Rochefort, Combat Intelligence
41 Lt. Col. Claude A. Larkin, USMC, CO Ewa Field, Marine Planes
42. Capt. James M. Shoemaker, CO US Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay
43. Lt. Col. Leonard Weddington, CO Bellows Field
44. Lt. Comdr. Wm. E. G. Taylor (helping-army set up AWS).

BASIC DOCUMENTS AND PERTINENT DATA

Date	Description	Known to Genl.	Remarks
1935	Joint Army & Navy Def. Plan,-Rainbow 5	Yes.	This was the basic plan.
Jan.24,'41	Letter Secy. of Navy to Secy. of War	Yes.	Sets forth in detail expected attack on Fleet in P.H.
Feb.1,1941	Adm.Kimmel takes com.		
Feb.7,1941	Secy of War answers Secy of Navy letter	Yes.	Secy War states both sent to Gen. S. and in his statement admits letter 2/7/41 received from W.D., 2/19/41.
Feb.7,1941	Gen.Short takes com.		
Feb.15,'41	Pac.Ft.Con.Letter 2CL-41 (Security Measures)	Yes.	This corresponds to Army SOP, and based on this CG and Adm.Bloch drew "Joint Air Operations Agreement".
Mar.21,'41	Joint Air Operations Agreement.	Yes.	When part of Army or Navy Air Forces will come under command of other.
Mar.31,'41	Addendum I to 2CL-41 and Annex	Signed by CG, Hawn Air Force &Adm.Bellinger.	This is a joint estimate of the air action each would take in case attacked (Summarizes situation in detail).
Apr.11,'41	Joint Coastal Hawaiian Frontier Defense Plan	Yes.	Signed Gen.Short & Adm.Bloch.(See pgs. 1 & 2 in Brief and Resume for details.)
Apr.11,'41	Addendum II to 2CL-41	?	This is naval instruction as to degrees of readiness of plans based on Addend.I.
June, 1941	See letter Secy.War to Navy dated Feb.7,1941		Radar equipment supposed to be delivered to CG in Oahu.
June 19,'41	Letter Gen.Short to Adm. Kimmel	Yes.	Stating AWS "will be in operation in the near future".
Aug.5,1941	Letter Gen.Short to Adm. Kimmel	Yes.	Stating AWS is "rapidly nearing completion.
Aug.20,'41	Ex.35-Plan Gen.Martin for Aviation Defense	Yes.	Sent thru Gen.Short to WD.Covers in detail exactly what happened in attack.
None given In effect	Joint Action of Army and Navy. R5-553.	It appears so	Plan of Joint Board stating specific functions of Army in re AWS and transmission of info to Navy.Page 8 of Brief.
Oct.15,1941	2CL-41 (Revised)	?	No particular import this matter.
Oct.16,1941	CNO despatch to Cincpf	Yes. R2-40	"Japan may attack US and Britain.
Nov. 5,1941	Standing Operating Procedure, Hawn Dept.	Yes.	Ex.32. Duties AWS and Interceptor Command.
Nov.24,1941	CNO to Cincpf. Directed to inform Army	Thinks may have.R2-39.	"Suprise aggressive move of Japs in any direction a possibility."
Nov.27,1941	CNO to Cinc directed to inform Army	Adm. Kimmel says yes. ?	"This is a war warning."
Nov.27,1941	C of S to CG, Hawn Dept.	Yes.	"Hostile action possible at any moment. Negotiations terminated."
Nov. 27,'41	G-2 to G-2,Hawn Dept.	Yes.	"Possible that hostilities may begin."
None given	Hawn Dept.,Field Order No. 1.	Yes.	Lawton says this created Interceptor Command.
Nov.28,'41	G-2 to C.Areas & Overseas Depts.	Must have. ?	"Critical situation demands" watch for subversive activities.
Nov.28,'41	CG to WD	Yes.	"Alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy."
Dec.1,2,3, 1941	Gen.Short says in conference with Navy.		Doesn't remember anything they discussed.
Dec. 3,'41	CNO to Cincpf	?	This is message Japs to destroy ciphers, codes, burn papers.
Dec.6,'41	Japs burning papers	Yes ?	Reported to C of S Powell night before. He reported at Staff meeting this date.
Dec.7,'41	WD warning toCg	Not at time.	This was message that came too late.

Note: All plans and messages are set out fully in Ex. 36 by Gen. Gerow.

Times, April 12, 1942.

THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR AS SEEN BY THE JAPANESE



This photograph, showing the enemy blasting our ships on the morning of Dec. 7, was taken by a Japanese aerial cameraman, sent from Kuibyshev to Moscow, whence it was radioed to New York. The four vessels on the near side of Ford Island (center) are described (left to right) as two United States cruisers, one of which is afire; the U. S. S. Utah, lying on her side, and an auxiliary craft that also has been hit. Beyond the island a column of water rises near a line of United States warships while a bomber flies away (to right of column). According to the Japanese caption, American planes were lined in rows on foreground of island.

Associated Press Radiophoto, passed yesterday by United States and Russian censors

berland-av, Somerset, Md.

May Urges Death for Kimmel & Short

By United Press

PIKEVILLE, Ky., April 7—Rep. May (D., Ky.) chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, recommends a "shooting match", court martial of Lieut. Gen. Walter C. Short and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commanders of Army and Navy installations at Pearl Harbor during the Japanese assault.

May made the recommendation at an Army Day celebration in this little county seat in the Cumberland Mountains.

Tom Holland, editor of The Pikeville County News, defined "shooting match" as "Kentucky language for a lawful execution."

May placed complete blame for the success of the Japanese attack on the two commanders. He said they were given sufficient warning of attack.

"It was probably the morning after Saturday night," May said. "You know Honolulu is noted for its night clubs."

...ap Bull
...Asleep

MRS. MILTON KOG
—Star Staff

Pearl Harbor Pilot Wins Navy Cross

JACKSONVILLE, Fla., April 4 (U.P.).—A 31-year-old naval flyer who took his unarmored Sikorsky amphibian aloft as Japanese war planes were attacking Pearl Harbor on December 7 in order to obtain "information of the enemy," today received the Navy Cross for bravery.

The flyer, Lieut. Gordon E. Bolser, of Los Angeles, was carrying only two Springfield rifles in his plane when two Japanese planes attacked him at an altitude of about 1,500 feet. Unable to fight back, he broke away from the Jap fighters by slipping into a cloud bank and gaining altitude.

Bolser who was transferred to the Jacksonville Naval Air Station last week as an instructor in observation and scout training, was reticent to discuss his exploit but lauded the conduct of his comrades at Pearl Harbor under fire.

"Talk about suicide squadrons," he said, "we really had them. Men from disabled ships were eager to get at the enemy and begged for a chance to go up, even in unarmed training planes.

"Ten of them crowded around when I started my takeoff. Our crew included two strangers—one from a battleship and one from a patrol squadron. We had no arms until two sentries handed over their Springfields."

A native of Boston, Bolser is the son of Mrs. Charles C. Allen of Los Angeles.

He was decorated today by Capt. Charles P. Mason, commandant of the Naval Air Station, on behalf of President Roosevelt.

A 29-
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Mrs.
repeate
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street N.W. which she left immediately after her marriage last April.

All across the continent she found the same listlessness. In the Middle West particular, she noticed there were no signs that a war was in progress.

She left Hawaii February 28, flew by clipper to San Francisco and completed the trip by train. In California she saw the first lights at night she had seen in three months, and here at home she experienced one of the greatest letdowns of her life.

"The city is just like it was when I left it, although America is facing the greatest war in her history," she said yesterday. "No one here is at all perturbed, while life in Hawaii is like living in a fortress. I feel like saying, 'Wake up, people, and do something.' Unfortunately, it may take a bombing to make them do this, but there will be no laxity after that. I can never forget the feeling you have during an air raid—you want only one thing, and that is your life."

Saw Rising Sun Insignia.

Mrs. Kogan and her husband were awakened at their home at Schofield Barracks at 7:55 a.m. December 7 by loud noises in the sky. They threw on wraps and walked out into the yard, thinking it was something different in the way of maneuvers. They commented to each other that if war was like this it must be terrible. Smoke was rising in all directions. The gigantic explosion of bombs, the heavy roar of coast artillery fire and the rattle of machine guns seemed to be shaking the entire island.

Out of the dogfight overhead a plane peeled off and came toward them, flying low. They watched it until they saw the rising sun insignia on its side, saw its machine guns spouting, saw bullets kicking up soil at their feet. It was then they knew the thing was real and that the warning of a Hawaiian

newspapers a week ear
Japan could be expected
that week end had come t

Mrs. Kogan remembers
husband's reaction to the
escape.

Nightmare for 24 Ho

"I think I'll go shave," s
him.

And then she asserted he
ity as a bride. "I think y
she said. "This is war."
strong in her memory that

Things were a nightmare for the next 24 hours. She helped make surgical dressings all morning and then she was huddled in a quadrangle to await evacuation. It was well after dark when she and other women were taken away by bus. They passed by the burning ruins of Pearl Harbor, through a blackness broken frequently by tracer bullets. Along the roadside they could hear the excited talk of many people, all going toward Honolulu.

Eventually the bus drew up at a school building in Kalihi Valley. There the evacuees lay down on the floor on a thin layer of blankets and tried to sleep.

"Before December 7," she recalled, "we hadn't even been told what to do in case of an air raid.

"Hawaii has had her bombing experience and Hawaii is prepared," she said. "But I'm afraid for Washington—

[6] DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

PLANS

1. Joint Army and Navy Defense Plan of 1935. See Ex. 36 and R1-5.

Based on above War Plans Division prepared Army Strategical Plan which consists of Operations Plan—Rainbow 5, and Concentration Plan—Rainbow 5. Mission assigned Hawaiian Coastal Frontier under Army Strategical Plan are:

a. Joint.—Hold Oahu as main outlying naval base and control and protect shipping in coastal zone.

b. Army.—Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea and air forces and against hostile sympathizers. Support naval forces in protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers, * * *.

c. Navy.—Patrol the coastal zone; control and protect shipping therein; support the Army.

Based on above plan General Short and Admiral Bloch appeared and signed on April 11, 1941 the—

2. Joint Hawaiian Coastal Fontier Defense Plan, Ex. #36, states in part—

"I. *General:*

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, * * *, are adopted.

"II. *Joint Air Operations:*

2. * * *.

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels * * *.

b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. * * *."

In addition to foregoing, Major Lawton states (R1-5) that [7] this plan says—

"The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, shall provide for the beach and land, sea-coast, *and anti-aircraft defense of Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor Naval Base and naval forces present, etc., etc.*"

"*The Army to provide for anti-aircraft and gas defense*, intelligence and *warning services*, protection of landing fields and naval installations and outlying islands consistent with available forces, defense of installations on Oahu vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, water, power, and for interior guard and sabotage * * * within Hawaiian Island * * *, *establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of Oahu defensive coastal area* in cooperation with the naval inshore patrol, * * *, *and an aircraft warning service for the Hawaiian Islands*, * * *."

Under this Plan the *Navy was to be responsible for "distant reconnaissance"*.

Based upon above there was issued Field Order #1 which was a secret operations order for Hawaiian Department (R1–17). Major Lawton states that this document creates the interceptor command and the aircraft warning service.

Then to further amplify Field Order #1 which was secret, the Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) of 5 November 1941 was issued (Ex. 32).

Section II, paragraph 15*j* provides:

"The interceptor Command will:

Coordinate and *control the operations of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units*, and will provide for the coordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.

[8] (2) The coordination of the anti-aircraft fire of Naval ships in Pearl and/or Honolulu Harbors.

(3) *Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.*"

R1–34 states where these three documents were examined and briefly their contents.

Based upon the Joint Army and Navy Plan-Rainbow 5, Admiral Kimmel on February 15, 1941, issued his security measures in a letter known as "Letter 2CL–41", which was later revised on October 15, 1941, and known as Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL–41 (Revised). R5–following page 549. Paragraph (G) of this letter provided that Commandant 14th. ND would be the Naval Base Defense Officer, known as N. B. D. O., and as such should cooperate with the Army for "defense against air attack".

In furtherance of this proposed cooperation Admiral Bloch and General Short on March 20, 1941, drew up an agreement which was signed and approved by them March 21, 1941 (R5–554–556). This was known as their Joint Air Operations Agreement. This provided in brief that Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under tactical command of the Army, and that under certain situations Army planes would go to the Navy to assist them with their "distance patrol" and other times Navy planes on shore would operate under Army control.

April 9, 1941, the N. B. D. O. issued an Annex for the Naval Forces to this Joint Air Operations agreement based upon this agreement, Letter 2CL–41, 15 February 1941, and Addendum I to the Plan.

[9] Addendum I is a joint estimate of the air action necessary, dated 31 March 1941, signed by Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force (General Martin) and Admiral Bellinger (R5–556C). This states, in pertinent part, as follows:

I. *Summary of the Situation:*

(a) Relations between US and Orange are strained, uncertain and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile action by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long period.

(d) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. *Survey of Opposing Strengths:*

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more *fast raiding forces composed of carriers* supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers. * * *

III. *Possible Enemy Action:*

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations at Pearl Harbor.

3. A combination of these two:

(b) *It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles.*

(c) A single attack might indicate or not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack * * *.

(d) * * *.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using * * *. (Here discusses dawn and dusk carrier borne plane air attacks in detail.) (See this document as it completely covers and provides for just what happened.)

IV. *Action Open to United States:*

* * * * * * *

[*10*] (4) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces *until an attack is known to be imminent* or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. *It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises.* * * *.

V. *Decisions:*

* * * * * * *

2. Air Combat Group. (To) Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report types of attacking aircraft. *Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group.* * * *.

(c) *Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this* plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on Oahu.

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

* * * * * * *

Addendum II to this Plan follows on R5–556K, see also R5–556M, N, and this briefly describes the various states of readiness of the planes necessary to perform their duties under this plan. The two lowest degrees or states of readiness are:

> *Material Readiness, E—All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan; and under Operational Readiness #5. All types—four hours.*

On January 24, 1941, Secretary of the Navy Knox wrote to the Secretary of War Stimson, which letter reads in pertinent part, as follows (R16–1823–1827):

> MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This re-examination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect [*11*] to Japan, and by reports

from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major distaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

(1) Air bombing attack.
(2) Air torpedo plane attack.
(3) Sabotage.
(4) Submarine attack.
(5) Mining.
(6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense for all but the first two appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.

Both types of air atack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with other operations enumerated. * * * Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

The counter measures to be considered are:

(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;

(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they can reach their objectives;

(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;

* * * * * * *

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, *and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.*

(2) * * *.

(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action [*12*] in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty exists.

* * * * * * *

Sincerely yours,

FRANK KNOX.

On the 7th day of February, 1941, the Secretary of War answered this letter, in brief, as follows:

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, 1941, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort.

2. (Here the Secretary outlines the Hawaiian Project for defense. Says all material for aircraft warning service will be there not later than June, 1941, etc.)

* * * * * * *

6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General,

Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.

HENRY STIMSON.

This last letter from War to Navy is Ex. 22, and reported on page R16–1827 of transcribed testimony. In General Short's statement he admits receipt on February 19, 1941, "of your letter of February 7, 1941", and refers to much information on aircraft he didn't have. (It is inferred that this is the letter to which he refers, but it should be checked.)

On the 20th day of August, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force (General Martin), submitted to the War Department, [13] through the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (General Short), a plan for the Air Defense of Oahu (Ex. 35). It states, in pertinent part, as follows:

I. *General:*

1. The key to this plan is found in the provision for first, a complete and thorough search of the Hawaiian area daily during daylight; secondly, an attack force available on call to hit a known objective located as a result of the search, and, thirdly, if the objective is a carrier, to hit it the day before it could steam to a position offshore of Oahu where it could launch its planes for attack.

* * * * * * *

III. *Facts Bearing on the Case:*

1. Facts:

a. The Army mission is: "To defend the naval base of Oahu. * * *"

d. To perform its missions, the Fleet must have freedom of action without responsbility for the defense of its base.

2. Assumptions:

* * * * * * *

c. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach within range of Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or attack on Oahu.

* * * * * * *

e. Our most likely enemy, Orange, can probably employ a maximum of six carriers against Oahu.

IV. *Discussion:*

Part 1. The Search:

1. The only manner in which the Hawaiian area can be thoroughly searched for enemy surface craft, *particularly aircraft carriers*, in the event of a situation requiring such action, is to provide a sufficient number of aircraft to conduct a daily search of a desired area during daylight hours with 100% coverage through 360 degrees. * * *

Part 2.

1. Section 1:

a. An enemy should be primarily interested in obtaining the maximum cover of darkness for his carrier approach. This section illustrates four possible uses of darkness by an enemy to cover his approach. * * *.

* * * * * * *

c. * * * The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action open to the enemy.

V. *Conclusion:*

1. * * *.

2 *a.* The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the *action upon which we should base our plans* of operation [14] is the early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule:

(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before attack.

(2) * * *.

(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of the attack.

VI. *Recommendations:*

* * * * * * *

4. * * * The sole purpose of the existence of the military establishment on Oahu, ground and air, is for the defense of Oahu as an outlying naval base. * * *.

It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the strongest outlying naval base in the world and could, therefore, withstand indefinitely attacks and attempted invasions. Plans based on such convictions are inherently weak and tend to create a false sense of security with the consequent unpreparedness for offensive action.

Just prior to December 7, 1941, there were several communications that are mentioned throughout the testimony and should be borne in mind, as follows:

1. General Short on R2–40 admits receiving the following from the Navy *16 Oct. 41:*

The following is a paraphrase of a despatch from the CNO which I have been directed to pass to you. Quote: "Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be anti-American and extremely nationalistic. If the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapproachment with the United States. Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and United States are held responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack those two powers. View of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan."

2. R9–1094: On November 24, 1941 CNO to Cincpf—General Short thinks (R2–39) he probably saw it:

There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of [*15*] negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that *a surprise aggressive movement in any direction* including an attack on the Philippines or Guam *is a possibility*. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action addressed (* * *) inform senior Army officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipiate Jap action. * * *. (*These communications are all found Ex. 36*)

3. War Department to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, November 26. 1941. in re two planes to photograph islands to locate Jap guns, ships, etc.

4. CNO to Cincpf dated November 27, 1941 (there is considerable discussion about whether this was delivered to General Short or not, but Admiral Kimmel tells just how it was delivered by a Lieutenant Burr to G–3, either Donegan or Lawton, on November 27, 1941, in R6–622,3, it reads in part (See R9–1095):

This is a paraphase of a classified dispatch.

* * * * * * *

"Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo." * * *

5. Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 27 November 1941:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all [*16*] practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the US desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japa-

nese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

6. G–2, War Department, to G–2, Hawaiian Department, dated November 27, 1941:

Advise only the CG and the C of S that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. *Also possible that hostilities may begin.*

7. G–2, War Department, to all Corps Areas and Overseas Departments, dated November 28, 1941:

Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department * * * (then discusses sabotage. See Ex. 36).

8. Commanding General to Chief of Staff, November 28, 1941:

Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy.

9. Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, December 7, 1941 (this message never delivered prior to attack):

Japanese are presenting at 1:00 P. M., EST, today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication.

[17] On R5–553, Admiral Kimmel testifies in regard to a publication known as "Joint Action of the Army and Navy." He says, "This publication was prepared by the Joint Board and promulgated to the two services by a joint order signed by the Secretaries of War and Navy. Under a heading "The Specific Functions of the Army in Coastal Frontier Defense"—(*the Army will provide* (I have added the Italicized words for clarity—DKS)):

A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.

On R5–554 Admiral Kimmel reads a statement from this "Joint Action of the Army and Navy", page 32 thereof, which states:

An aircraft warning service is a communication and intelligence service which forms part of the communication and intelligence service of the frontier defense. The purpose is to warn centers of population, industrial plants, public utilities, and military and naval establishments of the approach of hostile aircraft, and to alert Air Corps units and antiaircraft artillery units. It consists essentially of observers, of information centers for plotting the courses and distributing information of approaching hostile planes, and of the necessary communications.

(NOTE: This above document is discussed but no date thereof given, although Adm. Kimmel says it was in force December 7, 1941, and prior thereto. Check it.)

Ex. 7: On page 11, General Short in his statement cites an extract from the Joint Coastal Frontier Plan which is also his Ex. D attached thereto, and it reads:

"Method of Coordination. The CG, Hawn Dept, and the Commandant 14th Naval Dist. have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation [18] and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Army and Navy Defense Plan, 1935, Chap. 2, par. 9*b*."

On R5–583, Admiral Kimmel reads a Naval Dispatch dated December 3, 1941, which states:

"OpNav informs CinC Asiatic, CincPac, Combat 14–15 that highly reliable information has been received that instructions were sent Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington,

and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn secret documents."

Ex. 16: This is account of action and orders taken since December 7th at Wheeler Field. This document is extremely illuminating in that it indirectly shows what was necessary and not done prior to the attack—such as information for conduct of families during air raids; blackouts, what to do in gas attacks, orders for gas masks. (No provision for these things prior thereto.) It includes:

Special Orders for chemical air attack dated December 9, 1941.
Air raid instructions, dated December 7, 1941.
Statement that they distributed Stewart Klaxons for air raid warning system after attack. (Conseqeuntly, must have had them prior thereto.)
December 9, 1941, sets up a practice air raid for Honolulu. This signed by General Short.
December 9, 1941, had them exchange their old gas masks for new ones as old ones were unserviceable.
Submitted Col. Wm. Flood, Commanding Wheeler.

Ex. 17: From General Rudolph at Hickam Field. Gives his new arrangements and instructions since December 7, 1941. Blackout instructions, issued gas masks, and sirens for air raid alarms. Cooperation with Navy on patrols.

Ex. 18: From General Tinker, Air Force Commander, Hickam [*19*] Field. About same as above.

Ex. 20: This is a communication from General Martin to Commanding General dated September 20, 1941, arranging for Joint Army and Navy practice drill for 17–22 November, 1941. (This was a plan for the drill.) States they want to test "ability of carrier aviation to attack defenses of Oahu"—"efficiency of Interceptor Command". "* * * defense of Oahu will be directed by the Interceptor Commander using recently installed equipment and controlling operations from his control board."

Ex. 31: SOP, CAC—53rd CA Brigade (AA) November 26, 1941. CO—Harbor Defense—Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Kaneohe Bay.

"Sec. 1, para. 6—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces."

See pars. 233–273, incl., FM 10–5 (particularly applicable to "close in" defense by all sea coast artillery and AA units.) "Sec. 1, para. 10–*a*. AA defense is a responsibility of every unit. See Paras. 261–273, FM 100–5."

"All units will have their automatic weapons habitually in readiness for AA defense.

d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:

(1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation; * * *

(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attacks and observation by dispersion of personnel and material when in bivouac or in position, * * * Sec. 1, para. 11 * * * an adequate alarm system will be provided. (Alarms for air attacks, close-in defense and blackouts indicated.)"

Ex. 32: SOP, Hawaiian Department, 5 November 1941. This is practically same content as preceding Ex. 31 in re all things mentioned above.

Ex. 27: This is telephone conversation on December 3, 1941, [*20*] between a Japanese in Honolulu by name of Mori and a Military or Naval officer in Tokio, translated and available to Military Intelligence, Hawaiian Department, December 5, 1941. (This does not seem to show very much of importance except that Tokio inquired about the number of air planes flying about daily and if Mori knew "anything about United States Fleet".)

Ex. 28: SOP, 25th Division—See Section I, para. 10, "Alarm system" and Sec. I, para. 6 *a*, *b* (1) (2)—relative to having AA guns and ammunition.

Ex. 29: SOP, 24th Division. See in re AA defense and Sec. 1, para. 13—"alarm system".

[*21*] POSSIBLE SPECIFICATIONS

1. FAILURE TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE INSHORE AERIAL PATROL

R1–5: Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan—provides amongst other things for Army the "* * * establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of Oahu defensive coastal area."

R1–14: Major Lawton states that Army fliers were to patrol inshore area off Oahu (about 20 miles) and Navy to operate a surface patrol in same area.

R2–127: Gen. Short states there were no planes in the air this Sunday morning of attack, and that it was "Most unusual". Would have to ask Davidson why not. But had they been in the air "they would have had no ammunition. They were only training."

R2–107: Gen. Short states, "Inshore reconnaissance was a daily thing. We had planes around the Island just constantly."

R2–162: Pursuit planes not armed at time of the attack, Gen. Short admits. Says, "They were not on a war footing." (There was no "inshore" patrol established. He means that training planes were just flying around for the training. They had no ammunition while in the air.)

R2–172: Gen. Davidson had charge of the pursuit planes on the Island and says that none of his planes ever flew before 7:30 A. M. and then just for training and never flew on Sundays.

R2–181: General Davidson says there were no planes in the air this Sunday morning just the same as any other Sunday morning. They were resting.

R6–738: Adm. Bloch says that he and Gen. Short signed the Joint Coastal Hawaiian Frontier Defense Plan, April 11, 1941. By this Navy undertook the distant reconnaissance and the Army to provide an "inshore aerial patrol" to run out 25 to 50 miles at sea. Prior to December 7th he don't think Army ever did this.

R14–1648: Gen. Martin was Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and admits that prior to December 7, 1941, there was no inshore patrol.

[22] R2–200: Gen. Rudolph, Commanding General, bombers, says that he was only training crews to bring over the bombers from the mainland. That when his ships were up they would have no ammunition unless they were doing some target practice in connection with their training. None of his planes were in the air at time of attack December 7, 1941, at 7:55 A. M. and that none got in the air until after the attack.

R2–127: General Short, after stating that "planes were in the air constantly", was asked, "Well, they were the planes of your inshore patrol?" He replied, "Well, they were planes that were in training, but they would see just as much as—yes, they would have only been inshore patrol; they wouldn't have gone over 15 miles; they wouldn't have seen anything that those training planes wouldn't have seen constantly".

R2–107: General Short states, "My reconnaissance under the plan with the Navy is limited to just the immediate offshore of the island, ordinarily limited to 15 miles. * * *" (See statement of Admiral Bloch, R6–738, supra.)

[23] 2. FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES

R1–5: Joint Coastal Frontier Plan makes Army responsible for aircraft defenses.

R2–80: General Short admits that all anti-aircraft batteries didn't have ammunition. Admits four batteries had to go some distance to get it, and some had to go to the crater after it, and those who had it had to unbox it.

R2–88. 25th Division had to draw ammunition for their artillery and was not in battle position until 4 P. M.

R2–128: Alert #1 didn't provide for air attack at all, but only for uprisings "* * * where there was no threat from without."

R2–189–90: General Davidson says the biggest difficulty was that plane guns were not loaded and the ammunition was in a hangar that was afire.

R2–190: General Davidson states that had he been in position with his ships he could have shot down Jap planes before they reached their objective.

R3–257: General Wilson says that by the time he got to the field the men themselves had gotten the machine guns out and "had gotten busy".

R3–234: Colonel Phillips states that AA guns had no ammunition. Thinks they should have under FM 100–5. (This he speaks of would be mobile units.)

R3–252: General Wilson, 24th Division says his troops had to draw ammunition.

R3–262: General Murray, 25th Division, says that he had violated regulations and had previously drawn ammunition. He says he knew the area for drawing ammunition (small) at Schofield and as it was congested he knew that it would be a regular slaughter if Japs attacked with bombs. He thought there might be a surprise raid, so he did this. Says it took about six hours to draw ammunition owing to the congestion in the area.

R3–274: General Burgin says some of his AA guns were in position "in 15 or 20 minutes and others had to go to the other side of the Island and were not in position until afternoon. A great many did get into position." (This latter remark implying that they all did not. Negative.)

R3–275: General Burgin says that all of his guns did not have ammunition. Men had to go to the crater for it, and even that that was near guns was still in boxes and had to be unboxed before could be used.

R3–280. There were 60 mobile and 26 fixed AA guns.

R3–270: General Burgin says that when he got Alert #1 he expected Alert #2 right away. Alert #2 "is where we take ammunition."

R3–345: General Martin said that bad Alerts 2 or 3 been in effect their planes would have had fuel and ammunition.

R4X434: Sergeant Mobley Hall tells of having to get machine guns [24] for anti-aircraft shooting out of the supply room at Wheeler Field and set them up and then go for "supplies". (Presumably ammunition.)

R4–437, 8: Captain Ebey, CAC, says his CA guns were not in position at Barbers Point at time of attack. Had to get 4 guns down there under fire. Got some machine guns out of supply room and set them up in a tennis court and fired, then set them on a barge and fired back at attacking Japs. They had no machine guns or ammunition at time of attack.

R4–458, 9: Lieutenant Stephen Saltzman, 98th CA, had no guns and their machine guns were in storeroom.

R4–459: Lieutenant Saltzman says they had ammunition pits and gun pits, but had to dig in ground for barracks for the men (?). They had no automatic weapons except .30 Calibre Brownings with infantry adapter mounts for anti-aircraft fire. Had no AA guns and the machine guns they had were in the storerooms.

R4–473: Lieutenant Cooper—came to Hickman Field—men were getting machine guns out, trying to put them together—they lacked water cans.

R4–469: Lieutenant Colonel Jack Howard, QMC, has charge of depot—many supplies—and on R4–471, says depot an easy target and had no machine guns for anti-aircraft at time of attack.

R4–473: Lieutenant Cooper, above, states that men were desperately and bravely bringing machine guns out and trying to shoot them.

R4–497: Captain West, CAC, had some machine guns (ground) at Camp Malakole, but had to get AA guns out of storage and set them up.

R4–498: West says no equipment in place and ready to fire. Says not ready at Pearl Harbor for 1 or 2 hours after attack.

R4–500: Lieutenant Lyman, CA, his was a machine gun battalion—had no AA guns and their machine guns were in storage about 50 yards away.

R10–1166: Lieutenant Colonel Larkin, UMSC, CO of Ewa Field, had planes for Army use December 7, 1941, but Army never called nor was he called that entire day (Army controlled these land planes by the plans in effect.) Says for their anti-aircraft they had only some .30 calibre machine guns that they took out of some destroyed planes.

R10–1191: Captain Shoemaker, Commanding Officer Ford Island, (1193–1197). Army were supposed to install AA guns and ammunition and supposed to man them. This is an Army battery. They had been there before on some tests, but December 7th they never showed up at all all day long. They got out some machine guns but the ammunition was in storage.

R10–1210: Commander Martin, Kaneohe Bay, had no anti-aircraft except ground machine guns and rifles. All planes here were put out of commission.

[25] R10–1217: Lieutenant Colonel Weddington, Commanding Officer, Bellows Field, had planes but no ammunition. No anti-aircraft whatever. Got out their machine guns but had to go to the crater for ammunition. Post wasn't authorized any ammunition he says.

R13-1590: Colonel Pickett, USMC, was at Navy Yard Barracks—they were not supposed to handle the anti-aircraft defenses but no one called them so they of their own accord got machine guns out of the shed and ammunition and set them up. They were not set up or ready in any way and they had to do this under fire. Took them about 20 minutes.

R14–1648: General Martin says they did not set up machine guns at fields for the protection of planes.

R16–1890: Lieutenant Colonel Whaling saw one of our AA's shoot at our own plane.

R5–553: Admiral Kimmel testifies in regard to a publication known as the "Joint Action of the Army and Navy." He states, "This publication was prepared

by the Joint Board and promulgated to the two services by a joint order signed by the Secretaries of War and Navy." He says Army was to provide—

"A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy."

R5–554: Admiral Kimmel purports to read from page 32 of this document wherein it defines the functions of an aircraft warning service. (This is fully set out on page 17 this Brief and Resume under Documentary Evidence.) No date of this is given but the Admiral says it was in force and effect December 7, 1941, and prior thereto.

Ex. 9: Statement of Captain Edward Kent that he was ground defense officer at Bellows Field. They had some ground machine guns but no ammunition. Had asked for some ammunition about December 1, but it hadn't arrived.

Ex. 13: Captain Edward Kent makes another statement that at Bellows Field they had no rifles or ammunition issued, so they issued some rifles to use for their anti-aircraft. Their machine guns were not set up until after the attack. Had only rifles and a few machine guns from the grounded planes to ward off the attack.

Ex. 28: SOP 25th Division.

Ex. 29: SOP 24th Division (These sop's all provide for each unit responsible for its own air attack defense.)

Ex. 31: SOP, CAC—"Section 1, par. 6—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground and air forces." See paragraphs 233–273, FM 100–5. (Particularly applicable [*26*] to "close-in" defense by all sea coast artillery and antiaircraft units.)

Ex. 32: SOP, Hawaiian Department, November 5, 1941.

R4–427: Lieutenant Welsh says that pits were dug for installing AA guns in some places but the guns were not ready.

R4–471: Colonel J. Howard, QMC, had many supplies in his QM depot which was an easy target but had no machine or other guns for anti-aircraft defense.

Ex. 7: Statement by General Short—page 24: "All anti-aircraft batteries had skeleton crews guarding them. *All units had in their possession ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns.*"

Ex. 7, p. 23: Here appears a written statement by Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler wherein he says at time of attack he was "Pursuit Officer at the Interceptor Control Center." (But see statements of his superior officer, Major Bergquist, (R3–379), Tyler merely sent there to watch it and familiarize himself with its operation.)

Ex. 7, p. 22: Appears an affidavit of Private Joseph P. McDonald who was the telephone operator at the AWS information center at time of attack. (Merely verifies that Lockard called in, Private McDonald wanted Lieutenant Tyler to call back the men at the Board, but Lieutenant Tyler said it was not necessary.)

R2–80: General Short here, and also in his statement (Ex. 7, p. 24), said that all anti-aircraft batteries had .30 caliber, .50 caliber, and small arms ammunition, "in their immediate possession." Then he says, "All but four batteries had their ammunition for the 3-inch guns immediately accessible. For instance, down at DeRussy the ammunition was in the casemate. They had to carry it probably 75 yards, but their men were right there, and the guns were all set up and in position, *but the ammunition was not right along side of the guns.* There were four batteries that had to go further for their ammunition. * * *. (B. C. D, and F, 64th Infantry). The first one of those batteries started drawing its ammunition at the * * * Crater, *where we had our ammunition in caves*, at 8:15, * * *. And by 10:15 they had all drawn what we call a day of fire, which for that particular battery is 300 rounds per gun. * * . *They moved out, and they had about a thousand yards to go*, and by 8:15 were actually drawing ammunition, * * *."

Q: "And the batteries you say all had the ammunition at the——"

A: Immediately accessible. They were not right along side of the gun. I say they had to step into the casemate and probably carry the ammunition 75 yards. Down at Fort Kamehameha they probably didn't have to carry it that far, and they were in action very quickly as a result of that. The casemate was closer to the position."

R2–81: General Short says under Alert #2 the ammunition would have been along side of the guns.

[27] 3. FAILURE TO SET UP AN INTERCEPTOR COMMAND

R1-5: Joint Coastal Frontier Plan—Army to provide against air attack.

R1-16: F. O. #1, dated November 28, 1941, sets up duties and responsibilities of Interceptor Command.

R1-18: SOP, Hawaiian Department states in pertinent part: "The interceptor command will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, including available Naval and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, aircraft warning service and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include (1) arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft, (2) the coordination of the anti-aircraft fire from naval ships in Pearl and Honolulu Harbors, (3) transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

R2-51: General Short here explains the workings of the Interceptor Command, just as though it was all set up and definitely states that General Davidson was in command thereof December 7th.

R2-68, 9: General Short states that ordinarily a Naval Officer was at the Board in the information center to relay any information on to the Navy in compliance with (3) above—and that he thinks three Naval Officers were detailed there. Says they were not there December 7th.

R2-178: General Davidson states definitely that on December 7th this command was not set up, that it was not activated.

R2-170: General Davidson states that he was not in charge of interceptor command December 7th because there was no interceptor command on that date. (Gen. Davidson had been in US from about Oct. 15, 1941 until Dec. 3, 1941, and after the 3rd he took the 4th and 5th in writing up his findings from the mainland where he had been studying the workings of interceptor commands, so he knew very little that was going on.)

R2-179: Davidson says interceptor command was not activated until "a few days ago" (Dec. 24, 1941.)

R2-196: Interceptor Command activated December 17, 1941.

R3-232: Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff, admits interceptor command activated December 17, 1941.

R3-274: General Burgin, Command General CA, (sea coast and anti-aircraft artillery), when they are ready to fire turns his anti-aircraft over to the interceptor command, as had been doing in drills, and did this December 7th., and says "they were just shooting at everything * * * I don't think they had much control."

R3-339: General Martin in speaking of AWS was asked, "Who had it if you didn't?" Answer "It was under the Signal Officer who [28] was in charge of the installation of the equipment."

R3-353: Lieutenant Colonel Powell, Department Signal Officer, had been setting up this command and that it had not been organized on December 7th. That he had been in U. S. with General Davidson. Interceptor Command had not been organized in accordance with SOP.

R3-356: Colonel Powell says that on morning of December 7th he was at his home in Honolulu at time of attack. Was not at AWS. (This is where interceptor commander would be.)

[29] 4. FAILURE TO PROVIDE A PROPER AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE

R1-5: Joint Coastal Plan—Army to provide for aircraft warning service.

R1-16: F. O. #1 provides army's responsibility for AWS.

R1-18: SOP, Hawaiian Department, Army to supply and "provide for transmission of information to all interested agencies". (Navy?)

R2-178: Although General Short had stated that this under General Davidson, General Davidson here states that it was not under his command as the Signal Corps were just setting it up and they were operating it a little.

R3-232: Colonel Phillips states that the "radars are still not installed", (apparently meaning the fixed ones).

R3-233: Had only three mobile units in use, and two of these not operating at time of attack. (They were only ordered to operate between 4 and 7 a. m., after that they could use them to train if they wanted to, but not required, and as no training on Sunday, they all quit at 7 a. m., December 7th, except the one boy, Lockard.) (Navy did not know that this was only time they were operating. Were not told.)

R3–253: When Colonel Powell, Signal Officer, got back from U. S., G–3 told him to operate it from 4 to 7 a. m., and this he did, but it was not set up yet in accordance with SOP for Interceptor Command.

R3–329: General Martin, Commanding General, Air Force, says December 7th the AWS was under the Signal Officer (Col. Powell) who was installing the equipment, never under Martin's command. (Which it would have had to be to be under Gen. Davidson.)

R3–337: General Martin says that AWS was never under his command.

R3–339: General Martin in speaking of AWS was asked, "Who had it if you didn't", answer, "it was under the Signal Officer who was in charge of the installation of the equipment."

R3–353: Colonel Powell, Signal Officer, says that on December 7th the detector instruments were under his direction, and it was planned that when he got the AWS working satisfactorily that he would turn it over to the Interceptor Command.

R3–354, 5: Colonel Powell says that at time of attack he had seven listening posts (AW stations) set up and could have enough men to operate them 24 hours, but there were not enough stations as they wear out under strain.

R3–368: Lieutenant Tyler, AC, was told by Major Bergquist to go over to the information center this morning from 4 to 8 a. m.—didn't know what to do—had no instructions—had only seen "board" once before and had never operated it. Says at 7 a. m. all those who had been there sitting [*30*] around the board with earphones on, took them off and all went home, except the switchboard operator, who is always there, and himself because he had been told to stay there until 8:00 o'clock. This officer had no instructions whatever as to his duties there. At about 7:20 a. m. the radar station at Opana (northern tip of Island) called in all excited and said a large number of planes were coming in from about 132 miles north. This was Lockard and he told this to Lt. Tyler, who told him not to worry about it. In about ten minutes Lockard called in again, very excited, the operator asked the Lt. if he shouldn't call the men back to the board. Lt. Tyler said not to. Very soon the attack came.

R3–377: Major Bergquist had been helping voluntarily to set up the information center and he states that it was not finished. He had voluntarily and without instructions, had officers under him go over to the board to act as watch officers, just to see it operate and learn what it was about, and this is why he had Lt. Tyler go over there this morning from 4:00 to 8:00 o'clock. The Board only operated until 7:00 a. m. but he had told Tyler until 8:00 and that is why he was there.

R3–380: He states that he knew that Lt. Tyler knew nothing about the Board and didn't expect him to as it was not necessary to have any air officer there at that time at all.

R3–383: Major Bergquist states that the Aircraft Warning Service Company, operating under the Signal Corps, were the ones ordered to operate the AWS from 4:00 to 7:00 a. m. The Air Force merely cooperated on its own initiative. Major Tindall, Commander Taylor and himself were all Controllers and could have operated it.

R3–382: Major Bergquist says that they could have operated the mobile units 24 hours a day at the time and that the sets could have stood it. The difficulty was with the gas engines operating the sets rather than the sets themselves, but even then could have operated them.

R3–390: Major Tindall says that altho not detailed or instructed to go over to the Information Center, he knew that it would probably be undermanned at the time of the attack on December 7, 1941, so he voluntarily went over there to help out if he could. Major Bergquist, Comdr. Taylor and himself were the only three who might be qualified to act as control officers and none of them were detailed there at that time as it had not been finished and was not ready, and even then it was only ordered to operate between 4:00 and 7:00 a. m. There was no naval officers there as there never had been any assigned. So there were none there this morning "the same as any other morning".

R10–1229: Lt. Comdr. Taylor says the AWS was "not ready by any means", and there was no naval liaison officers detailed there.

R3–356: Colonel Powell, Signal Officer, under whose direction the AWS was at the time of the attack, states that at that time he was at his home in Honolulu, not at the AWS center.

R5–553: Admiral Kimmel testifies in regard to a publication known as the "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy", saying, "This publication was prepared by

the joint board and promulgated to the two services by a joint order of the Secretaries of War and Navy. "He says that it provides under a heading "The specific functions of the Army in Coastal Frontier Defense" that the Army shall provide—"A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy."

R5–554: Adm. Kimmel reads from this document on page 32 thereof where it defines functions of AWS. (This will be found in Documentary Evidence.)

[*30a*] Ex. 7, p. 23: Here appears a written statement by Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler wherein he says at time of attack he was "Pursuit Officer at the Interceptor Control Center." (But see statements of his superior officer, Major Bergquist (R3–379), Tyler merely sent there to watch it and familiarize himself with its operation.)

Ex. 7, p. 22: Appears an affidavit of Private Joseph P. McDonald who was the telephone operator at the AWS information center at time of attack. (Merely verifies that Lockard called in, Private McDonald wanted Lieutenant Tyler to call back the men at the Board, but Lieutenant Tyler said it was not necessary.)

[*31*] 5. FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF APPROPRIATE WARNINGS TO ALL INTERESTED AGENCIES

Exhibit 32: Standing Operating Procedure—Nov. 5, 1941: Section II, paragraph 15j provides: "The Interceptor Command will: Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery (* * *), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
(2) * * *
(3) *Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.*"

R5–553: Admiral Kimmel testifies in regard to a publication known as "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy", saying "This publication was prepared by the Joint Board and promulgated to the two services by a joint order signed by the Secretaries of War and Navy." Under a heading therein 'The specific functions of the Army in Coastal Frontier Defense' it says the Army will provide:

> "A communications and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, *with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.*"

(Altho in the record it does not appear that the date of this document was, Admiral Kimmel says it was in effect Dec. 7, 1941.)

R5–554: Admiral Kimmel reads from page 32 of above stated document, viz: "An aircraft warning service is a communication and intelligence service which forms part of the communication and intelligence service of the frontier defense. *The purpose is to warn centers of population, industrial plants, public utilities, and military and naval establishments of the approach of hostile aircraft,* and to alert Air Corps units and anti-aircraft artillery units. It consists essentially of observers, of information centers for plotting the courses and distributing information of approaching hostile planes, and of the necessary communications."

R2–68–70: General Short testifies that there were Naval Officers at the Information Center at all times to get this information and relay it to the Navy. That they were liaison officers detailed there for that purpose—and he thinks that three naval officers had been so detailed to act in "transmitting" any warnings to the Navy. But, altho they had always been there on previous mornings, there were none there this morning of the attack.

R3–380: Major Bergquist says that Lt. Tyler at the Board this morning would not know that the planes heard were not Navy planes because the Navy liaison position at the Board had not been filled yet.

R3–381: Major Bergquist says that there had never been any navy liaison officers at the Board prior to December 7, 1941, and that Comdr. Taylor had contacted the navy in regard to sending some such officers over for that purpose, but none had as yet been sent.

R3–389: Major Bergquist also states that there was no bomber liaison at the Center until in afternoon, December 7, 1941.

R5–632: Admiral Kimmel states that no naval officer had ever been detailed to the AWS center to keep navy advised.

[32] 6. FAILURE TO ESTABLISH A PROPER SYSTEM OF DEFENSE BY COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH THE NAVY

R1–5: Major Lawton sets out the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Plan. Therein the Navy is to provide for a "distant reconnaissance".

R1–14: Under this Plan the Army was to conduct an inshore aerial patrol and the Navy a surface patrol of the same area. Major Lawton thought this distance would be about 20 miles out.

R6–738: Admiral Bloch says that he and General Short signed this Plan and under that the Army were to conduct an inshore aerial patrol to a distance of 25 to 50 miles.

Exhibit 7, page 11: In his exhibit D General Short sets out the following extract from the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan:

> "*Method of Coordination.* The Commanding General, Hawaiian Dept., and the Commandant, 14th. Naval District, have determined that in their joint plan the method of coordination wil be by *mutual cooperation* and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935, Chapter 2."

R1–18: Standing Operating Procedure, 5 Nov., 1941, states that the Interceptor Command shall control the AWS and "provide for transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies."

R2–42: After War Dept. radiogram of Nov. 27, 1941, Gen. Short states that he only ordered Alert #1, and operation of AWS 4:00 to 7:00 A. M., but it doesn't appear that he notified the Navy of these steps.

R2–108: Gen. Short states that he didn't ask Navy about the "distant reconnaissance".

R2–127: Gen. Short doesn't know why the planes were not in the air this Sunday morning of the attack. Says there were planes all around the Island constantly. "Most unusual" that they were not up this morning. However, it would have made no difference as if they had been up they had no ammunition as they were only training up to that time.

R2–164: Gen. Short says that he did not discuss with the Navy whether they considered Alert #1 sufficient; says they, "Never talked it over."

R2–167: The General says that with all his guns and materiel he couldn't have guaranteed that the Fleet would be safe. (But never talked it over.)

R2–53: Gen. Short tells of the many meetings with Admirals Kimmel and Bloch just prior to the time of attack, but nothing to show that the Navy were ever informed that interceptor command had not been activated; that AWS was only working from 4:00 to 7:00 A. M.; that there was no inshore aerial patrol, or that only Alert #1 as to sabotage was in effect.

R2–68, 9: Gen. Short states that ordinarily a naval officer was at the Board at the Information Center—that he thinks that three officers were detailed there from the Navy. (This was not true so it shows they were not *mutually cooperating.*)

R2–108: Gen. Short says he never asked the Navy what distance reconnaissance they were making as, "*It was their full responsibility. I didn't know just where they went, and I don't know just what they did when they were out. That was a naval responsibility. * * *, and I did not feel that it was my business to try to tell Adm. Kimmel how he would conduct his reconnaissance*".

R2–119: Gen. Short says that Alert #1 doesn't call for the operation of the AWS at all, but were doing it anyhow.

[33] R2–128: Gen. Short states that Alert #1 didn't cover air attack at all. *And that no particular precautions were taken whether the Fleet was in or out of the Harbor.*

R2–186: Gen. Davidson states that a Navy Officer (Comdr. Taylor) had been around helping them set up the AWS, but not there every morning and that he was not detailed there as a liaison officer.

R2–222: Col. Phillips, Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Dept., was the senior Army member of the Local Joint Planning Committee (Army and Navy security measures), but that they had never met since he became Chief of Staff and was a member, November 6, 1941. Also, that they never met even after the communications of Nov. 27, 1941.

R3–223: Col. Phillips never consulted with the Navy Fleet or Dept. heads at any time between Nov. 27, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941.

R3–227: Col. Phillips says that after the War Dept. radio of Nov. 27, 1941, he and Gen. Short talked it over and decided on Alert #1. *He thought that the Navy would make "reconnaisance," but never asked them or consulted them in any way.*

R3–227, 8: Col. Phillips never did know when the fleet were in or out of the Harbor, and he says knowing this fact would have made a difference in their plans of defense. "* * * *but as Chief of Staff, I never knew.*"

R3–229: Col. Phillips states that he was never present at any conferences between Commanding General and the Navy Commanders. That the General always took his aide along with him to these conferences. Says that the General was personally handling the protection and/or cooperation with the Navy. "Short was handling all that himself."

R3–235, 6: Col. Phillips says that "they" depended on the Navy to warn them. (I presume that he means by the distant reconnaisance.)

R3–245: Col. Phillips states again that there were no meetings of the Joint Planning Committee.

R3–270: General Burgin says that Gen. Short expressed himself "very forcefully" along the line that with the Navy scouting. etc., no ships could get close enough to land a plane. He got the impression that Gen. Short got this from the Navy.

R3–273: Gen Burgin, Commanding General sea coast artillery and anti-aircraft artillery, says he never knew when the Fleet was coming in, altho it would have helped him with his defenses had he known this.

R3–283: Gen. Burgin says that the Navy never gave any information as to when they were coming in except when they were practicing.

R3–293: Lt. Col. Fielder, G–2, Hawaiian Dept., states that at the Staff meeting on the morning of Dec. 6, 1941, he reported that the Japs were burning papers at the Consulate. That he knew of this a short time before this. That the FBI had reported it to one of his men and he in turn told meeting of the Staff. (Gen. Short says that he did not know of this, and Col Fielder does not state specifically whether Gen. Short was at this Staff meeting.) Says nobody paid any attention to this burning of papers.

R3–381: Major Berquist says that there had never been any Naval liaison officers at the Information Center, prior to Dec. 7, 1941.

R5–538: Admiral Kimmel says that he inspected the Pearl Harbor defenses and was astounded at their weakness.

R5–554: Adm. Kimmel says that my Army and Navy Joint Agreement signed March 20, 1941, "defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of the Island of Oahu" would be under the tactical control of the Army. Signed by Adm. Bloch and Gen. (This is true. See under Documentary Evidence.)

[*54*] R5–556C: Here Admiral Kimmel sets out the Joint Agreement and the Joint Estimate of the Situation (Addendum I). (These are set forth in the preceding pages under Documentary Evidence.)

R5–569: Adm. Kimmel says that the Navy were not informed until about Dec. 9, 1941, that the radar operated by Sgt. Lockard at Opana had picked up the approaching Jap planes the morning of the attack. Had they been they might have trailed them back to carriers.

R5–581, 2: Adm. Theobald states that the "war warning message" of Nov. 27, 1941, from CNO to the Navy "was given by a Naval Officer to an Army Officer."

R5–583: On December 3, 1941, the CNO sent Adm. Kimmel a message that they had reliable information that the Jap consulates at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, London and Washington were to destroy most of their codes and ciphers and burn secret papers at once. (Gen. Short admits he was in conference with Adm. Kimmel this day, but it is not brought out whether he was informed of this message.)

R5–608, 9: Adm. Kimmel states that there were no Navy morning or evening patrols except over the route to Honolulu(?), and to the south where a task force was out—nothing to the north. He says no evening patrols anywhere at anytime.

R12–1481: Adm. Kimmel says that the Army was furnished with a schedule that did show what ships were in or out of the Harbor at a given time and this had been so for months.

R5–630–7: Adm. Kimmel states that he thought the AWS was working, and that radar sets were in good shape, had never been informed otherwise. He knows that no naval officer was detailed at the Information Center as a liaison officer. He had the SOP, 5 Nov., 1941, Hawaiian Dept., and from that thought the Interceptor Command and the AWS was working as provided therein. Just learned at time of hearing that the permanent radar sets were not even then installed.

R6–662, 3: Here Adm. Kimmel states just how he understands the "war warning" message was given to Gen. Short. Says Comdr. Layton gave it to Lt. Burr (Navy liaison at Army Hq.) who gave it to G–3 (Col. Donegan or Major Lawton) on Nov. 27, 1941.

R6–667: Gen. Short wrote Adm. Kimmel June 19, 1941, saying that the AWS "will be in operation in the near future." Aug. 5, 1941, Gen. Short wrote him again that AWS (aircraft warning service) is "rapidly nearing completion."

R6–669, 670: Tentative SOP (Standing Operating Procedure) of Interceptor Command was never given Adm. Kimmel he states.

R6–676: Adm. Kimmel knew there was no distant patrol of Dec. 7, 1941.

R6–730, 1: Admiral says that Gen. Short never told him at any time what he proposed to do after the messages of Nov. 27, 1941.

R6–733–738: Adm. Bloch didn't know the radars were not working all the time, didn't know anything about the inshore aerial patrol.

R7–771: Adm. Bloch states that the conversations between Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short were very general.

R7–804, 5: Adm. Bloch says that he and Gen. Short talked many times after Nov. 27, 1941, and that Gen. Short never told him at any time prior to Dec. 7, 1941, that he was only alerted to prevent sabotage. After attack he went to the General's office and said, "Weren't you on alert?" and the Gen. replied, "Only against sabotage." Navy Condition 1 is their highest form of Alert while Army Alert #1 is their lowest. He thought the Army was on a "high" alert. Didn't know about the various types of alerts.

R7–806: Adm. Block thought Gen. Short was given the "war warning" despatch because he was given one by Adm. Kimmel.

[35] R7–831: Capt. DeLany, USN, knew that the AWS was very unsatisfactory, and "couldn't get information out of it."

R7–859: Admiral Pye says that he would depend for warning upon scouting by aircraft, "and it would seem reasonable to suppose that with all of the Army observation posts it would be impractical for enemy aircraft to arrive in this position in such a fashion that we could not fully man our guns." He assumed that Army's AWS was in full operation—"* * * because on these drills they had given adequate warning."

R7–865: Adm. Pye says that Navy had its guns manned and ammunition at them at all times after Nov. 27, 1941.

R9–1094: Here Lt. Comdr. Layton introduces several Naval despatches right up until December 3, 1941, showing the imminence of war. (However, these are not brought home to Gen. Short in the record, but this might be checked. If they were cooperating they should have been made known to him.)

R9–119: Rochefort knew that Jan Consulate was burning papers the Wednesday before Dec. 7, 1941.

R14–1624: Gen. Short here says that the SOP, Nov. 5, 1941, was issued as an accomplished procedure. This sets out the functions of the Interceptor Command and provides that the Army will transmit warnings to "interested agencies". (Ten copies of this were given the Navy.)

R14–1626: Gen. Short upon being recalled admits that at time of attack the Interceptor Command had not a "definite organization". "We were working it informally". Doesn't know for sure whether the Navy knew this or not. (He didn't say this before.)

R14–1655: Gen. Martin, Com. Gen. Haw. Air Force, did not know the Navy had no daily off-shore reconnaissance.

R14–1648: Gen. Martin admits that prior to Dec. 7, 1941, there was no inshore aerial patrol by the Army Air Force.

R16–1823–1827: Here are set out the two letters. One from Secretary of Navy, Jan. 24, 1941, setting out the matter of protection of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and the answer thereto by Secretary of War, Feb. 7, 1941, which were sent to General Short and received by him. He admits receipt thereof in his statement as of Feb. 19, 1941. (See Documentary Evidence this Brief and Resume.)

R2–164: General Short was asked, "You didn't actually coordinate with the Navy as to whether they considered Alert #1 sufficient?" He replied, "I didn't go down and ask the Navy, no, sir, whether they considered it sufficient. I am sure from all of our talk that everybody understood just what was being done."

Question to General Short, "* * *. Was it intended that the same alert would be ordered by the Navy or by the Army in each case?" He replied, "I hadn't—yes."

R2–38: General Short was asked if he got the "war warning" message to Navy. He replied, "I don't remember. I perhaps saw it in that I was in conference

with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch on the 27th for 2 or 3 hours. I was in conference with him on December 1—Admiral Kimmel on December 1, and with both of them on December 3; so in all probability I did see the one to which you refer. I am not sure whether it was sent to me officially."

[*35a*] R2-39: General Short states the same answer would apply to the Naval Communication of November 24, 1941. (See documentary Evidence in this Brief and Resume.)

R2-46: General Short says, "Now, to take up the question of having no information to indicate an attack, as I say, I was in constant communication with the 14th Naval District. *I had nothing in the way of alarming news.* In our Coastal Frontier Defense Plan *we coordinate the work of the Army and Navy by mutual cooperation.* * * *

R2-46: General Short here discusses the Joint Air Operations Agreement of March 21, 1941, and says what they each agreed to do, and then, after stating the Navy was responsible for distant reconnaissance, says *"The question of just how the total reconnaissance was carried out was never known to me.* * * * I assumed that the Navy planes were searching all the other critical areas, and they probably were. *I say that was a matter that was not under my control."*

R2-107: General Short states, "My reconnaissance under the plan with the Navy is limited to just the immediate offshore of the Island, ordinarily limited to 15 miles. * * *" (See statement of Admiral Bloch, R6-738, supra.)

R2-70: General Short in speaking of the operation of the Interceptor Command station said there would under battle conditions "be a total group of about 30 officers there. * * * Including the naval officer. I think three naval officers is the normal quota that they have there."

[*36*] 7. FAILURE TO ISSUE ADEQUATE ORDERS TO HIS SUBORDINATES AS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE DUTIES IN CASE OF SUDDEN ATTACK

R2-66: Gen. Short here tells about Lt. Tyler being at the Board on this morning of the attack and getting the call regarding the approaching planes from Lockard. (But he had no instructions whatsoever regarding any duties there or what he was to do in case anything happened.)

R2-162: Gen. Short says that no planes had any ammunition. Were only training.

R2-163: Gen. states that no troops under his command were on a war footing.

R2-177: Gen. Davidson here sets out two telegrams whereby he is instructed not to disperse the planes.

R2-178: Gen. Davidson was never instructed to operate the AWS—it was just being set up, by Signal Corps.

R2-172: Gen. Davidson had charge of the pursuit planes but had never been instructed to have any in the air prior to 7:30 A. M. when they started the day's training—never told to operate an aerial inshore patrol—never told or instructed to have his planes in the air on Sunday mornings.

R2-186: Gen. Davidson states that he was never informed as to the serious international situation between U. S. and Japan. Hence, his subordinates, including Lt. Tyler, did not.

R2-200: Gen. Rudolph, Commanding General 18th. Bombardment Wing, has charge of the bombers, states he positively had no information of critical relations between U. S. and Japan.

R2-201, 2: Gen. Rudolph states that as an instructor that had he ever seen a radiogram stating "this is a war warning" he would never have had his planes concentrated, and especially on a Sunday morning.

R2-203: Major Allen, AC, says at attack he rushed out—got into a plane—it wouldn't start—he didn't know what to do—asked instructions—finally got into the air at Hickam Field about 11:30 A. M.

R2-205: Major Allen never heard a discussion, even informally, that there might be an attack by Japan.

R2-206: Major Allen, AC, didn't know that there was a flight of 12 of our own bombers coming in from the mainland at the time of the attack—saw some of our own men fire on these pilots as they were trying to land.

R3-226: There were no restrictions on social functions. All liberties and leaves of the men were normal.

R3-353: Col. Powell, Signal Corps. who had been getting the AWS together had been in the U. S. with Gen. Davidson from about Oct. 15, 1941, to Dec. 8, 1941, and when he got back G-3 had already told Col. Murphy, whom he had left

in charge, to operate the AWS between 4:00 and 7:00 A. M. He was told nothing else to do than just this. *Says there was no way of getting any information to the Navy.*

R3–237: Col. Phillips, C of S, states that no one ever reported to him that any ammunition was insecure in a hangar at Hickam Field. He says that no one ever reported to him that Lockard had picked up the planes that morning until a few days later when the Signal Officer just mentioned it informally.

R3–245: Col. Phillips didn't know whether Navy had been given SOP, Nov. 5, 1941, or not, or whether they would know what Alert #1 meant or not, or whether they had a similar procedure. (Navy were given 10 copies.)

[37] R3–249, 250: Brig. Gen. Durwold Wilson, CG 24th. Division, was verbally told by Col. Haynes, G–2 25th. Division, on Nov. 27th. that he had seen a telegram that Jap Negotiations were off, but no mention was made that hostilities might ensue. Never called into conference or consulted.

R3–251: Gen. Wilson says that he felt safe from attack on account of the patrol system (?), altho he says he knew nothing about it except by hearsay. He thought the Navy had an inshore and off-shore patrol.

R3–254: Gen. Wilson was at the "Ann Etzler's Cabaret" the preceding Saturday night at Schofield Barracks.
Col. Phillips was there –R2–216.
Gen Short was there.
Gen. Murray was there –R3–264.
Gen. Burgin at "a little party at Ft. Ruger."
Major and Mrs. Dupree had rather "large party at Schofield"–R3–226.
Gen. Martin was at Dinner Party at Hickam Field –R3–332.

R3–299: Col. Fielder, G–2, says that he and Gen. Short discussed the possibility of an attack in a "purely academic way."

R3–260, 1: Gen. Murray, CG 25th. Div., "planned to take a horseback ride that morning. Was perplexed * * *".

R3–264: On Nov. 27th. when Gen. Murray got Alert #1 he was not informed in any way as to the seriousness of the situation. No intimation—nothing.

R3–265: On Nov. 27th when Gen. Murray got Alert #1

R3–265: He says that he talked with Gen. Short several times between Nov. 27, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, but the Gen. had never intimated any serious or critical situation. He had only mentioned that he couldn't get all the funds he wanted for various things. Nothing in re international situation.

R3–273: Gen. Burgin thought the Interceptor Command was working and thought that Gen. Davidson was in charge of it.

R3–274: Gen. Burgin states how on this morning of the attack he got his anti-aircraft ready and turned it over to the Interceptor Command as he had done on the drills, and says, "They didn't have good control". (There wasn't any Interceptor Command and this Gen. didn't know it, altho he turned over his guns to it. It was just then being run by Majors Tindall and Bergquist who voluntarily went over there thinking that it would be undermanned.)

R3–316: Lt. Col. Bicknell, Ass't G–2, got the information that the Japs were burning papers on December 5, 1941, and informed Staff meeting next morning. Says that it meant that war was imminent to him.

R3–337: Gen. Martin says that Gen. Davidson was the Interceptor Commander, then on page 338 he didn't even seem to know that it was not activated until Dec. 17, 1941.

R3–368: Lt. Kermit Tyler was told by Major Bergquist to go over to the Information Center of the AWS this morning but didn't know why. He had no instructions only to be there between 4:00 and 8:00 A. M. He had never operated a Board and had only seen one once before.

R3–377: Major Bergquist had been helping the Signal Corps set up the AWS, and knew it was operating between 4:00 and 7:00 A. M. so he thought it would be a good idea to acquaint the officers under him with it by having them take turns going over there and watching the Board. So without being told to do so he sent over Lt. Tyler. Says that no Air Corps officer was required to be there as it was not under the Air Corps as yet. Page 380—he states that he knew that Lt. Tyler knew very little about it, didn't expect him to. Says there were no naval officers ever there as they had been assigned there as yet.

R3–383: Major Bergquist says that the Air Corps were merely cooperating on their own hook. Page 384—he states that there was no bomber liaison [38] there at the Center until afternoon of that day.

R3–386: Major Bergquist states that he came there about 10:00 A. M. as he was not detailed or assigned there, but merely came to help out.

R3–390: Major Tindal says that he was not detailed or assigned to the Information Center of the AWS, but knew it would probably be undermanned so he went over there to help out. *He was the first officer there and the men were trying to man it themselves.*

R4–415: Lts. Taylor and Welsh rushed to Maleiwa Field—no one told them to go up or to do anything—no squadron commander present. (He was hunting deer on another Island.) So on their own initiative they both took to the air after loading ammunition. They brought down several planes.

R4–427: Lt. Welsh says the guards there had no instructions as to what to do if enemy planes came over.

R4–447: Col. McCarthy says that on Dec. 7, 1941, he never did receive instructions to put in Alert #3 so he just did it himself and did what he could.

R4–448: Col. McCarthy says that from about Nov. 22, 1941, until Dec. 2nd or 3rd. that Alert #2 had been in effect. Says that Post Commander called in several Battalion Commanders and verbally gave them orders to put Alert #2 in effect.

R4–476: Lt. Cooper says that they had been on Alert #3 for about two weeks. (I don't understand these two officers and it should be checked.)

R4–454: Pvt. Shortt, ambulance driver, rushed to the hospital—three or four doctor officers there—had no instructions or orders—knew that men were injured so without any instructions he went out and picked up wounded by himself—no litter service or assistance at all.

R4–461: Lt. Saltzman stated that he couldn't conceive of this attack "in my wildest dreams". Says that this is what the Junior Officers thought:—"Knowing that the Signal Corps, the AWS has outposts all over the Islands and that they are manned almost continually and that Navy patrols these waters, I never felt that we would be completely surprised the way we were." (This last word is "did" in record.)

R4–491: Pvt. McBriarty at Bellows Field says that about 8:30 A. M. a plane flew over shooting its machine guns, but as no one was hit they thought nothing of it and he went on to Church.

R14–1654: Gen. Martin says that no search was made for carriers on this morning.

R14–1659: Gen. Davidson says that the Interceptor Command did not direct that a search for planes from carriers be made this morning. (How could it?)

Exhibit 16: This document gives in detail the things they have done since the attack such as practice air raids, drills for gas attacks, practice air raid on Honolulu, distributed the Klaxons fo rair warning system. This at Wheeler Field. (See contents of this Exhibit more fully set out under specification 11.) (While this is all negative evidence, nevertheless it does show what was *not* done prior to the attack and what could have been done to alleviate the severity of said attack and the loss sustained.)

Exhibit 17: This sets forth what was done by Gen. Rudolph subsequently at Hickam Field. (See this under specification 11.)

Exhibit 15: Blackout instructions for Hickam Field, issuance of gas masks; air raid drills; plans for evacuation of women and children, etc..) Klaxons for air warning service had not been issued.

[39] 8. FAILURE TO TAKE ADEQUATE MEASURES TO PROTECT THE FLEET AND NAVAL BASE AT PEARL HARBOR

R1–5: Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Plan (See Documentary Evidence in this Brief and Resume)—"Army to provide for land, sea coast and anti-aircraft defense of the Island of Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor and the naval forces there present. See also Exhibit 25, Plan for Air Defense of Oahu, * * *

"III. Facts Bearing on the Case.

1. Facts:

a. The Army mission is: 'To defend the naval base of Oahu'. * * *

d. To perform its missions, the Fleet must have freedom of action without responsibility for the defense of its base."

Also, Joint Army and Navy Defense Plan, 1935, Rainbow 5:

a. Joint—Hold Oahu as main outlying naval base and control and protect shipping in coastal zone.

R1–14: By above Plans Army was to conduct an inshore aerial patrol. (The distance of this is in debate.)

R2–42: After warning of November 27, the only measures General Short took were to order Alert #1 (sabotage and uprisings) and radar operation 4–7 a. m.

R2–80: General Short states that all anti-aircraft batteries, and these included PH, did not have ammunition. Says that by 10:15 a. m., they were already, though.

R2–51: General Short states what measures he took after November 27—See page 42 above.

R2–53: General Short states that he met with Kimmel and Bloch several times just prior to December 7, but nothing to show that they were informed that interceptor command was not organized; AWS was not working only 4–7 a. m.; that there was no inshore patrol or that only Alert #1 was in effect. (There is much to show otherwise, however.)

R2–108: General Short says he never asked the Navy what distance reconnaissance they were making as "It was their full responsibility". "I didn't know just where they went, and I don't know just what they did when they were out. That was a naval responsibility. * * * and I did not feel that it was my business to try to tell Admiral Kimmel how he would conduct his reconnaissance."

R2–119: General Short states that Alert #1 is not for air attack and under this it was not necessary to operate AWS at all.

R2–127: General Short states no planes in air at time of attack this Sunday morning, he didn't know why, says it was "most unusual".

R2–157: *General says that no special precautions are taken whether Fleet is in or out of the harbor.*

R2–162: General admits his planes were not on a war footing at time of attack and had no ammunition.

R2–178: General Davidson says the AWS not under his command at this time—that Signal Corps were just setting it up. (Materials had been there since June, according to Secretary of War's letter of February 7, 1941.)

R2–186: General Davidson says a naval officer was helping set up the AWS but none were detailed to serve there for liaison. (Hence, there was no provision for transmitting information to interested agencies.)

[40] R2–172: General Davidson states no planes of his (pursuit) were ever in the air prior to 7:30 a. m., and never any on Sundays.

R2–190: General Davidson had 80 planes in commission and 69 not, this morning.

R2–189, 190: General Davidson states that the biggest difficulty was that the plane guns were not loaded and the ammunition was in the hangar that was on fire.

R3–222, 3: Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff, was senior army member of Local Joint Planning Committee, but it never met since he was a member. Never consulted with Navy Fleet or District heads from November 27 to December 7.

R3–227, 8: Colonel Phillips says he never consulted Navy. He never knew when Fleet was in or out of the Harbor and this would affect the plan for defense. Never present at any conference of Commanding General with Navy. *"General Short was handling all that himself."*

R3–234: Colonel Phillips states that anti-aircraft guns, mobile units, had no ammunition. Thinks that under FM 100–5 they should have had some.

R3–245: As Chief of Staff he never knew what forces the Navy had. Depended on Navy to warn them. (?)

R3–273: General Burgin says although he had the sea coast artillery and the anti-aircraft artillery he never knew when fleet was coming in although it would have helped him a lot to know this.

R3–293: Lieutenant Colonel Fielder reported at Staff meeting morning of December 6, that Japs were burning papers.

R3–316: Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, Assistant Chief of Staff, got information that Japs were burning papers at 5 p. m., Friday, gave to Staff next morning. Also brought the Mori message to Commanding General the night before, but they could make nothing of it. (Ex. 27.)

R3–325: General Martin states that Japs seemed to know everything about them. "Unfortunately we were in Alert #1, that was the most unfortunate thing of all."

R3–368: Lieutenant Tyler detailed to Board with no experience, no instruction, wasn't even supposed to be there. Opana called and reported planes but

Tyler not told what to do, didn't know so he did nothing, and planes, although they had been detected, came on and surprised them all.

R3–380, 1: Major Bergquist says AWS not organized or set up; no interceptor command activated; no naval liaison or other means for getting information to Navy. On his own responsibility sent Tyler up there to get acquainted with it. Says had sufficient personnel to operate 24 hours. Bergquist was not detailed there, but did voluntarily go there and help take charge of it when the attack came.

R3–390: Major Tindall voluntarily went over there during attack as he knew it was not set up and would be undermanned.

R4–437, 8: Captain Ebey says his truck drawn coast artillery was not in position at Barbers Point. They were machine gunned on the way. They had to get machine guns out, set them up and fire back.

R4–468: Sergeant Klatt: C. A., says the switchboard and telephones for his battle post were in the barracks supply room—not installed.

[41] R4–497, 8: Captain West says that at Malakole they had some machine guns but the anti-aircraft had to be gotten from the storage and set up. No equipment in place and ready for fire.

R5–538: Admiral Kimmel says he inspected defenses at Pearl Harbor and was astounded at their weakness.

R5–549: (See two letters (2CL–41) of Navy's—SOP, Hawn. Dept. in Documentary Evidence. Also Ex. 35 "Air Defense of Oahu".)

R5–556C: On March 31, 1941, Bloch and Martin signed joint estimate of situation covering joint Army and Navy Air Action in event of hostile surprise attack. (See this in Documentary Evidence it covers the exact thing that happened.)

R5–581, 2: Admiral Theobald says that November 27, "war Warning" message given by "a naval officer to an army officer".

R6–730, 1: Admiral Kimmel says that Short at no time ever told him what measures he was going to take as a result of the messages of November 27.

R7–804: Bloch didn't know Army not on a "high" alert—never knew different kinds of alerts.

R10–1191: Captain Shoemaker, Commanding Officer, Ford Island, says Army was to set up an anti-aircraft defense of the island and man it, but that on this day they didn't even show up so they got out some machine guns but had to get ammunition from storage.

R14–1624: Short says hat SOP, 5 November 1941, was issued as "accomplished procedure". (This was given the Navy.)

R14–1622: General Short says, "Frankly, * * * I was more serious about the training rather than expecting anything to happen at that time".

R14–1634, 5: General Short admits reconnaissance and radar working haphazardly up until December 7, because "I didn't think the situation demanded it."

R14–1641, 2: General Short states that if he had had all the material he needed it wouldn't have made any difference in his plans.

R3–383: The AWS Company, operating under the Signal Corps were the ones ordered to operate the AWS from 4 to 7 a. m. The Air Force merely cooperated on its own hook. Operating on a war footing there would be a controller and a pursuit officer present at the Information Center. Major Tindall, Commander Taylor and himself (Major Bergquist) were all controllers and could have operated it.

R3–339: General Martin in speaking of AWS was asked, "Who had it if you didn't?" Answer, "It was under the Signal Officer who was in charge of the installation of the equipment."

R3–337: General Martin says that AWS was never under his command.

R3–353: Colonel Carroll Powell says that at time of attack the Interceptor Command had not been organized in accordance with SOP. On this day AWS was under his direction.

[42] R3–356: At attack he was at his home in Honolulu. Was not at the AWS station.

R3–389: Major Bergquist says there was no bomber liaison at Information Center until in afternoon, December 7.

Ex. 20: Joint drill to test efficiency of interceptor command. (See).

R12–1481: Admiral Kimmel says Army was furnished with schedule showing when ships in and out and had been getting this several months.

R5–553: Admiral Kimmel testifies in regard to a publication known as the "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy." He states, "This publication was prepared by the Joint Board and promulgated the two services by the Secretaries of

War and Navy by a joint order signed by them respectively". It states what the Army shall provide for under a heading "The specific functions of the Army in Coastal Frontier Defense"—

> "A communication system and an intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy."

R5–554: Admiral Kimmel then reads from page 32 of this Joint Action plan and it defines and describes the duties of an aircraft warning service. (This is copied verbatim on page 8, Documentary Evidence, in this brief and Resume.) Admiral Kimmel says this was in effect December 7, 1941, and prior thereto.

R2–168: General Short was asked:

> Q: "Well, your basic plans state specifically that that is the responsibility of the forces (Army) here, to protect that base."
>
> A: "That is correct."
>
> Q: "All right. Now, if you had those ideas have you discussed them with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch along those lines? Have you ever discussed with them the situation, or rather, whether or not they should bring their fleet in, or how many? Has that ever been discussed?"
>
> A: I don't think that I have discussed that particular point as to how many ships they would bring in."

[43] 9. FAILURE TO HAVE HIS AIRPLANES DISPERSED IN ANTICIPATION OF A HOSTILE ATTACK, AFTER HAVING BEEN WARNED OF THE DANGER THEREOF

Ex. 36: See communications of both the Army and Navy dated October 16, 1941; November 24, 1941; November 27, 1941 (one to Army direct from War Department, and the "war warning" dispatch to Cincpf), and November 28, 1941, and the Navy dispatch of December 3, 1941 (although it is not shown that General Short saw this latter, he says he was in conference with both Admiral Kimmel and Bloch on December 3, 1941), all bearing upon the warnings of danger given to General Short. These various documents also appear in this Brief and Resume under Documentary Evidence.

R2–84: General Short admits purposely grouping the planes as they were then easier to guard against sabotage.

R2–177: General Davidson set out two telegrams from Hawaiian Air Force not to disperse planes.

> "Nov. 27, 1941. * * * HAF Four two C place Alert number one in effect immediately. Anti-sabotage only. This is an actual repeat actual alert not a drill."

Followed by:

> "Under alert #1 aircraft will not be dispersed. All units continue training under condition easy five."

Easy five meant E5 which was ready in four hours. So just continued to train normally under conditionE5. Nothing ready.

R2–200: General Rudolph states alert #1 "did not include airplane raids; it included sabotage. Therefore, we bunched the planes because we could have much better protection against sabotage."

Ex. 6: This map shows the bunched arrangement of planes at Hickam Field.

[44] 10. FAILURE TO HAVE HIS AIRPLANES IN A STATE OF READINESS FOR AN ATTACK

R2–162: General Short admits that pursuit planes were not on a war footing at time of attack and were not supplied with ammunition.

R2–127: General admits no planes in the air this fateful Sunday morning.

R2–128: General states that Alert #1 doesn't cover air attack at all.

R3–345: General Martin states that had Alerts 2 or 3 been in effect the planes would have had fuel and ammunition, would have been better.

R3–331: Martin states that he had 140 pursuit planes at time and about one-half of them out of commission.

R2–190: Davidson says that he had 80 ships (pursuit) in commission at time and 69 out of commission.

R2–189, 90: General Davidson state that the biggest difficulty at the time was that the planes guns were not loaded and the ammunition was in a hangar that was on fire.

R2–177: General Davidson shows two telegrams from Commanding General, Hawn Air Force, not to disperse planes under Alert #1.—

> "Nov. 27, 1941. * * * HAF Four two C place Alert number one in effect immediately. Anti-sabotage only. This is an actual repeat actual alert not a drill."
>
> "Under alert #1 aircraft will not be dispersed. All units continue training under condition easy five."

R5–556K, M, N: Addenda I and II to the plan of Army and Navy made in accordance with the Joint Air Operations Agreement of March 21, 1941 (R5–556A) provide conditions of aircraft readiness, in pertinent part, as follows:

> "Material Readiness, E—All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan; and under Operational Readiness #5. All types—four hours."

R3–383: Major Bergquist says that if there had been Alert #2 the planes would have been dispersed; a pilot there at all times and a man sitting in the cockpit at all times to warm it up, and could be up in 1 to 3 minutes.

R3–389: Bergquist says there was no bomber liaison at information center December 7th until in the afternoon.

R4–415–423: Lieutenant Taylor and Welsh rushed to Maltewa Field and the men were just loading ammunition (30 cal.) into the planes—there was no Squadron Commander there (he was bear hunting on Molokai Island)—had no instructions at all so just jumped in to the planes and brought down six Japs and were cited for this by the Government.

R8–893: Amdiral Bellinger says that all Navy planes were armed with machine guns and had ammunition. (Also, somewhere in there that Navy planes were all dispersed.)

[*45*] R14–1658: General Martin states that he did not set up machine guns at Fields for protection of planes. (What about the SOP's and FM 100–5—Every unit will be responsible for its own defense from air attack.)

Ex. 25: In statement by Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, states that there were no airplanes ready for immediate use at time of attack.

R2–200: General Rudolph, Commanding General bombers, says that he was only training crews to bring over the bombers from the mainland. That when his ships were up they would have no ammunition unless they were doing some target practice in connection with their training. None of his planes were in the air at time of attack December 7, 1941, at 7:55 a. m., and that none got in the air until after the attack.

R2–201, 2: General Rudolph, Commanding General bombers, says that if he had had any intimation of pending trouble he would never have had his planes bunched or concentrated, but would have had them ready for the air, "Especially on a Sunday morning."

R5–561: Here General McNarney reads a statement submitted by General Short in re condition of Reconnaissance and Bomber planes on December 7, 1941:

> Reconnaissance planes in commission—6.
> Reconnaissance planes out of commission—7.
> Bomber planes in commission—39.
> Bomber plane out of commission—33.

R2–128: General Short after saying it was "most unusual" for planes not to be in the air this Sunday morning, was asked how he would explain that. He replied, "I wouldn't be able to explain it without asking General Davidson why; *but if they had been up and training they wouldn't have had ammunition, for normally in training they did not carry ammunition.*"

R2–128: General Short says further "* * *. There is no question, if we had had pursuit in the air fully armed and expected this attack at 8 o'clock, why, we probably would have—we might have been able to stop it to a considerable extent, at any rate."

R2–162: General Short was asked, "Were the pursuit planes armed and supplied with ammunition at all?" He replied, "They were not."

R2–163: General Short was asked, "Were the bombers in the same state of unpreparedness as the fighting planes?" He replied, "Yes, sir."

[46] 11. FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, THEIR FAMILIES ET CETERA, ON VARIOUS RERERVATIONS

R3-232: Colonel Phillips states that the Hawaiian Home Guard was not in existence December 7th—"It was just being organized." Says there was no aerial warning service "with sirens in tower downtown" at that time. Have been established since.

R3-233: Colonel Phillips states again that there was no system of air raid warnings.

R1-5: Under the Joint Coastal Plan the Army mission was to provide against air and *gas* attack.'

R4-412, 13: Colonel Phillips again states there were no sirens or warnings at various fields of any kind prior to attack. No warning devices of any kind. Also, again no air raid warning for "tower" prior to December 7th.

R4-514: Civilian Chas. Utterbach states that civilian comment was, "They caught them asleep, by God."

Ex. 15: This contains a group of orders and instructions issued issued subsequent to attack at Hickam Field. (While this evidence is of subsequent measures it does show what security measures were lacking prior to the attack.) It shows: gas masks issued; a gas alarm system established; blackout regulations promulgated: one communication dated December 20, 1941, states, "*The Hawaiian Air Depot is dependent upon the inverted sections of gasoline tanks for shelter and protection of our personnel in the event of an air raid. * * * It is requested that we be permitted the use of these sections until such time as adequate air raid shelters are built for our personnel, * * *.*" (Permission was granted by 1st Indorsement.); and a system of air raid wardens established.

Ex. 16: By order General Short gives orders for a practice air rail alarm on December 10 for Honolulu. Issued December 9, 1941. Also states that Members of the Military Police, Honolulu City Police, Home Guard and Honolulu Fire Dept. have been issued a supply of Stewart Hand Klaxon sirens for distribution throughout the City of Honolulu.

December 9, 1941—Standing orders first issued for defense against gas attack.

December 7, 1941—Bulletin "Information for Conduct of Families in Air Raids."

Ex. 17: This contains subsequent instructions by General Rudolph, Commanding General 18th Bombardment Wing. This states gas masks issued to all personnel. Sirens issued for use in giving air raid alarms. Construction for additional facilities underneath barracks floor *initiated*, to protect *men occupying barracks. Continuous daily patrols have been flown in cooperation with the Navy. Evacuation plans* [47] *for women and children initiated.* Complete blackout instructions put into effect.

(These exhibits are all negative evidence, but show (1) that these obvious safety measures they call for were not done prior to the attack, and (2) that the facilities were there and all of these things could have been done prior to the attack had anyone even suspected there might be trouble.)

(An article appears in the Washington Star for week of March 23, 1942, of an interview of Mrs. Mary Kogan, 1340 Taylor Street, N. W., wife of Lieutenant Milton Kogan, wherein she states that she and her husband were at Schofield Barracks at time of attack. She states therein, in pertinent part, "It was then they knew the thing (*the attack*) was real and that the warning of a Hawaiian Newspaper a week earlier that Japan could be expected to attack that week end had come true. * * * Before December 7, we hadn't even been told what to do in case of an air raid".) [*Underscoring* supplied.]

(As showing that General Short must have known of imminence of attack, a Mr. Raymond Coll, a Hawaiian newspaper editor is quoted by a Washington Newspaper, shortly after the submission of the report of the Roberts Board, January 24, 1942, as stating, in substance, that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had made clear by their utterances before December 7, 1941, the probability and immence of a Japanese attack at an early date.) (We have not been able to examine these Hawaiian papers at the Congressional Library as the papers were at the bindery at the time of this report.)

SECRET

June 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM for the Files.

I today saw General Hilldring and Colonel Donald Wilson, the officer who is to succeed him on July 1, about the general court-martial charges we have drawn up in the matter of General Short. General Hilldring explained the background of the situation to Colonel Wilson. General Hilldring advised me that there was nothing to do at the present time but hold the papers but suggested that I should at some time tell the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff that we had prepared a draft of specifications and were awaiting any further instructions.

M.C.C.

July 21, 1943.

Took up this matter with Gen. Marshall. He told me that it would have to wait until Secty Stimpson's return. That it was a matter for his decision.

SECRET

27 NOVEMBER 1944.

Memorandum for Mr. Bundy:
Subject: Secretary's Press Release of 28 February 1942 Re General Short.

1. Attached hereto are two copies of the Secretary's press release of 28 February 1942.

2. Pursuant to his direction the Judge Advocate General's Office on 4 March undertook preparation of charges against General Short, utilizing all available data including the Roberts Report and transcript. This work was completed 20 April 1942 and resulted in preparation of charges alleging violation of the 96th Article of War, with eleven specifications as follows:

Specification 1: Failure to provide an adequate inshore aerial patrol.
Specification 2: Failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defense.
Specification 3: Failure to set up an Interceptor Command.
Specification 4: Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service.
Specification 5: Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate warnings to interested agencies.
Specification 6: Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation and coordination with the Navy.
Specification 7: Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their duties in case of sudden attack.
Specification 8: Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.
Specification 9: Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation of a hostile attack, after having been warned of the danger thereof.
Specification 10: Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an attack.
Specification 11: Failure to provide for the protection of military personnel, their families, etc., and of civilian employees on various reservations.

3. The above charges were merely tentative and possible charges and were never approved by The Judge Advocate General or transmitted to the Secretary of War. Of course, they were never made public.

WILLIAM J. HUGHES, Jr.,
Colonel, JAGD.

1 Incl. Cy Press Release (dup)

EXHIBIT NO. 141

Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading up to it.

16 October 1940. Received report from Japanese sources in Mexico of intentions to bomb four (4) Battleships on 17 October 1940. This report conveyed in person by me to CINCUS (Admiral Richardson) then at San Pedro, Calif., with three (3) Battleships and one(1) Heavy Cruiser. Official report made to C.N.O. (O.N.I.) by Comdt 11th. Naval District, San Diego. (See O.N.I.files for copy.)

13 November 1940. Assisted in Investigation and recommendations regarding Intelligence facilities in Hawaii. This being conducted by Capt. W.K.Kilpatrick U.S.N. on orders of CINCUS (Adm. Richardson).

14 November 1940. Discussed with Admiral Block the vulnerability of Fleet at Pearl Harbor and recommended certain measures for security. Obtained his permision to have sent to Honolulu certain key men to build up the Intelligence organization.

9 February 1941. Letter to Admiral H.R.Stark USN regarding my conversations with Admiral NOMURA at San Francisco on 8 Feb. (Copy attached).

11 February 1941. Letter to Admiral H.E.Kimmel USN regarding NOMURA conversations and the existing situation. (Copy attached).

17 February 1941. Reply of Adm. Stark to my letter of 9 February. (Copy Attached).

March 1941. Conversation with Admiral Kimmel (CINCPAC) and his Chief of Staff (Capt. WW. Smith USN) regarding NOMURA interview, and SURPRISE ATTACK on our Fleet by Japanese in case hostilities eventuate. Details of this conversation are covered in a Personal and Confidential Memo to Chief of Staff to Cincpac, Rear-Admiral Milo Draemel, USN, for presentation to CINCPAC (Admiral Nimitz) and dated March 17, 1942. (Copy Attached).

16 September 1941. Letter to Admiral Stark urging caution, and other matters.(Copy attached).

October 1941. Japanese discussion of chances of success of air attack on Pearl Harbor, Copy of this presented to Capt. C.H.McMorris USN (Planning Officer on staff Cincus) a translation of "When Japan Fights",by Nosaku Hirata. (Copy attached).

20-25 October 1941. Extensive conversations with an Investigator from Washington, Mr Curtis B. Munson, (believed to be from high levels) carrying a letter from Admiral Stark (CNO) to "open everything to him". He was given an accurate picture of the situation existing and how it would develop. He was told to"forget about uprisings and sabotage" about which he was most concerned because the Japanese would start the war "With an air attack on our Fleet for the purpose of disabling four Battleships. Some details are included in my memo to Adm. Draemel, mentioned above and copy attached. (See Munson authentication attached.)

13 November 1941. Conversation with Lieut. C.H.Coggins,(MC) USN, (Attached to Intelligence organization), regarding existing Officer Morale and lack of readiness for war. Details included in report to Fleet Intelligence Officer, same date. (Copy attached).

20-25 November 1941. Conversations with Lieut. Coggins regarding existing low army morale. Details in Confidential memo to District Intelligence Officer , 14th Naval District, Honolulu dated 5 December 1941. (Copy attached).

Nov. 1941 Conversations regarding failure to apprehend Seven (7) Japanese agents found photographing Kaneohe Naval Air station on all sides, on 4 November 1941.(This one of first spots hit by attacking aircraft). Details available in O.N.I.Files, including Teletype report to F.B.I. Office in Honolulu. For whole Intelligence situation , this known only to Officer in Charge of Investigations, Lt-Comdr. W.B.Stevenson, USNR, now at Honolulu. (See letters from Director Naval Intelligence dated 17 Nov 1941 - attached to [illegible])

27 November 1941. Detailed discussions with Mr.Lorrin B. Thurston, Head of Radio Station KGU, Honolulu and Editor of Honolulu Advertiser regarding present serious situation and preparation of his radio station for necessary broadcasts at time of air attack.

28 November 1941 Sailed with Task Force 8 (Adm. Halsey) for Wake Island.

2 December 1941. News report of arrival in Washington of Japanese Ambassador to Peru. This was indicated by me as one of the conditions which would bring a "break" one way or another, in my conversations with Munson and others.

4 December 1941. Report from CINCUS that unidentified submarine had been reported in the operating areas on night on 4 December.

This was the condition on which I had advised all in my conversations, including Admiral Kimmel, that the Japanese would be ready to strike. From 1800 to 2400 endeavored to intercept Japanese conversation on Radio short wave. There was nothing that would have justified any report to my Task Force Commander or CINCUS.

7 December 1941 (0800) When Communication Officer reported the attack on Oahu, switched on Radio and KGU Honolulu was sending out the words we had discussed on the evening of 27 November.

At night we joined the USS Detroit and Destroyers and Scouted to the Southward for the Enemy. Nothing sighted. Entered Pearl Harbor at daylight, 8 December.

Additional Items which Indicate Contributions to PEARL HARBOR.

Facilities for espionage provided by the newspapers in Hawaii, particularly those in Japanese language.

Details are emphasized and summarized in a report to CINCPAC immediately after Pearl Harbor and dated 7 January 1942. (Copy attached)

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Lack of Security Indoctrination of Naval Officers and inadequate Security facilities.

Details are summarized in a letter to CNO via CINCPAC dated 27 January 1942 (copy attached)

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Inadequate selection of officers for Intelligence duty.

Details summarized in letter to CNO via CINCPAC dated 27 January 1942. (Copy attached)

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Inadequacy of Intelligence functions before Pearl Harbor as indicated by Memo to CINCUS dated 2 January 1942, as requested by a member of his staff.

Letters from D N I (Rear Admiral) W S Anderson indicating need for clarification of agreements with F B I.

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-B
JR3/MD
A2-6
Serial No. 0125016

C O P Y

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence
Washington

CONFIDENTIAL

November 19, 1940

Dear Zacharias:

Thanks for your letter of November 5th. You are quite right that clarification is highly desirable. Enclosed is a copy of an official letter stating that such action is now under way.

The fact that some clarification was desirable has been apparent to me ever since the F.B.I. letter was written. However, that F.B.I. letter was not a directive insofar as the Army and Navy were concerned, and I awaited an auspicious moment in which to obtain the clarification. [illegible] statement of 6 September was really intended to inform the law enforcement officials to whom they should report certain information, but, unfortunately, named only F.B.I., whereas it should also have stated that subjects of a certain character of direct interest to the Army or Navy should also be reported to the proper officials of those departments. Anyway, there soon will be something in the hands of the members of all three intelligence services which will clear up this particular matter.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

CONFIDENTIAL

W. S. Anderson,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

Captain E. M. Zacharias, U.S.N.,
Eleventh Naval District,
Naval Operating Base,
San Diego, California

Enclosure

2

C O P Y

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
C;-16-B
JR3/MD
A2-8
(SC)A8-3
Serial No. 0324916

Nov. 19, 1940

CONFIDENTIAL

From : Chief of Naval Operations.
To : Commandant, Eleventh Naval District

SUBJECT : Cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

References: (a) Comeleven confidential letter Serial No. I-519 of November 8, 1940.

1. Receipt of reference (a) is acknowledged.

2. This Office concurs with the desirability of the situation being cleared up with respect to the President's directive of 26 June 1939 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation letter of September 6, 1939 quoting a White House statement. Steps are now underway to prepare a joint directive which will clear up the matter.

W. S. Anderson,
By direction.

cc: DIO-11

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. S. SALT LAKE CITY

Mare Island, California,
February 8, 1941.

My Dear Admiral:

I think that you will be interested in a conversation which I had with Admiral Nomura yesterday. It lasted for more than an hour and we were alone the entire time in his room at the hotel. Having known him intimately and favorably over a long period we were in a position to speak frankly. I decided to arrange for such a conversation in order to determine if possible the purpose for which he was sent over here and to explore, if possible, the latitude which might be in his hands. As a result of the conversation I have formed the following impressions:

(1) That Japan regrets her partnership in the Axis and is greatly concerned over the China venture, therefore Admiral Nomura was sent here to determine the best bargain to be obtained. (A previous thought that he might be coming to "Rock us to sleep" while Japan proceeded to the Southward, has been eliminated definitely).

(2) He will try to prevent an embargo on oil and other essentials now being obtained here, and will request reconsideration on those now under embargo.

(3) Japan definitely has decided that they cannot "conquer" China or exert sufficient control while Chiang Kai-shek maintains his present position and strength. They realize that their best way out is a peace. This will be attempted first by trying to dissuade us from further aid to China, thereby allowing the Wang Chin-wei group to gain control under Japanese direction. If this is impossible he will then explore the other possible means of bringing about peace in China.

(4) That hostilities between Japan and the U.S. can be avoided if he is given sufficient basis for an approach to the leaders in Japan. (I indicated to him that an immediate definite indication of sincerety by Japan would have to be forthcoming if our Government approved such an approach. When he asked "but for example" I replied "If I were asked, I would say 'Immediate cessation of all Ja anese activities in Siam and French Indo-China'". He made no comment on this.

In the course of the conversation he made the following positive statements:

(1) That his mission was to prevent a resort to force between Japan and the U.S. in settling present disagreements.

(2) That Japan has completely changed her views with regard to China, and that peace is essential to both countries.

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(1)

U. S. S. SALT LAKE CITY

(3) That if the U.S. is patient until Europe is settled then the Far Eastern situation will take care of itself. (This statement I took to be a feeler, therefore I resisted an impulse to ask him if impatience meant probability of force by us in the Far East). My reply was optimism over British prospects which prompted the question from him "Do you think it will be a long war?". My answer was negative and reason given was the effect upon the German people when they finally hear of U.S. aid to Britain.

(4) That the signing of the Axis pact was done only after a sharp division of opinion and with only a slight balance of influence in its favor. Now, the mistake is realized but as it is a "fait accompli" nothing can be done towards cancelling it. It must die a natural death. (The previous day a leading Japanese business representative in San Francisco referred to the signing of the pact by Japan as a grave mistake. When asked what could have brought this about he stated without hesitation and authoritatively that it was accomplished by bribery of officials with tremendous sums of money from Germany.

Details of Conversation

After the usualexchange of pleasantries I opened the conversation by indicating to the Admiral that I thought he had been given a most difficult task and asked him how he expected to handle it. He said "My hope is to prevent a resort to force in settling the difficulties existing between our two countries. I replied, "Of course you know that at least 65% of the American people are reconciled to any action as far as the Far East is concerned, and you yourself have often said that such a conflict would be so disastrous for Japan and entail great loss for the U.S. We have no desire to see Japan defeated and destroyed. We saved her in 1904, you will agree?" He answered in the affirmative, and I continued, "Well, we would like to save her again because the very same reasons exist today. The American people have long since learned that a strong Russia or a strong China means the end of Japan, in which case problems for us will come from other sources. I have always told the Japanese that we would go to war if our Commerce was blocked off, because that has been the cause of every war in which we have engaged. Now see what has happened to all Foreign trade in Manchuria. What would happen in the rest of Asia?" At this he apologized for their extremists and I reminded him that they are the ones who bring on wars. I then said, "Admiral, one thing which the American people can't reconcile is why Japan, a country which has called continually for 'Equal Opportunity' could sign a pact with Germany which has done away with all opportunity and has the utmost contempt for all other nations?" He replied that there was a sharp division of opinion in

(2)

U. S. S. SALT LAKE CITY

Japan as to the advisability of signing the pact and that only a very slight balance of influence made it possible. Now they realize the mistake but it is a "fait accompli" and it is practically impossible to cancel it. Therefore it will have to die a natural death.

"Admiral, I would like to know why you think you can pick a man like Wang Chin-wei, set him up and count upon him working for Japan?"

He replied that what was for peace in China and that this was very necessary now to combat the growing menace of Communism which has spread Russian influence as far South as Beiping. "In this case", I said, "it seems to me that you need a man like Chiang Kai-shek to combat it, as he has done so successfully for over ten years. That is where you ought to make your agreement if you really want the peace of Asia, and here is where the U.S. might act as Mediator and again save Japan. With communications as now exist in China you will never be able to conquer or control it. Peace in China will bring prosperity to all three of our countries. Your objective of markets and raw materials will be realized. Our complementary trade will thrive again and there remains only the problem of taking care of Japan's expanding population. Let's explore the roles of possibility. Do you think that if Chiang Kai-shek should be willing to cede Manchuria to Japan in return for the protection it would afford Asia from the inroads of Communism, would you then be able to go to the Japanese people and say 'Japan has at last reached her original objective, we can now stop the war in China and settle down to prosperity', do you think it would be accepted?" This question was evidently unexpected for after much hesitation the Admiral laughing said and then seriously said, "It would have to be handled very carefully, you know how excited the extremists become in such matters and the steps they take." I replied that I remember well the affair of 1936. "That of course would clear up the rest of China for a resumption of normal affairs under the careful direction of Chiang Kai-shek and the long desired development would eventuate. The fears of Japan about a strong Russia in Asia or an over strong China would disappear." The Admiral again indicated the difficulty of approach to such problems in Japan at this time, but I said that the more difficult they were the more important they became. And I added, "Of course, you understand that if Japan really wants the U.S. to assist in solving this serious situation without resort to force, which you say is your mission, then there would have to be an immediate definite indication of sincerity by Japan." He then asked, "What for example?" I replied, "If I were asked, I would say Immediate cessation of all Japanese activities in Siam and French Indo-China." He made no comment on this and remained thoughtful for an appreciable interval.

(3)

U. S. S. Salt Lake City

During this conversation I made one reference to my watch and the fact that he must have many claims on me in order to give him the opportunity to indicate a desire to break off, but each time he stressed that he had no engagements and wanted to continue talking.

Other parts of the conversation were devoted to the general course of the trade between the two countries which I indicated has been unduly to the vilification of the U.S. by the controlled press of Japan. Parallel with the intensified raging over the Immigration Treaty after the U.S. had signed Japan from defeat, it continued with every incident. Typical was that after the Immigration Bill, a purely economic incident occasioned by the failure of Congress for who to adhere to the existing standards thereby exhausting the California formula. Japan does not admit fairness.

I indicated that the public in now well aware of the vast difference between the Monroe Doctrine and the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. Also that the public does understand Japans needs and the difficult situations with which she has been confronted in the west, however they do not understand and will not tolerate either in Europe or Asia any imposition on our sovereignty which restricts their freedom to go where and when they will.

In conclusion I told the Admiral that he had been quoted in the Press as having accepted this mission on the condition that while he was here the Japanese Government would not take any steps in the War West which might embarrass him. He neither confirmed nor denied this. I then said that I hoped that it was true because if had put him in a very favorable light with the American public and they would wish him every success as I do.

Admiral Nomura is accompanied by Mr. Kawasumi, as adviser. Kawasumi was formerly Consul-General at San Francisco, and was not looked upon as a good minor. Having had some occasion to observe him in 1931 I was not impressed with his ability. For a diplomat he was usually unapproachable, which gave the impression of extended reticence to the Interior coalition. It is believed that he will be only a general guide for Admiral Nomura, since activities or conclusions will not be influenced by Mr. Kawasumi.

Admiral Nomura was very appreciative of the attentions which he received from Admiral Hinkenkamp while in Honolulu, and I am sure these will have a profound effect in Japan, in making his prestige.

(4)

U. S. S. SALT LAKE CITY

Admiral Richardson, who knew of my proposed conversation with Admiral Nomura, had expressed a desire to have any details I could give him on it. I am therefore sending a copy of this letter to Admiral Kimmel.

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

H. H. ZACHARIAS.

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N.
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

15 September, 1941.

My dear Admiral:

It is gratifying to see that there is possibility of resolving the Japanese situation, but we must not relax until they have given concrete demonstrations of sincerity.

I am writing particularly to invite attention to a matter which I consider most urgent and opportune in view of our present relations with the British. I am writing to you because I do not want Captain Kirk to feel that an "old timer" was trying to impose his views on a new arrival, and in this case I would want him to be most receptive.

I have tried unsuccessfully for years to get from the British mutually beneficial I mean, such as picture files of Japanese Naval officers, and, also, general ideas on the British counter-espionage systems. With the new and present relationship all of this should be available to us. I am certain that no one has gone after the things I consider most important. I know that our Attache's and Assistants do not have the ground work necessary to pursue these items. Counter-espionage is a profession in itself requiring schooling and voluminous reading, none of which our people have undertaken. I know of only a few officers qualified to undertake this work. The FBI sent two men to London for several weeks, but I dare say they spent most of their time at Scotland Yard on methods of investigation. Investigation and counter-espionage are as far apart as the poles; therefore, FBI, while excellent in their own field of investigation, will never be able to do our work for us, because counter-espionage and counter-fifth column activities are basic military operational functions.

I have in mind a man who is now working for the Commander-in-Chief, and has pleased him with results. This man I had ordered to Honolulu to help build up the organization in this most vital spot. When I arrived in Honolulu last November to take command of the SALT LAKE CITY, I was asked to assist in a survey of the Intelligence Organization, and this resulted in radical changes in and additions to personnel, space, and equipment. With the training now instituted here, I am optimistic to feel some of the security which we had in the 14th District. As soon as the necessary work now underway is well along, both ashore and afloat, this man should be available to make a trip to London. He is Lieutenant C. F. Corgius (MC), and being a doctor his analytical abilities and

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infinite energy will also bring his own bureau much information on combat medicine and surgery. He is well known in O.N.I., having recently completely edited their Investigation Manual. Ross McIntyre, some time ago, advised me we could use him wherever necessary.

Of course I look forward to the day when I will be in the position to continue to work out the many ideas which I know to be vital to our Intelligence Organization. As you know, the Commander-in-Chief has expressed himself as to the lack of a sufficient and thoroughly effective Intelligence Organization. In the past it has been a difficult "selling" job, but I hope eventually to make our people, particularly the higher ranks, realize the important elements. Last June, while in Washington, Admiral Anderson asked me one day if I would be willing to sacrifice my career for intelligence. I replied, "Admiral, the time has come when if we don't think about sacrificing our careers, there won't be any to sacrifice". Of course, I am delighted with my ship and will soon have in half of my two years in grade, but if and when the situation demands my statement above still stands.

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,

ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS.

Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

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





November [illegible], 1941

5. "That is exactly right. If the officers of this fleet are going to emerge from their present fog of indecision, it is going to be because somebody in authority has put his foot down and forbidden wholesale experimentation at this critical time, and has said in effect 'A good plan well executed is better than the best plan poorly executed'. I am reminded of the eve of the battle, I think it was Trafalgar, when Nelson told his captains 'No man can be very wrong if he closes with an enemy ship and fights her bravely.'"

6. "Well, I am very glad to hear your opinion, I believe that you are probably correct. I am hoping that our present period of experimentation will soon be over and we will be substituting drills for experiment."

[illegible]

- 4 -

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C
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[redacted] DISTRICT
District Intelligence Office
Sixth Army, [redacted]
Honolulu, Hawaii

CONFIDENTIAL CHC/he

December 4, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR: The District Intelligence Officer.

Subject: Army M.O.R., Morale of.

1. Unsolicited information regarding the morale of local Army troops has come to the attention of the writer several times in the past two weeks. The nature of this information is such that it is difficult to determine to what authority it should be submitted. From the disclosures of these informants it is nevertheless self-evident that steps should be taken to correct the conditions now existing.

2. To begin with, our own informants who frequent places visited by Army and Navy enlisted men report that the experienced soldier of the regular Army is disgusted and baffled by the uniform coddling attitude which is shown the enlisted men of the new Army. This soft handling has resulted in greatly reduced discipline in the new regular, the volunteer, and the selectee. The newer additions to our Army have become aware of their immunity against disciplinary action and have taken full advantage of this immunity to an extent which enrages and disgusts all regular non-coms who have seen service prior to the present emergency. An example of this attitude is shown by often-repeated incidents in which a newly-enlisted private will push a sergeant out of the way in order to obtain his food out of turn. This is frequently accompanied by some sarcastic remark as "Excuse me, Sergeant, this is the new Army." The non-commissioned officers have all learned to their chagrin that it is useless to place the enlisted man on report for infractions of the regulations because the officers, with few exceptions, support the offender, reprimand the petty officer and give a lecture upon the tenderness with which the enlisted man is to be handled. The few officers who are known to have made an attempt to inculcate proper discipline and to enforce this discipline by assigning punishments in accordance with the regulations and the traditions of the Army have been promptly removed from their positions by higher authority. Personnel of the regular Army are confused and their morale is seriously injured by this new policy and they do not know what to think [redacted] such a policy.

3. The morale of the Army Air Force appears to be particularly poor. It is not known whether present conditions are due to the necessity for rapid expansion which is faced by the [redacted] or whether insufficient care is used in the selection of new personnel. The situation is real, however, that many experienced Air Force non-commissioned officers and enlisted men attribute a large percentage





MEMORANDUM FOR: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (continued):

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(3) Take appropriate action immediately on any intransigent or continually skeptical key officer who is unwilling to assume responsibility for positive action or recommendations.

(4) Continue and speed up training in all the above specialists jobs. (This war is going to require many replacements and we have too few already).

(5) Give Commanding Officers afloat digest of pertinent intelligence activities with which they might be confronted or which might add to general plan (this should have been a comprehensive peace-time activity but it is not too late to correct).

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CONFIDENTIAL

7 January 1942.

Memorandum for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Interview with the Military Governor (General Emmons) regarding reestablishment of Japanese Language Newspapers in Hawaii.

In accordance with the directions of the Commander-in-Chief, Captain E. M. Zacharias, U.S.N., accompanied by Captain I. E. Mayfield, U.S.N., ONI 14th Naval District, called upon General Emmons to present the views of Captain Zacharias on the Japanese Language newspapers, with a view to establishing reasons sufficient to prevent resumption of the publication of these papers in Hawaii. After delivering the Commander-in-Chief's message, the General was advised of my background of twenty years connection with Naval Intelligence and status as a Japanese Language Officer, and the following statement was then made: "There is concrete evidence that Japanese newspapers in the past have been used for espionage purposes. There is concrete evidence that enemy agents are still at large in the Islands. There is concrete evidence that enemy transmissions of information have not been stopped. It is therefore firmly believed that unless the writing, editing, and printing of these Japanese papers is done by Caucasians, they can and will be used for transmission of information to the enemy".

The General then asked how such information is transmitted, which I explained as coded conversation, chosen words, advertisements, etc. He then said that this would be checked

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carefully by his people to see that there were no deviations. I explained that there were no translators whom he could obtain who would be sufficiently grounded in espionage technique to be able to pick up any such insertions. He then admitted that the work on the paper would be done by second generation Japanese. I then explained the influences and pressures that had been exerted on these people for many years and that with all the time that I have worked on them I am still to receive a single bit of information which we knew them to have and which any real American citizen would turn over to his government. (I forgot to tell him that this pressure extends to liquidation and is an effective method of the narcotic and gambling ring whom we know work with enemy agents and are used to keep people in line). I then asked the reasons for republication, which he explained was for morale purposes, stating that because of the large number of Japanese who cannot read English he thought that it would be a big morale factor for the population if they could get news in their native tongue. In addition he would be able to get to them refutation of claims that are made on the Tokyo broadcasts. I explained that this could be done just as well in the English newspapers and was certain that the second generation would keep their parents informed of everything appearing therein. Why should we be so solicitous about the alien Japanese? These are the ones who are our most dangerous suspects. We know that for years these people have had their assigned details.

At some point in the conversation the General made the

statement, "What is the use of stopping the newspapers when there are so many other sources of information open to them". (This supine acceptance of an intolerable condition is most amazing). I replied, "We should stop all of these sources and if we don't start somewhere we are not going to make any headway". He said, "We have no censorship of mail between the Islands and that is an easy method for the agents". I then said that if this is necessary, it should be done also. He then remarked that the mail was piling up tremendously now, which I advised was a good form of censorship in lieu of the other, provided it is held long enough.

The General then questioned the availability of Japanese agents and I had to say that he would find that there are at least six hundred and probably more key men still at large. The conversation then turned to the methods of picking them up which I assured him could and should be done. Upon asking how, I told him by a general round-up of all first generation (alien Japanese), all second generation who have been in Japan from early childhood, because they (the very dangerous group known as KIBEI) have been in touch with the younger elements in Japan who are the ultra chauvinists upon whom the Nazis have worked and it is they who have brought about the present situation; and finally all the second generation who have been continually in contact with visiting Japanese Dignitaries, Naval Officers, etc., all of whom should have been listed in the files. At this he expressed general inability to do such a job for several reasons; first, "We need these Japanese for labor, it is a different situation from the coast

-3-

where there is a labor market. Then there is the problem of housing and feeding all of this large group if taken in, and we can't spare the lumber and materials and time to do this extensive work, if we are going to prepare for another attack. Our first job is to get all these ships out of the harbor before another attack comes". I then emphasized that the one way to bring the Japanese back for another attack was let their agents have freedom of movement to get information out, because they will have sufficient exact data necessary to operate as they did before. We should create the impression of being fully prepared and of welcoming a return. The General, perturbed replied, "Oh no, we wouldn't welcome a return".

The General then said that he was not worried about information getting out but was more concerned with the sabotage that might take place at the time that an attack is to be made. I then explained that the sabotage threat did not exist in Hawaii because they did not have any access to industrial activities, utilities, etc., as they did on the West Coast, except the one power plant here which was not vital, and the dock facilities. I then outlined the vulnerability of the West Coast and the steps I had taken in July, 1940 in Washington to put into effect concrete plans utilizing all existing governmental agencies for a general round-up before their efforts could be successful. He then insisted that his communications here were vulnerable although strategic points were under guard.

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He reaffirmed again the necessity for the Army preparing to repel attack, to which I replied that the first step in such a move is to deny information to the enemy and if we hope to keep them from coming back we had better take in all of their agents. He expressed belief that FBI and MID were doing all they could and I had to say it is obvious that what had been done is not enough. Incidentally, I was the one who tried over a period of two years to have M.I.D. implemented by giving Colonel Oldfield (G2-9th Corps Area) ammunition for letters to Washington. Nothing would be done until M day. I was the one who gave F.B.I. its start from the Eleventh Naval District. I know exactly what both agencies have and their capabilities. He then asked what more could be done. I replied it is absolutely necessary to round up every Japanese of any generation to whom any suspicion attaches. Those few already in custody are only the ones on whom concrete evidence is in the files. The other can be apprehended and must be.

We then made moves to break off the conversation at which time the General made the statement, "I am not going to stop the newspapers unless it can be proved to me that they are being used for espionage purposes. I have the dual responsibility here of preparing the defenses and of keeping up the morale of the people. I replied, "The morale will be of little consideration if we allow them to originate a belief that we are displaying signs of weakness, and from my knowledge of them I can say definitely that republication of these newspapers will be so viewed. And if we

let them know that we have any fears, or are relaxing in our vigilence and do not take the proper steps to curb the activities of their agents, we are encouraging them to come back.

He reiterated his decision to let the papers go to press, until it can be proved further that they are being used for espionage purposes.

I stated that we would make that attempt. This, he indicated he would be glad to have us do. It is therefore assumed that our Intelligence service is authorized to obtain from the Army all data regarding the methods of handling those publications and to cover all individuals connected therewith.

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Conclusions

It is my considered opinion that the sole consideration of the Army is devotion to the effort of building their defenses so that they will be able to defend Oahu from an attack in force by the enemy Fleet with enemy air support from one of the other islands upon which the enemy will be able to establish a base.

It is further considered that in formulating their plans, there has been no consideration whatever of the psychological factors and characteristics of the Japanese.

That no consideration is being given to the possibility of preventing such an attack by denying information to the enemy, which fact allowed them to work with such complete accuracy in the previous attack.

That the above situation is an extremely dangerous one for the Navy and that immediate action should be taken to remove every element of such danger. It can be done and must be done.

There is definitely a lack of any thought of the Fleet and its protection. They are thinking only in terms of combat defense.

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Recommendations.

It is recommended that the Commander-in-Chief as Senior Officer Present prevail to prohibit the publication of these Japanese newspapers, and that he take necessary steps to obtain coordinated and cooperative effort on the part of all governmental agencies in the area, in order to remove the menaces noted above.

Respectfully,

E. M. ZACHARIAS
Captain, U.S. Navy.

CONFIDENTIAL

Facts concerning the reopening of the Japanese Language Newspapers.

If it is proposed to resume the publications mentioned, Nippu Ji Ji, and Hawaii Hochi, it is most important to know who will write, edit and supervise the material which will appear therein. If it is planned to use the editorial staffs which managed the papers previously, the whole proposal may be regarded simply as a very dangerous experiment. Both of these papers have always been strongly pro-Japanese, and frequently anti-American. The sentiments of the staffs cannot be expected to change overnight, or by request. Having for many years been absorbed in the furthering of Japanese ambitions, we may expect these people to seize every opportunity to turn the new publications to the advantage of Japan. This can best be done by using the newspaper as a secret means of informing local fifth columnists of intended plans. Announcements of this sort are now impossible, except by telephone. The resumption of newspaper publishing will give the enemy a means of widespread signaling. This will be almost impossible to detect --- the whole story may be told in a misplaced comma or a misspelled word.

Any person who scoffs at the above idea as fantastic, obviously knows nothing whatever about either German or Japanese espionage practices. The idea is being used at the present moment in every city in Europe; it is years old and is standard practice in every Intelligence organization.

Let us consider for a moment who are the persons now in charge of the two newspapers under consideration -- who have not been placed in detention: On the Nippu Ji Ji, we have the son of the owner. The owner himself, Yasutaro Soga, is under detention because of both espionage and propaganda activities.. The elder Soga was a member of the advisory council of five which met with the Japanese Consul in affairs of the Japanese State. His newspaper has for many years been violently pro-Japanese and frequently openly anti-American.

The son, Shigeo Soga, was born in Hawaii, educated on the mainland, "traveled" in Japan. He has been completely in his father's confidence in matters concerning Japan, and has represented his father's newspaper in important matters for several years. To our undercover informants, he has revealed his real pro-Japanese feelings on many occasions. To entrust this man with the resumption of publication would be extremely dangerous. However, much the same situation exists with regard to the rest of the staff. None of them can be trusted, in the light of past experience.

In the case of the Hawaii Hochi, the editor is an Eurasian named Makino. He is the son of an Englishman named Higginbottam and a Yokohama girl named Makino. He took his mother's name, and is now known as Fred Makino. More than ten years ago this man led the Japanese people in a court action instituted against a bill introduced in the Territorial Legislature for the control of foreign language schools. Makino is known as a violent and previously outspoken pro-Japanese, formerly a leader in Territorial labor movements.

CONFIDENTIAL

He and his agents have identified and shadowed our own counter-espionage agents on some occasions. It is hoped that neither he nor any member of his staff is seriously considered as proper supervisors of a Japanese paper in war-time.

It is freely admitted that it is desirable to print information for dissemination among the local Japanese which will counteract the Japanese propaganda -- but such a project cannot be safely carried out unless the publication from top to bottom is staffed by dependable persons, who must be caucasians.

There is no reason whatever why the refutation of such propaganda from Japan cannot be effected in the English newspapers and broadcasts all of which are used by the second generation, who are the ones we are trying to reach. The alien Japanese should not be a consideration.

Another consideration must be recognized. That is the feeling of the local Filipinos. If the Japanese newspapers are printed and distributed, they, being unable to read and judge for themselves the contents, are bound to be very seriously disturbed about it. We know very definitely that they are already very much agitated and it can be said without hesitation that we cannot, for the sake of local peace and harmony, afford to further disturb their confidence in the Government. Race riots are a definite possibility from this source and this warning should be recorded.

***

Mr. Hyun

Danger in Resuming of Publication
for Hochi and Nippu

We presume that these two Japanese newspapers will resume publication under the strict censorship of the Military Government, but we must consider of some dangers will be caused by the publication in the Japanese language.

1. It will give a greater encouragement to the older Japanese aliens who are now very optimistic over the war situation in Manila.

2. It will help to build the morale for Japanese victory upon the minds of the younger Japanese (or American citizens) who are under absolute control of their parents.

3. It will give a greater chance to the enemy (Japanese) agents in using these papers for conveying their ideas of secret activities in the plain language (using slang, proverbs and poems).

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File No.
C.25/AS (10-rmc)

27 January, 1942.

From: Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, U.S. Navy.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Security Indoctrination, necessity for.

Enclosure: (A) Intelligence Bibliography for Naval Officers.

1. One of the principal difficulties encountered in establishing a really effective security program in the Navy arises from a basic lack of appreciation by many naval officers of the vital necessity therefor. Even in the higher ranks, despite accumulated experience of years, there have been instances of surprising obtuseness and regrettable lack of appreciation of the scope and importance of Intelligence work. In some instances officers have gone so far as actively to oppose necessary security measures apparently feeling that such measures reflect both upon the integrity of their men and constitute unwarranted restrictions upon their own freedom of movement and expression. In others the simplest and most elementary efforts to safeguard the establishment against penetration by foreign agents and subversive elements have been largely nullified by the apathetic or skeptical attitude of responsible officers.

2. The foregoing is especially true of shore establishments and yet, in general, these stations offer greater opportunity for espionage and sabotage with less chance of detection than any other portion of the naval establishment. The technical excellence of our material, our progressive design policy and our acknowledged world leadership in Naval Aviation, all offer rich rewards to the foreign espionage agent. Many of our shore establishments by reason of construction and grouping of buildings and other equipment offer rich prizes to the saboteur.

3. Having been a nation more or less insulated in the past from the intrigue and espionage of Europe and the Orient, we appear to have developed a rather widespread belief that the spy and the saboteur are creatures confined largely to those areas and are existent in this country chiefly on the silver screen or in the sensational magazine. That this blissful state of affairs does not, in fact, exist is becoming increasingly apparent as is also the fact that the Navy as a whole and its officers in particular must be indoctrinated with a sound appreciation of the

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File No.
CA25/A8 (10-rns)

27 January, 1942.

Subject: Security Indoctrination, necessity for.

vital importance of Intelligence and an intelligent grasp of its scope and methods. In view of the unfortunate lack of any such program of indoctrination at the Naval Academy, the Postgraduate School, or in the service, such indoctrination and training must, in a large measure, come through aroused interest, reading and study by the individual officers themselves.

4. That this situation exists cannot be doubted by anyone who has taken part in the informal group discussions held in the wardroom afloat or the officers' clubs ashore. Logically it must follow that, as the result of this widespread feeling, the Navy offers an easy field of activity for the enemy agent. It is known that this is the reputation which we enjoy abroad. It is so easy to obtain information here that to do so can hardly be regarded as a noteworthy feat.

5. The need for proper indoctrination of personnel is considered acute. It is well realized that they must acquire this indoctrination under their own power. To attempt to drive or force them to security efforts will only succeed in alienating them and thus placing the security program further than ever from accomplishment. Therefore, they must be lead and instructed in such a manner that they will not be aware of forces tending to direct and change their opinions.

6. It is believed that the best way to accomplish this end is to direct their thoughts into the proper channels by means of reading matter placed at their disposal. If the majority of officers can be induced to read of espionage matters, they would indoctrinate themselves and their former ill-founded convictions would disappear.

7. As a means of arousing interest in this vital subject on the part of the average officer, the appended list of books relating thereto has been prepared. These are entirely of the non-fiction variety and include the best in the field. They are arranged generally in the order of recommended priority. Reviews of the more important ones are included.

8. It is believed that this list provides the basis for a concrete and logical course of reading and study in this important field. It is therefore urgently recommended that it be

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File No.
CA25/A8

(10-rue)

27 January, 1942.

Subject: Security Indoctrination, necessity for.

printed or mimeographed and given wide distribution ashore and afloat and that, insofar as possible, the books listed be supplied to the appropriate activities. If necessary to obtain reprints of those now out of print, this should be done at the earliest opportunity and in sufficient quantity to provide several copies for each ship and shore station. If necessary, to reduce expense and save time, these books should be reproduced in paper cover form by any one of the many publishing houses who do such reprint work.

2. The enclosure was prepared by an officer of the Navy who has worked continually and in conjunction with the writer, but for certain reasons his name is withheld at this time, but it is largely through his efforts that this excellent compilation has been made. Proper recognition has and will be made for his work.

E. M. ZACHARIAS.

U S S.

File No.
CA25/48 (12-rue)

27 January, 1943.

From: Captain Elis M. Zacharias, U.S. Navy.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Selection of Officers for Intelligence Duty.

1. The following letter, prepared more than a year ago was withheld awaiting more favorable circumstances which would ensure attention. Under the present circumstances it is felt that it should be forwarded immediately:-

The greatest single weakness of our Naval Intelligence today lies in the fact that our officers are selected for reasons other than special fitness for this kind of work. For many years officers throughout the Navy have been assigned to Intelligence work for trivial or irrelevant reasons and with little regard for the aptitude or personal qualifications of the officer concerned. They have been given Intelligence work as collateral duty because they have had little else to do. Until quite recently they have been inducted as Naval Attaches largely because they were socially inclined. Some have been recruited because they were of foreign extraction or could speak, sometimes haltingly, in a foreign tongue. Some owe their assignment to fortuitous circumstances or their own curiosity and interest.

In consequence of this policy, Naval Intelligence, already inferior in numbers and financial support, when compared with similar organizations abroad, has become inferior in quality as well.

A brief consideration of other Intelligence services reveals the marked contrast which exists at the present time, and goes far to explain the causes underlying our inferiority.

The Intelligence services in other countries is regarded generally as a career which demands the highest individual qualifications, and whose members deserve and receive the most careful and intensive training. The foreign conception of the Intelligence branch is that it serves as the eyes, ears and memory of the fighting forces, and that, for this important duty, the best men are none too good.

In selecting agents, foreign governments comb their entire services for candidates who can meet the highest standards of

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U. S. S.

File No.
C428/AS (10-rae)

27 January, 1942.

Subject: Selection of Officers for Intelligence Duty.

character and aptitude and who give promise of profiting from a program of strenuous training. In at least six foreign countries the chosen agent is sent to school for periods of two to four years and the successful graduates are returned to these schools at intervals throughout their careers. As a student he is trained to observe, to remember, to classify and to evaluate. He studies the arms, equipment, uniforms, organization, history, geography, language, plans and policy of the countries with which he is to match wits. And he, in turn, is studied by older Intelligence officers to determine his special qualifications and how they may best be utilized. After finishing his courses in general Intelligence the officer begins to specialize, and, in two of the world's first class powers today, this specialization has been carried to the point where he may be assigned to espionage or counter-espionage against one potential enemy only. The officer remains in this section for a long period of years or for his entire career, constantly perfecting his knowledge of the enemy.

It is easy to realize, when we compare our own haphazard and casual selection of intelligence officers with the realistic and efficient methods employed abroad, that, in this endless battle of wits which we are fighting in peace and in war, we find ourselves practically helpless against the overwhelming odds imposed by the superior numbers and training of our opponents. When the American Intelligence officer, selected almost at random, and without training worthy of the name, pits himself against the elite of other services he is badly outmatched, and the resulting struggle must be called, in many instances "no contest."

What is to blame for the present situation? Probably many contributing factors are involved. This country, enjoying geographical isolation from other great powers and relatively long periods of peace, has been lulled by our wealth and growing power into a false sense of security no longer justified in the light of world events. This "Fool's Paradise" is shared by large proportions of our ranking officers, few, if any, of whom have ever received intelligence training in their long, peaceful careers. Yet now, when world tension increases and espionage is carried on wholesale, we must depend upon these officers to initiate a policy of realism for which their experience so inadequately prepares them. Ranking officers belittle the thought of spies or the suggestion of dangerous sabotage from within, they

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File No.
CA25/AB (10-rec)

27 January, 1942.

Subject: Selection of Officers for Intelligence Duty.

laugh at the possibility of subversive threats to our morale, they have spoken disparagingly of the Intelligence service, regard Intelligence officers as mere embellishments of the service, and resent and even combat efforts aimed at effecting security. Meanwhile foreign agents throng to our shores, the Spy's Happy Hunting Ground, and steal and buy military and naval secrets out from under the noses of these same officers. Two of our latest cruisers had spies working aboard during construction and during trial runs without being apprehended. They were even allowed to take blueprints home with them at night. Not a single spy has been caught in this country in the last fifteen years as a result of forthright and efficient counter-espionage work. The few who have been apprehended fell victim to purely accidental and unfortunate circumstances and blunders.

Therefore, the writer regards our first great need as proper indoctrination of all officers, particularly those in command.

The second great need is for training of Intelligence officers. This should be begun by a general course given in the line P.G. school. It should comprise no less than one hundred hours of instruction. This course would achieve two worthwhile purposes. First, it would indoctrinate all officers in a subject scarcely less important than any other technical subject, and second, it would serve as a basis course from which to select young officers who are qualified for advanced study and careers in which assignment as Intelligence officers would play an important part.

The present futile gestures in the direction of training for Intelligence must be converted into a real effort. A long list of courses of instruction exists at present merely on paper, and serves only to mislead those concerned with our efficiency in this branch. The "building" of an efficient Intelligence officer requires more time than the construction of a battleship and, as a common sense precaution, cannot be delayed until flashes of gunfire are seen on the horizon.

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File No.
C425/AS (10-ras)

27 January, 1942.

Subject: Selection of Officers for Intelligence Duty.

The Standards of a Good Intelligence Officer

The officer selected for Intelligence duty must have special personal and temperamental qualifications to be successful in that duty. He must possess a mental alertness which will enable him to cope with agile and clever opposition, fortified by ample financial resources. He must be imaginative enough to visualize the possible plans of enemy agents and at the same time be sufficiently analytical to properly evaluate the information which comes to him. There must be in his natural or acquired make-up a certain amount of suspicion and disbelief. He must be mentally aggressive and possess the initiative required to plan effective operations. He should be discreet and not garrulous, and should understand human nature, its strength and its weaknesses. Additionally, he should be willing to hazard his own personal standards of conduct in the accomplishment of an important objective contributing to the national welfare in time of war.

He must be realistic. He must have the ability to see things as they are, and to have the courage to bring them to the notice of his superior.

The orthodox and conservative type of naval officer is designed by training and indoctrination not to be an Intelligence officer. For this reason the selection of personnel from the Navy for this type of duty should be made early in the officer's career so that he may be trained in the stratagems of this important branch of the service.

2. It is recommended that this letter be given wide distribution among the officers of the Fleet as coming from the Commander-in-Chief, in order to promote a general interest in this subject and encourage reading and study of books related thereto. A selected list of such books has been forwarded this date to the Chief of Naval Operations.

E. M. ZACHARIAS.

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL. March 17, 1942.

Memorandum for Admiral Draemel

In accordance with your request after our conversation this morning, the following memo is submitted:-

My conversation with you is impelled from a sense of duty because of what I consider a serious situation existing in Hawaii. Once before, in such a situation, I gave concrete opinions and advice which apparently could not break through preconceived ideas. History was about to repeat itself and no one would believe it. I have no personal ambitions or desires regarding the subject matter other than assuring that we have a safe and well protected base for our Fleet, which is the sole reason for the existence of Hawaii. It has been my attitude that it makes no difference who does a job as long as it is done efficiently and thoroughly.

Any criticism direct or implied is offered solely from a constructive viewpoint and is for the purpose of preventing in the future a recurrence of a disaster such as that of 7 December.

Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmell and Captain Smith, during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them, of the exact events to take place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen, but also how and when. My only error was that the Japanese were after four battleships and they got five. I also gave them the reasons for my conclusions and advised them of the steps necessary to prevent such an attack. From time to time, in contact with the Staff, I would voice possibilities and only two months before the attack amazed at unrealistic attitudes I said, "When are we going to stop these surprise inspections and prepare for surprise attack". About that same time Mr. Munson, a representative from Washington, (believed to be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from Opnav to "open everything to him", sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my opinion as to what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast. After outlining to him my firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a weekend and probably Sunday morning, with all the reasons therefor, and I then stated, "You now have two envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can look for it to break immediately, one way or the other". This envoy arrived in Washington about 2 December 1941

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On the night of 27 November, after dinner with Lorrin Thurston, Head of the Honolulu Advertiser and KGU, I related the impending possibilities as above and he said, "Here I am a O-2 Officer and I haven't even been advised what to send out over the radio in case of an attack". I advised him precisely to say, "We are having a sporadic air attack, everyone should keep calm and remain indoors. Do not go on the streets as it will prevent the military from getting to their stations. There is nothing to worry about". On 28 November I sailed with Task Force 8 for Wake Island. Upon receipt of CinPac's despatch on 7 December, "The Islands are being attacked this is no drill", I turned on my radio and KGU was sending out my exact words. At least someone believed it. This was probably made certain by the press announcement about 3 December that the Ambassador to Peru had arrived in Washington as a third envoy. Seeing this, Mrs Thurston reminded her husband and they were alerted.

On Friday, 5 December, having received a report of a submarine off Oahu - one of the things I gave Admiral Kimmell as a positive indication of intention to attack - I listened all evening on short wave for Japanese conversation. All was garbled conversation but the intensity of the acknowledgments (typically Japanese) indicated to me that something was imminent. I tried to obtain a single word which would justify me in requesting ComTaskFor 8 to advise CincPac, but nothing could be made out. I knew what the reaction would be to a recommendation from thin air and I assumed that proper warnings would be coming from Washington.

I have made it a point when afloat to give my advice to Intelligence activities both ashore and afloat and when necessary even to the point of "butting in". I had tried for years to have detailed a Fleet Intelligence Officer who was not tied up as Flag Secretary or on other jobs. Finally two years ago Commander Dyer advised me that Cinpac was going to have a Fleet Intelligence Officer. I recommended Lt-Commander Layton, who has consistently done a splendid job in an office where there should have been twenty officers instead of two. Early in November I was about to see Captain Smith and advise that he get some help for Layton and Hudson as they were both worn down and appeared ready to crack up. But I hesitated, wondering why should I have to advise Cinpac on the adequacy of his force. It should have been obvious to any Commander that Intelligence at such a time was his most vital issue. I decided not to approach Smith, because I found that Intelligence was not receiving its proper recognition.

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One of the contributing factors to 7 December was the reluctance of Admiral Kimmell to assume his prerogatives and tell the Commandant to carry out directives or some one else would be obtained to do the job. The possibilities of an unpleasant situation should have been readily apparent to the Department when a former Commander-in-Chief is put under a younger man. Petty jealousies are bound to be present and these grow into opposition. A typical indication was one incident which I observed closely. When I arrived in Honolulu in November, 1940 to take command of the Salt Lake City I was asked to assist in a survey of the District Intelligence Office which was initiated by the Commander-in-Chief. It was learned then that recommendations had been blocked and that the office was of little value.

This survey included immediate and extensive recommendations, including trained personnel to be taken from my old 11th District to build up the 14th as quickly as possible.

The next day, after telling Admiral Bloch the security we enjoyed in the 11th and indicating the complete lack here he approved all steps to remedy the situation. Accordingly, the personnel arrived and expansion, planning and training were rapid. During the course of a subsequent survey to outline faults in the District, the report or digest was brought to the attention of Admiral Bloch. This survey was made by an officer who was working for the Commander-in-Chief and also helping the District. At the sight of this critical survey coming from the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Bloch gave vent to his wrath and Intelligence activities sufferred for quite a time.

The skepticism of the Commandant regarding necessity for security was also typical from a remark once made during security efforts, "Bring me a Japanese spy. I've never seen one and would like to see one". His yard was full of them.

On 16 September, 1941, in a letter to Admiral Stark, I stated, "It is gratifying to see that there is a possibility of resolving the Japanese situation, but we must not relax until they have given concrete demonstrations of sincerity".

All of the foregoing is simply to indicate the possibility of qualified personnal accurately estimating the situation, and the distressing fact that nothing was done about it.

I am now concerned because of another situation which is growing in seriousness and proportions. Rumors are increasing and I find not only the morale of civilians falling lower and lower but also that of Naval Officers. This is a typical

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fifth column technique and it must be stopped. It not only softens up our own people but it is throwing the second generation Japanese into the laps of enemy agents, many of whom are still not in custody. I used to be most optimistic about the Japanese never returning here for another raid, but the persistence of the present situation, which they will learn about soon enough, will be an invitation to them to return. This situation can be corrected somewhat by strong "offensive" pronouncements but not by "defensive" ones, and by punative action against rumor mongers. I found one woman frantically engaging passage because an Army man told her how terrible the gas attack would be when it came. Someone is spreading a rumor that there is to be a Japanese fleet attack on April 14th. I am now trying to trace the source of some rumors. Rumors are sometimes started to enhance the position of an individual or organization.

Apparently, on the West Coast they are undecided how to handle the Japanese situation. Here, where it is much more difficult, I find that little or nothing is being done. Make no mistake about it, the proper handling of this situation requires two qualifications: first, highly professional Intelligence activities, and second, a thorough knowledge of the Japanese people. The Army in Hawaii has no one qualified to handle either. I know what they have and what they are capable of doing. It makes no difference who does the job as long as it is done efficiently and thoroughly. But I venture to make the flat statement that little or no results have been received on cases turned over to them by the 14th Naval District. I find that the numerous Japanese amateur operators have only been admonished by letter only not to operate. Adequate searches have not been made. Known suspects have not been taken into custody. Strategic locations are still endangered by the presence of enemy aliens. The problem can be solved in forty-five days by qualified personnel and Intelligent action.

In my long interview with General Emmons, I was impressed with his incompetence. He appeared to have no thoughts of his own. He gave as the reason for continuing the Japanese newspapers that they were necessary for the morale of the enemy aliens. At the same time, the Army has assembled all the second generation Japanese into one battalion of the Territorial Guard and have disbanded it. The selectees have been disarmed and put into labor battalions. This action will have the effect of sending these

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boys slinking home and into the laps of enemy agents. It is most serious. There are sensible solutions to all these problems which certain of us have worked out, but it is inadvisable to let incompetent hands take on pre-prejudiced solutions.

After my interview with General Emmons, I searched for the reasons for what seemed like an undue influence upon him. Yesterday I think I discovered the answer. I was told that one of his principal advisors on Island and Japanese matters is General Wells, a highly paid official, of one of the large local industries whose objectives are still "maintenance of the status quo".

At the present time the Army is endeavoring to take over control of the Intelligence Organization in Hawaii. Under those conditions the Commander-in-Chief would be tying his own hands voluntarily. Their past and present training and performances in no way qualifies them for the work. I know their capabilities and what they have because it was I who for many years, tried to have them implemented on the West Coast, but the War Department invariably replied, "No action will be taken until M day". As a result they "had not a single trained Intelligence man with which to start an organization". The quotations are from General Miles, the head of G-2.

The Naval Intelligence Organization of the 14th District has been built up and trained through the intensive effort of two excellent officers with years of experience behind them. Through their knowledge, excellent personnel have been enrolled and trained and I am safe in saying that in spite of obstructions which should have been help, this organization is so far superior to the Army and M.I.D. for Intelligence work that there is no comparison.

Conclusion

Hawaii, as a defense outpost of the United States, is of value solely as a safe base for the Fleet. The protection of it provides the only excuse for the existence of the Army. An offensive attitude is a requisite to that defense. This offensive attitude does not exist. Under the present state of administration, the influences at work, and the degenerating morale, I cannot escape the feeling that unless firm action is taken we are approaching a situation which might result in something worse than that of 7 December. (It has always been my considered opinion for a long time that because of the racial situation the Hawaiian Islands will eventually require a military government. Its purposes dictate that it should be a Naval military government, therefore now is the time to start it.)

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Recommendation

That the Commander-in-Chief, as Military Commander, exercise his function as Military Governor and take command of all activities that the administration of martial law be delegated to a Deputy, as at present, if such administration has been satisfactory, and that the Intelligence Organization be centered under the Commander-in-Chief, in order to insure the security of the Fleet and the Fleet Base.

That power of arrest be extended to special agents of the Naval Intelligence Organization. (The most vitally interested agency but the only government agency not having the power.)

That the security of the Naval District and the Navy Yard be incorporated under a competent head (The present security officer, Victor Houston, was recently removed from the Police Commission and it is inconceivable that he should be in a position to hamper Naval security.

E. M. LACH JAS.

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"The American Commander-in-Chief has been occupied by various secret plans but the three points which he is the most concerned are:

(1) Will a Japanese fast STRIKING FORCE made up of cruisers and aircraft carriers come on a scouting or striking mission?

(2) Will Japanese submarines hover near the Islands to attach or harass the Fleet?

(3) Will a Japanese Expeditionary force be sent overseas?

The first of these is the most fearsome. Suppose Japan were to form a fast striking force composed of such speedy battleships (whose speed America cannot match) as the HARUNA, KONGO and KIRISHIMA, the aircraft carriers AKAGI and HIYUJO, and the MACHI class of heavy cruisers? This would be a fast-stepping force that would be truly matchless and invincible!! Were they opposed to even the large guns of American battleships, they could utilize their superior speeds, thus leaving their slow adversaries behind. If opposed to a cruiser force they could close in and with telling blows crush the opposition. Truly, this would be a peerless force; able to close to battle, or open out, if out gunned! If this Fast Striking Force should meet misfortune, losing one or two fast battleships or aircraft carriers, they would surely be a severe blow to Japan and we would have to grit our teeth, smothering our rage until the day of a decisive Main Engagement to obtain our revenge!

Maybe such a bold venture would be too great a risk, who can say? On the other hand, warfare is a risk and he who hesitates, or fears the risks of bold venture, cannot wage war! Moreover, an attack off Hawaii would be the first battle of the Pacific War and if in the very first engagement one can wrest the courage away from the enemy by ones own daring, it would put him in a funk or give him the jitters." ---

Excerpt from "WHEN JAPAN FIGHTS" by Mr. Wacmaku Hirata.

Washington, D. C.
July 10, 1942

I have read the Personal and Confidential report of Captain E. M. Zacharias, U.S.N., as a memorandum for Admiral Draemel, dated March 17, 1942, and desire to state that the remarks relating to me and the outline given to me as indicated therein is exact and correct in detail.

In addition he suggested that the attack would conform to their historical procedure, that of hitting before war was declared.

Curtis B. Munson

Pertinent extracts from above report,

"About that same time Mr. Munson, a representative from Washington, (believed to be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from Opnav to "open everything to him", sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my opinion as to what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast. After outlining to him my firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a weekend and probably Sunday morning, with all the reasons therefor, and I then stated, "you now have two envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can look for it to break immediately, one way or the other". This envoy arrived in Washington about 2 December 1941."

EXHIBIT NO. 142

MATERIAL RELATING TO "WINDS" CODE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

From: Tokyo 1 (a)
To: Washington
19 November 1941
Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.[1]

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI[2]

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.[3]

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[1] East wind rain.
[2] North wind cloudy.
[3] West wind clear.

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement .

Forward as urgent intelligence.

(Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)

25432 JD-1: 6875

I (b)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
Circular #2354

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI".
(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".
(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.); "NISHI".

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.

(Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

25392 JD-1: 6850

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[1]

1 (c)
Top Secret

28 November 1941
From: CINCAF
Action: OPNAV
Info: COMSIXTEEN CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN 28143Ø

Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Signapore X If diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed following words repeated five times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts will have significance as follows X Higashi Higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and Nei XX on Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be used XX America Higashi no Kaze Kumori XX England X Nishi no Kaze hare X Unquote X British and COMSIXTEEN monitoring above broadcasts

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1 (d)

Telegram Received

BF. This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC).

---------- Batavia
From: Dated December 4, 1941
Rec'd. 9: 19 a. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

220, December 4, 10 a. m.

War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following from Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo:

"When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather reports: one east wind rain war with United States, two north wind cloudy war with Russia, three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice burn codes and secret papers."

Same re following from Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General Batavia:

"When threat of crises exists following will be used five times in texts of general reports and radio broadcasts: one Higashi east America, two Kita North Russia, three Nishi west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack on Malaya and Dutch Indies."

Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since 1936.

FOOTE.

HSM

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1 (e)

From: ALUSNA BATAVIA
Date: 5 DEC 1941
Decoded by: KALAIDJIAN
Paraphrased by: PURDY
Ø31Ø3Ø CRØ222

OPNAV RRRRR

From Thorpe for miles War Dept. Code intercept:—Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain XXXXXX United States: north wind cloudy Russia: west wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

(Signature illegible)

Distribution:
War. Dept. Action Files: CNO 2ØOP 2ØA Record Copy: 2ØC X Show OPDO Top Secret

Secret

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2 (a)

Naval Message
Message
From OPNAV
Released by: L. F. Safford

Navy Department
Precedence: Priority XXXX

Com 14
Com 16

Date
TOR CODE ROOM: 2548
CINCAF
CINCPAC
282301

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

New Tokyo broadcast schedules as follows X Jig victor jig one two two seven five kc six pm and seven pm to Pacific Coast six thirty pm to Western Hemisphere X Jig hypo love five one six zero kc eight pm nine pm and ten pm to China coast X Jig unit option nine four three zero kc six thirty pm to Western Hemisphere X Jig hypo prep one one nine eight zero kc ten thirty pm to Europe X Probably Tokyo time.

Top Secret—Ultra
Secret

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2 (b)

1 December 1941
From:
Action: CINCAF
Info: CINCPAC, OPNAV, COMFOURTEEN
Ø11422

Top secret

Jig victor jig press tonight in closing seventeen hundred schedule stated quote "All listeners be sure and listen in at zero seven zero zero and zero seven thirty tomorrow morning, since thehe may be important news" unquote XX Suggest frequencies seven three two seven X nine four three zero X and one two two seven five X times Tokyo lct.

2 (c)
Sent No. 519, 12/5 Secret

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,
G2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii:

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

MILES.

Top Secret Secret

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., August 18, 1944.

I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as follows:

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather messages which Major Wesley T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such message was intercepted. This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT.

Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been unable to contact Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood, 20–G, Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.

Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941, which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p. m. EST, December 5, 1941.

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG 4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the Romaji version of these messages.

on file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August, 1944.

[SEAL] T. J. SLOWIE,
Secretary.

Top Secret

3 (a)

DOCUMENT NO. 1

GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN
GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND
GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP
GROUPS REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND AT END OF BROADCAST

The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. Guest requested the Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941.

3 (b)

Secret

DOCUMENT No. 2

TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE WEATHER
KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS
CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM

Weather message from station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941.

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3 (c)
Secret

DOCUMENT No. 3

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM SOUTH. (repeated 3 times)
Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2130 gmt December 5, 1941.

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3 (d)
Secret

DOCUMENT No. 4

English	*Romaji*
This is in the middle of the news but today, specially at this point I will give the weather forecast:	Nyusu no tochu de gozaimasu ga honjitsu wa toku ni koko de tenki yoho wo moshiage masu
WEST WIND, CLEAR	NISHI NO KAZE HARE
WEST WIND, CLEAR	NISHI NO KAZE HARE
This is in the middle of the news but today, at this point specially I will give the weather forecast:	Nyusu no tochu de gozaimasu ga kyo wa koko de toku ni tenki yoho wo moshiage masu
WEST WIND, CLEAR	NISHI NO KAZE HARE
WEST WIND, CLEAR	NISHI NO KAZE HARE

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ transmitted by them between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941.

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4 (a)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., Room 4D761, the Pentagon, 3 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell:

Pursuant to your request the War Department directed General MacArthur's Headquarters to make inquiries in Japan concerning the Winds Code.

Attached are unparaphrased copies of the cables exchanged between the War Department and General MacArthur.

HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Colonel, GSC.

Incl.

4 (c)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 6, 1945.

DEAR MR. MITCHELL: In compliance with your request of December 3, 1945, I enclose a paraphrase of our cable of November 6, 1945 to London, the Hague and Canberra inquiring about the "winds" message.

My letter of yesterday advised you of the answers we have received from London and the Hague.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Herbert S. Marks,
/t/ HERBERT S. MARKS,
Assistant to the Under Secretary.

Enclosure:
Paraphrased cable.

The Honorable WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel,*
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.

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30 OCTOBER 1945.

GSB 168
From: War Department
To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo

On 19 Nov 1941 Japanese Foreign Office advised its representatives abroad that in case diplomatic relations with United States, Great Britain or Russia were about to be severed a certain signal in form of false weather report would be broadcast in news message and that all code papers were then to be destroyed. Signal was to be "Higashi No Kaze Ame" (east wind rain) in case of break between Japan and United States, "Kitano Kaze Kumori" (north wind cloudy) in case of break between Japan and Russia and "Nishi No Kaze Hare" (west wind clear) in case of break between Japan and Great Britain. Congressional committee investigating Pearl Harbor attack has requested that Japanese records and authorities be examined to ascertain whether any signal implementing this or any similar code was in fact transmitted on or prior to 7 Dec and if so exact time and manner or transmittal. Inconclusive evidence available here suggests such signal may have been transmitted on or about 4 Dec. Request that all reasonable steps be taken to obtain such information and that this request and resulting information receive no publicity.

---

3 NOVEMBER 1945.

BSG 187
From: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo
To: War Department

GSB 168 dated 31 Oct investigation has been initiated and results thereof will be communicated at the earliest practicable date. Progress in work of this kind is of necessity somewhat slow. However, every effort will be made to expedite it. Necessary steps have been taken to avoid publicity.

GSB 180 6 NOVEMBER 1941.
From: War Department.
To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo.

Supplementing GSB 168 there follows full Japanese text of two circulars from Tokyo Foreign Office dated 19 Nov 1941:

Circular 2353. Kanchoo fugoo atsukai kokusai jigyoo no hippaku no kekka itsu saiaku no jitai ni tachi itaru kamo hakararezaru tokoro kakaru baai wagahoo to aitekoku tono tsuushin wa tadachi ni teishi serarubeki wo motte wagahoo no gaikoo kankei kiken ni hinsuru baai ni wa waga kaigai

hoosoo no kakuchi muke nihohoo news no chuukan oyobi saigo ni oite tenki yohoo to shite. 1. Nichibei kankei no baai ni wa "higashi no kaze ame". 2. Nichiso kankei no baai ni wa "kita no kaze kumori". 3. Nichiei kankei no baai ("tai" shinchuu "maree" Netherlands E. I. kooryoku oboe fukumu ("nishi no kaze hare". 02 do zutsu kurikaeshi hoosoo seshimeru koto to seru wo motte migi ni yori angoo, shorui too tekitoo shobun aritashi. Nao migi wa gen ni gokuhi atsukai to seraretashi.

Circular 2354: Gokuhi. Wagahoo no gaikoo kankai kiken ni hinsen to suru baai ni wa ippah joohoo hoosoo no bootoo oyobi matsubi ni: 1. Nichibei kankei hippaku no baai ni wa "higashi". 2. Nichiso kankei no baai niwa "kita". 3. Nichei kankei ("tai" shin chuu "maree" Netherlands E. I. kooryoku oboe fukumu (no baai mi wa "nishi". Narugo 05 do ate soonyuu subeki ni tsuki goryoochi aritashi.

Both messages sent in _____[1] Believe broadcasts mentioned for signalling in circular 2353 were voice broadcasts and those in 2354 were Morse code.

[1] Code designation omitted.

BSG 196 13 NOVEMBER 1945.
From: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo.
To: War Department.

Reference message 1 November requiring search of Jap records and interrogation of authorities to ascertain whether an implementing signal to circulars 2353 and 2354 (see GSB 180) Tokyo Foreign Office 19 November 1941 was ever transmitted. Investigation discloses that all pertinent records were burned prior to emperor's rescript of 14 August 1945. Interrogation of authorities so far has resulted in absolute denial of transmission of such an implementing message and existence of any prearranged instructions which would permit transmission of such an implementing signal. It would help the investigation if pertinent authorities could be confronted with circulars 2353 and 2354. This has not been done before in order to avoid disclosing to the Japanese the fact that we had this info. Investigation will be continued but without much prospect of success unless appropriate authorities can be confronted with circulars mentioned.

GSB 186 13 NOVEMBER 1945.
From: War Department.
To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo.

Reference BSG 196 you are authorized to confront Japanese officials with copies of circulars 2353 and 2354 but without disclosing when or by what means they were obtained.

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21 NOVEMBER 1945.
BSG 210
From: Commander-inChief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo.
To: War Department

In reply to radiogram 31 October 1945, GSB–168, the results of interrogation of number of employees have indicated that signal implementing circular 2353 and 2354, was probably not transmitted prior to 8 December, Tokyo time, but was transmitted by radio voice broadcast at some hour after 0230, 8 December, Tokyo time. Exact hour unknown. No evidence can be obtained that implementing signal was transmitted by radio telegraph. 1 employee, now in Tokyo, states that he received radio voice broadcast signal in Rangoon at 0930, 8 December, Tokyo time (0630 Rangoon time). No info has been obtained that any signal implementing similar code was transmitted.

As stated in my message number BSG–196, the burning of pertinent records prior to Emperor's rescript of 14 August 1945 precluded obtaining info on this subject from that source.

Furthermore, individuals who were in authority at time under consideration admitted nothing until they were confronted with circulars 2353 and 2354 of Tokyo Foreign Office, 19 November 1941, pursuant to authority contained in your GSB–186.

These employees did not learn when or by what means these circulars were obtained.

Further investigation here appears unprofitable. Request authority to discontinue it.

24 NOVEMBER 1945.

GSB 196
From: War Department
To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo

Reference BSG 210. Only use of Winds code (either voice or radio telegraph) shown here by available contemporaneous records is voice broadcast from Tokyo between 0902 and 0935 on 8 December Tokyo time using code words referring to British Japanese relations. In order to assist in evaluating information given in your BSG 210, Joint Congressional Pearl Harbor Committee desires to know first whether persons who conducted interrogation or those who were interrogated had any knowledge that prior to the interrogation of the United States had information establishing use of Winds code on 8 December Tokyo time, and, secondly, if such persons did have such knowledge, whether they knew that the United States had no definite information establishing use of Winds code at any time prior to 8 December Tokyo time. Prompt reply will be appreciated.

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27 NOVEMBER 1945.

BSG 214
From: Commander-in-Chief Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo
To: War Department

Reur GSB–196 persons who conducted interrogation had no knowledge that prior to interrogation United States had info establishing use of Winds code on 8 Dec Tokyo time. Persons who were interrogated were not asked whether they knew that United States had info establishing use of Winds code on 8 Dec Tokyo time. Also, interrogated persons were not asked whether they knew that United States had no info establishing use of the Winds code at any time prior to 8 Dec Tokyo time. They will be questioned on these points at once and answers provided. Employee referred to in my BSG–210 who stated that he received voice broadcast signaling Rangoon at 0930, 8 Dec Tokyo time (0630 Rangoon time) may have meant that he received code words referring to British-Jap relations. He will be questioned again. This partial reply is made now and full reply will be forwarded as promptly as employees can again be found for questioning.

---

27 NOVEMBER 1945.

GSB 197
From: War Department
To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo.

Information supplied in BSG 214 is believed sufficient answer to Committee's question, which was directed towards prior knowledge of interrogators and whether anything had developed in the interrogation which would indicate such prior knowledge on the part of Japanese. It seems clear from your BSG 214 that there was no such indication. Please confirm this.

It is requested that no further interrogation on this point be conducted unless Congressional Committee indicates desire to press inquiry further, in which event you will be advised.

Further interrogation of employee referred to in BSG 210 to ascertain whether broadcast heard in Rangoon used code words referring only to British-Japanese relations would be helpful. Other wise you may consider interrogation completed.

---

30 NOVEMBER 1945.

BSG 219
From: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo
To: War Department

Reur GSB 197 nothing developed during interrogation which indicated on part of Japanese prior knowledge of character stated in your GSB 197.

Employee who heard Rangoon broadcast states he does not recall code words heard but believes they referred to severance of British-Jap relations. This resulted from further questioning of this employee and without prompting as to character of answer given.

4b

U. S. NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION TO JAPAN

Interrogation No. 11.

Place: FLTLOSCAP
Date: 30 November 1945

Subject: Radio Tokyo Broadcast December 8.
Personnel Interrogated: Mr. Shinroku Tanomogi, Head of Overseas Department of Japan Radio Broadcasting Corporation in December 1941; presently member of the Diet and secretary to the Minister of Transportation.
Interrogator: Captain Peyton Harrison, USNR.
Interpreter: Lt. (jg) Stanley E. Sprague, USNR.
Summary:

Mr. Tanomogi, as head of the Overseas Department, was in charge of programs, including news programs, beamed to foreign countries. All news releases were controlled or "censored" by the Information Bureau of the Cabinet, the Communications Bureau of the Communications Ministry, and the General Staff.

Mr. Tanomogi was usually on duty at Radio Tokyo every other night. He was on duty the night of December 7 (Tokyo Time) and stated that the regular schedule of programs was broadcast. At about 0400 on December 8, he received a telephone call from the Information Bureau informing him that Japan was at war and that scheduled programs would have to be rearranged and preparations made for broadcasting important government communiques. An official of the Information Bureau arrived at Radio Tokyo early on the morning of December 8 to work out details with Tanomogi's staff. Tanomogi remained at Radio Tokyo until about 1800 of December 8. He stated that they broadcast only what was given them by Domei News or by the Information Bureau. "All news was official government news".

Mr. Tanomogi was asked if he remembered the "east wind rain" weather report broadcast about 1500 on December 8. He replied that he was not listening to the broadcasts at that particular hour, but that he had a vague recollection of some such announcement being broadcast among the releases abruptly ordered for transmission that day by the Information Bureau.

Mr. Tanomogi was handed a copy of Drew Pearson's article in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin of November 9, 1945. He stated that he would have known of it if a message such as that described as being broadcast December 4 had been transmitted and that he had no recollection at all of any "east wind rain" report or any similar phrase being broadcast prior to December 8.

PARAPHRASE OF INCOMING TELEGRAM

To: London, the Hague and Canberra, November 6, 1945.
From: Secretary Byrnes

The Congressional Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack has sent to the Department a communication of which the essential portion is quoted below:

"Under date of November 19, 1941, Japan advised its representatives abroad that if danger arose of a breach of diplomatic relations with the United States, or Russia or the British, and the cutting off of other means of international communications, an emergency system for warning Japanese diplomatic representatives of impending break in diplomatic relations would be used, by adding in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast the following:

"(1) In case Japan-United States relations were in danger, the words Higashi No Kazeame (East Wind Rain).

"(2) In case of Japan-Russian relations in danger, the words Kitanokaze Kumori (North Wind Cloudy).

"(3) In case Japan-British relations in danger, the words Nishi No Kaze Hare (West Wind Clear).

this signal to be given in the middle and at the end of the broadcast as a weather forecast, 'each sentence to be repeated twice'. This arrangement also said, 'When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc.'

"At the same time, on November 19, 1941, the Japanese sent further notice to its representatives that when their diplomatic relations with the United States, Russia or the British were in danger, there would be added at the beginning and at the end of Japanese general intelligence broadcasts words as follows:

"(1) If it were Japan-United States relations, the word 'Higashi'.
"(2) If it were Japan-Russia relations, the word 'Kita'.
"(3) If it were Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malaya, and Nei), the word 'Nishi'.

these words to be repeated five times at the beginning and end of the broadcast.

"The Joint Congressional Committee Investigating the Attack on Pearl Harbor of December 7, 1941 are tryinv to ascertain whether any broadcast under this system were monitored and overheard, either by the United States or by Australia, the Dutch East Indies or the British, and, if so, on what day and at what time such a broadcast was overheard, and if so the text of the broadcast, and whether either of the three nations mentioned, having overheard the broadcast, advised the United States of the fact. We are particularly interested in the period from November 27th to December 7th inclusive, and suggest that the inquiry first cover that period and then, if time permits, work back to November 19, 1941."

You are requested urgently to inquire of the government to which you are accredited concerning the above and at the earliest possible moment to telegraph a report of the results.

---

4 (d)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 29, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. MITCHELL: I am enclosing as requested by your office a paraphrase of the cable from Canberra which was referred to in my letter of November 26.

Sincerely yours,

(S) Herbert S. Marks
(T) HERBERT S. MARKS,
Assistant to the Under Secretary.

Enclosure: Paraphrase of cable from Canberra.

The Honorable WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel,*
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.

Paraphrased copy

CANBERRA, *November 16, 1945.*

SECRETARY OF STATE, *Washington,*
168, November 16, 3 p. m.

Nothing has been revealed by an exhaustive search of the records of the monitoring service according to the Department of External Affairs. It is stated however that they may have missed certain messages in code as at that time trends only were followed and Japanese broadcasts were not taken down verbatim by the monitoring service.

MINTER.

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4 (e)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 5, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. MITCHELL: I enclose a paraphrased cable dated December 4, 1945, just received from London in reply to our inquiry of November 6 as to whether the British had monitored and overheard any Japanese broadcasts using the so-called "winds" code between November 19 and December 7, 1941.

As to the Netherlands, the Counselor of the American Embassy at The Hague advised us by telephone this morning that the Dutch Foreign Office has now stated in reply to our inquiry of November 6, that the most careful search has had negative results.

Sincerely yours,

(S) Herbert S. Marks
(T) HERBERT S. MARKS,
Assistant to the Under Secretary.

Enclosure: Paraphrased cable.

The Honorable WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel,*
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.

PARAPHRASING OF INCOMING TELEGRAM

To: Secretary of State, December 4, 1945
From: American Ambassador, London

The Foreign Office has just informed us that while their inquiries are not yet finished, up to the present no evidence has been found that any "wind" message was received before the morning of December 8, 1941, the day following the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Foreign Office says that there was relayed to Singapore from Hongkong a broadcast by the Japanese which contained messages in code and which was received in Singapore six hours following the attack on Pearl Harbor. The text of the Japanese code is not available yet but if desired we will ask the Foreign Office for more particulars.

The following messages appearing on the indicated pages of Committee Exhibit 1 deal with instructions sent in code via ordinary commercial channels of communication, to Japanese representatives to destroy their codes:

Enclosure (A)

6 (A)

Top Secret—Ultra

8 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subj: JD–1: 7001, special studies concerning

1. In an effort to locate JD–1: 7001 the following sources have been exhaustively studied:

a. numerical file of JD–1 #'s.
b. chronological file of Japanese Diplomatic translations.
c. the "Japanese diplomatic traffic log" for 1941.
d. old GZ card index of Japanese diplomatic traffic, under Tokyo circulars and Tokyo-Washington circuit.

2. A special study of Jd–1 #'s was made to determine the relationship between the date of the message, the date of translation of the message, and the JD–1 #. The results of this study are attached to this memo.

3. From this study it would appear that JD–1: 7001, if such number was assigned to a translation, was for a message dated 28 November 1941, translated on either 12–2–41 or 12–3–41 by the Army. As all of the JD–1 #'s on both sides of JD–1: 7001 were translated on either 2 December 1941 it seems reasonably certain that the message was dated on or prior to 3 December 1941.

4. Throughout the JD–1 numerical file there are incidents of cancelled numbers. The reasons for some of these cancellations are not given: others are given as follows: "duplicate of message previously numbered", "additional part of message already assigned a number", and "number skipped by mistake".

5. In October 1944 and on 14 May 1945 Lieut. Comdr. G. E. Boone called Col. Rowlett at Arlington Hall and secured from him the following information concerning the Army numbering system in 1941: Occasionally numbers were cancelled, but there was no indication given of the reason for the cancellation, by whom it was made, nor by whom it was authorized. He stated that there were other cases of numbers cancelled in the 1941 file.

/s/ Sally T. Lightle,
/t/ SALLY T. LIGHTLE,
Lieut., USNR.

Enclosure with Op–20–G Top Secret—Ultra Serial 00036(20

Study of JD–1 #'s to determine relationship between date of message, date of translation, and JD–1 #

JD–1#	Date of message	Date of translation	Army or Navy trans.
6975	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N
6976	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N
6977	29 Nov 1941	12-1-41	N
6978	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N
6979	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N
6980	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N
6981	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N
6982	30 Nov 1941	12 2-41	A
6983	1 Dec 1941	12-1-41	N
6984	1 Dec 1941	12-1-41	N
6985	27 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N
6986	9 Oct 1941	12-3-41	N
I 6987	11 Oct 1941	12-2-41	N
6988	25 Oct 1941	12-3-41	N
6989	12 Nov 1941	12-3-41	A
6990	12 Nov 1941	12-3-41	A
6991	15 Nov 1941	12-3-41	N
6992	15 Nov 1941	12-3-41	N
6993	15 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N
6994	15 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N
6995	18 Nov 1941	12-3-41	A
6996	20 Nov 1941	12-3-41	A
6997	21 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N
6998	22 Nov 1941	12-2-41	A
6999	27 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N
7000	28 Nov 1941	12-3-41	A
7001			
7002	28 Nov 1941	12-3-41	A
7003	28 Nov 1941	12-2-41	A
7004	28 Nov 1941	12-3-41	A
7005	28 Nov 1941	12-3-41	A
7006	29 Nov 1941	12-3-41	N
7007	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N
7008	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N
7009	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N
7010	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N
7011	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N
7012	1 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N
7013	1 Dec 1941	12-2-41	N
7014	2 Dec 1941	12-3-41	A
7015	2 Dec 1941	12-3-41	A
7016	3 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N
7017	2 Dec 1941	12-3-41	A [1] N
7018	3 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N
7019	3 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N
7020	3 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N
7021	2 Dec 1941	12-3-41	A
III 7022	2 Oct 1941	12-4-41	A
7023	2 Oct 1941	12-4-41	A
7024	20 Oct 1941	12-4-41	A
7025	25 Oct 1941	12-3-41	N
7026	7 Nov 1941	12-4-41	N
7027	10 Nov 1941	12-4-41	A
7028	15 Nov 1941	12-3-41	N
7029	20 Nov 1941	12-4-41	A
7030	21 Nov 1941	12-3-41	N
7031	21 Nov 1941	12-3-41	N
7032	24 Nov 1941	12-4-41	A
7033	24 Nov 1941	12-4-41	A
7034	25 Nov 1941	12-4-41	N
7035	25 Nov 1941	12-4-41	N
7036	25 Nov 1941	12-4-41	N
7037	29 Nov 1941	12-4-41	N
7038	29 Nov 1941	12-3-41	N
7039	29 Nov 1941	12-3-41	N
7040	1 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7041	1 Dec 1941	12-4-41 Pt. 1.3	N
7042	1 Dec 1941	12-5-41 Pt. 2 12-4-41	N N
7043	1 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N
7044	1 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N
7045	1 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N
7046	2 Dec 1941	12-4-41	A
7047	2 Dec 1941	12-4-41	A
7048	3 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N
7049	3 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7050	3 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7051	3 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7052	3 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7053	3 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7054	1 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7055	1 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7056	1 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7057	3 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7058	2 Dec 1941	12-5-41	A
7059	2 Dec 1941	12-4-41	A
IV 7060	18 Oct 1941	12-5-41	A
7061	10 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7062	15 Nov 1941	12-4-41	N
7063	18 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7064	18 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7065	18 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A

[1] Revision.

Study of JD-1 #'s to determine relationship between date of message, date of translation, and JD-1 #—Continued

JD-1#	Date of message	Date of translation	Army or Navy trans.
7066	18 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7067	20 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7068	20 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7069	22 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7070	24 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7071	25 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N
7072	25 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N
7073	25 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N
7074	25 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N
7075	25 Nov 1941	12-4-41	N
7076	26 Nov 1941	12-4-41	A
7077	26 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7078	26 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N
7079	27 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N
7080	27 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N
7081	27 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N
7082	27 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N
7083	28 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7084	28 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7085	28 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7086	29 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N
7087	29 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N
7088	30 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7089	30 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7090	1 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N
7091	1 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N
7092	1 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7093	1 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N
7094	2 Dec 1941	12-4-41	A
7095	3 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N
7096	3 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N
7097	3 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7098	3 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N
7099	3 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N
7100	3 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N
7101	4 Dec 1941	12-4-41	A
7102	4 Dec 1941	12-5-41	A
7103	4 Dec 1941	12-5-41	A
7104	4 Dec 1941	12-5-41	A
7105	4 Dec 1941	12-4-41	A
7106	4 Dec 1941	12-5-41	A
7107	4 Dec 1941	12-5-41	A
7108	4 Dec 1941	(no date given)	A
7109	27 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N
V 7110	18 Nov 1941	12-6-41	A
7111	18 Nov 1941	12-6-41	A
7112	18 Nov 1941	12-6-41	A
7113	20 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7114	20 Nov 1941	12-6-41	A
7115	26 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7116	26 Nov 1941	12-6-41	A
7117	26 Nov 1941	12-6-41	A
7118	26 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7119	27 Nov 1941	12-6-41	N
7120	28 Nov 1941	12-6-41	A
7121	28 Nov 1941	12-6-41	A
7122	2 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N
7123	3 Dec 1941	12-6-41	N
7124	2 Dec 1941	12-7-41	A
7125	2 Dec 1941	12-6-41	A
7126	3 Dec 1941	12-7-41	A

6 (b)

Top Secret–Ultra

EXAMPLES OF JD-1 #'S CANCELLED AND JD-1: 6998–7004

INDEX

JD-1 #	Date	Circuit
911	Cancelled	
985	Cancelled	
1004	Cancelled	
2874	Cancelled	
4647	Cancelled	
6998	22 Nov 1941	Batavia-Tokyo.
6999	27 Nov 1941	Rome-Tokyo.
7000	28 Nov 1941	Tokyo-Hsinking.
7001	Cancelled	
7002	28 Nov 1941	Buenos Aires-Washington.
7003	28 Nov 1941	Rome-Tokyo.
7004	28 Nov 1941	Hsinking-Peking, Nanking and Shanghai.

Top Secret—Ultra
(All handwritten:)
Cancelled
Dupl. of 957
911 Cancelled HSH 2/20/41

(All handwritten:)
Top Secret—Ultra
Number Cancelled
Part 3 of 3
Bangkok-Tokyo=8 Feb. 1941 #92
(See JD-1: 971)
985

Top Secret—Ultra
(All handwritten:)
Cancelled=
Part 2 of 957
1004= HSH 2/20/41

(All handwritten)
Top Secret—Ultra
Number skipped in error (Cancel)
2074 HSH

(All handwritten)
Top Secret—Ultra
Cancelled
Cancelled by Army after being numbered. HSH
4647

Secret
Top Secret—Ultra
From: Batavia (Isizawa)
To: Tokyo
November 22, 1941
Purple.
#1253.

To be handled in Government Code.
Departmental secret.

The activities of KOO CHOO SUI, backed up by the CHI GOO KAI and the KOO HOO (an intelligence society and a publication), is working hard in our behalf to stamp out anti-Japanism. Several incidents have occurred lately and his opponents are rather belligerent. Consequently, Governmental surveillance over KOO is rather close. From April to September of this year we afforded KOO a subsidy for the KOO HOO and a fund for collecting intelligence, amounting to from 2,000 to 3,000 guilders. KOO is so familiar with the Chinese and natives here that in case of emergency he can do much to help us. That is why I have employed him so far. He is ready at our direction to start the distribution of pamphlets designed to win over as many of his consanguinaries and the natives as possible. I think that we should continue to avail ourselves of his services. He has a family of eight. Therefore, I think we should let him have 3,000 guilders for operating expenses; 15,000 guilders for living expenses, and 12,000 guilders as a subsidy for the KOO HOO as of from October 1st to the end of the year. Will you please, therefore, arrange to appropriate and remit that amount, namely 30,000 guilders.

Army 25633 6998 Trans. 12-2-41 (6)

Top Secret—Ultra

From: Rome.
To: Tokyo.
27 November 1941
(Purple)
?
(*1st section*—undecodeable)
(*2nd Section*)

Although supply movements are beset with difficulties, including occasional sinkings of convoys, these supplies are continuing and they are optimistic of the final outcome.[1] Furthermore * * * (Remainder of section 2 undecodeable)
(*3rd section*)

As regards Italian-French relations, up to now independent conversations between the French and Italians have not taken place. However, with the elimination of Weygand it is being said in various quarters that a great increase in use of Tunis army transportation facilities is contemplated.
JD–1: 6999 Secret (M) Navy Trans. 12–2–41 (G–TT)

[*1*] Secret
Top Secret—Ultra
From: Tokyo
To: Hsinking
November 28, 1941.
Purple.
#782 (corrected to #882).
Re your #751.*

1. We have been communicating with the German representatives here, giving them much of the Manchukuoan opinions and, as a result of a talk between OTAKI and WOHLTHAT, the final draft for a new German-Manchukuan pact is proposed by Germany as follows:

(a) The title of the pact is "A provisional agreement for extending German-Manchukuoan economic Relations."

(b) This pact is effective until the last day of March next year.

(c) The balance of 85,000 tons of soy beans shall be delivered before the end of March at the old price although the agreement expires the end of January.

(d) 4,500 tons of soy bean oil, including the undelivered balance on the contract for jimson, shall also be delivered by the end of March.

(e) Exchange permits shall be given for the unused balance of German contingent goods specified in the pact of May 31, 1941. (Minister WAGNER must have a list of about one million marks' worth of goods in Japan, Manchukuo, Shanghai and other Far Eastern points.)

(f) Export permits shall be gine for German goods which are now held or may in the future be held in Manchukuo at the convenience of the holders. If a state of emergency should arise, this goods shall not be confiscated nor seized. The above should be administered on a rational basis.

[*2*] (g) The application of this contract will be acted on by specified conferences of local tradesmen.

(h) The term for repayment of the "W" account shall be extended to May 31, 1942. However, this understanding shall be made directly with the bank at the same time the pact is set up; it will not be mentioned in the pact.

(i) 1,000,000 marks shall be appropriated at the end of November and December respectively and 1,500,000 marks at the end of January and February respectively from the "B" account for repayment of the "X" account. (Although their representatives have already expressed their wishes to WAGNER, when I talked with WAGNER on the 21st I did not mention this. As he believes it should be handled from special funds, I think it is best for Manchukua to negotiate for necessary funds on short term credit under this measure).

(j) Germany will offer credit to a maximum of 10,000,000 marks, because of the reduction in amount of shipments of Manchukuoan products (soy beans and soy bean oil). For this credit a new account, "V," will be set up. Thus, the

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[1] In Libya.

"X" account should be liquidated during the term of the new pact through the 5,000,000 marks from account "B" and soy bean payments, and account "W" should be reduced by at least 1,000,000 marks from soy bean payments.

(k) The balance of account "B" shall be used for payments to Germany. Manchukuo is at liberty to make payments under heading (c) from any account whatsoever.

[3] (1) The second section and the second paragraph of the third section of the pact of May 31, 1941 (means for conversion of obligations not yet settled at the expiration of the pact) shall be left unchanged.

2. Although Manchukuo will probably want to pay Germany through regular channels, because of the obstacles to transportation I think it would be better to deduct German payments from (a) together with a suitable rate of interest. Moreover, believing that the terms of this pact are reasonable since Manchukuo's credit responsibilities are greatly increased, as soon as they get Manchukuo's approval Germany will send it to Berlin. As they wish to have it returned to Tokyo with the signatures of WOHLTHAT, SPINDLER and the Manchukuoan representatives not later than Christmas, they demand speedy consideration by Manchukuo.

Please press the Manchukuo government for prompt adoption of the above pact and please wire a reply. Since Japan and Germany are virtually in agreement on the Chinese text, please urge them again to let us know at once their opinion of the German-Manchukuoan understanding mentioned in our secret message #474 * dated September 27th (German edition: German text).

This telegram has been discussed with military authorities and Vice Minister MIURA.

Army 25631 Trans. 12-3-41 (5)

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* Not available.

Top Secret-Ultra
(Typed)
JD-1: 7001
Number cancelled.
7001
Top Secret-Ultra
Secret
From: Buenos Aires (Tomii)
To: Washington
November 28, 1941
Purple
#17

We have received the consignment from your office. Plesase advise us the call letters and general news.

Army 7002 Trans. 12/3/41 (8)
Secret
Top Secret-Ultha
From: Rome
To: Tokyo
November 28, 1941.
Purple.
#766. (Primary importance)

According to reports received from the Vatican through CICOGNANI, the Papal representative in Washington, many indications are evident that Japan forms a great obstacle to the United States' early termination of the present anti-Axis war. Public opinion in the United States is that America would be able to achieve victory for Great Britain simply by large-scale production of military supplies if it were not for this obstacle. In the event of a Japanese-American clash, assistance to England and the Soviet would decrease, making necessary American military intervention by means of forces on the European continent. Moreover, there are a great many who believe that during American-Japanese negotiations Japan put forth stipulations encroaching upon American interests and honor and so causing conditions to become extremely delicate.

There were also reports to the effect that the difficulties of Japanese-American negotiations constrained the Interventionist faction headed by the President and strengthened the position of he Isolationists.

Army 7003 25630 Trans. 12-2-41 (MR)

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[1] Secret
Top Secret-Ultra
From: Hsinking
To: Peking, Nanking and Shanghai
November 28, 1941
Purple
Cir. 231 (Message to Tokyo #779)

Local military intelligences are as follows. For you information.

1. At the military review in celebration of the anniversay of the revolution, 47 airplanes of an unrecognizable type flew over the city of Kuibyshev. They were definitely of American design and construction. It seems that large numbers have recently been arriving.

(The above is a report of the Japanese Military Attaché in the Soviet.)

2. Large bodies of anti-Communist mobile forces are fighting in the vicinity of Mininsk (Russe) and Barugujin [a] (south of Krusnoyarsk), destroying lines of communication and attacking the Kolhoz and Sofhoz. (The above is a spy report.)

3. The 39th Sharpshooters Division (in the neighborhood of Kogaiko [a]) has executed before the firing squad 20 unsuccessful deserters who tried to get into Manchukuo between May and November. To date, 46 Soviet troops have deserted. The Soviet, in order to prevent desertion, has moved certain detachments away from the border or have strung charged barbed wire fences along the border. Another means which they are utilizing is making the regiment responsible for detachments from which there have been deserters. (The above is intelligence of primary importance.)

[2] 4. Recently to the Ude Front, the surveillance troops of the outer Mongolian area have within the last few days deliberately trespassed on Mongolian territory several times, even to the extent of 10 to 20 kilos. They are taking a strong, hostile attitude toward Japanese surveliance troops. (The above is intelligence of primary importance.

I have transmitted this to Peitai, Shanghai, and Nandai.

Army 25632 Trans. 12/3/41 (5)

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[a] Kana spelling.

EXHIBIT NO. 142A

DEC. 5, 1941.

MR. STERLING: At 7:45 p. m. Mr. Carter called in from Portland with the following information:

JVW3 2130G

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM SOUTH. (the above was repeated three times)

JVW3 sent a time signal at 2200G and then:

I WILL NOW GIVE YOU THE WEATHER REPORT (nothing further, carrier on but no modulation—evidently cutoff in Tokyo).

Remarks by Carter; They are getting a more complete picture of the operations now and it is evident that at 2130G the Tokyo weather is transmitted and at 2200G the Tokyo weather and weather for other prefectures. Reception is getting better and estimate efficiency on this assigment has increased approximately twenty-five percent.

Foned Col. Bratton and gave him the message at 7:50 p. m.

Remarks by Col. Bratton: Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it means that we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals. (Asked Col. Bratton if I should communicate the information to Portland—concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.) No. I will have a conference with Lt. Col Dusenberg in the morning and will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard.

DE

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION SECTION OF MAIL AND FILES FROM TO RADIO INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

(The following handwritten)

Night Watch Log—Nov. 24th to Dec. 8th 1941

Return this file promptly. DE
Papers are not to be removed from the file.
Secret

Nov. 24, 1941

1. At 6:55 PM the Supervisor of the Coast Guard Radio Station at Alexandria, Va. telephoned to report that W9WGI was causing serious interference to their circuit on 4050 kcs. Requested Supervisor to inform this office immediately if the interference was again heard. (No further reports from CG up to midnight)

Nov. 25, 1941

At 9:10 the Supervisor of SA-P telephoned in from Jackson, Miss., requesting information relative to the resignation of Henry Gantt, an operator at SA-10. (Memo. re: conversation placed on Mr. Sterling's desk.)

Nov. 26, 1941

Handled routine correspondence and traffic.

Nov. 27, 1941

At 6:20 pm Monitoring Officer Cave of NA-9 called in regard to Wash. Case 4001 and 4002. Mr. McIntosh gave Cave the information requested.

Nov. 28, 1941

At 7:55, the Major Guest telephoned in requesting Mr. Sterling's home phone number. Gave him the requested information. *At 8:00* pm long distance operator called on Na. 2925 stating that Portland, Oregon was calling and desired to contact Mr. Sterling. Informed operator that Mr. Sterling was not here, but that he could be reached at his home Evergreen 278. *At 10:20* Mr. Sterling called giving instructions he wished passed on to Mr. Norman, Mr. North and Miss Perry.

Nov. 29, 1941

Handled routine correspondence and traffic.

Dec. 1

1. 5:05 P. M. Monitoring Officer CA-8 (Bairley) telephone to report that Ferguson (Wash. 3423) original informant, has moved out of neighborhood where original key clicks had been heard and requested further instructions. Told Bairley to contact Officer House of Auburn Police for further information. Also contact Ferguson at his new address for detailed description of signals he had heard previously.
2. At 5:45 P. M. telephoned Col. Bratton. Gave him a message per Mr. Sterling's instructions.
3. 9:05 P. M. telephoned Mr. Sterling re verification of frequencies for Portland.
4. 9:30 P. M. Monitoring Officer Duncan SA-5 telephoned from Tallahassee, Fla. stating he had heard unlicensed station JUMP (Wash. 3930) and probably could have complete evidence of unlicensed operation within two days. He stated that the subject was undoubtedly using a phonograph oscillator. Duncan requested information as to whether he should remain in Tallahassee or return to St. Augustine and work on some in-active alleged subversive cases. Informed Duncan to remain in Tallahassee two more days and endeavor to complete his evidence on Wash. 3930.
5. 9:45 P. M. sent TWX to Portland confirming frequencies.

Dec. 2

1. 7:35 P. M. long distance operator called on Na 2995 asking for Mr. Sterling. Operator stated that Portland, Ore. was calling. Informed her that Mr. Sterling was not here but that he could be contacted at his home in Baltimore, Evergreen 278.

Dec. 3

1. 6:15 P. M. received TWX from GS–P relative to NDA cases.
2. 6:25 P. M. telephoned Mr. Peterson for information concerning NDA cases.
3. 6:43 TWX to GS–P containing instructions relative to NDA cases.
4. 7:15 P. M. long distance operator of Portland, Ore. called on NA 2995 for Mr. Sterling. Informed her that Mr. Sterling was not in office at present but that I would try to contact him.
5. 7:20 called Lafayette Bowling Alley and had them page Mr. Sterling. They reported that Mr. Sterling had already departed.
6. 7:45 P. M. Mr. Sterling called this office and directed me to take message from Mr. Carter at Portland, Ore.
7. 7:52 P. M. contacted Mr. Carter at Portland, Ore. and obtained message for Mr. Sterling.
8. 7:55 P. M. telephoned Col. Bratton at his home and delivered a mesage in accordance with Mr. Sterling's instructions.
9. 8:37 P. M. Mr. Sterling called this office and contents of message from Portland, Ore. was read to him.

Dec. 4

1. 6:55 P. M. called Mr. Norman at his home in reference to message from GS–P concerning Mr. McKinney. Mr. Norman advised that no further action was necessary.
2. 8:12 P. M. received a message from Mr. Carter at Portland, Ore.
3. 8:25 P. M. unable to contact Lt. Col. Dusenburg either at the War Dept. or at his home.
4. 8:40 P. M. telephoned Mr. Sterling requesting instructions relative to a message from Mr. Carter.
5. 8:45 P. M. called ONI watch officer at Navy Dept. to ascertain if he was permitted to accept messages of interest to Col. Bratton's office. The officer in charge stated that he was not certain but that he would inquire and call me back.
6. 9:05 P. M. Lt. Brotherhood 20–G Watch Officer Navy Dept. telephoned to state that he was authorized to accept message in question. Gave Lt. Brotherhood the message from Mr. Carter.
7. 9:32 P. M. Lt. Brotherhood called to inquire if any other reference to weather was made previously in program intercepted by Portland. Informed him that no other reference was made.

Dec. 5

1. 7:45 P. M. Mr. Carter called in from Portland, Ore. with a message.
2. 7:50 P. M. telephoned Col. Bratton at his residence and repeated the message from Mr. Carter.
3. 11:05 P. M. Monitoring Officer Dunphey of CA–6 telephoned in requesting information on Wash. Case 3259. Informed Dunphey would try to get the information for him in the morning.

Dec. 6

1. Handled routine correspondence and traffic.

Dec. 8

1. 6:15 A. M. Mr. Dunphey called in, no results. Told him take six hours off, then assume duties for six hours, then eight hours off, alternating with Baltimore Unit.
2. 8:00 A. M. Mr. Meriwether called in, no results. Told him to remain on job until noon when CA–6 unit would take over. Informed him to take over watch again at 6:00 P. M.

3. 8:50 A. M. NA-3 called re Washington case 3722, off air. Mac gave him some important bearing and/or intercept assignment.
4. 12:00 Noon. Mr. Meriwether and Mr. Blum at office. One will take 6:00 P. M. to Mid., the other 6:00 A. M. to Noon, sandwiched with Falls Church.
5. 12:10 P. M. Mr. Berle of State Department called—Wanted Mr. Fly, finally got Mr. Fly.

EXHIBIT NO. 142B

From: Tokyo
To: (Circular telegram)
7 December 1941
(Plain Japanese language using code names)
Circular #2494

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

NOTE: The above is the translation furnished the *President* and other high officials at 1100 (EST) on Dec. 7, 1941. In the rush to get it out, *one* code word was overlooked. The correct translation reads as follows:

> "Relations between Japan and the following countries are not in accordance with expectation: England, United States."

This omission, which was not discovered until January, 1944, does not appreciably change the information that was available at 1100 (EST) on Dec. 7, 1941.

NOTE: The Army translation of Circular #2494 (supplied in March, 1944) is as follows:

> "Relations between Japan and _____ are approaching a crisis (on the verge of danger): England, United States."

NOTE: See JD #6985.

JD-1: 7148 Secret (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

Original

Tokyo Circular #2494

S 7 DEC 41.

SF DE JAH
621 S Tokyo 19 7 85ØS JG
Koshi, PANAMA
Urgent 92494 *Koyanagi* rijiyori seirinotugoo arunituki *Hattori Minami* kinenbunko seturitu kikino kyokaingaku sikyuu denpoo aritass stop—Togo
12Ø8 S JP
S 387/7 85ØS GR23 7639
Obese ovals rpwno rfnmo rtjmo rwfmo gnome.

JD-1: 7148 Secret (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

Distribution

Tokyo Circular #2494 5652
S 7 DEC. 41

SF DE JAH
622 S TOKYO 19 7 85ØS JG KOSHI HAVANA
623 S TOKYO 19 7 85ØS JG RIYOJI HONOLULU
624 S TOKYO 19 7 85Ø JG RIYOJI NEW YORK
625 S TOKYO 22 7 85ØS JG JAPANESE CONSUL VANCOUVER
626 S TOKYO 22 7 85ØS JG JAPANESE MINISTER OTTAWA ONT
(Same text and sign as our NR5651)
122Ø JP
7639

JD-1: 7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

Distribution

Tokyo Circular #2494 5653

S 7 Dec 41.

SF DE JAH
627 S TOKYO 19 7 85ØS JG RIYOJI SAN FRANCISCO
628 S TOKYO 19 7 85ØS JG RIYOJI PORTLAND ORE
629 S TOKYO 19 7 85ØS JG RIYOJI SEATTLE
63Ø S TOKYO 19 7 85ØS JG RIYOJI NEW ORLEANS LA
631 S TOKYO 19 7 85ØS JG RIYOJI CHICAGO ILL
632 S TOKYO 19 7 85ØS JG RIYOJI LOS ANGELES CALIF
(Same text and sign as our NR565)

1243 JP
763Ø

JD-1: 7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

EXHIBIT NO. 142C

Department of State,
Washington, February 4, 1946.

The Honorable Seth W. Richardson, *General Counsel*
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
Congress of the United States.

Dear Mr. Richardson: Enclosed are paraphrases of three telegrams received regarding the "winds" message, supplementing previous correspondence on this subject.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert S. Marks,
Assistant to the Under Secretary.

Enclosures:
1. Telegram from London, December 15, 1945;
2. Telegram from The Hague, January 26, 1946;
3. Telegram from London, January 31, 1946.

Telegram Received From The American Embassy at London, Dated December 15, 1945 (Paraphrase)

This morning we had a conversation regarding the "winds" messages with a Foreign Office Japanese expert who was in the Foreign Office immediately preceding and at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. He declares that, so far as he knows, prior to December 8, 1941 no such messages were received. Investigation is still being carried on but the Foreign Office has as yet no information which would change the statement contained in the Embassy's telegram of December 4, 1945 on this subject.

Telegram Received From The American Embassy at The Hague, Dated January 26, 1946 (Paraphrase)

We have been informed by the Foreign Office in a note dated January 24 that all reports of monitored Japanese broadcasts were destroyed before the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies by the Japanese. The same is true of the archives of the Netherlands Indies Government. For this reason the Foreign Office regrets that it is unable to supply the information which has been requested by the Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack.

Telegram Received From The American Embassy at London, Dated January 31, 1946 (Paraphrase)

The Foreign Office states that the investigation requested in the Department's telegram 9745 of November 6, 1945 has drawn a complete blank and that it does not seem worthwhile to make any further investigation.

EXHIBIT NO. 142D

November 14, 1945

MEMORANDUM TO MR. GESELL:

The attached communication was received by me from my Supervisor in Hawaii on November 14, 1945. I am forwarding it for your information.

In passing, I would like to state that the Russian staff of the Naval Intelligence Division was not authorized by the War Department to participate in the work in Honolulu.

C. A. Bicking
Assistant Chief Engineer

Attachment

CABicnbp/61

C
O
P
Y

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Engineering Department
Radio Intelligence Division
November 7, 1945

Address reply to:
609 Stangenwald Building
Honolulu 1, T. H.

PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

VIA CLIPPER AIRMAIL

Mr. George E. Sterling
Chief, Radio Intelligence Division
Federal Communications Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Sterling:

I have read with interest the extracts from the Army and Navy Pearl Harbor boards. I agree with you that the Army's statement to the effect that, "On December 7 a number of illegal radio stations interfered with the radio operations of the Army" is the result of ignorance and lack of understanding on the part of Army personnel concerned. I should like to know the exact basis for the statement. I assume that something more than the general allegation was made.

There have been numerous references in the newspapers lately to the coded Japanese weather message which was to reveal their plans. In reading through the translations of Japanese news broadcasts recorded at HA-P and translated by the O.N.I., Honolulu, I came across the following with which you are probably familiar. However, since it differs considerably from the current news stories and may be in addition to the "Weather Message" referred to, I am repeating it for your information. This translation was made from recordings of the JZI Japanese language broadcast on 9515 kc. for December 8, 1941, Japan time. The translation included a report of the Japanese attacks for the day (December 8, Japan time, being December 7 Honolulu time) and, therefore, the "Weather Forecast" followed rather than preceded the Pearl Harbor attack. The O.N.I. translator inserted the following in parentheses between news items: "There a weather forecast was made--as far as I can recollect, no such weather forecast has ever been made before. His exact words were: "Allow me to especially make a weather forecast at this time--'West wind, clear'" Since these broadcasts are also heard by the Japanese Navy it may be a part of the)" It will be noted that the O.N.I. translator was apparently unaware of any previous search for such a forecast. The same weather forecast was referred later in the December 8 broadcast.

The translations made by the O.N.I. were furnished this office and the F.B.I. by messenger. We did not receive the translations for December 8 until December 11, 1941. As a matter of fact, I believe that the translations for December 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 were all received from the O.N.I. on December 15. This was not unusual, the translations generally being received from a week to two weeks after the date of the broadcast.

Present indications are, according to the newspapers, that the Senate House Committee which is investigating the Pearl Harbor attack will not visit Hawaii for sometime.

Sincerely yours,
/s/ Lee E. Dawson

Station JZI Program
Date 12/8/41 (J[illegible])
Frequency 9595 kilocycles

[illegible] our [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] -
land [illegible] foreign [illegible], [illegible] -
first [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible], [illegible],
entered [illegible] state of [illegible], [illegible],
the Imperial Army and Navy [illegible] [illegible]
our Army [illegible] Navy [illegible] [illegible]
Eastern Pacific [illegible], [illegible].
achievements of our [illegible], [illegible]
Army [illegible] Navy headquarters, [illegible] (1)
today, the 8th [illegible], [illegible]
strength in the [illegible]. (3) Our [illegible]
the British [illegible] .....([illegible]) -
merican Admiral .....([illegible]) ([illegible]) -
perial Navy at [illegible], [illegible]
(4) Our Imperial Navy [illegible], [illegible]
at sea, [illegible]. (5) The British [illegible],
state of war [illegible], [illegible],
cooperation closely with our [illegible],
tion in [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible], [illegible] [illegible],
our Imperial [illegible] [illegible]
on the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].
wards, [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible], [illegible] [illegible]
air force [illegible] [illegible], [illegible]
tion.

[illegible],
capability [illegible],
[illegible] [illegible],
Navy, [illegible] [illegible].

A British [illegible] [illegible]
turn. [illegible] [illegible],
according to [illegible] [illegible],
Chief [illegible] [illegible],
fleet in the [illegible] [illegible]
Admiralty [illegible],
respectively, [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible],
and [illegible].
pole [illegible].....
[illegible].

Our Imperial Army is repulsing the British troops which have invaded Thailand. In regard to this, our embassy in Bangkok made the following announcement at 4 am today: For a long time, we have been expecting the British troops to invade the southern part of Thailand and, as expected, they began to cross the Malayan border early this morning. To preserve the peace of the Southern Pacific and protect the independence of Thailand, our government immediately started a negotiation with Thailand and, at the same time, started an attack against the British troops, which are being presently wiped out. Thus was the statement announced by our embassy in Thailand.

The Domei dispatch from Shanghai. Since dawn today, Shanghai has been in a state of war and to maintain the peace and order within the International Concession, our army and navy detachments made a special penetration. At the same time, the following announcement was made in the name of the high commanders of our army and navy in Shanghai: The Japanese troops have been reinforced within the international concession, but that the aim of the Japanese troops is to maintain the peace and order, and prosperity of the international settlement. The Japanese troops have no hostile feeling against the residents carrying on rightful occupations within the concession.

Our Imperial Army has disarmed the American marines stationed in North China. In regard to this, a Domei dispatch from Peking reported that our imperial army this morning issued an ultimatum to disarm to the 200 American marines stationed in Tientsin, Peking and Tsin tao (?) and since each accepted this ultimatum, the disarming of the marines was carried out at 1 pm today.

Today, his majesty, the Emperor, rendered an Imperial decree to our Imperial Army and Navy, as follows: "Since the outbreak of the China incident, my army and navy have stoically fought for over four years to punish the bad and in spite of their great achievements, the war has not been quelled yet. After considering the past and seeing the England and America's claims are scandalous, I attempted to make my government settle the situation peacefully. In spite of this, not only did England and America show no sincerity to consider peace, but instead strengthened their military and economic coercion in an attempt to make our country yield. Hence, to protect our country's existence and self-defense and establish lasting peace in East Asia, I have decided to declare war against England and America. Having faith in your loyalty and bravery, I look forward to the accomplishment of our ultimate aim and the upholding of our national glory".

In reply to this Imperial decree, War Minister Tojo and Navy Minister Shimada respectfully made the following reply: Your subjects, Hataki and Shigetaro, respectfully reply. WE cannot help but be deeply impressed on receiving such a glorious (?) decree today, subjects, pledge to cooperate solidly and exert our utmost efforts and thus expect

to respond to your will. On behalf of the government and the Army and Navy, we, Hideki and Shigetaro, your subjects, respectfully make this reply. December 8, 1941.

(Signed) Hideki Tojo, Minister of War.
Shigetaro Shimada, Minister of Navy.

Since our Army and Navy has started a war against England and America in the Western Pacific at dawn today, our Government at 7 am today held an emergency session of the cabinet at the premier's residence. Outside of Foreign Minister Togo, all the cabinet ministers were present. Firstly, Minister of Navy Shimada reported the developments of war against England and America and based on this report, the course to be taken by the government was decided, whereupon Premier Tojo called on the Emperor and reported the decision.

According to a Domei dispatch from Washington, Foreign Minister Togo reported by order Envoys Kurusu and Nomura to call on Secretary of State Hull at 1:00 P.M. on the 7th, 3:30 A.M. of the 8th Japan time, and present our government's official reply to the American note of the 26th. At the same time, Foreign Minister Togo invited American Ambassador to Japan, Grew, to his official residence at 7:30 A.M. today and handed him an official note similar to the one handed to Secretary of State Hull. Immediately afterwards at 7:45 A.M., he invited British Ambassador to Japan, Craigie and explained to him the text of this reply.

Immediately after our loyal Army and Navy had entered a state of war with England and America at dawn today, it was decided to break off diplomatic relations with both countries and enter a state of war. Consequently, our government at 11:45 A.M. today declared war against England and America. At the same time, an order for the convocation of a two days special session of the Diet on the 15th was issued. At the emergency session urgent bills of appropriations and other nature will be presented and, at the same time, the governments policy to cope with the unprecedented emergency is expected to be explained by Premier Tojo and other ministers.

(Here a weather forecast was made as far as I can recollect, no such weather forecast had ever been made before. The exact words were "Allow me to especially make a weather forecast at this time, 'east wind, clear'." Since these broadcasts are also heard by the Japanese Navy, it may be some sort of code.)

At 8:30 A.M. today, our government made the Foreign Ministry announce the results of the Japanese-American negotiation and the Japanese-American notes. The announcement made clear the real facts of the effort exerted by our government till the very last minute to preserve the peace of the Pacific. Japan's note to America was an official reply to America's note of the 26th and notified the fact no settlement can be expected even if the negotiation were to be continued. It actually was a final notice

to America, and within it, our country made public to the world the r
son for declaring the war. It is as follows: That America's princip
adhered to in the Japanese-American negotiation are idealistic and he
proposal, for example, is obsolete and ignores the realities of East
Asia. That England and America's economic oppression is more mean th
armed resistance. That the imperialistic exploitation of England and
America has been the root of disorder in East Asia. That the continu
tion of aid to Chungking absolutely cannot be ignored by our country.
That England and America, scheming with the other hostile nations, ar
intensifying their action to make Japan and China fight each other, b
our country is..... Taking these five points up, our country
fairness was made clear to the world.

Now, let me give you the text of the Foreign Ministry's an
ment. From the standpoint of settling the Pacific problems peacefull
thus contributing toward world peace, our government has carried on n
tiations with America ever since the middle of last April. At first,
proposal was made by America, but, just at that time, the joint defen
of French Indo-China was concluded. Then, England and America, coope
ing with each other, took action to strengthen their economic oppress
Hence, Premier Konoye sent a message to President Roosevelt in August
urge America to reconsider her action. However, America, adhering to
claims for the abrogation of the Japanese-German-Italian Alliance, th
withdrawal of Japanese troops stationed in China and the matter of int
national trade without discrimination, totally rejected our claim. Of
course, these demands cannot be accepted by our country. As a result,
our country hurriedly dispatched Envoy Kurusu to America and bearing
patience upon patience, our country continued the negotiation with a c
ciliatory attitude. However, America, adhering to her principles, whi
are counter to the realities of East Asia, assumed an attitude to ign
our claim and effort. At the same time, England, Chungking, Dutch Ea
Indies and Australia renewed their effort to strengthen their anti-Ja
nese preparation. Hence, the Japanese-American negotiation finally
reached a critical state. Besides, the situation surrounding our cou
became such as to leave no room for optimism. Since it became clear
America absolutely has no intention to continue the negotiation, our
government sent a memorandum as of the 7th to the American Government
made her attitude clear. The developments of the Japanese-American n
tiation announced by the Foreign Ministry were as follows: Our counti
desire to establish the East Asia mutual prosperity sphere and contri
toward world peace has been trampled by the world war fever and the cl
longing threats of England and America. America, mobilizing 10,000,0
soldiers and setting up a two-ocean navy of 3,500,000 men, has intens
her unjust scheme to make the world her own. Even in the recent Japa
American negotiation, they attempted to oppress our country with an a
rogant attitude of being not even afraid of God, and as an attitude t
the leader of East Asia, it was too much to ignore. In spite of this
country, hoping for America's consideration to the very end together
our people, continued to remain calm. However, today, the war of the

Pacific has been brought about by America and England. It should be definitely stated at this time that President Roosevelt and Premier Churchill has undertaken the Pacific war without consideration of the war's havoc on humanity [illegible] of their program for the domination of the world. In the course of the four and a half years [illegible] the China incident, each and every Japanese has shed tears of indignation against England and America's wicked hostile attitude, but [illegible] for the sake of the peace of the Pacific as well as the [illegible]. This patience, today has reached its limit. The time has [illegible] rise unitedly and risk the fate of the nation for the cause [illegible].

At dawn today, December 8, the [illegible] Imperial Army and Navy headquarters to the effect that [illegible] will enter a state of war against American and British [illegible] the Western Pacific at dawn today was [illegible] through [illegible] country through the radios and newspapers. Every [illegible] throughout the country [illegible] further strengthened their determination [illegible] came and instantaneously, [illegible] a determination to punish the evil [illegible] outrageously wicked England and America. Today, [illegible] clear and devoid of even a speck of cloud [illegible], [illegible] seemed to be congratulating the promising future [illegible], [illegible] to fight for the establishment of [illegible] the world just like the brilliant [illegible], [illegible], as an indication of our strength [illegible], [illegible]! When I received this report that war [illegible], I hurried to my..............and on my way, I [illegible] well as those working, [illegible] expression [illegible]. [illegible] with the issuing of the Imperial decree [illegible], the nation's determination to march forward [illegible] gushed forth. Not long afterwards, [illegible] of our country was announced over the radio, [illegible], achievements of our Navy, which is [illegible] American and British forces [illegible] amount of power [illegible] though the Pacific were [illegible], [illegible] out the nation. [illegible], [illegible] England and America [illegible] through the establishment [illegible] flare up within the hearts of [illegible] people.

The next is [illegible] dispatch [illegible], [illegible] states that according to [illegible], official sources in [illegible] against America in the [illegible].

At this time, [illegible] again [illegible], clear". (Repeated this [illegible]).

Now, let us broadcast to you the [illegible],

dir ctor of the 2nd section of the information bureau entitled "To the J panese residents abroad on receiving the Emperor's decree of war". Jap nese residents abroad, an Imperial decree declaring war against Eng-l nd and America was issued at 11:45 am, December 8, Japan time. It was just previously broadcast to you. Then, too, I believe that you have heard the electrical transcription of Premier Tojo's broadcast. Again, since I believe that you will know the details of the Japanese-American negotiations as well as our country's claim, I will refrain from mention-ing them. Today, our Imperial Army and Navy of matchless loyalty has al-ready started an attack in the Western Pacific and over a wide range, and, we are achieving brilliant results. To accomplish this great war, the, 100,000,000 people of Japan, should concretely put into practice the spirit of service and unite solidly to rest the mind of our majesty, the Emperor, for there is nothing to fear. As you already know, the Japanese-American negotiation went through all sorts of complications and dif-ficulties during the past eight months, and America made the following demands upon our country. They were (1) complete and unconditional e-vacuation of Japanese troops from China, (2) the abolition of the Nanking Government (3) immediate abrogation of the tripartite alliance and (4) her so-called idealistic four principles, indicating her definite refusal to recognize the realities of East Asia. Consequently, not only has she attempted to hamper the natural demand for the strengthening of the mutual prosperity relations between Japan and the southern nations, but has also strengthened her ABCD encirclement and intensified her coercion toward Ja-pan, both economically and militarily. At the same time, she, utilizing Chungking as her tool, is planning her own defense at the expense of China and is scheming to achieve her ambition of dominating East Asia as well as the world. Although ours was enduring the unendurable and exerting her utmost effort to readjust the Japanese-American relations with a con-ciliatory spirit for the sake of world peace and humanity, it became de-finitely clear that America will never reconsider. I shall repeat: The reason that our country remained patient and exerted her utmost effort in the Japanese-American negotiation till today, as clearly explained in the Imperial decree, was based on our noble spirit to maintain the peace of East Asia and thus contribute toward world peace and not that we were afraid of England and America's economic and military strength. Nevertheless, America, underestimating our military and national strength and attempting to make our country yield before her oppression, assumed .....attitude throughout the negotiation. In view of this fact, who can criticize the righteousness of Japan, who has been compelled to take up arms because of the extreme hostile acts of England and America? Japan as well as her people has repressed her tears and has borne the un-bearable to the limits of her power and has performed every measure that should be performed. Hence, there is no other course but war to take to-day. In other words, Japan has resolutely taken up her arms to protect her rights and existence and to establish a new world peace. This, in other words, is the duty of righteous Japan and the manifestation of the deeply-rooted conviction of the nation. However, we are not bearing any grudge nor hate the people of America and England, who have been mis-led by their leaders. As a result, we have no hostile feeling against



EXHIBIT NO. 143

(This exhibit is the proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed December 18, 1941 by the President and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 144

(This exhibit is the proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, pursuant to precept dated February 12, 1944 of the Secretary of the Navy and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 145

(This exhibit is the proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 146

(This exhibit is the proceedings of the Naval Court of Inquiry convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 147

(This exhibit is the proceedings of the investigation conducted by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, September 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to August 4, 1945, and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 148

(This exhibit is the report of investigation during the period November 23, 1944, to September 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, AUS, for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 149

(This exhibit is the proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 150

280 Bronxville Road
Bronxville, New York
18 March 1944

Admiral William F Halsey, U.S.Navy
Commander South Pacific Fleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Dear Bill,

You have on your staff Commander A.D.K ramer, U.S.N., who was on duty in the Communications Office in the Navy Depastmen at the time of the attack on Pearl harbor and for some time prior to that date. I believe he has knowledge of facts and incidents whic. occured in the navy Department hwich are of interest and value to me. Will you please obtain from him an affidavit and ask him if he will supply me with a copy. I will assure him that I will make no use of the affidavit without his permission so long as he is alive. If he does not wish to supply me with a copy of the affidavit, I would appreciate it very much if he will make the affidavit, put it in a secure place and inform me when I can obtain it.

There was a message received in the Navy Department on December 4th or 5th, 1941, which came to be called the "winds Message". I should like to know:

What station first received the Winds Message ?

What date was it received in Washington ?

When was it deciphered, translated, decoded and delivered to repponsible officials in Washington ?

What officials in Washington saw the translation of the Winds message and when ?

What was the substance of the information contained in the Winds Message ?

What Action towards notification of Field Commanders of contents of message and implications thereof was taken ?

There was a note delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to Mr. Hull on 7 December 1941.

When were the first 13 parts of this message received, decoded, and delivered to responsible officials in Washington ?

What officials in Washington received translations of the first 13 parts of this message and when did each receive them ?

Admiral William F. Halsey, USNAVY 18 March 1944

When was the 14th part of the message received, decoded and delivered ?

What officials in Washington received translations of the 14th part of this message and when did each received it ?

What action was recommended by you or anyone else of which you have knowledge ?

There was a message directing the Japanese Ambassador to deliver a note to Secretary Hull in person at 1;00 P.M. Easteren Standard Time on 7 December 1941.

When was this message received in the Navy Department ?

What agency decoded the message and when was decoding completed ?

What agency translated the message and when was the translation delivered to the Navy Department.?

What officials in Washington received translations of this message and when did each received it ?

What action was taken as a result of this message ?

When Commander Kramer delivered this message to Mr. Knox a memorandum pointing out that 1:00 P.M. Eastern Stadard Time was sunrise in Honolulu and midnight in Manila and that the whole thing meant sunrise air raid in Pearl Harbor within a few minutes after the delivery of the Japanese note.

Will you please have Commander Kramer answer all of the fore-going questions of which he has knowledge and put them in the form of an affidavit and also request him to include in his affidavit any other matters of which he may have first-hand knowledge. I shall be very grateful to him for this matter will be of considerable interest and value to me.

My kindest regards to you always Bill.

Most Sincerely yours,

/s/ H.E. Kimmel.

EXHIBIT NO. 151

MEMORANDA PREPARED BY CAPTAIN SAFFORD

TABLE OF CONTENTS

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[*1*] Secret

17 MAY 1945.

Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett, U. S. N. R.
Subj: Evaluation of Messages of 26 November 1941.
Ref:

(a) Opnav—242239 (Nov. 1941).
(b) Com 14—260110 (Nov. 1941).
(c) Com 16—261331 (Nov. 1941).
(d) Com 14 Communication Intelligence Bulletins (1 Nov.–6 Dec. 1941).
(e) Station "H" Chronology (1 Dec.–6 Dec. 1941).
(f) Roberts Report (Senate Document 159) dated 23 Jan. 1942.
(g) CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence" Vol. 1, No. 22, 8 Dec. 1944—P. O. W. Account of Raid on Pearl Harbor.
(h) Op–16–F2 Weekly Memorandum dated 1 Dec. 1941.
(i) Jane's Fighting Ships—1941 edition.

Encl:

(A) Op–20–3 GL Memo dated 14 May 1945.
(B) "Japanese Naval Vessels" (ONI—December 1942).

1. Reference (a) advised that *Com 16 intercepts* were considered most reliable and requested Com 16 to evaluate reports on Japanese naval movements and send despatch to Opnav, info Cincpac. Com 16's estimates were more reliable than Com 14's, not only because of better radio interception, but because Com 16 was currently reading messages in the Japanese Fleet Cryptographic System ("5-number code" or "JN25") and was exchanging technical information and translations with the British C. I. Unit at Singapore. McCollum knew this and gave it due consideration when he drafted reference (a).

2. Reference (b) summarized Japanese naval activities for the current month and advised that some large scale movement involving most if not all of the Japanese Navy was about to take place. The message itself was summarized in its last sentence, as follows:

> Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.

This information was reliable, timely, and accurate on the whole. It must be realized, moreover, that this estimate was based entirely on "radio intelligence," the Com 14 C. I. Unit being unable to read anything except the Weather Ciphers and other minor systems of the Japanese Navy at that particular time. This fact was known in the Navy Department, and the Director of Naval Communications and the Director of Naval Intelligence were so informed by me.

[*2*] 3. The major project of the 14th District C. I. Unit in November 1941 was attack on the Japanese Flag Officers Cryptographic System (Transposition Cipher superposed on a "4-character code"—think we called it "AD")—in which they were being backed up by similar attack in the Navy Department. This system (its earlier editions) had been our main source of information on the Japanese Navy from 1926 or 1927 up until about November 1940. It was the most difficult as well as most important system the Japanese Navy was using and our most skilled and most experienced officers and men were attempting its solution. If we could have solved the Flag Officers System, Admiral Kimmel

would probably have known of the Japanese plans and the Pacific Fleet would not have been surprised on December 7, 1941. Unfortunately, neither the U. S. Navy nor the British cryptanalysts ever succeeded in cracking this system. The "5-numeral" system yielded no information which would arouse even a suspicion of the Pearl Harbor Raid, either before the attack or afterwards. The Japanese abandoned the "AD (?)" system in 1942 or 1943, apparently because of excessive delays and unreadable messages. As regards the "JN25" or "5-numeral" system, the current code (JN25B) had been in effect since 1 December 1940, remained in effect until 27–31 May, 1942, and was partially readable in November 1941. A new system of keys was introduced on 4 December 1941 and reported by Com 16–041502, but the carry over of the old code made their solution quite simple, and we were reading messages again by Christmas, Corregidor getting the "initial break" on 8 December 1941. The Hawaiian C. I. Unit did not commence work on the Japanese Navy's "5-number" system until 10 December 1941, at which date it discontinued attack on the "Flag Officers System." (The Navy Department continued its attack on the "Flag Officers System" as long as it remained in use.)

4. Reference (c) contained Com 16's evaluation of reference (b) plus extensive observations and comments of his own, and in general agreed with Com-14's estimate. Com 16 had the benefit of his own translations plus "tips" from Singapore. Com 16 also had much better direction finder service as distances were much less, differences of longitude much less, and the bearings lines generally cut at more favorable angles for reliable plotting. This advantage was lost with the capture of Guam a few days after the Pearl Harbor Raid.

5. The discrepancies between references (b) and (c) are mostly artificial, the only important difference being in the following sentences, which are quoted below:

Ref. (b), Com 14–260110:

> There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air group in the Marshalls which comprise airron twenty four at least one carrier division unit plus probably one third of the submarine fleet.

[3] Ref. (c), Com 16–261331:

> "Second section (expected to operate in mandates) crudiv five X Cardiv three Ryujo and one Maru____."
>
> "Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in mandates X. Our best indications are that all known first and second fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area X____.

It is apparent that everyone has jumped to the conclusion that "carrier division unit" meant "carrier division," but such was not the case. Commander Williams used the term "unit" rather loosely: in this instance it was later identified, on November 30, 1941, as "a unit of plane guard destroyers" (i. e., two or more destroyers attached to CarDiv 5). Another source of confusion was in the loose use of the term "Mandates." To Com 14 it meant Jaluit, Marshalls, and Eastern Japanese Mandated Islands, but to Com 16 it meant Palao or Halmahera. The Japanese Mandated Islands stretched over an East-West belt 2,100 miles long, so the distinction is important.

6. A study of reference (d) reveals the following:

(a) Call "SI TI 4" (previously identified as Cardiv 4) was located at Jaluit on November 19, but on November 21 was identified as a Submarine Squadron.

(b) The November 25th statement, "One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates," was retracted on November 27 by the statements:

> "No further information of Carrier Division Five in Mandates."
>
> "Carriers are still located in home waters."
>
> (NOTE: According to reference (j) the Pearl Harbor Attack Force sailed from the Kurile Islands on 27 November 1941.)

(c) On November 30, the above discrepancies were reconciled by the statement:

> "The presence of *a unit of plane guard destroyers* indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this has not been confirmed."

(d) Another interesting bit of information appeared on November 30:

"The only tactical circuit heard today was one with Akagi and several Marus."

[4] (e) The December 2nd Summary comes clean:

"Almost a complete blank of information on carriers today. Lack of identification has somewhat prompted this lack of information."

(f) The last specific mention of carriers was on December 3rd:

"No information on submarines or carriers."

(g) The record as to carriers is closed with the December 5th entry:

"No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."

(h) The earlier estimate of submarine concentration in the Marshalls is reaffirmed on November 30 as follows:

"This unit cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a submarine concentration in that area (the Marshalls). Every evidence points to a concentration of not only the small (RO-class) Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force."

(NOTE: See enclosure (A) and reference (g).

7. In view of the foregoing, and after consideration of all other information available to me at this time, I evaluate Com 16's statement "All known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure Area," to refer specifically to the following carriers:

CarDiv 1	*CarDiv 2*	*CarDiv 5*
Kaga (F)	Soryu (F)	Shokaku
Akagi	Hiryu	Zuikaku

These carriers were in the vicinity of the Japkanese main islands on that date, and participated in the Pearl Harbor Raid on 7 December 1941.

CarDiv 3, Ryujo and (Kasuga) Maru, were stated by reference (c) as earmarked for operations under CinC Second Fleet in the forthcoming offensive in Southeastern Asia and were not specifically located, although it was implied that they were at Palao. They did not represent an offensive threat against U. S. possessions other than Guam and the Philippines. Reference (h) and enclosure (A) list the Kasuga (Maru); reference (i) and enclosure (B) do not; she might have been the Shoho.

CarDiv 4 (Hosho and Zuiho), second line and escort carriers used for training pilots in flight deck operations, may have been assigned to the Fifth Fleet, or to the First Fleet (see enclosure (A)), or directly under the CinC Combined Fleet. These ships did not represent an offensive threat against U. S. possessions at that time.

[5] The Koryu was listed in reference (h) as being in the Sasebo-Kure Area. Reference (i) describes the Koryu as a sister ship of the Soryu and Hiryu. Enclosure (B) and later information indicate the Koryu was nonexistent. She was undoubtedly confused with one of the four auxiliary carriers.

8 Reference (e), prepared by the Chief Radioman in Charge of Radio Heeia, supports and amplifies reference (d), but introduces one element of confusion. Extracts are quoted below.

1 December 1941

(Nothing of particular interest.)

2 December 1941

"CinC Second Fleet has shifted to Sasebo and is probably going to South China to direct operations of units sent to this area from the Empire."

"No signs of movement of the Third Fleet or Carriers were given in today's traffic. It is believed that they remain in the vicinity of Kyushu. CarDiv 4 is believed to still be at Sasebo. CarDiv 3 has not shown any activity during the last few days, and it is possible that this unit has gone South."

3 December 1941

"It is believed that the Carriers are still based at or near Sasebo."

4 December 1941

"Very little activity was observed in the Sasebo or Kure areas. The Carriers are believed to have remained in the vicinity of Kyushu."

"The large number of high precedence messages and general distribution might indicate that the entire Navy is being instructed to be prepared for drastic action."

5 December 1941

"No indication as to locations of the Carriers was noted in today's traffic, although it is believed they remain in the vicinity of Kyushu."

[6] *6 December 1941*

"At 0430, Tokyo was heard using 32 kcs, dual with 12330 kcs for UTU broadcast of traffic. This broadcast was discontinued at 1800, but 7285 kcs (M) was immediately brought up and used until 1900, when it was secured. This broadcast was in addition to Tokyo's regular UTU. Tokyo also broadcasted traffic on 6985 kcs (A) during the evening."

"Saipan, Takao and Ominato were also heard broadcasting traffic to units in their vicinities. The use of this method of delivering messages tends to keep unknown the positions of vessels afloat, and is probably one of the first steps toward placing the operation of the Navy on a wartime basis."

9. Reference (f) states on page 9:

> "The Naval Intelligence Service in Hawaii, due to lack of information indicating that the bulk of Japanese carriers were at sea, concluded they were in home ports."

The Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer (Lt Comdr. E. T. Layton U S N) and the Hawaiian Communication Intelligence Officer (Comdr. J. J. Rochefort, U.S.N.) deny ever making such a statement to the Roberts Commission. This information must have come from the District Intelligency Officer (Capt. I. H. Mayfield, U.S.N.) or one of the members of Admiral Kimmel's staff, who were completely outside of the picture as regards Communication Intelligence or locations and movements of Japanese Naval Forces. The statement can find some support in reference (e) but none in reference (d), which was the last word in this matter.

10. Reference (d) was examined by a member of the Roberts Commission—but was not submitted as evidence. Reference (d) was not available to Admiral Hart because it was not submitted to him at Pearl Harbor and could not be located at the Navy Department. Reference (e) was not located until the day before I gave my "on-the-record" testimony to Admiral Hart. It did not quite fit the description of Com 14's Daily C. I. Summaries that Rochefort had told me about in the spring of 1943, but I figured my memory or his had been at fault. So reference (e) was submitted to the "Hart Investigation" to substantiate my testimony as well as refresh my memory. It is apparent that reference (e) has been the source of confusion and misleading evidence in the two earliest investigations of the Pearl Harbor Disaster.

L. F. SAFFORD,
Captain, U.S. Navy.

[7] Secret

19 MAY 1945.

Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett, U. S. N. R.
Sub: Evaluation of "UTU" Broadcasts.
Ref:

(a) Com 14—Routine ø522øø (Dec. 1941).
(b) Com 14 Communication Intelligence Bulletins (1 Nov.–6 Dec. 1941).
(c) Station "H" Chronology (1 Dec.–6 Dec. 1941).
(d) CinCAF—Priority øøøø345 (Dec. 1941).
(e) CinCAF—Priority øøøø73ø (Dec. 1941).
(f) CinCAF—Routine ø21636 (Dec. 1941).
(g) CinCAF—Priority ø61255 (Dec. 1941).

Encl: (A) Copies of references (d), (e), (f) and (g).

1. Reference (a) reported to Com. 16 and to Chief of Naval Operations;

"UTU's are being sent by HA FU 6 (Tokyo Radio) on 32 kilocycles instead of 39 kcs as before."

This message was sent with *ROUTINE* precedence was handled by the Navy Department Code Room, and was delivered to Op–20–G at 1943 GCT on 6 December 1941 according to notation on the message.

2. Reference (a) is, to a large extent, evaluated by references (b) and (c), relevant portions of which are quoted below:

2 December 1941 (Ref. (b))

"The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast, and also where Takao Radio received the same dispatch that it previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao was broadcasting traffic to those fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location reports, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances, Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao."

[8] *3 December 1941 (Ref. (b))*

"Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good."
"It is the impression that both Second and Third Fleets are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence means."

3 December 1941 (Ref. (c))

"Takao, using call *NUKU*, was heard broadcasting traffic on 7155A kcs (night) and 14310A kcs (day). This broadcast was similar to the Tokyo UTU broadcast. Traffic was broadcast to CinC's combined, Second and Third Fleets, Comdr. Combined Air Force, Comdr. Indo-China Force and several unidentified afloat calls."

4 December 1941 (Ref. (b))

"Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio (in Formosa) today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation."
"It is now believed that CinC Sceond Flet is in the vicinity of Takao and that apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which CinC Second Fleet is still copying."

4 December 1941 (Ref. (c))

"Takao continued to broadcast traffic on 7155A kcs (night) and 14310A kcs (day) to ships in that vicinity. A regular series of UTU numbers are being used by Takao and the broadcast is similar to Tokyo's. Takao uses the call *NUKU*, and calls RIKU (All ships in my vicinity?)."

5 December 1941 (Ref. (b))

"Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broadcast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit is duplex operation. There were several new intercept schedules heard. Ominat Radio working Sama and Bako sending fleet traffic. *The Takao broadcast handling traffic to Second and Third Fleets while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic for these units also.* It is noted that some traffic being broadcast several days old WHICH INDICATES THE UNCERTAINTY OF DELIVERY EXISTING IN THE RADIO ORGANIZATION."

[9] "Neither the *Second or Third Fleet Commanders* have originated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic over broadcast. *They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther South* since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic."

5 December 1941 (Ref. (c))

"Takao continues the use of the UTU broadcast on 7155 kcs to units in that area. From all indications, CinC's Second and Third Fleets are in the Takao area or have moved even farther South from Takao."

"Saipan, Ominato and Takao were heard broadcasting traffic to vessels in their vicinity. Tokyo broadcasted traffic on 12330 kcs in addition to his regular UTU broadcast. At 0430/6th Tokyo was observed using 32 kcs for an UTU broadcast. This frequency was used dual with 12330 kcs. Signals were very strong during the day. The use of this low frequency indicates traffic sent on this broadcast is for ships at a great distance from Tokyo."

6 December 1941 (Ref. (b))

"Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic. *This is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level, but is the result of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery.* The stations now holding broadcasts are: Tokyo (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts), Saipan, Ominato, and Takao."

"Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units are sending their traffic via the Takao and Tokyo broadcasts."

"Fifth Fleet appears dispersed about the Japan Sea with Ominato broadcasting traffic for this unit."

6 December 1941 (Ref. (c))

"Takao continues to broadcast traffic for ships in that vicinity on 7155 kcs (A) (night) and on 14310 kcs (A) (day)."

"At 0430, Tokyo was heard using 32 kcs, dual with 12330 kcs, for UTU broadcast of traffic. This broadcast was discontinued at 1800, but 7285 kcs (M) was immediately brought up and used until 1900, when it was secured. This broadcast was used in addition to Tokyo's regular UTU. Tokyo also broadcast traffic on 6665 kcs (A) during the evening."

[10] 3. It was a matter of official record in Op-20-G, and common knowledge among our intercept operators, that the Naval Radio Station Tokyo had, on several occasions during the period 1936-1941, keyed other transmitters for test or during Grand Maneuvers of the Combined Fleet. The transmitters that are specifically remembered are:

Haranomachi (250 miles north of Tokyo) (Commercial)	19.6	kcs	400 kw (reported)
Fukuoka (near Sasebo) (Commercial)	32	kcs	100 kw (estimated)
Kure (Navy)	57	kcs	50 kw (estimated)
Yokosuka (Navy)	63	kcs	50 kw (estimated)

By way of comparison, corresponding characteristics are listed for the transmitter used for regular Tokyo UTU broadcasts:

Tokyo (Navy) 39 kcs 100 kw (estimated)

It was also a matter of general knowledge and official record that Tokyo Radio normally operated at reduced power but did not hesitate to go to full power when anything important occurred. Broadcasts on 19.6 kcs from Haranomachi (JAA), the most powerful station in Japan, would have implied submerged reception by submarines or transmission to a far-distant surface force.

4. References (d), (e), (f) and (g) report actual sighting of the Japanese Naval Forces referred to in paragraph 2 above. Reference (g), reporting the Japanese Amphibious Force which landed at Kota Bharu a day or two later, was deciphered in the Navy Department Code Room at 1557 GCT on 6 December 1941. This was approximately two hours before reference (a) was received by Op-20-G. In view of the actual sighting of the Japanese Invasion Force heading for the Kra Peninsula, reference (a) came as an anticlimax.

L. F. SAFFORD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

[*11*] Enclosure (A)

From: CINCAF
Date: Dec. 2, 1941
Decoded by: Laresen
Paraphrased by: Purdy
Ø2Ø345. CRØ759

For Action: OPNAV PP
Information: CINCPAC PP

Patrol plane sighted 9 submarines speed 1Ø course south at Ø23Ø GMT LAT 13-1Ø north long 11Ø degrees.

Shown DOO ØØØØ
Shown OPDO Ø85Ø
Shown 38W Ø85Ø

Dist: 38W Action
Record Copies 38S DOO 38 12 13 16
Navaide JRB

CNOL
2Ø OP

[*12*] From: CINCAF
Date: 2 Dec 1941
Tor Code Room 1Ø48
Decoded by: Weinstock
Paraphrased by: Purdy
ØØ73Ø CRØ778

For Action: OPNAV PPPP
Information: CINCPAC PPPP

Bear Ø7Ø from Saigon distant 18Ø M miles 3 type 1-61 submarines in cruising formation headed south 15 knots. 21 transports anchored Camranah Bay with six planes patrolling overhead.

Distribution:
38W Action.
Record Copy: 38S 12 38 16
Files: CNO 2ØØP General

Shown OPDO by W. Bell
021120
SHOW OPDO
GBM: No action copy requested

NavAide JRB H

[*13*] Todays reconnaissance no results of significance other than as previously reported X the nine submarines were line abreast five mile spacing X ships in Camranh are mostly large several probably cargo only X our planes having been sighted on Indo China coast three successive days have discontinued search that locality for the present XX action addees are C X M and cinc csina via numeral cypher XX goodnight.

38W—Action
Record copy 38S—12—38—16
13—Navaide

CNO
20 Op
Secret
Routine

From: CINCAF
To: OPNAV
By: HUTCHINSON
Exact Translation NAVCOM-14

Refer: Ø21636
Tox: 2Ø17 Indicator: GUPID
Date: Dec. 2 1949

Ø896

[14] ~~GOLF~~ ~~BALLSDXX~~ Cinc China reports quote two five ship convoy with escort six cruisers and ten destroyers lat eight north one zero six east at zero three one six Greenwich today X convoy ten ships with two cruisers and ten destroyers seven dash forty north one zero six dash twenty east two hours later X all on course west X three additional ships seven dash five one north one zero five east at zero four four two course three ten X this indicates all forces will make for Kohtron repeat Kohtron unquote X my scouting force sighted thirty ships and one large cruiser anchored Camranh Bay ~~XX~~ ~~NIBLICK~~

Priority Secret
From: CINCAF
To: OPNAV
By: CURTIS
Exact Translation

Refer: 061255 CR Ø151
Tox: 1557 Indicator: CETYH
Date: 6 Dec 41

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[15] Secret 21 MAY 1945.

Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett U. S. N. R.

Subj: Information concerning the Japanese passenger ship TATUTA MARU and American passenger ship PRESIDENT MADISON.

Ref:

(a) CinCAF Ø1Ø3ØØ (Dec. 1941).
(b) OpNav Ø71722 (Dec. 1941).
(c) "Where Away" (1944) by Perry & Leighton.
(d) AmCon Batavia #263 dated Dec. 31, 1941.
(e) AmCon Singapore #391 dated Dec. 29, 1941.
(f) Minister Vichy #1191 dated Aug. 14, 1942.

1. Reference (a) requested authority for CinCAF to use the PRESIDENT MADISON for evacuation of American Marines plus about 615 American Nationals in North China area, and advised that the MADISON could arrive at Chingwangtao (seaport for Peiping) on 10 December 1941.

2. Reference (b) advised CinCAF six days later that the State Department was informing the Japanese Government of the MADISON'S movements and requesting that she be allowed to proceed "freely and without hindrance" in return for similar arrangements "made for TATUTA MARU now enroute Los Angeles to evacuate Japanese Citizens." It is apparent from the tone of reference (b) that war in Eastern Asia is anticipated but that this war does not include the United States. Reference (b) was prepared by the Central Division of Naval Operations (Op-13) and the records of that Division may contain additional information on this subject.

3. Reference (c) states on pages 39-48 that the USS MARBLEHEAD joined the PRESIDENT MADISON on 9 December 1941 in Balikpapan (Borneo) and escorted her to Surabaja (Java). It mentions the "frightened passengers" on the MADISON. References (d) and (e) report the departure of the MADISON (with evacuees) for Colombo on 29 December 1941.

4. Reference (f) is the State Department's only readily available reference to the TATUTA MARU. It reports that the TATUTA MARU will be used as an "exchange ship" for civilian internees. However, it is believed that additional information could be located in the files of the State Department, of Op-13, and of Op-20-G.

5. An interesting story appeared in reference (c) on page 28, as follows:

> "Back in the States it was still December 6th. A minute or two after three that morning a plain-language message came over the radio. * * * By 3:15 the general alarm began hammering the MARBLEHEAD's people into wakefulness. * * * Over the loudspeaker system were coming the

relentless words: 'Man your battle stations.' When all stations had been manned, an announcement was made over the public address system: 'We have just received an official plain-language message which says. "The Japanese have commenced hostilities. Act accordingly." ' "

L. F. SAFFORD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

NOTE: The Memorandum bear the following handwritten notes:
"The authors were a bit ambiguous at this point."
"Dick Lern, Navigator of the MARBLEHEAD says this was just after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Monday Dec. 8th, Tarapan Time. A check with the book shows that 'still Dec. 6th referred to the quiet evening' the day before Ø3ØØ/8th (Tarapan Time)=21ØØ/7th GCT=1Ø3Ø/7th (Pearl Harbor Time)"
"This could have been based on CincPac Ø71542 or NSS Ø71939 ([illegible] 142).

[*17*] Secret

[Handwritten note:] Note: Not given to Adm. Hewitt or Lt. Cdr. Sonnett. Memorandum of conversation with Mr. Walter Foote at the State Department on Wednesday, 30 May 1945.

1. Mr. Walter Foote was the American Consul General at Batavia, Java, from 1927 until the capture of Java by the Japanese in 1942, except for a short tour of duty in Australia. At the present time he is attached to the State Department and is standing-by to return to Java as diplomatic representative of the United States Government. Mr. Foote knew all the NEI officials intimately and was taken into their confidence in all official matters in their relations with Japan. Mr. Foote may be reached on Branch 420 at the State Department, in care of Miss Jane Wilson.

2. Mr. Foote got his information about the Winds "Set-Up" message from "Tony" Lovink, Advisor to the Governor General for East Asiatic Affairs. Mr. Lovink is now Netherlands Ambassador at Chungking, being one of the few high Dutch officials to escape from Java. Mr. Lovink was head of the NEI Intelligence Service and was well informed as to Japanese plans and intentions. As early as July, 1941, Mr. Lovink informed the Governor General that Japan was planning the conquest of East Asia and the only thing in doubt was just when the Japanese would commence their advance. Mr. Lovink said the Winds "Set-Up" was the first tangible thing that he had to show his Government to prove his predictions. As he expressed it, "It was the first thing I could sink my teeth into." Mr. Lovink kept warning the NEI Government as to the Japanese plans and preparations for war, and was regarded as an alarmist. Subsequent events proved him 100% correct throughout.

3. Mr. Lovink informed Mr. Foote of the Winds "Set-Up", and Mr. Foote sent Batavia confidential message #220, dated 4 December 1941, addressed to the State Department, after thinking the matter over for about two hours. This message was largely at Mr. Lovink's behest. Lieut. Colonel Thorpe, USA, and Lieut. Commander Slawson, USNR, got their translations of the Winds "Set-Up" directly from the NEI War Department at Bandoeng. (Lt. Comdr. Slawson was killed in action off the coast of New Guinea.) (Lt. Col. Thorpe is believed to be still alive.)

4. The Dutch listened for the Winds "Execute" message but did not hear it. Mr. Foote is positive that he would have been notified if any Winds "Execute" had been heard in Java. The Dutch were convinced that Japan was going to make war on them on December 6, 1941, when the big convoy of 35 transports (Mr. Foote's recollection), guarded by about six cruisers and several destroyers, was sighted heading straight for Kota Bharu (Malaya). The Dutch did not think that Japan was going to attack the United States and Pearl Harbor came as a complete surprise to them.

5. Vice Admiral Helfrich, NEI Commander in Chief, ordered his subs to sea on December 6, possibly earlier, and stationed them to defend the Netherlands East Indies. Submarines had orders not to commence hostilities [*18*] without positive orders. When the news of the Jap attack on Pearl Harbor reached Java, the Governor immediately broadcast the following message to all NEI armed forces:

"We are now at war with Japan which has just attacked Pearl Harbor,"

or words to that effect. The Dutch Navy commenced hostilities immediately after this broadcast but took no hostile action before. (Vice Admiral Hel-

frich attended the San Francisco Conference in 1945 as one of the Dutch delegates.) The story that NEI Fleet put to sea on December 6, 1941, with orders to sink anything flying the Japanese flag seems to be a somewhat garbled version of what actually happened.

6. The NEI Intelligence were very alert. They had all the leading Japanese under constant surveillance throughout November and December, 1941, and had most of them under arrest within fifteen minutes of the time the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor was broadcast by the Governor General. Mr. Foote personally saw one whole block of Japanese run down the street in their underclothes in the custody of NEI policemen.

7. Mr. Foote lived next door to the Japanese Consul General and saw his arrest a few minutes after the previously-mentioned incident. Mr. Foote saw the Japanese Consul General burn his codes and secret papers in his back yard a day or so before Pearl Harbor. He could see servants bringing papers from the consulate and could see the smoke flame up each time a new batch was thrown on. (Mr. Foote was burning his own secret papers at the same time in his own back yard.)

8. When Mr. Foote came to Washington about a year ago, prior to going to duty at Curacao, NWI, he looked up all his telegrams and reports on file in the State Department to refresh his memory. Mr. Foote recalled the #220 as soon as he saw it. He stated that there was no record in the State Department of any further reference to the Winds Message or anything in the nature of a war warning, and that he did not recall ever having sent one. He is thoroughly convinced that the Dutch did not hear the Winds "Execute" message but that they would have believed it if they had heard it. Mr. Foote was one of the very last white men to leave Java. He escaped on a small steamer from a small port down the coast with nothing but the clothes on his back. He received the warning to get out from Captain J. M. Creighton, U. S. Navy, who escaped through some other route, believed by plane.

9. "Tony" Lovink was thoroughly convinced that the Winds "Execute" message would contain the Japanese Government's decision as to peace or war with Russia, the United States, and England (including NEI), respectively, and impressed this fact on Mr. Foote.

10. The above memorandum is prepared from notes made at the time and is a reasonably accurate summary of Mr. Foote's statements.

22 JUNE 1945.

[*19*] Secret
Memorandum for Admiral Hewitt.
Subj: Pearl Harbor Investigation.
Ref: (a) My testimony given this date.

1. I now recall that Lieut. Commander Brotherhood told me that he did not receive a written copy of the "False" Winds Message from the F. C. C., but merely received the information by telephone. The only written version of the "False" Winds Message we ever had prior to 1944 was a memorandum of the phone call in Brotherhood's handwriting. Only one significant word (North) appeared and it was in English. It was this memorandum that Kramer threw in the "burn bag" after telling Brotherhood that this was not what we were looking for.

2. The Winds "Execute" Message which passed through my hands on the morning of 4 December 1941 was a teletype copy (typed on yellow teletype paper) of the entire Japanese broadcast about 200 or 300 words long. Three significant words (Kita, Higashi, and Nishi) appeared and they were in Japanese. Kramer's translation appeared in pencil, or colored crayon, at the bottom of the sheet. There was very little chance of confusion.

3. I would like to make one correction in the testimony I gave today:

"Mr. Phillip Cate, Japanese translator, employed by the Navy Department is still alive. It was his brother, employed as a Japanese translator by the War Department, who died a few weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor."

Respectfully,

L. F. SAFFORD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

[20] Confidential 14 JULY 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH ADMIRAL HEWITT'S INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER.

1. This memorandum is prepared, while events are still fresh in my mind, for possible use in connection with future Investigations of the Pearl Harbor Disaster or Court-martials in connection with Pearl Harbor. It includes certain acts which strike me as *irregular or unusual and probably illegal.*

2. On or about Friday, 11 May 1945, I was called to an unofficial conference (or meeting) conducted by Lieut. Comdr. John Sonnett, USNR, in Room 1083A, Navy Building. He was in civilian clothes, as he has been on every occasion on which I have seen him. Sonnett told me that he had been assigned as a legal assistant to Admiral Hewitt in an investigation of the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor Disaster, that he was also a special representative for Secretary Forrestal in this investigation, and that he was authorized to handle Top-Secret and Secret information and documents. He showed me papers signed by Secretary Forrestal and Fleet Admiral King verifying these statements. At my request, he let me read the Precept which directed Admiral Hewitt to conduct the investigation. It was my understanding that Admiral Hewitt had not yet returned to Washington and that Sonnett was getting things lined up to expedite matters after the Admiral's arrival.

3. I answered many questions pertaining to my testimony before previous investigations and discussed discrepancies between my testimony and the testimony of other witnesses. Sonnett requested that I give him, by the end of the next week, written memoranda to be used as a basis of study and examination (under oath) on the subjects listed below. This was done, and the memoranda submitted as follows:

Subject	Date submitted	Remarks
"Winds Message" (6 pages)	15 May 1945	Withdrawn on 18 May 1945 at the suggestion of Lt. Cdr. Sonnett. Original retained for possible future use.
Evaluation of Messages of 26 November 1941 (6 pages).	17 May 1945	Also lists the 6 carriers described by Com 16 as "all known First and Second Fleet Carriers."
Evaluation of "UTU" Broadcasts (8 pages).	19 May 1945	No action was taken because Jap invasion fleet had been sighted by RAF planes off Kota Bharu.
Tatuta Maru and the President Madison (1 page).	21 May 1945	Indicates that on 7 Dec. 1941 the CNO refused to believe that the U. S. would be involved in the war that was imminent in East Asia.

[21] On Sonnett's request, I prepared and furnished him copies of certain U. S. Naval messages, the Station "H" Chronology for 1–6 Dec. 1941, and Com 14 Daily CI Summaries for 1 Nov.–6 Dec. 1941.

4. It was apparent to me on my very first meeting with Lieut. Comdr. Sonnett that he was acting as a "counsel for the defense" for the late Secretary Knox and Admiral Stark rather than as the legal assistant to the investigating officer. His purpose seemed to be to re'ute testimony (before earlier investigations) that was unfavorable to anyone in Washington, to beguile "hostile" witnesses into changing their stories, and to introduce an element of doubt where he could not effect a reversal of testimony. Above all, he attempted to make me reverse my testimony regarding the "Winds Execute" Message and to make me believe I was suffering from hallucinations.

5. I talked to Sonnett the second time on 18 May 1945, and the third time a day or two later. On these latter occasions, like the first, Sonnett tried to persuade me that there had been no "Winds Execute" Message, that my memory had been playing me tricks, that I had confused the "False Winds Message" with what I had been expecting, and that I ought to change my testimony to permit reconciling all previous discrepancies and thereby wind up the affair. In some cases the idea was stated outright, in some cases it was implied, and in other cases it was unexpressed but obviously the end in view.

6. I distinctly recall Lieut. Comdr. John Sonnett, USNR, making the following statements to me during the course of the above-mentioned conferences:

"You are the only one who seems to have ever seen the 'Winds Execute' Message."

"How could the 'Winds Execute' be heard on the East Coast of the U. S. and not at any of the places nearer Japan?"

"It is very doubtful that there ever was a 'Winds Execute' Message."

"It is no reflection on your veracity to change your testimony."

"It is no reflection on your mentality to have your memory play you tricks—after such a long period."

"Numerous witnesses that you have named have denied all knowledge of a 'Winds Execute' Message."

"You do not have to carry the torch for Admiral Kimmel."

[22] 7. I testified before Admiral Hewitt the first time on or about 24 May 1945, before he went to Pearl Harbor. I testified before Admiral Hewitt a second time on 22 June 1945, after his return from examining witnesses at Pearl Harbor. Upon completion of my testimony (in which the "Winds Execute" Message had figured), I asked him, "off-the-record," if there was still any doubts in his mind as to the "Winds Message" having been sent by Japan and disseminated in the War and Navy Departments. The Admiral looked startled, and before he could reply Sonnett said:

"Of course, I am not conducting the case and I do not know what Admiral Hewitt has decided, but to me it is very doubtful that the so-called 'Winds Execute' Message was ever sent."

Admiral Hewitt thought a minute or two more and then said:

"You are not entitled to my opinion, but I will answer your question. There is no evidence of a 'Winds Execute' Message beyond your unsupported testimony. I do not doubt your sincerity, but I believe that you have confused one of the other messages containing the name of a wind with the message you were expecting to receive."

8. For my part, I do not doubt Admiral Hewitt's integrity, but I do believe that Sonnett has succeeded in pulling the wool over his eyes.

9. I also believe that Sonnett employed similar tactics on other witnesses whose testimony had favored Admiral Kimmel, particularly Rochefort and Kramer.

10. Copies of the memoranda described in paragraph 3 are appended hereto. Also appended is a memorandum to Admiral Hewitt, dated 22 June 1945, clarifying my testimony regarding the "Winds Execute" Message and indicating that Sonnett had attempted to trick me into stating the opposite of what I intended to say.

/s/ L. F. Safford,
/t/ L. F. SAFFORD,
Captain, U. S. N.

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[23] [Following Memorandum bears this handwritten note:]

18 May 1945.

Delivered to Lt. Cdr. Sonnett by Lt. Cdr. Linn about 1000 on 15 May 1945.
Withdrawn on May 18, 1945 at the suggestion of Lt. Cdr. Sonnett.
Retained for possible use at the Next (?) investigation of Pearl Harbor.

L. F. SAFFORD.

Secret 14 MAY 1945.

Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett? U. S. N. R.

Subj: Winds Message.

1. To the best of my knowledge and belief the following officers knew, in December 1941, that the Winds "Execute" message had been broadcast from Tokyo on (or about) 4 December 1941 (and prior to 7 December 1941), although some of them did not learn about it until after the attack on Pearl Harbor:

ARMY

Name	Present rank	Station and duty on 7 December 1941
George C. Marshall	General of the Army	Chief of Staff. U. S. Army.
Leonard T. Gerow	Lt. Gen. U. S. A	Director, War Plans Division.
Dawson Olmstead	Maj. Gen. U. S. A. (Ret.)	Chief Signal Officer.
Sherman Miles	Maj. Gen. U. S. A	Director of Military Intelligence. War Plans (Handwritten note) Military Intelligence Division (WDGS)[1] (Corrected after return. LFS).
Clayton Bissell	Maj. Gen. U. S. A,	
Otis K. Sadtler	Col. U. S. A	Army Communications, Office of Chief Signal Officer.
Rufus S. Bratton	Brig. Gen., U. S. A	In charge, Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence.
Rex W. Minckler	Col., U. S. A	Chief of Signal Intelligence Service, Office of Chief Signal Officer.
Harold Doud	Col., U. S. A	In charge, Japanese Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer.
[24]		
Robert E. Schukraft	Col., U. S. A	In charge, Intercept Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer.
Frank B. Rowlett	Lt. Col. (Signal Corps Reserve), U. S. Army.	Principal Cryptanalyst, Japanese Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer.

NAVY

H. R. Stark	Admiral, U. S. Navy	Chief of Naval Operations.
R. E. Ingersoll	Admiral, U. S. Navy	Asst., Chief of Naval Operations.
R. K. Turner	Vice Adm., U. S. N	Director, War Plans Division.
T. S. Wilkinson	Vice Adm., U. S. N	Director of Naval Intelligence.
Leigh Noyes	Rear Adm., U. S. N	Director of Naval Communications.
J. R. Beardall	Rear Adm., U. S. N	Naval Aide to the President.
J. R. Redman	Rear Adm., U. S. N	Asst. Director of Naval Communications.
F. E. Beatty	Rear Adm., U. S. N	Aide to the Secretary of the Navy.
L. F. Safford	Capt., U. S. N	Op-20-G. In charge, Security Section, Naval Communications.
A. H. McCollum	Capt., U. S. N	Op-16-F2. In charge, Far Eastern Sect., Naval Intelligence.
G. W. Welker	Capt., U. S. N	Op-20-GX. In charge, Intercept and Direction Finding Section.
[25]		
A. D. Kramer	Capt., U. S. N	Op-20-GZ. In charge, Translation and Dissemination section. (Actually attached to Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence.)
L. W. Parke	Comdr., U. S. N	Op-20-GY. In charge Cryptanalytical Section.
A. A. Murray	Lt. Comdr., U. S. N. R	Watch Officer in Op-20-GY.
H. L. Bryant	Chief Ship's Clerk, U. S. N.	Confidential Yeoman in Op-20-GZ.

[1] [Handwritten note:] Corrected after return. LFS,

[26] 2. An element of confusion was caused by the Tokyo Weather Forecast or "False" Winds Message intercepted by the F. C. C. at 2200 GCT, 4 December 1941, and phoned to Lt. Comdr. Brotherhood during the evening of 4 December 1941. It is believed that certain officers attached to Op-20-G in December 1941 had in mind the "False" Winds Message when they informed me that they knew of the "Winds Message." Their names are as follows:

Lt. Comdr. G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R.
Lt. Comdr. F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R.
Lt. Comdr. A. V. Pering, U. S. N. R.
Lieut. F. L. Freeman, U. S. N.
Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N.

The F. C. C. interception of another Winds Execute Message between 0002 and 0035 (GCT), 8 December 1941, proves that the Japanese Government *did* use this system for broadcasting *war warnings*.

3. There never has been any doubt in my mind that the Winds "Execute" Message was broadcast from Tokyo two or three days prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and forwarded to the Navy Department. The points in doubt, which I sought to clarify by sighting the incoming Japanese message (or its translation), were:

(a) Exact date [i. e. December 4 (Thursday) or December 5 (Friday) 1941].

(b) Exact wording of the original Japanese broadcast.

(c) Station call, time and frequency of the Japanese Radio Station which broadcast it. (This would reconcile "skip" phenomena.)

(d) Whether received in voice or Morse code.

(e) Station which intercepted the message.

4. After receiving the Winds "Execute" Message I discussed with Lt. Comdr. Welker (Op-20-GX) the advisability of discontinuing the special intercept watches being maintained to pick up the Winds "Execute." However, only two days previously we had translated Tokyo Circular #2409 (JD #6985) dated 27 November 1941—setting up a system for sending out "Hidden Word Messages" (INGO DENPO) in event of strained relations. Although we expected these would come over regular commercial circuits (as proved the case on the morning of 7 December 1941), we could not be sure, and it seemed advisable to continue the existing set-up which covered all possibilities (even though it meant the operators continuing their doubled-up watches), and required no further orders and no possibility of misunderstanding and confusion. It is my impression that Welker discussed the matter with Capt. Schukraft, and the Army made a similar decision. I have not discussed this with Welker since September 1942 and I have no idea how well he remembers this incident.

[27] 5. Somebody must have notified the War Department about the Winds "Execute" Message because Colonel Bratton telephoned to Admiral Noyes and requested a copy of the original Japanese broadcast so that he could verify the translation. (This was customary in highly important intercepts.) Admiral Noyes got quite indignant and told Colonel Bratton that the Navy's translation was correct and that the War Department would not be furnished a copy of the original message. The foregoing incident, if verified by Colonel Bratton will prove that the Winds "Execute" got as far as Rear Admiral Noyes and G-2.

6. There is one possible source of information on the Winds Message which has not been checked, namely—the Australian C. I. Organization. The Australians had a small C. I. Organization and in December 1941 they were intercepting Japanese Diplomatic radio traffic and reading messages in the J-19 system. (The Dutch in Java were also reading J-19, as well as the British in Singapore and London and the U. S. Army and Navy in Corregidor and Washington.) The Australian C. I. Unit had liaison with the Singapore C. I. Unit, including exchange of translations and keys, except for the Purple and Red machines. The Winds "Set-up" message (Tokyo Circulars #2353 (JD #6875) and #2354 (JD #6850), dated 19 November 1941) were in J-19. Singapore sent translations to Corregidor (CinCAF 281430 (COPEK) to OpNav) and undoubtedly sent these same translations to Australia. The Australians may have intercepted the Winds "Execute" Message on 4 December 1941. If so, this was the basis of Senator Ferguson's "Australian War Warning" which received much publicity in December 1943. This hypothesis could be easily proved or disproved. The following secret message to the Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne, is suggested:

Secret

"From: SECNAV.
"To: FRUMEL.

"Referring CINCAF twentyeight fourteen thirty November nineteen fortyone and Tokyo circulars twentythree fiftythree and twentythree fiftyfour dated nineteen November same year in jig nineteen did Australians intercept or know of such a warning broadcast from Tokyo on or about four December nineteen fortyone X If affirmative forward by airmail certified. Transcript of broadcast as received with notation as to date X time X frequency X voice or Morse X call letters of transmitting station X location of intercepting station and other relevant data."

[Handwritten note:. Australia knew of the Winds "execute" but did not intercept this message locally.

[NOTE: This message was never sent. LFS.]

[28] 7. Lieut. Colonel Rowlett heard of the Winds "Execute" by office gossip a day or two before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. A few days after the attack Colonel Sadtler came to him and said, "I would like to see the Winds Message," or words to that effect. Rowlett referred him to Major Doud, in charge of the section, who in turn referred him to Colonel Minckler, the Chief of S. I. S. The rest of the story belongs to the Army Investigation rather than the Navy Investigation except for the fact that it furnishes further proof of the authenticity of the Winds "Execute" Message and that some written record of it did exist in the War Department in December 1941.

8. A complete exposition of Radio Wave Propagation would be very lengthy and out of place. It is sufficient to say that the radio frequencies used between Japan and the United States were quite erratic in performance, and that long distance radio communications in an East-West direction are more difficult and less reliable than those in a North-South direction. A few pertinent examples can be given, namely:

(a) The long fourteen (14) part Tokyo Serial #902 (JD-1 #7143) was intercepted solid at Bainbridge Island, Washington. Part Two (of Tokyo Serial #902) and Tokyo Serial #904 (JD-1 #7144) were also copied at Cheltenham, Maryland, and forwarded to the Navy Department and used for the actual decryption. (This is verified in the GY Log for 6 December 1941.) The rest of Tokyo Serial #902 was "uncopyable" at Cheltenham.

(b) Part Two of the very important three-part Tokyo to Berlin #985 (JD-1 #6943) was missed but the first and third parts were copied solid.

(c) We finally had to call on Corregidor to cover the Berlin-Tokyo circuits as the combined efforts of Intercept Stations in the East Coast, West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide better than fifty (50) percent coverage. During the period 1 December-7 December 1941, the Navy Department received seventy (70) Japanese Diplomatic intercepts from Corregidor as compared with Seventy-three (73) from Bainbridge Island, Twenty (20) for all other U. S. Navy Stations, and ninety-three (93) for all U. S. Army Stations. The Japanese were trying to reach Rio and Buenos Aires as well as San Francisco, Mexico City, and Washington. (See distribution of Tokyo Serial #2354.) It is not at all surprising that the frequency used to reach Washington, Rio, and Buenos Aires skipped over the West Coast and Hawaii. There is a possibility that this frequency was heard in Australia even though it skipped over Manila, Singapore, and Java.

9. There is one final place where written confirmation of the Winds "Execute" Message may exist—the Record of Proceedings of the Roberts Commission. I cannot believe that they could cover up so completely that some mention of the Winds "Execute" did not slip into the record. First they said I didn't know what was going on around me; now they claim I am suffering from hallucinations. Under the circumstances it is only fair that I be permitted to search through the record for such evidence in order to prove my sanity, as well as my intelligence and my veracity.

[Handwritten note:] See testimony of Col. Fielder and Col. Bicknell—Dec. 24, 1941.

[29] 10. In conclusion the following quotation from my secret memorandum to Colonel West, dated 2 October 1944, is submitted for consideration:

"The reason for my stressing the '*Winds Message*' so much in my testimony (in all three cases) is because we could afford to talk about it, even print it in the newspaper, without detriment to the war effort. Even the Dutch know of the Code and the FCC listened for the message. We had the same information—*at the same time*—from more secret but less dramatic sources. Also the 'Winds Set-up' was the *nearest* thing to a warning CINCPAC ever got. If the 'Winds Execute' had been heard at Pearl Harbor, the fleet would not have been surprised. And because CINCPAC was given no information that the 'Winds Execute' had been sent, everybody at Pearl Harbor believed it had *not* been sent and that the Japs were still making up their minds as to the next step."

/s/ L. F. Safford,
L. F. SAFFORD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

[30] From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2354

When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations "Higashi"
(2) Japan Russia relations "Kita"
(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI) "Nishi"

The above will be repeated five times and repeated five times at beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, B. A., Mexico City, and San Francisco.

[Handwritten note] J-19 Key for this message passed to Washington (Navy Dept) by London (Admiralty) on Nov. 24, 1941.
JD-1: 6850 Secret Navy Trans. 11-26-41. S(TT) Intercepted Nov. 19, 1941.

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[31]

BATAVIA
Dated December 4, 1941
Rec'd 9:19 a. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

220, December 4, 10 a. m.

War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following from Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo:

"When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather reports: One east wind rain war with United States, two north wind cloudy war with Russia, three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice burn codes and secret papers."

Same re following from Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General Batavia:

"When threat of crises exists following will be used five times in texts of general reports and radio broadcasts: one Higashi east America, two Kita north Russia, three Nishi west British with advance into Thiland and attack on Malaya and Dutch Indies."

Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since 1936.

FOOTE.

Secret

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[32] Secret
From: Alusna Batavia
Date: 5 Dec. 1941
Decoded by: Kalaidjian
Paraphrased by: Purdy
Ø31Ø3Ø CRØ222

For Action: OPNAV RRRRR

From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. Code Intercept: Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain United States: north wind cloudy Russia: west wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

Distribution:
War Dept. Action Files: CNO 2ØP 2ØA
Record Copy: 2ØG X Show OPDO

[33] From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:
HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:
KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)

(3) Japan-British relations:
NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

[Handwritten note:] J-19 Key for this message passed to Washington (Navy Dept) by London (Admiralty) on Nov. 24, 1941.

JD-1: 6875 (Y) Navy Trans 11-28-41 S (TT) Intercepted Nov 19, 1941.

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[34] From: CINCAF
For Action: OPNAV
Date: 28 NOVEMBER 1941
Information-COMSIXTEEN
Decoded by: P R White

CINCPAC
COMFOURTEEN

[Handwritten:] COPEK.

281430

Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore X if diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed following words repeated five times at beginning and end of ORDINARY TOKYO NEWS BROADCASTS will have significance as follows X Higashi Higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and Nei XX on Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be used XX America Higashi no kaze kumori XX England X' Nishi no kase hare X unquote X British and comsixteen monitoring above broadcasts.

Secret

EXHIBIT NO. 152

BOARD OF WATER SUPPLY, HONOLULU, HAWAII

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON DAMAGE BY PROJECTILES IN THE CITY OF HONOLULU ON DECEMBER 7, 1941

Immediately following the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, and after several water main breaks and interruptions of water service had been reported, the writer was delegated by Mr. Frederick Ohrt, Manager and Chief Engineer, Board of Water Supply, to visit the various points in the city where damage had been done and to take notes on the damage and get photographs where practical. This was desired in order that the water department, as a vital agency, would be better qualified in the event of renewed attacks to operate effectively in protecting water mains and other installations and repairing any that were damaged.

Accordingly, on December 8, and several days following, some forty to fifty places were visited and available information collected. The chief points are listed below:

A Partial List of Points in Honolulu Reported as Struck by Projectiles on December 7, 1941.

(Not all these points were visited; some are probably duplicates due to confusion in reporting.)

Washington Place
South and Queen Streets
2840 Kalihi Street
2683 Pacific Heights Road
625 Ala Moana
758 Kaaloa Street
1807 Liliha Street
2653 Rooke Street
Alewa Heights
Fort and School Streets
Kuhio and Kalakau Streets
610 E Street, Damon Tract
North School Street
2160 Numana Road
Iolani Palace
Judd and Liliha Streets
Nisei Club, 44 South School
Lewers and Cooke Company
Hauoli and McCully Streets
Kalihi Pump Station
Fort Armstrong
Nuuanu and Kukui Streets
734 McCully
3122 Duval Street
2113 Bingham Street
Iolani School & Judd Street
Henry Street, upper end
1838 Puowaina Street
56 Wyllie Street
Lewers and Kuhio Streets
Kamehameha Heights
44 Dowsett Avenue
May Damon residence, Moanalua
2522 Kalihi Road
Moanalua Garden
Police Shooting Range, water front
2640 Kamanaiki Road
Waipa Lane
1443 Nuuanu Avenue
956 Spencer Street
1630 Leilehua Street
Robello Lane
Hawaiian Gas Products, Kuwili St.
467 Judd Street
Judd and Iholena Streets
Dowsett Ave. and Alika Drive
Kamamalu Park
Kukui Street

Principal sources of information were the daily papers, the Territorial and City-County offices of Public Works the City-County Road and Garbage Departments, the Board of Water Supply Maintenance and other divisions, the Honolulu Police Department daily log, and finally persons at the various sites of damage. The writer is not an expert in the field of ballistics, or high explosive projectiles, and to avoid error has recorded only what was actually seen, as to damage and explosion effects, without attempting to say what sort of projectile was responsible.

Many observers have testified to the immediate commencement of fire after the striking of projectiles at Lunalilo School and at McCully and King Streets, suggesting that these projectiles may have been of the incendiary type. At many other points the projectiles landed either inside or near houses and then exploded to produce two marked effects, (1) blast damage, and (2) splinter damage. The combination of these two was sufficient to totally wreck a small two- or three-room house when landing in it, or one side and a room or two of a larger house. In such case the damage as the far side of the house or two or three partitions away was not great.

The blast damage was very severe on an adjacent wall, floor, or windows, or on furniture in the room struck, blowing them out, and generally wrecking furniture. In some cases wood splinters or fragments of bric-a-brac were driven through plaster board in the manner of tornado damage. However, it was noticeable that blast damage fell off very rapidly and unbroken windows would be found in the second or third wall removed from the focus of explosion.

Splinter damage was similar in its falling off characteristics. Prentiss says splinter velocities may be 5,000 to 7,000 ft./sec., or 3 to 4 times that of a rifle bullet, but that because of small size and irregular shape, the velocity falls off very rapidly. Observations in Honolulu confirm this strongly. Splinters often went through wooden partitions or the first web of concrete hollow tile but commonly did not go through a second 1" board, and in no case seen by the writer did they go through both sides of an 8" hollow tile wall. In the near vicinity of the focus there was much tearing and rending of wood due chiefly to blast, or to displacement of the structure. In cases where the projectile landed in the street a few feet from buildings, the outer walls were well spattered by splinters, many of which did not pass through even the wooden wall.

A few passed through one or two wooden walls, or broke off corners of wood or masonry. Many windows were broken. It is the the writer's impression that except for large glass windows, by far the most damage was blast damage. (This applies to the particular projectiles involved chiefly on December 7, 1941, but is no prediction.)

Some projectiles landing in gardens and out of doors apparently did not explode at all, but merely made a one- or two-foot hole in wet ground and passed several feet downward. General advice to persons in air raids is well borne out by observations. At any point seen by the writer, a person lying in a two-foot trench or behind a two-foot embankment 20 feet away would have been safe. Of course some persons not over 20 feet away were unharmed without protection but that was good luck. Injury and death were due to being tossed about by blast effect, to being struck by objects actuated by blast, and to splinters or fragments of pavement or pavement thrown by explosion.

Damage in one store was exceedingly slight by direct hit, blast or explosion, but came chiefly by water from the breaking of one sprinkler head. The corner of one small garage annex was struck by a projectile which knocked off one or two cubic feet of the concrete foundation and splintered the corner of the woodwork but did not explode and did no injury to two people eight or ten feet away. All the observations of the writer indicate that on hearing a raid alarm it is imperative to get under the best cover that is nearby, and that side cover is most important, and roof cover next. If roof cover is not available, an open trench or the corner of a walled garage even if open to one side offer a large proportional safety.

Prepared by:

/s/ Chester K. Wentworth,
CHESTER K. WENTWORTH,
Principal Geologist.

Approved by:
/s/ Frederick Ohrt,
FREDERICK OHRT,
Manager and Chief Engineer,

December 23, 1941

(The remaining portion of Exhibit 152 is a map of the City of Honolulu, reflecting points struck by projectiles, December 7, 1941, and is reproduced as Item No. 37 In Exhibits—Illustrations to Proceedings of Joint Committee)

EXHIBIT NO. 153

STATEMENT TO THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

A RECORD OF CIVILIAN AND INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS IN THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

Introduced by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, Territory of Hawaii

[1] *To the Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate the Pearl Harbor attack*

I. Purpose of this statement

It is the understanding of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association that your Honorable Congressional Committee has as its objective an exhaustive investigation intended to present to the public a full report on all activities leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, and that in carrying out this investigation all persons have been invited to present to the Committee any material, documents or other relevant information pertaining thereto.

It is the further understanding of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association that your Committee, in addition to its primary objective of bringing before the public any relevant information having any bearing or significance relative to a final determination of responsibility for that disaster, is also interested in correcting any deficiencies, ommissions, misimpressions or incorrect conclusions or

inferences resulting from the reports of previous investigating committees or boards.

The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, on behalf of its member plantations, plantation agents, and the officials and individuals associated with these organizations, and on behalf of the Territory of Hawaii generally has therefore prepared this statement for the consideration of your Committee, with the request that it be entered into, and made a part of, the record of the Committee's investigation for three primary reasons:

First, it is believed that the information presented herewith, duly supported by records and documents or true copies thereof has direct bearing upon the activities of the armed forces in this area prior to December 7, 1941; and

Second, it is conclusive proof of an outstanding record of cooperation with the armed forces in the fulfillment of their mission prior to the beginning of the war in the Pacific, as well as subsequent thereto, on the part of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their agents, and individuals associated therewith and the Territory of Hawaii generally; and

Third, it is believed that the information presented herewith duly supported by records and documents or true copies thereof, is conclusive proof of the error contained in certain testimony given before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, appointed by the Secretary of War, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, to Ascertain and Report the Facts Relating to the Attack made by the Japanese Armed Forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and is also conclusive proof of the falsity of the inferences and conclusions which could be drawn from the reading of the Report of said Board as released to the public on August 29, 1945, in that said Report incorporated excerpts of the testimony herewith objected to in a manner indicating that the statements contained in said testimony were accepted by the Army Pearl Harbor Board, [2] which thereby were capable of false and misleading impressions, and which in fact did result in false and misleading impressions in the public mind in that said testimony and the presentation in said Report intimated a lack of cooperation with the Army and the Army Commanders in Hawaii, which conclusion is erroneous, is entirely lacking in foundation, and has resulted in a grave injustice to the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their plantation agents, officials and individuals associated therewith and the people of Hawaii generally.

The testimony specifically objected to as presented before the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor are those portions of the testimony of Major General Henry T. Burgin, U. S .A., Commanding General of Artillery, Hawaiian Department, said excerpts of testimony being set forth on pages 174–177, inclusive of the report of said Board as released on Wednesday, 29 August 1945, by the Secretary to the President of the United States. The statements in said testimony were that (1) one of the great handicaps to development of field artillery positions was resistance from land owners to letting the artillery go on the land or lease it for the placing of battery positions; (2) that if General Short had gone to Alert #3 there would have been great opposition from important and influential civilians on the island and particularly those who compose what is known as the Big Five; (3) that among those influential citizens whom he thought might have voiced their objection were, among others, Mr. Walker, a sugar man, General Wells, and the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, and those having the land and crop interests in sugar and other crops. The testimony to which objection is taken is set forth verbatim as Exhibit "A", appended herewith.

It is contended that the statements in this testimony before the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor are in error, that the statements are entirely lacking in foundation, and that the inferences of lack of civilian cooperation in Hawaii with the Army and Army Commanders which inferences resulted from the inclusion of said testimony in the Report of the Army Board are likewise in error and lacking in foundation, and that the weight of the evidence supported by the records prove conclusively an outstanding record of cooperation in Hawaii on the part of the people generally, and in particular on the part of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their plantation agents, officials and individuals associated therewith.

Summary

The following statement presents to your Committee a record of cooperation with the armed forces prior to December 7, 1941, and thereafter on the part of

the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their agents, and officials and individuals connected or associated therewith, and on the part of the Territory of Hawaii, which, it is submitted, is an outstanding record of cooperation and assistance.

On the part of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and its member plantations, this record of cooperation is one of established policy extending over a period of many years, built upon close relationship with the armed forces, and mutual recognition of the needs and requirements of the military and the contributions that could and have been made by the plantations in the defense plans of Hawaii. This policy of cooperation was further engendered and developed through the close liaison always maintained between the sugar industry and the military authorities by Major General Briant H. Wells (Ret.) a former Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army, who in 1934 was made Vice-President and Executive Secretary of the Hawaiian [3] Sugar Planters' Association following his retirement from the Army on completion of his tour of duty as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. This established policy of cooperation is proven by the fact that sugar plantation lands were made available for Army use prior to Pearl Harbor on each and every occasion that the Army requested the use of such lands. It is demonstrated by the establishment as early as 1940 of an extensive plantation provisional police organization with the purpose of providing police organization for the primary purpose of providing aid and assistance in the defense of Hawaii and the fulfillment of the mission of the armed forces in Hawaii. It is demonstrated by the comprehensive emergency food subsistence program for Hawaii developed by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association long prior to the war, and the organization prior to the war of comprehensive civilian defense committees engaging in extensive preparedness activities under plantation auspices in close coordination with civilian and military authorities. All of these instances of close cooperation and coordination are further emphasized by the war record of the sugar plantations of Hawaii and of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association in the aid and assistance given the armed forces on December 7, 1941 and thereafter, making available all plantation facilities, machinery, equipment, and manpower, in a period of critical emergency.

On the part of the people of the Territory of Hawaii it is submitted that the record of civilian preparedness activities prior to the war is outstanding for its appreciation of the emergency conditions existing in the Pacific long prior to Pearl Harbor. The readiness of the people of Hawaii to do whatever the military and naval commands might advise or desire and in many instances to undertake these preparedness activities on their own initiative, at considerable expense, with the firm conviction long prior to December seventh of the necessity for developing extensive defense preparations reflects to the lasting credit of the people of Hawaii.

This record of cooperation is presented hereafter in full. The preparedness activities of the civilian community of Hawaii is presented in the statements of persons in the community participating in the organization of these activities. It is submitted that these statements provide a complete refutation of the testimony referred to in the report of the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor and any inferences therefrom resulting from the inclusion of said testimony in the report of said Board. This record of cooperation with the military by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their plantation agents, and the officials and individuals connected therewith, and the record of civilian preparedness activities on the part of the people of Hawaii generally is submitted to your Committee with the request that it be made a part of the record of your Honorable Committee.

[4]

II.—*Certain Inferences of Lack of Civilian Cooperation in Hawaii as Contained in, and Resulting from, the Report of the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor are in Fact Conclusively Refuted Elsewhere in the Same Report.*

Certain inferences contained in said testimony are refuted elsewhere in the same report of said Army Board, although not specifically referred to in that portion of the report incorporating this testimony. For example, at page 59 of said report it is stated (italics added):

"General Herron, who preceded General Short, had been directed on June 17, 1940, by Washington, to institute an alert. (R. 213) This alert lasted six weeks. (R. 214–215). After it was suspended at the end of six weeks it was reinstated for a period. The alert was an all-out alert, with complete dispersion of forces into combat positions and with full equipment and ammunition.

"General Herron testified that there was no disturbance of the civilian population by the use of this all-out alert which was instituted under conditions similar to those which later prevailed for General Short's alert.

"When asked as to the Alerts 1, 2, and 3 of Short, he disposed of these alerts with the following language:

" 'General HERRON. That was a refinement that the training men put over on General Short when he came out there. I told him I would not do any such thing. There was only one kind of alert, and that was a total alert, and then I would do it in accordance with the situation. But the training men liked refinements, and they recommended three kinds because the Navy had three kinds. But they did not get to the real point of the thing. The Navy has three kinds, but the all-out alert is number one, always. Now they ease up into two and three; but these young men did not know that, and when Short came out they put over the three and got them reversed, so that Short went into the Number 1, which was sabotage. It did not seem to him a very important change, I don't suppose, and it turned out to be vital. It was too much of a refinement,' (R. 226–227)"

And at page 78 (italics added):

"As the entire attack upon Pearl Harbor did not extend beyond approximately three hours, it is obvious that the selection of the correct alert was vital. Historically, and by way of precedent, Short had before him the action of General Herron in the preceding year of an all-out alert under Field Order No. 1 of Herron by which complete dispersal of planes and troops and guns was affected, with ammunition at the guns. *The record shows (Colonel Capron and other witnesses—R. 1398, 2025, 2720, 2728, 2772–2773, 3096–3097)* that there was no *disturbance of the civilian population as a result of the action by Herron.* This is significant, in view of the fact, as will later appear, that General Short gives that explanation as one of his primary reasons for the selection [5] of Alert Number 1, because he might alarm the population. (R. 427–428, 532–533).

"It should be kept in mind that the civilian population was accustomed to the continued movements of the Army and Navy in their frequent maneuvers and practice operations. Much of the civilian population in this instance was living practically in the midst of one of the greatest military and naval installations anywhere, so that their state of mind would be far different, from that of people on the mainland unaccustomed to such sights. *Then, too, the newspapers oft-times contained much more exciting news, threats and disturbing events, than anything that an alert could stir up, either by the Army or Navy or both. The explanation therefore lacks both substance and credibility.*"

And further on page 79 (italics added):

"At this point the question of sabotage which led to the selection and implementation of Alert No. 1 should be examined. *No single instance of sabotage occurred while Short was in command up to December 7.* It was true that there were 35,000 aliens of Japanese origin and there was a total of 160,000 or about 37% of the population of Japanese origin or affiliations (R. 289), but *in no case was there any instance of misbehavior, despite a very exhaustive investigation being made constantly by the F. B. I. and by G–2, as well as by Naval Intelligence.*

"We have investigated the state of mind and the information as to the actions of the Japanese population in an endeavor to understand why it was that General Short adopted his anti-sabotage alert on November 27 in the face of the increasing international tension, and of his own estimate and that of the Navy that an air attack was the most dangerous form of attack likely to be encountered. We therefore resorted to the testimony of a great variety of witnesses in all walks of life in Honolulu, resident there during 1941, and inquired of their feelings and views and the whole situation as to the Japanese population.

"We could find no substantial evidence of any fear by these witnesses, including some of the best-informed leaders in the civil life of the Islands, that the Japanese would commit acts of sabotage. Their knowledge was based upon long residence in the Islands and experience with the Japanese. Governor Poindexter, newspaper editors like Raymond S. Coll, of the *Honolulu Advertiser*, United States District Attorney Angus Taylor, Shivers, head of the F. B. I., General Wells, executive vice-president of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, and

Walter Francis Dillingham, president of the Oahu Railway and Land Company and owner or director of many other enterprises in the Islands, concurred with many other witnesses such as ranch owners, government officials, leaders in business, that the risk of sabotage, so long as the Army and Navy were in a predominant position, before an actual landing and show of success by the Japanese, was a relatively minor matter. However, the Army was sabotage-minded. There appeared to be no substantial basis for this fear other than [6] speculation as to what a large body of citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry might do in case of stress."

On pages 130–131 it is further stated (underlining added):

"The third portion of the message (from the Chief of Staff's Message dated November 27, 1941, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department) is this: 'Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma alarm the civilian population or disclose intent. Report measures taken.'

"Comment: This was an order. Short could take such measures, including reconnaissance, as he deemed necessary. What was available to Short for reconnaissance and defensive action and the measures taken by him are fully discussed elsewhere.

"Here again we find the limitation that he must act cautiously. However, the weight of evidence indicated that a higher form of alert then that taken would not have alarmed the public."

These statements indicate that that portion of the testimony pertaining to objection on the part of influential citizens to an Alert #3, is itself refuted by the record and conclusions of the Army Board. The factual record supports this conclusion that the sugar plantations, and the Territory of Hawaii generally have at all times supported, assisted, and cooperated fully in all maneuvers, alerts, and other activities, training or otherwise, of the military authorities in Hawaii.

III.—The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its Member Plantations, the Plantation Agents and Officials and Individuals Associated Therewith Have as a Matter of Established Policy Cooperated in Every Way with the Army and Army Authorities

As to that portion of this testimony which was placed in the record, and thereafter the report of the Army Board, the statements to the effect that there was opposition from land owners to letting the artillery go on the land or lease it for the placing of battery positions, the record of cooperation with the military on the part of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations and their plantation agents is to the exact contrary, said record of cooperation being an outstanding one over a period of many years, reflecting in the written record thereof, cooperation which has presented no opposition to the military at any time in matters pertaining to requests connected with any defense preparation, plans and training, or other measures taken by the military. This record of cooperation is one commonly recognized, appreciated and accepted by former and present Army Commanders in this area.

To refute such statements and to acquaint your Committee with the record of cooperation of the sugar industry of the Territory of Hawaii with the Army and with Army authorities as a matter of policy, the files of all plantations and of the [7] Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association have been reviewed thoroughly. Endeavor has been made in the material presented hereafter to present a factual, complete picture of this record of cooperation, resulting from the established policy of the plantations to assist the armed forces in their needs and requirements. Supporting documents and records are included as exhibits. Brief statements of other community preparedness activities have been included to the extent that a true and accurate presentation can be made with brevity covering very extensive activities, where supporting documents would be voluminous.

Should the Committee desire additional material, records or other documents, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association is prepared to present such additional material at the convenience of the Committee.

IV.—Sugar Plantation Lands Were Made Available for Army Use Prior to Pearl Harbor Whenever The Army Requested The Use of Such Lands

The record of the sugar plantations in making lands available to the uses and requirements of the Army is an exceptional record extending over a period of many years. Since the major military activities in Hawaii prior to Pearl Harbor centered on Oahu, the location of Pearl Harbor, a study has been made of the requests made by the Army to Oahu sugar plantations during the period commencing in 1939 and extending up to December 7, 1941. This study involved a careful comprehensive review of all plantation records during this period. Review of all records of plantations and the records of the plantation agents discloses not a single instance in which *any* plantation denied entry to the Army. On the contrary every request, regardless of its nature, whether mere permission to use lands for a certain period or purpose without formal documents, or lease or license to enter, or entry prior to condemnation, was granted with promptness and complete cooperation, reflecting a mutual appreciation of the problems facing the military authorities which is illustrative of a high degree of coordination between civilian interests and the military which, it is contended, would not have been duplicated in any other part of the country.

The requests received by the plantations from the Army during the period mentioned totalled one hundred seventy-nine (179). Approval was given in every case. These requests were of various natures. For example, permission to carry out maneuvers on plantation roads and lands, to establish gun positions, either temporary or permanent, to install cable, radio and telephone communications lines, construct extension spurs to railroads, enter upon plantation lands for surveys for airfields and other installations, and a variety of other related military uses such as camouflage tests in cane lands.

These requests as granted by the seven plantations located on the Island of Oahu are graphically presented on the map attached herewith as Exhibit "B", made a part hereof.

The plantation boundary lines are approximate only, and encompass lands owned or under the control of the sugar plantations. Each black circle represents one request granted. All sugar plantations at one time or another granted blanket permission to the Army for maneuvers of infantry units, Artillery units, or the entire Hawaiian Department. Blanket permission so granted is reflected in shading the various plantations.

[8] Grouping of the circles in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor and Haleiwa reflect the greater concern of the military authorities with these areas. The fewer circles shown on the more remote plantations are indicative of lesser utilization by the military authorities of the lands of those plantations. It should be remembered that verbal authorizations granted, of which there were many, are not shown. Only requests supported by documents have been counted.

This visual presentation reflects the full cooperation at all times of all sugar plantations, regardless of the nature of the requests received by the plantations for the use of their lands. Without discussing each and every request, illustrative examples of the requests received, together with the authorization granted to the Army indicate how closely integrated the Army activities and plantation activities have been on Oahu and conclusively prove the high degree of cooperation. Without burdening down this statement with an exhaustive presentation, a few examples have been selected at random and are supported herewith by true copies of the substantiating documents.

Requests for permission to enter upon plantation lands were in many cases so common that blanket permission for the use of all plantation lands was often granted. In a letter dated November 8, 1940, Mr. James N. Orrick, the Manager of Kahuku Plantation Company, located on the North shore of Oahu, volunteered to Lieutenant General Herron, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to grant a blanket authorization covering the use of all the roads and lands under the control of the plantation for maneuver purposes, and including the use of plantation water and any other facilities deemed necessary to carry out maneuvers. In replying to this letter on November 13, 1940, Lieutenant General Herron stated:

"I am in receipt of your exceedingly gratifying letter of November 8th in regard to the use of plantation lands by the troops of this command. What you say in regard to the good conduct of troops on your lands and your most generous offer of a blanket permission give me the greatest pleasure. Please accept my sincere thanks for any my appreciation of your very helpful offer."

Copies of this exchange of correspondence are set forth herewith in full in Exhibit "C".

Similarly by indorsement on February 17, 1941, blanket permission was granted by Oahu Sugar Company to the 64th Coast Artillery (Anti-Aircraft) to occupy positions from time to time on the property owned and controlled by the plantation. Copies of the exchange of correspondence between the Army Colonel Commanding the 64th Coast Artillery (AA) and the plantation manager are included in Exhibit "C". A similar authorization had previously been given on November 21, 1939, on an unlimited time basis by Honolulu Plantation Company to the same Coast Artillery unit. This correspondence is also included in Exhibit "C."

Similar blanket permissions were also granted by other plantations, and are recorded on the attached map.

Contrary to any of the statements concerning opposition from land owners relative to leases of land for gun positions, the records of the sugar plantations indicate that prompt and comprehensive authorization was at all times given whenever request was made by the Army authorities. Immediate entry was granted as a matter of established policy without requiring execution of the formal documents.

[9] For example, in June, 1941, the Real Estate Officer, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, was in the process of leasing three sites of approximately three acres each from Ewa plantation Company, two of which were required for anti-aircraft gun sites, the remaining one for a Sub-Sector Command Post. In a letter dated June 4, 1941, Mr. A. S. Davis, Vice-President of Ewa Plantation Company, pointed out that the plantation was prepared to discuss the terms and conditions of the lease and further added:

"If, however, the importance of this matter to the National Defense Program is such as to require immediate occupancy by the War Department of the areas proposed to be taken, Ewa will be agreeable to such a plan, upon the understanding that, at a later date, maps delineating the specific areas will be furnished by you, together with a formal document."

Copy of this letter is set forth in full in Exhibit "D".

A similar letter dated May 29, 1941, was sent by Mr. John H. Midkiff, Manager of Waialua Agricultural Company, Limited to the same Real Estate Officer, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, authorizing entry on plantation lands to permit immediate construction of eight gun emplacements, two mortar positions, and permanent trenches and fortifications, it being understood that maps delineating the specific areas would be furnished with a formal instrument covering same at a later date. This authority was granted less than one week from the date of receipt of the request. Copy of this letter is included in Exhibit "D"

Similarly, when on April 25, 1941, Lieutenant General Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, addressed a letter to Mr. H. A. Walker as President of Waianae Company, requesting that the Army be permitted to initiate construction of certain railway spurs across the plantation lands, pending final acceptance by the War Department of the license already granted to the Army to enter and use the plantation lands involved, the plantation through its agents, American Factors, Limited, of which Mr. Walker was President, authorized immediate entry. This authority for immediate entry was transmitted within three days of the time that General Short made his letter request. Exchange of this correspondence is set forth in Exhibit "D".

Other examples can be selected at random. It should be pointed out, moreover, that many of these requests involving troop maneuvers meant many hundreds or even a few thousand men and many vehicles using plantation roads and lands during maneuvers of individual units, as part of division maneuvers, or the entire Hawaiian Department, such maneuvers being scheduled in many instances as surprise alerts. There are attached herewith copies of three letters to Waialua Agricultural Company, Ltd. and to Ewa Plantation Company with reply indorsement thereon authorizing use of lands for planned maneuvers during 1941, and reflecting the constant use of plantation lands by Army units. (Exhibit "E".)

A variety of other requests have been made in the past to the plantations by the Army and promptly granted in a spirit of complete cooperation. For example, in January 1941, the Commanding General of troops at Schofield Barracks desired to perform experiments with the possibilities of camouflaging gun positions in

canefields. This assistance was immediately given by Waialua Agricultural Company, Limited. Exchange of correspondence is attached hereto in Exhibit "F".

At another time a request was addressed to Oahu Sugar Company requesting that new plantings of cane be started about five yards from the fence line at the Waipio Sub-Station (electric power station) in order that defense of the Sub-Station [*10*] against sabotage might be facilitated and at the same time be made more effective. This request was immediately recognized as set forth in the correspondence included in Exhibit "F".

Further evidence of the willingness of the plantations to cooperate in all matters pertaining to the defense potential of plantation facilities is reflected in a letter of Waialua Agricultural Company, Limited dated July 21, 1939, furnished to various Army authorities including the Department Service Command at Fort Shafter which supplied the authorities with information relative to total employees, the racial groups, engineer and motor equipment available, railroad equipment, etc. Copy of this letter, included in Exhibit "F", is illustrative of the information which has been furnished by all plantations in response to Army requests.

Commanding officers have always been appreciative of this established policy of cooperation as evidenced by this active assistance promptly granted.

When Lieutenant General Herron relinquished his command of the Hawaiian Department to Major General Short in February, 1941, he addressed letters of appreciation to the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association expressing appreciation for the continued and substantial contributions of the Association to National Defense. This letter concluded:

"Please believe that the liberal and helpful attitude of the Association is not lost upon the Army and that we are grateful. For my successor, General Short, I bespeak your good offices and a continuance of the generous assistance you have always given to the Army in Hawaii."

Copy of this letter is set forth in full as Exhibit "G".

Letters of appreciation were addressed by General Herron to the various plantations recognizing the cooperation given. Similarly, letters have been received from other commanding officers reflecting their appreciation for consistent cooperation. On June 3, 1940, the Commanding General, Schofield Barracks and Hawaiian Division, Major General Wm. H. Wilson, U. S. A., addressed letters to the plantations expressing appreciation for the cooperation given during the maneuvers in May 1940. Illustrative of these letters is that addressed to Oahu Sugar Company, Limited, included in Exhibit "G". This letter states:

"The success of the maneuvers, completed May 25, 1940, has in a great measure been facilitated by the cooperation of private land owners in allowing Hawaiian Division to use land during this period."

Other phases of this continuous cooperation have been recognized, as for example in a letter from Lieutenant General Short, dated November 29, 1941, thanking Mr. Hans L'Orange, Manager of Oahu Sugar Company, for the assistance rendered in surveys, layouts and location of the airport in the vicinity of Kipapa, although the original plans to locate an additional airport at that location was changed in favor of construction at Kahuku Point. This letter is set forth verbatim in Exhibit "G".

With such evidence of cooperation it is believed that the record of the plantations in making their lands available whenever requested by the Army and to whatever extent required is a record of complete cooperation. It is difficult therefore to understand for what purpose or on what basis the testimony protested herein, amounting as it did to a grave injustice to the Territory generally, could have been introduced in the record without factual support or to understand how the Army Board could therefore proceed to indicate [*11*] acceptance of this testimony without ascertaining the true factual record of cooperation.

V.—Organization of Sugar Plantation Provisional Police Guard in July, 1940

An outstanding example of a record of cooperation between the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and its member plantations with the Army is demonstrated in the early organization of the Plantation Provisional Police throughout the plantations on Oahu, commencing at the early date of July 30, 1940. Undertaking this program of organization of groups of employees trained in police work under leadership and guidance of trained police of the police

force of the City and County of Honolulu, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the plantations through the Oahu Sugar Managers' Association proceeded to develop an effective police organization whose objective was complete training to meet any emergency which might arise.

At a special meeting of the Oahu Plantation Managers' Association held at Waipahu on July 19, 1940, in conjunction with the Army and City and County Police authorities, Mr. T. G. S. Walker was appointed Coordinator of Plans for any emergency which might arise. In a confidential memorandum dated July 30, 1940, to all Sugar Plantation Managers on Oahu, the newly appointed Coordinator outlined the various alerts which the organization of the Provisional Police was intended to meet. Plan No. 1 envisioned an alert. Plan No. 2 envisioned "sudden and unpredicted overt acts by disloyal inhabitants, whether accompanied or not by hostile 'Blitzkrieg' from air or sea." This confidential memorandum is set forth in full as Exhibit "H".

No publicity was given to these initial plans nor to their purposes. Nor was any publicity given to the fact that the sugar plantations were undertaking this program in cooperation with Army authorities. In the confidential memorandum dated July 30, 1940, issued by the Coordinator, it was requested that this work be kept as confidential as possible and the police be mentioned as the instigators rather than the Army. This was at the request of the Army authorities.

This organization contemplated, in addition to the actual organization and training of police, the procurement of any information bearing upon any phase of internal security. This is reflected by the transmission of Memorandums to the Coordinator and to the Chief of Police as early as July 31, 1940, setting forth lists of local Japanese on the plantations as well as pointing out incidents of rumors and their source, and the names and locations of any questionable characters.

At a meeting held at the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association Board room on Tuesday, August 6, 1940, at which Major Melvin L. Craig, Department Provost Marshal, Major W. O. Poindexter, Provost Marshal's Office and the Chief of Police, Mr. W. A. Gabrielson, and the Managers of all Oahu plantations were present, the Chief of Police presided requesting details as to number of personnel, trucks and living quarters to be supplied by each organization. Districts and each beat boundaries were explained. A program of lectures at each of the plantations was outlined covering the next two weeks. A Memorandum of the Coordinator states relative to this meeting that

"Major Craig expressed General Charles D. Herron's thanks for the splendid cooperation being shown by the Plantation Managers." (See Exhibit "I".)

Although it was never publicly expressed, the salary of the Coordinator, who was employed on a fulltime basis for the organiza- [12] tion of these provisional police, was paid entirely by the seven Oahu plantations, through the Oahu Plantation Managers' Association, on a pro rata basis.

The close coordination which was maintained by this voluntary organization with the Army forces of the Hawaiian Department and with the Police Forces, City and County of Honolulu, is shown by the provisional police plan for emergency guard divisions prepared by the Office of the Chief of Police on August 12, 1940, and issued over the signature of the Chief of Police, Mr. W. A. Gabrielson. This plan issued as a confidential memorandum states that "the provisional police plan is to provide the personnel and other means necessary to protect from overt acts all agencies and establishments, both civil and military, which are essential to the defense of the Island of Oahu, the defense of which is not charged to combat elements nor located on military reservations. In the performance of this mission the City and County of Honolulu Police Department will take over when directed by the Department Commander." This plan is set forth in full as Exhibit "J". The plan divided the Island of Oahu into four police districts, Police District No. 1 embracing the City of Honolulu and the remaining three districts comprising the rural districts.

Dividing the rural districts into beats correspondng to the plantations and one beat comprising the three pineapple plantations, the plan then contemplated the selection of guards after careful scrutiny of their records, estimating that a grand total of 836 guards would be required for this plan. Prior to the date that the plan was to become effective, it was stated that the Army would furnish the Police Department a detailed map of installations to be guarded. Sugar plantation managers agreed to provide messing and housing facilities for the personnel furnished from their respective plantations. Until proper arrangements were made otherwise, th sugar plantations agreed to furnish the necessary

trucks, including one riot truck equipped with armor plates or sand bags and armed with machine guns and sufficient personnel, located at every police district headquarters. Tour of duty on each installation would be based upon the decision of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department prior to the effective date of the plan. The plan also contemplated that arms, ammunition and equipment sufficient for the proper discharge of these duties would be furnished by the Army. This organizational plan was distributed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, the Chief of Police, the Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department and the Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Division.

On the basis of this provisional plan, and proceeding in cooperation with the plantation managers, the Coordinator proceeded to organize the necessary guards on each plantation. It should be pointed out that this organization was entirely separate from the units of regular plantation police.

Actual organization embraced much more than that of police guard. A memorandum of the Coordinator indicated that interest was being worked up in local food production, storage of food, establishing a fire alarm system and also emergency facilities and hospitals. Reports relative to Nazi or Japanese activity and rumors pertaining thereto were checked carefully at all times. Commencing in December, 1940, arrangements were made to give men from each plantation instruction in shooting on the police range.

The complete coordination between the Coordinator of Provisional Police plans, the plantation managers and the provisional police on the plantations and the Army authorities is reflected in a letter to the plantation managers from the Coordinator dated December 17, 1940, pointing out that the [13] Coordinator had been requested by the Army authorities to sit in on the Headquarters Staff exercises covering war conditions. The coordinator stated:

"During these exercises Col. Craig took me around and introduced me to the various Headquarters Staffs who would be especially cooperating with the plantation managers and civic authorities.

"Col. Hayes, the Chief of Staff, tentatively suggested that the plantation managers and some of their executive staffs might care to have a similar exercise worked out for them with regard to the possible conditions which might face them in time of emergency. It was suggested that Col. Poindexter might work out such a plan with the Chief and me, and at some mutually agreed on date suitable to all plantations, the plantation managers and their executive staffs might go through an exercise with Poindexter, the Chief, and possibly myself actnig as neutral judges."

This letter is set forth in full as Exhibit "K".

In December, 1940, it was arranged that General Herron visit Governor Poindexter to explain the urgency of finding some means, if possible, under the home guard defense laws by which funds could be drawn to uniform, equip, and give armed training to the provisional police guard. Apparently no action developed from this since the plantations continued to finance the arrangements whereby the continuation of this training was possible.

In February, 1941, during one of the frequent Army alerts, a meeting was held between Army authorities, the Chief of Police, and executives of the civilian personnel of District #1. Each was asked to give a short summary of their actions regarding their anti-sabotage precautions, etc. On the basis of this alert and this coordination with the civilian personnel comprising the police guard of District #1, the Coordinator made arrangements whereby the other districts were trained for immediate response to any alert. Although the meeting with the civilian defense group during the Army alert was called at one hour's notice by the Army authorities, every company notified was represented by its chief executive.

On March 8, 1941, the Coordinator, Provisional Police Plan furnished to all plantation managers and to the pineapple plantation representative, Wahiawa, the complete mobilization plan for the provisional police. At this time the sketches showing the "vital points" in the various districts which the Army wished the provisional police force to guard were not furnished but were withheld to be forwarded as soon as released by the Department Provost Marshal.

In May, 1941, the Army planned and carried through Hawaiian Department maneuvers. The provisional police were invited to participate in these maneuvers. Five hundred eighty-two (582) members of the Provisional Police Guard did so participate. Officers and non-commissioned officers of the Army were designated to supervise and instruct the guard in the use of riot shotguns, as

reflected in the copy of letters of instructions dated May 5, 1941, from General Short to the Commanding General, Schofield Barracks, set forth in full as Exhibit "L." Five rounds of ammunition per man were furnished by the Army. Silhouette type targets were provided. Instructions for guards at bridges and other installations to [14] guard against sabotage by persons approaching on the ground or descending from the air by parachutes were spelled out specifically. Reports indicated all guards performed satisfactorily, keen and alert in the performance of their duty.

Soon after this alert, T. G. S. Walker, Coordinator, Provisional Police Plan, was selected by the Mayor, City and County of Honolulu, to act as Coordinator of the Emergency Disaster Council commencing June 17, 1941. Major Douglas King, Assistant to the Chief of Police, was designated by Chief of Police Gabrielson to continue the work of Coordinator in matters pertaining to this police guard organization. Throughout the remaining months until December 7, 1941, instruction continued unabatedly. The Army was requested and did furnish the noncommissioned officers to give instruction in the use of firearms. Instruction talks by the Chief of Police, the Chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department Provost Marshal were arranged at the various provisional guard units. Courses of instruction in First Aid which the Army authorities considered most necessary were also undertaken.

Immediately prior to December 7, 1941, this provisional guard detail totalled between 1500 and 1800 plantation employees. This unit swung into action on December 7th assuming guard duties immediately according to prearranged plan, thereby relieving Army personnel for duty elsewhere. They stood at their posts for many hours during the early days of the war pending final arrangements whereby many of these men became air raid wardens, or assumed other active defense duties.

VI. The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association Developed a Comprehensive Emergency Food Subsistence Program Long Prior to the War

For a long period prior to the war, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association had been directing attention to problems of local food subsistence. In 1935 the Association had created and established a Diversified Crops Committee composed of men representing all phases of agricultural activity in the Territory. Originally concerned primarily with study and research directed towards ascertaining what food crops could be grown in the tropical Hawaiian climate with profit to the growers and also as a phase of plantation activities, the Committee devoted considerable attention and effort to plans for producing locally crops in such quantities and of such a nature as would provide the entire population with adequate subsistence if any emergency stopped the flow of foodstuffs into the Territory from outside sources.

Successive Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department had been emphasizing subsistence food production as a major defense problem of the Territory, as a phase of the mission of the military forces. For a period of at least eight years before the emergency resulting from war in Europe, plans were being formulated, developed and revised by the Department Service Command and by the Civil Affairs Section, G–5, Headquarters Hawaiian Department.

Being fully cognizant of the activities of the Army in emergency food subsistence planning, Major General Briant H. Wells (Ret.), former Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association following his retirement from the Army, had invited the Army to designate a representative to attend meetings of the Diversified [15] Crops Committee and work with the Committee in coordinated planning. Lt. Col. James A. Ulio had been designated in 1937 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department and thereafter an Army representative was appointed each year. The close relationship between the Diversified Crops Committee and the Army authorities is reflected in a memorandum of Lt. Col. Ulio in 1937, explaining the objectives of the Diversified Crops Committee. Copy of this Memorandum is set forth in full as Exhibit "M".

In the latter part of 1940 the plans developed by the G–5 Section were officially made known to various civilian groups. With these expressions of mutual recognition by the military and civilian groups of the necessity for adequate planning to meet any emergency, new impetus was given to the activities of the Committee. The Pineapple Producers Cooperative Association also appointed a special food production committee which immediately undertook to determine

the extent to which pineapple lands on Oahu could be used to supplement cane and small farmers' lands in food production.

The close coordination between the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Army is reflected in the letter dated February 1, 1941, of Lieutenant General Herron to the Association previously referred to and set forth in full as Exhibit "G". In this letter General Herron stated in part:

"The attitude of all of your personnel is beyond praise, but I feel that I should especially express appreciation of the invaluable aid of your Secretary, General Wells, and of the vital and highly intelligent work done by your Diversified Crops Committee and its members."

In this connection, it should be kept in mind that every effort was made by the Trustees, President and Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association to include on the Committee expert agriculturists although they might not be directly employed by the sugar plantations or the Association. For example, the Standing Committee appointed by Mr. H. A. Walker as President for 1941 included Dr. H. L. Lyon, Chairman, Director of Experiment Station, Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association; Mr. H. P. Agee, Agricultural Consultant for Castle & Cooke, Limited, sugar factors, and Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Ltd; Dr. J. H. Beaumont, Director of the Experiment Station, U. S. Department of Agriculture; Dr. D. L. Crawford, President, University of Hawaii; Dr. A. L. Dean, Vice President, Alexander & Baldwin, sugar factors; Col. Casey Hayes, G–5 Section, Hawaiian Department; Mr. L. D. Larsen, Director Plantation Activities, and Vice President, C. Brewer & Co., Ltd., sugar factors; Mr. W. W. G. Moir, Agriculturist, American Factors, Ltd., sugar factors; and Mr. H. H. Warner, Director, Agricultural Extension Service, University of Hawaii. This representative group of agriculturists therefore included experts whose services the Army could not have obtained otherwise.

On January 30, 1941, sub-committees were appointed as active operating committees. These included an Animal Husbandry Sub-Committee, to promote production of meat, milk and eggs; a Chemical Supplies Sub-Committee, to ascertain requirements in fertilizers, fungicides, insecticides, weed killers, etc., and take steps to insure an adequate supply of each; a Field Operations Sub-Committee, to plan appropriate food crops on requisitioned land in sufficient quantities to assure an adequate diet for every person on Oahu; an Inventories and Disbursements Sub-Committee, to keep track of the fluctuating food supply and advise as to its equitable distribution, with particular [*16*] attention to inventories and the promotion of food conservation and food storage; a new crops Sub-Committee, to locate and demonstrate new food crops that might be grown to advantage; the Pineapple Producers Cooperative Association Relations Sub-Committee to coordinate the efforts in food production of the two respective organizations; and a Truck Gardens Sub-Committee, to stimulate production of truck crops on plantations, on small farms and in home gardens by independent growers. On February 7, 1941, an additional Army representative, Major A. R. Lamb, Sanitary Corps, was appointed to the Diversified Crops Committee as alternate for Colonel Hayes.

Indicative of the seriousness with which the Diversified Crops Committee undertook to develop comprehensive plans for emergency subsistence is the distinction made by it between plans developed for "Emergency A" and those developed for "Emergency B". "Emergency A" was defined as a condition of total blockade and complete isolation of Oahu from the mainland and off-islands. "Emergency B" contemplated a condition of total blockade and isolation of the Territory of Hawaii from the mainland or other sources of food and feeds.

Starting out in January, 1941, to develop intensively a plan of emergency subsistence for Oahu, the Field Operations Committee enlarged its personnel in May, 1941, by the addition of representatives on the islands of Maui, Hawaii and Kauai, with the additional responsibility of developing, with the assistance of the representatives of the Planters' Associations of the several islands, a Territorial emergency subsistence plan in which each of the islands might contribute to the subsistence of the civilian and military population of Oahu to an extent most consistent with their own and general Territorial interests. The enlargement of the Committee contemplated also the development of emergency subsistence plans for each of the islands with the assistance of the Planters' Associations of the several islands.

These efforts, directed as they were to the extreme emergency, Emergency "A", were entirely of a cooperative nature, to be coordinated with the military and government authorities. Final plans as submitted contemplated the requisition-

ing of lands, that good land would be taken out of cane production by authority of a food administrator, the withdrawal of such lands to be planted and managed in accordance with the plans developed.

Further indication of the close coordination between the committee of the HSPA and the Army is found in listing of appropriate food crops in the final plan as submitted on October 23, 1941, evolved to meet the extreme situation, Emergency A. The crops listed in the Army plan in September 1940, with two deletions and one addition were alone considered to be "appropriate food crops."

That the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Diversified Crops Committee and its sub-committees were at all times proceeding under clear recognition of the importance of the development of comprehensive emergency planning is clearly illustrated by the tone of a letter addressed to the then Territorial Governor, the Honorable Joseph B. Poindexter, on June 19, 1941, signed by Harold L. Lyon, Chairman of the Diversified Crops Committee and Director of the Experiment Station of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, following a conference of General Wells, Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, and Dr. Lyon with the Territorial Governor. He pointed out that the Committee had available at that date feasible plans for food and feed production in the Territory with the intention of placing these plans at the disposal of a food Administration if, and when such Administration [17] was created. He also made clear the extremes which the Committee assumed for purposes of the planning:

"If the extreme situation develops—That is, complete isolation of Oahu—the conditions which make this possible will render such exposed sections of the Island as Waianae, Kahuku, and Waimanalo unfit and unreliable for farming operations; therefore, plantings for the extreme emergency should be confined to the four major and centrally located plantations."

This letter is set out in full as Exhibit "N".

In the first few months of 1941, the Diversified Crops Committee had already evolved extensive plans of such a complete nature that Walter C. Short, Lieutenant General, United States Army, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, accepted the plans as submitted as the basis for all planning for Oahu. In a letter dated May 15, 1941, addressed to the Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, General Short stated:

"Please express my thanks to the Trustees of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association for the Report of the 'Field Operations Committee' and for the 'Emergency Planting Plan' of the Diversified Crops Committee.

"I feel that the Report, together with the Plan, is the best and most complete study on the subject of local emergency food production yet accomplished, and that this work will constitute the basis for all planning on this subject for Oahu.

"In this connection I have directed that the Planting Plan with such minor changes as may be necessary from a military standpoint, be incorporated in our current Food Production Plan for application to Army use should this ever be required.

Copy of this letter is set forth in Exhibit "O".

Efforts of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, and the various food specialists who had joined in the comprehensive emergency subsistence planning did not cease, however, with this approval, but continued throughout the rest of the year. On October 23, 1941, the Field Operations Committee submitted to the Diversified Crops Committee of the HSPA a complete "Emergency Food Production Plan," its comprehensiveness being indicated by the fact that it consisted of over one hundred and twenty-five pages of estimates, charts, graphs and compilations, representing a complete plan for any emergency. Commencing with careful estimates of the requirements for emergency subsistence rations for all the people in the Territory, the plan then specified the kinds of vegetables that should be grown, how many acres should be planted, how many pounds of seed obtained, what the initial seed orders should be, with computations of average yields per acre, and determination of the number of acres of sugar cane land, and pineapple lands to be planted and harvested each month and day. Fertilizer requirements were estimated for the various crops, and amounts determined on the basis of acreage requirements. Insect control requirements were also computed. Equipment, tools and machinery requirements were [18] also determined, and the number of the various kinds specified, with a listing of the priority of procurement. Tentative allotments of acreages of emergency crops among the various plantations were attempted with guidance from the military authorities in allotting subsistence food crops on Oahu to the four central plantations, Oahu Sugar Company Ltd., Waialua Agricultural Company, Ltd., Ewa

Plantation Company, Ltd., and Honolulu Plantation Company, Ltd., assigning forage and feed crops to Kahuku, Waianae and Waimanalo, located outside the pocket of Honolulu, Pearl Harbor and Schofield Barracks.

Assuming the necessary seeds and equipment were procured, and planting undertaken, it was still recognized that it would require considerable time for the crops to mature for harvesting. The Committee therefore compiled a list of staple foods and the amounts needed of each which the Committee recommended for storage and considered necessary to carry over an estimated six months period from the beginning of the emergency to the initial production of food crops. This list was later the basis for the imports and storage by the Federal Surplus Commodity Corporation acting in conjunction with the military authorities and the Food Control Section of the Office of the Military Governor.

The number of animals required, the number needed to be imported, the number that should be culled for economy of feed, the requirements of feeds and forage, and the acreages needed to be planted and harvested were computed carefully. The seed requirements for this feed were also tabulated, and the fertilizer needs for feed production, and the machinery required for feed crops. Considerations relative to increasing banana and papaya production and increasing the consumption of pineapples were explored carefully. Culture of yeast from sugar was explored as a means of supplying protein needs.

It was this plan which represented the culmination of years of attention and active experiments. It was this plan which the Army adopted as a basis for all emergency food subsistence planning.

As early as 1937, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association had appropriated money for food crop experiments and continued these experiments at some expense over a period of years. Money was also appropriated for the purchase of agricultural equipment required for cultivation of these emergency food crops and some equipment was purchased and delivered prior to the outbreak of war.

Considerable optimism has always been expressed by the uninitiated over the possibilities of growing temperate climate food crops in Hawaii, and considerable effort has been directed to this. The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association spent time and money, with all of the technical assistance of the extensive facilities of the experiment stations in experiments directed towards selectivity of suitable crops. The experiments conducted were without question worth many more times their cost, for they included the lessons gained from the experiments of expert talent familiar with climate and soil.

While these developments proceeded, in full coordination between the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Army, other committees were established such as the Food Committee appointed by the Mayor, City and County of Honolulu, in 1940, the Governor's Committee on Food Storage in March 1941, and the Governor's Emergency Food Commission in June 1941. Membership of these committees was closely integrated [*19*] with that of the membership of the Diversified Crops Committee.

Subsequent to December 7, 1941, an Advisory Committee for Food Crop Production was established by the Military Governor. However, the experiments and plans of the Diversified Crops Committee, Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, provided the basis for subsequent efforts directed towards local emergency food subsistence.

Any additional information desired relative to the extensive plans prepared for emergency food subsistence can be furnished promptly by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.

VII.—Oahu Sugar Plantations Provided the Basis for the Development of an Efficient Civilian Defense Organization Throughout Rural Oahu Prior to the War

Having organized an extensive provisional police organization throughout all of the plantations as early as 1940, and participated in blackout practices as early as 1939, the plantations were prompt in undertaking the development of civilian defense organizations in 1941, so that by December 7, 1941, each plantation had trained its personnel to swing quickly into action when the emergency arose.

Early in August, 1941, the Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu appointed Mr. Stafford L. Austin, Manager of Honlulu Plantation Company, as a member of the Major Disaster Council. Mr. Austin proceeded immediately to organize

a Rural Oahu Committee, with districts corresponding to the areas occupied by the plantations except for the Wahiawa area composing the town of Wahiawa and the pineapple plantations, and the Kaneohe area on the windward side of Oahu. Each of these divisions was in turn in charge of the plantation manager, ho in turn supervised various defense committees which prepared plans and mobilized all available plantation facilities for defense emergencies.

An appreciation of the extensive and efficient preparedness organization possible under this procedure requires appreciation of the facilities which the plantations were able to make available. In addition to the executive talent, and the existing organization of superintendents, supervisors, and all plantation workers, there were all of the physical plant facilities of each plantation, including power and light, fire fighting equipment, trucks, cranes, and fully equipped, completely staffed hospitals. Accustomed to working as units, the plantations provided efficient organizations to develop promptly elaborate civilian defense preparations. The assistance which the plantations were able to provide on the morning of December 7, 1941, not only to civilians in the vicinity of plantations but also to Army and Navy personnel and installations is ample proof in itself of the close coordination of the plantations and the military authorities, the integration of the plantation facilities with the military requirements, and the effectiveness of the defense preparations made by all plntations.

Without burdening your Committee with an exhaustive presentation of the activities of each plantation in the development of civilian defense organizations, the organization developed by Honolulu Plantation Company provides an example of similar organizations developed by all plantations, closely coordinated through the Chairman of the Rural Oahu [20] Committee of the Major Disaster Council.

Throughout August and September, each plantation designated committees which proceeded to hold regular meetings, engage in training, and organize plantation facilities. Committees were established for the following: Transportation-Evacuation, Police, Medical, Fire and Air Raid Warning, Communicatiou and Intelligence, Food Administration, Electric Power and Light, Rural Water, and Engineering. There is attached herewith as Exhibit "P", an outline of the Major Disaster Organization developed at Honolulu Plantation Company and distributed on October 3, 1941, by the Chairman of the Rural Oahu Committee to all Plantation districts.

The Fire and Air Raid Warning Committee proceeded to train its personnel, already trained in fire fighting, in the methods of handling incendiary bombs and fires resulting from other enemy action. This Committee distributed instructions, and conducted lectures and demonstrations for the education of the public in accordance with the procedure that became common throughout the mainland after the outbreak of the war.

The Medical Committee prepared plans to supply medical aid during the time of disaster, designating collecting points, conducting first aid training for all plantation personnel, and encouraging training of nurses. Since each plantation as a matter of policy had complete hospital and medical facilities engaged in the treatment of injuries and sickness of plantation personnel, and had long experience in the maintenance of public health, these additional preparations were able to be completed promptly and in manner hardly to be duplicated in any other mainland locality. Moreover, the location of the plantation hospitals throughout the island, and in many cases in close proximity to Army airfields and posts, and as in the case of Honolulu Plantation Company, within a few miles of Pearl Harbor, naturally resulted in attention beign given to possible need of the plantation facilities for military personnel. Close liaison existed between the plantation doctors and Army and Navy Medical officers.

The Police Committee prepared plans for the protection of transportation routes, and the guarding of installations, the directing of traffic, maintenance of order in time of disaster, instruction of behavior in case of air raid alarm and of blackout, and the prevention of looting. The existing plantation provisional police provided personnel already trained for these functions and responsibilities.

The Food Administration Committee prepared plans for extensive company food production, coordinating these plans with the Diversified Crops Committee of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association. Educational campaigns were commenced for the development of home gardens.

The Transportation and Evacuation Committee prepared listings of all avail able transportation, and compiled organization charts for motor and rail trans portation personnel. Maintenance of all equipment was a responsibility of thi committee. In effect, the work of this committee was a pooling of all existin transportation facilities of the plantation to direct their utilization for emergenc purposes when required, for operation and maintenance of equipment was o course part of the daily plantation operation.

The Communication and Intelligence Committee, in addition to communicatio liaison between the various headquarters of the Major Disaster Organization, als engaged in intelli- [21] gence activities to ascertain any subversive activi ties, false rumors, unrest or other developments which might be of value to th military intelligence agencies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or whic might be of assistance to the plantation provisional guard in maintaining order

The Electric Power and Light Committee was organized for the purpose o proper maintenance of the plantation electric system which all persons, civilia and military, recognized as an important source of power for standby service i case of damage to the Hawaiian Electric Company plant, the island's main sourc of electric power.

The Rural Water Committee outlined alternate sources of water in case o destruction or obstruction of the existing system, and planned emergency trans portation of drinking water if required.

The Engineering Committee was established to plan for construction of al raid shelters, and formation of damage repair crews.

These committees met regularly and were not mere paper committees. Th plans developed by these committees at Honolulu Plantation Company were th basis for action on December 7, 1941, just as each plantation on Oahu was engage in identical activities. First aid classes were well attended in close coordinatio between the plantation hospital staffs and the Medical Preparedness Committe of the Honolulu County Medical Society. Equipment needed in fighting fire resulting from enemy air raids was obtained and individual householders ha been instructed to obtain necessary fire fighting equipment as early as Septembe 27, 1941. This equipment was specified to include bags of sand, ladders, re ceptacles for spare water supply, and a fire extinguisher if possible.

Householders were encouraged to store additional food, and for this purpos basic subsistence items were imported in quantity by plantation stores. Specia precautions were taken to keep careful account of all explosives, and in additio to the customary precautions additional inspections were made daily of all ex plosives stores. Close coordination was at all times maintained with the othe plantations and the respective districts, and with the various committees of th Major Disaster Council.

The plantations, and plantation personnel, were proud of the civilian defens organization they developed and they are proud of the immediate response the were able to make on the morning of December 7, 1941. It is submitted that th civilian defense preparedness achieved by the sugar plantations through the or ganization of the various committees on each plantation, and coordinated throug the Rural Oahu Committee of plantation managers, represents one of the bes examples of such organizations then in existence.

There is attached herewith as Exhibit "Q" a report of the Chairman of th Rural Oahu Committee which presents in summary from the activites of the rura civilian defense divisions on the morning of December 7, 1941 and immediatel thereafter.

[22] *VIII.—The Personnel and Facilities of Hawaii's Sugar Plantation Provided Immediate and Valuable Assistance to the Army and Navy in Meeting the Emergency Resulting from the Attack on Pearl Harbor*

The preparedness of the plantation provisional police units has been discussed as has the preparation of the Civilian Defense of Major Disaster Committees These organizations undertook their assignments immediately. The planning of the Diversified Crops Committee of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Associa tion, for emergency food subsistence, was utilized thereafter.

In addition to these pre-Pearl Harbor defense preparations by all of the suga plantations, there was the further direct participation of the plantations wit the Army and Navy in rallying to meet the sudden emergency. The materia and in many ways almost indispensable aids provided to the Army and Nav by the sugar plantations on December 7, 1941 and thereafter was not alone th

uniting of forces to meet a common enemy. It was also organized assistance, reflecting the appreciation of the sugar industry over a long period of years of the integrated relationship existing between the sugar industry and the military authorities and the essential part of the plantations in the plans of the military for the defense of Hawaii.

At the request of Army authorities all sugar plantations had at various times prior to the war submitted information concerning the defense potential of the sugar plantations. There was every indication in the manner by which this information was requested and compiled that the Army considered the plantation facilities as an integral part of the plans of defense of Hawaii. The sugar plantations, and the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association had proceeded accordingly. As has been previously pointed out, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, particularly under the guidance of the Vice-President and Executive Secretary, Major General Briant H. Wells (Ret.), former Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, proceeded on established policy of close coordination and cooperation with the military forces.

On the morning of December 7, 1941, every plantation mobilized to aid the military forces in whatever way or manner assistance might be given. The war record of the sugar industry, particularly on that fateful day and for months thereafter is a record which would require volumes to record. It covers much more than civilian preparedness. It includes direct assistance to the armed forces themselves, in a manner that can be appreciated fully only as the location of the plantations in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, Army, Navy and Marine airfields and other installations is recognized with the extensive facilities of each plantation in machinery, equipment and manpower and the close relationship that has at all times existed between the plantation personnel and the personnel of the military forces, and the practical liaison with the military commanders which Major General Wells continued. It can truly be said that the sugar plantations were in the war immediately alongside the Army and Navy.

It is submitted that the part played by the sugar plantations in meeting this emergency has no parallel in any part of our country. A few examples serve to illustrate this.

[23] *Plantation Hospitals Received Many of the Wounded Service Personnel*

Some plantations were subjected to enemy strafing fire the morning of attack and suffered casualties. Plantation hospitals were immediately receiving victims of the attack. These casualties received at plantation hospitals on Oahu included Army, Navy and Marine personnel as well as civilians.

Plantation Equipment was Dispatched to Installations Attacked by the Enemy

Plantation trucks and cranes with plantation personnel to man the equipment were dispatched to Pearl Harbor, Ewa Marine Air Station, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and other Army and Navy installations as requested or required. Equipment dispatched by Ewa Plantation Company on the Seventh is illustrative of this aid and assistance. At the request of the Ewa Marine Aviation Group, three cranes and two caterpillar tractors with twelve equipment operators were engaged in aiding the Marine Air Station in the removal of aerial bombs from magazines and loading them on bomb carts and distributing the loaded bombs as directed. This crew stood by at the air station throughout the night of the Seventh. Another crane and two additional tractors were dispatched on December 8th to expedite this work. From that time until December 21, 1941, some Ewa Plantation men and equipment remained at the Marine Air Station. The men were even trained in fusing aerial bombs and placing them in the bomb racks of planes.

Shortly after the attack the Navy requested all possible assistance in supplying pumps, welding units, and cranes for use at Pearl Harbor. This equipment was dispatched promptly, remaining in use in some instances for many months.

Construction equipment from the plantations was made available throughout Oahu and all other islands for emergency construction of airfields and other installations. In many cases this equipment was of primary importance in making possible the rapid development and completion of airfields at a time when the utmost speed was essential to insure airfield facilities on Oahu, and the other islands.

Plantation Labor Provided a Large Construction Force for the Army

The pool of plantation manpower with many men trained in equipment opera tion was also available for emergency construction. Army recognition of th aid and assistance which the plantations could provide is reflected in the fina pooling of these available resources for dispatch at the call of the militar through a central Coordinator for the plantations. Through this central co ordinator's office, foremen and skilled and unskilled laborers were dispatche to a great variety of projects. Coordination of this plantation labor was no limited to Oahu but included the other islands of Hawaii also, where the plan tation labor supplied for Army construction was of extreme importance sinc the plantations were virtually the only source of labor on these islands an virtually no defense construction had been undertaken prior to the war, thereb emphasizing the urgency of construction which the plantations were able t expedite.

Stevedores and dock working crews were obtained from plantation labo tractor and crane operators, carpenters, [24] welders, electricians, garag and machine shop mechanics, truck drivers, blacksmiths, painters, plumber sheetmetal workers, power plant operators, locomotive operators and trainmer accountants—these categories of labor supplied by the plantations to the Arm and reporting where directed, are illustrative of the type of labor furnished well trained in their respective skills. Man-hours of labor supplied under thi procedure to the Army during the time of emergency until the Army was able t recruit the necessary workers, both locally and from the mainland, illustrates th importance of this labor to the Army:

Year:	*Man-Days of Plantation Labo Supplied to Arm Engineer*
1941 (December)	66,03
1942	390,17
1943	54,39
1944	3,52
Total	514,13

Power was Supplied from Plantation Electric Power Plants

On December seventh, all plantations immediately undertook standby servic at their electric power plants as units in the island-wide coordination of ge erating plants. On a number of occasions subsequent to the Seventh, variou plantations were called upon to carry the electrical load in their localities whe ever emergencies arose such as those resulting from accidents, from major r pairs, or emergency demands for additional power at the shops at Pearl Harbo and elsewhere. In these cases the coordination of the available sources of powe through the central control of Hawaiian Electric Company proved of inestimabl value to the armed forces in meeting the unprecedented demands for power tha followed the enemy attack with the development of the defenses of Hawaii, an the expansion of the fleet repair shops at Pearl Harbor. Recognition by the mil tary authorities of the value and importance of the plantation power facilities i demonstrated by the construction of a 300,000 gallon concrete fuel oil storag tank at Ewa Plantation to serve the plantation power plant. This constructio was undertaken at the direction of the Corps of Engineers.

Plantation Repair Shops were Utilized Constantly by the Army and Navy

Following the attack, plantation machine shops were utilized for a wide variet of repairs as well as for the fabricating of substantial armament units. Th machine shops of Ewa Plantation Company, for example, fabricated tank barrier 30-caliber gun mounts, 37-, 75-, and 155-millimeter gun mounts, tank repair stand and fuel storage tanks. Equipment was repaired and rebuilt. At this one plant tion, 37 percent of the total man-hours worked by the machine shop crews durin the period from January 1st to September 30th, 1942, was for the account of th Army.

Other plantation shops such as plumbing, carpenter, and blacksmith sho were similarly engaged in repair, fabrication and construction work for th armed forces.

[25] *Plantation Water and Inventories of Supplies were Available to the Armed Forces*

Plantation water supply systems proved of great aid to the armed forces at this time of emergency. An example of this is the furnishing of water to Barber's Point Naval Air Station and to Ewa Marine Air Station by Ewa Plantation Company. The scarcity of water on the arid Ewa plain presented a serious problem in normal times. Had the Navy been required to develop new sources of potable water before construction work could have started, valuable time would have been lost. Although furnishing of this water created a substantial drain on the plantation system, the plantation was able to maintain fairly constant pressure while meeting the Navy's requirements. From December 7, 1941 through September 1942, Ewa supplied the Navy a total of 77,260,000 gallons of water.

Miscellaneous materials were obtained from the plantations for a multitude of requirements particularly during the very early days of the war. The supply of sugar bags was immediately siezed upon for the use of the armed forces and the civilian defense authorities to be filled with sand for protection of vital installations and gun positions.

Volunteer Units Were Formed With Plantation Personnel

Plantation Personnel was trained to form organized volunteer units to aid in guarding essential installations and in the active defense of Hawaii. These volunteer units, organized as regiments in rural Oahu and on the other islands were trained in the use of weapons and in combat methods, thereby providing assistance to the military through release of troops for other combat assignments. Organization of these units, with the organization of businessmen in Honolulu was accomplished in close coordination with the military authorities. These volunteer units, important as they were on Oahu, were of even greater importance on the other islands as troops were moved to forward areas for offensive operations.

These examples of the participation of the plantations in the defense of Hawaii can be no more than illustrative of the many activities in which the plantations engaged in active support of the military during the war. All plantations of Hawaii participated in this close coordination with the military forces. The role played by the plantations located on the islands of Hawaii other than Oahu was demonstrably of primary importance to the Army in the emergency of defense preparations.

It is submitted that here in the war record of Hawaii's sugar plantations there is more than response to a common emergency; that in this record there has been a degree of organized assistance which could have been achieved only after careful consideration and planning on the part that the plantations could play in an emergency as a natural phase of the close coordination and cooperation with the military forces which the management of the sugar industry and the officials of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association had developed as a matter of established policy long prior to the war.

[26] *IX.—Under War Conditions and in Spite of Serious Limitations in Manpower, Hawaii's Sugar Plantations Continued to Maintain Sugar Production at Nearly Peacetime Levels During the War Years*

Sugar and its byproduct, molasses, have been basic agricultural commodities required in the prosecution of the war to a successful conclusion. It has long been recognized how essential it is that sugar production be maintained at the highest possible level. Hawaii's sugar plantations did not fail therefore to direct the utmost effort to continue the production of sugar in accordance with directives from Washington to exert every effort to this end.

Problems of decreasing manpower, as a result of the attraction of employment with the Army, Navy, and their Contractors, presented great difficulties. Equipment required for Army and Navy construction involved delays in planting and harvesting. Scarcity of materials affected maintenance and impeded operations. Blackout restrictions and other military regulations reduced the hours of work and resulted in problems of working conditions requiring constant adaptation.

In spite of these considerations, however, Hawaii's sugar plantations exerted additional effort towards meeting the multitude of problems presented, directing more intensive effort to achieving exceptional total tonnage production for these war years.

There is attached herewith as Exhibit "R" a chart comparing sugar cane a age, sugar production, average number of male adult employees (unskilled) total men days of all employees (unskilled) on Hawaiian Sugar Plantati from the period 1936 through 1944. This chart shows a production of 870,109 t in 1942, 885,640 tons in 1943, and 874,947 tons in 1944. Hawaii's sugar indus is proud of this record, and the great contribution that this represents to nation's successful prosecution of the war.

This record has not gone unacknowledged. By letter dated November 2, 1 addressed to the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, the Secretary of Agri ture acknowledged this production record in observing:

"The work of your institution, I am told, proved especially significant in recent war period. Notwithstanding rigid military regulations and a very try manpower situation, the Hawaiian Islands maintained their sugar productio near peacetime levels. For this accomplishment the Nation can be grateful.

This letter is set forth in full as Exhibit "R".

X.—Conclusion

It is submitted that this record of the sugar industry in Hawaii in its coope tion with the military authorities in preparedness activities prior to the war, in coordination of activities with the military throughout the war is an outstand record, representing a complete refutation of any of the inferences and stateme contained in the report [27] of the Army Board to Investigate Pearl H bor which might reflect upon this record.

Hereafter there are attached the statements of persons in the civilian c munity of Hawaii who participated in the preparedness activities of the civil community of Hawaii prior to the war. These illustrative statements are sented so that your Committee may be cognizant of the part played by the pe of Hawaii to prepare for any emergency which might arise. It is submit that the degree of civilian preparation thereby achieved reflects to the last credit of Hawaii.

It is respectfully requested that this statement of the Hawaiian Sugar Plant Association with the statements of civilian preparedness in Hawaii set fo hereafter be made a part of the record of your Committee to the end that grave injustice to the Territory of Hawaii resulting from the incorrect and leading statements and inferences in the report of the Army Board to Investig Pearl Harbor relative to Hawaii's cooperation with the Army during the crit period prior to the war may thereby be corrected in the manner which the ex lent war record and preparedness activities of the sugar industry and Hav prior to the war so amply justifies.

HAWAIIAN SUGAR PLANTERS' ASSOCIATIO
P. E. SPALDING, *President.*

DECEMBER 1, 1945.

I, Chauncey B. Wightman, of the City and County of Honolulu, Territory Hawaii, and Secretary of the Hawaiian Surgar Planters' Association, hav seen the original documents from which copies were made and are attached exhibits in the statement submitted herewith to the Joint Congressional Comm tee to Investigate Pearl Harbor, submitted to the committee on behalf of Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and their member plantations and copies contained in the statements submitted by Mr. Alfred L. Castle, relat to the preparedness activities of the Hawaii Chapter, American Red Cro Mr. T. G. S. Walker, relative to the preparedness activities of the Major Disas Council, City and County of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii; Dr. H. L. Arn relative to the preparedness activities of the Medical Preparedness Commit Honolulu County Medical Society; Dr. F. J. Pinkerton, relative to the prepar ness activities of the Honolulu Blood Plasma Bank; Addison E. Kirk, relative the preparedness activities of the Transportation Committee, Major Disas Council, City and County of Honolulu; and Mr. Heaton L. Wrenn, relative the preparedness activities of the Honolulu Police Reserve, do hereby cer that said copies as contained in this statement submitted herewith to the Jo

Congressional Committee to Investigate Pearl Harbor are true and exact copies of the original documents thereof.

Chauncey B. Wightman
CHAUNCEY B. WIGHTMAN.

TERRITORY OF HAWAII,
City and County of Honolulu, ss:

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of January, 1946.

[SEAL] ALBERTA VAN BROCKLIN,
Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit, Territory of Hawaii.

My Commission expires 6-30-1949.

[28] EXHIBIT "A"—EXCERPT OF TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL HENRY T. BURGIN BEFORE ARMY BOARD TO INVESTIGATE PEARL HARBOR (ARMY BOARD REPORT, PP. 173–177 INCLUSIVE)

8. *Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Defenses.* General Burgin commanded the Coast Artillery Command consisting of seacoast artillery plus all antiaircraft artillery in the Hawaiian Department. He commanded the 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade composed of the 64th Regiment, 251st Regiment, and the 98th Regiment.

He testified that the Interceptor Command was being organized on a temporary basis saying:

"We had constant training and maneuvers, practice, where that particular thing was stressed, and the antiaircraft was turned over to interceptor Command * * * For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy. Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions, they would know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the roadways, somtimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simulated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to December 7. * * * On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on December 7. The fleet was in the harbor."

And again he said, as to the Interceptor Command:

"It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming in, and immediately the interceptor command would take over. All that is, so far as turning it over to the interceptor command, is that the interceptor command tells you when to hold fire and when to resume fire." (R. 2602–2604).

This brought him to his opinion expressed in the record that if the Interceptor Command had worked during the drills and exercises on the morning of December 7, then it could have worked for the attack. He said in his opinion it would not have made any difference anyway, "because we didn't have ammunition with our mobile antiaircraft. If they had been out in the field without any ammunition, they would have been worse off than they actually were." (R. 2604)

He said of his antiaircraft batteries:

"They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition." (R. 2604)

A reference to the next section will show that it was General Short who supported the Ordnance Department in refusing to issue this ammunition to troops when they went out for exercises in the field.

Additionally, General Burgin found that he could not [29] even put his guns into final position because of the conditions now described.

General Burgin pointed out one of the great handicaps to development of field artillery positions was resistance from land owners to letting the artillery go on the land or lease it for the placing of battery positions. He described the situation as follows:

"General RUSSELL. Is it true, therefore, General, that prior to December 7, 1941, so far as you can recall, you had never had all of your mobile batteries in the positions which they were to occupy in the event of hostilities?

"General BURGIN. That is correct; they had not all been in the actual position they were to go in.

"General FRANK. Was that because of this opposition to the people who owned the land?

"General BURGIN. Yes, and the fact that we had not yet gotten the leases all fixed up, so that we could move into those positions for practice." (R. 2628)

He also pointed out that if General Short had gone to Alert No. 3 there would have been great opposition from important and influential civilians on the island and particularly those who compose what is known as the Big Five.

As to this he said:

"General RUSSELL. Is there in your mind some thought that there would have been developed a considerable opposition among the influential civilian population here on the island toward the results of Alert Number 3?

"General BURGIN. I think there is no doubt about it, in the world.

"General RUSSELL. In other words, if General Short had ordered Alert Number 3—and I am asking this question in the interest of clarity—if General Short had ordered Alert No. 3 and thrown all of his people into readiness for immediate combat, including the issuing of ammunition, it might, or, in your opinion, it would have provoked opposition on the part of some of the responsible and influential civilian population here on the island?

"General BURGIN. I feel positive it would.

"General GRUNERT. Even though he might have explained that to the influential citizens, there would still have been opposition?

"General BURGIN. I don't believe you could have explained it, at that time.

"General GRUNERT. Who are some of those influential citizens that you think might have voiced their objection?

[*30*] "General BURGIN. Oh, my!

"General GRUNERT. Is Dillingham one of them?

"General BURGIN. Mr. Dillingham, Mr. Walker.

"General FRANK. Which Walker?

"General BURGIN. I don't know. He is a sugar man. General Wells." (R. 2629)

He said amongst those people were the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, and those having the land and crop interests in sugar, pineapples, etc.

In this connection it should be noted that there is proof in this record that one of the things that may have influenced Short in Selecting Alert Number 1 and not stirring up the Japanese population was the opposition that developed then and later from the large commercial interests on the island using Japanese labor, that they did not want it disturbed and that they would be shut down in their business if a substantial portion of it was either deported or interned. (R. 2654)

As General Burgin testified, if the tables had been reversed and Americans had been situated in Japan like the Japanese were in Hawaii they would have been locked up before the war started and not afterwards. (R. 2649)


EXHIBIT "B"
MAP OF OAHU
INDICATING EVERY AUTHORIZATION
GRANTED BY SUGAR PLANTATIONS TO UNITED STATES ARMY
FOR ENTRY ON SUGAR PLANTATION LANDS
DURING PERIOD FROM JAN. 1, 1939 TO DEC. 7, 1941.
LEGEND
WAIALUA SUGAR CO.
EWA PLANTATION CO.
OAHU SUGAR CO.
HONOLULU PLANTATION CO.
WAIANAE CO.
WAIMANALO SUGAR CO.
KAHUKU PLANTATION CO.

[32] EXHIBIT "C"

NOVEMBER 8, 1940.

Lieutenant General C. D. HERRON,
Commanding, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR GENERAL HERRON: During the past 17 years the Army has at times used our roads and lands for maneuvers and each time your staff has requested our permission before carrying out these exercises. During this period we have never had an occasion to complain about the condition in which our roads and lands were left by the Officers and men under your command. With this in mind I wonder if, during these strenuous times, it would be of any help to you and your staff to have for maneuvering purposes, a blanket okeh covering the use of the roads and lands under our control. If so, I will be glad to have it forwarded immediately.

This will also cover the use of plantation water and any other facilities that you might deem necessary to successfully carry out maneuvers.

If there is any other way in which we can cooperate please do not hesitate to call on us.

Yours very sincerely,

/s/ JAMES N. ORRICK,
Manager, Kahuku Plantation Company.

JNO: L

[33] Commanding General

WAR DEPARTMENT,
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, November 13, 1940.

To: Mr. JAMES N. ORRICK,
Manager, Kahuku Plantation Company, Kahuku, Hawaii.

MY DEAR MR. ORRICK: I am in receipt of your exceedingly gratifying letter of November 8th in regard to the use of the plantation lands by the troops of this command. What you say in regard to the good conduct of troops on your lands and your most generous offer of a blanket permission give me the greatest pleasure. Please accept my sincere thanks for and my appreciation of your very helpful offer.

We shall be delighted to have the blanket permission and I trust that should any transgression occur, as it must in time, you will immediately notify us in order that we may make prompt restitution and take the necessary preventive measures against repetition.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ C. D. Herron
C. D. HERRON,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

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[34] NOVEMBER 18, 1940.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Oahu, T. H.

DEAR SIR: Until further notice you and your command are hereby permitted for maneuvering purposes the free use at any time of all roads and lands under our control at Kahuku.

Permission is also granted for the withdrawal of domestic water from the pipeline situate on the Kamehameha Highway near our Main Store at Kakuku.

Yours very truly,

KAHUKU PLANTATION COMPANY,
/s/ JAMES N. ORRICK, *Manager.*

[35]

HEADQUARTERS 64TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA)
OFFICE OF THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER
Fort Shafter, T. H., February 11, 1941.

In reply refer to: 680

OAHU SUGAR CO.,
Waipahu, Oahu, T. H.

GENTLEMEN: In carrying out training in various missions for the defense of Oahu this regiment must use positions, usually on the sides of roads, for searchlight units. Each of these units consists of about ten men and the searchlight equipment. The units arrive at the positions just before dark, occupy them for three or four hours and then depart. Four of these positions are located on your property.

1. 1000 yards southeast of pump camp #5 at first locked gate on the road to Manawahua.
2. At a railroad crossing 0.6 miles north of the road which begins just west of the Waipahu Grade School.
3. On a cane field road at the east end of the stables which are just off Kunia Road near Kunia Camp #1.
4. On cane field road at the southwest edge of a reservoir by the camp 1¾ miles north of Ewa Junction and about ¼ mile east of Kam Highway.

As the various missions and plans change from time to time, new positions have to be occupied, and as each position requires permission it is readily seen that freedom of movement to meet each situation is hampered. It is therefore requested that this regiment be granted blanket authority to occupy positions from time to time on the property owned and controlled by you.

This of course would be granted with positive assurance that every care will be exercised to prevent damage to the property.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) C. K. Wing
C. K. WING,
Colonel, 64th CA (AA) Commanding.

WAIPAHU, OAHU, T. H., *February 17, 1941.*

To: Colonel C. K. Wing, Commanding 64th C. A. (AA), Fort Shafter, T. H.

Permission to use specific positions as described in the [36] above letter is hereby granted.

Your request for blanket authority to move to other positions not specifically described herein is also granted.

Yours very truly,

OAHU SUGAR COMPANY, LIMITED,
(Signed) H. L'ORANGE, *Manager.*

HL'O: W

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[37]

HEADQUARTERS 64TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA),
Fort Shafter, T. H., November 16, 1939.

In reply refer to: 680 (P&T)

HONOLULU PLANTATION CO.,
Aiea, Oahu, T. H.

GENTLEMEN: In carrying out training in various missions for the defense of Oahu this regiment is in need of positions usually along side of roads to place small groups of men with equipment such as searchlight units with a crew of about 8 to 10 men. Some of the desired positions are located on property belonging to or controlled by your company. It is requested that permission be granted this regiment to place these groups of men with their equipment of the following locations:

A position on Aiea Heights
A position on Red Hill

The men arrive at these positions with their equipment just before dark, occupy them for three or four hours and then depart.

As these various missions and plans change from time to time, new positions have to be occupied and as each position requires permission, it is readily seen that freedom of movement to meet each situation is hampered. It is therefor requested that this regiment be granted blanket authority to occupy positions on the property owned or controlled by you from time to time. This of course would be granted with positive assertion that every care will be exercised to prevent damage to the property and interference with traffic on roads.

Very truly yours,

/s/ C. K. Wing
C. K. WING,
Colonel, 64th CA (AA),
Commanding.

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[38] NOVEMBER 21ST, 1939.

Colonel C. W. WING,
Commanding, 64th C. A. (AA), Fort Shafter, Oahu.

DEAR SIR: We will be pleased to grant you permission to occupy any position you wish, on the plantation, so you may carry out your various missions and plans, as requested in the last paragraph of your letter of November 16th, 1939.

Yours truly,

HOUOLULU PLANTATION COMPANY,
STAFFORD L. AUSTIN, *Manager,*

SLA: ESB

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[39] EXHIBIT "D"

JUNE 4, 1941.

Captain J. E. YOUNG, Q. M. C.,
Real Estate Officer, Fort Shafter, T. H.

LAND MATTERS

DEAR SIR:

In connection with Ewa Plantation Company's leasing to the Army of three sites of approximately three acres each (not referred to in our letter to you of May 29, 1941) the locations of which were tentatively agreed upon between Acting Manager Slater Miller and your Lieutenant Colonels Lynd and Taliaferro, we wish to say in this respect that Ewa Plantation Company is prepared to discuss with you the terms and conditions to be embodied in such a lease, and for this purpose we accordingly ask that you telephone or write us to arrange a place and date of meeting.

As we understand, the site proposed by Lieutenant Colonel R. F. Lynd for the Sub-Sector Command Post lies in the vicinity of Ewa Field 20.1 crossed by the 200-foot contour ditch. Of the other two sites selected by Lieutenant Colonel E. H. Taliaferro for anti-aircraft gun sites, one lies in the reclaimed area adjacent to Ewa Field 64 and the other on the North slopes of Honouliuli Valley in the neighborhood of Ewa Field 32.

For your information, before any lease can be entered into with the Army covering these three sites, we believe it will be necessary for you to locate same on the ground and prepare maps and descriptions. Further, if you intend to record the lease, it will require the subdivision, for land court purposes, of certain lots on which these sites are located, all such work to be undertaken at your expense.

If, however, the importance of this matter to the National Defense Program is such as to require immediate occupancy by the War Department of the areas proposed to be taken, Ewa will be agreeable to such a plan, upon the understanding that, at a later date, maps delineating the specific areas will be furnished by you, together with a formal document. If, in the immediate taking of such areas, cane crops are thereby demaged, you will reimburse or compensate Ewa Plantation Company for all such crop damages and all other damages incidental to such taking.

Very truly yours,

/s/ A. S. D.
A. S. DAVIS,
Vice-President, Ewa Plantation Company.

[40] MAY 29, 1941.

QM 660. C-RE (Gen.)

Captain J. E. YOUNG,
Q. M. Corps, Real Estate Officer,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR SIR: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of 22 May, 1941, requesting confirmation of verbal permission for the use of certain small areas of land by the War Department for military purposes.

Permission is hereby granted the War Department for military use, as requested, of the small areas of land desired. It is understood that maps delineating the specific areas will be furnished with a formal instrument covering same at a later date. This permission covers the following approximate sites:

Seven gun emplacements and three bomb-proof shelters to be constructed at various locations along Puuiki Beach, all located on Lot A of Land Court Application 1089.

One gun emplacement at Kaiaka Bay, located on Grant 1976, Apana 3, under lease to Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd., from Dorthea Emerson.

Two mortar positions, located on land leased from the Bishop Estate by Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd., near the City of County Reservoir at Haleiwa.

Permanent trenches and fortifications, located just above the Wahiawa Ditch and below the road leading across Helemano 6 Reservoir on Land Commission Award 7713, Apana 34.

The permission to use these various sites for military purposes is granted subject to the following provisions:

1. No growing crops are to be disturbed.
2. No plantation facilities, such as irrigation ditches, pipe lines, etc., are to be disturbed without making prior arrangements.
3. All fences or gates leading to the various sites will be closed at all times.
4. That the use of these various sites by the government will not in any way constitute a release of title to the land by Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd.
5. The permission granted for the use of lands which are leased by Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd., from other parties only extends until the expiration of the leases involved.
6. Permission to use the above sites is granted for the extent of the present National Emergency, and in the event that the use of sites is desired beyond said emergency, [41] then it is felt that same should be covered by a formal document properly executed by all parties and interests.

I hope this fulfills your immediate request and that it will serve until the necessary formal instruments can be prepared for approval.

Very truly yours,

WAIALUA AGRICULTURAL CO., LTD.,
/s/ JOHN H. MIDKIFF, *Manager.*

JM: mhs

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[42] MAY 1, 1941.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL,
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR SIR:

LICENSE FOR RAILWAY ON WAIANAE CO. LAND

Referring to your letter of April 28th, Engr. 662/7, requesting permission to enter at once upon the land of Waianae Company at Maili, Laulaulei, Oahu, for the purpose of constructing railway spurs authorized under license, the execution of which by the War Department is now pending, please be advised that on behalf of said Company, you are hereby authorized to make immediate entry upon said land for the purpose specified.

Your very truly,

AMERICAN FACTORS, LIMITED,
/s/ C. T. B.
C. T. BAILEY,
Manager, Land Department.

CTB: LL

[43]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., Apr. 28, 1941.

In reply refer to: Engr. 662/7

Mr. H. A. WALKER,
President, Waianae Company,
% American Factors, Limited, Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR MR. WALKER: This is to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Bailey's letter dated 17 April 1941 transmitting to me a document and three duplicate copies of a license for the railway to be located on the land owned by your company at Mail, Lualualei, Oahu.

Pending final acceptance of this document by the Secretary of War, it is requested that the Army be permitted to initiate the construction of these spurs.

I desire to express my sincere thanks for your prompt and helpful attitude that you and other officers of your Company have adopted toward the furtherance of this military project. Your hearty cooperation exemplified fine support of the national defense of your country.

Very truly yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

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[44]

EXHIBIT "E"
HEADQUARTERS 24TH DIVISION ARTILLERY,
Schofield Barracks, T. H., November 6, 1941.

WAIALUA AGRICULTURAL CO.,
Waialua, T. H.
Mr. J. H. Midkiff, Mngr.

DEAR SIR: Request is made for use of certain portions of your land as described below:

Area	Men	Vehicles	Purpose	Date	Time	Unit
164	60	12	ROOP-K	Nov 25-26	AM-PM	Hq 24 Div Arty.
164	400	50	ROOP-K	Nov 25-26	AM-PM	13th FA.
180	400	50	ROOP-K	Nov 25-26	AM-PM	13th FA.
322	400	50	ROOP-K	Nov 25-26	AM-PM	13th FA.
123	140	20	ROOP-K	Nov 24	AM-PM	13th FA.
161	60	10	ROOP-K	Nov 24	AM-PM	Hq Btry 52 FA.
161	140	20	ROOP-K	Nov. 27	AM-PM	HQ & B, 13 FA.
180	60	10	ROOP-K	Nov 25	AM-PM	Btry B, 52 FA.
180	60	10	ROOP-K	Nov 26	AM-PM	Hq Btry, 52 FA.

The usual precautions to safeguard your property will be observed. Cultivated or plowed land will not be entered upon. Your workers and machinery will not be interfered with. Every effort will be made not to damage roads.

Reply by endorsement hereon will suffice. The enclosed envelope requires no postage.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Rox. H. Donaldson
ROX. H. DONALDSON,
Major, 24th Division Artillery,
Land Officer.

First Endorsement

NOVEMBER 7, 1941.

To Major ROX. H. DONALDSON
24th Division Artillery,
Land Officer, Schofield Barracks, T. H.

1. Approved.

/s/ Joseph Matson, Jr.
JOSEPH MATSON, Jr.,
Civil Engineer, Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd.

JM: mhs

[45]

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE,
Schofield Barracks, Territory of Hawaii, March 25, 1941.

Mr. H. R. SHAW,
Waialua Agricultural Co., Waialua, Oahu.

DEAR SIR: Request is made for use of certain portions of your land as described below:

Area	Men	Vehicles	Purpose	Date	Time	Unit
Johanna	70	10	RSOP	April 7	A. M.	13th FA.
Johanna	100	12	Reconnaissance	April 11	A. M.	13th FA.
Johanna	300	40	Camp-K	April 14-17	Day & Night	13th FA.
Anahulu	350	50	RSOP-K	April 7-8	Day & Night	13th FA.
Anahulu	350	50	Camp-K	April 14-17	Day & Night	11-8th FA.
Euc. Forest	350	50	RSOP-K	April 7-8	Day & Night	13th FA.
Euc. Forest	100	12	Reconnaissance	April 21	A. M.	13th FA.
Euc. Forest	350	50	Camp-K	April 14-17	Day & Night	13-8th FA.
Brig. Woods	150	15	Camp-K	April 14-17	Day & Night	13th FA.
ERA Camp	150	15	Camp-K	April 14-17	Day & Night	13th-8th FA.
Kaiaka Point	10	2	Camp-K	April 14-17	Day & Night	13th FA.
Puiki Woods	50	5	Camp-K	April 14-17	Day & Night	13th-8th FA.

The usual precautions to safeguard your property will be observed. Cultivated or plowed lands will not be entered upon. Your workers and machinery will not be interfered with. Every effort will be made not to damage roads.

Reply by endorsement hereon will suffice. The enclosed envelope requires no postage.

Very truly yours,

/s/ R. W. van de Velde,
R. W. VAN DE VELDE,
Captain, 11th F. A. Brigade.

Note: Areas for April 14–17 are for North Shore maneuver, we do not know definitely which will be used, but may, at one time or other, have to use all.

WAIALUA, T. H., *March 28, 1941.*

Permission granted. No exceptions.

/s/ Harold R. Shaw,
HAROLD R. SHAW,
Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd.

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[46]

HEADQUARTERS,
ELEVENTH FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE,
Schofield Barracks, Territory of Hawaii, Sept. 5, 1941.

EWA PLANTATION CO.,
Ewa, Oahu, T. H.
(Att. Mr. S. M. Miller, Field Supertd.)

DEAR SIR: Request is made for use of certain portions of your land as described below:

Area	Men	Vehicles	Purpose	Date	Time	Unit
260	70	10	RSOP-K	Sept. 22, 1941	All Day	Hq. 1st Bn 13th FA.
260	70	10	RSOP-K	Sept. 25, 1941	All Day	Btry. C 13th FA.
262	70	10	RSOP-K	Oct. 3, 1941	All Day	Btry. A 13th FA.
277	70	10	RSOP-K	Oct. 3, 1941	All Day	Btry. B 13th FA.

The usual precautions to safeguard your property will be observed. Cultivated or plowed lands will not be entered upon. Your workers and machinery will not be interfered with. Every effort will be made not to damage roads.

Reply by endorsement hereon will suffice. The enclosed envelope requires no postage.

Very truly yours.

/s/ R. B. HOOD,
Major, 11th F. A. Brigade.

SEPTEMBER 10, 1941.

EWA PLANTATION COMPANY,
Approved.

/s/ S. M. MILLER.

"Restricted"

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[47] EXHIBIT "F"

SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T. H., *January 13, 1941.*

Mr. H. R. SHAW,
Waialua Agricultural Co., Waialua, T. H.

DEAR MR. SHAW: There follows a very peculiar request. General Murray is very anxious to make some experiments with the possibilities of camouflaging gun positions in cane fields. In order to accomplish this we have to have the cooperation of some plantation. You and the Waialua Co. have been most cooperative and for that reason I feel that I may be "working a willing horse to death." Please feel free to refuse if you so desire.

Here is the proposition: We would like two plots of cane approximately 40' x 40', one side of which to be directly on a road with no irrigation ditch to cross. Some of the cane will be cut out of these plots and we will run a gun into each, stretch a camouflage net over it and experiment with various methods of placing the cut cane on the nets until we find the method which shows least change in an air photo. This experiment to be made during February 25–27. We need a full growth of cane to get as much height as possible and thought if you were planning to burn a field about that time, the cane cut for the experiment would not be wasted.

I realize that you are in business and that your concern is not set up be an auxiliary to the Army, so please be frank in your reaction to this request.

Cane, covering so much of the lowlands, as you know, is one of our problems and we can think of no other way to solve it.

Very truly yours,

/s/ R. W. van de Velde
R. W. VAN DE VELDE,
Captain, 11th F. A. Brigade.

OK
M

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[48] JANUARY 14, 1941.

CAPTAIN R. W. VAN DE VELDE,
11th Field Artillery Brigade,
Schofield Barracks, T. H.

DEAR CAPTAIN VAN DE VELDE: Your request of January 13th for cane areas in which to make tests on camouflaged gun positions has been received, and I believe we can make the necessary arrangements.

As you anticipated, it would be necessary to arrange the test in an area which would be harvested within three days of the date of the experiment. Whether an area which would suit your purpose from the viewpoint of roadset and topography would be available between the exact dates of February 25–27 cannot be predicted this far in advance.

My suggestion would be that about February 15–20 we make an inspection together of the areas which will be harvested between that time and March 1st. By choosing several alternate positions, I could notify you several days in advance of the date each area is to be cut, and you could make final arrangements as influenced by availability of a gun battery or of Air Corps participation.

As always, we shall be happy to cooperate with the Army in this experiment, and are sure that you will cooperate to minimize disturbance of our normal production operations.

Very truly yours,

HAROLD R. SHAW,
Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd.

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[49]

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SEVENTH INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER,
Schofield Barracks, T. H., September 23, 1941.

Superintendent,
Oahu Sugar Plantation Co.

DEAR SIR: It has been brought to my attention recently that the property adjacent to the Waipio Sub Station has been cleared of cane.

If it would be convenient to you I would like to request that new plantings be started about five (5) yards from the fence line in order that defense of the Sub Station against sabotage may be facilitated and at the same time be made more effective.

Sincerely yours,

/sgd/ Wm. A. McCulloch,
WM. A. MCCULLOCH,
Colonel, 27th Infantry,
Commanding.

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[50]

SEPTEMBER 29, 1941.
41/1041

WM. A. MCCULLOCH
Colonel, 27th Infantry
Commanding Schofield Barracks, T. H.

DEAR SIR: In reply to your letter of September 23, 1941 please be advised that new plantings of cane in the area adjacent to the Waipio Sub Station will be started five (5) yards from the fence line.

Yours very truly,

OAHU SUGAR COMPANY, LIMITED.
(Signed) H. L'ORANGE, *Manager.*

HL'O:M

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[51]

JULY 21, 1939.

Lieut. CLYDE R. MCBRIDE,
2nd Bn., 13th Field Artillery,
Schofield Barracks, T. H.

DEAR SIR: In reference to your letter of July 17, 1939 requesting data on the Waialua Plantation of possible military interest and value, we are glad to supply the following information:

(A) Personnel data as of June 30, 1939:

(1) Adult Male Personnel Employed				(2) Total Plantation Population			
Ancestry	Citizen	Non-Citizen	Total	Men	Women	Children	Total
Japanese	275	176	451	536	425	833	1,794
Filipino	17	808	825	804	152	501	1,457
Chinese	5	5	10	14	6	17	37
Korean	14	20	34	46	34	68	148
Porto-Rican	12	10	22	27	18	45	50
Portuguese	110	9	119	137	119	171	447
Hawaiian	24	.....	24	26	14	23	63
Anglo-Saxon	57	1	58	62	60	51	173
All Others	17	.....	17	18	10	25	53
Total	531	1,029	1,560	1,670	838	1,754	4,262

Estimated total population of Haleiwa Village (Non-Plantation)_____ 4

(B) Engineer and Motor Equipment Available:

(1) Trucks and Trailers, 19.

Total Cargo Capacity, 65 Tons.

Passenger Capacity, 1105 persons.

(2) Tractors rated by horsepower:

HP	22	30	35	40	65	70	75	95	Total
No.	13	2	1	5	2	2	2	2	29

(3) Miscellaneous Engineer Material:

Mobile Cane Loaders, 7.
Excavator Bucket, 1.
Drag Line Bucket, 2.
Road Grader, 10', 1.
Bull-dozers, 2.
Tractor-trailers, 3.
Heavy Breaking Plows, 2.
Heavy Disc Plows, 2.
Portable Air Compressors, 2.
Portable Welding Machines, 2.
Portable Concrete Mixers, 2.

Detailed list of hand tools and normal warehouse supply submitted to De ment Service Command in August, 1938.

(C) Railroad Equipment:

(1) Length Permanent Narrow-Gage Main Line, 55¼ miles.

(2) Length Portable Track (12-foot section), 10 miles.

(3) Number of Locomotives, 7.

(4) Number of Cane Cars (3 to 4 tons cargo capacity), 736.

(5) Number of Labor Cars (Seating Capacity—25 men), 25.

(6) Number of Flat Cars, 36.

(7) Number of Oil Cars, 2.

[52] (D) Time required to lay one mile narrow gage portable trac proximately 20 mandays of 8 hours. Our average figure to date for 16-man c in each harvest field is 3.83 man-days for 1,000 feet of portable track.

(E) Time necessary to burn and clear one acre of cane land highly vari depending on weather conditions and yield of cane, and whether for comme or military purposes. A working approximation would be 8 man-days to and cut one acre of cane, plus 7 man-days with proper equipment to load clear the area.

(F) Possibility of cutting off water supply of Haleiwa and Waialua feasible at individual sources of supply, as we maintain 19 pumps supp 108 million gallons per 24 hours from 114 wells. Destruction of power at (1) Waialua Mill and (2) Hawaiian Electric Transformer station, a concrete reservoir at Haleiwa would probably accomplish purpose.

(G) Plantation roads and ditches are semi-permanent in the sense that are placed on key terrain features, and are seldom moved.

(H) The legend that plantation water supply is poisoned is entirely myt Practically all pump water is potable but subject to contamination in channels; gravity mountain water is usually very turbid as well. Dur few months of the year, fertilizer is applied in the irrigation water withi field but not in main supply canals. Arsenic berbizides are applied direct vegetation along roads and ditches and within cane fields—never in the i tion water.

(I) Other Features of Possible Interest:

(1) The plantation maintains complete shops for railroad, electrical mechanical repairs. Detailed list of power tools available submitted to De ment Service Command, August, 1938.

(2) Electric Power—Mill Power Plant, 3,000 KWH; Hydroelectric plant Brigade Woods, 385 KWH.

(3) Billeting—total number of dwellings, 1,087; average floor area dwelling, 900 square feet.

(4) Livestock—65 mules, 15 pack-mules, 14 horses.

(5) Wahiawa Tunnel—four miles long, 4 feet by 6 feet cross section, completely covered and concealed route for foot troops from Kaukonahua B near Artillery Gate, Schofield, to Brigade Woods.

A similar tunnel on east side of Kawailoa Gulch gives covered approach from Wahiawa-Pupukea Road to Eucalyptus Forest.

Very truly yours,

H. P. SHAW,
Irrigation Overseer.

HPS: es.
cc: Department Service
Command, Fort Shafter, T. H.
A. C. of S., G–3 Hawaiian Division, Schofield Barracks
S–3, 21st Infantry Brigade, Schofield Barracks
S–3, 27th Infantry, Schofield Barracks
Mr. C. R. Sischoff

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[53] EXHIBIT "G"

WAR DEPARTMENT,
HEADQUARTERS HAWN. DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, February 1, 1941.

HAWAIIAN SUGAR PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION,
Honolulu, Hawaii.

GENTLEMEN: It would be unseemly and ungrateful to quit my command of the Hawaiian Department without expressing the appreciation of the Army for the continued and substantial contributions of your Association to National Defense.

The attitude of all of your personnel is beyond praise, but I feel that I should especially express appreciation of the invaluable aid of your Secretary, General Wells, and of the vital and highly intelligent work done by your Diversified Crop Committee and its members.

Your Forester, Mr. George A. McEldowney, has for many years in his own time advised and assisted the Schofield Barracks authorities in their reforestation program and the very substantial progress made in the last two years is largely due to him.

Please believe that the liberal and helpful attitude of the Association is not lost upon the Army and we are grateful. For my successor, General Short, I bespeak your good offices and a continuance of the generous assistance you have always given to the Army in Hawaii.

With all good wishes and sincere thanks, I am,

Sincerely,

C. D. HERRON,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

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[54] HEADQUARTERS SCHOFIELD BARRACKS
AND HAWAIIAN DIVISION,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL,
Schofield Barracks, T. H., June 3, 1940.

In reply refer to: 354.2 (6–3–40) 4

Mr. HANS L'ORANGE,
Manager, Oahu Sugar Company,
Waipahu, T. H.

DEAR MR. L'ORANGE: The success of the maneuvers, completed May 25, 1940, has in a great measure been facilitated by the cooperation of private land owners in allowing the Hawaiian Division to use land during this period.

Every effort was made to prevent damage to property and inconvenience to land owners. A survey is being made to insure the repair of any damages caused by troops during maneuvers. If property, under your control, has been damaged, incident to its use by troops, a report from you giving details will be appreciated.

Please accept my appreciation for your cooperation and generosity in allowing the army to use your lands during this maneuver, and for all past favors.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) Wm. H. Wilson
WM. H. WILSON,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

[55]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., Nov. 29, 1941.

In reply refer to: Engr. 600.12 (Kipapa)

Mr. HANS L'ORANGE,
Manager, Waipahu Plantation,
Waipahu, T. H.

DEAR MR. L'ORANGE: After considerable study and investigation, the War Department has decided that the additional airport to be constructed on this Island should be located in the vicinity of Kahuku Point rather than in the vicinity of Kipapa Gulch where I originally recommended its construction.

I wish to thank you for your efforts in assisting members of my Staff with the location, surveys and layouts of the airport in the vicinity of Kipapa. Your knowledge of local conditions was of great value in this study. Since there is still a possibility of future expansion of the air forces in this department, Kipapa may re-enter the picture at some later date. However, all action upon that site has been stopped at the present time.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

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[56]

EXHIBIT "H"

POLICE HEADQUARTERS,
Honolulu, Hawaii, July 30, 1940.

Confidential Memorandum
To All Sugar Plantation Managers Oahu, T. H.

Owing to current events, the Oahu Sugar Managers Association at a special meeting held at Waipahu July 19th, in conjunction with the Army and Police Authorities, appointed the writer as co-ordinator of plans for any Emergency which might arise. It was, however, carefully pointed out that this is purely a precautionary measure and does not necessarily denote a belief that such an Emergency is near or even bound to come.

However, the Plantation Managers are faced with the necessity of having plans for two phases.

I. The Alert—Plan No. 1.

II. Sudden and unpredicted overt acts by disloyal inhabitants whether accompanied or not by hostile "Blitzkreig" from air or sea—Plan No. 2

Plan No. 1:

This will come in force the instant that information received or other indications denote the advisability of putting in precautionary measures. This plan is taking shape rapidly, and I hope to report to you more fully on this in the next week or so.

However, it might be well for you to remember that the Alert will probably mean that:

(a) As far as possible Plantation work should proceed as normally as possible.

(b) Previous plans to keep people calm should be put in force.

(c) All personnel for guard duty, transportation, housing facilities, etc., promised under this plan would probably be immediately required by the Police.

(d) Further guards for your own private property and buildings would be required. Cane fire preventive patrols might be advisable.

(e) Arrangements for putting plan No. 2 into effect would have to be made.

Plan No. 2:

I will discuss this in a future memorandum and also verbally with individual managers.

[57] It is requested that this work be kept as confidential as possible and the Police be mentioned as the instigators rather than the Army.

Yours very truly,

/s/ T. G. S. WALKER,
Co-ordinator Emergency Plan.

[58] EXHIBIT "I"

POLICE HEADQUARTERS,
Honolulu, T. H.

Confidential
Memorandum: *Provisional Police Plan*

A meeting was held at the H. S. P. A. Board Room 10 A. M. Tuesday, August 6th, 1940.

The following were present: Major Melvin L. Craig, Major W. O. Poindexter, Chief of Police W. A. Gabrielson, Mr. George Y. Bennett, Waimanalo Sugar Co.; Mr. J. N. Orrick, Kahuku Plantation Co.; Mr. J .H. Midkiff, Waialua Agricultural Co.; Mr. Hans L'Orange, Oahu Sugar Co.; Mr. J. D. Bond, Ewa Plantation Co.; Mr. Robert Fricke, Waianae Plantation Co.; Mr. S. L. Austin, Honolulu Plantation Co.; Mr. T. G. S. Walker.

Chief of Police Gabrielson presided. Details as to number of personnel, trucks and living quarters to be supplied by each organization were discussed. District and Beat Boundaries were explained.

Dates for lectures by Police to Provisional Police were fixed to start as follows:

Kahuku Plantation Co., 5 P. M., Monday August 19.
Waimanalo Plantation Co., 7:15 P. M., Monday August 19.
Waianae Plantation Co., 5 P. M., Tuesday Aug. 20.
Ewa Plantation Co., 7 P. M., Tuesday Aug. 20.
Waialua Plantation Co., 5 P. M., Wed. August 21.
Waipahu Plantation Co., 7 P. M., Wed., August 21.
Honolulu Plantation Co., 4:30 P. M., Thurs. August 22.

Subsequent meetings will be announced later, though it was thought if possible lectures and instructions should be given weekly at same time and place until course is finished.

Major Craig expressed General Charles D. Herron's thanks for the splendid co-operation being shown by the Plantation Managers.

Meeting adjourned 11:20 A. M.

/s/ T. G. S. WALKER,
Co-Ordinator Provisional Police Plan.

[59] EXHIBIT "J"

Confidential

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE,
Honolulu, T. H., August 12, 1940.

PROVISIONAL POLICE PLAN FOR EMERGENCY GUARD DIVISION

PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION BY THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE VOLUNTARY GUARD DIVISION

Maps: Island of Oahu 1/62,500 w/4 overlays attached hereto; Island of Oahu, 1/62,500 (SECRET) showing Signal Corps installations to be distributed by Army when emergency occurs.

1. The Provisional Police Plant is to provide the personnel and other means necessary to protect from overt acts all agencies and establishments, both civil and military, which are essential to the defense of the Island of Oahu, the defense of which is not charged to combat elements nor located on military reservations. In the performance of this mission, the City and County of Honolulu Police Department will take over when directed by the Department Commander.

2. The Island of Oahu is divided into four (4) police districts, namely, Police District No. 1, City of Honolulu; and Police Districts Nos. 2, 3, and 4, comprising the rural districts.

3. *a.* There will be a Captain of Police in charge of the Provisional Guard Division, who will have two assistants, namely,

(1) The Captain of Police in Charge of Police District No. 1; and

(2) The Captain of Police in charge of rural Oahu Districts Nos. 2, 3, and 4.

b. There will be a lieutenant of Police in charge of each Police District No. 2, 3, and 4; and to assist these lieutenants of Police will be three (3) Sergeants of Police for each Police Beat.

c. The personnel required within Police Districts will be supplied from the following sources:

(1) *DISTRICT NO. 1*—Police officers on pension, the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Public Utilities, Pineapple Companies, and other citizens of the City of Honolulu.

(2) *DISTRICT NO. 2*

Beat 1: Waimea Bridge to Brigade Woods (Inclusive). Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd. Mr. John Midkiff.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—79 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

[*60*] (c) One (1) truck for shift changes.

Beat 2: Brigade Woods to Kipapa Gulch (Inclusive). Three Pineapple Plantations:

(a) California Packing Corporation

(*1*) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—55 men.

(*2*) One (1) truck (riot).

(b) Hawaiian Pineapple Company.

(*1*) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—55 men.

(c) Libby, McNeill & Libby.

(*1*) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—32 men.

(*2*) One (1) truck for shift changes.

(3) *DISTRICT NO. 3*

Beat 1: Pearl Harbor Junction to Pearl City Junction (Inclusive). Honolulu Plantation Company—Mr. Stafford Austin.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—58 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

(c) One (1) truck for shift changes.

Beat 2: Pearl City Junction to Kunia Road. Oahu Sugar Company—Mr. Hans L'Orange.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—66 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

(c) Two (2) trucks; 1 riot and 1 for shift changes.

Beat 3: Kunia Road to Nanakuli (Inclusive). Ewa Plantation—Mr. Douglas Bond.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—63 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

(c) Two (2) trucks for shift changes.

Beat 4: Nanakuli to Kaena Point (Inclusive). Waianae Plantation—Mr. Robert Fricke.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—112 men.

[*61*] (b) One (1) truck for shift changes.

(4) *DISTRICT NO. 4*

Beat 1: Makapuu Point to Kokokahi Road, Waimanalo Plantation—Mr. George Bennett.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—40 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

(c) One (1) truck for shift changes.

Beat 2: Kokokahi Road to Kahana Bridge. (Not inclusive). Mr. George Bennett.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—30 men.

(b) One (1) truck for shift changes.

Beat 3: Kahana Bridge to Waimea Bridge (both inclusive). Kahuku Plantation—Mr. J. W. Orrick.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—102 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

(c) Two (2) trucks: 1 riot and 1 for shift changes.

d. Each police district commander will be responsible for the guarding and protecting of all vital installations, both civil and military, and within his respective district.

e. Training.

(1) Guards will be selected, after their records have been carefully scrutinized, from lists supplied by organizations detailed to do so in the Provisional Police Plan. Information as to details of training will be published in a separate Police Memorandum.

f. Divisional strength:

District Patrols & Guards	Shift	Total
I. Channel Street to Awa Street (Patrol)	8	24
Awa St. to Pier 37, via RR (Patrol)	6	18
Main Plant, Hawaiian Electric	2	6
Mutual Telephone:		
Main Plant	2	6
Kaimuki	1	3
Waiupe	1	3
Nuuanu	1	3
Kalihi	1	3
Punahou	1	3
5 Railroad Bridges, Kalihi	5	15
Sewer Disposal, Nuuanu Plant	2	6
Sewer Disposal, Date St	1	3
Sewer Disposal, Ala Moana & Fort Armstrong	1	3
[62]		
Water Supply, Beretania St	2	6
Water Supply, Houghtailing & King	2	6
Water Supply, Kapahulu & Harding	2	6
Water Shaft, Kamehameha IV Road	2	6
Water Shaft, 16th & Claudine Aves. (Kaimuki)	2	6
2 Radio Stations	4	12
	46	138
Headquarters' Clerks & Timekeepers	1	3
	47	141
Fire and Police Alarm (City Hall)	1	3
	48	144

g. Prior to the date that this plan is to be effective, the Army will furnish the Police Department with a detailed map of installations that are to be guarded.

4. *a.* Campsites—Locations of:

(1) Police District No. 2:
Wahiawa—CCC Camp
Waialua—Waialua Agricultural Co.

(2) Police District No. 3:
Aiea—Honolulu Plantation Co.
Waipahu—Oahu Sugar Co.
Ewa—Ewa Plantation Co.
Waianae—Army Military Reservation.

(3) Police District No. 4:
Kaneohe (to be erected)
Kahuku—Kahuku Plantation Co.
Waimanalo—Waimanalo Sugar Co.

b. All sugar plantation managers, excepting Waianae Company, which is not supplying housing, have agreed to provide the messing and housing facilities for the personnel furnished from their respective plantations.

c. One (1) riot truck, equipped with armor plate or sandbags and armed with machine gun and sufficient personnel, will be located at every police district headquarters. One (1) pick-up truck will be located at each police beat headquarters. (Until proper arrangements can be made, the sugar plantations will furnish the above named trucks.)

d. The tour of duty on each installation by the various guards, pay, etc., will be published in a later Police Bulletin. The same will be based upon the decision of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department prior to the effective date of this plan.

e. There will be designated a Lieutenant of Police as Supply Officer, who will be in charge of all supplies for all police districts. He will function directly under the Chief of Police.

f. All guards will be furnished with distinctive markings, insignias, uniform, etc., which will readily designate them as special police guards. (Suggested uniform for these guards would be the Army fatigue clothing, plus fabricated sun helmet of proper design).

g. Arms (service riot guns), ammunitions and equipment, sufficient for the proper discharge of these duties will be furnished by the U. S. Army.

5. *a.* Each riot truck, patrol car, and sub-district headquarters will be equipped with radio. (It is recommended that [*63*] the Territory of Hawaii extend the use of its voting booths for headquarters in the several sub-police districts.)

b. Command Posts:

Chief of Police, Honolulu Police Station.
Captain of Police-in-charge Division, Honolulu Police Station.
Captain of Police, District 1, Honolulu Police Station.
Captain of Police, Districts 2, 3, 4, at Wahiawa.
Lieutenant of Police, District 4, at Kaneohe.
Lieutenant of Police, District 2, at Wahiawa.
Lieutenant of Police, District 3, at Pearl City.

W. A. GABRIELSON,
Chief of Police,
City and County of Honolulu.

1 Enclosure: Chart—Organization, Voluntary Guard Division.
Distribution:
Commanding General, Hawaiian Division—1.
Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade—1.
Chief of Police—1.
Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department—1.
Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Division—1.

District, Beat Description	Huts	Stations	R. R. Bridges	Hiway Bridges	Trucks	Beat	Men Required		
							Patrols & hqrs.	Res.	Total
IV. 1. Makapuu Point to Kokokahi Road (inclusive)	4	1	0	0	1	33	3	4	40
2. Hokokahi Road to Kahana Bay Bridge (not inclusive)	1	1	0	1	1	21	6	3	30
3. Kahana Bay Bridge to Waimea Bridge (both inclusive)	4	2	[1] 5	[1] 1	2	90	3	9	102
III. 1. Pearl Harbor Junction to Pearl City Junction (inc)	2	0	3	2	1	45	3	4	58
2. Pearl City Junction to Kunia Road	1	0	4	1	2	54	6	6	66
3. Kunia Road to Nanakuli (inc)	3	2	3	0	2	54	3	6	63
4. Nanakuli to Kaena Point (inc)	7	3	6	0	1	99	3	10	112
II. 1. Waimea Bridge to Brigade Woods (inclusive)	3	1	5	2	1	69	3	7	79
2. Brigade Woods to Kipapa Gulch (inclusive)	5	0	8	3	3	123	6	13	142

RECAPITULATIONS

District I	144
District II	221
District III	299
District IV	172
Grand Total	836

[1] Waiau Power Plant, 6.

[65] EXHIBIT "K" Confidential

POLICE DEPARTMENT,
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU,
Territory of Hawaii, December 17, 1940.

Subject: Suggested Exercise for Plantations.
To: All Plantation Managers and Mr. Leo Rodby.

The Army authorities very kindly asked me as your representative to sit in on their Headquarters Staff exercises to cover war conditions.

In these exercises, only the staffs of the various units work, being told that theoretically they have so many men and such and such equipment under their control. Each officer affected is given a bunch of sealed envelopes with instructions to open them up at the different specific times stated on each envelope. Inside these sealed envelopes are messages stating that such and such an event has taken place; the officer then has to state in writing whom he contacted and what action he would take with the theoretical force at his command to handle the situation.

During these exercises, Colonel Craig took me around and introduced me to the various Headquarters Staffs who would be especially cooperating with the Plantation Managers and civic authorities.

Colonel Hayes, the Chief of Staff, tentatively suggested that the Plantation Managers and some of their executive staffs might care to have a similar exercise worked out for them with regards to the possible conditions which might face them in time of emergency. It was suggested that Colonel Poindexter might work out such a plan with the Chief and me, and at some mutually agreed on date suitable to all the Plantations, the Plantation Managers and their executive staffs might go through an exercise with Poindexter, the Chief and possibly myself, acting as neutral judges.

Would you please let me know what you think of the above plan, and if you wish me to go further into the matter with the Army and Police authorities.

Please keep this confidential until a final decision is made on the matter.

/s/ T. G. S. Walker,
T. G. S. WALKER,
Co-ordinator, Provisional Police Plans.

TGSW:DL

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[66] EXHIBIT "L"

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 May 1941.

Subject: Participation of Provisional Police Guards in Department Maneuvers during period 17 May to 18 May 1941.
To: Commanding General, Schofield Barracks, T. H.

1. In connection with Department Maneuvers to be held in May, five hundred eighty-two (582) members of the Provisional Police Guard will participate during the period 12:00 noon, 17 May to 12:00 noon, 18 May 1941, inclusive. The contemplated plan calls for the employment of one hundred ninety-four (194) of those men for each relief while guarding installations located within Police Districts II, III and IV.

2. It is desired you designate nine (9) officers (junior grade) and nine (9) non-commissioned officers to supervise and instruct these guards in the use of the Riot Shot Gun, and nine (9) Medical Corps enlisted men who are capable of administering first aid. This personnel to report to the office of the Department Provost Marshal at 10:00 am, 10 May 1941. It is further resired that a total of 235 Riot Shot Guns and a total of 2,910 rounds (5 rounds per man) of ammunition for same be made available for target practice, and a total of 235 targets—E. Silhouette type.

3. The personnel mentioned above will be stationed as indicated and the Riot Shot Guns and ammunition for same distributed as shown below:

Police District II

Beat 1:
Place: Haleiwa Court House
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: 1 Em to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 31 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 31

Beat 2:
Place: Wahiawa Court House
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 31 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 31

Police District III

Beat 1:
Place: Pearl City Court House
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 19 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 19

Beat 2:
Place: Waipahu Athletic Field
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 24 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 24

[67] Beat 3:
Place: Administration Building, Ewa
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: I EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 24 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 24

Beat 4:
Place: Wainae Courthouse
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: I NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 24 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 24

Police District IV

Beat 1:
Place: Waimanalo Plantation Gymnasium
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 14 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 14

Beat 2:
Place: Kaneohe Court House
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: I EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 11 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 11

Beat 3:
Place: Kahuku Plantation Co. Police Station (near Picture House)
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 37 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 37

Totals

Commissioned Officers	9
Non-Commissioned Officers	9
Enlisted Men capable of administering 1st Aid	9
Riot Shot Guns	235
Rounds of Ammunition for Riot Shot Guns	2910
Targets	235

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

[68] EXHIBIT "M"

Subject: Objectives of the Diversified Crop Committee of H. S. P. A.

1. Basic Considerations.

a. The purpose of crop diversification should be dual, namely, to make the local community more self-sufficient in time of peace and to develop local facilities so that Oahu may be made entirely self-supporting in time of war.

b. A broadened agricultural base to include a greater diversification of food crops will be of great value in a depression, will be an influence to improve the well-being of local labor at all times and may well be the determining influence in the defense of these islands in time of war. The cost of the development of diversified agriculture may be considered as a very reasonable insurance premium protecting an investment of many millions.

c. The local climate and other conditions make it economically sound to put the major agricultural effort of the islands into sugar and pineapple production. The major emphasis on these two products should not be altered.

d. Present trade relations with the West coast in food commodities provide a valuable mainland tie which should not be severed.

e. A reasonable objective should be to accomplish a 50% self-sufficiency in time of peace accomplished by putting major emphasis on those things which are most suited to local production.

f. Crop diversification in the Hawaiian Islands, to be effective must be within the plantation system. This is apparent in view of the fact that plantations control all suitable land, control most of the labor and are financially the only agencies capable of undertaking any such activity.

g. Crop diversification should be given "infant industry" assistance and protection. This is necesssary in view of the fact that the local agricultural field is completely occupied.

h. Diversified agriculture should be developed under conditions such that a relatively small amount of land in the most suitable location will be devoted to it. This will require land in an area outside the heavy rain belt and where irrigation is easily feasible.

i. Food production must be so organized as to provide for a continuous flow of produce to the market. Retailers will patronize the agency which can promise continuity of supply. This will require control by the plantations, the H. S. P. A. or a growers associations such as the Maui Association.

/s/ J. A. ULIO.

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[69] EXHIBIT "N"

EXPERIMENT STATION OF THE HAWAIIAN SUGAR PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION

APPENDIX SEC. III–B–(1)

JUNE 19, 1941.

The Honorable JOSEPH B. POINDEXTER,
Governor of Hawaii, Iolani Palace, Honolulu, T. H.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR POINDEXTER: In compliance with your request, I submit the following brief statement regarding what has been done and what should be done to insure an adequate food supply for Hawaii in case of an emergency.

The Diversified Crops Committee.

In 1935, the H. S. P. A. called together, as a Diversified Crops Committee, a group of men representing all phases of agricultural endeavor in the Territory.

Ever since its inauguration, this Committee has functioned continuously and at the present time its membership is as follows:

J. H. Beaumont	Col. Casey Hayes
H. P. Agee	L. D. Larsen
F. W. Broadbent	H. L. Lyon
D. L. Drawford	W. W. G. Moir
A. L. Dean	H. H. Warner
A. D. Ednie	Neil Webster

While the primary function of the Diversified Crops Committee was to find new crops that could be grown in the Territory with profit to the growers, it has from the very first given much attention to plans for producing, locally, crops in such quantities and of such a nature as would provide the entire population with adequate subsistence in case some emergency stopped the flow into the Territory of foodstuffs from outside sources. During the past year, all the efforts of this Committee have been focussed on this one objective.

A Food Administration with Authority an Obvious Necessity

The Diversified Crops Committee has at all times held the opinion that whenever an emergency develops necessitating the local production of a large part or all of the food required to feed the people in this Territory, a Food Administration would be set up and financed by the Federal Government, and given unlimited powers to requisition land, water, labor, machinery, fuel and all seeds and cuttings of food plants.

The Diversified Crops Committee has, through long continued efforts on the part of its members and their associates, worked up feasible plans for food and feed production in this Territory with the intention of placing these plans at the disposal of a Food Administration if, and when, such [70] an Administration was created.

On request, the Diversified Crops Committee can supply inventories of stocks of essential foods, feeds, fuels, etc. present at the time in the Territory and can also provide an estimate of the cost of any operation which it recommends.

If Prepared for the Worst, any lesser Emergency can be Easily Handled.

It is quite probable that if an emergency develops, the Territory will experience a gradual curtailment of transportation facilities but we should be prepared to promptly meet the worst possible situation. As the bulk of the Territory's population resides on the Island of Oahu, the most serious situation that can arise is the complete isolation of Oahu, not only from the mainland but from the other Islands in the group as well. The Diversified Crops Committee has prepared a food production plan to meet this critical situation should it ever arise. If some agency is authorized and financed to carry out this plan to meet the worst possible situation, it will be able to cope rather easily with any situation of lesser severity which may be inflicted upon us. The Diversified Crops Committee has, therefore, drawn up a Basic Plan to meet the extreme situation; this plan being so drawn that it can be put into effect by increments, the entire plan becoming effective only when the extreme situation is about to be realized.

Adequate Funds should be made Immediately Available.

If the extreme situation develops—that is, complete isolation of Oahu—the conditions which make this possible will render such exposed sections of the Island as Waianae, Kahuku and Waimanalo unfit and unreliable for farming operations; therefore, plantings for the extreme emergency should be confined to the four major and centrally located plantations. The lands of these plantations are among the most highly productive in the Territory and their use for growing diversified crops will represent a heavy financial investment. The minimum area of irrigated lands required for planting under the Basic Plan is 8,700 acres. These sugar cane lands, when requisitioned, will all be carrying heavy crops of cane and it will require much energy, labor and expense to get this cane out of the ground, put the land in shape and plant other crops. Seeds and propagating material for the crops to be planted must be grown or purchased.

Seeds for some crops can be purchased from outside sources but that for others, such as pigeon pea, must be grown locally. The sweet potato should be our most extensively planted food crop as it is our most reliable, but we shall have to have much more propagating material than is now available in the

Territory. Steps should be taken at once to secure appropriate land and grow thereon the propagating material of the essential crops which will be required for the initial plantings under the Basic Plan.

The planting, cultivating and harvesting of the food crops that must be grown will require special machinery not now to be found on sugar plantations or elsewhere in the Territory. The procuring of this machinery should be attended to at once as it will take time to get it here from the mainland. Following recommendations of the Diversified Crops Committee, the H. S. P. A. has already invested several thousand dollars in [71] emergency machinery, but this will only serve to demonstrate what is needed. The H. S. P. A. has also spent many thousands of dollars on the promotion of diversified crops through field and feeding experiments carried on under the supervision of the Diversified Crops Committee.

We Must Grow Crops for Feed.

In addition to growing food crops for human consumption, we must grow crops to feed beef cattle, dairy cattle, hogs and and poultry, for we must have meat, milk and eggs. The by-products of the sugar and pineapple industries will be employed to advantage as feed, but these will not go very far towards fulfilling requirements. We must grow forage crops for cattle, root crops for hogs and seed crops for poultry.

Protein Foods and Feeds.

A life sustaining diet for all animals including man must provide a considerable amount of protein, that is, organic compounds containing nitrogen. Hawaii's standard crops are notoriously rich in carbohydrates but very low in protein. As a consequence, the Territory imports, under normal conditions, large amounts of foods and feeds which supply protein. To provide adequate protein for human consumption and for stock feed will be one of the most serious problems to be solved in an extreme emergency.

All plants can make protein out of carbohydrates and inorganic nitrogen, but animals do not possess this ability, so must derive all their proteins from plants. The sugar cane, pineapple and banana make protein for their own bodies, but place very little of it in the products which we recover, so, in an emergency, we must grow plants that put protein in that portion of their bodies which we, as humans, use for food. Bean plants deposit a lot of protein in their seeds and, as we can grow many varieties of beans successfully in Hawaii, they constitute one crop on which we can rely for a considerable part of our protein in an emergency.

Another crop rich in protein, the cultivation of which is being advocated by the Diversified Crops Committee, is yeast. This lowly organism can be grown easily in a weak sugar solution to which has been added ordinary fertilizer salts. It feeds on the sugar and, picking up the nitrogen and mineral elements, builds up protein, growing at a prodigious rate. The yeast organism does not construct a complicated body but merely clothes its living substance with a thin membrane. A mass of dry yeast, therefore, is largely protein. Under favorable conditions, which are easily maintained in any climate, a crop of yeast grows to maturity in less than 24 hours, so it is quite possible to harvest a crop every day in the year.

At a pilot plant in Honolulu, financed by the H. S. P. A., all the details of yeast production as a commercial crop has been worked out. The dry product is 50 per cent protein and very rich in the vitamins of the "B" complex. It is quite palatable and a number of people have, for some time, been eating it regularly to determine its value as a source of protein in the human diet. Their reactions are all very favorable. Up to the present time, most of the output of this pilot plant has been used in feeding experiments at the University with cattle, hogs and poultry. The results of these experiments clearly indicate that yeast is an excellent source of protein for these food-yielding animals. However, since this yeast has proven to be a good protein food for humans, it would be poor economy to feed it to beef cattle in an emergency, for it will [72] be necessary to feed at least 10 pounds of yeast protein for every pound of protein recovered in beef.

Since an abundance of sugar will always be available on Oahu, the Diversified Crops Committee recommends that adequate facilities be provided so that in an emergency yeast may be produced in large quantities for food and feed. Under our conditions, the culture of yeast affords the surest and quickest method of producing the essential protein.

Stores and Storage Most Essential.

It will be at least 6 months after operations under the Basic Plan have been started before its returns will fully meet the needs of the population, so it is essential that we have on hand supplies of food and feed to carry us through this critical period.

We have learned by experience that crops cannot be successfully grown on our lands unless they are supplied with adequate fertilizers and as all fertilizers used in Hawaii are brought in from outside sources, it is essential that an adequate supply of these materials be imported and held in reserve for use in case an emergency develops.

In order to combat the diseases and insect pests which are certain to attack the divers crops which we must grow in an emergency, we should have on hand an adequate supply of appropriate insecticides and fungicides. These materials should be brought into the Territory while transportation facilities are still available.

Most of the energy consumed in the Territory outside of sugar factories is derived from fuel oil, diesel oil and gasoline brought from the mainland. We cannot have electric lights and electric power if the flow of these fuels from the mainland is stopped. Most of the water used for domestic purposes and irrigation on Oahu is pumped from wells with power derived from fuel oil. Deprive Oahu of fuel oil, and the water supply of Honolulu would fail completely, while most of the can fields on the Island would have to go without water and the crops which they carry would be ruined. Deprive Oahu of Diesel oil and gasoline and it would be impossible to operate the machinery necessary to the cultivation of field crops. It is most essential, therefore, that if an extreme emergency is impending, large supplies of fuel oil, Diesel oil and gasoline be held in storage on Oahu for, if our power supply fails, we will be unable to long survive.

Cultivation of Truck Crops in Hawaii Not Profitable under Normal Conditions

The chief aim of agriculture is to capture radiant energy by means of crops which store it in products which can be utilized by man. Of all known crops, sugar cane is the most efficient producer of such products and, consequently, its cultivation adds more to our national resources in a given time than can the cultivation of any other crop. So long as normal transportation between Hawaii and the mainland can be maintained, Hawaii can contribute most to our national resources by growing sugar for shipment to the mainland, and most to our national prosperity by buying from the mainland products produced more efficiently there than they can be produced in Hawaii.

[73] Hawaii is tropical and its fields are not suitable to the cultivation of temperate zone crops. If such crops are grown, the yields are not comparable to those obtained in temperate climes.

It should be obvious to any student making a careful examination of the situation that anyone undertaking the production of truck crops in Hawaii on a scale sufficient to satisfy the local demand for these crops is embarking on a course that will lead to financial disaster if mainland produce has continued access to our market. If Hawaii must undertake the production of food crops to tide her through a national emergency, the Federal Government should underwrite the enterprise, as it cannot survive when the emergency is passed and will be liquidated at a considerable loss to its promoters.

Yours respectfully,

(Signed) HAROLD L. LYON, *Director.*

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[74] EXHIBIT "O"

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., May 15, 1941.

Major General BRIANT H. WELLS (Ret.)
Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association,
Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR GENERAL WELLS: Please express my thanks to the Trustees of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association for the Report of the "Field Operations Committee", and for the "Emergency Planting Plan" of the Diversified Crops Committee.

I feel that the Report, together with the Plan, is the best and most complete study on the subject of local emergency food production yet accomplished, and that this work will constitute a basis for all planning on this subject for Oahu.

In this connection, I have directed that the Planting Plan with such minor changes as may be necessary from a military standpoint, be incorporated in our current Food Production Plan for application to Army use should this ever be required.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

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[75] EXHIBIT "P"

RURAL OAHU COMMITTEE,
MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL,
October 3rd, 1941.

To All District Chairmen

GENTLEMEN: For information and guidance, I am enclosing herewith the Outline of Organization as used by Mr. Penhallow of District "8". The functions under such sub-committee may be changed to suit local conditions in each district. Further information regarding the function of each committee, will be found in the "Outline of Plan for Protective Measures for Civilian Population of Oahu in case of Bombardment," recently delivered to you.

We have also received a letter from Dr. R. B. Faus, In Charge of Detail Plans and Training, which we give you herewith:—

"At the request of Mr. Walker, I am pleased to inform you that one unit of the Emergency Medical and Ambulance Service has been formed at Kailua under the direction of Dr. Chinn. I know one is being formed at Kaneohe under the direction of Dr. Ching and a third at Wahiawa under Dr. Mack.

"First Aid classes have been conducted at Kahuku and Waialua under Drs. Rothwell and Davis. (Classes have been and are being held at Aiea under Dr. Thompson). Dr. Garton Wall informs me that he is all set at Ewa Plantation. I have not been informed as to what further assistance they may need in the way of equipment and man-power to develop their units."

From the foregoing, it is evident that any information and assistance needed for the formation of Medical units in the various districts, will be gladly given by Dr. Faus and his committee Please address all communications to Dr. Faus thru these headquarters.

Yours truly,

/s/ S. L. Austin
STAFFORD L. AUSTIN,
Chairman, Rural Oahu Committee,
Major Disaster Council.

SLA: FSB
Encl.

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[76] *Major Disaster Committee—District 8*

Chairman: Richard Penhallow
Vice Chairman: Robert Johnston
Transportation: Alfred Muller
Police: George W. Groves
Medical: P. H. Liljestrand
Fire: T. B. Goskirk
Communication: Intelligence, S. K. Toomey
Food Administration: Jaul I. Fagan, Jr.
Electric Power-Light: Syl. Sonognini

Transportation-Evacuation: A Muller
List of available transportation (less Police, Fire, Medical and communication requirements)
Organization chart for transportation personnel, motor & R. R.
Maintenance of equipment
Co-operation—Police, Medical, Fire, Communication, Food Administration and Electric committees.

Police: G. W. Groves
Provisional Police and company guards
Protection of Transportation Routes
Utility installations
Prevention of Looting
Direction of Traffic
Maintenance of order in time of disaster
Instruction in behavior when alarm sounds (Schools, etc.)
Training of Police personnel
Black-out committee (J. K. Evans)
Education of Public
Co-operation—All other committees.

Medical: P. H. Liljestrand
Outline of plan to supply medical aid during time of disaster:
Location of Hospital and Aid Stations
Location of Collecting points
Organization of Personnel
Training of Personnel
Education of Public
Maintenance of Public Health, Prevention of Epidemic:
Immunization
Sanitation
Co-operation—All other committees.

Fire: T. B. Goskirk
Organization of Fire brigades
Maintenance of equipment
Training of Personnel
Education of Public, Incendiary bombs, etc.
Co-operation—All other committees.

Communication and Intelligence: S. K. Toomey
District Headquarters:
Communication Liaison between Rural Headquarters and district ganization
Communication Liaison between units of district organization a between units and headquarters
Organization chart of personnel including messengers and radio a telephone personnel (2 Radio Patrol Cars).

[77] Intelligence:
Keep in constant touch with the grape vine, to learn in advance subversive activity to enable Police to maintain order. (Camp Pol personnel)
Co-operation—All other committees.

Food Administration: P. I. Fagan, Jr.
Company food production. (Prepared plan)
Home gardens. (Educational campaign)
Store inventories. (Maintain periodical check)
Household inventories. (Encourage increase)
Make an outline of your organization's arm's and personnel
Co-operation—All other committees.

Electric Power and Light: Syl. Sonognini
Organization chart of maintenance Crews
Maintain Plantation electric system by repairing breaks as soon as t occur
Co-operation—All other committees.

Rural Water: A. M. DaVico
Organization Chart of Maintenance & Repair Crews
Description of System
Outline of Alternate sources in case of destruction or obstruction of pre system

Plan for transporting drinking water if impossible to pipe
Cooperation with Rural Water Department, City & County
Cooperation with all other committees.
Engineering: J. M. Nakano
Organization Chart of administrative personnel & necessary crews for damage repair
Plan for air raid protection by clocks in villages:
Suitable plans for Air Raid Shelters
Recommendation for location of Air Raid Shelters
Cooperation with Engineer, Rural Chairman's Advisory Staff
Cooperation with all other committees.

[78] EXHIBIT "Q"

RURAL OAHU COMMITTEE,
CIVILIAN DEFENSE CORPS,
December 21st, 1941.

Mr. T. G. S. WALKER,
Director, Civilian Defense Council, Honolulu, Hawaii.

DEAR SIR: With reference to your memorandum of December 30th, 1941, on the subject of Civilian Defense, I give you the following. I am enclosing herewith the Organization Chart of the Rural Oahu Committee of the Civilian Defense Council, so that you may get a clear picture of the set-up in Rural Oahu.

Within an hour of the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Forces of the Rising Sun, this whole rural organization was functioning 100% in all capacities. The various committees were standing by at their designated Stations for immediate action.

From then on everything moved along smoothly and the civilian activities were taken care of in all the districts without delay. All vital public utilities installations were placed under guard and plantation power plants were standing by to come onto the main lines at the moment's notice of a power failure.

In the weeks following the "Blitz", all defense requirements of labor, equipment and supplies for both the Army and Navy were handled through this office for the Rural Districts, which turned out to be a tremendous job. However, we believe that the wants of the Army and Navy were well taken care of. In fact, all labor, equipment and supplies were pooled for their immediate use. One special article of which they were in dire need, was sand bags and their wants in this line were quickly made available to them from the stocks of sugar bags on hand at the plantations. Approximately 1,000,000 bags were requisitioned for this purpose.

All food inventories were taken care of with dispatch by the Committee of Food Administration which was ably handled by the Chairman, Mr. W. W. Morrell. This licensing of stores was also done by the same group of men in the Rural Areas.

Our Rural Engineering Committee is busy at this time, gathering all information on utilities in the Rural Districts to make it available to the U. S. E. D. Department of Utilities, who has asked that this be done by our Rural Civilian Defense Committee.

The rationing of gasoline in the Rural Districts is being well taken care of by the nine district chairmen. This is a big job in itself and the chairmen are to be congratulated on the fine manner in which they handled all the various and sundry items that were asked of them to do. All this work being done on their own time and everyone has given freely of their time.

[79] We want to take this opportunity to express our appreciation for the fine work done by your office and the excellent and efficient manner in which all our problems were handled by your organization. I do believe that the Oahu Defense Organization really put their hearts into the job at hand, and made it go with a minimum of delay. The chairman of the Rural Committees did a swell job and as Chairman of the Rural Oahu Committee, I have nothing but praises for the fine work these gentlemen have done and are still doing.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stafford L. Austin,
STAFFORD L. AUSTIN,
Chairman, Rural Oahu Committee, Civilian Defense Corps.

SLA: ESB


·EXHIBIT · "R"·
··CHART·COMPARING·SUGAR·CANE·ACREAGE··SUGAR·PRODUCTION
·AVERAGE·NUMBER·OF·MALE·ADULT·EMPLOYEES·(UNSKILLED)AND
· TOTAL·MEN·DAYS·ALL·EMPLOYEES·(UNSKILLED)·
· ON·HAWAIIAN·SUGAR·PLANTATIONS ·
YEAR 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943
SUGAR CANE ACREAGE
PRODUCTION TONS · 96
AVERAGE NUMBER MALE ADULT EMPLOYEES (UNSKILLED)
TOTAL MEN DAYS ALL EMPLOYEES (UNSKILLED)
PAGE 80

[81] EXHIBIT "S"

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
Washington, November 2, 1945.

HAWAIIAN SUGAR PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION,
Honolulu, Hawaii.

GENTLEMEN: I regret very much that previous commitments have made it impossible for me to accept the kind invitation extended by your President, Mr. P. E. Spalding, to attend the 50th Anniversary dinner of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.

Please extend my congratulations to the officials of your association's experimental station in their observance of its 50th year of operation. Your association has earned recognition as a research organization through the persistent efforts of its scientific personnel. It is only necessary to compare the per-acre production of sugar cane in your area with the similar results of any area in the world to realize the outstanding scientific progress made by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association. The work of your institution, I am told, proved especially significant in the recent war period. Notwithstanding rigid military regulations and a very trying manpower situation, the Hawaiian Islands maintained their sugar production at near peacetime levels. For this accomplishment the Nation can be grateful.

The scientific knowledge your association has acquired through the years provides the best kind of basis for further important research. Knowledge is one thing which can never be surplus. In building the kind of free world for which we have fought, we shall have use for all the knowledge we possess and can acquire. One way or another, we must build a world of plenty for all people. That is the only way the world can survive. Let us work together, using all available knowledge, to expand the world's economy and meet the needs of mankind.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ CLINTON P. ANDERSON, *Secretary.*

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[82] CIVILIAN PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES AND ESTABLISHMENT OF MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU

T. G. S. Walker, Honolulu, Hawaii

[83] Probably no community in the United States has been more closely geared to the activities of the Army and Navy throughout its entire history than has the community of the Territory of Hawaii and more particularly the Island of Oahu and the City and County of Honolulu.

It is believed that the Territory of Hawaii was among the very first, if not the first, integral part of the United States of America, to realize that war with Japan was becoming inevitable and that the civilian population would not only be vitally affected by the war but should organize to take care of as many of the civilian public as possible without calling on the military authorities and Army troops for help.

BLACKOUT PRACTICES

As early as 1939, the City and County government of Honolulu, with the cooperation of Army authorities, organized and carried out a comprehensive total blackout for the Island of Oahu. The cooperation of the public was outstanding and the mechanics of blacking out for the island in case of a sudden attack proven satisfactory. Similar blackout practices territorial-wide were carried out in 1940 and 1941 with equally favorable response from Army authorities. A copy of the radio statement of General Short following the blackout test of Hawaii on May 20, 1941, is attached herewith in full as Exhibit "A".

ORGANIZATION OF EMERGENCY RELIEF COMMITTEE

In July 1940, one of the Supervisors of the Board of Supervisors, City and County of Honolulu, Mr. A. S. Cleghorn Robertson, had proposed the formation of a committee to prepare a major emergency disaster plan and to draft a bill to effectuate the same for submission to the Board of Supervisors. At a meeting of a general committee of businessmen and leaders of the community held at the Mayor's office on July 8, 1940, a motion had been made by Mr. Cain which was duly passed reading in part "to determine how much money, if any, would be needed and how much work would be involved in the establishment of such a committee."

By letter dated July 16, 1940, Mayor Crane, the Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu, appointed a subcommittee with instructions "to study more fully the Emergency Disaster Plan." This subcommittee, at this early date of July, 1940, proceeded to consider a broad Emergency Disaster Plan contemplating "sabotage during the period of strained relations; war with its attendant possibilities of partial blockade; blockade; bombardment; bombing, landing parachute troops; landing of major boats or troops." The agenda states that by "strained relations", the subcommittee envisaged conditions to exist in which it seems possible that a foreign power will attempt sabotage and preparations for an attack on this Territory and that during such a period government of the city would be conducted as in normal times up until the time [84] That the Governor declared martial law. At such time the subcommittee envisaged that the Governor would take charge of the administration with the aid of the National Guard and the Emergency Disaster Plan could therefore provide for the cooperation of our citizenship with the Governor and the National Guard. At the discretion of the Governor, assistance of Federal troops, Army and Navy, could be obtained at this time and cooperation with those forces should be foreseen and provided for. The agenda also conceived the possibilities that upon the inception of war the government of the Territory would presumably be taken over by the military authorities. Therefore, any proposed emergency disaster plan could provide for cooperating with the military force "so that as little burden as possible falls on the shoulders of troops who will be necessary in the field."

Following this expression of community interest in preparedness activities, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Oahu Plantation Mangers Association had initiated at their own expense the training of a Provisional Guard Unit at their own expense. This development is discussed in the statement of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.

On April 3, 1941, Mayor Lester Petrie who succeeded Charles S. Crane as Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu called a meeting of the Board of Supervisors with various department heads to "consider the formulation of and participation by the City and County government in a major disaster plan for this community." The undersigned, as Coordinator for the Plantation Provisional Police Unit was present at this meeting. Mayor Petrie explained that "the object is really to coordinate our plans and schedules with the military service so that in the time of extreme emergency, the military service will not be hampered unnecessarily by civilian problems which we can well take care of ourselves." He explained that he had discussed these proposals with General Herron and with General Short. General Short was then expected to discuss these civilian activities at the Army Day luncheon, which he did on April 7, 1941.

At this time, also, the Honolulu Medical Society was proceeding with its organization of an Emergency Preparedness Committee. At the meeting of the Mayor, Dr. Clarence E. Fronk and Dr. Thomas Mossman of the Medical Preparedness Committee pointed out that the Committee was then working on some twelve aid stations possibly increasing that to twenty to be located throughout the city, operating on a twenty-four hour basis in time of emergency. Different concerns in town had already volunteered about one hundred commercial trucks for ambulances. About sixty drivers had volunteered for training and a first aid unit was being set up for display and training.

The Chief of Police explained that at that time a force of between 2,000 and 2,500 men had been organized to guard public utility companies, plantations, both sugar and pineapple, the City and County, the oil companies, and other installations. This plan contemplated complete tie-up with the Army and the civilian police.

The Mayor explained that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss organizational activities possible on the part of the City and County of Honolulu in view of the existing defense activities being carried forward by individual groups and organizations and the discussions in the Territorial Legislature. [85] As a result of this meeting a temporary committee of five was appointed by the Mayor which in turn called upon the undersigned to assist in studying emergency disaster plans. This committee recommended to the Mayor the appointment of a Major Disaster Council composed of City and County department heads with certain representatives of the utility companies. Appointment of a full-time Coordinator was also recommended, and a proposed resolution was submitted urging the Territorial Legislature to allocate sufficient funds for a major emergency. Representatives of the Army, Navy and Territorial Government were to be appointed to the Council.

In the meantime, on April 8, 1941, an ordinance was proposed before the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu, to create a Major Disaster Council. This ordinance was approved on April 26, 1941. The Major Disaster Council so created was to consist of the Mayor, a City and County department head as Vice-Chairman, and such other persons as the Mayor might appoint with the approval of the Board of Supervisors. This Council was charged with the coordination of all community resources and by means of mutual cooperation and effort to create a plan for utilizing all resources for relief and general welfare of the people in the event of some major disaster. The Mayor was empowered to declare when an emergency disaster existed. The divisions of the Council were set forth to include, among others, transportation, communications, power and light, law and order, fire protection, water and water supply, medical, Red Cross, rescue demolition and gas protection, air raid warning, mortuary work, finance and supplies, and rural Oahu. The Ordinance authorized a coordinator to be responsible for the entire plan.

The Mayor proceeded, therefore, with the appointment of the Council and the undersigned Coordinator. The first meeting of the Major Disaster Council was held on June 24, 1941. Copy of the Minutes of this first meeting is attached herewith as Exhibit "B." Also attached as part of the same exhibit is an organizational chart of the Council as originally established.

Close coordination was maintained with the Army through the designation by General Short of Lt. Colonel Casey Hayes, F. A., U. S. Army, of G–5 Section, Hawaiian Department, and Col. H. K. B. Lyman, CE, U. S. A., Department Engineer, as advisors of the Council. Capt. C. C. Baughman, USN, Captain of the Yard, Pearl Harbor, was designated by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as Navy Advisor. By October, 1941, the Department Surgeon, Colonel Edgar King, USA, had been designated an advisor.

The undersigned as Coordinator, with the Executive Committee of the Council, proceeded to set up suitable headquarters, organized and trained volunteers, tabulated available transportation and evacuation facilities, designated emergency reporting points for all personnel equipment, and took all other possible steps to cushion the shock to civilians in any emergency that might arise. The necessity for relief of trained Army personnel for actual combat by having civilians handle as many of their own problems as possible was a paramount consideration in all of the above plans and activities.

The provisional police organization as developed subsequent to June, 1940, was merged with the Major Disaster Council. All plantation managers and other chairman of the various districts were appointed Major Disaster Council chairmen with the fullest possible power to act for the Council in their own districts in case of an attack.

[86] On July 1, 1941, the Emergency Medical and Ambulance Committee of the Honolulu Medical Society which had been training volunteers several months with funds supplied by the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce and some considerable assistance from the Hawaii Chapter, American Red Cross, was made a Major Disaster Committee with Dr. H. L. Arnold as Chairman and Dr. Robert Faus as Vice Chairman. The Mayor and Board of Supervisors allocated $6,000 to cover this Committee's expenses for the period from July 1–December 31, 1941. The above sum was augmented by $5,000 from proceeds of a benefit football game. A full report of the activities and medical preparedness by Dr. H. L. Arnold is set forth hereafter. Private individuals, the Chamber of Commerce, and Committee Members themselves made contributions to the activities of the Major Disaster Council. The contributions were

not limited to any racial group but included all nationalities—Caucasian, Hawaiian, Filipino, Chinese, and Japanese.

The Coordinator for the Major Disaster Council from the time of appointment to December 7, 1941, delivered approximately 150 talks to business and fraternal organizations, parent-teachers association groups, etc., emphasizing the need for preparedness and the need for volunteers. The response of the community to these talks, and the response of the publicity given to the activities of the Major Disaster Council in the formulation and preparation of plans was considerable.

Mayor Lester Petrie and the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu approved the purchase on City and County funds of medical equipment totalling $50,000; medical supplies $10,000; fire fighting equipment worth $72,500 and two-way radio equipment $7,500. Most of this equipment arrived in November, 1941, and was of inestimable value on December 7, 1941. In the purchase of fire equipment, able assistance provided by Mr. Charles W. Schruth, Federal Works Engineer, was of great value in permitting procurement through the Lanham Act. This equipment started arriving in Honolulu in February, 1942. Close liaison was maintained with Army and Navy Intelligence as well as with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In its coordinating activities, the Major Disaster Council joined with Army, Navy and FBI representatives in establishing a committee with prominent representatives of each racial group resident in Hawaii for the purposes of formulating plans for meeting the problems attendant upon any war emergency with the variety of racial groups present in the Territory.

In conjunction with the Army authorities and parallel with the public appeal of Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding general, Hawaiian Department, a campaign was initiated to get householders to purchase canned goods for storage up to the limit of their cupboard space. In this manner large spaces in warehouses and store shelves were cleared permitting merchants to make large purchases in shipments from the Coast in October and November, 1941. The amount of shipping space thus released for war materials was appreciable.

COOPERATION WITH TERRITORIAL OFFICIALS—M-DAY LAW

During this period it was becoming more and more apparent that the situation called for wider authority and more financial backing than that possible under City and County financing. The Major Disaster Council urged Governor Joseph Poindexter to call a special session of the Legislature to [87] enact an M-Day law, giving the Governor unusual emergency powers. This session was called by the Governor on September 15, 1941. And at the request of the Governor and President of the Territorial Senate, a special committee of the Major Disaster Council under the chairmanship of Mr. Fred Ohrt, compiled a financial report showing what "M-Day funds" in their opinion should be set aside for preparedness activities and in case of an attack. This recommendation was for $1,500,000 the first year and a total of $8,000,000 in case of a war of three years. Also at the request of the Territorial Senate, the Coordinator and members of the Major Disaster Council attended this session and gave advice regarding the M-Day Bill.

It was at this session that Lt. General Walter C. Short appeared at the request of the Territorial Government and gave a strong talk on the danger of the situation and the urgent needs. The Territorial Legislature passed the M-Day Bill allocating $500,000 to this Administration and setting up a reserve fund of $1,000,000.

The work of the City and County Major Disaster Council had undoubtedly alerted large numbers of the population to the dangers involved in the Pacific and the necessity for serious, intensive defense preparedness. It is impossible to present briefly any complete picture of the extensive preparations that were made and the training and preparations carried through. In any event, however, the rapidity with which the personnel of the Major Disaster Council organization reported for duty immediately after the attack on December 7, 1941, and proceeded to discharge their pre-assigned duties efficiently and effectively is ample proof of the excellent organization that had been developed. There is attached herewith as Exhibit "C" a copy of a summary prepared by the undersigned of the activities of the Council following the attack. This report was prepared on January 2, 1942, following the activities of that fateful time. Additional reports of the various sub-committees are available if desired.

CONCLUSION

By this summary of defense activities, the undersigned has attempted to present in summary form only the extensive preparedness activities undertaken by the civilian community prior to the war. Additional brief statements of the chairmen of the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, the Medical Preparedness Committee, the Transportation Committee, the Blood Bank, and the Reserve Police follow this statement.

It is believed that after a review of these statements it will be evident that the civilian community had succeeded, long prior to Pearl Harbor, in developing elaborate preparations for any major disaster and demonstrated complete cooperation with the Army and the Navy with active response to any of the desires or suggestions of the military authorities for civilian preparedness. It is believed that this is certainly a matter to be entered into the record of the Honorable Investigating Committee to counteract any inferences or impressions in the testimony and report of the Pearl Harbor Army Board which might be construed to the contrary.

Additional information and material is available relative to the activities of the Major Disaster Council should the Committee so desire.

T. G. S. Walker
T. G. S. WALKER.

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[88] EXHIBIT "A"

GENERAL SHORT'S BLACKOUT BROADCAST TALK, 20 MAY 1941

General SHORT (Following introduction by announcer): I am speaking to you from the command post of the Hawaiian Department somewhere on the Island of Oahu. Into this command post tonight have streamed the messages from the many vantage points both on this island of Oahu as well as from Hawaii, Maui, Lanai, Molokai and Kauai, telling the story of the great job the Territory of Hawaii has done in blacking out the Islands.

Far underground in the command post are located the vital nerve centers of command and communications of the Hawaiian Department. Staff officers have been receiving these reports both from Army airplanes and observation posts. In an actual emergency it is into these C. P.s that the story of the blackout would stream.

From a vantage point in an observation post nearby I have with my own eyes witnessed the complete blackout of Honolulu, the great Pearl Harbor naval base, Schofield Barracks, and the Army's Hickam Field.

I have watched the swift and expeditious manner in which this job was done. From the reports pouring into the command post and handed to me here, I have been apprised of the success of the exercise throughout the entire Territory.

Hawaii has had, probably, more practice in blackout than any other major American community. But she has out-done her previous efforts tonight. Loyalty and cooperation with your Territorial Blackout Committee has spelled success in a job which would have made the task of enemy bombers a difficult one.

With such a spirit activating all Americans in this time of national trial I think we can meet with confidence all threats of enemy encroachment even that of bombardment from the air.

Governor Poindexter, Mr. Sinclair and members of the Territorial Blackout Committee, and to the people of the Territory of Hawaii, I extend my praise and congratulations, and giving you my aloha, I say Good Night.

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[89] EXHIBIT "B"

MINUTES—MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU

The first meeting of the Major Disaster Council of the City and County of Honolulu was called to order by Mayor Lester Petrie, at 1:30 P. M. on Tuesday, June 24th, 1941, in the Assembly Room of Honolulu Hale.

Mayor Petrie opened the meeting by announcing that while a Council such as this had been under consideration for some time, it was necessary to get official backing before anything of importance could be done. The Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu had, therefore, on April 8th, 1941, passed Ordnance No. 891, Bill No. 24, creating the Major Disaster Council of the City and County of Honolulu, outlining its duties and functions, and providing for its maintenance. Mayor Petrie explained that the work had been delayed while the "M" day bill was under consideration in the Territorial Legislature, but now that it seems advisable, the organization of the Council would proceed immediately.

The Mayor expressed his appreciation for the response given by the downtown business men to his invitation to serve on the Council, and their indication of willingness to serve on this committee.

Mayor Petrie announced that he had appointed Mr. T. G. S. Walker as Co-ordinator of the Major Disaster Council, and that Mr. Walker had his staff organized and was at the service of the members.

A call of the roll showed all members of the Council present or officially represented.

Mr. T. G. S. Walker, Co-ordinator, gave a resume of what has been done by, and what could be expected of, the co-ordinator's office. He said that the principal aim was to try and stop the overlapping of individual organizations, and to get all civilian defense workers under the authority of the Mayor and Board of Supervisors. Mr. Walker said that in the main the committees would be run by City and County executives, but that no defense plan would be complete without the cooperation of the industrial and business leaders, and for this reason the splendid response of these leaders was greatly appreciated.

The Co-ordinator announced that the policy would be that the Co-ordinator will simply be the liaison man, who will work with the Army and Navy authorities so that our efforts will coordinate with their defense plans. He stated that both the Army and the Navy had been asked to serve on the Major Disaster Council in an advisory capacity, and that General Short had delegated, as representatives of the Army, Col. A. K. B. Lyman and Col. Casey Hayes; while Admiral Block had sent as the representatives of the Navy, Captain C. C. Baughman.

Mr. Walker stressed the fact that the work of the Council would of necessity be done by the chairmen of the various committees which the Mayor would appoint later in the meeting, and by their assistants, but that his office and staff would at all times be available for information or assistance. [*90*] He suggested that in order to facilitate the handling of major problems, and to save the members of the Council from having to meet too frequently, an Executive Committee be appointed, and that it be comprised of the chairmen of the main committees of the Council.

Mayor Petrie said that he considered this the best procedure. He then asked the approval of the Council on the following appointments to the chairmanships of the various committees set up by Ordinance 891:

1. Co-ordination—T. G. S. Walker
2. Transportation—Addison E. Kirk
3. Communications—Alvah A. Scott
6. Law and Order—W. A. Gabrielson
8. Fire Protection—W W. Blaisdell
9. Water and Water Supply—Frederick Ohrt
10. Streets and Highways—Joseph F. Kunesh
11–12. Medical: Health & Sanitation—T. M. Mossman, M. D.
13–14. Red Cross: Rescue etc.—John F. Gray.
20. Finance—George Waterhouse

The Mayor added that he had requested the Board of Supervisors to approve the name of W. W. Beers as a member of the Council, and that this action would be taken at the Board meeting today. Mr. Beers would then be appointed in charge of a new committee to handle the Food problem.

It was moved, seconded and unanimously carried that the list of chairmen submitted by Mayor Petrie be approved.

Mayor Petrie then asked that each member of the Council submit in writing to the Co-ordinator, the name, address and telephone number of an alternate who could represent him in case of enforced absence from a meeting of the Council.

The Mayor then suggested that the Executive Committee be comprised of the following:

Mayor Lester Petrie, Chairman
Joseph F. Kunesh, Vice-Chairman
W. A. Gabrielson
Frederick Ohrt
W. W. Blaisdell
T. M Mossman, M. D.
John F. Gray
Alvah A. Scott
Addison E. Kirk
Supervisor John M. Asing
George Waterhouse
W. W. Beers
Col. A. K. B. Lyman
Col. Casey Hayes
Captain C C. Baughman
T. G. S. Walker, Co-ordinator

The list was accepted as presented.

The suggestion was made, however, that the Council be kept advised at all times of the action taken by the Executive Committee, and this was agreed to be a necessary procedure.

The Mayor then presented for discussion the subject of finances. He pointed out that all phases of the work were handicapped by the lack of funds, and he stated that the City and County had reached its limit in supplying money to carry on the work. He then asked for suggestions as to a solution of the problem.

[*91*] A long discussion followed as to ways and means of financing the work of the Disaster Council.

Mr. Dillingham suggested that at least part of the cost should be borne by the Federal Government, and suggested that immediate contact be made with the Office For Emergency Management at Washington. Major General Wells concurred in this view. The Co-ordinator explained that this had already been done; and Mayor Petrie pointed out that the Governor and Dr. Fronk were now on their way to Washington to present the territorial situation to the Chairman of the Emergency Office. It was agreed that no direct action could be taken by this group that would in anyway interfere with the Governor's program.

Mayor Petrie announced that just prior to his departure for the mainland, Governor Poindexter had appointed the following Territorial Advisory Defense Council:

Honorable Lester Petrie, Chairman
Dr. H L Arnold
Honorable William Ellis
Col. Perry M. Smoot
Honorable A. S. Spencer
Honorable S. M. Spencer
General Briant H. Wells

The Mayor read to the Council a letter from Admiral Block, in which he stated his willingness to cooperate with the Major Disaster Council; and he greeted the representatives of the Army and Navy who were present, thanking them for the wonderful cooperation they had given and were giving.

Mayor Petrie then stressed the necessity for the various committee chairmen keeping the Co-ordinator informed on all activities within their committees, furnishing him with copies of all pertinent correspondence, and also with a list of the personnel of the committees, together with office and home addresses and telephone numbers.

It was suggested and agreed that all publicity should be released through the office of the Co-ordinator.

After some discussion it was agreed that afternoon meetings were most convenient for the majority of the members, and the first meeting of the Executive Committee was called for 2 P. M. on Thursday, May 26th, 1941, in the office of the Mayor.

Mayor Petrie announced that all members of the Major Disaster Council must sign the Oath of Loyalty, and stated that notaries would be present in the Assembly Hall at the close of the meeting to administer the oath.

The meeting adjourned at 2:30 P. M. to meet again at the call of the Chair.

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[92]

KEY TO ORGANIZATION CHART

MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU

1. Co-ordination & Intelligence	T. G. S. Walker
2. Transportation	Addison E Kirk
3. Communications	Alvah A. Scott
4. Power and Light	Leslie A. Hicks
5. Personnel	D. Ransom Sherretz
6. Law and Order	W. A. Gabrielson
6A. Provisional Police	Major Douglas C. King (Ret.)
7. Law Enforcement	W. A. Gabrielson
8. Fire Protection	W. W. Blaisdell
8A. Fire Wardens	Paul Carter, Director
9. Water and Water Supply	Frederick Ohrt
10. Streets and Highways	Jos. F. Kunesh
11. Medical	Thos. M Mossman, M. D.
12. Health and Sanitation	F. M. Haralson, M. D.
13. Red Cross	John F. Gray
13A. Housing & Shelter-Evacuation	
13B. Necessities of Life	Frank E. Midkiff
13C. Rehabilitation	Lyman H. Bigelow
14. Rescue, Demolition, Gas Prot	W. A. Gabrielson
15. Air Raid Warning	Federated Churches
16. Religious Worship	A. K. Powlison
17. Recreation	Duke Kahanamoku
18. Mortuary Work	Jon Wiig
19. Law	George Waterhouse
20. Finance and Supplies	Oren E. Long
21. Education	Stafford L. Austin
22. Rural	W. W. Beers
23. Food Production	
A. Zone 1—District 5	Sam Damon
B. Zone 2—District 4	Cleghorn Robertson
C. Zone 3—District 4	Tom Waddoups
D. Waterfront Warden	J. L. Friel

Not Shown: Sub-committees reporting direct to Co-ordinator's Committee:

Engineering	H. A. R. Austin
Publicity	Walter Macfarlane
Camouflage	Robt. O. Thompson
Protection of Art	Edgar C. Schenck


Board of Supervisors
MAYOR
Major Disaster Council Army & Navy Advisors
V-C
Coord
Section
Wardens

[94] EXHIBIT "C"

SUMMARY OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, FROM DECEMBER 7TH TO 31ST, 1941, INCLUSIVE

The Co-ordinator of the Major Disaster Council of the City and County of Honolulu notified the Mayor promptly upon receipt by him of word that the Island of Oahu was being bombed, by enemy Japanese planes. He then proceeded immediately to his headquarters at the City Hall.

All Committee Chairmen and members of the Council were notified by telephone and radio to report immediately to the City Hall for duty. Within an amazingly short time all Chairmen and sub-chairmen of the twenty-six committees under the Major Disaster Council, had reported, and organizations composed of committee members and volunteers proceeded according to previously laid plans.

Mayor Petrie, who is also Chairman of the Major Disaster Council, authorized the Co-ordinator to use the facilities of the City Hall for headquarters, as he saw fit, thus making it possible to concentrate the majority of the work near the office of the Co-ordinator.

The Co-ordinator was then appointed Director of Civilian Defense for the Island of Oahu by the Territorial Director.

A clerical staff, composed of City and County employees, court workers, and volunteers from private industry, and others, was organized to handle the dissemination of information and instructions from the Co-ordinator to his Chairmen. This staff worked steadily all day Sunday and through the night. On Monday an arrangement was made to divide the staff into three groups, each working an eight hour period, viz; 8 A. M. to 4 P. M.; 4 P. M. to 12 midnight; and 12 midnight to 8 A. M. A competent person was appointed to direct the work of each group. These volunteers continued in full force for the first week—there being several hundred of them—after which the government employees returned to their departments, where they were needed as many department heads are also chairmen of Major Disaster Council committees. From that time on a strictly volunteer staff has carried on. In the past week it has been possible to cut this group down to approximately thirty-five persons during the day, and a smaller number of volunteers at night, but a crew has been maintained on twenty-four hour duty in the Co-ordinator's office since the commencement of the war on December 7th, 1941.

In accordance with arrangements which had been made during the preparatory period, the American Legion delegated twelve men for use by the Co-ordinator in his office. These Legionnaires served as assistants to the Co-ordinator, and as guards and aides, performing any service asked of them willingly and efficiently. Two of these Legionnaires were appointed as Shift Directors in the office of the Co-ordinator. One other Shift Director and three Liaison Officers were also appointed by the Co-ordinator to assist him in the handling of the tremendous volume of work which centered in his office during the first three days following the attack. With these Shift Directors and Liaison Officers there were stenographers, typists and clerks on duty day and night.

[95] Attached to this resume are copies of the reports of activity by the various individual committees during the period from December 7th to December 31st, 1941. These reports speak for themselves, and I can add nothing but the highest praise of the manner in which directions and instructions forwarded from the Co-ordinator's office to the Committee Chairmen, were followed out by the Chairmen and their workers.

As martial law was declared immediately after the disaster, and all civilians ordered off the streets, it was necessary that some means of identification for civilian defense workers be devised.

The Military Governor ruled that only Major Disaster Council identification cards would be recognized, and for several days this office issued identification cards, each bearing a number; arm bands (white with a large, red "CD" printed on them); and red, white and blue "CD" stickers for automobiles to all persons presenting proof that they were engaged in civilian defense operations. A record was kept of all cards, bands and stickers issued.

The number and type of volunteers was amazing, and most gratifying. They ranged from Army and Navy wives, resident civilians etc., to mainland salesmen whose work was interrupted and tourists who were stranded in Hawaii and anxious to do their bit. All came forward and offered their services, then served faithfully in whatever task was assigned them. One City and County official

stepped into a job of manual labor in order to get help quickly to people in distress. Many volunteers gave up any possibility of income to serve in civilian defense as long as they were needed; others found themselves without employment for one reason or another, when they returned to their businesses at the end of the first few strenuous days. Many of these latter have continued to work long hours without remuneration and without complaint.

During the first two or three days practically all questions regarding all phases of the problems facing the City and County of Honolulu came to this office. Clerks were on duty twenty-four hours a day to answer these calls and aid persons in need of information and assistance. Queries ranging from an inquiry from a Navy wife asking if her husband had been killed at Pearl Harbor, and service men attempting to locate their evacuated families, to simple questions of whether or not we were still being bombed, passed over the desks of these clerks, were disposed of, and a record kept of them. In the first two nights of the Blackout hundreds of calls were received. Some reported suspicious lights and signalling which warranted the investigation they received; others proved to be very bright stars twinkling in our blue Hawaiian sky. One woman threatened to go through the Governor to the President of the United States if guards were not placed on a downtown hotel, which was at the moment heavily guarded. Others reported incidents which were passed on to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

To sum up the activities of the Co-ordinator's office, for the first three days all placing of evacuees, taking over of schools for first aid stations, directing and instructing fire wardens, securing guards for buildings, utilities, etc., were directed and supervised by the Co-ordinator, and the work was carried out by the Committees of the Major Disaster Council as the Civilian Defense for the Island of Oahu.

[96] For the last two weeks the office has continued to function, carrying out the instructions and orders of the Military Governor, and Civilian Governor and the Territorial Director of Civilian Defense, and generally carrying on civilian defense operations. For the third week of the War there has been maintained in the City Hall a skeleton crew on twenty-four hour duty—all committees having returned to their own headquarters. There is, however, a large staff on call which can be rounded up and ready to work within an hour from the receipt of any announcement of an alert.

/s/ T. G. S. W.
T. G. S. WALKER,
Director, Civilian Defense for the Island of Oahu.

JANUARY 2nd, 1942.

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[97] HAWAII CHAPTER, AMERICAN RED CROSS—ITS PART IN THE CIVILIAN PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

Alfred L. Castle, Honolulu, Hawaii

[98] The Hawaiian Chapter, American Red Cross, was set up in World War I on a Territory wide basis. It maintained a certain amount of service on Oahu after the war, and a skeleton organization throughout the Territory. There was no difficulty therefore for the Chapter to swing into any preparedness program for World War II.

PRELIMINARY

In June of 1940 the Hawaii Chapter decided that it should prepare itself and likewise take active part in the production and shipment of needed articles to our probable Allies, particularly Britain. At the Executive Committee meeting of June 13, 1940 a Production Committee was set up with Mrs. H. V. Von Holt, Chairman; Mrs. S. R. Damon, vice-chairman; and Mrs. Arthur Molyneux, chairman of Production. Mrs. H. S. Turner, was chairman of Surgical Dressings; Mrs. David Akana, chairman of Supplies, Instruction and Supervision; Mrs. Heaton L. Wrenn, chairman of Knitting; and Mrs. Peter K. McLean, chairman of Volunteer Special Services funds. After this same meeting contact was made with supply houses in Honolulu to the end that raw materials and supplies would always be on hand. It was pointed out that Hawaii might be the object of attack. Groups on Oahu, Molokai, Kauai, and at three localities on Hawaii were already at work on surgical dressings. From then on, for a period of 9–10 months, the majority of dressings and garments of various sorts produced

were sent to the British Red Cross. Contact was, however, maintained with the Army here, for at the meeting on November 28, 1940 Mrs. von Holt reported that the Army had recommended that one quota of surgical dressings be kept here for local use, a quota being approximately 17,000 dressings. At that meeting, however, it was felt that about 50,000 dressings should be kept here, which was done for those early stages.

EXPANDED WORK

By March of 1941 the Chapter had materially increased its work, and was more definitely pointing to the need for local preparedness. It was reported that from our local production 145,000 surgical dressings, and over 6000 knitted garments had been made and shipped to the British Red Cross, but from then on policy changed and production was held here. At the meeting of March 21, 1941 the pending M-day bill in the Hawaiian legislature was discussed. The First-Aid Committee reported some 1000 women had completed courses. Mrs. Moir reported that two Motor Corps classes had been completed, one at Schofield Barracks totalling 30 women and one in Honolulu with 28. Further steps were taken at that meeting to set up again the formal Branch organizations on the outside islands.

MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL

In April of 1941 the Supervisors of Honolulu created a Major Disaster Council to coordinate the resources of the City, with residents, firms, agencies and organizations to meet any major disaster or emergency. The Red Cross, acting under National charter, could not surrender in any way either its direct prerogatives or obligations, but the Hawaii Chapter immediately cooperated with such Council and throughout did its agreed-upon part. Because of their long experience, Mr. John Gray, for nearly 20 years with the Red Cross in Hawaii and executive secretary of the Chapter, and Alfred L. Castle, [99] Chapter vice-chairman, were at once assigned to the prepardness work, both acting as members of the Major Disaster Council and liaison between the Army and Red Cross. Mr. Castle had organized the Hawaii Chapter in World War I, was the first Field Director here, was a deputy commissioner and executive secretary for the Red Cross in Siberia, and special reepresentative to Japan, China, and the Philippines in World War I. The relations between the Hawaii Chapter and the Major Disaster Council were of the best throughout.

WAR PREPAREDNESS

The plans of the Red Cross were laid primarily with a view to air attack by Japan, an attack which might be directed not only against military and naval objects but also against the city, whether deliberate or not. The possibility of bombardment was considered, and, to a small degree, invasion and its effect on the civilian population. Besides repeated conferences with the Major Disaster Council (hereafter called the Disaster Council), conferences were had by Messrs. Gray and Castle, individually or together, with the Commanding General Walter G. Short, and the Department Surgeon, Col. Edgar King and members of his staff. As a result of the conferences with the Army, General Short on May 10, 1941 wrote Mr. Castle a letter which stated in part:

"* * * In the first priority and requiring immediate action are:

"1. The organization and training of aid station groups and the provision of initial equipment for not less than twelve such stations.

"2. The provision of an adequate reserve of medical supplies for the civilian population.

"It is understood that the training of personenl for the aid station groups has been well begun and that a primary objective is to provide funds for completion of the training and for the purchase of initial equipment for twelve stations. The time element is very important as the supplies, both initial and reserve, must, I am informed, be secured on the mainland, not being locally available.

"* * * It also is my understanding that the arrangements for carrying on this work, as contemplated by your organization, are fully concurred in by other local groups now concerned with the same problem."

General Short's letter is attached hereto in full and marked Exihibit "A".

Relationships between the Army and Red Cross throughout the entire period to December 7 were of the best.

Under this general title of War Preparedness the work will be grouped under appropriate subheadings.

(a) *First Aid Training and Aid Stations.*

By the end of March 1941 and as a part of the intensive Red Cross program nearly 1,000 persons had received first aid training.

In April of 1941 the Preparedness Committee of the [*100*] Honolulu County Medical Society, headed by Dr. Harry L. Arnold with Dr. Robert B. Faus as executive officer undertook, in cooperation with the Red Cross, a very intensive first aid training program. Red Cross instruction books were used, and Red Cross certificates awarded for those who passed. Strictly Red Cross classes were also continued separately. While the larger part of this operation was conducted by the Preparedness Committee, and the history will appear in the reports of Dr. Harry L. Arnold, Chairman of that Committee, the net result was that many thousand persons were trained and qualified prior to December 7.

On April 25, 1941 a joint statement on the training plan was issued by the Preparedness Committee and the Red Cross and published in the Honolulu Press. Such statement is hereto attached and marked Exhibit "B".

In September of 1941 the National Red Cross in Washington sent to Hawaii two expert instructors in first aid and water safety to assist in the intensified program.

As a part of the general program it was essential that aid station equipment be obtained so that on an attack there would not only be available trained personnel but aid stations fully equipped, with trained personnel, so that casualties could be effectively handled. It was contemplated that much of the funds necessary would come from the M-Day bill being considered by the Territorial Legislature in April. The bill apparently was lost the last night of the session in the first days of May, and no relief was forthcoming. The Red Cross then at once stepped in and supplied emergency funds, until after June 30 the Board of Supervisors of the City was able to make further appropriations. Had not the Red Cross stepped in at that time the entire program might have been seriously jeopardized. (See letter of Mr. Castle to Dr. Arnold, dated May 13, 1941, marked Exhibit "C", enclosing copy of the letter of General Short (Exhibit "A"), and Dr. Arnold's reply thereto, marked Exhibit "D".)

It was likewise necessary to obtain the actual equipment for first aid stations, which are referred to in the correspondence attached variously as "units," "medical units," "aid stations" and "emergency units," and physically to set these up for operation at carefully selected sites. The Army, in the first instance, came to the rescue, agreeing to loan 20 units to the Red Cross. In early June, sixteen units had been received from the Army, which were immediately put to use. (See excerpt from letter Mr. Gray to Mr. Castle, dated June 10, 1941, marked Exhibit E.)

Meanwhile, to hasten matters and to get further aid from the National Red Cross in Washington, John Gray, executive secretary of the Hawaii Chapter, left here on April 15 for Washington armed with letters from Colonel King, the department surgeon, specifying medical supplies and emergency units necessary for use for the civilian population in case of an attack, and not purchasable locally. The medical supplies will be referred to later. Later in May and June Mr. Castle was in Washington also discussing both subjects with National Red Cross headquarters. Tentative agreements were reached and by the end of July twelve complete medical station units, costing some $25,000, were ordered for shipment to the Hawaii Chapter. (See excerpt from letter Mr. Mitchell to Mr. Castle, dated July 22, 1941, marked Exhibit F.)

These units all arrived in Hawaii prior to December 7, and were held in accord with a letter from Colonel King, [*101*] dated July 29, 1941, marked Exhibit "G."

On the Japanese attack, Honolulu had adequately trained personnel and properly equipped first aid stations at 20 separated points, sufficient to meet any emergency existing on that day and for the entire war as it developed. Each station had been adequately supplied far in advance by the Hawaii Chapter, Red Cross, with surgical dressings and other production equipment.

The matter of expansion of hospital facilities referred to in General Short's letter was handled by the Preparedness Committee.

(b) *Medical Supplies.*

The Department Surgeon, Colonel King, felt that emergency supplies of drugs and medicines, not procurable locally, should be on hand for civilian use, with

which we agreed. This list, prepared by Colonel King, was taken on April 15 to the National Red Cross by Mr. Gray and under date of May 16, 1941, the Red Cross here was advised that National would send such supplies. In June the City decided to make certain purchases of medical supplies, but Mr. Castle then in Washington was able to explain that such purchases did not conflict or in any way overlap the articles desired of the Red Cross. The medical supplies requested of the Red Cross were delivered in Honolulu beginning in August, in various batches, up to December 4, 1941, at a cost of about $40,000.

(c) *Production Department—Surgical Dressings.*

Beginning in April 1941, all production was held in Hawaii, and the character of the production was molded to meet an anticipated attack. The number of workers, all volunteers, who came to the work rooms at the Castle Kindergarten and elsewhere steadily increased. Work done was on surgical dressings, hospital garments, operating robes, convalescent robes, pajamas, knitted goods and other necessary articles. In July the Department Surgeon was given a statement, marked Exhibit "H," showing the disposition of locally produced Red Cross surgical dressings in the Territory, in addition to actually finished goods held in Honolulu. The statement also showed that material had been ordered for approximately 240,000 more surigal dressings.

In August a quota of surgical dressings, about 17,000 dressings, was divided among the 20 aid stations operated by the Preparedness Committee (Drs. Arnold and Faus). Certain hospital garments and other emergency robes or garments were likewise distributed.

Long before December 7 the Red Cross used certain homes, with proper basements, and two school buildings, at widely separated parts of the City, for the storage of such articles that would be used at once in case of an attack. There were more of such storage centers, away from headquarters at Castle Kindergarten, and in them were stored surgical dressings, hospital garments and robes, convalescent robes, and such, women's and children's clothing, and canned goods. All centers were selected with a view to both geographical distribution and quick accessibility.

In October and November the Hawaii Chapter in its surgical dressings production centered on special Army dressings, and between November 25 and December 4 delivered to the Army Medical Department here a total of 58,121 dressings.

[*102*] On December 7 the parties assigned to headquarters and to the storage centers reported on a prearranged schedule. From one center over 19,600 dressings were released for the Pearl Harbor hospital, together with certain garments, and one quota, about 17,000, was sent to Tripler Hospital from another center, deliveries in each instance being made by the Red Cross Motor Corps.

The foundation laid and the experience gained during the entire year of 1941 made possible the enormous and specialized production for the services, Army, Navy and Marine, which steadily increased throughout the War, in the latter months averaging well over 1,000,000 surgical dressings per month.

(d) *Motor Corps.*

Motor Corps was organized in April and May of 1941, its first work being the collection, sorting and distribution of books and magazines to our armed forces. In order to qualify, members had to take prescribed courses. Regular duty was started on July 21, 1941, with 28 Army wives, 17 Navy and 49 civilian women, married or single. Due to the evacuation policy of service personnel, by December 7 there were only three in Motor Corps directly connected with the Army or Navy, their places being largely filled by local women. In order that the Army and Navy should be fully acquainted with Motor Corps uniform, cars, and insignia, as well as for humanitarian reasons, Motor Corps from July on took convalescents from Military and Naval hospitals for drives and excursions. During the fall months additional training was given in first aid, emergency delivery of babies, military drill, gas and chemical warfare lectures and demonstration, and blackout driving. A complete list of assignments, subject of course for change, was made for attack day, so on December 7 certain Corps members reported at once to assigned posts, and the balance at headquarters.

On December 7, and for the immediate days thereafter, not a single preparation proved to be futile. Motor Corps carried supplies to Hickam, Pearl Harbor, Schofield and other posts, assisted evacuees, and hurried back and forth from all Army and Navy posts on innumerable assignments. Naturally, such posts were

closed to the public on the attack, but the fact that Motor Corps and the Red Cross uniform had been previously well known made it possible to go right through to complete vital assignments, whereas others were turned back. All this was not an accident—it had been carefully thought out and prepared for months in advance; and on that particular day, a Sunday, proved a Godsend.

(e) *Evacuation and Disaster Relief.*

It had been agreed in advance that evacuation, housing and feeding of civilians caused by an enemy attack was primarily a governmental function. Nevertheless, the Red Cross stood by to assist and cooperate. On December 7 Motor Corps assisted in transporting evacuees. The Red Cross took charge, and assumed responsibility for the large group of evacuees housed at the University of Hawaii. Movements of evacuees were quickly coordinated without the slightest friction between the Disaster Council and the Red Cross.

In accordance with prearranged plans the heads of the large supply houses in Honolulu, together with adequate staff and all available trucks and drivers, reported at once on December 7 for duty. Telephone orders from the Red Cross for clothing, mattresses, blankets, canned goods and innumerable items were promptly filled and delivered by the Red Cross [*103*] Motor Corps or properly authorized civilian trucks, as the case might be. The Red Cross did not have to go through any red tape but orders were taken over the phone and the charges made later. December 7 and the following few days cost the Red Cross some $50,000.

(f) *Canteen Service.*

This corps was organized in August 1941. It had training in serving convalescents from Navy hospitals on picnics, and certain Allied contingents passing through Honolulu, both in conjunction with Motor Corps. The Navy had loaned the original equipment.

At 10 a. m. on December 7 the Canteen Corps was called to duty and set up service at once in the Iolani Palace grounds, feeding medical unit workers, officials, truck drivers, guards, emergency police, civilians, or any one who needed food in such grounds. Canteen Corps remained on 24-hour duty until December 17 when gradually its work in the Palace was taken over by the O. C. D. Service to evacuees, located and living in other parts of Honolulu was, as stated above, handled by the Relief Council and the Red Cross. By the time O. C. D. took over, the evacuee problem had largely worked itself out.

It is interesting to note that the acting chairman of this unit passed the entrance at Pearl Harbor that morning at 6:30 on an Inter-Island steamer on her return to Honolulu, receiving her call for service at her home shortly thereafter.

(g) *Home Service Department.*

This department, trained to assist service men and their families, was organized in September 1941 but not specifically as a war measure. On December 7, because of its trained personnel, it was at once of value in assisting evacuees to look up separated members of families, render temporary assistance and advice, to assist in new living arrangements, and to answer inquiries from the mainland.

CONCLUSION

The fact that civilian affairs ran so well on December 7 is definitely due to the intensive preparation of the Disaster Council, with all its ramifications, and the Red Cross. There was no panic or any semblance of one. It is remarkable that throughout all the training period there was no friction, but only a "pull-together" and "get-ready" spirit. The closest cooperation prevailed between the Disaster Council, its able director, T. G. S. Walker, Drs. Arnold and Faus, the Army medical department acting under authority of the Commanding General, and the Red Cross. On December 7 the Disaster Council's headquarters were at the City Hall, and the Red Cross at the Castle Kindergarten, both in the same block. The preparedness work as a whole stimulated the Red Cross workers in that period, and certainly assisted as a starting point for the amazing record of the Hawaii Chapter, all of which, except for "military secrets", appears in the printed Chapter reports issued subsequently for each year.

Alfred L. Castle.
ALFRED L. CASTLE.

[*104*] EXHIBIT "A"

(Letterhead of
Headquarters Hawaiian
Department, Fort
Shafter, T. H.)
Refer: (MED) 080

Mr. A. L. CASTLE,
Acting Director, American Red Cross, Honolulu, T. H.

MY DEAR MR. CASTLE: It has been brought to my attention that the local chapter of the American Red Cross has offered to take such action as may be needed, to continue the program of preparation for emergency relief for the civilian population, to become effective in event of disaster particularly such as might eventuate from an enemy air attack on the city. It is understood that the leadership thus assumed will be available until superseded by an appropriate Government agency or until for other reasons it is no longer needed.

That leadership, under those conditions as offered by the American Red Cross, is a source of the greatest satisfaction to me. May I again bring to your attention what seem to be the most urgent local needs. In the first priority and requiring immediate action are:

1. The organization and training of aid station groups and the provision of initial equipment for not less than twelve such stations.
2. The provision of an adequate reserve of medical supplies for the civilian population.

It is understood that the training of personnel for the aid station groups has been well begun and that a primary objective is to provide funds for completion of the training and for the purchase of initial equipment for twelve stations. The time element is very important as the supplies, both initial and reserve, must, I am informed, be secured on the mainland, not being locally available

Closely linked with the items in the first priority but not of such extreme urgency in point of time are:

1. The expansion of hospital facilities for the civilian population.
2. The provision of an adequate number of vehicles for ambulance service on call.

It also is my understanding that the arrangements for carrying on this work, as contemplated by your organization, are fully concurred in by other local groups now concerned with the same problem.

[*105*] I consider your proposed action to be both adequate and timely and should like to see it be put into effect in the shortest practicable time in order to meet any disaster or emergency situation.

Yours very truly,

(S) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

[*106*] EXHIBIT "B"

JOINT STATEMENT OF PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEE AND THE RED CROSS

While the United States is not actually at war, and there is no occasion for war hysteria, the international situation is so critical that the civilian population of Honolulu must realize that the time has come *now*—not tomorrow for intelligent, adequate, civilian defense preparedness. No sane person can think otherwise.The Army and Navy is not here to protect the population of Honolulu; their duty is to defend Hawaii as one of the most vital parts of the Ameican Defense system. In case of emergency the civilian population must be prepared to care for itself.

As one of the first and most constructive steps in this program the Preparedness Committee of the Medical Association has undertaken the task of recruiting, training and getting ready for instant mobilization a large group of civilians who will be so organized that they can quickly render first aid, collect, sort, and transport to hospitals injured civilians with proficiency.

At least 50 doctors are now freely giving their time for this training period.

This program needs men and women who can become thoroughly trained in this work. As a part of the enlistment in this training and work, those taking the course are required to respond to their posts of duty at any call in an emer-

gency. Honolulu must be able to mobilize quickly and efficiently, and its volunteers must be competent to perform tasks assigned.

No program can be carried through without cost. The instruction books and supplies involved cost in excess of $1.00, but the booklet received is a valuable one for anyone to own. The majority of people taking the course will undoubtedly gladly pay this $1.00, but certain firms and individuals have contributed enough so that if anyone cannot afford this sum the booklet and supplies will be furnished them free.

At the end of the course examinations will be given in cooperation with the Red Cross, and those passing will receive proper certificates. To qualify for such certificate, the person must have attended instruction classes for at least 20 hours, must pass a written examination and certain demonstration tests in artificial respiration, digital pressure, etc., and practical problems.

The Rew Cross, for a long time here in Honolulu and throughout the Territory, has been making up surgical dressings and materials of all types which would be imperatively needed in case of an emergency. The call on the Red Cross is and has been heavy, and will be for some time to come—how long no one knows.

The instruction courses being given by the Preparedness Committee do not overlap or conflict with the First Aid classes of the Red Cross. These latter classe sare educational—vitally so now—and will continue as formerly, with the granting of the certificates to those who pass successfully. In less than a year now, 897 persons have successfully passed [*107*] the work prescribed in the Red Cross courses, providing a most valuable nucleus for any defense work.

(Honolulu, Hawaii, April 25, 1941)

ROBERT B. FAUS,
Executive Officer in Charge of Plans and Training for Preparedness Committee.

ALFRED L. CASTLE,
Vice Chairman Hawaiian Chapter, American Red Cross.

[*108*] EXHIBIT "C"

MAY 13, 1941.

Dr. HARRY L. ARNOLD,
Chairman, Preparedness Committee of the Honolulu Medical Association, Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR DR. ARNOLD: Confirming our conversation of recent date, I wish to define the relationship of the Red Cross with your committee in connection with the point of first aid training, the equipment of first aid stations, etc., as originally worked out by your committee.

The program originally proposed by your committee was a very vital part of the plans already prepared for M-Day. It had been assumed that the legislature would pass the M-Day bill, which in turn carried with it an appropriation of $50,000 for what I may term the "training period," and a further $250,000 after an emergency should be declared. This bill failed under circumstances not necessary here to relate, and left the entire program somewhat in chaos. Unless something was done for civilian defense, the attitude of Hawaii towards such defense seemed a disgrace.

The work of your committee, and the training in first aid for emergency purpose, were already under way. It seemed criminal to drop this for lack of funds. Accordingly, a tentative arrangement was worked out by which your executive officer, Dr. R. B. Faus, became Chairman of the Disaster Relief Committee of the Red Cross. You are also a member and you are familiar with the personnel of that committee, which consists of six. If you want to suggest another doctor or someone else on the committee please let me know, but, as pointed out below, the work will in practice function through your own committee.

The program so splendidly outlined and started by your committee is not technically a Red Cross function. Your own program is more properly a Government function which would have been carried out through funds provided by the M-Day bill. The Red Cross would in the usual situation function as a relief organization after a disaster has occurred. However, the Red Cross cooperates with other agencies, and in this particular instance it is obvious that work started by you must not stop; it is vital to defense, and is the first step in preparing against a disaster which might be much worse except for adequate preparedness.

It will not be the policy of the Red Cross to endeavor in any way to direct or control your work. For that reason we apopinted Dr. Faus chairman of our committee, as the work he is heading up seems the most vital to be carried on. However, we will have to supply the funds, budget the same, and have the same properly audited; the same would be true whether you worked with Government funds or Red Cross. There are other matters in connection with disaster relief which we ourselves will have to work out and which were contemplated by the M-Day setup.

If and when Government funds are available the work of your committee will undoubtedly come under the Gov- [*109*] ernment setup, where it should properly come. There is no thought on the part of the Red Cross to retain any function properly belonging to another group, or in any way to take any credit for the work of the Medical Association. We are only trying to carry on as a stopgap until an M-Day program with Government funds can be perfected for I am convinced this must come sooner or later.

The big problem now is of course finance. I am informed that the minimum requirement of your present program is $20,000, with more to come if the work is expanded to complete the setup. The Red Cross has not that amount available. It will therefore be our problem to consider ways and means of raising funds and of carrying on the work being done by you, until such time as Governmental funds are available. Please understand that the amount of assistance we can give is limited by the financial problem. I believe the present arrangement, as soon as this is approved by your committee, can be covered by temporary budget allotment.

I feel, also, that the present arrangement is a happy one, as the work of the Production Department of the Red Cross, and its own First Aid classes, very closely dovetails in with your work.

I enclose a copy of a letter from General Short which sets forth this entire matter far better than I can. He is very definite in his statement that this work should continue, and certainly the Red Cross will endeaver to cooperate to the best of its ability. Let me repeat again our assurance that we are not trying to dictate policies to you, or interfere with or control your work, but are merely trying to make possible the continuation of this work until our assistance is superseded by the appropriate Government agency.

Very truly yours,

/S/ ALFRED L. CASTLE,
Vice Chairman, Hawaiian Chapter of the American Red Cross.

ALC: GB
ENCL.

[*110*] EXHIBIT "D"

HONOLULU, HAWAII, *May 13, 1941.*

Mr. ALFRED L. CASTLE,
Vice-Chairman, Hawaiian Chapter of the American Red Cross,
Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR MR. CASTLE: We are deeply appreciative of your letter of even date, offering the financial assistance of the American Red Cross in making preparations for disaster relief of the civilian population of Honolulu.

It is the unanimous opinion of this committee that we should accept your offer and proceed as rapidly as possible to secure the necessary funds and supplies as outlined in General Short's letter. The amount mentioned in your letter ($20,000) would not be adequate for the full program, but would provide for the initial training period.

Yours very truly,

HONOLULU COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY,
By (s) H. L. ARNOLD, *Chairman.*

[111] EXHIBIT "E"

Excerpt—letter from John F. Gray, Secretary Hawaii Chapter, to Mr. Alfred L. Castle, dated June 10, 1941.

"Under date of June 7th I wired you to let you know something of what had been happening here. I am now enclosing a clipping from the Advertiser June 5, 1941, outlining in more detail the action taken by City-County officials with regard to providing medical supplies and fire equipment. Bids have been let for the supplies and apparently these will be available in the near future.

In the meantime Mr. Evans, Special Representative from National Headquarters whom you did not meet, has contacted the military and civilian authorities during a brief stay of four or five days and he is to return on June 16th for a ten days' or two weeks stay at which time civilian activities will be coordinated with official agencies. Until then it was deemed advisable that the training of the medical units continue without interruption and the Army agreed to loan us up to twenty units, authority for this having been received from the War Department in Washington.

To date I have signed for sixteen of these units which have been delivered to the Armory in the custody of Dr. Faus and Mr. Fitkin who are assigning units to their various commanders. Mr. Evans also thought it advisable and wired for Washington to ship us twelve complete units for our own use here. Undoubtedly we shall have to set up at least one unit on each of the larger outside islands if for no other than psychological reasons.

Just this morning Mr. Davis of Consolidated Amusement authorized me to give publicity to the donation of the ambulance and that will be released within a day or two.

Production work is progressing very nicely under the leadership of Mrs. Molyneux. Mrs. von Holt was ill going up to the coast, as you may know, and she stayed in Los Angeles only a week before returning. She is not on duty yet but hopes to be very soon."

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[112] EXHIBIT "F"

Excerpt—letter from L. M. Mitchell, Assistant to the Vice Chairman, American Red Cross, to Mr. Alfred L. Castle, Vice Chairman, Hawaii Chapter, dated July 22, 1941.

"Meantime, we are proceeding with the matter of medical supplies and have authorized the purchase of equipment for the twelve stations in accordance with the request transmitted by the Chapter and the letters prepared by the Army authorities. As soon as medical station equipment can be purchased, it will be shipped to your Chapter for assembly in the twelve station units, since it is not feasible at this end to break up the purchases and assemble the units prior to shipping. It is understood that these medical station units will be held for the emergency and that in the event an emergency need does not develop and there is later need for them elsewhere, they will be available for such use. With this understanding, the cost of this equipment is being met by the National organization.

"As indicated in our cable of yesterday to Mr. Gray, we have already ordered the revolving stock of medical supplies requested some time ago as a reserve to be held in Honolulu for immediate use in case of emergency. These supplies have actually been purchased for China and are shipped to Honolulu to protect your ability to meet any emergency that may arise. They should be held intact so that, if necessary, they may be forwarded to China at a later date, or shipped elsewhere as the need arises. It may be advisable with some items to forward the stock on hand in Honolulu to China and replace with fresh supplies in the interest of keeping the stock currently fresh. From time to time, the situation will be reviewed and appropriate action to keep the stock in current condition for immediate use will be made."

[113] EXHIBIT "G"

(Letterhead of
Headquarters Hawaiian
Department, Fort
Shafter, T. H.)

29 JULY 1941.

Mr. JOHN F. GRAY, *Field Director,*
American Red Cross,
426 Dillingham Building,
Honolulu, T. H.

MY DEAR MR. GRAY: The following plan for the storage and issue of certain amounts of American Red Cross medical supplies, designated as "Reserve" and "Aid Station Equipment (12)", has been approved:

1. Both the Reserve and the Aid Station Equipment will be held in storage for actual use and not issued for training purposes. If items for training purposes cannot be secured from any other source, minimal quantities as approved by this office to be issued for this purpose.

2. All items to be stored under the control of the Commanding Officer, Hawaiian Medical Depot, properly dispersed, Storage to be at the risk of the American Red Cross.

3. Method of Storage:

a. Reserve Supplies. According to usually accepted rules.

b. Aid Station Equipment. Each to be earmarked for a particular local civilian Aid Station group. To be so marked and the proper civilian officials notified.

4. Issue. By order of the Department Surgeon, subject to approval of the Department Commander.

Please notify Captain Paul Nixon, Hawaiian Medical Depot, Fort Shafter, as far in advance of arrival of supplies as your information permits. Include approximate cubic footage space required and list of items.

Reference transportation, request delivery by you at points to be specified by Captain Nixon.

Yours very truly,

EDGAR KING,
Colonel, Medical Corps,
Department Surgeon.

Information Copy:
Mr. A. L. CASTLE,
312 Castle & Cooke, Ltd.
Honolulu, T. H.

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[114] EXHIBIT "H"

SURGICAL DRESSINGS

HAWAII (1 quota) #—Hilo has material and is making a quota to be stored in Hilo: Mrs. R. M. Lindsay, Hilo, Phone 2006.

KOHALA (1 quota)—Has completed quota, five boxes, stored. Mrs. James M. Beck, Mahukona, Phone, Kohala 368.

KEALAKEKUA (2 boxes)—2 boxes shipped from Oahu. Assorted. To be stored by Mrs. William J. Paris, Kainaliu, Hawaii, Phone, 2 W 716.

LANAI (1 quota)—Ship from Oahu 5 boxes completed by Oahu. To be stored by Mrs. H. B. Caldwell, Lanai City, Lanai, No phone, must wire.

MOLOKAI (1 quota)—Material for 1 quota is being made up on Molokai and will be stored by Mrs. George P. Cooke, Kaunakakai, Molokai, Phone, 7 W 29.

MAUI (2 quotas)—Has material to make one quota Will ship from Oahu quota now being completed by Kahuku. To be stored by Mrs. Stanley Elmore, Spreckelsville, Maui, Phone, 4 W 576.

KAUAI (1 quota)—Has material and is making quota to be stored by Mrs. J. C. Plews, Lihue, Kauai, Phone, Lihue 326.

OAHU (3 quotas)—Will make and store 3 quotas here in three separate places. Material on hand for 3 quotas plus. Material for 14 extra quotas ordered from the mainland.

One quota contains approximately 17,000 dressings.

[115] MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS IN THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

H. L. ARNOLD, M. D., *Honolulu, Hawaii*

[116] MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS

The first organized effort of the medical profession of Honolulu to prepare for the medical aspects of war, began in June of 1940. Dr. Clarence Fronk was appointed by the officers of the Territorial Medical Association to represent them on the National Committee on Medical Preparedness. During the following year, Doctors Fronk, Faus, Wallis, Keay and Burden were appointed as a Territorial Committee on Preparedness. The County Medical Society also appointed a Committee in 1940, consisting of Doctors Fronk, Palma, Fred Lam and James Kuninobu. This Committee met, made plans, and endeavored to interest the profession, but in general, their efforts did not meet with much success. However, on April 11, 1941, following discussions with the Surgeon, Hawaiian Department, Colonel—now Brigadier General—Edgar King, the Honolulu County Medical Society elected a committee, consisting of seven members, Doctors Larsen, Judd, Strode, Pinkerton, Withington, Faus and the writer. These men were called the Preparedness Committee, and were given power to act for the Society in making the necessary arrangements to prepare for the care of civilian casualties in the event of war.

Organization

The first meeting of this committee was held on April 15, 1941. The conviction of every member of the committee that war was imminent and that it was urgently necessary for preparations to be made to care for a potentially large number of injured civilians is reflected in the following excerpts from the minutes of this initial meeting.

"* * * The following specific actions were taken:

Dr. Robert Faus was reappointed to the position which he held under the previous preparedness committee. It was decided that his work was to be facilitated by the Committee in any way which Dr. Faus might suggest.

* * * * * * *

The actual listing of medical personnel on this Island for duties during war conditions was decided to be an absolutely necessary factor and this work will go forward as rapidly as possible.

* * * * * * *

Dr. Fronk stated that the Army would be able to furnish beds and linen for the potentially expanded hospitals. Dr. Fronk also stated that it was unlikely that subsidiary hospitals anywhere near the business districts would be useful.

The potential local manufacture of typhoid vaccines was discussed and approved.

The offer of Dr. James Kuninobu of supplying medical personnel from the Japanese Medical Society for service in the event that it is needed was accepted gladly and he will be so notified.

Dr. Pinkerton reported that the blood and [117] plasma bank situation was satisfactory and well under way.

Dr. Faus was given charge of the arranging for supplies of orthopedic apparatus such as Thomas splints and Kirschner stirrups."

The minutes of this first meeting of the Preparedness Committee are attached hereto in full and marked Exhibit "A".

Dr. Robert Faus (now Colonel, M. C., A. U. S.) was made executive officer in charge of plans and training and functioned as such until after December 7, 1941. Subcommittees were formed and additional advisers called in from time to time. Liaison was established with the Army, the Hawaii Chapter, American Red Cross, the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, the City and County government, the Major Disaster Council under Mr. Walker, the Nursing Association, and innumerable other less important organizations. The close liaison maintained with the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross is reflected in the exchange of correspondence with that organization (See the following letters in the presentation of the Hawaii Chapter, American Red Cross: Letter of Mr. Castle to Dr. Arnold dated May 13, 1941, marked Exhibit "C" enclosing copy of letter from Lt. General Walter C. Short, and Dr. Arnold's reply thereto marked Exhibit "D").

Training

The physicians of the city were divided into groups and assigned to specific duties in the event of war. One group of surgeons, with their volunteer nurses, was assigned to go to military hospitals and assist military surgeons in caring for their casualties, since it was obvious that the medical staffs of these hospitals for normal times would not be able to deal with a sudden influx of casualties resulting from enemy action. Other groups were assigned to do the same thing for the local civilian hospitals. Still others were assigned to First Aid Stations to care for minor casualties, and to prepare for transportation to the hospital those casualties too badly injured to be taken there without prior treatment. Twenty First Aid Stations were set up throughout the City in schools and public buildings, and in some instances in private buildings through the generosity of the owners, and to each of these a staff was attached. It was obvious that it would be necessary to train large numbers of lay personnel in the primary care of casualties, and there were not enough teachers to do this. Therefore, a course was instituted for "teaching teachers." A large class of teachers was trained by Dr. Faus and given diplomas by the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, and the work of training the workers themselves then began. In all nearly 3,000 individuals representing all nationalities were given courses and certificates of graduation in the principles of First Aid, Ambulance Training, etc.

All of these training activities included extensive publicity throughout the entire community. Records of the Preparedness Committee show that from the time of its inception to November 30, 1941, members of the committee had delivered a total of 18 public speeches while newspaper publicity had totalled 3,775 inches in the columns of the local newspapers.

Finances were a problem from the beginning. Obviously, it was necessary to have some sort of an office and to have at least a skeleton personnel to do typing, mimeographing, mailing and so forth. The funds for this purpose came very largely from the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, although the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, the Committee [*118*] members themselves, and many other persons of all nationalities contributed liberally of their funds for the purpose. The Army detailed a medical officer to the sole duty of assisting in the work. The large mercantile firms of Honolulu, such as American Factors, T. H. Davies, and many others, were contacted for permission to make arrangements to convert their fleets of trucks into ambulances by the addition of frames to hold stretchers. Two hundred and fifty such trucks were thus fitted and the drivers trained before December 7, 1941.

Nursing Services

A survey of the nursing facilties of the Territory, under Miss Matthews, was instituted and carried out and the nurses available for emergency duty in every community were listed, with their telephone numbers and capabilities.

Hospitals

The hospitals of the City were studied critically, with a view to discovering how their capacities to care for patients could be increased, and how they could be evacuated of the less seriously ill to permit the entrance of large numbers of casualties, should the occasion arise.

Supplies and Equipment

The supplies and equipment of the Aid Stations were in part loaned by the Army, and in part purchased by funds donated by the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, the Chamber of Commerce, and the City and County of Honolulu. Each Aid Station had at least two doctors assigned to it, two dentists, at least three nurses, a group of nurses' aides, ambulance drivers, and many other types of specialized personnel. These volunteers attended regular weekly meetings from June, 1941, until long after the war had begun.

Ambulances

Three ambulances were donated—one by the Wholesale Liquor Dealers' Association, one by the Consolidated Amusement Company, and one by the Schuman Carriage Company. These vehicles were almost indispensable during the training period for transportation of supplies, equipment and personnel to the various stations. The ambulances which would be depended upon if war came, however, were the converted trucks volunteered by Honolulu business firms. Mass rallies were held on several occasions in the Armory, and in the auditorium of McKinley

High School for the purpose of stimulating interest and furthering the course of training.

On each of the "outside" islands, a chairman was selected by the local County Medical Society and put in charge of the work, as had been done in Honolulu. The preparations were, of necessity, less elaborate and extensive than were in Honolulu, but every island, including Lanai, had made, long before December 7th, Definite and detailed plans for what they would do in the event of enemy action.

Evacuation

Evacuation sites were provided for the various hospitals, to serve for a place to put less seriously sick patients, to make room for more seriously injured and to increase their possible capacity. It was also assumed that it was likely that a hospital might well be destroyed by fire or bombing and that the entire organization might find it neces- [*119*] sary to move to new quarters. These were selected and arrangements made for transportation to them. The Major Disaster Council's transportation division, under Mr. Kirk, was responsible for these arrangements. In spite of the serious objection of the Bureau of Narcotics of the International Revenue Department, arrangements were made with the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross to have on hand a generous supply of morphine. This was stored in a safety deposit vault, pending the need for its distribution. Typhoid vaccine was arranged for, from the Territorial Board of Health, it being felt that in the event that the people in the community, or any considerable number of them, were evacuated to the mountains, typhoid fever would promptly become a problem.

Blood Bank

The blood plasma bank, which had been established some time before, continued under the management of Dr. Pinkerton, also a member of the Committee, and strenuous efforts were made by him to increase the supply of stored plasma to be ready for an emergency. Due to general lack of public understanding of the blood donation idea, however, the quantity, while large in comparison with most cities was, of course, far from adequate. The work of the Honolulu blood plasma bank is discussed more fully in a separate presentation by Dr. F. J. Pinkerton.

Did the Plan work?

On the morning of December 7th, the Headquarters diary of the Emergency Medical and Ambulance Service at Kaahumanu School shows that the chain telephone system which had been set up in preparation for such an event began to function at 8:20 A. M., when Mrs. Nash called her office staff to duty. At 8:35 A. M., the ambulance trucks from Davies and Company and American Factors, Ltd. were ordered to fit their frames and be ready for call. Other companies were alerted later by Mr. Paul Meyer, officer in charge of the ambulance pool.

At 9:00 A. M., Colonel King, then Department Surgeon, telephoned in a request for twenty-six doctors and twenty nurses to report to Tripler Hospital. These nurses and doctors were called immediately; fortunately, most of the doctors of the City were attending a postgraduate lecture on wound surgery at that hour. At 9:10 A. M., Colonel King requested that as many trucks as possible, fitted as ambulances report to Hickam Field to carry wounded from Hickam to Tripler Hospital. Twelve trucks left immediately and others left as rapidly as they drove in to report. By 9:20 A. M., forty-five trucks were on their way to Hickam Field. Most of the wounded from Hickam Field were transported by these ambulances, and most of the treatment of the wounded was done by civilian physicians, nurses and volunteer helpers.

The Aid Stations were all manned promptly and reported in from time to time as shown on the attached blotter. In all, 2,344 persons were treated for illness or injury on December 7, 1941, by these organizations. Distribution of these treatments and, to some extent, the nature of them, is listed on the enclosed sheet. Lunalilo Station was actually struck by a Japanese bomb, set on fire, and compelled to move to an adjacent building.

Distribution of cases treated at the Medical Unit is shown on the tabulation attached herewith as Exhibit "B."

[*120*] The recognition of the Army for the services rendered on December 7, 1941, is reflected in the following memorandum from the Office of the Surgeon, Hawaiian Department, dated January 19, 1942:

"Memo to: Dr. H. L. Arnold, Office of Civilian Defense.

"From: Headquarters Hawaiian Department—January 19, 1942.

"Request that the following statement, which has the approval of the Department Commander, be published in the Honolulu County Medical Journal:

" 'The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, wishes to take this opportunity to thank the physicians and their assistants for the splendid aid and cooperation rendered on December 7 and the period following in the care of the wounded. All did a superior job.'

"For the Department Surgeon.

"(Signed) SIDNEY POSNER,
"Captain, Medical Corps."

Miscellaneous Activities

The balance of the day's activities was devoted to innumerable details of rendering assistance to sick and injured persons, to hospitals and doctors and to moving supplies and equipment to places where they were needed.

The wisdom and adequacy of the plans and training schedule were, it is submitted, demonstrated by the relatively prompt and smooth functioning of the organization when war came. The devoted service of the volunteer trainees and trainers, who spent hours and hours of time in preparing for war can never be adequately praised.

Major General Norman Kirk, the Surgeon General of the United States Army, in addressing a large group of physicians from the Service and the civilian community on January 26, 1945, at Kamehameha Hospital said, "Before beginning my talk, I want to express the thanks of the Army to the civilian physicians of Honolulu for the magnificent job they did on December 7th, *when they were ready for it and we weren't.*"

H. L. ARNOLD.

[*121*] EXHIBIT "A"

MINUTES OF FIRST MEETING OF PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEE OF THE HONOLULU COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY—APRIL 15, 1941

All members present, and by invitation Dr. Clarence Fronk and Dr. Thomas Mossman. It was decided that the President of the County Medical Society should *ex officio* be invited to all meetings of the Committee in future, and that these meetings would be held weekly on Tuesday at noon at the Pacific Club when there were matters to be discussed and that notification would be sent out in plenty of time in advance. A quorum will consist of four members and the reporting will be done by the Chairman of the Committee.

The division of the committee into the following categories was approved:

Dr. Robert Faus—Executive, in charge of all phases of the Committee's work.

Dr. N. P. Larsen—In charge of plans for hospital expansion and evacuation.

Dr. Joseph Strode—In charge of hospital teams for civilian casualty care.

Dr. J. R. Judd—In charge of hospital teams for military casualty care.

Dr. Paul Withington—In charge of the collection and primary care of casualties.

Dr. F. J. Pinkerton—In charge of liaison with Chamber of Commerce, the Red Cross, other branches of the County disaster organizations, and Supplies and Publicity.

Dr. H. L. Arnold—In charge of administration, hygiene and sanitation.

It was agreed and considered of vital importance that all medical personnel be under the control of this committee and assignments of such personnel be made only under its sanction.

The following specific actions were taken:

Dr. Robert Faus was reappointed to the position which he held under the previous preparedness committee. It was decided that his work was to be facilitated by the Committee in any way which Dr. Faus might suggest.

Dr. Mossman stated that he was in the process of preparing a master list of the available medical supplies on Oahu and he is to continue this work.

[122] The actual listing of medical personnel on this Island for duties during war conditions was decided to be an absolutely necessary factor and this work will go forward as rapidly as possible.

When and if the Disaster Board of the City and County lays plans for the construction of evacuation camps or shelters, recommendations for the hygiene and sanitation of these camps will be offered. Dr. Enright and Dr. Haralson were to be approached regarding the desirability of publicity concerning the need for typhoid and smallpox vaccination on a voluntary basis as soon as this can be done.

Dr. Fronk stated that the Army would be able to furnish beds and linen for the potentially expanded hospitals. Dr. Fronk also stated that it was unlikely that subsidiary hospitals anywhere near the business district would be useful.

The potential local manufacture of typhoid vaccines was discussed and approved.

The offer of Dr. James Kuninobu of supplying medical personnel from the Japanese Medical Society for service in the event that it is needed was accepted gladly and he will be so notified.

Dr. Pinkerton reported that the blood and plasma bank situation was satisfactory and well under way.

Dr. Faus was given charge of the arranging for supplies of orthopedic apparatus such as Thomas splints and Kirschner stirrups.

A committee consisting of Drs. Fronk, Judd and Strode will confer upon two matters: one, the appointment of hospital teams for the care of hospitalized patients in both military and civilian hospitals and also upon the standardization of the treatment for burns and the acquisition of necessary supplies for this work. It was suggested that the physicians of the city be circularized as to what good and serviceable instruments they have which would be available for the use of the general disaster committee in the event of serious need for such instruments.

The principle was laid down that doctors who are asked to teach in the evacuation units now being organized will not of necessity be expected to serve in these units in the actual emergency but all doctors who are asked to do this work of teaching are urged to cooperate to the fullest extent.

Captain Gay is caring for the coordination of medical services during potential disaster with the other functions of the general disaster committee.

It was decided that all actions taken by the Committee should be given publicity by posting them in the office of the Honolulu County Medical Society.

There being no other business, the meeting was adjourned.

/s/ H. L. Arnold,
Chairman, Preparedness Committee,
Honolulu County Medical Society.

HLA : H

EXHIBIT "B"

[123] *Cases treated at the medical unit, December 7–31, 1941*

	Aliiolani (8–12 no record)	Farrington	Kaneohe	Kailua	Kalihi-Kai	Kawananakoa	Kaahumanu	Kuhio	Liholiho	Lunalilo	Manoa	Maunalua	Palama	Pohukaina	Scottish Rite	Thos. Jefferson	Wahiawa	Waialae	Hqts. Unit	Waikiki	
Deaths	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Deliveries	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Dental treatment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	11
Dressings	39	67	72	2	19	19	15	0	3	29	13	0	27	50	4	19	9	1	99	33	520
Doctors called	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Home	116	157	70	49	67	37	82	42	15	119	13	10	48	285	50	58	40	12	967	52	2, 289
Hospitalized	4	13	2	1	5	4	4	0	0	2	0	1	6	5	1	0	1	0	4	2	55
Medical treatments	46	50	5	13	15	11	43	30	1	20	0	2	27	188	16	2	7	0	666	16	1, 158
Minor injuries	11	37	33	46	24	6	34	41	10	68	13	2	11	15	34	15	12	9	165	27	613
Miscellaneous	24	10	5	4	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	1	11	0	0	4	68
Severe injuries	6	6	16	0	4	0	0	1	0	3	0	1	8	1	1	1	2	0	0	4	54
War casualties	3	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	18	0	0	15	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	42
Total	120	170	72	50	72	41	86	42	15	121	13	11	54	290	51	58	41	12	971	54	2, 344

Total number of patients treated in the 20 medical units: 2,344.

[*124*] PREPAREDNESS OF THE HONOLULU BLOOD PLASMA BANK PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

F. J. Pinkerton, M. D., Honolulu, Hawaii

[*125*] During the year 1940 many informal discussions were had by the physicians in Honolulu concerning the merits of a Blood Bank and the importance of such in the event that war developed between the United States and Japan. Ways and means were discussed pro and con by a few of the more interested and far-thinking physicians. Finally, at the suggestion of the Public Health Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, a letter was written to the chairman of the committee putting the general thoughts of the various discussions in letter form and suggesting that the Public Health Committee might be interested in financing and operating such a Blood Bank.

Since such a project involved the voluntary donations of blood from a favorable group, the matter was discussed with representatives of the Junior Chamber of Commerce and their interest and support solicited with the thought in mind that the membership, composed of young men, would be the best group to call upon for voluntary blood donations.

In February, 1941, an outline of the proposed blood and plasma bank was presented to the Public Health Committee of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce and a committee was appointed by the chairman to supervise and inaugurate and begin operations of the blood bank. This committee was composed of the following:

Chairman of Public Health Committee, Chamber of Commerce, as chairman.
A representative of the Health Committee from the Jr. Chamber of Commerce.
A Pathologist.
A representative of the Surgeon of the Hawaiian Department, U. S. Army.
The Territorial Commisisoner of Health.
The Medical Director of the Queen's Hospital.
The City and County Physician.

Principal provisions of the plan were:

1. A central bank was to be established in the City and County Emergency Hospital to draw blood and prepare plasma.

2. The Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross was asked to assume charge of publicizing the project and securing donors.

3. The supply of plasma and its production for the Blood Bank was to be under the direction and control of the Public Health Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu.

4. No blood or plasma was to be offered for sale.

5. As a beginning the central supply was to consist of 100 flasks of plasma, 250 cc. each.

6. Certain equipment was to be purchased for hospitals on Oahu desiring to prepare plasma in addition to that of the central bank. (In order to decentralize and to encourage widespread interest in the technical preparation of plasma and the operation of a blood bank it was decided to offer to all the hospitals minimum equipment which could be brought into [*126*] operation when an emergency arose and to train the technicians of those hospitals in the technic.

Budget: A budget of $2,000, later increased to $3,000 was appropriated by the Public Health Committee of the Senior Chamber to convert space at the City and County Emergency Hospital into a laboratory, and to purchase equipment and pay salaries. A physician, a medical technologist and a bacteriologist were employed to supervise the laboratory. Eight hospitals on Oahu, (six in Honolulu and two in rural Oahu) agreed to participate in the program. Equipment was purchased for all of them and their own technicians were trained in plasma technic by the Blood Bank technologist.

Opening of bank: After four months of preparation and securing equipment from the mainland, the first blood was drawn on June 2, 1941. A schedule of bleeding nine to twelve donors' a week was maintained. At the end of three months, 96 men and women had given blood and 77 flasks of plasma were on hand.

Additional appropriation: $1,000 additional was appropriated by the Chamber of Commerce and a plan approved for doubling the goal to 200 flasks and to speed operations to care for about 30 donors a week. Under the new schedule, within five weeks 153 donors had given blood and the goal of 200 flasks had been passed.

Cost: The cost of the last 138 flasks came to $7.25 per 250 cc., as compared to the cost of $19.50 to $27.50 per 250 cc., for commercial plasma.

Red Cross: In October of 1941 the Blood Bank project was offered to the American Red Cross but this organization did not accept the offer because of lack of approval from Washington.

Closing of bank: In November of 1941 the Chamber of Commerce feeling that the demonstration had been successful and that enough experience had been had to insure protection to the community in the event of war, closed its doors. Several weeks were required to draw and culture the plasma then in the process of production and to take inventory of the equipment.

Storage: On December 1, 1941, 203 flasks of plasma were placed in the cold storage warehouse at the Hawaiian Electric Company and plans were made to turn the central laboratory over to the City and County Hospital for an indefinite period (to carry on the functions of a central blood bank for emergency needs if required).

Sneak attack on December 7, 1941: On December 7, 1941, our Army and Navy bases were attacked and an urgent appeal by Service hospitals went out for plasma. The chairman of the Public Health Committee of the Chamber of Commerce delivered 75 flasks to the Tripler General Hospital, 80 flasks to the Queen's Hospital for civilian use and 45 flasks to the Pearl Harbor Naval Hospital. Within six hours the total supply, the product of months of effort, was exhausted. The doctors who attended the wounded that day tell of men who were carried in, very evidently marked for death, and they also tell how many of these men still live because of the life-giving plasma being on hand and ready for instant use to be poured back into their veins.

[127] *Immediate expansion of blood bank:* Now the value of those months of preparation, of standardizing technic, of training technicians, was felt. A call for donors was broadcast over local radio stations and the response was overwhelming. A schedule of 50 donors per hour, 10 hours a day, 7 days a week was maintained for two weeks. Every available doctor and nurse was enlisted to assist. Between 20 and 30 doctors worked on a volunteer basis from 3 to 5 hours daily in taking the donors, many of them in addition to their First Aid Station duties. Men and women from all walks of life and all economic levels stood in line for hours. War workers came after their long shift of duty, as did dock workers and workers in the sugar and pineapple fields. The original blood bank laboratory was placed on 24 hour duty, the personnel working in three eight-hour shifts, sterilizing equipment, preparing sodium citrate, culturing plasma and dispensing it.

The laboratory at the Queen's Hospital typed the donors, ran serological tests on the blood, prepared plasma and dispensed blood and plasma.

Units were instituted at the Experiment Stations of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Pineapple Producers' Cooperative Association. Equipment and technical assistance were borrowed from the University of Hawaii.

The other seven hospitals absorbed part of the load of plasma preparation with equipment provided by the Public Health Committee in advance of the attack. Personnel of all these hospitals had been trained during 1941 for just such an emergency.

The Blood Bank was again offered to the American Red Cross but this offer was not accepted; it was then taken over by the Office of Civilian Defense who assumed responsibility for expenses incurred as of December 7, 1941.

F. J. Pinkerton
F. J. PINKERTON. M. D.

[*128*] PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE, MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, TERRITORY OF HAWAII, PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

Addison E. Kirk, Honolulu, Hawaii

[*129*] THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING PEARL HARBOR

The following is a brief summary of the activities of the Transportation Committee, Major Disaster Council, City and County of Honolulu, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Unfortunately, the records of this Committee have been forwarded to Washington, D. C., with the files of the local Office of Defense Transportation.

The Major Disaster Council was formed on June 24, 1941, with each member assigned as chairman of a committee. The Transportation Committee was formed immediately thereafter with members heading some committee, each of which dealt with a particular type of transportation with the exception of the Engineering Committee. Various meetings were held, including joint meetings, with the representatives of the Evacuation Committee and other committees affected by transportation.

In the beginning the Committee's activities consisted of a complete survey of all types of transportation including railroad, highway, ships, barges, tugs and airplanes. The Engineering Committee made a survey and an analysis of each garage, service station and repair shop on the island. The information secured was tabulated and cross indexed. Prior to December 7th, roughly 5,000 trucks, buses and vehicles of all types were listed. This listing included the individual responsible for the unit, key personnel in larger companies with telephone numbers and addresses for out of hour calls.

The list of vehicles ranged from heavy duty trucks to small pick-up trucks and included refrigerated units which might be used for the temporary storage of food at evacuation centers.

The Engineering Committee, in its survey of garages, had a complete list of the machines, tools and other equipment available for emergency repairs as well as major overhauls. Personnel of each garage was listed and special training noted. Compilation of the capacity of all gasoline storage was included, both for the purpose of refueling during an emergency and for the dispersion of this highly necessary fuel.

The "danger zone" which had been established by the military authorities was divided into four zones with a committee member in charge of each.

In classifying transportation vehicles, including buses, the listing was divided with those available in the city of Honolulu in one and those in the country districts in the other. As stated before, by December 7th, there were approximately 5,000 of these vehicles listed. These did not include certain trucks which had been turned over to the Medical Committee for use as ambulances. Prior to December 7th these vehicles had been outfitted as ambulances with removable equipment which could be installed in a very few minutes.

With the attack on December 7th, all committee members reported to their posts and calls for transportation equipment began to come in shortly after the attack.

I am pleased to report that the cooperation of those people volunteering their equipment was 100%. The volunteer drivers exceeded the requirements. I am happy to report that all requests for transportation received after [*130*] 9 a. m. December 7, 1941, were filled satisfactorily and in each instance, the vehicles were dispatched not later than twenty minutes after the call came in.

The largest single job done that day was the evacuation of the women and children from Schofield Barracks and from Hickam Field to various cafeteria equipped schools in Honolulu. The movement from these posts was done in total blackout without serious incident.

Respectfully submitted.

A. E. Kirk,
A. E. KIRK,
Chairman, Transportation Committee,
Major Disaster Council.

[131] ORGANIZATION OF THE CIVILIAN POLICE RESERVE IN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU PRIOR TO DECEMBER 1, 1941

Heaton L. Wrenn, Honolulu, Hawaii

[132] On July 28, 1941, with the approval and under the authority of the Honolulu Police Department and Chief of Police W. A. Gabrielson, the Honolulu Police Reserve was organized under the leadership of Major Douglas G. King a former officer in the British Army. The purpose of the Police Reserve was to provide a trained body of citizens who could assist and augment the regular Honolulu Police force in time of emergency. 144 men enrolled in the first group and these men were given a course in police training. This training consisted of 14 lectures by police instructors. The subjects included the apprehension of criminals, search and seizure, judo, the law of arrest, criminal law, criminal investigation, traffic work, identification work, first aid and other pertinent subjects. The lectures were held once a week on Monday evenings at the Central Intermediate School from 7:30 to 9:00 P. M. The final evening lecture was concluded on October 27, 1941. Thereafter the men were given training during the daytime in drilling, judo, riot guns and pistol shooting. 24 of those enrolled in the first class dropped out during the course of instruction. 120 of the first class were commissioned as officers of the Honolulu Police Department on November 3, 1941.

Beginning on September 9, 1941 the members of the class started accompanying regular police officers on their beats on every eighth day. On the graduation of the class it was decided that the group would meet once a month for further instructions. The first meeting of the group was held on December 1, 1941 at the Central Intermediate School.

A second class of 38 men was started on November 25, 1941. This course of instruction was interrupted by the events of December 7, 1941.

On December 7, 1941, 114 of the first class and 28 of the second class went on active police duty.

On December 7, 1941 the 142 members of the Police Reserve did regular police duty guarding important installations, working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in picking up enemy aliens and persons suspected of being dangerous to the security of the community, guarding the office of the Japanese consulate, evacuation work in bombed areas, traffic duty, and in fact doing the same type of work as the regular police officers. Following December 7, 1941 the members of the Reserve for a time did duty every day and night for several weeks then the group was divided so that they did duty every other day. Subsequently the Reserves were divided into six groups, each of which did regular beat work during the third watch for one night a week and on two nights a week every seventh week.

The members of the first class who went on duty on December 7, 1941 represented the several racial groups comprising our population and were largely business men. For example, the group numbered among its members an undertaker, a physician and surgeon, an interior decorator, bank tellers, a dentist, trust company officials, salesmen, accountants, lawyers, an instructor in physical culture, steamship executives, newspaper executives, contractors, an industrial relations director, radio executives, chemists, clerks, architects, dairymen, investment brokers, bankers, merchants, hotel executives, insurance salesmen, securities salesmen, theater executives, a veterinarian, florists, bookkeepers, scientists, mechanical engineers and agriculturists.

[133] Following December 7, 1941 additional groups of Reserves were given intensive police training, commissioned as officers and did active police duty. The Reserves for a substantial portion of the time they were on active police duty numbered approximately 300 men at one time on active status.

The Honolulu Police Reserve was the first organization of its kind organized in the United States and probably the only group whose members went on regular duty as commissioned uniformed police officers performing all the functions of regular police.

The Police Reserve continued on an active status until October 13, 1945.

HEATON L. WRENN.
Heaton L. Wrenn

EXHIBIT NO. 154

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERAL ARNOLD AND GENERAL MARTIN

Correspondence between General Arnold and General Martin (1941)

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[*1*] 15 AUGUST 1941.

Major General H. H. ARNOLD, U. S. A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR GENERAL ARNOLD: There has been mailed under separate cover a secret study which was being made at the time the memorandum from the Secretary of the General Staff was received requesting that " a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii."

This study was originally made by Colonel Farthing as Commanding Officer of the 5th Bombardment Group (Heavy) assisted by Major Rose and Captain Coddington. It has been prepared as a staff study and carefully checked as to its contents with certain additions being made by the G-3 Section of the Hawaiian Air Force. It represents to me the complete possibility of the Hawaiian Islands being defended from attack by carrier-based aircraft. It is not making a statement which can not be fully realized upon to say that, "The defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be accomplished with the 180 heavy bombardment airplanes which are setup for this mission by this study." That being true, then, by occupying outlying fields on this island group and with the requisite number of airplanes and the combat crews as called for by this study, the defense of the Hawaiian Islands has been accomplished and need cause the War Department nor the Army Air Force further concern.

The original of this report is being forwarded through the Department Commander of the Hawaiian Department but I am sending you a copy direct so that you may have an opportunity to consider this study prior to the original arriving in the War Department.

Most sincerely,

(S) F. L. Martin,
F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army.

[*2*] 20 AUGUST 1941.

Subject: Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii.
To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.
Thru: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. In compliance with copy of corrected memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, OCS 17234-25, from the Secretary, General Staff, dated July 17, 1941, "that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii", there is attached for consideration of the War Department a plan for the employment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. This plan clearly presents the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Attention is called to the recommendations therein.

2. No increase in personnel of the permanent air garrison of Hawaii is necessary to bring the actual heavy bombardment strength to one group. Under provisions of Table of Basic Allowances No. 1, War Department, dated December 1, 1940, fourteen additional heavy bombardment airplanes will be required to provide a total strength of one group of thirty-five B-17D type airplanes. This force is so small for the mission to be performed that it is considered entirely inadequate.

3. When the RDF installation is completed and the 15th Pursuit Group has its full complement of 80 fighters no further increase for pursuit aviation is considered necessary. Provision should be made to maintain at all times the 14th Pursuit Wing at full combat strength of 80 fighters and 105 interceptors. It is contemplated that pursuit aviation will perform its normal mission in the defense of these islands by intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft in the vicinity of or over the Island of Oahu. This is considered an adequate force to perform the pursuit mission in the defense of these islands.

4. A combination medium bombardment-torpedo force is considered highly desirable in order that attack can be made under conditions of low visibility when horizontal bombing is not feasible and is therefore recommended as a component part of the Hawaiian Air Force. (See Study No. 2 in attached plan).

5. On the assumption that there is a possibility of enemy surface craft reaching the shores of Oahu, one squadron of dive bombers is [3] considered necessary to assist the ground forces in withstanding an invasion effort by concentrating on denying the enemy any opportunity to establish beach heads. The quick and accurate striking power of dive bombers makes them particularly effective for close-in support of the ground forces and this premise is borne out by information contained in intelligence reports received on the war in Europe. Dive bombers would also be employed against hostile surface craft and submarines which had penetrated close to the shores of Oahu.

6. With the addition of the force of medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and one squadron of dive bombers no further increase in the number of light bombardment airplanes is required.

7. One additional observation squadron should be assigned the Hawaiian Air Force to supplement the new ground organization of the Hawaiian Department which is being re-organized into two triangular divisions. The ground forces of the Hawaiian Department should be provided with three observation squadrons. At present there is assigned one observation squadron (C&D) and one light bombardment squadron which could be diverted to observation duty.

8. To increase the number of aircraft in the Hawaiian Air Force as outlined in this letter and in the attached plan it is estimated that approximately 3,871 additional men should be assigned. A minimum of 216 combat crews and 180 maintenance crews are necessary to operate 180 B–17D type airplanes. Sufficient personnel are now present in the Hawaiian Air Force to man 70 combat crews and 70 maintenance crews for heavy bombardment aircraft. Additional personnel equal to the differences above should be assigned to the Hawaiian Air Force to meet these requirements. Further personnel increases should be made to activate two medium combination bombardment-torpedo squadrons, one dive bomber squadron, one additional observation squadron and five air base squadrons. The five air base squadrons will be used to maintain the outlying fields tabulated below which will house heavy bombardment squadrons as indicated. The two Air Base Groups (S) are to be used to maintain Bellows Field and the site selected for the station of the 15th Pursuit Group.

Barking Sands	2
Morse Field	2
Hilo	1
Lanai	1
Parker Ranch	1

9. The dive bomber squadron and three observation squadrons with allied services will become, in effect, an air support command and will be stationed at Bellows Field.

[4] 10. Tables of Organization prescribe five enlisted men for each heavy bombardment combat crew. For continuous daily operation a minimum of fourteen men will be necessary for each heavy maintenance crew. Using these figures as a basis, personnel requirements have been computed as shown in Inclosure No. 2.

11. There is at present available, under construction and awaiting approval of the War Department, housing for 12,288 enlisted men. This study will require housing for a total of 12,813 men to provide for all Air Corps and associated personnel. This leaves but 525 men to be cared for in a future project which will be submitted when this study has been approved. For detailed analysis of housing see Inclosure No. 3.

12. It is my conviction that by increasing the present strength of the Hawaiian Air Force by one observation squadron, a minimum of one dive bomber squadron, two squadrons of combination medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and by increasing the strength of long-range bombardment to a total of 180 airplanes a positive defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be assured without any assistance whatever from the naval forces giving the Navy complete freedom of action.

(S) F. L. Martin,
F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls—
Incl #1—Plan for the Employment of Long-Range Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu. (In triplicate).
Incl #2—Personnel Requirement Recapitulation. (In triplicate).
Incl #3—Air Force Housing Facilities. (In triplicate).
[NOTE.—For inclosures see Army Exhibit 35, Roberts Record.]

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[5] Basic: (Ltr. HAF, 20 August 1941, "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii.") AG 381/264 HDP

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., August 1941.

To Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

I concur in this study.

/S/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls. (dup).

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[6] SEPTEMBER 25, 1941.

Major General F. L. MARTIN,
Hawaiian Air Force,
Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR MARTIN: There has just been brought to my attention the Hawaiian Department Tentative Standing Operative Procedure publication July 14, 1941. I note under Section 2 that the Hawaiian Air Force is charged with being prepared to release a provisional battalion totaling 500 men to assist the auxiliary police force. It is *further* observed that the Hawaiian Air Force is charged with defending Schofield Barracks against ground and sabotage attacks.

The combat units, together with the auxiliary and service units set up for the Hawaiian Department, have been designed primarily to insure the full effectiveness of air force operations during that critical time indicated under the Hawaiian Department Alert No. 1. It would appear, however, that we have overestimated the requirements for the Hawaiian Air Force. Obviously, it would be impossible for the Hawaiian Air Force to carry out the mission above noted, in addition to its Air Force combat mission, unless there were a surplus of Air Corps and related troops.

As we are so short of trained officers and personnel in the Air Force, it is most undesirable to employ such personnel for other than Air Corps duties, except under most unusual circumstances.

It would seem that the proper step to be taken would be a request made on the War Department to increase the Hawaiian Department by the number of personnel required to assist the auxiliary police force and to defend Schofield Barracks. Our action would then be to reduce the numbers of Air Corps and auxiliary personnel by that number.

However, before any official steps are taken, I would appreciate your unofficial and informal comment.

Sincerely,

H. H. ARNOLD,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of the Army Air Forces.

[7] 3 NOVEMBER 1941.

Major General H. H. ARNOLD,
Chief of the Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR HAPPY: In reply to your request for unofficial and informal comment upon the use of Air Corps troops as ordered by "Hawaiian Department Tentative Standing Operating Procedure," dated July 14, 1941, the following information is submitted.

During the department maneuvers, which lasted from the 12-24 May of this year, the Department Commander, General Short, became very much interested in the proper employment of all military personnel in a last stand defense of Oahu. At that time he mentioned the fact that the Air Force had approximately 4,000 enlisted men at Hickam Field and nearly 3,000 at Wheeler Field; he saw no reason why these men should not receive some training as Infantry so that after the Air Force was destroyed they could assist the ground forces in the defense of the island. I told him it was not possible to give such training at this time as the Air Force's first mission, that of training combat crews, was in a most unsatisfactory state. In order to obtain these combat crews the men must be processed through our technical schools and in addition thereto gain experience in the actual performance of these duties under proper supervision.

As no further comment was made at the time, I thought the matter was a closed issue. Without further warning a letter was received from the Hawaiian Department, dated 5 June 1941 on the subject of training Air Corps personnel for ground defense missions. This letter directed that—

a. At Hickam Field: The training of two battalions of 500 men each to perform the following missions:

(1) One battalion to provide ground close-in defense for Hickam Field.

(2) One battalion to be prepared to take over initially under the direction of the Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department, the anti-sabotage mission within Police District No. 1, City and County of Honolulu, now assigned to the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, under the provisions of FO #1, OHD 38.

[8] *b. At Wheeler Field:* The training of one battalion of 500 men to perform the following missions:

(1) Provide ground close-in defense of Wheeler Field.

(2) Be prepared to take over initially under the direction of the Headquarters Commandant, Hawaiian Division, the protection of the Schofield Area now assigned to the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, under the provisions of FO #1, OD 40.

The training of these 1,500 men was conducted under the supervision of Infantry instructiors, after three o'clock in the afternoon, four afternoons per week. The men who were placed in these battalions were the most recent arrivals in the islands, plus a certain number of noncommissioned officers required in the organization. The officers for these battalions were reserve officers regularly assigned to these two stations but from other arms of the service. As the Air Corps training for the enlisted men in these battalions progressed they received assignments with the Air Corps commensurate with their ability and training. The Infantry drill in the afternoon, which usually lasted from 3:00 p. m. to 4:30 p. m. interferred a great deal with the performance of their normal duties and when an alert was called these men were required to take their defensive positions which took them away from their Air Corps assignments. This left the organizations to which these men belonged extremely short of the necessary personnel for carrying-on the functions required of the Air Corps organizations. In other words, there was imposed upon these men the performance of a duty assigned to them for the last defense of this island when the Air Force was still carrying-on its primary mission in the defense of the island. As soon as sufficient reliable data could be collected as to the inroad this was making on Air Force activities, a letter dated August 25, 1941, was prepared on this subject and taken to the Department Commander, General Short, in person showing that it was inconsistent with the Air Force mission to require its men to train as Infantry and to take their Infanry positions when an alert was called, leaving vacant their proper assignment with the Air Force. The only relief from the performance of these duties General Short would give at the time was that those assigned to such duties and properly trained for the performance of these duties need not receive more training than was necessary to insure that they would be properly prepared to assume these duties when called upon.

A new "Standing Operating Procedure" is being prepared but has not yet been published. A copy of this procedure which was submitted to this headquarters for comment made no mention of the assignment of Air Corps troops for Infantry missions, other than that Air Corps troops will be trained for the close-in defense of Army airdromes on the Island of Oahu. I have delayed answering your letter awaiting the publication of this "Standing Operating Procedure", that I might be sure that the provisions of the existing "Standing Operating Procedure" had been changed as indicated above.

[9] It is my belief that the letter which I mentioned above, pointing out the unnecessary handicaps placed upon the Air Force in training as Infantry at a time when they were unable to conduct sufficient training to meet their primary mission as Air Force troops, has received consideration. In this letter I asked the Department Commander to rescind his instructions requiring Air Corps troops to train as Infantry at least until such time as we had developed sufficient combat and maintenance crews to meet the Manning Tables for the number of airplanes allotted to the Hawaiian Air Force. I am attaching hereto a copy of the letter on the subject of diversion from Air Force training, dated August 25, 1941.

It is my firm belief that no attempt would be made by an enemy force to make a hostile landing on these islands until the Hawaiian Air Force has been destroyed or reduced in effectiveness to the point where they could offer little if any resistance. When the present allotment of airplanes has been received and these airplanes are properly manned by competent combat crews, there is no enemy in these waters strong enough to destroy the Hawaiian Air Force or effect a landing on these shores.

I can well understand how one charged with the defense of these islands, assuming that the Hawaiian Air Force had been destroyed, would wish to utilize to the fullest extent the military man power available to him in carrying out his mission of the defense of Oahu. For Air Corps troops to be effective under such circumstances they should be properly trained for the parts they are required to play in such defensive action but I just do not wish my Air Force troops to receive training for this "last ditch fight" until they have been properly trained for their primary mission with the Air Force.

General Short is a very reasonable man of keen perception. It is now my belief that he sees more clearly the training problems confronting the Air Force and realized its enormous proportions. I do expect that the training of Air Force troops as Infantry will not be permitted to seriously interfere with their proper training for their normal mission.

I feel very strongly that a War Department policy should be established or orders issued which will prescribe that troops from the ground forces have the responsibility of the defense of airdromes and performance of interior guard duty. If the interior guard duty is to be performed by Air Force troops, then a special table of organization should be issued for a Military Policy Company to be established at each post for the performance of interior guard duty. Due to the importance and value of property on Air Corps stations, troops performing interior guard duty should be especially well trained for this service. These services can never be efficiently performed except by those who are regularly and permanently assigned to such duty. The duties to be performed by troops for the close-in defense of an airdrome are quite similar and require the same training as that given to all ground troops for a similar mission. As to [10] the number of men required, it makes no difference whatever whether the defense of airdromes and interior guard duty are performed by Air Force troops or troops from other arms. In either case troops performing these duties must have this as their sole responsibility and assignment.

I am happy to say that this problem of training Air Force troops with Infantry, which has caused me such deep concern, seems now on its way to a satisfactory solution. Having given me this opportunity to unofficially and informally bring this matter to your attention I shall, if in the future this burden becomes unbearable, bring it to your personal attention.

I am forwarding under separate cover a study which has been made of our personnel requirements to meet the allocation of airplanes for the Hawaiian Air Force. As you will observe tables of organizations for the respective units have been adhered to as far as possible. Our experiences indicates the num-

ber of men in these organizations barely meets the demands on this personnel for our operations.

Expressing to you my high esteem I beg to remain,

Most sincerely,

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army.

1 Incl.
Cy. ltr. fr. HAF, to CG HD,
8/25/41

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[11] Nov. 27, 1941.

Major General F. L. MARTIN,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force,
Hickam Field, T. H.

DEAR FRED: Your letter of November 3, 1941, was very enlightening on the use of Air Force troops in Hawaii. I am happy to learn that in your opinion a satisfactory solution to the problem will be arrived at shortly.

When the new "Standing Operating Procedure" of the Hawaiian Department is published, I would be interested in knowing the policy which it expresses toward air troops and their employment in local defense of air bases. These matters are of vital interest and the decisions reached in Hawaii may aid in the solutions of similar situations in the United States or in other theaters.

In your letter you urged that a War Department policy be issued which will prescribe that ground forces assume the responsibility of airdrome defense. The broad policy governing local ground defense of air bases has been published in War Department Training Circular No. 47, dated July 18, 1941. Paragraph 16 of this circular states the order of availability of troops for defense, and Air Corps troops are listed in the 4th priority with a notation that their primary mission is operation, maintenance and repair of aircraft. I believe that this is a plain statement of current War Department policy on this matter.

I am appreciative of your efforts to keep me abreast of developments affecting your command.

Yours very truly,

H. H. ARNOLD,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of the Army Air Forces.

EXHIBIT NO. 155

(Exhibit 155 is the original Radar Plot of Station OPANA, December 7, 1941 and will be found reproduced as Item No. 38 in Exhibits—Illustrations to Proceedings of Joint Committee)

EXHIBIT NO. 156

Far Eastern Section, G-2
June 21, 1941

TO: ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2.

Subject: Final Recommendations for Eastern Intelligence Organization.

I have the following recommendations to submit:

1. That the Military Attache, Thailand and the Military Observer, Singapore be removed from jurisdiction of the Philippine Department and placed directly under the War Department. As things now stand, we have an inconsistent situation in that these two are under the Philippine Department, while our offices in Japan and China are of course under the War Department. To correct the situation a radiogram should be sent to the Commanding General, Philippine Department substantially as follows:

Inform Jacobsen and Brink that effective this date they are placed under War Department jurisdiction. The War Department desires that they continue to send a copy of all reports direct to Philippine Department.

2. That Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China be transferred to the Far Eastern Section. In support of this it is obvious that Burma should be grouped with China, primarily on account of the Burma Road, and secondarily, because of the communication set. Respecting the transfer of the other three places named, all of Southeastern Asia should in my opinion be considered as one large operational area, very closely related to China, Japan and Philippine Islands. Should this transfer be approved there should of course be transferred to the Far Eastern Section the clerical personnel tentatively set up for their handling in the British and Western European Sections.

3. That instructions be issued that the Commanding General, Philippine Department, the Military Observer, Singapore, the Military Attache, Thailand, the Military Attache, China, and the Military Attache, Japan substantially as follows:

The War Department desires that there be full and complete cooperation with British Intelligence agencies in the area under your jurisdiction, such cooperation to include exchange of information on the strength and disposition of our own forces, as well as of other countries in which we may be mutually interested.

File

In this connection it is further recommended that the Director of Naval Intelligence be asked to consider issuing similar instructions to our corresponding Naval organizations and Intelligence agencies. According to General Lee in London, the British have already instructed the Far Eastern people to this same end and particularly desire that Naval information be included.

4. That we form a Secret Service organization to operate in the Far East. From my conversations with the Far Eastern Combined (Intelligence) Bureau and also the Chief of the British Secret Service (also Singapore), I am convinced that much information, particularly as regards areas under Japanese control and other remote areas, can be secured only through the operations of such a system. Such a system obviously must be kept separate from our normal Intelligence organization, and we should, I think, lean heavily upon British advice and experience in organizing. The Chief of the British Service in Singapore informed me that in case we should desire to organize a similar system, he was prepared to assist us in every way, including the recruitment of native operatives. In as much as it is highly desirable for obvious reasons not to have a regular army officer directing such organization, I recommend that Major Warren Clear, a retired officer now on duty in the Public Relations Section and a Japanese language graduate, be sent to Singapore to consult with the Chief of the British Secret Service there regarding the details of organization and the selection of an operating headquarters, which should probably be either in Singapore or Hongkong.

5. PERSONNEL

A. Abroad

(1) I recommend that the Air Corps be requested to furnish a well qualified and well rounded officer for duty in Singapore where there is a great mass of information on the air forces and the air fields of the entire Far East. He should of course be accredited to Singapore.

(2) I repeat my former recommendation that we send to Singapore one of our very best Japan men. The present Military Observer, Lt. Col. Brink, is well qualified to cover Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China. Additionally, however, since much of the work of the Far Eastern Combined Bureau and most of the work of the British Secret Service is oriented on Japan, I consider it essential that we have in Singapore a Japan man who is thoroughly familiar with our present information on Japan. Major Robin Rage, at present Asst. Military Attache in Tokyo, answers the requirements fully and would, in addition, be of value to the British in evaluating information on Japan, and would thus enable us to give something back to the British in return for the information that we

extract from their files. So little information is obtainable at present in Japan that I feel we should at once transfer Pape to Singapore. Pape should likewise be accredited to Singapore.

(3) My original radio recommendations concerning the Singapore office called for two full-time clerk-stenographers. The radio recommendations naturally reached Washington in advance of my letter explaining the necessity for the personnel, and in reply to the radio only one clerk and a messenger were authorized. The messenger is of course necessary and should have been included in my original recommendations. At least one additional clerk-stenographer, however, will be necessary, and I recommend that Brink be authorized by radio to hire one additional clerk at a salary of $1200.

(4) Since the British Branch Intelligence Office in Hongkong is largely oriented on Japan, I feel that we should likewise have a Japan man in Hongkong (in addition to our China man stationed there). Major Joseph J. Twitty, C. E., a Japanese language graduate, is qualified and desires the detail. It is recommended that he be ordered to Washington for a short period of orientation and then sent to Hongkong. He should of course be accredited to Hongkong as an official observer.

(5) The transfer of Pape to Singapore will of course have some effect upon the Tokyo office. In case my recommendations concerning the establishment of a Secret Service organization in paragraph 4 above are not favorably considered, I recommend that Clear be sent to Tokyo as Assistant Military Attache. Otherwise, Tokyo can still carry on by utilizing the services of Major C. Stanton Babcock, Cavalry, who has just completed his formal language study, who is already an M. A. in name, and who is, in fact, at present actually working in the Tokyo office as Pape's assistant.

(6) Since temporary promotion for our observers and and attaches abroad is apparently out of the question, I recommend that we do what we can to increase their prestige by making such of them as are not at present, either GSC or Acting GSC. While this may seem somewhat inconsequential here in Washington, in my opinion it will definitely enhance their prestige abroad.

B. Within the Far Eastern Section

While the tentative allotment of Reserve and Civilian personnel is in general satisfactory, I consider it essential that we at once place a well qualified China language graduate (regular Army) in charge of the China desk, so that as the Reserve and Civilian personnel now being selected becomes available we will have someone already familiar with the China situation to direct their activities. While there are a number of China graduates on our books, I feel that, particularly in

view of the present aid to China pro[illegible] the possible [illegible]ration of a [illegible] military [illegible], we should have a [illegible] of air [illegible] set [illegible] the China Depot, Major [illegible] Travis [illegible] already been made available to us by virtue of his work with the C[illegible] Government. Moreover, and probably [illegible] valuable for the [illegible], Major Travis [illegible], has [illegible] joined the [illegible] Section. I recommend that Major Roberts be at once transferred to the Far Eastern Section to take over the China desk before he likewise will have spent so much time with [illegible] that it will be considered inadvisable to move him as a replacement for Roberts in the [illegible] Section. I desire to recommend Major Joseph K. Yarnell, [illegible], now on duty in the Office of [illegible] Information. Major Yarnell has been successive[illegible] in the Military Attache offices, also in direct charge of their Counter Intelligence Subsection, and is thus extremely well qualified for the [illegible] work. His tour in the Philippine Department will expire [illegible]. He desires the change, and I recommend that he be ordered at once to [illegible] of Air Force Intelligence, thus relieving Roberts for the China desk.

[illegible] Allowances

a. Quarters

I am informed by Lt. Col. Roberts of the Finance Section that steps have already been taken to equalize the allowances of our attaches abroad with those of the Navy. This is an important step that effective applies to attaches only and still leaves observers on the old $100 per month basis. I therefore recommend that the Finance Section arrange for additional allowances to be paid from contingent funds in the next fiscal year so that the total personal allowances be made as follows:

(1) Military Attache - Observer - $[illegible]
Air Observer - $[illegible]
Naval Observer - $[illegible]

(2) [illegible] - Naval Observer - Equalized with allowance of Assistant Military Attache, Army.

(3) Secret Service (if authorized) - $250

b. Travel

I recommend the following travel allowances be established for the next fiscal year:

- 5 -

(1) Thailand - $1500

(2) Singapore - (a) Observer - $[illegible]
(b) Air Observer - $3000
(c) Japan Observer - $[illegible]

(3) China - (a) Ma Ao, Chungking - $2500
(b) Ao Ma Ao, Chungking - $1000
(c) Ao Ma Ao (air), Chungking - $2000
(d) Ao Ma Ao Hongkong - $1000
(e) Ao Ma Ao, Tokio - $500
(f) Japan Observer, Hongkong - $1200

(4) Japan - (a) Ma Ao, Tokyo - $1000
(b) Ao Ma Ao, Tokyo - $500

L. [illegible]
Lt. Cole, G. S. C.
War Plans Section